Putting presidents power into place:
A measurement of constitutional presidential strength in
non-presidential systems
Paper (draft): ECPR General Conference 2014
Anna Fruhstorfer1
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Abstract:
This article introduces a new tool to measure presidential power: the index of constitutional
presidential strength (CPS). This index places emphasis on the president as a significant
player in non-presidential systems. Established measurement tools of presidential power are
quickly stretched to their limits if they are to account for both semi-presidential and
parliamentary systems. Part 1 of this article therefore discusses the established measurement
tools, especially criticizing how well-grounded, in terms of theory and methodology, they are.
Part 2 introduces the new measurement tool, which is especially useful to measure low-level
constitutional competences and proposes a balance of content and concept validity.
Keywords: Presidents, Constitutions, Measurement
Please do not quote or circulate without author’s permission!
1 Anna Fruhstorfer, [email protected]; Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Department of Social
Sciences, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin
I am grateful to the Silvia von Steinsdorff and Zachary Elkins for their input, suggestions and support and
everybody from the Comparative Constitutions Project for allowing me to conduct this research project at the
University of Texas at Austin.
Introduction
Political science has paid little attention to presidents in systems with a powerful parliament
and prime minister. So far scholars have been mostly focusing on semi-presidential systems,
whereas purely parliamentary systems are often not discussed. This article argues that the
functional logic behind parliamentary systems and that behind semi-presidential systems are
often similar and they should therefore be treated similarly. However, established
measurement tools of presidential power are quickly stretched to their limits if they are to
account for both types of political systems. Additionally, applying Shugart and Carey (1992),
Frye (1997), Metcalf (2000), Roper (2002) and others to actually measure presidential power
leaves one sincerely doubting how well-grounded, in terms of theory and methodology, these
measurement tools are.
Part 1 of this article discusses the established measurement tools by Shugart and Carey (1992)
(with the revision by Metcalf 2000), Armingeon and Careja (2007) (and with a similar scheme
also Frye 1997), Roper (2002) and McGregor (1994), critically assessing their deficiencies
with regard to three main aspects: The cursory use of indicators, the formation of additive
indices, and the structural disregard of the functional logic of parliamentary systems in the
conceptual approach towards presidential power. In addition, by addressing different
problems of validity and reliability (see Carmines & Zeller 1979 and Fortin 2010), some
methodological shortcomings in established measurement tools will be highlighted.
Based on these considerations, part 2 of this article introduces a new measurement tool: the
index of constitutional presidential strength (CPS). This index places emphasis on the
president as a significant player in non-presidential systems. Presidential power in these
systems is extremely diverse (Weaver & Rockman 1993:19); a factor not yet represented in
established measurement tools of presidential power. This shortcoming accounts for the
limited capacity of other indices to yield valuable data on lower power levels. Embracing this
diversity allows for the development of a multidimensional representation of presidential
strength with an emphasis on constitutions and the functional logic of parliamentary systems.
Only then we can discuss further differences between constitution and reality from a
comparative perspective.
Therefore, the tool presented here for measuring constitutional strength of presidents will
provide immense advantages for comparative research. It emphasizes low-level constitutional
competences, mostly overlooked by established measurement tools. With the proposed
balance of content and concept validity and the possibility for other researchers to decide
which data to use, the index of CPS offers methodologically and empirically sound paths for
further research on presidential power. Furthermore, the application of this tool in 46
countries in 2011 provides a comprehensive data collection for presidential strength.2 The
sample consists of all countries with a president as head of state and a Prime Minister, so in
fact the central selection criterion is the constitutionally formalized separation of the head of
state and the prime minister.3 And as “(t)he defining distinction between presidentialism and
parliamentarism concerns the degree of interdependence between the executive and the
legislature" (Cheibub, Elkins & Ginsburg 2010:6),“the separation of origin and survival”
(Shugart and Carey 1992:22) of the executive is the decisive category. With this, the case
selection follows the idea that president and prime minister are the major players for power in
the political realm.
A Critique of Established Measurement Tools
The criticism towards the established measurement tools can be subsumed under three main
categories: First, the cursory use of indicators; second, the formation of additive indices; and,
third, the structural disregard of the functional logic of parliamentary systems in the
conceptual approach towards presidential power. In the following, all three will be discussed
in detail exploring advantages and disadvantages to the tools by Shugart and Carey (1992)
(with the revision by Metcalf 2000) and Armingeon and Careja (2007) (and with a similar
scheme also Frye 1997). These two are the most established measurement tools and both
represent a group of diverging conceptualizations and measurement proposals. In addition,
Roper (2002), McGregor (1994) and Kouwel (2003) and Siaroff (2003) with the adaption of
2
All measurement data can be accessed here: [as the homepage would identify the author it will be
included just before publication]. The sample has been established according to four basic dimensions,
namely executive structure, time, democracy, and constitutional event. These were collected as part of
the Comparative Constitutions Project (Comparative Constitutions Project).
3
All other classic selections criteria like ‘demission of the government by the president’ according to
Steffani (1979), the direct election or the primary control over the cabinet (Shugart and Carey 1992)
are not relevant for the selection of the sample here. The definition of parliamentary systems is based
on Steffani (1979:39), the definition of semi-presidential systems on Elgie (1999: 13) who describes it
“as a situation where a popularly elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and
cabinet who are responsible to parliament”.
van Cranenburgh (2008) will also be touched on only briefly. All these measurement tools
were great inspirations for the here presented index. And whereas the lack of space forces a
focus on critique, the index of CPS hopes to contribute to the state of the art established by
Shugart and Carey (1992) and all the others.
The most frequently used tool for measuring presidential power is the index described by
Shugart and Carey (1992). This index was revised by Metcalf (2000), based on her claim that
low-level presidential power is not well-represented. Although subscribing to her assessment,
a comparative perspective provides evidence that the advances in the 2000 Metcalf revision
are still too limited to grasp the parliamentary logic. The parameterized overview suggests
that the improvements claimed by her are not advancing the index in the direction she claims.
In addition to this specific conceptualization of presidential power as “strong” power, both
Metcalf (2000) and Shugart and Carey (1992) established indices that provide a basis for a
coherent and comparative view on presidential power but have two disadvantages: First, both
tools contain coding decisions based on the functional logic of presidential systems and,
second - which might be a result of the emphasis on presidential systems - both include a very
limited number of non-legislative competences. At the same time, the inclusion of more
legislative competences, such as censure and partial veto, limits the reliability and validity of
any measurement of non-presidential systems as, empirically, they never occur in
parliamentary systems. As Metcalf described for Shugart and Carey’s index (1992) "(t)he
major disadvantage is that it is better at distinguishing variations at high levels of presidential
power than at low levels. In particular, by treating the president and the assembly as the only
relevant actors, it does not capture well the dual authority structure of semi-presidentialism"
(Metcalf 2000:667). This should be more explicitly emphasized, not only focusing on the dual
authority structure of semi-presidentialism, but on its different logic of functioning. Especially
the degree of interdependence between the executive and the legislature, following the rules
of parliamentarism rather than presidentialism, has to form an essential part of any
measurement index of presidential power. Shugart responded to this critique by including
more levels in his indicator for cabinet formation ("2 President appoints ministers who need
confidence of assembly" Shugart 1996:7), which constitutes a promising move in the right
direction. In addition to these points of criticism, mainly concerning the indicator level, both
the Shugart and Carey index, and the adaptation by Metcalf share an imbalance between
concept and content validity. A correlation analysis even indicates some negative correlations
between single items and between the item ‘dissolution of the assembly' and the overall score
(Fortin 2013:95, although this is a result based on a pooling of Frye 2000 and Shugart and
Carey 1992). This lack of convergent validity is a problem all additive indices share and
which can only be controlled by a high correlation between single indicators, as discussed in
detail for the CPS.
