Master’s Thesis in Political Communication
Anti-what?
Hostility stances in the
speeches of European
right-wing populist
parties’ leaders.
by Andrea Masini
Student number: 10140700
Email: [email protected]
Date of completion: 28th June 2012
Thesis supervisor: Dr. Fadi Hirzalla
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Abstract
Hostility lies at the core of the ideology of European right-wing populist parties. In fact, they
are often generally described as “anti-something” parties. In my thesis, I will start from this
common consideration, with the final goal of determining what the word “something” of this
definition stands for. Through a qualitative content analysis of speeches of right-wing
populist parties’ leaders in Belgium (the Vlaams Belang), France (the Front National), Italy
(the Lega Nord) and the Netherlands (the Partij Voor de Vrijheid), I will shed light on the
similarities and differences amid European parties of this kind concerning hostility attitudes.
The results pinpoint the existence of three main objects against which hostility is expressed:
the European Union, immigration and the national political establishment. This common set
of hostility positions notwithstanding, a qualitative approach to the speeches gives support to
the hypothesis that there exist inter-parties differences with regard to the hostility expressed
by the leaders. In fact, on the one hand, different salience is given to the main hostility stances
within the speeches. On the other hand, the main hostility elements are articulated in different
subthemes, which vary from party to party. Finally, there exist hostility positions which are
peculiar just to one party.
Keywords: political speeches; right-wing populist parties; hostility; anti-immigration; antiestablishment; anti-Europe
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Introduction
In this thesis, I will conduct a cross-national comparative study of speeches of European rightwing populist parties’ leaders. The ultimate aim of the study is to examine similarities and
differences between parties, particularly with regard to the direction of the attitudes of
hostility which are entailed in the speeches and are core elements of these parties’ ideologies
(Betz, 1993). Therefore, I will aim at answering to the following research question:
RQ: “In which ways and against which objects are hostility stances expressed by European
right-wing populist parties?”
In order to meet this goal, I will carry out a qualitative content analysis of speeches of the
leaders of four right-wing populist parties from four European countries, namely the Italian
Lega Nord (LN, Northern League), the French Front National (FN, National Front), the
Vlaams Belang (VB, Flemish Interest) in Belgium and the Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV,
Party for Freedom) in the Netherlands.
Concerning the relevance of the study, I argue it has salient implications for research in
political communication in two aspects. Firstly, it will contribute to the academic discussion
about populist right-wing parties by shedding light on the differences amid parties’ ideologies
in four European countries. Through the constant comparative method (Boeijle, 2002) I will
first identify the objects of the attitudes of hostility in the speeches, thus contributing to
research about right-wing populist parties’ ideology construction. In doing so, I aim at moving
criticism towards a number of scholars who use a party family approach to investigate
extreme right-wing populist parties in Europe (Mair & Mudde, 1998; Mudde, 1996; Rydgren,
2008). In fact, I argue there is the need to contextualize the hostility attitudes of each party at
a national level.
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Secondly, I claim that this study will be relevant in that it focuses on the latent content of the
speeches, giving a deeper insight into the attitudes of hostility of right-wing populist parties.
Specifically, through a qualitative content analysis I will analyze how the manifest and latent
language is used to express hostility stances and to give salience to them. Actually, metaphors
and other figures of speech are often used by politicians in political communication, as a way
to help people to make sense out of the political sphere (Edelman, 1964).
In the next section, I will discuss relevant theories that form the theoretical background of the
thesis. In specific, I will review the literature about right-wing populist parties in Europe, with
particular focus on cross-national comparative studies, pinpointing the most frequent objects
and issues towards which the attitudes of hostility are expressed. In the third section, I will
identify the methodological choices that have been done. In the fourth section, I will present
the results of the study. Finally, in the conclusions, I will discuss the findings in light of the
research question. In this sense, I will point out the objects towards which right-wing populist
parties express hostility attitudes, and the ways in which hostility is communicated.
Theory
In this section I will review the existing literature that serves as a background for my thesis,
giving an overview of studies about European right-wing populist parties’ ideologies that
have been conducted both in socio-political and political communication research field. First
of all, I will outline the ideological characteristics of parties of this kind that emerge from
previous comparative studies. Then, I will point out two main approaches that have been
taken by scholars. Firstly, from a conceptual standpoint, these parties have been considered as
members of a party family, characterized by shared ideological characteristics. Secondly,
from a methodological point of view, the studies have been following a quantitative approach,
focusing on the parties’ electoral programs. The elucidation of each one of these research
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approaches will be followed by the discussion of its limitations. Finally, I will point out how
my study aims at solving these shortcomings by answering to the research question: “In which
ways and against which objects are hostility stances expressed by European right-wing
populist parties?”.
Right-wing populism is a hot topic in socio-political research. A number of scholars have
been investigating the implications of the rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe from
the end of last century (Ignazi, 1992; von Beyme, 1988). Comparative studies on right-wing
populist parties have been made both within a limited number of neighboring nations
(Anderson, 1996; Betz, 2002; Koopmans & Kriesi, 1997) and at European level (Fennema,
1997; Ignazi, 2006; Rydgren, 2008; van der Brug & Fennema, 2003). On the whole, the
results have given support to the rejection of the single-issue party hypothesis, pointing out
the existence of a more complex ideology within each party (Mudde, 1999).
Specifically, according to Betz (1993), right-wing populist parties’ ideologies focus on
hostility about social, economic and political issues. From a socio-economic perspective,
these parties reject a view of the society based on social equality, advocating for economic
systems that favor the individual (Betz, 1993). In this sense, existing literature has underlined
that right-wing populist parties have moved from ideological anti-communist positions
(derived from fascist movements) to economic anti-welfare state and anti-tax stances (Derks,
2006; Fennema, 1997; Linz, 1976; Swank & Betz, 2003). Furthermore, they typically
embrace xenophobia, in terms of hostility towards immigration and social integration of
marginalized groups (Betz, 1993, 2002; Fennema & Pollman, 1998; Rydgren, 2008). A study
conducted by Rydgren (2008) pointed out that there has been a development from traditional
positions of racism (based on a hierarchical conception of ethnicities) to stances that embrace
the doctrine of ethno-pluralism, according to which a multicultural society ultimately leads to
the destruction of national identities (Griffin, 2000; Minkenberg, 1997; Taguieff, 1988). On
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top of that, right-wing populist parties hold positions of hostility against the European Union
(Hainsworth, O’Brien & Mitchell, 2004; Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; van der Valk, 2003).
