Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 50
CIEAP/UAEM
Latin America: Toward an old and
decreasing population?
Juan Chackiel
Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía
Resumen
América Latina: ¿Hacia una población
decreciente y envejecida?
Así como en el siglo XX América Latina se
caracterizó principalmente por la transición de
la fecundidad y la mortalidad, el siglo XXI
quedará marcado por la desaceleración del
crecimiento y los cambios en la estructura por
edades de la población, tendentes a una
sociedad más envejecida. Se prevé que, a
mediados del presente siglo, la región tendrá un
crecimiento muy próximo a cero y un cuarto
de su población será de adultos mayores. Aquí
se analiza este escenario en el marco de la
coexistencia de países en distintas etapas de la
transición demográfica. Particularmente, se
enfatiza en ciertas características del
envejecimiento: mayor representación
femenina y de la población más anciana, así
como en las visiones optimistas y pesimistas
de la tendencia de la relación de dependencia
demográfica. De todas maneras, en muchos
países de transición reciente y acelerada
todavía habrá una importante demanda de
servicios para la población materno-infantil, a
la que se sumará la creciente población de
adultos mayores.
Abstract
As in the 20th century Latin America was
characterized mainly by the transition of the
fecundity and morbidity, the 21st century will
be characterized by growth’s deceleration and
the population’s change of age structure, both
tending to an older society. It is foreseen that,
by the middle of the current century, adult
population will have a growth very close to
zero and a quarter of its population will be of
older people. Here this stage is analyzed in the
framework of coexistence of countries in
different stages of the demographical
transition. Particularly, certain characteristics
of the aging are emphasized: larger feminine
and older population representation, as well as
the optimistic and pessimistic visions of the
tendency of the demographical dependence
relation. In any way, in many countries of
recent and accelerated transition there is still
an important demand of maternal-infantile
population services, this will be added to the
elder growing population.
Key words: demographic transition,
population’s growth, structure by age,
demographic aging, Latin America.
Palabras clave: transición demográfica,
crecimiento de la población, estructura por
edad, envejecimiento demográfico, América
Latina
Introduction
I
n the past years, the Latin American demographic dynamic was characterized
by an increasing growth of its population and its young age structure as a
consequence of the high fecundity and mortality rates. This created a hard
discussion since the so-called ‘demographic explosion’ and the high dependency
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Latin America: Toward an old and decreasing population? J. Chackiel
relation aftermath of an increasing growth of the infant population were
considered as negative issues for the yearned boost of the economic development
by some sectors.
Later, since the end of the 1960’s, the countries from the region began to
incorporate themselves to the demographic transition process; as a consequence,
the gradual, but sustained decrement of the population growth rate and the
emerging aging process has been observed. This has recently brought along a
new concern, perhaps nourished by the condition of the European countries
which are in a more advanced stage of the transition. Now, there are some who
are nervous about the image of the decreasing and aging population, with a strong
older adult social burden.
One of the demographic transitions’ expressions is the population’s aging
process, as a result of the descent in the mortality and fecundity rates. This
phenomenon is presented in two forms: on one hand, people live, in average, more
than before, and on the other hand, there is a change in the age structure mainly
characterized by the decrease in the proportion of children and the number of
people in advance ages. Although both approaches are linked one to another,
they present very different concepts. The first case refers to the extension of the
people’s life, which is related to their extended life expectancy, and the second
case corresponds to the changes affecting the population’s relative distribution
by age as a result of the mortality, fecundity and migrations trends.
Based on what has been expressed, the objective of this work is to analyze
the population’s growth trend and the age structure, particularly the one of the
aging process that, in a higher or lesser extent, the countries from the region are
experiencing.
Latin America: an accelerated demographic transition
The demographic trend experienced since the middle of the XVIII century by
now developed countries, was connected to the economic transformations linked
to the industrialization and the changes in the population’s life style. This process,
called demographic transition, was characterized by the change from high to low
levels, first on fecundity and then on mortality, so that a new phase with levels
in both variables. There is a wide literature regarding this concept, led in Europe
by Landry (1934), and by Notestein (1945) in the United States, followed by
Coale (1977) and Chesnais (1986), among many others.
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In the pre-transitional stage, of both fecundity and mortality, the population
growth rates were relatively low, and at a second stage there was an increment
of the latter due to the decrement of the mortality and the persistence of a high
fecundity. Later, after the descent of the mortality, there is a steeper drop in the
fecundity and, as a consequence, a reduction in the population’s growth rate.
Finally, a new equilibrium is reached, now with low mortality and fecundity and
also with a low population growth rate.
Even if it is possible to find some exceptions in this demographic behavior,1
that sometimes occur with some peculiarities, it is a practical concept for the
analysis of the recent demographic trends of the countries from the Latin
American region (Benítez, 1993; Chackiel and Martínez, 1993; Zavala de Cosío,
1992).
During the last century, the Latin American countries also experienced, in a
higher or lesser extent, this demographic transition process. However, there are
important differences regarding what is happening in the region in contrast with
what happened in developed countries. Among these differences can be
mentioned that in the Latin American countries in an advanced phase of this
transition, and those that are in the middle of the process, present changes in a
faster way whereas the developed countries took about two centuries to
complete this process, in the region this is taking just a few decades.
Another characteristic that makes them different is the fact that in the
developed countries the demographic transition was a product of the
industrialization, of the advancements in medicine and the change in the
population’s life style. Conversely, the process first linked to the increasing
economic growth and to the social transformations of the 1960’s and 1970’s in
our region can happen with certain independence from the recent economic
crises and even in population where poverty is steady, or even where it is even
increasing.
In a way, the developing countries can incorporate available technology
which can be appropriate and low cost for the mortality and birth control. By the
way, developed countries took long to generate this technology. Besides, the
current changes in Latin America take place in total different historic contexts,
and the factors that produce the drops of fecundity and mortality can be different
to those that occurred in, for example, Europe (Livi, 1993).
1
Many authors have questioned the fact that the demographic transition process is considered as a
theory and in several works there have been exceptions to this respect (Coale, 1977; Benítez, 1993).
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Latin America: Toward an old and decreasing population? J. Chackiel
Recently there has been a ‘second demographic transition’ since in the
developed countries changes, mainly on fecundity, are going further than it was
expected in the classic concept of demographic transition (García and Rojas,
2004; Van de Kaa, 1997). The concept of ‘second demographic transition’ has
been formulated taking into account modifications occurred in recent decades in
the families and nuptiality formation patterns, which has as a consequence the
decrease of fecundity to unforeseen levels (global fecundity rate lower than 1.5
children per woman). The changes experienced in these countries refer to the
increment of the age when people get married and the marriage dissolutions,
followed by the increment in the consensual unions and the procreation out of the
wedlock. These would be the causes for which fecundity dropped under the
replacement level (global fecundity rate of 2.1 children per woman)2 and the
negative natural growth rates already experienced by some European countries.
