Robert I. Csehi
[email protected]
+36 30 245 8229
(647) 981 2436
The Changing Nature of Intergovernmental Relations in Labor Market
Development
– Cases for Collaborative Federalism in Canada and the EU?1
(A short outline of the paper to be presented at the ’International Conference on Comparing Modes of
Governance in Canada and the European Union: Social Policy Engagement across Complex Multilevel Systems;
October 14-15; Victoria, BC)
The puzzle, its theoretical implications and empirical relevance
Federal systems are always challenged with the basic question of who does / shall do what?
According to the traditional understanding whatever is important to the constituent units shall
remain within their own jurisdiction, whereas, issues of greater concern shall form the body of
competences of the federal level. Usually, this type of strict, formal division of powers is
manifested in a written constitution. However, such a construct has been challenged by not
only external (e.g. elements of globalization2) and internal (e.g. the need for more effective
policy outcomes) factors, but also there is a voluntary openness to improve the interactions
among the different levels of governance, often to share costs. In general, the constituent units
are more and more required to co-operate with one another in order to be able to face common
challenges in particular policy areas, such as labor market issues. Yet, contrary to traditional
federal thinking (see Hueglin and Fenna, 2006: 147-148) where the member states delegate
competences to the federal level in case the relevance of the issue goes beyond the capacity of
individual states, the states remain reluctant to transfer more competences formally to the
federal level3. As a consequence, competences do leave the level of the constituent units, but
they hardly ever actually ’arrive’ at the federal level, creating a certain tension and a very
particular mode of governance between the different levels. As a consequence, instead of a
formal, hierarchical, cooperative model, a rather informal, heterarchical, collaborative type of
federalism emerges.
Coordination and co-determination of ’national policy’ in labor market related issues is of
great importance in not only a fully federal state which yet remains highly decentralised, such
as Canada, but also within the context of the European Union (EU)4. Both the Labor Market
(Development) Agreements and the European Employment Strategy represent the type of
1
This short study is part of a greater project which compares different policy areas within a collaborative
federalist framework and tries to find answers to why certain policy areas are more developed in terms of
collaboration than others and what influence it has on the overall federal structure. Also, this research has not
been concluded yet, thus the general aim is to generate discussion and critical remarks.
2
On the influence of globalization on federalism and the challenge to welfare state, see e.g. Galligan and Wright
(2002); Hueglin (2003); Baier (2005: 209); Bakvis et al. (2009).
3
In the EU even though the aim is to avoid further increasing the power of the federal level, it does not mean
that there is an apathy for further integration (see also Puetter, 2003, 2011).
4
Taking the European Union as a case for federalism is a highly debated issue among scholars of European
integration theory, even though, the federal characteristics of the EU can hardly be denied (see e.g. Börzel and
Hosli, 2002; Burgess, 2006). Because of this contestation this dissertation takes the EU a case for federalism by
analogy. Thus, the unconcealed aim of this dissertation is to assess the federal characteristics of the European
Union through a comparison analyzing the nature of intergovernmental relations in Canada and the EU.
structural tension mentioned above. It is argued that the role of intergovernmental relations
(IGR) increases as the constituent units are looking for solutions on a common ground, but
with an aim to render the federal level of governance constrained, limited. What may be
puzzling is the difference in the scope and success of these intergovernmental relations in
shifting power relations attached to the given policy area. This short paper shall further
describe and possibly explain some of the major changes within the intergovernmental sphere
and their impact on the overall federal structure, as far as leadership-movement is concerned.
Using the collaborative federalist framework (see Simeon and Cameron, 2002) the outline
shall provide with a comparison between the Canadian and EU practices. Last, but not least,
we shall conclude with some important questions for the future.
The topic is relevant both theoretically and empirically. It considers intergovernmentalism
within a federalist approach, rather than an alternative to it, and thus questions the old
dichotomy of European integration theory. Also, as considerations of sovereignty gain more
relevance, and yet globalization dynamics are likely to accelerate, it is important to look
closer at how federal systems react to these challenges through a remodelled management of
intergovernmental relations.