According to Netjes and Edward (2005), these parties play a key role in “framing and
mobilizing national identity against European integration” (Netjes & Edward, 2005, p.1).
By observing these similarities in terms of hostility positions, socio-political comparative
research on right-wing populist parties in Europe has mainly taken a party family approach,
considering these parties as an ideologically homogeneous block based on a common range of
hostility stances (Mudde, 1996). An approach of this kind has been taken by Betz and Johnson
(2004), who have observed a convergence of the electoral programs of European right-wing
populist parties on the so-called “cultural racism” (derived by the abovementioned ethnopluralistic doctrine), as well as on identitarian stances. Following the same approach, Rydgren
(2008) pointed out the rise of a party family of right-wing populist parties in Europe,
characterized by common xenophobic positions, as well as anti-EU and anti-tax stances
(Rydgren, 2008). Although the results of these studies are useful to outline a common set of
shared hostility stances, I argue that the party family approach may represent a limitation to
the analysis of right-wing populist parties in Europe.
Actually, the aim of a party family approach to the study of European right-wing populist
parties is that of identifying common ideological aspects between parties, namely in terms of
hostility positions. This may lead to a twofold overgeneralization. Firstly, this approach might
fail to point out inter-parties differences in terms of salience that is given by each party to the
different hostility stances. The studies that I mentioned above (Betz & Johnson, 2004; Mudde,
1996; Rydgren, 2008) have grouped together parties from different European countries in
accordance to a common set of ideological positions, without identifying differences between
parties based on the core hostility stances. Secondly, there may be an overgeneralization in
the sense that this approach might not be able to grasp the complexity of the shared hostility
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positions. For example, the xenophobic and anti-system stances identified by Rydgren (2005)
as ideological foundations of the European right-wing party family are actually articulated in
a different way from party to party, hence directed towards different objects.
As noted by Buijs and van Donselaar (1994), what seems to be a wave of these parties at a
European level, is in reality a rise of different parties with specific characteristics. In fact, on
the one hand, hostility positions are articulated in different subthemes. On the other hand,
there are inter-parties differences concerning the salience which is given to particular hostility
issues. For example, it has been pointed out that the PVV in the Netherlands and the VB in
Belgium give particular prominence to anti-Islamic positions (Bruinsma & de Blois, 2007),
whereas the LN in Italy is more focused on general anti-immigration stances. The FN gives
more salience to anti-European attitudes compared to other right-wing populist parties in
Europe, focusing on the hostility against the European monetary union (van der Brug &
Fennema, 2003). Moreover, a number of studies have shown that there exist hostility stances
that are peculiar just to one single party. For instance, the ideology of the LN entails a central
position of hostility against the inefficiency of the Italian centralized bureaucratic structure
(Betz, 1993; Giordano, 2000; Huysseune, 2003). This is a unique form of anti-system stance
in right-wing populist parties in Europe. Hence, these findings give support to the hypothesis
that there are differences between European right-wing populist parties with regard to the
ideology construction process.
Consequently, the analysis of the process of ideology construction becomes crucial to
understand the differences among parties’ ideologies. Research in political communication
has mainly taken a quantitative approach to analyze differences in these parties’ ideologies,
focusing on the manifest content of written documents such as party manifestos (Mair &
Mudde, 1998). According to Mair and Mudde (1998), the manifesto approach has mainly
been used in studies which aimed at observing the common ideological features of a party
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family, as an objective method to conduct a systematic comparative analysis. In this sense,
this approach has been taken by Betz (1994), Fennema (2005) and Rydgren (2008) to point
out the shared ideological characteristics of European right-wing populist parties.
The objectivity of the method notwithstanding, I argue that the manifesto approach may be a
limitation to conduct an in-depth analysis of the ideologies of right-wing populist parties. In
fact, the centrality of hostility positions (van der Brug & Fennema, 2003) justifies the choice
of a different approach than the manifesto one in order to analyze the process of ideology
construction. First of all, a different unit of analysis should be employed instead of the party
manifesto. In particular, I argue that the analysis of political speeches is more indicated to
shed light on differences in the ideology of right-wing populist parties. According to van Dijk,
“among the many forms of reproduction and interaction, discourse plays a prominent role as
the preferential site for the explicit, verbal formulation and the persuasive communication of
ideological propositions” (van Dijk, 1995, p.17). Moreover, a number of scholars state that
political speeches are used by right-wing populist parties’ leaders to institutionalize their
hostility attitudes towards certain objects, therefore creating new forms of political discourse
(Evans, 2005; Oesch, 2008; Rydgren, 2008). Thus, I argue that content analysis of political
speeches is crucial to understand in depth the hostility stances of right-wing populist party,
which lie at the core of their ideology (Ansell, 1997; Charteris-Black, 2006; Kopecky &
Mudde, 2002; Rydgren, 2008; Taggart, 1998; van der Valk, 2003; van Dijk, 1993).
Secondly, I argue that the analysis of the hostility positions has to take into account also the
latent meaning of the political language used in leaders’ speeches. A number of scholars have
observed that right-wing populist parties’ leaders are more likely to express hostility positions
through a rhetoric of exclusion, which is embedded not just in the manifest but also in the
latent language they use (Riggins, 1997; Stolcke, 1995; Wodak, 2003). According to a study
of populist discourse of Austrian party FPÖ by Wodak (2003), this rhetoric is mainly realized
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in “implicit or latent linguistic units or clauses (presuppositions, implicatures, inferences,
allusions; etc.)” (Wodak, 2003, p.134). As noted by other political communication scholars,
metaphors and other figures of speech are used to shape anti-immigrant and racist political
discourses (Santa Ana, 1999; Wodak, 2003), as well as anti-Islamic (Wodak, 2003) and antiEuropean discourses (Reid, 2004). Therefore, I argue that a qualitative approach is the most
suitable to answer to the research question of this study, because it allows to examine
meanings and themes that are embedded in the latent content of political speeches,
specifically in the symbolic language which is mainly used in the rhetoric of exclusion
(Bryman, 2004; Mayring, 2000; Ritsert, 1972). According to this, a quantitative manifesto
approach may fail to grasp the latent meaning of right-wing populist parties’ political
language. Hence, it might not be a suitable method for the in-depth analysis of a process of
ideology construction which focuses on hostility positions.