In Latin America there is not enough evidence of the existence of this latter
transition as proposed (García and Rojas, 2004). In this sense, for the analysis
of the demographic trends of the XX century is still appropriate to use as a
reference framework that provided by the traditional concept of transition.
The international awareness, which has been spread at international
conferences since 1974, about the population issues is something that has to be
taken into account to the context of the demographic trends of the developing
countries. In such requests the availability of common resources and aims is
approved, related to health, mortality and the reproductive rights that affect the
decision on the number of children the couples wish to have and, above all, the
creation of conditions for an easier access to the fecundity controlling means.
In the demographic transition process framework, throughout the XX
century3 the region moved from having a life expectancy rate at birth of 52 to 71
years and from a GFR of six to 2.7 children per woman, which led to a descent
in the annual average growth from 27 to 15 per thousand. In this way, the
prevailing high rates, mainly in the 1950’s and 1960’s, are those that led to the
fact that the population tripled, from 161 millions in 1950 to 513 in 2000. However,
these average figures are the result of very heterogeneous situations, which are
expressed in life expectancies at birth that at the end of the century (1995-2000)
varied between 57.2 (Haiti) and 77.3 (Costa Rica), GFRs between 1.6 (Cuba)
2
The global rate of 2.1 is considered symbolic because it constitutes the fecundity level that, if
maintained, only ensures the replacement of the population; in consequence, after certain time it will
produce a zero growth rate.
3
The demographic behavior is described after 1950 since that is the date from which there is data
available and systematic estimations for the countries, elaborated by the United Nations.
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and 5.0 (Guatemala) children per woman, and annual average growth rates
between 4.5 (Cuba) and 27.5 (Honduras) per thousand (Cepal/Celade, 2005).
At the beginning of the 1990’s, and as a part of the preparation of the 1994
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) of El Cairo,
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Ecla) presented
in several documents the typology of the countries from the region according to
the stage of the demographic transition there were at in the 1995-2000
quinquennium (Cepal/Celade, 1995a; 1995b). Next, the countries are located in
the four stages that can be identified in this process4, for three times of the last
century’s second half:
1950-1955 quinquennium
Incipient transition: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Dominican Republic and Venezuela (135.8 million of people in total, 84.3
percent of the total population of the region).
Moderate transition: none.
Full transition: Argentina and Cuba (23 millions, 14.3 percent of the total
population of the region).
Advanced transition: Uruguay (2.2 millions, 1.4 percent of the total population
of the region).
1985-1990 quinquennium
Incipient transition: Bolivia and Haiti (13.6 millions, 3.1 percent of the total
population of the region).
Moderate transition: Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay (20.8
millions, 4.8 percent of the total population of the region).
Full transition: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico,
Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic and Venezuela (338.5 millions, 78.4 percent
of the total population of the region).
4
The location of each country is based on the values of the birth and mortality rates, according to the
following criterion: incipient transition, high birth rate (32 to 45 per thousand) and high mortality
rate (more than 11 per thousand); moderate transition and moderate mortality rate (seven to 11 per
thousand); full transition, moderate birth rate (24 to 32 per thousand) and moderate and low mortality
rate (four to seven per thousand); advanced transition, low birth rate (10 to 24 per thousand) and
moderate and low mortality rate.
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Advanced transition: Argentina, Chile, Cuba and Uruguay (59.4 millions, 13.7
percent of the total population of the region).
1995-2000 quinquennium
Incipient transition: Haiti (8.4 millions, 1.6 percent of the total population of the
region).
Moderate transition: Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua (31.1
millions, 6.1 percent of the total population of the region).
Full transition: Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Dominican Republic and Venezuela (226.8 millions, 44.3 percent of the
total population of the region).
Advanced transition: Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Cuba and Uruguay
(245.7 millions, 48 percent of the total population of the region).
In 1985-1990 an important modification in the demographic panorama of the
region is already visible, since with the exception of Uruguay, Argentina, and to
a certain extent, Cuba, in 1950 all the other countries were at an initial stage of
the transition. Conversely, at the end of the 1980’s, most of the countries were
in full demographic transition. Later, in just one decade, from 1995-1990 to 19952000, there are important changes, considering that the evolutions of the
demographic variables are long-term phenomena in general.
In this period, among other changes, there are two countries that have already
passed from the full transition stage to the advanced transition stage; Costa Rica
and Brazil,5 which represents one third of the region’s inhabitants. This indicated
that, in terms of population, the modification of the panorama is still larger.
Whereas in 1990 the population of the region belonging to the countries in
advanced transition was of 59 millions (14 percent), in 2000 it is of 246 millions
(48 percent), which means that it was four-folded in a 10-year period.6
Given the own delimitation of every typology, the changes that occur in the
interior of each group are hidden, changes that, for example stop at the threshold
of moving from the advanced transition to countries of full transition. These are
the cases of Panama, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Dominican Republic,
which have birth rates close to the limit of both categories (Cepal/Celade, 2005).
5
Brazil would have an advanced transition, mainly due to the changes in its fecundity because its
mortality is relatively higher.
6
It is fourfold, mainly because Brazil’s change from full to advanced transition.
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Within each category there is a certain degree of heterogeneity that is evident
in the values of the countries’ demographic parameters (Chackiel, 2004). These
differences would be more significant in the advanced transition group, the one
that includes countries which their recent population growth rates, for example,
are between five and 24 per thousand.7 Besides, in the same group are, for
example Uruguay and Argentina, whose demographic transition begins in the
beginning of the XX century, and some other that have had changes concentrated
in the last 30 or 40 years.
The international migrations are also a component of the demographic
change, but their volumes and trends are less predictable and do not follow an
easily to determine pattern. That it is why this component is not generally taken
into account in the demographic transition proposals, but without a doubt it has
to be considered for the analysis of the demographic trends of the Latin
American countries. For example, the migratory movements could explain some
irregularities in the population’s growth rate and the age structure, mainly in the
small countries where they acquire a relatively higher importance. Moreover,
they can also present an indirect impact through the influence they have on what
is happening with the fecundity and mortality trends (Livi, 1993).
In Table 1 are shown some of the demographic indicators of countries chosen
according to the different stage in the demographic transition process. Without
a doubt, regarding the future are hypotheses that are constantly revised
whenever there is new information (Cepal/Celade, 2005, United Nations, 2005).