Collaborative federalism and governance
Federalism is one of the most contested concepts in political science. The fundamental
characteristics of federalism are as follows: „if (1) two levels of government rule the same
land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and
(3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) of the
autonomy of each government in its own sphere” (Riker, 1964: 11). This definition can also
be complemented by Daniel Elazar’s formulation of federalism, according to which it is „a
genus involving a combination of self-rule and shared-rule” (Elazar, 1995: 7). Defining
federalism has become something of a cottage industry, yet these two definitions can help us
start exploring the different types of federalism.
Federalism can be divided up into different types depending on the form and substance. Form,
in relation to federalism refers to the formal / constitutional distribution of powers between
the different levels of governance. Two different categories can be distinguished based on this
category: the distribution of powers is either coordinate (see Wheare, 1964) or concurrent.
The first refers to a structure where competences are distributed in a fashion that each level is
independently in charge of different policy areas. Usually, it is arranged in certain
enumeration of powers in the constitution, so that there are no shared competences.
Concurrency takes place when certain areas become constitutionally shared, in other words,
there is a certain overlap – either administrative or legislative – between the different levels.
As for the substance of federalism, instead of being concerned with the legal arrangements of
federalism it focuses rather on politics, and political relationships. Consequently, taking the
different levels of governance into account, the substance of federalism may be characterized
as either cooperative or competitive. Cooperation refers to a relationship between the different
levels of governance that is more amicable, mutually bounding, and points into a direction
beneficial to the parties involved in it. In a federal system it would mean, that each level of
governance has a distinct role and responsibility in the carrying out of a given policy measure,
and it is done in a cooperative manner (e.g. framework legislation done by the federal level in
retirement policy, complementary legislation / regulation passed by the constituent units).
Cooperative relations may be conducted both horizontally and vertically, however, a
horizontal cooperation does not necessary mean a vertical one. In other words, the constituent
units may cooperate without having the same attitude towards the federal level of governance.
Competition, on the other hand, means that the different levels of governance, from time to
time, challenge one another in the carrying out of policy measures (e.g. different tax codes).
Based on the aforesaid, we could construct a small matrix that would outline four different
types of federalism based on the different form and substance of federalism which is summed
up in Table 1.
FORM / SUBSTANCE
CO-ORDINATE
CONCURRENT
COMPETITIVE
Dual federalism
Un-cooperative federalism
COOPERATIVE
Collaborative federalism
Cooperative federalism
Table 1. Types of federalism based on different form and substance
Assuming that form creates different subtance, in other words legal arrangements create
different circumstances for politics, four different types of federalism can be outlined. All four
forms of federalism describe structural phenomena, the method of dividing powers among the
different levels of governance concerning particular policy areas, with the option to change
over time. The difference is in the tools they use to achieve this end. It has to be stressed that
this categorization is based on policy areas, and the political / legal relationship of the
different levels of governance within these areas. Accordingly, dual federalism is about
separation (even sealing) of the different levels of governance from one another, which is
achieved both vertically and horizontally. A competence belonging to the constituent units
remains totally unique and distinct from one member-state / province to another (e.g. general
education regulation differ among the constituent units). There is, however, competition
between the different levels (constituent units often challenge the federal level) and among the
constituent units (SUBSTANCE is competitive). In general, the relationship between the
different levels, and among the constituent units themselves remains very much restricted, as
far as policy areas are concerned (FORM is coordinate). In cooperative federalism,
constitutionally a particular policy area is shared between the different levels (FORM is
concurrent) and the relationship between the different levels is of a cooperative nature.
However, formal concurrency does not necessarily lead into cooperation, but it may cause the
different levels challenge one another. Consequently, un-cooperative federalism (see BulmanPozen and Gerken, 2009) evolves in cases where formally a given competence is shared and
yet the constituent units oftentimes challenge (SUBSTANCE is competitive) the conduct of
the federal level within that policy area (either legislatively or administratively). Last, but not
least, collaborative federalism accounts for cases where formally the system remains
coordinate, as far as the policy area in question is concerned, but there is a certain degree of
cooperation evolving among the constituent units (and in some cases the federal level of
governance as well). Naturally, federal systems – through the different policy areas – may
evolve from one type to another. The question is, why certain areas take the collaborative
rather than the cooperative form, and how the former may eventually turn into the latter?