To sum it up, I argue that existing comparative studies on European right-wing populist
parties present a number of limitations. On the one hand, researchers in the socio-political
field have often taken a party family approach when analyzing these parties’ ideologies,
neglecting the differences between their ideologies in terms of hostility positions. On the
other hand, political communication scholars have mainly opted for a quantitative manifesto
approach in order to analyze right-wing populist parties’ ideology, disregarding the latent
meanings of the text that are often use to express hostility attitudes. Thus, in this study I aim
at solving these limitations by conducting a qualitative content analysis of speeches of the
leaders of four populist right-wing parties from four European countries, namely the Italian
Lega Nord, the French Front National, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium and the Partij Voor de
Vrijheid in the Netherlands. Through a qualitative approach to the analysis of the speeches I
will be able to grasp the latent meanings embedded in the political language, therefore getting
a deeper understanding of the hostility positions within parties’ ideologies. Therefore,
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answering to the research question: “In which ways and against which objects are hostility
stances expressed by European right-wing populist parties?”, I will contribute to draw an indepth, contextualized picture of right-wing populist parties’ ideologies in Europe, especially
concerning their hostility stances that lie at the core of their political principles.
Method
In the previous chapter, I justified the theoretical foundations of the adoption of a qualitative
content analysis of political speeches as research method. In this section, I will shed further
light on the methodological choices that I have made in order to conduct this study. Firstly, I
will clarify the choices regarding the sample characteristics. Secondly, I will explain in depth
the analysis technique that I will use. In specific, I will describe how the constant comparative
method (Boeije, 2002) will be used to analyze the sample, and ultimately answer to the
research question: “In which ways and against which objects are hostility stances expressed
by European right-wing populist parties?”.
Sample
In this section, I will explain the choices regarding the sample that I will analyze in my study.
First of all, the speeches were selected through purposive sampling. The first two choices
were done with regard to the countries and the parties to be selected. Then, I have chosen the
speeches that form the final sample of the study.
Concerning the country selection, I have decided to consider France, Italy, the Netherlands
and Belgium. The choice has been led by three main reasons. Firstly, as these countries are
members of the ‘Original 5’ EU founding members, it is likely that right-wing populist parties
have developed an elaborated anti-European discourse (Hainsworth, O’Brien & Mitchell,
2004; Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; van der Valk, 2003). Secondly, these countries present
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different socio-demographic characteristics, especially regarding immigration, which may
have led to inter-parties differences in the anti-immigration discourse (Rydgren, 2005; van der
Valk, 2003). Thirdly, historical and cultural differences amid these nations might have an
impact on the hostility stances entailed in the ideology of right-wing populist parties. For
example, Italy and Belgium are relatively “young” countries, compared to France, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. I argue that this is likely to lead to different positions of
anti-establishment hostility, for example towards the central government, in their political
discourse.
The second choice has been done with regard to the right-wing populist parties whose
speeches will form the final sample of this study. I have chosen the most representative rightwing populist parties in the selected countries, as indicated by a number of scholars in the
field (Fennema, 1997; Ignazi, 2006; Rydgren, 2008; van der Brug & Fennema, 2003): the
Front National in France, the Lega Nord in Italy, the Partij Voor de Vrijheid in the
Netherlands and the Vlaams Belang in Belgium.
Finally, choices have been made with regard to the source of the speech (who actually made
the speech) and the time-span to be selected. Concerning the first decision, I have chosen to
consider speeches of party leaders. In fact, according to the ‘charismatic leadership
hypothesis’ (Charlot, 1971; Madsen & Snow, 1991) populist parties’ charismatic leaders are
more likely to be in charge of constructing the party ideology through their speeches.
Regarding the second choice, I have decided to select political speeches that have been held in
the last three years (2010, 2011 and 2012), in order to get a recent overview of the differences
in populist, right-wing parties in Europe, concerning the objects of their hostility stances.
To sum it up, the abovementioned choices have been taken in order to draw a broad and up to
date sample of political speeches of right-wing populist European parties, and finally answer
to the research question: “In which ways and against which objects are hostility stances
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expressed by European right-wing populist parties?”. Accordingly, the following speeches
will form the final sample, four for each country (a total of 16 speeches). For the FN, I have
chosen to analyze the speech of party leader Marine le Pen at the conclusion of the national
council of the party in 2010, the speeches of Nice and Metz in 2011 and the one held at the
presentation of the FN electoral program in the same year. Regarding the LN, I will analyze
the speeches of party leader Umberto Bossi in the party annual rally of Pontida in 2009, 2010
and 2011, as well as a speech he held in Venice at another party meeting in 2011. With regard
to the PVV, I will consider the speeches that its leader Geert Wilders made in Almere, Berlin,
London and The Hague in 2010. Concerning the VB, I will select four speeches of the leader
Filip Dewinter, that he held in Israel in 2010, during the congress “Cordon against
immigration works” in 2011, at the VB Youth congress in 2012 and in Antwerp at the
beginning of the same year. The speeches were retrieved online from the parties’ official
websites (specifically, for the FN, http://www.frontnational.com/categorie-videos/discours/;
for the LN, http://www.leganord.org/segretariofederale/discorsi.asp; for the PVV,
http://www.pvv.nl/index.php/in-de-media/persberichten.html; for VB,
http://www.filipdewinter.be/category/toespraken).
Actual conduct of the study
In order to conduct the qualitative content analysis of political speeches, I will develop a
coding manual which is consistent with the purpose of the research. The coding procedure
will be conducted with the help of the computer software MAXQDA.
As I aim at analyzing the differences in populist right-wing parties in Europe concerning
hostility stances, I will first have to identify the latter, specifying the object towards which the
hostility is directed. After having done this, I will consider the different hostility positions as
macro-categories in the coding scheme. In this sense, this approach is that of a directed
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content analysis (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009), because the coding procedure starts taking into
consideration elements of hostility, which are key in right-wing populist parties ideologies
according to existing researches in the field (Ansell, 1997; Charteris-Black, 2006; Kopecky &
Mudde, 2002; Rydgren, 2008; Taggart, 1998; van der Valk, 2003; van Dijk, 1993).