Also in the Table 1 the mortality and fecundity rates can be observed and, with
certain gap, also the consequences about the population’s growth and its
structure by ages. As the countries advance in the transition, there is a
contraction of the percentage of children and a gradual increment in the
percentage of old adults.
7
The growth rate of five per thousand corresponds to Cuba and the 24 per thousand to Costa Rica.
The latter is relatively high because the very low mortality this country has reached and the high crude
birth rate, a as product of its young structure by ages.
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TABLE 1
GLOBAL FECUNDITY RATE, LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, ANNUAL GROWTH
RATE MEAN AND PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION FROM 0 TO 14 YEARS OF
AGE, AND 60 AND MORE, FOR SELECTED YEARS AND COUNTRIES
1950
Demographic indicators
Latin America and the Caribbean
Global fecundity rate
1970
2000
2010
2025
2050
5.9
5.3
2.7
2.3
2.0
1.9
Life expectancy at birth
51.8
60.2
71.5
74.0
76.9
79.6
Annual growth rate mean (per thousand)
27.0
25.5
15.3
12.7
8.6
2.8
Percentage of population from 0 to 14 years of age
40.0
42.4
32.1
28.2
23.4
18.2
6.0
6.4
8.1
9.7
13.6
20.3
Percentage of population from 60 and more years of
age
Guatemala (moderate demographic transition)
Global fecundity rate
7.0
6.3
4.8
3.9
2.8
1.9
Life expectancy at birth
42.0
52.0
67.6
70.8
74.1
77.9
Annual growth rate mean (per thousand)
28.0
27.0
23.9
24.2
18.9
9.5
Percentage of population from 0 to 14 years of age
44.6
44.6
44.1
41.6
34.4
22.6
4.2
4.4
5.9
6.5
7.2
13.0
Percentage of population from 60 and more years of
age
Ecuador (full demographic transition)
Global fecundity rate
6.7
6.3
3.0
2.5
2.1
1.9
Life expectancy at birth
48.4
57.8
73.3
75.4
77.6
80.0
Annual growth rate mean (per thousand)
26.2
29.5
14.8
13.9
10.3
4.1
Percentage of population from 0 to 14 years of age
39.5
44.4
34.5
30.3
24.5
18.5
8.1
6.3
7.4
9.2
13.2
21.9
Percentage of population from 60 and more years of
age
Mexico (demographic transition between full and
advanced)
Global fecundity rate
6.9
6.7
2.6
2.1
1.9
1.9
Life expectancy at birth
50.7
61.5
74.2
76.7
79.2
81.1
Annual growth rate mean (per thousand)
26.9
31.8
14.5
10.6
6.8
0.4
Percentage of population from 0 to 14 years of age
42.0
46.5
33.7
28.0
22.0
17.0
7.1
6.1
6.9
8.9
14.2
27.4
Percentage of population from 60 and more years of
age
Continues
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TABLE 1
GLOBAL FECUNDITY RATE, LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, ANNUAL GROWTH
RATE MEAN AND PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION FROM 0 TO 14 YEARS OF
AGE, AND 60 AND MORE, FOR SELECTED YEARS AND COUNTRIES
(CONTINUE)
Demographic indicators
1950
1970
2000
2010
2025
2050
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina (Advanced old demographic transition)
Global fecundity rate
3.2
3.1
2.5
2.2
2.0
1.9
Life expectancy at birth
62.7
66.7
73.8
75.7
78.1
80.7
Annual growth rate mean (per thousand)
19.7
15.6
10.4
9.4
6.4
2.5
Percentage of population from 0 to 14 years of age
30.5
29.4
28.0
25.1
22.0
17.8
7.0
10.7
13.3
14.5
16.7
24.3
Percentage of population of 60 and more years of
age
Cuba (very advanced demographic transition)
Global fecundity rate
4.1
3.9
1.6
1.6
1.7
1.8
Life expectancy at birth
59.5
69.8
76.7
79.0
81.0
82.4
Annual growth rate mean (per thousand)
18.5
17.9
3.6
1.6
-0.1
-6.0
Percentage of population from 0 to 14 years of age
35.8
37.0
21.2
17.6
15.3
14.2
7.3
9.5
13.7
17.4
25.0
33.6
Percentage of population of 60 and more years of
age
Source: Cepal/Celade, 2005, and United Nations, 2005.
The population’s growth trend
Latin America, in average, has a decreasing trend in its population’s annual
average growth rate, which is the result of the changes in the mortality and
fundamentally in the fecundity since the mid 1960’s. In the five-year period from
1960-1965, it would have reached its maximum value (20 per thousand), as
product of the low mortality stressed in the post-war period and of an elevated,
and sustained, fecundity. Later, from that moment on, a drop in the fecundity
starts, which will lead to a growth rate of 16 per thousand at the end of the 1990’s
(Cepal/Celade, 2005).
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Latin America: Toward an old and decreasing population? J. Chackiel
Whereas the global fecundity rate of the region in the last 40 years of the last
century is reduced in 55 percent, the growth rate does it less than proportionally,
in 42 percent. This is related to the called growth potential of the population’s
structure by ages, that, since they are relatively young, it has an important
contingent of women in childbearing ages.8
The Latin America’s growth rate in the 1960’s was the highest of the world;
however, at the end of the last century it was already in the average of the
developing regions, being overcome by the African continent (United Nations,
2005). Anyway, due to its higher fecundity and the mentioned high potential of
its structure by age, Latin America’s population growth is still high if compared
to developed countries, mainly European countries, which have already zero,
even negative rates.
The developed countries, mainly those from Europe, in the 1970’s already
presented replacement fecundity, and it took 30 years for that to become a zero
population’s growth rate. For Latin America, in average, it is foreseen a
replacement fecundity for the 2020-2025 quinquennium, and there will not have
zero population growth rates yet in 2050, final year of the available projections
(Cepal/Celade, 2005).
In Graphic 1 is presented the trajectory of the growth rate for selected
countries of the region in order to appreciate the different change patterns.
Before the decrement of the growth rate, in several countries, among them
Mexico, can be seen an increment of it, which is the result of the drop in mortality
and of a still high fecundity, and in some cases with slight increments (Cepal/
Celade, 2005).
Haiti, is the only country that is currently in an incipient stage of its
demographic transition due to its high mortality rate and also because of the large
number of emigrants it presents a lower growth rate (18 per thousand in 19952000) in comparison to other countries that have a similar global fecundity rate
(Cepal/Celade, 2005).