The different types of federalism account for different modes of governance. Dual and
cooperative schemes are the most formalized ones as they rely heavily on the general legal
framework that distributes the competences among the different levels of governance. What is
more indicative for collaborative federalism is the conduct of intergovernmental relations, and
the changes thereof5.
5
Un-cooperative federalism is taken out of the discussion as it accounts for formally concurrent cases, as
opposed to the coordinate one in case of the collaborative type. The main difference between uncooperative and
collaborative federalism is the fact that in the un-cooperative scheme the competence area has already become
formally shared, and thus the constituent units defend their autonomy with the power of the servant (see BulmanPozen and Gerken, 2009). In the collaborative scheme such a formal arrangement has not been reached yet, and
thus the level of independence at the level of the constituent units is greater, thus autonomy is defended with the
power of the sovereign! Naturally, there is a great difference between the conduct of intergovernmental relations
in these two types of federalism.
Collaborative federalism is where „national goals are achieved, not by the federal government
acting alone [i.e. like in the dual system] or by the federal government shaping provincial [i.e.
constituent unit] behavior [i.e. like in the the cooperative system] through the exercise of its
spending power, but by some or all of the 11 governments and territories acting collectively”
(Cameron and Simeon, 2002: 54). In other words, collaborative federalism is about finding a
way to policy coordination without replacing constituent unit systems by a federally
orchestrated one, but yet ensure harmonization through co-determination6. In a sense, within
the collaborative framework the allocation of powers is not a settled issue, but rather an openended process (see also Nicolaidis, 2001, 2006). It is not constitutionally determined, but
rather worked out through other, more informal means, one of which is intergovernmental
relations7. To a certain degree, collaborative federalism injects confederalism to the overall
structure of the federal system. As far as competences are concerned, it provides with a noncentralizing feature as opposed to the dualist decentralized and the cooperative centralized
one8.
Collaborative federalism has a great impact on governing methods. Instead of the traditional,
formal understanding of responsible government and ministerial accountability, it involves
informal, rather diplomatic mechanisms. It is policymaking through promotion of dialogue,
shared understanding of values, mutual engagement, deliberation, consensus-building and
agreements. Collaboration is about building commonality, alignment of activities, negotiation,
preparedness to compromise that may involve a lot of power-related elements (highly
important for federal structures), such as oversight mechanisms9, the ability to force
outcomes, compliance, coalition-building, empowerment, etc. Also, in general, there is a
shared understanding of roles and responsibilities concerning the actual policy area in a rather
informal way, however (see also O’Flynn and Wanna, 2008: xii). In the collaborative
framework the question is not how certain issues can be best achieved by the federal level of
governance, but rather, how the federal level can contribute to an effective management of a
given task? In other words, what matters is what capacitiy building exercises emerge, develop
and may get institutionalized in the overall conduct of intergovernmental relations?
The main concern of this short paper is to assess to what extent the intergovernmental practice
had an impact on the power-related elements of the federal structure. What institutions,
processes, and outputs may alter or have already altered the overall structure of competence
division through substituting a formal distribution of powers? Next, the paper shall look at the
Canadian and EU practices in the field of labor market.
The case of labor market development
Labor market development is one of the most important policy areas today. With the financial
and economic crisis, most countries face challenges of high unemployment. If the
competitiveness of workers cannot be enhanced through training, integration, mobility
6
In other words, collaborative federalism is about creating a national framework without actually having one, as
harmonization is not necessarily a value. This, on the other hand keeps the federal idea of unity and diversity
alive.
7
That’s the reason why intergovernmental relations substitute for many characteristics guaranteed by the formal
/ legal frameworks of dual and cooperative federalism.
8
In other words, collaborative federalism signals a shift from vertical to horizontal sharing of competences
where the federal level is not the apex of the political pyramid but rather a facilitator that watches out for
coherence in given policy areas.