Armingeon and Careja (2007) (and with a similar scheme also Frye 1997) combine 29
indicators that influence presidential power. The coding decisions established for these
indicators of the Presidential Power Index represent the elementary yet great idea of power
sharing. This idea is also pursued by the index of CPS. Nevertheless the mentioned authors
are prone to the same criticism as Shugart and Carey of establishing an index with a not fully
comprehensive conceptualization of presidential power. This results in problems of
convergent validity and so of concept and content validity. In discussing for example the
Presidential Power Index, two main issues have to be addressed: 1) the inclusion of a variety
of indicators without the crucial balance between concept and content validity, and 2) the
weighting of indicators based on the mode of presidential elections. Increasing the number of
indicators like Armingeon and Careja (2007) (and with a similar scheme also Frye 1997) the
lack of equivalence between these indicators becomes more and more problematic. Although
they tackle this problem by weighting indicators by halving the value in countries without
direct election, an approach Tavits also uses (Tavits 2009b), a conceptual or empirical
justification for this approach would be useful. Furthermore, as Fortin has shown, this
weighting decision produces a bimodal distribution with in fact two “clusters of cases on both
the high and low ends of the potential spectrum” (Fortin 2013:99). In addition to this
methodological issue to be considered for any inference statistics it is also a problematic
approach on the descriptive level, as it does not reflect a conceptual logic behind the
weighting decision. This critique does not mean that direct election should not be considered
as it will be discussed later.
Although other measurement tools exist, they are not as frequently used as the two discussed
in detail in the foregoing. For example, McGregor‘s (1994) index is partly inconsistent and
therefore problematic for further analysis. It offers a broad selection of indicators, similarly to
Armingeon and Careja (2007) and Frye (1997). These indicators are subsumed under the
random latent variables of symbolic and political power and weighted (or rather multiplied)
according to the degree to which each is assumed to have political or symbolic power.
Kouwel (2003) and Siaroff (2003) both choose a nominal coding scheme. Although their
overall scores are each ordinal, the nominal character of the indicators and with this the
measurement results are not fully comprehensive.
Roper (2002) combines different approaches and moves in the same direction as the CPS
index. He proposes a parsimonious measurement tool, which starts to include the specific
logic of premier-presidential regimes. However, his coding decisions are close to the ones
proposed by Shugart and Carey (1992) and therefore do not describe the specific logic for
non-legislative indicators in particular, such as the demission of the cabinet. Similarly to
Shugart and Carey (1992), the legislative power dimension does not establish a fully
convincing consistency of items; none of the three proposed indicators correlated significantly
with the overall measurement result. This is a surprising finding, considering the important
competence of legislative veto power in a variety of cases. Furthermore, although Roper
presents a parsimonious tool, which always comes at the expense of content validity, it should
be strong at least on concept validity. What Roper proposes is neither; it does not adequately
capture the empirical diversity of premier-presidential or semi-presidential systems and it
deploys two dimensions developed a priori. It would be more convincing if they were based
on methodological considerations and a clearer conceptual idea about the multidimensional
representation of presidential power.
A Tool to Measure Constitutional Presidential Strength
Therefore, it is necessary to design a new tool specifically for non-presidential systems. It
must be based on a thorough theoretical foundation and a rigorous methodological discussion
of the uni-dimensionality of indices. The index of CPS introduced here was developed by the
author doing exactly that. It measures constitutional presidential strength, which can be
considered a subtype of a broader concept of presidential power. Hannah Arendt claims that
“(w)hen we say of somebody that he is “in power” we actually refer to his being empowered
by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which the
power originated to begin with (potestas in populo, without a people or a group there is not
power), disappears, “his power” also vanishes. In current usage, when we speak of a
“powerful man” or a “powerful personality”, we already use the word power metaphorically;
what we refer to without metaphor is “strength”” (Arendt 1970:44). This strength is
represented in different competences a president is given by the people through the
constitution.
In light of this it should be clear that a measurement of constitutional competences cannot be
based on a broad concept of power but on one of its dimensions. These competences are
measured with two random latent variables - legislative (xlg) and administrative (xad) powers formed by 14 indicators on an ordinal scale from 0-4 points: SUMps Σ (xlg+xad).
Table 1 Variables and Indicators
The selection of 14 indicators is based on the conceptual idea behind constitutional
presidential strength. What is described here as construct validity finds its basis in the
selection of indicators. The combination of these 14 indicators represents the functional logic
behind parliamentary systems; essentially, it will be argued that these 14 indicators are equally
relevant to the overall construct of presidential strength and add useful information to the
overall concept.
The selection of these 14 indicators, based on the critical analysis of established measurement
tools and literature on the prerogatives forming presidential power in non-presidential systems
(among them in particular Steffani 1979, Duverger 1980, Linz 1994, Sartori 1994, Shugart
1998, Lijphart 1999, Strøm 2000, Rüb 2001, Almeida & Cho Seok-jo 2003, Cheibub,
Przeworski & Saiegh 2004, Amorim Neto & Strøm 2006, Elgie & Moestrup 2008, Schleiter
& Morgan-Jones 2009) was refined by the bottom-up process of coding constitutions and
gradually adapting the index. These indicators form a basic-level concept of constitutional
presidential strength. The additive index consists of two random variables, which in fact
constitutes one latent variable. This poses certain limitations to the index. The perks and perils
of this approach will be discussed later. Additionally, two alternative approaches to solving
this problem of lacking concept validity will be presented.
In the following, the 14 indicators are described in detail (for coding decisions see Annex),
discussing both the respective coding decisions for them and the conceptual and empirical
reasons for their inclusion. The main resource for coding decisions was the idea behind
Armingeon and Careja's (2007) power index to distinguish between the exclusive power of
the president, the shared power of the president and the cases in which the president does not
hold any power. In doing so, the CPS index refines a basic conceptual logic of power sharing.