Nevertheless, I aim at generating other subthemes using the more inductive constant
comparative method (Boeije, 2002), as it is the most suitable to develop original insights. As
suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985), I will make sure that the categories are internally
homogenous and externally heterogeneous. Then, I will draw conclusions from the coded data,
making sense of the macro-categories and subcategories that I identified through the
qualitative content analysis. In this way, for each speech, I will focus on one issue of hostility
and I will evaluate how utterances, metaphors and other forms of symbolic language are
actually constructing the issue as a problem within the discourse, that is how the hostility is
expressed in each speech. According to Huckin (1997), I will determine if the hostility stance
constitutes the frame of the entire speech, looking at its topicalization (that is, what the writer
chose to put in the topic position). In doing so, I will be able to establish the salience of the
hostility issue in the speech. Then, I will analyze the use of language when it refers to the
hostility position, examining how images and metaphors are used to make hostility concepts
more vivid. In this way, I will point out the ways in which right-wing populist political
discourse is constructed by each party leader.
To sum it up, I will follow a two-step analysis. Firstly, I will pinpoint the different objects of
hostility that are embedded in the speeches, identifying different macro-categories and
subthemes using the constant comparative method. Secondly, through a qualitative content
analysis, I will point out the inter-parties differences with regard to the ideology construction.
As the research approach I will use is mainly inductive, the inferences will be drawn from the
coding of the data. Therefore, I expect to get an in-depth understanding of the differences
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between European right-wing populist parties regarding the objects of hostility stances, from
the manifest as well as from the latent content of the text.
Results
In this section of my thesis I will present the results of the qualitative content analysis of the
speeches of the sample. In particular, I will identify the existence of three main objects against
which hostility positions are declared. Firstly, I will demonstrate how hostility is expressed by
right-wing populist party leaders of the sample against the European Union. Secondly, I will
describe how Umberto Bossi, Filip Dewinter, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders express
hostility against immigration during their speeches. Thirdly, in the last part of the result
section, I will analyze the ways in which hostility against the national political establishment
is declared by the same leaders.
Hostility against the European Union
Hostility against the European Union is expressed in every speech of the sample by rightwing populist party leaders. Nevertheless, there are differences with regard to the centrality of
the hostility in the speeches. On the one hand, I argue that this position of hostility is central
in Le Pen’s political discourse. On the other hand, hostility against the EU does not lie at the
core of the speeches of Bossi, Dewinter and Wilders. In particular, with regard to the leaders
of the PVV and the VB, I claim that this position of hostility is collateral to the central one,
namely against Islam. The abovementioned differences notwithstanding, I argue that the
analysis of the parties’ attitudes of hostility against the EU may be conducted following two
main subthemes. In fact, firstly, the parties express hostility against the nature of the EU. In
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particular, they blame three aspects of its nature: its supranational character; its strict
regulatory role; its globalist and liberalistic attitude. Secondly, hostility is expressed by the
parties’ leaders with regard to the Euro, the European common currency and, more in general,
to the negative economic consequences of the introduction of the latter.
Concerning the hostility towards the supranational character of the EU, I argue that Marine Le
Pen, during the speech she gave in Metz in 2011, refuses a common European identity. In
order to give strength to this stance, she also quotes one of the fathers of the nation, General
Charles De Gaulle.
“As General De Gaulle said: “(…) the reality is, at this moment, the fact that Europe is made out of
nations.””
As I will point out later in this section, right-wing populist parties’ leaders often use
quotations from notable historical political characters to support their views. This is a
rhetorical device they use with the final purpose of legitimizing hostility positions that they
take.
According to the same sentiment of hostility, the VB’s leader Filip Dewinter uses a metaphor
during the speech at the VB Youth congress in 2012 to express hostility against the EU
centralizing tendencies.
“…we are the only ones in Europe who want to erect a dam against the Eurocentralism”
Moreover, right-wing populist leaders’ speeches entail elements of hostility against laws and
regulations adopted by the EU, assuming that the latter are harmful to the electoral base they
represent. For example, the LN’s leader Bossi, during the speech held in Pontida in 2009,
refers to the issue of milk quotas (an EU fiscal measure which obliges farmers to pay taxes for
every kilo exceeding a given quantity) and tells to the audience an anecdote about how he
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suggested to the Minister of agriculture Luca Zaia (also member of the LN) to go to Brussels
in order to solve the problem.
“[I said to Minister Zaia]: “Go to Europe and slam your fist on the table. Tell them that we come
from Northern Italy. You are spokesperson of a people which is able to go Europe and take its
interests by the balls. We did not enter the EU to be slaves, but we wanted our rights.””.
As it has been pointed out in this extract, Bossi often uses vulgarity to give power to his
statements. Vulgarity is peculiar in Bossi’s speeches when compared to the other right-wing
populist leaders taken into exam.
Furthermore, also Geert Wilders declares himself hostile to the EU regulatory role. According
to this, in the speech in Berlin in 2010, the PVV’s leader considers the process against himself
(in 2009 he was prosecuted by a Dutch court for having called for a ban on the Koran) a
paradigmatic example of how the EU regulatory role goes to the extremes, as laws are created
to regulate what citizens (including politicians) should think and say.
“Other than in America, we don’t dispose of a First Amendment which guarantees to people the
freedom of expression in the way the latter helps to foster the public debate. In contrast to the U.S.,
national governments and, increasingly, the EU write regulations to decide what their citizens –
including democratically elected politicians like myself – have to think and what they have to say.”
In addition to the alleged detachment from citizens’ interests, the EU is also blamed by rightwing populist leaders for having a globalist and liberalistic nature. The hostility to the latter is
stressed by Le Pen at the end of the presentation of the electoral program of FN in 2011, in
which she says:
“Fifth biggest economy of the world, France has to have its borders back, protect them with
customs-taxes and import-quotas, and not wait for European protections that will never come in the
same way one waits for Godot. Because the European Union by nature vomits every idea of
protectionism and borders!”
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In this sense she argues France will have to wait in vain for customs protection, in the same
way the protagonists of Beckett’s famous play are waiting for Godot. In fact, the repulsion to
borders protection is deeply rooted in the nature of the EU.
Finally, I will take into account the second main object towards which the hostility against the
EU is expressed by right-wing populist parties’ leaders: the Euro, the European common
currency, and the negative economic consequences of its introduction. When talking about the
Euro in the speech held in The Hague in 2010, Geert Wilders addressed a rhetorical question
to the audience in order to cast doubts on the real need for a common currency. To emphasize
the idea that the Euro has harmed the Netherlands, he evoked Northern European countries
that did not join the Euro and were not touched by the economic crisis. Therefore, he recalled
the possibility for the Netherlands to exit the Euro zone.
