James H. Willbanks. The Battle of An Loc. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. xxi
+ 226 pp. $29.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-253-34481-6.
Reviewed by Ron Milam (Department of History, Texas Tech University)
Published on H-War (November, 2005)
The American Advisory Effort Near the End of the War
Scholars of the Vietnam War experience have traditionally focused on the role of U.S. advisors during the
Kennedy years, or in an ancillary role to the American
ground war efforts at the height of American involvement. David Donovan’s memoir Once a Warrior King
(1985) addressed U.S. advisor experiences in the post-Tet
Offensive time frame and Edward Metzner’s More Than A
Soldier’s War (1995) chronicled his seven years as an advisor to various Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)
units. Both of these books, as well as several others,
contained elements of combat experiences in conjunction
with traditional pacification efforts.
by a participant, and Willbanks was present as an advisor to an ARVN unit. But this is not just an eyewitness account. Utilizing newly discovered archival evidence and recently translated North Vietnamese afteraction reports, Willbanks has reconstructed the minutia
of the nearly three-month long siege. And the effort is
not simply to provide another memoir of Vietnam war
stories, but to answer the question that has plagued military historians since the war ended: was the Army of the
Republic of Vietnam an effective fighting force?
Willbanks tackles this question without generalized
commentary; rather he provides excruciatingly poignant
James Willbanks, in his book The Battle of An Loc, descriptions of leadership failure and heroic actions.
vividly describes the U.S. advisory effort at the end of Where South Vietnamese commanders failed to seize the
America’s involvement in the war, during Hanoi’s 1972 initiative and advance, he is critical. Yet, on numerous
Easter Offensive. By that time, American infantry units occasions he is complementary to both the junior offihad departed the country, and only air and some lo- cers and enlisted men who did the fighting, and to the
gistical support remained. American society had lost enemy who were sacrificed by stubborn PAVN leaderinterest in the war, and the Nixon administration was ship. Through intensive research of North Vietnamese
deep into its Vietnamization program. Hanoi was in- archives and memoirs of various PAVN commanders, the
creasing its efforts to solidify ground gains as a means former advisor describes a strategic plan to destroy An
of improving its negotiating leverage at the Paris Peace Loc and open Highway 13 to Saigon. If this plan were
Talks. And in An Loc, a provincial capital sixty-five miles successful, North Vietnam could have marched on Saigon
north of Saigon, a three-month siege began, which, if suc- nearly three years before the final invasion or, at a minicessful, could provide a pathway for North Vietnamese mum, could have created a situation in Paris synonymous
takeover of South Vietnam. In a battle that would re- with Dien Bien Phu and Geneva in 1954. President Thieu
sult in over 150,000 combined belligerent casualties, the understood this historical parallel as did Major General
ARVN would distinguish itself by defeating the Peoples James Hollingsworth, senior military advisor to the Third
Army of (North) Vietnam (PAVN).
Regional Assistance Command. So maintaining An Loc
as a South Vietnamese provincial capital was as imporThe Battle of An Loc could only be written effectively tant to the stability of the Most populous region in South
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Vietnam as Kontum was to the Central Highlands.
or wounded in their support of the ARVN effort. Willbanks cites several officers and senior noncommissioned
officers who received Distinguished Service Crosses for
their service, many posthumously. One could argue that
similar heroic exploits while serving in American units
would have resulted in the award of Medals of Honor. As
a former advisor in Vietnam, this reviewer is sensitive to
the role we played, and Willbanks’s insightful account of
this pivotal battle will remind readers of the importance
of such soldiers to the war effort.
Willbanks’s analysis of ARVN performance may be
controversial among some U.S. combat veterans and
Vietnam War scholars who continue to believe that the
ARVN did not possess the will to fight. His book will
contribute to a body of literature which gives the ARVN
soldier credit for his fighting spirit, but still blames the
leadership for failing to win the war after American units
departed in 1973. Missing after that date were U.S. advisors and U.S. tactical air support which Willbanks believes were the most critical factors in the final outcome
of the siege of An Loc. He believes that the very presence of U.S. advisors on the ground, and their refusal to
leave when defeat looked imminent, inspired the ARVN
to continue to fight.
The Battle of An Loc is a fine book with rich, vibrant
descriptions of combat, weapons, and command decisions. Willbanks writes from an insider’s perspective,
but demonstrates the discipline of a historian who knows
what questions to ask. Passion for the research subject
trumps any concern for objectivity, and this former adMost of the U.S. Army personnel at the battle of An visor recognizes when the facts should speak for themLoc were members of Advisory Team 70 and they re- selves. The book will contribute to the scarce literature
ceived a rare Presidential Unit Citation for their perfor- on both the U.S. advisory effort and the latter days of the
mance during those critical days. This book will serve
war.
as a testimonial to the many advisors who were killed
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Citation: Ron Milam. Review of Willbanks, James H., The Battle of An Loc. H-War, H-Net Reviews. November, 2005.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=11218
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