Legislative veto power
Not only in the measurement scale of Shugart and Carey (1992), but also in other
measurement tools here cited on several occasions, legislative veto power of presidents is an
important indicator. The index of CPS emphasizes this point made by Shugart and Carey but
differs from them and others in its exclusion of partial veto (Metcalf 2000 or Shugart & Carey
1992). This veto is a combination of reactive veto power, but also an attempt to actively
change content. Empirically, it is not relevant in non-presidential systems. The presidential
veto against a legislative initiative already confirmed by the legislative assembly and an
overruling by this assembly with a 2/3 or 3/5 majority were valued equally with 4 points.
None of the cases in my sample provided the opportunity to observe an absolute veto with no
possibility to overrule.4 Certainly, the democracy level on which the case selection in this
research project is based provides an explanation for this. This also holds true for legislative
veto power in the index of CPS, which can only be overruled by a 3/5 or > majority and has
the classic attributes of a hindering power. Overruling with an absolute majority or the
combination of veto and referendum are valued with 2 points. This also applies to both the
overruling with a simple majority and to formulating a legislative veto with only the
countersignature of the Prime Minister - a power to make subjects the topic of discussion. As
already stated by Shugart and Carey "(h)ighly constrained, the veto can allow the president no
more than an opportunity to express disapproval for a law, with no ability to block it"
(Shugart & Carey 1992:134) and therefore thematizing certain issues is valued with 1 point.5
Judicial review (submitting legislative initiatives to the Supreme Court)
Judicial review is not a significant presidential competence on its own. But as Constitutional
Courts became “export hits” (Steinsdorff 2010:479) in the process of democratization in postcommunist Eastern Europe, the threat of this competence evolving can form a central aspect
of presidential power (or as Alec Stone Sweet puts it. “(i)n 2003, after a polite nod to
Westminster, parliamentary sovereignty can be pronounced dead” (Stone Sweet 2003:2745)).
4
This is contrary to the observation by Shugart and Carey (1992:157).
Two chambers, which have to renew the assent, can lead to further blocking of the legislative
process. As it is not of significant importance for presidential power, I did not include it in this Index.
Nevertheless it should be mentioned that in India, Italy and Romania the way a legislative presidential
veto has to ‘go’ is somewhat more complicated than in other countries without a second
chamber/legislative veto combination.
5
An important aspect, which can turn Supreme Courts/Constitutional Courts into important
allies of the president, is the type of court we observe: diffuse or concentrated. In countries
with Constitutional Courts, functioning according to the diffuse type, like the United States
"[…] the provision for judicial review does not increase the role of the president in the
legislative process." (Metcalf 2000:671) Taking this into account for the coding decisions and
cases in which only the president can refer legislation to the Constitutional Court without any
restrictions to policies is valued with 4 points. In two countries, India (Art. 137 and Art. 143)
and Croatia (Art. 88), only the president can refer legislation to the Constitutional Court for
review, which is why these were coded with 4 points. If the president, the prime minister (or
the whole cabinet) or members of the national assembly (undefined majority) have the
constitutionally assigned competence to refer legislation to the Constitutional Court, it is
valued with 2 points. If this competence is combined with cooperation for referring legislation
to the Constitutional Court, the value attributed is 1 point. If the president has no competences
or every citizen can refer legislation it is valued with 0.
Legislative initiative
The legislative initiative is the first active constitutional competence of a president described
here and adopts the coding decisions of Armingeon and Careja (2007). None of the observed
countries have a system in which only the president has the power to initiate legislation (4
points), not even in a reserved policy fields. This is a phenomenon only practiced in
presidential systems, for example Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay (Shugart & Carey
1992:139). This supports the argument that the countries in the sample follow the logic of
parliamentarism rather than the assumed logic of a mixture of characteristics from
parliamentarism and presidentialism in semi-presidentialism. Contrary to Shugart and Carey’s
reasonable assumption "[...] that when presidents, or ministers who are exclusively
accountable to presidents, are allowed to initiate legislation on their own, they are generally
among the primary forces in the legislative process" (Shugart & Carey 1992:139), this relation
cannot be observed for non-presidential systems. The non-exclusive exercise of legislative
initiative by the president was valued with 2 points and the lack thereof with 0 points.
Power of decree
The presidential competence with the potential to be the most dominant is their power of
decree, i.e. issuing decrees with legislative force without applying the usual legislation
procedure. Relevant here is not the symbolic power of decree, but the competence to issue
decrees which are not an act of parliament. "(O)nly those laws which the president can initiate
and which maintain the force of law unless specifically rescinded (vetoed) by congress are
meaningfully called decree laws" (Shugart & Carey 1992:143). This power of decree is very
rare among non-presidential democratic countries and can only be found in countries with a
post-soviet legacy (e.g. Ukraine with restrictions to certain policy areas, Art. 106 and
Moldova, Art. 94, where the president can issue decrees for all policy fields apart from
matters of defense and foreign politics, for which he needs the countersignature of the Prime
Minister). For the CPS index, a president with an unlimited power of decree in the initially
described sense was valued with 4 points, a power of decree for certain policy areas with 3
points and no power of decree with 0 points.
Declaration referendum
Referendums can be divided into three types (government-initiated, citizen-initiated, and
mandatory); in addition, citizen-initiated veto is sometimes included as a fourth type (Elster
1995). Relevant here is one type – the government-initiation referendum and the role the
president plays during the initiation of this referendum. It is important to consider "who asks
the question and […] who triggers a referendum" (Hug & Tsebelis 2013:466). It can be argued
that the combination of these two aspects hinders an effective separation of powers. From a
constitutional perspective, in Georgia (Art. 67), Moldova (Art. 66 and Art. 88) and
Montenegro (Art. 93), the president and other institutions have the right to initiate a
referendum (independent from each other) and are therefore valued with 3 points. Turkey
(Art. 104) and Niger (Art. 49) are valued with 4, as only the president has the right to initiate
a referendum. Nevertheless, 16 countries are valued with 0 points, because their president has
no competences concerning the declaration of a referendum.
Legislation during state of war/emergency
The competences of presidents in a state of war or siege or after the declaration of emergency
differ greatly. They can range from suspending "[…] liberties and tak[ing] direct command of
local agencies in times of unrest” (Shugart & Carey 1992:145) to the execution of legislative
power: “Constitutions differ in the degree to which congressional ratification or oversight of
states of exception is required (Shugart & Carey 1992:145)". However, not only is the
competence as such an important factor, but so is the manner in which it is enacted. Therefore,
legislation in its own right, without the subsequent assent of the parliament, is valued with 4,
whereas the subsequent assent of the parliament is valued with 3. Emergency powers can lie
at the core of presidential competences, but in most cases - involving legislative power in
times of siege, war or emergency – they are shared (which is valued with 2 points). In 20
cases, the president has no legislative competences whatsoever (0 points).