“And we ask a fundamental question: what is the Euro necessary for? As if in Denmark, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland the economic situation was worse than it is in our country. (…) If, and of
course I hope it won’t be the case, the Euro fails, we say: better a strong Guilder than a weak Euro.”
At the end of the same speech, Wilders argues that Dutch money is gone to help “sinful”
Greece, which is a symbolic unvirtuous nation, opposed to the “good” ones that have been
mentioned before.
“(…) we can say goodbye to our money for corrupted and fraudulent Greece.”
The same hostility against the Euro and its disastrous economic consequences is expressed by
Marine Le Pen in 2011, in the speech of presentation of the electoral project. Using a biblical
metaphor, the FN’s leader says the Euro is a “golden calf”, a sacred cow which has huge
costs for France.
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“This untouchable dogma which puts round our neck the debt millstone of other countries, Greece,
Ireland, Portugal, which obliges us to refuel them without break, for nothing, without any debate,
without any vote, whereas we already have an Himalayan debt of 1700 billion euro !”
Also in this case, “bad”, unvirtuous nations are used in order to express hostility towards the
economic consequences of the European monetary union. Consistent with Wilders’ approach,
Le Pen aims at legitimizing the perspective of the end of the common European currency. In
fact, her hostility against the Euro goes to the extremes when she says, during the same
speech:
“The end of the Euro is just the end of a failed operation, of an unfortunate operation!”
Hostility against immigration
In the speeches of the sample, immigration is the second main object against which hostility is
expressed by right-wing populist parties’ leaders. Specifically, this position is central in the
political discourse of the PVV’s leader Geert Wilders and the VB’s leader Filip Dewinter.
Concerning the speeches of the FN’s leader Marine Le Pen, I argue that the hostility against
immigration is one of the core positions that she holds. Quite surprisingly, hostility against
immigration is relegated to a marginal position in the speeches of the LN’s leader Umberto
Bossi.
In this section, I will claim that leaders of the right-wing populist parties of the sample
express hostility against the cultural, economic and social consequences of immigration for
the host country. Hence, firstly, they are hostile to the cultural mutations brought by
immigration. Specifically, on the one hand, they reject multiculturalism, a phenomenon
through which the home culture is mixed with the ones of immigrants. On the other hand,
they are hostile to Islam, as they argue it will oust the home culture in the next future.
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Secondly, Bossi, Dewinter, Le Pen and Wilders express hostility against the negative
economic consequences of immigration for the host country’s population. Thirdly, in the
speeches of the sample leaders declare themselves hostile to the social consequences of
immigration, namely in terms of crime increase.
Concerning the hostility against multiculturalism, Marine Le Pen’s speech in Nice in 2011
brings out a peculiar equation: multiculturalism is multiconflict.
“France is also confronted with multiculturalism, which turns upside down its laws, its customs, its
traditions, in other words its values of civilization and its identity. Multicultural societies always
become multiconflictual societies”.
Moreover, the same rhetorical equation is used by Filip Dewinter in the speech during the VB
Youth congress in 2012, in which he says:
“Multiculturalism has become multiconflict. Meanwhile, everybody has understood that
multiculturalism is a lie. The melting-pot society does not give any single social, cultural or
economic added value. (…). As a consequence, we have to choose for assimilation instead of
integration. ”
The same conclusion is also expressed by Wilders in the speech in Berlin of 2010. Using the
rhetorical device of quoting notable politicians, he argues that this position was also shared by
Theodore Roosevelt.
“President Theodore Roosevelt had a clear view on the duties of immigrants. That’s what he said
about the topic: “We have to insist on the fact that immigrants have to come with good intentions,
committed to become Americans and to be assimilated; (…).””
Furthermore, leaders of the PVV and the VB use their speeches to convey hostility against
Islam. In this thesis, I will consider the latter as a subtheme of the hostility against
immigration. Nevertheless, one may argue this hostility stance deserves to be considered as an
19
apart, main theme, as it represents the core of the political discourse of Geert Wilders and
Filip Dewinter. This centrality notwithstanding, I claim that the two leaders clarify the
dependence of the theme of Islam to the one of immigration during their speeches. According
to this, while speaking at the VB Youth congress in 2012, Dewinter uses a mythological
metaphor to make the connection between immigration and Islam clear.
“Multiculturalism and massive immigration are the Trojan horse of Islam”.
Moreover, Wilders explains the same idea in the speech in Berlin of 2010, starting from an
historical perspective and therefore putting himself as an expert of the theme.
“From an historical point of view, Islam spread through military conquests or through the use of the
weapon of Hijra, immigration. (…) Hijra is also what we have to face nowadays. Islamization of
Europe keeps on moving forward.”
Hence, hostility to “islamization of Europe” derives from the hostility against the nature of
Islam, particularly concerning three aspects. Firstly, according to Wilders and Dewinter, Islam
is not a religion, but a totalitarian political ideology, similar to communism and National
Socialism. According to this, in the speech in London in 2011, through the often used
rhetorical device of quoting venerable characters of the past, Wilders states that even Winston
Churchill had compared Adolf Hitler’s book “Mein Kampf” (literally “My war”) to the Koran,
the sacred book of Islam.
“Then, no wonder that even Winston Churchill called Adolf Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” the new Koran
of faith and war.”
Moreover, this quotation entails the second reason of hostility against the nature of Islam. The
two leaders argue that it has a violent nature. That is the idea expressed by Dewinter during
his speech at the VB Youth congress in 2012.
20
“Islam considers terrorism and violence as a legitimate way in order to achieve its goals. And yes,
there exist maybe moderate Muslims, but moderate Islam does not exist”
Thirdly, both Wilders and Dewinter argue that the values of Islam are opposite and
incompatible to the Western ones, as they are based on intolerance and supremacy of Sharia,
the religious law, on civil laws of the state. Consistent with his communicative style, in the
speech in London in 2010 Wilders combines his expertise on this subject with elements of
irony.
“Islam aims at dominating every aspect of daily life, from the cradle to the grave. Sharia law is a law
which controls every detail of daily life in an Islamic society. From civil and family law to criminal
law. It makes clear how one must eat, how he or she should dress, even how one should use the toilet.
Submission of women is good, alcohol consumption is bad.”