The countries with moderate transition, represented in the Graphic by
Honduras, still do not present a relevant decrement in their population’s growth
rates because they, in general, maintain values close to 30 per thousand in recent
years.
In the countries in full demographic transition, the descent in the population’s
growth is more marked. Many of these countries, that in the 1960’s had growth
8
The elevated number of women in childbearing ages is product of the high levels of fecundity of the
region in previous decades.
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rates of or close to 30 per thousand, in recent years they reach rates of around
20 per thousand annually (between 16 and 26 per thousand). This is the case of
Mexico and Ecuador in Graphic 1.
In the group of countries in advanced transition there is great heterogeneity
of behaviors. On one hand there are Costa Rica (24 per thousand in 1995-2000)
and Panama (20 per thousand) with high rates of population increment because
their high growth potential, their low mortality and, in the case of Costa Rica, its
positive migratory balance.9 Brazil (13 per thousand) which trajectory is similar
to the previous cases is different from them because its inferior fecundity global
rate, as well as its elevated mortality rate. Argentina and Chile, with a close
growth rate in 1995-2000 (13 per thousand), follow a very similar trajectory since
1970-1975. The former has a lower growth in the previous quinquenniums, this
is because its well-known low fecundity since the beginning of the XX century.
Finally, in a very advanced transition we find Cuba and Uruguay, which currently
have growth rates inferior to one percent. Uruguay, with low growth rates, as
well as Argentina because of the early descent of the fecundity, is also affected
by the large emigration for the last three decades.
GRAPHIC 1
LATIN AMERICA: ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH RATE MEAN
40
Argentina
35
Cuba
México
Rates per thousand
30
Ecuador
25
Honduras
20
15
10
5
0
1950-
-51955
19601965
19701975
19801985
19901995
20002005
20102015
20202025
20302035
-10
Source: Cepal/Celade, 2005.
9
It refers to the migration of Nicaraguan people to Costa Rica from the 1970’s.
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Latin America: Toward an old and decreasing population? J. Chackiel
Cuba has had for more than two decades a fecundity rate under the
replacement level, and it is also affected by a negative migratory balance.
Nonetheless, due its growth potential, it has not reached a zero growth rate; this
is expected to be reached in the next 20 or 35 years (Graphic 1).
The future population growth perspectives are fundamentally predetermined
by the hypotheses formulated for the behavior of the fecundity global rate. As
the recent projections from the United Nations (2005) are already considering
a trend toward a fecundity rate under replacement level (GFR of 1.85 children),
this entails that, sooner or later, negative growth rates will be reached. In Graphic
1 it can be seen that, with the exception of Cuba, that has a fecundity rate under
replacement levels, the rest of the countries will reach a negative growth after
year 2050.
The population’s growth by ages
If the trend of the population’s growth rate national mean is observed in isolation,
the important differences produced by the growth rates by age groups would be
out of sight. From the low fecundity, generally produced in the middle of the
1960’s, there are strong differences in the increment of the number of children,
of the population in active ages and of the people in advanced age. In Graphic
2 this fact can be exemplified with three countries: Honduras, Mexico and Brazil.
In Brazil, where the changes in fecundity began before than in Honduras,
there was a convergence of the population’s growth rate of the three age groups
considered in the 1965-1970 quinquennium, in an approximate value of 30 per
thousand annually. From that point a steep decrement of the children’s growth
rate began, which became negative before 2000. Conversely, the old adult
population group’s growth rate increased even more; according to the projections
it will reach a maximum of 40 per thousand, then it will begin its descent. The
population’s growth rate of the group between 15 and 59 years of age presents
a behavior between that of the children’s group and the group of the old adults,
and it will become negative between 2035 and 2040.
For Honduras, that begins this process late (the convergence is produced in
the 1975-1980 quinquennium), and it is expected that the children’s growth rate
will be negative close to year 2030, whereas by that time, the old adult population
will exceed 40 per thousand of annual average growth rate.
In the case of Mexico, even if it presents a similar trend as the other countries,
a very particular behavior in the descent of the old adult growth rate curve
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between 1950 and 1975 can be noticed (Graphic 2c). This descent, that implies
certain delay in the intensity of aging, would probably be due to the effects the
mortality increment of 1910 would have had on the population’s dynamic, caused
by the Mexican Revolution, as well as the presence of some contagious diseases
(Secretaría de Gobernación/Consejo Nacional de Población, 1993).
These dissimilar growth rates between the analyzed age intervals will bring
as a consequence a strong impact in the structure by ages, which is in the root
of the aging process analyzed in the following section.
The evolution of the structure by age:
the population’s aging
The relative distribution of the population by age, because it is the main
consequence of the levels and trends of the fecundity and the mortality, cannot
be separated from the transition stage the countries are in. As the descents of
mortality and mainly of the fecundity continue, there is a gradual aging process.
The aging process is corroborated when considering the different growth
rates by the groups of age analyzed in the previous section (Graphic 2). Due to
this fact, the total of the population of 60 years and more in Latin America
increased in the 1990’s to 10 million people, whereas the population under 15
years of age increased in approximately six millions. This is diametrically
opposed to what happened in 1960 when the children’s population increased in
28 millions and the population of old adults increased in less than five millions
(Chackiel, 2000). This means that the structure of the society demands is
changing; now increasing more than related to the old adult and less than
correspondent to the children. This implies the need of restructuring, for example,
the health services in function of the presence of more requirements from the old
adults.
As it happens with the other aspects, in the region there is an important
heterogeneity regarding the distribution of the population by age. The countries
with an incipient and moderate demographic transition have, in general, a young
population, represented by a wide-based population pyramid for to the high
percentage of the infant population (42 percent of children under 15 years of
age).
This is the case of most Latin American countries in the 1950’s and 1960’s,
and still in our days, of those countries that are in the mentioned transition stagesthis can be seen in the Graphic 3, for the selected countries of the region.
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Latin America: Toward an old and decreasing population? J. Chackiel
GRAPHIC 2A
BRAZIL. GROWTH RATE BY AGE GROUPS
50
Growth rate (by thousand)
40
30
0 - 14
20
15 - 59
10
60 and
older
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
0
-10
GRAPHIC 2B
HONDURAS. GROWTH RATE BY AGE GROUPS
50
30
0 - 14
20
15 - 59
60 and older
10
37
2040
2045
2030
2035
2020
2025
2015
2005
2010
1990
1995
2000
1985
1970
1975
1980
1960
1965
-10
1955
0
1950
Growth rate by thousand
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GRAPHIC 2C
MEXICO. GROWTH RATE BY AGE GROUPS
50
30
20
0 - 14
15 - 59
60 and older
10
40
20
20
30
20
20
10
20
00
20
19
90
60
80
19
-10
19
70
19
50
0
19
Growth rate by thousand
40
-20
Source: Cepal/Celade, and current estimations and projections.