Nomination prime minister, demission prime minister and dissolution of the assembly
The groundbreaking article by Steffani (1979), in which he outlines the basic principles of
how to differentiate between presidential and parliamentary systems (demission of cabinet or
Prime-Minister)6, forms the basis for this research project and the improvement of existing
measurement indicators. This is based on e.g. the observation that "(t)he defining distinction
between presidentialism and parliamentarism concerns the degree of interdependence between
the executive and the legislature, specifically with respect to the selection and dismissal
procedures of the respective offices" (Cheibub, Elkins & Ginsburg 2010:6). This
understanding of parliamentary systems is a central element for further improvement of the
established measurement tools. Although they are independently listed in terms of their value,
they are related in terms of their functional logic. In the CPS index a bargaining model
(Amorim Neto & Strøm 2006) is emphasized which regards the prime minister, the assembly
and the president as individual, but not independent, players. The Index of CPS does not
measure cabinet formation, but the nomination and dismissal of Prime Ministers.7 Prime
Ministers are one of the major players for power in the political realm. Their nomination and
demission procedure should describe more with regard to the power of presidents than the
often unspecific nomination procedure for the ministers and/or cabinet does. Therefore,
cabinet formation is excluded from this index for the sake of concentrating on the one agent,
who can challenge the president for power. Cases in which the president can appoint the
Prime Minister without consent from or cooperation with legislative forces (majority in the
National Assembly or President of the National Assembly) are valued with 4 points.
6
German Quote: "Ist die Regierung vom Parlament absetzbar, so haben wir es mit der Grundform
'parlamentarisches Regierungssystem' zu tun, ist eine derartige Abberufbarkeit verfassungsrechtlich
nicht möglich, mit der Grundform 'präsidentielles Regierungssystem'" (Steffani 1979:39).
7
Prime Minister is used here as an equivalent to Chancellor and other terms describing this function.
Contrary to other measurement tools, an additional category with 3.5 points was included.
This is not only closely related to the power to dismiss the Prime Minister, but also
emphasizes the relation between parliamentary majority and the President. In cases in which
the President appoints a Prime Minister with subsequent consent of the legislative body and
this legislative body withholds assent, the president is allowed to dissolve the parliament as
from the second failed attempt to nominate a Prime Minister. This clear method for imposing
discipline gives the president influence over non-partisan or highly fragmented parliamentary
majorities, with the threat of new elections (without this threat, 3 points).
These coding decisions appear quite clear, but it gets more complicated and fuzzy as the
restrictions put on the president by the constitution increase. Therefore, 2 points are attributed
to several options, which show the variety of possibilities regarding these restrictions, yet
emphasize their equivalence: President appoints Prime Minister in cooperation (Prime
Minister needs consent of the Parliament); Prime Minister does not gain the confidence of the
Parliament in the first round; the one nominated in the second round must be appointed
Minister (without a majority, President can appoint him/her or dissolve Assembly); or
President appoints, no direct assent by the Parliament required, but immediately possible to
declare no confidence. Value 1 and 0 do not allow the president any direct action, but cases in
which the president can at least declare that he is withholding the power of assent, although
this has no immediate effect, were coded with 1. Based on different levels of power, this
possibility to share an opinion should be valued higher than the complete lack of presidential
competences in the nomination procedure.
The demission of Prime Minister and the dissolution of the National Assembly are based on
the logic of parliamentary systems highly related to each other and also – but to a lesser extent
– to the nomination of the Prime Minister. This constitutes the most significant deviation from
Shugart and Carey (Shugart & Carey 1992) and Armingeon and Careja (2007), based on the
logic of functioning in parliamentary systems worth including. The unnecessary and, for this
case selection, unreasonable separation of cabinet dismissal and censure from other
measurement indices (Shugart & Carey 1992), (Metcalf 2000) is avoided here and replaced by
a combination of both in one indicator. Therefore, “[…] the degree of interdependence […]"
(Cheibub, Elkins & Ginsburg 2010:6) measures the differences between the power of
presidents and other relevant agents. Empirically, in most cases the president has to cooperate
with the National Assembly, but with varying degrees of influence: President can dismiss
Prime Minister with a stable majority in cooperation (3 points); President initiates demission
but needs cooperation with parliament (2 points); 1 point is attributed to cases in which the
Cabinet can only be dismissed by a vote of no confidence, but President has to assent; or by
countersignature of e.g. the President of the Assembly. All these cases function more or less
clearly according to the main logic of parliamentary systems as Steffani (1979) described it.
The dissolution of the National Assembly is somewhat more complicated. "The provision for
dissolution would seem to provide an institutional resource to resolve the problem of
congressional deadlock decried by the critics of presidentialism" (Shugart & Carey 1992:126).
The dissolution of the Assembly by the president alone is valued with 4 points, a high value
only observable in countries with a >median president according to SUMps. Similar effects
can be expected if the president can dissolve the National Assembly in cooperation with, for
example, the President of the National Assembly, which is valued here at 3. The significant
case in which a national referendum becomes necessary is valued 2 here. The classic
parliamentary case in which the president has the formal role of confirming the dissolution of
the National Assembly after the vote of no confidence/censure is valued here with 1 point if
he is obligated to confirm and with 2 points if he is given the option of confirming. The rare
case in which the president has no role at all in the process of dissolving the Assembly is
valued with 0 points.
Participation cabinet meetings
Intra-executive struggle, i.e. who has what role in the cabinet (PM or President), is one of the
most important questions that need to be addressed by a presidential power measurement
index. Not only the nomination procedures for the cabinet, but also “[…] the degree of
presidential influence on the cabinet" (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones 2010:1424) as stated in the
constitution contributes to constitutional presidential strength. It should be clear that equating
presidential power in nominating cabinet members with presidential influence inside the
cabinet is problematic. In addition to the question 'who is the agent and who the principal?', a
more distinct perspective on what occurs constitutionally inside the cabinet is useful for a
measurement of constitutional power. Therefore, an indicator based solely on the
constitutionally assigned competences of the president in cabinet meetings is established. The
role of the president in cabinet meetings can vary from participation as chief of cabinet
(valued here with 4 points), to chief but only for certain policies, to initiator of the meeting (3
points), simple participant (1 point) or no role (0 points).
Countersignature
Countersignature is not included in other measurement tools as a separate indicator; without
reason, one might argue. Metcalf (2000:669) uses it as part of the gradual decrease of
legislative power in one indicator (proposal of referenda) and case descriptions can also be
found (Duverger 1980). However, it can be assumed that countersignature is a central element
to obtaining more information on the deeper understanding of the presidential role as intended
by the constitution. The aspect of countersignature is already included automatically in other
indicators, as a limitation of powerful competences, yet the separate mention of this aspect in
the constitution needs to be included in a measurement index. No requirement of a
countersignature was valued with 4 points (also for cases in which this is limited by the
declaration of emergency), formal acts requiring countersignature was valued with 3 points. A
distinction was made between cases in which the president needs a countersignature for every
decision in a major policy field (1 point) and those in which he needs one for every decision,
apart from the nomination of the Prime Minister and the dissolution of the National Assembly
(2 points). A countersignature required for all presidential decisions should not only limit the
value of the respective indicator, but should also be treated as a value on its own (0 points).