9
This involves not only which sphere of action may be restricted from one level of governance, but it also asks
how action is limited within these given spheres, be it a reference to vertical or horizontal relationships.
measures, etc. the problem shall remain for long. Consequently, labor market questions are
closely connected to other social issues, such as education, immigration, social security, and
also general economic policy.
As for the constitutional status of labor market arrangements in Canada, as far as training
policy is concerned, it is the sole concern of the provinces (Article 93). The federal
government, on the other hand is only responsible for unemployment insurance (Article
91[2A]). Naturally, there is a lot of room for expansion for both spheres of government to
move into, as far as competence-distribution is concerned (e.g. „peace, order and good
governance”, or the federal spending power). However, the federal government has neither
the power nor the legitimacy to define a common framework on its own. Consequently, as the
constitution is quite silent on the issue, and any amendments to the document in the close
future seem to be out of reach10, the role of intergovernmental relations increases.
Intergovernmental relations in the field of labor market development have gradually
developed throughout the years. Depending on the era, the relations between the provinces
and the federal government shifted from cooperative to a rather collaborative type (see also
Donna and Klassen, 2009). From a collaborative federalist perspective three main questions
are important: How is policy-making arranged among the different levels of government so as
to keep the federal idea? What institutions and processes play an important role? How do
intergovernmental relations, in general, substitute for the formal, legal arrangements of
cooperative federalism?11
As for the constitutional settlement, the basic argument is that it is being substituted by
intergovernmental agreements, either on a bilateral (e.g. Labor Market [Development]
Agreements) or multilateral basis (e.g. Trade, Investment and Labour Mobility Agreement
and the New West Partnership Trade Agreement – BC, AL, SAS). Their main purpose is to
clarify the roles and responsibilities of the different levels of governance in the given policy
area. The major difference between a formal, cooperative model and this rather informal,
collaborative one is the relationship between the federal level and the constituent units. While
the former assumes a hierarchical relationship, the latter can be characterized as rather
heterarchical where no one is and can be threatened by the other.
Administratively, there are different sets of intergovernmental bodies, each having a distinct
role in the management of the policy-making. The single most important one strategically is
the Council of the Federation (working on labor mobility issues in relation to internal trade).
Also there are (inter-)ministerial councils (e.g. Forum of Labor Market Ministers, even though
it is not very active any more) connecting the ministers of the individual provinces to work
together on common problems. Usually, there is also a secretariat created to help the
management, and the implementation of the provisions of the agreements (e.g. TILMA
secretariat, management and joint committees overlooking labor market agreements, etc.).
Nowadays, these secretariats seem to be the most active in the shaping of policy-development.
Power-checking mechanisms involve different mechanisms of control from the planning to
the implementation stage (e.g. joint planning, reciprocal notice, funding predictability, etc.).
10
Also the fact that the constitutional arrangements remain untouched is one of the key elements of collaborative
federalism.
11
A more specific, comparison-based, research-centered question would inquire the difference in the
development of intergovernmental relations in specific policy areas, and would look for explanations in the
variation of outcomes. It is somewhat paradoxical, that with so many intergovernmental bodies emerging,
policy-innovation, problem-solving remains limited in certain cases. So does institutionalization actually help
deliver efficient policy-decisions?
Also, the judicial overview process is substituted by intergovernmental actions – usually
carried out by the secretariats – through the dispute resolution mechanism, as these
intergovernmental agreements are legally non-binding constructs.
In general, it is quite paradoxical that a certain level of institutionalization, formalization of
intergovernmental relations emerges despite the fact that the policy area itself remains
constitutionally very informalized. The question, however, still remains to what extent these
intergovernmental relations actually foster more effective policy decisions, or is there rather a
decline in the activities and a return to ’watertight compartments’?
The question is to what extent does the EU approach follow this type of development? Labor
market concerns are to a great extent identical to the one witnessed in Canada.