At the fist stages of the demographic transition process there is even a slight
or moderate rejuvenation of the population, product of a more marked drop of
mortality, mainly the drop of the infant mortality rate (Chesnais, 1990). This fact
has as a consequence a higher survival of children, which produces an effect
similar to the increment of the fecundity rates, this is, a higher proportion of the
group from zero to four years of age. Besides, added to this drop of the infant
mortality there is a moderate increment of the fecundity that took place in the
1950’s and 1960’s as a consequence of the improvements in the population’s
health condition, of the very general mortality and of the increments in the
nuptiality rates10 (Chackiel, 2004). The rejuvenation of the population took place
in all the countries of the region —with the exception of Uruguay and
Argentina—. For example, in Mexico, between 1950 and 1965, the percentage
of children of less than 15 years of age changes from 42 to 46 percent (Chackiel,
2004).
10
This would be coherent with the increments in the population’s growth rate in those years, which
was analyzed in the previous section.
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Latin America: Toward an old and decreasing population? J. Chackiel
From the beginning of the decrement of the fecundity rates, generally in the
middle of the 1960’s, the gradual aging process begins. As it was already
mentioned, this process is produced by the growth rate differenced by age, which
shows a marked drop in the children’s rates and an increment of the old adults
growth rate (Graphic 2).
The countries in full demographic transition already show a lower percentage
of people under 15 years of age, although it is still around 35 percent due to the
high proportion of women in reproductive ages (the case of Mexico in Graphic
3). Because of the concentration in the percentage of children, in this stage there
is a change in the population pyramid, called ‘‘aging by the base’’ (Chesnais,
1990).
At an advanced stage of the demographic transition, mainly on those
countries that have had important decrements in the fecundity rates in a short
period of time, there is a bulge in the central ages of the population’s pyramid,
where the active population is located. In these countries, for example, Brazil, the
proportion of people under 15 years of age in recent years is close or inferior to
30 percent, and the population of 15 to 59 years of age, around 60 percent
(Chackiel, 2004). These changes have an important incidence in the dependence
relation and in the challenges of the labor market, as it will be commented further
ahead. Chesnais (1990) calls this phase of the change process in the age
structure ‘‘aging by the centre’’.
The countries that have population in the eldest ages are Uruguay (17 percent
of people over 60 years of age), Argentina, (13 percent) and Cuba (14 percent).
This happens in the first two because they were exposed to a low fecundity and
mortality for a long period. For Cuba, to set an example, its extremely low
fecundity rate, which has been sustained for 25 years, as well as its high life
expectancy at birth, is having great influence. Even when this is happening, there
is a large distance between what is taking place in the developed countries, that
for year 2000 already have more than 20 percent of the population of 60 years
of age and more.11 These developed countries would be, in what Chesnais (1990)
calls ‘‘aging by the cusp’’ stage.
11
For example, 21 percent of France’s population is 60 years of age and older; 22 percent of Sweden’s,
and 23 percent in Japan. These countries are characterized by a global fecundity rate far below the
replacement level (around 1.5) and a life expectancy at birth of approximately 80 years of age (United
Nations, 2005).
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40
Guatemala
México
Cuba
1950
2000
2050
1950
2000
2050
1950
2000
2050
1950
2000
2050
0
4.2
7.0
7.3
7.1
6.9
5.9
10
15.2
13.3
13.7
13.0
20
17.9
17.5
21.2
25.1
24.3
22.6
30
27.7
33.6
33.1
35.8
per hundr ed
30.5
Source: Cepal/Celade, and current estimations and projections.
Argentina
40
42.0
44.6
44.1
50
51.3
50.9
51.2
50.0
59.9
60
59.0
57.9
56.9
57.4
62.4
65.1
64.5
70
GRAPHIC 3
LATIN AMERICA: STRUCTURE BY LARGE AGE GROUPS. SELECTED COUNTRIES. 1950 TO 2000
0-14
15-59
60and older
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Even if the aging process can be perceived analyzing the percentages of the
population at different ages, a more sensitive indicator is the called aging
indicator, which expresses the number of old adults per every 100 children12
(Graphic 4).
Without a doubt, Cuba’s is the most spectacular case, where in 1950 there
were 20 old adults per every 100 children, then this figure changes to 65 for every
100 children in year 2000, exceeding the figures of Argentina, which continues
its aging process at a very sustained, but gradual pace. On the other hand, in
Mexico and Ecuador, countries that have a recent full transition, the index moves
from 14 old adults per every 100 children in 1965 to 20 adults per every 100
children in year 2000.
Old people’s aging
The population of 60 years and more includes the old active adults who have a
social participation more or less intense and, therefore, they can make important
contributions to the society. But also within this group are the elderly people, from
which a large number have limited physical or mental capabilities and, therefore,
they require special attention in regards to their health, as well as a dignifying life
and death. This has led to consider the existence of a ‘third age’, from 60 to 74
years of age, and a ‘fourth age’, from 75 and more.
Due to the important increments in the life expectancy to 60 years, there is
also a variation in the production of the third and fourth ages. It can be said that
there is an aging in the interior of the old adult’s population. The 75 and more
years of age group, who in 1970 represented approximately 17 percent of the
people in advanced ages in Latin America, in year 2000 it constitutes almost one
fourth of that population. Now, in the countries that are in the first stages of the
demographic transition, such as Guatemala, this percentage is of 20 percent,
whereas in the countries with older population, such as Argentina and Cuba, this
sector is close to the 30 percent (Table 2).
The increasing proportion of old people is of a great importance for the social
policies destined to the population in advanced ages. Whereas it is foreseen a
series of measurements to meet the demands of the old adults regarding the work
conditions and the social participation, the needs from the most aged population
should not be forgotten.
12
The older adult population (60 years of age and older) and the children (0 to 14 years of age) quotient
are estimated by one hundred.
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October/December 2006
42
50
19
0
50
100
150
200
60
19
70
19
80
19
90
19
00
20
10
20
Source: Cepal/Celade, and current estimations and projections.