Nomination of Supreme Court judges
Both the fear of a judicialization of politics and the political influence on the judiciary play a
significant role in the discussion about the role of the president in the nomination procedure of
Supreme Court Judges. The inclusion of the nomination procedure of Supreme Court Judges
is based on two specific assumptions: 1) Presidents can have a variety of
nomination/appointment competences throughout the different branches of a political system
(judicature, administration, diplomacy, police etc.). To include all these competences would
be redundant because of their often clearly ceremonial and therefore highly speculative
political influence. However, to include one example of a position outside the triangle of
parliament-cabinet-president might show the overall tendency of the appointment structure in
a constitution. A nomination procedure that is highly dependent on the presidents’ decision
(nomination of more than ½ of the judges without countersignature, consent or influence of
the cabinet/PM/National Assembly) was coded with 4 points, countries in which the president
nominates less than 1/2, but more than 1/3, and only the National Assembly nominates the
other judges was coded with 3 points. Other cases that demonstrate the distinct cooperation of
the president were coded with 2 or 1 based on who nominates the judges and who confirms
their appointment.
Other: supreme commander of the armed forces and the declaration of war and/or
emergency
These two ‘other’ indicators were included because of their variance in the observed
countries. Although they are highly problematic in this context, as they have the potential of
yielding the highest level of competence but actually only have a clear symbolic influence,
both the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the declaration of state of emergency
feature as central elements in a broad concept of presidential power. Different levels of
influence of a president may occur, which are highly related to states of emergency. For the
purpose of the index, two separate conditions are considered: state of emergency/war and time
of peace. In addition, not only the competence of being the supreme commander is rated, but
also whether the president appoints the responsible agent (4 points in case the president is
always the supreme commander; 3 points if he only is in time of peace, but does appoint the
responsible supreme commander; 2 points for membership in a security council, and; 1 point
for when a countersignature is required or there is responsibility towards the cabinet).
Declaration of war and/or emergency was coded similarly, distinguishing between the
individual decision of a president (4 points) - considering, for example, his competences in
emergency legislation - and his decision in cooperation with other agents (3 points in case of
subsequent assent of Parliament, 2 points in case of the consent of Cabinet and the subsequent
consent of Parliament or 1 point, based on a cabinet initiative, including consent of
Parliament).
What is New and What is Improved?
Measurement results
The index of CPS (scale 0-56 points) has a range of characteristics and stretches from 9 points
in Germany as the lowest to 49 points in Mozambique as highest occurring value.8
Table 2 Measurement results for 46 countries in 2011
The median presidential institutions, in terms of the level of strength, are Latvia and Estonia
with 21.33 points. With its insensitivity to extreme values, the median offers more valuable
information on the data presented, which can be shown by their variance.
Table 3 Results of the index of CPS as Overview
Based on the results of this additive index, a variety of empirical evaluations can be
established. For example, an explorative data analysis is applied for the data collected by the
CPS index to discover ratios for two different groups: directly and indirectly elected
presidents. A t-test on the location parameter was applied, based on the normal distribution
(KMO) of these data and the equality of variance (Levene). With a p-value of 0.172, the 0hypotheses cannot be dismissed and therefore the equality of the variances can be assumed.
The t-test here displays a p-value of 0.003, testing the means of the two groups, namely
directly elected and indirectly elected. The means of the two groups significantly differ from
each other as in 95% of the cases, indirectly elected presidents have between 11.8 and 3.3
points less than directly elected presidents.
These empirical data are discussed here only briefly, as the index of CPS offers two directions
for further comparative research, each with its emphasis on a different aspect of validity.
Balance between content and concept validity
The two central methodological and conceptual aspects underlying the CPS and
distinguishing it from the established measurement tools are concept and content validity. In
addition to questions of criterion validity and equivalence, they will be discussed in light of
their importance for different forms of comparative research. With Fortin’s (2013) observation
on the cursory use of indicators subsumed into a “laundry list” of powers (Fortin 2010:18) in
8
All measurement data can be accessed here: [as the homepage would identify the author it will be
included just before publication]
mind, both the establishment of an additive index with a latent variable construct, and the
emphasis on the different latent dimensions have advantages and disadvantages. In this
context, the CPS is presented as an additive index, which mainly fulfills content validity. Yet
the results of this index show the balance between content and concept validity; between the
objective to include all indicators, which might influence presidential power and nevertheless
strive for a parsimonious research tool representing the two-dimensional concept of
constitutional presidential strength.
Concept validity
The establishment of an additive index had as its aim to strive for a high criterion-related
validity. But considering Fortin’s observation on the problems with one latent variable
construct, a factor analysis allows discovery of the underlying structure of the measured data,
meaning the structure that produces correlation covariance in the data. Principal axis-factor
analysis explores the underlying structure rather than to confirm theoretical dimensions
developed a priori. Therefore, the goal is to explain as much of the discovered groups of
bivariate correlations by means of as few latent constructs as possible. With the reduction of
non-correlated variables (RJUDREV RGI RLEGCRI RDECREE RNOMPM RDEMPM
RCABI RCOMMAF RDECLSE = Rank of Indicators, see Data Annex) one can group the
remaining indicators along 2 latent variables (factors).
Table 4 Rotated Factor Matrix
With this two-dimensional model a very distinct indicator structure can be found, which
follows the arguments by Fortin (2013) and Krouwel (2003) in favor of concentrating on a
high internal consistency of the index. Factor 1 consists of legislative veto, legislative
initiative, role in the cabinet and command of the armed forces, whereas Factor 2 includes
demission of prime minister and declaration of state of emergency (to treat an indicator
loading on a factor, it has to be + or – 0.500) (Backhaus u.a. 2011:389). As α for the four
indicators in factor 1 is .74, it is safe to combine them to one variable. Based on these two
variables researchers can adapt the Index of CPS to yield high concept validity.
Content validity
Although Booysen argues that in cases "(w)here the correlation between components and
index scores or variable and component scores is especially weak, the specific components or
variables may be excluded from the index" (Booysen 2002:130), this definition of validity is
too narrow. By working against this argument and including indicators that do not have a high
correlation with the overall concept or a high correlation with each item, content validity was
maximized for the CPS index. With the selection of its indicators, which include both
established indicators from other tools and indicators with an assumed influence based on the
specifics of parliamentary systems, the index of CPS shows validity in construct as well.
Therefore, analyzing internal consistency with a reliability test for all 14 indicators with
Cronbach's α (in this case 0.653, including all indicators) provides one possibility. For a
research project based on empirical data on an ordinal scale this is a considerably high value
(although a value of > 0.700 would have been better) taking into account that for some
indicators the equivalence in their values has to be considered.