’Constitutionally’, employment questions are the sole concern of the individual memberstates, however, the EU can intrude whenever the free movement of people, thus labor,
highlighted in the Lisbon Treaty, is not guaranteed12. However, there is no, federally
orchestrated employment strategy within the European Union, even though there is a greater
need for countries to collaborate on the issue in order to be able to preserve the economic
power of the EU. The issue is rather dealt with within the realms of the ’open-method of
coordination’ (OMC), labelled as European Employment Strategy, which very much
substitutes for a formal competence-distribution engraved in a constitutional document. The
OMC provides with a framework for the member-states to voluntarily coordinate their
policies. The main aim is to generate change at the level of member-states and thus avoid
federal intrusion through framework legislation. In this sense, it is very similar to the
Canadian case.
Administratively, the single most important actor in the field is the Employment Committee13
which is a treaty-based institution, and is responsible for preparing guidelines, reports,
recommendations. Its major purpose is to manage and promote the development of the
employment strategy, very similar to what the different secretariats do in the Canadian case.
The collaborative nature is manifested in the equal representation of the individual memberstates and the European Commission. However, the ’federal level’ is a lot more constrained in
the EU, as it lacks the financial means, the federal government of Canada possesses, and
through which it can actually influence policy outcomes. Also, the sectoral ministers meet
multiple times annually which is a lot different to the Canadian practice.
As for the processes concerned, the OMC provides with review processes, evaluation
procedures which emerge around multiple guidelines, targets and deadlines. Similarly to the
Canadian case, there is no legal consequence to non-compliance, however. As for the outputs,
the Employment Committee only creates opinions, reports and recommendations, but no
legally binding provisions.
In general, it could be argued that intergovernmental relations are a lot more formalized in the
European than in the Canadian context. However, there is a growing need in both cases to
further enhance collaborative schemes, as the constituent units remain very reluctant to
transfer more competences to the federal level. In a sense, the Canadian approach to labor
market issues is very divergent, as there is less and less initiative within a multilateral and
multilevel framework, whereas the bilateral and multilevel arrangements are vivid, and so are
some of the provincial multilateral ones. This also makes the overall system less transparent.
The answer in the Canadian context may be a set of regionally organized labor market
agreements that may or may not in the future develop into a common national framework.
12
13
Unless there is a derogation on labor mobility.
Its work is also helped by the European Employment Observatory.
However, at the moment, it seems that regional interests and demands are too different to
come up with a common ground.
The major question that still remains is to what extent intergovernmental relations actually
facilitate collaborative patterns, and what may counteract its effects? Why don’t we see more
collaboration in the Canadian context despite the intergovernmental bodies in place? Are
there lessons to be learned from the EU which does not have the means to actually financially
influence labor market developments in the member-states?
Conclusion
Collaboration among the different levels of governance can have many advantages but also
some disadvantages. It can lead to mutual learning and capacity building, it can provide with
new perspectives of old problems, and a kind of a testing-ground. But for federal systems, the
most important element is probably the way it clarifies the roles and responsibilities as far as
the competences are concerned. One of the biggest challenges to collaboration, however, is
that it may actually create less transparency and accountability, but may at the same time
prove to be very time-consuming, and less cost-efficient than centralized decision-making.
The issue of labor market development shall remain, and its impact on other areas belonging
to constituent unit jurisdiction, such as education is likely to rise. Therefore, it is becoming
more and more important for governments to be able to collaborate more efficiently on
matters of common concern. However, it has to go beyond mere rhetoric. The main aim is to
create greater harmony without actually creating a national policy, thus rendering the federal
government to the back-seat.
It is clear, that intergovernmental relations have changed around labor market issues, however
it shall be further researched to what extent these relations actually can facilitate more
efficient policy-learning, problem-solving capabilities, etc.? And also what roles the different
intergovernmental institutions may play in that process? As for the governance itself, the main
question is to what extent the tools of collaborative governance may influence policy
outcomes in policy areas where working together is necessary, however constituent units are
not willing to give the federal level more power?
As for the wider spectrum, the collaborative federal model may gain relevance, as there are
more and more issues on the horizon that are ’nationally’ important, but provincially delicate,
such as international trade agreements that cut well into provincial jurisdictions. Therefore, a
comparative assessment may prove to be useful, not only across sectors, but also across
different entities.
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