Index (by hundred)
250
20
20
30
20
40
20
50
20
GRAPHIC 4
AGING INDEX IN SELECTED COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA
H onduras
Ecuador
México
Argentina
C uba
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In particular, to satisfy the adequate housing arrangements, health conditions,
caregiving and affective support. Even if a number of these necessities can be
complied by the families; this is made difficult by the smaller number of children
or grandchildren due to the drop in the fecundity, and also because of the
economic resources problems to face the caregiving of the grandparents and
great-grandparents. The lack of appropriate attention to these demands leads to
the fact that these people live longer, but with a poor quality of life.
Feminization of aging
The more extended life expectancy of women in comparison to men has as a
consequence a higher proportion of feminine population in advanced ages.
Besides, given the differences favoring women in the life expectancy are
increasing, the trend of aging presents an increasing number of women. In
average, Latin American women lived 3.5 years more than men in the last
century, and this difference was practically doubled in 50 years (6.5 years for the
1995-2000 quinquennium). If the life expectancy at 60 years is considered, the
over-life of the feminine population is of between three and four years, which is
not little if it is considered that at that age the average of life is of 18 years
(Chackiel, 2000 and Chackiel, 2004).
In Table 3 are presented, for the 1950-2000 period, the data correspondent
to the masculinity index of the total population and of advanced ages in the
selected countries. In every case, and in the years analyzed, it can be observed
a low masculinity index which confirms the higher presence of women and,
besides that; this masculinity decreases as a more advanced age is considered.
For example, in Brazil, whereas for the 60 to 74 years of age group the index is
84 men per every 100 women in year 2000, for the following group the indicator
for the same year is 70 men per every 100 men.
On the other hand, the general trend is of a lower masculinity rate as more
advanced in their demographic transition countries are taken into account or even
within the same country as the process advances. According to Villa and
Rivadeneira (2000), the exceptions to this behavior are linked to the migratory
movements that, in some cases, alter the expected behavior. This could explain
the high masculinity indexes observed in Argentina in 1950.
Women live longer than men, but in general their quality of life is seriously
compromised because most of the cases are widows who have to face on their
own their last years on the planet.
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TABLE 2
PERCETAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE THIRD AND FOURTH AGES IN RESPECT
TO THE TOTAL OF OLDER ADULTS. SELECTED COUNTRIES 1950-2000
Country
Year
60 and older
Distribution
60-74
75 and older
Argentina
1950
1975
2000
100.0
100.0
100.0
84.2
79.8
72.1
15.8
20.2
27.9
Cuba
1950
1975
2000
100.0
100.0
100.0
79.7
79.7
70.9
20.3
20.3
29.1
Mexico
1950
1975
2000
100.0
100.0
100.0
82.0
73.0
75.0
18.0
27.0
25.0
Ecuador
1950
1975
2000
100.0
100.0
100.0
82.0
78.1
74.9
18.0
21.9
25.1
Guatemala
1950
1975
2000
100.0
100.0
100.0
84.6
80.7
78.8
15.4
19.3
21.2
Source: Cepal/Celade. Current population estimations.
This situation is aggravated because in many cases they do not have the
necessary income to afford the essential expenses of health services and
personal attention. To this is added the lack of affective attention since they do
not have a couple to accompany them, this fact is less frequent among men, for
whom, due to cultural reasons, is easier to keep on their lives with a much younger
woman.
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Latin America: Toward an old and decreasing population? J. Chackiel
The demographic bonus: a favorable dependency relation?
The population’s age structure change process has an important effect from the
social and economic point of view as it brings along a modification regarding the
importance of the ages integrated by the population potentially passive, in relation
to the population belonging to ages considered as potentially active or productive.
In general, it is considered positive for a society that the called demographic
dependency relation13 is low because this means that there are proportionally less
people who constitute a burden that has to be relieved by the population in active
ages.
In the beginning of the demographic transition, the dependency relation is high
due to the rising percentage of children. In Graphic 5 it can be observed that its
value in Guatemala, throughout the second half of the last century, it is
approximately of 100 potentially passive people per every 100 in active ages.
Similar and even higher values can be observed for Mexico and Ecuador until
1980 and 1975, respectively. However, Argentina, which has a population with
a smaller proportion of children in that period, presents a relation of 70 per every
100 people. But something worth observing in this Graphic is the countries’ trend
to the decrement of the dependency relation to values under 60 per 100. This fact
would already be occurring in some countries in the most advanced stage of the
transition (for example, Cuba) and it is foreseen that the same will happen in the
rest of the countries. Mexico stands out because the speed and intensity of the
descent of its dependency relation, which would be very close to 60 per every
100.
This drop in the dependency relation, which lasts for several decades, has
been called «demographic bonus» or «demographic opportunity» as it implies that
the society can dispose savings that can be invested in productive accounts or
to be reassigned to social benefits that until now are not easily met. As the saving
would come from the less pressure of the children’s demands, as its population
is practically in stagnation, it is proposed a rationalization of the social expense,
mainly to focus on the quality of education and reforms to the health sector to
meet the changes in the epidemiologic profile. This is seen as an opportunity to
make some reforms and investments that would prepare the countries for the
13
The demographic dependency relation is defined as the quotient between the population in passive
age (0 to 14 years of age plus the population of 60 years of age and more), in respect to the population
in age considered as active (15-50 years). The numerator components can be split and then there is
the dependency relation of children and the dependency relation of the old adults’ population.
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times when the dependency relation turns to high levels, this time with the load
of the advanced age population.
Even if the presence of descents in the dependency relations marks a positive
fact, there are certain doubts that an excessively optimistic posture is taken
(Chackiel, 2000).
One of the important considerations is that in order to be a dependency
relation effectively favorable, the demand for employments for an increasing
active population should be met. A country with an important unoccupied
population would lead to a real high dependency relation14 and it would be
worthless to have a favorable demographic structure. In this sense, regardless
it is an important element; it would seem that its use would be depending on the
markets capacity to absorb the rising demand for employments. Brazil, for
example, in 1996 would have a higher real dependency relation in comparison to
the demographic dependency since the former would be of 66 per every 100,
whereas the latter would be of 129 per every 10015 (Chackiel, 2000).
Another element to be considered is what is happening to the interior of the
countries where the demographic bonus is currently benefiting the medium and
high class households, which are the ones that have presented a higher
decrement in their fecundity rates. Anyhow, the bonus for the poorest sectors
will be reached as the new demographic behaviors are incorporated. In the
meantime, for those being benefited, redistribution of income policies will have
to be imposed, policies that ensure that all the society will benefit from the
liberation of resources that implies the low dependency relation. Still with Brazil,
the demographic dependency relation in 1996 for the ‘‘non-poor’’ would be of
55.3 per every 100, whereas for the ‘‘poor’’ would reach 90 per every 100. At
the same time, the real economic dependency relation would be, for the ‘‘nonpoor’’ of 106 per one hundred and for the ‘‘poor’’ of 185 per hundred (Chackiel,
2000).