In the same way, Dewinter expresses the hostility of his party against Islamic values at the
end of the speech he held in the congress “Cordon against immigration works” in 2011. Using
the rhetorical device of the anaphora, he lists Western cultural values and elements of
politically correct thinking thanks to which the negative values of Islam are able to permeate
our society.
“In the name of tolerance, we bring intolerance inside;
In the name of democracy, we bring dictatorship inside;
In the name of freedom of expression, we bring censorship inside;
In the name of religious freedom, we bring theocracy inside;
In the name of multiculturalism, we bring religious apartheid inside.”
Moreover, right-wing populist leaders express hostility towards the economic consequences
of immigration. During the speech held in Nice in 2011, the FN’s leader Le Pen asks a
rhetorical question to the audience, and then she presents some data to express hostility
against the negative consequences of immigration for France.
21
“Is it interest of France to have imposed to our country a massive immigration? (…) No, especially because,
considering the fact that more or less 5 million French people are jobless, what is the interest to have let
203 000 extra immigrants legally enter the country, just 5% of them with an employment contract, the rest
of them, therefore, depends on the tax payers ?”
In the same “scientific” way, during the speech in Almere in 2010 Geert Wilders quantifies
the economic consequences of immigration by quoting a study conducted by a Dutch forum
for economic research.
“Nothing is worse for our economy than the persistent mass-immigration. Therefore, I quoted the
research made by Nyfer. (…). Mass-immigration costs us 7, 2 billion euro per year”
Referring to the same hostility, in the speech in Pontida, the LN’s leader Bossi refers to the
huge costs connected to the war in Libya, after which a great number of Libyans have escaped
to Italy.
“The war in Libya has cost a billion euro, because of bombs and immigrants that we had to take, that
came from Libya after the war.”
On the contrary, Dewinter uses the vivid rhetorical device of prosopopoeia in the speech
during the congress “Cordon against immigration works” to express the same position of
hostility. According to this imaginary dialogue, immigrants are having a good time in the
Flanders at the expenses of Flemish citizens.
“To the question “Where’s the party”? Illegals and asylum seekers answer: “Here is the party!” The
time has come to give an end to parties where other persons make party at our expenses and we pay
the bill”.
Finally, hostility is expressed against the consequences of immigration on citizens’ safety.
According to right-wing populist leaders, criminality is increasing as a direct consequence of
immigration. In the speech in Metz of 2011, Marine Le Pen underlines this connection, asking
another rhetorical question to her audience.
22
“How can one love France if he is letting the citizens being brutalized by a more and more radical
violence, (…)? This violence is constantly fostered by mass immigration. Does it mean to love
France if one is continuously raising this migratory flux (…)? ”
On the occasion of his speech in Almere in 2010, Geert Wilders is more specific about the
increasing of criminality due to immigration, as he refers to a precise group of immigrants in
the Netherlands.
“In the classification of the municipalities that suffer the most from Moroccan criminals made by the
national police, the city of Amsterdam stands alone in the first position. Also, it seems that young
Moroccans criminals are organizing themselves in bigger organizations.”
In fact, at the end of the same speech, Wilders puts the audience in front of a false dilemma, a
choice between two opposites:
“Immigration or security?”
Hostility against the national political establishment
The analysis of the speeches of the sample points out that right-wing populist parties’ leaders
express hostility against a third main object, namely the national political establishment. In
specific, there appears to be a threefold distinction with regard to this position of hostility.
Firstly, in the speeches of the FN’s leader Marine Le Pen hostility is directed towards the
political inadequacy of ruling elites. Secondly, I argue that Filip Dewinter and Geert Wilders
express hostility against the politically correct behavior of ruling parties. Finally, the analysis
of the speeches of the LN’s leader Umberto Bossi pinpoints a peculiar conception of national
political establishment. In fact, hostility is declared against the Italian centralized political
apparatus. Therefore, in this section I will first shed light on the hostility against the
inadequacy of the political elites and on the one against the politically correct behavior of
23
ruling parties, elaborating a more articulated definition of these two concepts. Then, I will
report the results concerning Bossi’s peculiar hostility against the centralized political
apparatus, giving a clearer definition of the latter.
Concerning the speeches of the FN’s leader Marine Le Pen, I argue that she declares hostility
against the major French parties: the conservative UMP (Union pour un Mouvement
Populaire) and the socialist PS (Parti Socialiste), which are considered by FN’s leader as two
parts of the same, old, corrupted system. In fact, the latter is indicated by a number of
significant appellatives that she uses in the speeches:
“the system UMPS”, “the UMPS clique”, “the hypercaste”, “the corrupted hypercaste”, “caste of
potentates”.
In particular, the analysis of the speeches brings out a dichotomous definition of the hostility
against the inadequacy of national political establishment. On the one hand, Le Pen expresses
hostility against the economic failure of both the UMP and the PS. On the other hand, she is
hostile to their loss of morality. Both positions are declared by the FN’s leader through the use
of paradigmatic symbols. Firstly, the symbol of national political establishment’s economic
failure is the village of Gandrange, in which, Nicolas Sarkozy’s promises notwithstanding, a
steelwork was closed in 2009, causing the loss of 600 jobs in a population of almost 3000
inhabitants. In her speech in Metz in 2011, she explains:
“A name symbolizes the renunciations of the political elites (…): Gandrange. Gandrange, symbol of
the unkept promises. Of hopes which fade away. Of shameless lies.”
Secondly, in the same way, the so-called “Carlton-affair” is taken in the same speech as a
paradigmatic scandal in order to express hostility against the moral decline of the political
elites. In the Carlton hotel in Lille, a prostitution ring was led by politicians, amid which
24
former president of IMF and former appointed candidate president for the PS Dominique
Strauss-Kahn, and other members of the financial and entrepreneurial environment.
“The incredible multiplication of affairs, scandals, is far from being just limited to a matter of
morality. The “Carlton-affair” clearly shows that there exists a real pact of corruption which puts
together politicians, amid which a candidate president, members of the public administrations and
employees of stock market’s big groups.”
Concerning the speeches of Geert Wilders and Filip Dewinter, I argue that both leaders
express hostility against what they call the politically correct thinking of national political
elites. According to the discourse of the leaders of the PVV and the VB, this concept entails
two interconnected aspects underlying the nature of the ruling parties. Firstly, political elites
are called politically correct as they refuse the ethno-pluralistic doctrine (Griffin, 2000;
Minkenberg, 1997; Taguieff, 1988) and advocate cultural equality. Secondly, consistent with
the refusal of cultural racism, ruling politicians’ thinking is defined as politically correct
because it disregards the cultural integration problems connected to immigration and Islam. In
this sense, I argue that the hostility against the national political establishment in the discourse
of Wilders and Dewinter is subordinated to the core xenophobic positions.