This problem of equivalence between the indicators is a problem which should be discussed
for all measurement tools with ordinal scales, including the indicators of the CPS introduced
in the present article. But whereas other indices claim to measure presidential power, the
index of CPS is clearly focused on constitutional competences. This means that the
observations measured by the described indicators are for that reason “stated in a standard
language” […] and consistently applied” (Przeworski & Teune 1970:96-97). Different
indicators can have a different impact depending on the political context, for example the
right to declare war. This power has a completely different meaning in Austria than it does in
France. For instance, Tavits (2009a) attempts to include the idea of the different weighting of
indicators by measuring competences and then halving the value in countries without direct
election (similar to Armingeon & Careja 2007). However, this weighting decision seems
subjective and neither analytically nor empirically justifiable. In this light, the CPS does not
weigh indicators differently. This would be a decision increasing the danger of limited
awareness as described earlier, as a weighting would always be based on the empirical
knowledge of different countries and therefore highly subjective. Measuring impact too often
results in a lacking equivalence between indicators. This has a similarly severe impact on
further statistical usage as the ordinal scale level might have. Measuring constitutional
competences, like the index of CPS, means applying a “standard language” (Przeworski &
Teune 1970:96) and avoiding this problematic aspect of validity.
Differences from other measurement indices
In light of these results, the measurement shows substantial differences from established
measurement tools. Contrary to, for example, Shugart and Carey (1992) or Roper (2002), it
yields different findings concerning the degree of presidential power based on the median
president. As the overview in table 3 demonstrates, critique of Duverger’s proposition on the
analysis of semi-presidential systems - "(s)imilarity of rules, diversity of games [...]"
(Duverger 1980:167) - can be confirmed. Additionally, it is evident that a more precise
measurement of constitutional power yields more insight into different presidential
institutions from a comparative perspective. Listed in this table are the three main
measurement indices of presidential power, all measured with different scales and a different
number of indicators, making a comparison difficult. However, comparing the parameterized
measurement results does provide a clear overview of the following indices: Shugart and
Carey (1992), Metcalf (2000), Roper (2002), and the newly established index of CPS:
Table 5 Parametrized overview
These differences demonstrate the sometimes limited capacity of the three other indices to
yield satisfying data on lower power levels, are evident for Ireland (0.25 CPS) and Bulgaria
(0.20/0.32 CPS), for example. Both are valued with 0 points by Shugart and Carey (1992) and
0.09 points by Metcalf (2000), even though it is clear that both presidents have constitutional
powers - e.g. in Ireland to decide on a referendum (Art. 27 and 47) or in Bulgaria with a
legislative veto - that could be overruled by a simple majority (Art. 101) and, since 2003, by
an absolute majority. For Romania, Shugart and Carey (1992) and Metcalf (2000) measure the
presidential power as a minimal degree of 0.10/0.20. The index of CPS is therefore nearer to
Ropers’ (2002) results in general, but still values presidential power at 0.13 more. A similar
observation can be made for France, Macedonia, Peru, Croatia and Poland, for which the
measurement results of the CPS index and Shugart and Carey (1992) differ substantially. In
most compared cases, the CPS measures more constitutional presidential power than Shugart
and Carey (1992) do with their initial measurement index (without the revisions by Shugart
1996).
Conclusion
This article presents the index of CPS, a new way of measuring presidential power putting
emphasis on the president as a significant player in non-presidential systems. With the
proposed balance of content and concept validity and the possibility for other researchers to
decide which data to use, the index of CPS offers methodologically and empirically sound
paths for further research on presidential power.9 To enhance comparative statistical research
the adapted version of the Index of CPS yields high concept validity and with this allows real
comparative claims. Whereas with the additive index of CPS (with a relatively high
Cronbach's α) researchers have the opportunity for further descriptive studies. Both allow a
coherent and comparable perspective on constitutions and constitutional competences. This is
crucial in order to make it possible for unusual constellations in constitutional reality to be
discovered, described and explained. Additionally, with this index some of the common
assumptions concerning presidential power in non-presidential systems can be evaluated, e.g.
the consistency of system typologies based on direct election. Moreover, following a
traditional path of transformation literature, accurate assertions on the influence of certain
political systems on democratization depend on a correct categorization of system types.
Especially the two-dimensionality of the revised index allows precise assertions concerning
the effect of different variables on democratic consolidation. Research discussing
consolidation of democratic systems and debating the influences of historical legacies, modes
of transition, type of autocratic and pre-autocratic system already has a variety of ideas on
how institutions influence this process. To the same end constitutional choices in the process
of democratization are by no means without influence, although there is no consensus among
political scientists about which political system is the “best” to foster the process of
democratization. This considered the role of a certain type of political system in enhancing
democratic consolidation can still be discussed. Either following Linz’ work (Linz 1994) on
the worrisome effects of semi-presidentialism for democratic consolidation or explicitly
arguing against it, most researchers in transformation literature have a very distinct opinion on
the advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary and semi-presidential systems in
democratic consolidation. It should be the purpose of further research to discuss the
advantages of a certain constellation of constitutional competences.
9
The index of CPS has some inconsistencies for the measurement of purely presidential systems. Yet
an adaption of Shugart and Carey (1992) with a parametrized comparison of the index presented here
allows a comparative view of both systems and possible sub-types.
Following this traditional path of transformation literature on the role institutions play in
democratic consolidation, accurate assertions about the influence of certain political systems
on democratization depend on a correct categorization of system types. Yet, and this aspect is
crucial, definitions of presidential power in relation to the political system are still incoherent
and highly disputed. This problem is not solved here, but the results of the measurement of
CPS lead the discussion towards including presidential institutions and their competences for
a better understanding of different regime (sub)types. What is here implied is the question of
which role powerful presidents play for a successful democratic consolidation beyond the
often-discussed government instability (Schleiter 2009). Rather, as some constitutional
competences like the ‘role of the president in cabinet’ unfold unexpected effects for a
successful process of democratization, the impact of power-dispersing contrary to powerconcentrating constitutions (Alberts 2009) has to be reconsidered.
References
Alberts, Susan 2009. How constitutions constrain. Comparative Politics 41(2), 127-143.
Almeida, Acir & Cho Seok-jo 2003. Presidential Power and Cabinet Membership Under
Semi-Presidentialism. Chicago. URL:
http://www.iuperj.br/destaques/destaqant/almeidacho521tables.pdf.
Amorim Neto, Octavio & Strøm, Kaare 2006. Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of
Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies.
British Journal of Political Science 36(4), 619–643.
Arendt, Hannah 1970. On Violence. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
Armingeon, Klaus & Careja, Romana 2007. Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist
Countries, 1989-2007. Bern.
Backhaus, Klaus, u.a. 2011. Multivariate Analysemethoden. Eine anwendungsorientierte
Einführung. Berlin: Springer.
Booysen, Frederick 2002. An Overview and Evaluation of Compositive Indices of
Development. Social Indicators Research 59(2), 115–151.
Carmines, Edward G. & Zeller, Richard A. 1979. Reliability and Validity Assessment.
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc.
Cheibub, José A., Elkins, Zachary & Ginsburg, Tom 2010. Beyond Presidentialism and
Parliamentarism: On the Hybridization of Constitutional Form. Oslo.