Also it has to be taken into consideration the role that the change in the internal
composition of the demographic dependency relation plays in all this because it
is formed by the relation of children and older adults. As the fecundity descends
and the children’s growth became stagnant, the correspondent dependency
relation to the population from zero to 14 years of age turns lower (Table 4).
14
The quotient of the unemployed plus the non-active over the occupied of all ages is defined as the
‘real economic dependency relation’.
Data from Ecla Data Bank from the Pesquisa Nacional (National Inquest) by Amostra de Domicílio
(Pnad) 1996.
15
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Latin America: Toward an old and decreasing population? J. Chackiel
TABLE 3
MASCULINITY INDICES BY AGE GROUPS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES.
1950-2000
Year and age groups
Guatemala
1950
total
60 and over
60-74
75 and over
1975
total
60 and over
60-74
75 and over
2000
total
60 and over
60-74
75 and over
Masculinity indices
México
Brazil
Argentina
102.1
96.1
97.4
89.4
99.9
85.4
86.8
79.1
98.4
81.2
82.4
74.7
106.1
103.0
108.5
78.2
102.4
95.7
97.1
89.7
100.0
84.7
87.0
78.7
99.6
89.7
92.5
79.3
99.7
85.5
88.7
73.9
96.5
92.4
94.3
85.9
98.0
84.6
88.2
74.6
97.9
82.5
85.1
74.7
96.3
73.9
81.1
57.8
Source: Cepal/Celade. Current estimations.
There are doubts regarding the true existence of the demographic bonus, if
it is considered that even being a minor dependency relation would be formed by
a larger number of people in advanced ages. In this sense, it is argued that
probably the maintenance cost of an old person is a few times higher than that
of a child. This is clear in the health services sector as the affections of the elderly
are, generally, of a chronic nature, hence the diagnoses, procedures and
treatments of this population group are more expensive. To this is added the
increasing proportionality of people in the fourth age, for who it is necessary to
provide permanent care.
The latter leads to affirm that even if the dependent people would be less, it
would not necessarily be regarding the costs the society would have to provide
to ensure them a good quality of life and their development as an individual.
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GRAPHIC 5
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION OF TOTAL DEPENDENCY.
SELECTED COUNTRIES. 1950-2050
120
Relation by hundred
100
80
Argentina
Cuba
60
México
Ecuador
Guatemala
40
20
19
50
19
60
19
70
19
80
19
90
20
00
20
10
20
20
20
30
20
40
20
50
0
Source: Cepal/Celade. Current population estimations and projections.
XXI Century, aging in Latin America
As the XX century was marked by the demographic transition of Latin America,
the XXI century will be marked by the aging of its population. The rhythm of this
aging process will be important in the next decades, mainly because to the elderly
people population will integrate the numerous contingent of people who were
born in the 1950’s and 1960‘s. This fact, added to the increment of the life
expectancy, provides a clear explanation for the increment of the growth rates
of the population of 60 years and more observed in the section 2 (Graphic 2a and
2b).
During the second half of the last century, the number of people of 60 and
more years of age in the region was twofold every five lustrums, whereas in the
following 25 years it will increase two and a half times, then its growth intensity
will decrease. In absolute numbers, the population of old adults from year 2000
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Latin America: Toward an old and decreasing population? J. Chackiel
to 2025 will change from 41 millions to 98 millions. In percentage terms this
means that in the first quarter of the century people of more than 60 years of age
and more will be the 14 percent of the total population, and it is foreseen that in
year 2050 they will come to close one quarter of the population (23 percent).16
Whereas nowadays Uruguay, the most aged country in Latin America, has
17 percent of people of 60 years of age and more, Cuba, which will be most aged
country at the half of this century, will have the double, 34 percent of older adults
(Cepal/Celade, 2005). By then, most of the countries in incipient and moderate
transition would present a situation similar to that of Uruguay in the present times,
and the countries in full and advanced transition would have between 20 and 28
percent of people of 60 years of age and more. In order to measure the
importance of the change to come, consider that by year 2000 all the countries,
with the exception of Uruguay and Argentina, had between five and 10 percent
of people in those ages. This implies that in the next 50 years the old adults will
threefold their percentage of the total of the population.
However, it is worth mentioning that the most aged countries of the world, for
example France, Italy and Japan, currently have a proportion of people of 60
years of age and more close to the 25 percent, figure that Latin America will
reach in 50 years. Besides, there is no sign of a trend of the region’s situation
toward the approximation of that of the developed countries as the descent in the
fecundity rates of the latter is way below the replacement rate and the continuous
increment of the life expectancy will also experience a grater aging process. So,
the mentioned countries will have a population of old people close to 40 percent
of the total population by year 2050 (United Nations, 2005). This situation when
there is an inversion of the age pyramid, with a higher proportion of older people
than children, is called mushroom-like or macro-cephalic pyramids (Chesnais,
1990).
This scenario, already present in some other parts of the world, makes that
aging and its consequences become an increasing preoccupation in the whole
planet, and particularly in Latin America. In 1982 the first World Assembly on
Aging took place in Vienna, where the International Plan of Action on Aging was
elaborated, this plan was countersigned by the United Nations General Assembly.
This organism approved in 1991 the Principles of the United Nations in favor of
the aged people and declared 1999 as the international year of the older people.
16
These projections of population are done under the supposition that the fecundity of all the countries
will reach a rate under replacement level before 2050. The goal is a fecundity global rate of 1.85 children
per woman, except for some countries delayed in the transition.
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TABLE 4
RELATION OF TOTAL DEPENDENCY, OF CHILDREN AND OLDER ADULTS.
SELECTED COUNTRIES. 1950-2000
Country
Year
Total
Dependency relation
0-14 years
60 and older
Argentina
1950
1975
2000
60.2
68.4
69.6
48.9
49.2
47.0
11.3
19.2
22.6
Cuba
1950
1975
2000
75.8
89.5
53.6
62.9
70.7
32.6
12.8
18.7
21.0
Mexico
1950
1975
2000
96.3
109.9
68.3
82.4
98.0
56.7
13.9
11.9
11.6
Ecuador
1950
1975
2000
91.0
99.7
71.8
75.5
87.5
59.2
15.5
12.2
12.6
Guatemala
1950
1975
2000
95.4
97.4
99.9
87.1
88.5
88.1
8.3
8.9
11.8
Source: Cepal/Celade. Current population estimations.