Hostility against the politically correct thinking of the national political establishment is made
clear by Geert Wilders during the speech in Berlin in 2010. In fact, the PVV’s leader
expresses hostility against elite’s support for cultural equality, writing it off with the
expression “equality-mantra”. Moreover, with the use of a paradox, Wilders stresses the idea
of a contradictory way of thinking of the ruling parties, which are blind towards the dangers
of Islam as they were to the ones deriving from communism.
“In the same way they were blind towards communism, the political class (especially left-wing
parties) turns a blind eye towards Islam. (…) We can hear the repetitions of the old moral “equality-
25
mantra”. They used to claim that Western “imperialism” was as bad as Soviet imperialism; now they
claim that Western “imperialism” is as bad as Islamic terrorism.”
Using the same metaphor, Dewinter declares hostility against the “blind” European political
elites, a as they refuse to acknowledge the problems connected to the cultural integration
deriving from mass immigration. According to Dewinter, this politically correct attitude of the
political establishment will lead to dramatic consequences, described by the VB’s leader as an
apocalyptic scenario.
“As long as political leaders in Europe don’t want to have this reality [of massive immigration] in
front of their eyes and don’t dare to look at it, Europe will sink in a quagmire of violence, terroristic
attacks and conflict which will eventually lead to an ethnic-cultural civil war.”
Finally, I argue that the LN’s leader Umberto Bossi, unlike Dewinter, Le Pen and Wilders,
does not identify the national political establishment with any political party. In this sense,
Bossi expresses hostility against the ground of the Italian state, the centralized political
apparatus which is based in Rome, and is therefore called “Roman centralism”. Actually, this
hostility is necessary to reach the independence of Northern Italy from the central state, which
is the political final goal of the LN. In particular, hostility is declared to the centralized fiscal
policies of Italy, due to which the wealth produced by Northern Italy is “stolen” by the central
government and wasted. In fact, the idea of a “robbery” made by “Rome” (topographic
metonymy to indicate the Italian central government) is clearly expressed by Bossi during the
speech in Pontida in 2011. Through the use of a metaphor, he compares Northern Italy to a
mule that is carrying the whole country, an expensive (and therefore overloaded) burden.
“This is the result if they keep on using Northern Italy as a mule which has to carry a very expensive
machine. We have to find a solution about that.”
Moreover, Bossi is hostile to the centralized political apparatus as the latter ultimately wastes
public money. In fact, the LN’s leader expresses hostility against the idea to feed the greedy
26
Italian political central apparatus, the so defined “Roman ‘magna magna’”, a popular
expression which literally means “eat eat” and which indicates greed for money.
“Nowadays the economy has entered a moment of crisis; we don’t even have money for ourselves.
Imagine if we can maintain Rome and the Roman ‘magna magna’!”
Finally, the hostility against the centralized political establishment of Italy, which steals
money from Northern Italy and wastes them, is crystallized in an historical slogan of the LN,
spoken out by Bossi and repeated by the cheering audience in every speech:
“Roma ladrona, la Lega non perdona!” (which means “Rome, you thief: Lega Nord won’t forgive
you!”).
In the next section, I will discuss the results and I will suggest a number of themes future
research should focus on.
Conclusions and discussion
The last section of my thesis will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will summarize the findings of
the qualitative content analysis of speeches of European right-wing populist parties’ leaders,
pointing out how limitations of a party family approach have been overcome. Then, the
shortcomings of my study will be presented, together with recommendations for future
research on right-wing populist parties in Europe.
According to the research question: “In which ways and against which objects are hostility
stances expressed by European right-wing populist parties?”, my study aimed at outlining a
picture of the ideology of parties of this kind in Europe with regard to the hostility positions.
In general, I argue that my thesis has overcome the limitations of a party family approach that
I observed in the theory section. Firstly, the findings provide an in-depth description of the
27
hostility positions embedded in right-wing populist parties’ political discourse, outlining the
subthemes in which hostility stances are divided. Secondly, they show inter-parties
differences in terms of salience that is given to the hostility positions.
Actually, the results of this study identify three common objects against which European
right-wing populist parties of the sample express their hostility: the European Union,
immigration and the national political establishment. In this sense, partial support is given to
the findings of previous studies based on the party family approach. However, the results of
my thesis prove to be more detailed, in that they also describe the different subthemes that
compose the main hostility positions. As already observed by a number of party family
studies (Betz & Johnson, 2004; Fennema & Pollman, 1998; Rydgren, 2008), European rightwing populist parties share xenophobic attitudes. In particular, support is given to the
hypothesis that they embrace the ethno-pluralistic doctrine (Griffin, 2000; Minkenberg, 1997;
Rydgren, 2008; Taguieff, 1988). Nevertheless, the results of my study show that the general
xenophobic attitude is articulated in different subissues. Hostility is expressed by leaders of
the sample against multiculturalism and economic consequences of immigration, as well as
against the cultural influence of Islam. Furthermore, consistent with the findings of previous
studies on the right-wing populist party family, leaders of the parties of the sample express
anti-European positions (Hainsworth, O’Brien & Mitchell, 2004; Kopecky & Mudde, 2002;
Netjes and Edward, 2005; van der Valk, 2003). The results of my thesis support the idea that
this macro-theme is divided into three subthemes: hostility against the economic integration
of the EU (symbolized by the Euro), against European regulations and against the nature of
the EU. On top of that, the results have pinpointed the existence of a third, main theme of
hostility, namely against the national political establishment. This is a complex position,
articulated according to the different conceptions that European right-wing populist parties
have of the latter. Hostility is expressed by the FN against the inadequacy of the political
28
elites, by the PVV and the VB against their politically correct attitudes, and by the LN against
the Italian bureaucratic system. Finally, unlike previous comparative studies in socio-political
research (Derks, 2006; Fennema, 1997; Linz, 1976; Swank & Betz, 2003), the results of this
thesis have not pointed out the existence of a separate ideological hostility position in the
economic field (f.e., anti-tax or anti-welfare state). The latter appears to be subordinated to the
three, main hostility positions. In fact, right-wing populist party leaders express hostility
against the economic results of the introduction of the Euro, against the economic
consequences of massive immigration and, finally, against the economic problems caused by
inefficient political elites.