Cheibub, José A., Przeworski, Adam & Saiegh, Sebastian M. 2004. Government coalitions
and legislative success under presidentialism and parliamentarism. British Journal of
Political Science 34(4), 565–587. Online: URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123404000195.
Comparative Constitutions Project. URL: http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/
[2013-02-22].
Duverger, Maurice 1980. A New Political System Model – Semi Presidential Government.
European Journal of Political Research 8(2), 165–187.
Elgie, Robert & Moestrup, Sophia (Ed.) 2008. Semi-presidentialism in Central and Eastern
Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Elster, Jon 1995. Forces and mechanisms in the constitution making process. Duke Law
Journal 45(2), 364–396.
Fortin, Jessica 2010. Measuring Presidential Powers: Some Pitfalls of Aggregate
Measurement, prepared for delivery at the Annual Midwest Political Science Association
Conference.
Fortin, Jessica 2013. Measuring presidential powers: Some pitfalls of aggregate measurement.
International Political Science Review 34(1), 91–112.
Frye, Timothy 1997. A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post Communist Presidencies.
Comparative Political Studies 30(5), 523–552.
Frye, Timothy, Hellman, Joel & Tucker, Joshua 2000. Data base on political institutions in the
post-communist world. The Ohio State University. Unpublished Data Set.
Hug, Simon & Tsebelis, George 2013. Veto Players and Referendums Around the World.
Journal of Theoretical Politics 25(4), 465-515.
Krouwel, André 2003. Measuring presidentialism and parliamentarism: An Application to
Central and Eastern European Countries. Acta Politica 38, 333–364.
Lijphart, Arend 1999. Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirtysix countries. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.
Linz, Juan J. 1994. Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in
Linz, Juan J. & Valenzuela, Arturo (Ed.): The failure of presidential democracy:
Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore, MD, London: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Pr, 3–90.
McGregor, James 1994. The presidency in East Central Europe. RFE/RL Research Report
3(2), 23–31.
Metcalf, Lee K. 2000. Measuring Presidential Power. Comparative Political Studies 33(5),
660–685.
Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune 1970. The logic of comparative social inquiry. New
York: Wiley-Interscience.
Roper, Steven D. 2002. Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of
Premier-Presidential Regimes. Comparative Politics 3(3), 253–272.
Rüb, Friedbert W. 2001. Schach dem Parlament!: Regierungssysteme und Staatspräsidenten
in den Demokratisierungsprozessen Osteuropas. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH.
Sartori, Giovanni 1994. Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism, in Linz, Juan J. &
Valenzuela, Arturo (Ed.): The failure of presidential democracy: Comparative
Perspectives. Baltimore, MD, London: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Pr, 106–118.
Schleiter, Petra & Morgan-Jones, Edward 2009. Party government in Europe? Parliamentary
and semi-presidential democracies compared. European Journal of Political Research
48(5), 665–693.
Schleiter, Petra & Morgan-Jones, Edward 2010. Who's in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies,
and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets. Comparative Political Studies
43(11), 1415–1441.
Shugart, Matthew S. 1996. Executive-Legislative Relations, in Post-Communist Europe.
Transition(13 (December)), 6–11.
Shugart, Matthew S. 1998. The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength and Executive
Strength: A Theory of Politicians’ Constitutional Choices. British Journal of Political
Science 28(1), 1–29.
Shugart, Matthew S. & Carey, John 1992. Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design
and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Siaroff, Alan 2003. Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semipresidential and parliamentary distinction. European Journal of Political Research 42(3),
287–312.
Steffani, Winfried 1979. Strukturtypen präsidentieller und parlamentarischer
Regierungssysteme, in Steffani, Winfried (Ed.): Parlamentarische und präsidentielle
Demokratie. Strukturelle Aspekte westlicher Demokratien. Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 37–
60.
Steinsdorff, Silvia von 2010. Verfassungsgerichte als Demokratie-Versicherung? Ursachen
und Grenzen der wachsenden Bedeutung juristischer Politikkontrolle, in Schrenk,
Klemens H. & Soldner, Markus (Ed.): Analyse demokratischer Regierungssysteme.
Wiesbaden: VS Verl. für Sozialwissenschaften, 479–498.
Stone Sweet, Alec 2003. Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review: And Why It May
Not Matter. Michigan Law Review 101(8), 2744–2780.
Strøm, Kaare 2000. Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. European
Journal of Political Research 37(3), 261–289.
Tavits, Margit 2009a. Direct Presidential Elections and Turnout in Parliamentary Contests.
Political Research Quarterly 62(1), 42–54.
Tavits, Margit 2009b. Presidents and Prime Minsters. Do Direct Elections Matter? Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press.
Van Cranenburgh, Oda 2008. Big Men’ Rule: Presidential Power, Regime Type and
Democracy in 30 African Countries. Democratization 15(5), 952-973.
Weaver, R. K. & Rockman, Bert A. 1993. When and How Do Institutions Matter?, in Weaver,
R. K. & Rockman, Bert A. (Ed.): Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the
United States and Abroad. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 445–461.
Tables
Table 1 Variables and Indicators
Basic Level
Secondary Level
Legislative Competences
Indicator Level (all cue)
Veto
Legislative Initiative
Judicial Review
Decree Power
Referendum
Decree Power during State
of War/Emergency
Constitutional Strength
Administrative (or Nonlegislative Competences,
Shugart & Carey 1992;
Metcalf 2002)
Nomination Prime
Minister
Demission Prime Minister
Dissolution Assembly
Cabinet Meetings
Command Armed Forces
Countersignature
Nomination Constitutional
Court Judges
Declaration State of
War/Emergency/Siege
Table 2 Measurement results for 46 countries in 2011
Countries
SUMps
ELECTION
Albania
22.33
0
Austria
9.67
1
Bangladesh
28
0
Bulgaria
19.67
1
Croatia
24
1
Czech Republic
15
0
Estonia
21.33
0
Finland
16
1
France
31
1
Georgia
41.17
1
Germany
9
Greece
14.67
0
0
Guyana
37
1
Hungary
18
0
Iceland
21.67
1
India
19.33
0
Ireland
15.33
1
Israel
10.5
0
Italy
14
0
Latvia
21.33
0
Lithuania
20.17
1
Macedonia
21
1
Mali
26.33
1
Malta
16
0
Mauritius
19.33
0
Moldova
26.33
0
Mongolia
19.67
1
Montenegro
20.83
1
Mozambique
49
1
Namibia
22.67
1
Niger
26
1
Peru
31.5
1
Poland
24.67
1
Portugal
19
1
Romania
25.83
1
Sao Tome Principe
24
1
Senegal
42.33
1
Serbia
27.17
1
South Korea
18
1
Slovakia
26.5
1
Slovenia
17.83
1
Tanzania
34.33
1
Trinidad Tobago
22.33
0
Turkey
27.83
1
Ukraine
31
1
Vanuatu
11
0
Median President
21.33
SUMps = Sum of presidential strength, 0=indirectly elected, 1=directly elected
Table 3 Results of the index of CPS as Overview
N
Minimum
SUMps
46
9.00
Valid N (listwise)
46
SUMps = Sum of presidential strength
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
49.00
23.0359
8.48315
Table 4 Rotated Factor Matrixa
Factor
Rank of VETO
Rank of JUDRE
Rank of LEGI
Rank of REF
Rank of LEGCR
Rank of DECREE
Rank of NOMPM
Rank of DEMPM
Rank of DISSASS
Rank of CABI
Rank of COUNT
Rank of COMMA
Rank of DECSE
Rank of NOMCCJ
1
2
.720
.414
.602
.498
.377
.404
.114
.020
.084
.524
-.060
.533
.314
-.040
.071
-.248
.134
-.398
.183
-.081
.406
.579
.212
.164
.118
.116
.573
.447
Extraction Method: Principal-Axis
Factoring.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser
Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
Table 5 Parametrized Overview
Shugart/Carey
Metcalf
Roper
CPS
Differences
Countries
Parametrized (40) Parametrized (44) parametrized (24) parameterized (56)Shugart/Carey
Ireland
0.00
n.a.