The Program of Action approved by the Cairo ICPD (United Nations, 1995)
acknowledges this anxiety in the diagnosis of the demographic dynamic as well
as in the setting of objectives and measurement destined, among other things, to
create conditions that improve the quality of life, that enable the population to
carry an autonomous way of life, and to establish health attention systems,
economic and social security systems and social support systems for the elderly.
The evaluation of the Cairo Program of Action + 5 mentions the deficiencies of
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Latin America: Toward an old and decreasing population? J. Chackiel
services and policies to provide attention to the increasing population of elderly
people in the developing countries (United Nations, 1999).
In 2002 the World Assembly on Aging II, which approved the Madrid
International Plan of Action took place. ‘‘The objective of the Plan of Action
consists in guaranteeing that all the population groups can grow older safely and
in a dignifying way, and that the elderly people can continue participating in their
societies as citizens with full rights.’’ This declaration is considered as a
milestone in the treatment of aging throughout the world.
In November 2003 in Santiago de Chile took place the Inter-governmental
Regional Conference on Aging, when a regional strategy of implementation for
Latin America and the Caribbean of the Madrid International Plan of Action was
proposed and approved. In the regional strategy the priorities based on the
principles of the United Nations and framed on the commitments of the
Millennium Declaration (Cepal, 2004). Besides, general orientations that
fundament the proposed goals, objectives and actions are established.
In particular, among the orientations, it is established that:
The incorporation of the aging issue in the integral development and in the
public policies, with the consequential resignation of resources among the
generations, is part of the necessary adjustments to solve the problems of the
demographically more aged populations.
However, it is necessary to mention that for most of the region’s countries
the concern for the old people population is added to the pressure regarding the
maternal-infant attention. This due to the fact that even if the fecundity levels
have been decreasing in many countries, there is still an important number of
pregnancies and births from a still increasing number of women in childbearing
ages.
Conclusions
In the XX century Latin America has experienced an unprecedented demographic
change, fundamentally during the second half; this process still continues in the
beginning of the XXI century. To begin with, a reduction in the mortality that
began in the first half of the last century, which shows that a Latin American
person has in average a life expectancy of 71 years approximately, just about
twice the number of years they had 100 years ago, and 18 years more than in
1950. Later, the fecundity started to decrease, which in a few decades was
reduced to a half. The global fecundity rate in the 1950’s and 1960’s was of
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approximately six children per woman, whereas in 1995-2000 is somewhat half
that (2.7 children).
As a consequence of the changes in the fecundity and the mortality there is
a descent in the population’s annual average growth rate and a gradual aging of
the structure by ages, which will be more acute in the following decades. The
region, that 30 or 40 years ago was living what some qualified as demographic
explosion because it presented the highest growth rates observed in the world so
far (close to 30 per thousand), nowadays it has a more moderate rate; 16 per
thousand.
According to the location of the countries in the demographic transition
process, important differences can be noticed regarding the population’s growth
rate. In this way, the countries with an early transition, characterized by the
descent of the mortality and a high or moderate fecundity, still present high rates,
some of them similar to the regional rates in the 1960’s. The countries with recent
descents in their fecundity, due to the high growth potential of their young
structure by ages, still have a moderately high growth rate (close to 20 thousand).
The countries with advanced transition would present a very heterogeneous
situation since there are recent fecundity cases with steep descent, and some
other that already present a low fecundity since the first half of the XX century.
The case of Cuba must be considered as of very advanced transition because
its fecundity has been below replacement levels for 25 years; however, its
growth rate is still positive because its growth potential will not be turning
negative until 2025.
As a consequence that the fecundity projections, performed by Celade and
the United Nations Population Division, tend toward values below the replacement
level (GFR = 1.85 in general), the growth rates will seriously decrease in the
future. However, due to the population’s young structure by ages, with the
exception of Cuba, the countries from the region would not have a zero or
negative growth in the first half of the XXI century.
Due to the reduction of the fecundity and the extension of the people’s life
there is a very different trend from that of the population’s growth by age
structure. So, meanwhile the population under 15 years of age is drastically
reducing its increment and in many countries it is close to zero or it is already
negative, the population’s growth of people of 60 years of age and more gains
in the following years its historical maximum (close to 40 per thousand). The
latter is related to the fact that those who will reach the third age are the people
who were born five decades ago, when the fecundity was really high. On the
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Latin America: Toward an old and decreasing population? J. Chackiel
other hand, the growth of the population in active ages stays in an intermediate
value, beginning its descent several decades after the correspondent children’s
rates.
Such different growth rhythms among the age groups will have as a
consequence a strong impact in the structure by age of the population, which is
in the base of the aging process that is taking place in most of the region’s
countries.
In terms of the percentages of population in the large age groups, the situation
is heterogeneous among the countries, depending on the situation they are within
the demographic transition process. The countries with an incipient and moderate
transition currently have a high percentage of children, close to 40 percent,
whereas the proportion of the population of 60 years of age and older is of five
percent approximately. In the end are the countries with advanced transition,
where the population of under 15 years of age is 30 percent or less and the
percentage of old people, in general, over 10 percent. Uruguay, the most aged
country of Latin America has 17 percent of the population in the range of 60 years
and older. The aging process will be more marked in the following decades and
by the first half of this century, a fourth of the population will belong to the old
adults group.
In general, there is a pessimist standing regarding the change that is taking
place in the population’s age structure, which considers that with this change the
social burden will increase as it will try to provide the elderly with a healthy and
dignifying life. Before this standing, there has emerged a more optimistic vision
that considers that the demographic burden of a higher proportion of old adults
is compensated with the lower pressure of the children’s demographic burden.
So, the relation of the total demographic dependency (children plus the elderly)
during the next decades will tend to be lower, and later it will increase again. This
situation is known as the ‘demographic opportunity’, considering that the lesser
expenses in the upbringing and education of a smaller proportion of children will
enable reassigning the saved funds for the caregiving of the elderly and for
investments that will produce more development, so that the countries are better
prepared for the time when the dependency relation increases due to the
persistent aging process. However, there is the possibility of obtaining a benefit
from this ‘‘opportunity’’: the necessary capacity of the economy to create
productive employments, the higher costs of maintaining an old person in
comparison to the maintenance of a child, and the high dependency relation lived
in the poorest households.
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The truth is that the increment of the older adults’ proportion, and within this
group, the old people, with a higher presence of women, is an irreversible fact.
Before this, it is inevitable to create policies and programs to ensure a dignifying
retirement, a wide social participation and the offer of the necessary nursing and
affective cares for a dignifying death.
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