Furthermore, a qualitative approach to the analysis of the political discourse embedded in the
speeches has allowed to overcome a second limitation of the party family approach. Studies
conducted by Betz (1994), Fennema (2005) and Rydgren (2008) on right-wing populist
parties’ programs have identified the main hostility themes within their ideologies, namely
against immigration, against the establishment and against the EU. However, they have not
stressed the different salience that is given to these hostility positions in the ideology of each
party. Actually, the results of my study reveal inter-parties differences in terms of salience of
the three main themes of anti-European, anti-immigration and anti-establishment stances. In
this sense, the findings give support to the idea that different figures of speech and other
rhetorical devices have been used in order to stress the centrality of the main hostility position
within the party’s ideology. Specifically, the rhetorical device of quoting notable political
characters of the past is used by right-wing populist leaders to underline the centrality of a
hostility position within the party’s ideology. Marine Le Pen quotes General Charles De
Gaulle during her speech in Metz with the purpose of putting anti-European positions at the
core of the FN’s ideology. In the same way, Geert Wilders chooses to use Winston Churchill
and Franklin Delano Roosevelt to stress the centrality of anti-Islamic and anti-immigration
29
stances in the PVV’s ideology. Furthermore, other vivid figures of speech are used by leaders
of the sample in order to give prominence to certain hostility stances within the party’s
ideology. In fact, the biblical metaphor of “golden calf” is used by the FN’s leader to convey a
negative judgement of the Euro, therefore stressing the central importance of the hostility
against the EU in the FN’s ideology. Moreover, through the use of a quite long anaphora that
describes the dangers of the Islamic culture, and a vivid prosopopeia that portrays immigrants
as parasites of the Flemish society, the VB’s leader Filip Dewinter aims at giving salience to
the hostility stances against immigration and Islam. In fact, according to Tannen (1989),
“repetition, dialogue and imagery create involvement and therefore persuasion in discourse”
(Tannen, 1989, p.9). On top of that, the findings show that the LN’s rhetoric of exclusion is
shaped in order to give salience to the core element of hostility, namely against Italian central
bureaucratic apparatus. According to van Dijk (1995), the centrality of this hostility position
is emphasized by closing the speech with an impressive rhymed slogan against Rome. Finally,
the results give support to Fairclough’s (1992) hypothesis that the word usage is of key
importance in shaping the ideology construction. In this sense, semantic choices are made by
right-wing populist parties’ leaders in order to give salience to a specific hostility position in
the speeches. In fact, the findings show that Geert Wilders uses words belonging to the
semantic area of the Islamic culture in order to give salience to the coverage of the hostility
against Islam, at the same time showing his expertise in dealing with the PVV’s core hostility
position.
To sum it up, I argue that findings of previous studies on right-wing populist parties in Europe
based on the party family approach are useful, in that they describe a shared pattern of main
hostility stances. Nevertheless, a qualitative approach to the speeches of leaders of parties of
this kind allows to get a more detailed picture out of the general one. In fact, on the one hand,
in this thesis I have been able to show how the main hostility positions are divided into
30
different subthemes. On the other hand, I have identified the differences in terms of salience
of the core hostility stances within each party’s ideology.
Nonetheless, this study presents a number of limitations that should be considered. Firstly,
due to a limited number of languages that I master, the size of the sample had to be reduced to
four countries, too few for a study that aims at outlining a European picture of right-wing
populist parties. In specific, a shortcoming is represented by the fact that the sample does not
include Eastern European countries, in which the importance of right-wing populist parties is
dramatically rising in the last years (Mudde, 2005; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004). Actually,
this methodological choice may be problematic in that it does not take into account the nature
of the EU after the enlargement. Secondly, the sample did not include speeches that were
made by other members of the party than the leader. In fact, the duty of expressing hostility
positions is often delegated to other politicians within the party. The exclusion of the latter
from the sample may therefore represent a limitation to the understanding of the hostility
positions of the party. Thirdly, my thesis did not include a systematic analysis of grammatical
categories (such as, for example, complementation constructions). As the latter are a key
element of the expression of the rhetoric of exclusion (van Leeuwen, 2012; Verhagen, 2005),
this may be a limitation to the analysis of the hostility stances entailed in the speeches.
Finally, I claim that a higher goal should be set for political communication research on
European right-wing populist parties. Actually, further studies should aim at observing how
the ideologies of right-wing populist parties in Europe have evolved over time. Therefore,
scholars in this field should follow a two-step strategy. First of all, they should give a more
accurate and exhaustive answer to the research question of my thesis: “In which ways and
against which objects are hostility stances expressed by European right-wing populist
parties?”. According to this, they have to provide both a more in-depth analysis of each
party’s ideology and a more comprehensive picture of right-wing populist parties in Europe.
31
Then, they should be able to meet the higher goal of describing the evolution of European
right-wing populist parties’ ideologies in time, taking a longitudinal approach to the study of
the latter.
In order to meet the ultimate goal, future research about right-wing populist parties should
overcome the abovementioned limitations concerning the sample. Firstly, further studies in
the field should also consider speeches that are made by other party members than the leader.
Secondly, the sample should be representative of the 27 European member states, considering
also Eastern European countries that have just entered the Union.
After having given a more accurate and exhaustive answer to the research question “In which
ways and against which objects are hostility stances expressed by European right-wing
populist parties?”, future research should be able to analyze the evolution of the hostility
positions within the parties’ ideologies. This approach is likely to have important implications
for research about right-wing populist parties in Europe. In fact, in the light of the progressive
decline of traditional political cleavages (Dalton, 1996; Deegan-Krause, 2007), right-wing
populist parties’ ideology is more likely to put more and more emphasis on the “populist” part,
to the detriment of the “right-wing” one. In fact, as noted by Derks (2006), the rhetoric of
exclusion expressed by European right-wing populist parties is more and more based on the
Manichean distinction between “the people” and “the outsiders”, against which the hostility is
expressed, and less on hostility stances typical of the right-wing.
Therefore, in light of this evolution of the political sphere, future research in political
communication should take an extensive approach of the phenomenon of populism in Europe.
It should analyze the rhetoric of exclusion expressed by both right-wing and left-wing
populist parties, ultimately establishing if there are ideological points of convergence with
regard to their hostility positions.
32
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