n.a.
0.25
0.25
Bulgaria (1991)
0.00
0.09
n.a.
0.20
0.20
Bulgaria (2003)
n.a
n.a.
n.a.
0.32
Romania
0.10
0.20
0.29
0.42
0.32
France
0.13
0.20
0.25
0.50
0.38
Peru
0.23
0.51
0.28
Iceland
0.28
0.67
0.26
0.08
Finland
0.20
0.18
0.29
0.27
0.07
Lithuania
n.a.
0.04
0.33
Austria
0.13
0.11
0.21
0.16
0.04
Macedonia
0.05
0.07
0.34
0.29
Korea (1948)
0.25
0.21
-0.04
Korea (1987)
0.38
0.29
-0.09
Namibia
0.30
0.36
0.06
Portugal (1976)
0.33
0.27
-0.06
Portugal (1982)
0.19
0.29
0.30
0.12
Croatia
0.15
0.18
0.39
0.24
Poland
0.10
0.18
0.33
0.38
0.28
Slovenia
n.a.
0.07
0.13
0.31
Moldova
n.a.
0.29
0.39
Source: {Shugart 1992 #101}, {Metcalf 2000 #60}, {Roper 2002 #28} and author
Differences
Metcalf
Differences Roper
0,25
0.11
0.22
0.30
0.09
0.05
0.27
0,13
0,25
-0,31
-0,02
0,29
-0,05
0,01
0.21
0.19
0.24
0,04
0,19
0,10
Annex
Indicators and Coding Decisions
Legislative power (xlg)
Administrative (Non-legislative) Power (xad)
- Veto (no package)
4
Veto needs > 3/5 majority to be overruled
2
absolute majority; referendum [unclear
majority is assumed as the same majority as
passed first]
1
relative majority; countersignature required
[responsible minister, Prime Minister or
Cabinet should be treated similarly]
0
no Veto
Appointment of Prime Minister
4
President appoints Prime Minister without
consent or cooperation
3.5
President appoints Prime Minister with
subsequent consent; if Parliament withholds
assent, president has the power to dissolve
parliament (as from 2nd attempt)
3
President appoints Prime Minister with
subsequent consent
2
President appoints Prime Minister in
cooperation (Prime Minister needs consent
of the Parliament); Prime Minister does not
have the confidence of the Parliament in the
first round; the one nominated in the second
round must be appointed Minister (without a
majority, President can appoint him/her or
dissolve Assembly); President appoints, no
direct assent by the Parliament required, but
immediately the possibility to declare no
confidence
1
President appoints, but has the possibility to
withhold assent (without the possibility to
dissolve assembly)
0
President does not appoint Prime Minister; or
has to appoint the candidate, supported by
the majority from the Parliament
Submit initiatives to the Supreme Court
4
unlimited and independently
2
alone but limited to certain policy areas;
several institutions have the same right
1
several institutions together
0
no [cases with a diffuse Supreme
Court/Constitutional Court]
- Legislative Initiative
4
yes
2
yes, President has the right, but only in
cooperation with other institutions;
countersignature [responsible minister, Prime
Minister or Cabinet should be treated
similarly]
0
no
- Decree power (own legislation power)
4
yes
3
limited to certain policy areas
0
no
- Declaration Referendum
4
Only president
3
President and other institutions
(independent from each other)
2
President and other institutions (in
cooperation)
1
Referendum automatically in connection
with a veto by the president; President
declares only the date; Only with
countersignature [responsible minister,
Prime Minister or Cabinet should be
treated similarly]
0
no
Legislation during state of war/emergency
4
alone without consent of Parliament
3
alone with subsequent consent of Parliament
2
in cooperation with Cabinet without consent
Parliament
1
in cooperation with Cabinet with subsequent
consent Parliament
0
no
Demission Prime Minister
4
President can dismiss Prime Minister
independently
3
President can dismiss Cabinet with a stable
majority in cooperation
2
President initiates demission but needs
cooperation with parliament
1
Cabinet can only be dismissed by a vote of
no confidence, but President has to assent; or
Countersignature [responsible minister,
Prime Minister or Cabinet should be treated
similarly]
0
no
- Dissolution Assembly
4
only President can dissolve Assembly
3
Cooperation with president of the Assembly
2
OPTION: confirmation of vote of no
confidence; countersignature [responsible
minister, Prime Minister or Cabinet should
be treated similarly]
1
OBLIGATION: confirmation of vote of no
confidence; countersignature [responsible
minister, Prime Minister or Cabinet should
be treated similarly]
0
no
- Participation Cabinet Meeting
4
yes, as chief
3
yes, as chief for certain policies; can initiate
a meeting
1
yes, as participant
0
no
- Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
4
yes, always
3
not in the state of war, but appoints the party
responsible
2
not in the state of war, but takes part in the
sessions of the Security Council
1
yes, always, but with countersignature
[responsible minister, Prime Minister or
Cabinet should be treated similarly]; yes,
always, but active responsibility with the
Cabinet
0
no
- Nomination Supreme Court Judges
4
alone, more than ½ without countersignature
3
President nominates <1/2 but > than 1/3;
only Parliament nominates the other judges
1
yes, always, but with countersignature 1/3
president; or in cooperation with
Cabinet/Parliament; or Countersignature
[responsible minister, Prime Minister or
Cabinet should be treated similarly]
0
no
- Declaration of war/emergency
4
yes, without consent
3
yes, with subsequent consent of Parliament
2
no, but in case of emergency with consent of
cabinet and subsequent consent of
Parliament
1
yes, on the initiative of the Cabinet and with
consent of Parliament
0
no
- Countersignature
4
no; only for declaration of emergency
3
only for formal acts (nomination diplomatic
corps, etc.)
2
every decision, apart from nomination of the
Prime Minister and Dissolution of the
Assembly
1
every decision in major policy areas
0
every decision
32