THE ,POLITICALSIGNIFICANCEOF THE WOLOFADHERENCE
TO MUSLIMBROTHERHOODS
IN THE
NINETEENTHCENTURY
Lucy Behrman
The major ethnic groups in Senegal had been exposed to Islam long
before they joined the Muslim brotherhoods, or tariqas, in the nineteenth
century. Indeed, the Tukulor had converted to Islam en masse by the end of the
eighteenth century, while the Wolof had been in contact with Muslim Marabouts
long before the first Europeans appeared in the fifteenth century. 1 Numerous
Wolof converted during this early period, although the group as a whole did not
accept the religion until the end of the nineteenth century.2 But the advent of
the brotherhoods, which caused the mass conversion of the Wolof in that
century, was more than a continuation of the long process of Islamization. The
brotherhoods appeared as dynamic movements, symbolizing the social and
political protest of the followers which they attracted. This essay seeks to
answer three major questions about this attraction of the brotherhoods for the
Wolof: first, what attributes of the brotherhoods made them particularly suitable for stimulating and channeling political protest and reform movements?
Second, what specific factors in the Senegalese situation during this period
gave the brotherhoods their dynamic appeal? And finally, what was the political
significance of the Wolof conversion at this time?
1.
2.
60
Louis Verribre. "La Population du Sen6gal (Aspects Quantitatifs),"
(Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Faculty of Law and Economics, University of Dakar, 1965), 51.
See Martin Klein, "The Muslim Revolution in Nineteenth Century Sene gambia, " and Lucy Behrman, "The Islamization of the Wolof by the End
of the Nineteenth Century, " in African History Papers, ed. D. McCall,
published for Boston University, Praeger, 1967 (not yet appeared). See
also V. Monteil, "Lat-Dior, Damel du Kayor (1842-1886) et l'Islamisation
des Wolofs," Archives de Sociologie des Religions, XV-XVI (1963), 77-104.
African Historical Studies, I, 1 (1968)
WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS
61
The Brotherhoods as Political Organizations
The simplest answer to the first question appears to be that the brotherhoods were appropriate vehicles for reform, because they came from outside
the Senegalese social and political system; although members of brotherhoods
had proselytized in the West African area prior to the eighteenth century, intensive efforts at conversion in the Senegal area did not begin until the late
However, a brief sketch of the deeighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.3
velopment of the Muslim orders shows that this answer is not sufficient to explain the attraction and force of the tariqas.
The communities which foreran the brotherhoods grew up in the early
or Sufism. The members
years of Islam and were based in Islamic mysticism,
of the small Sufi communities in the early period lived an ordered life in which
individual moral and physical discipline, as well as mystical theology and ritual,
These orders had only limited appeal to the few men willing
were emphasized.4
to give up their worldly possessions
and live an ascetic life to achieve a state
of union with God. Later, however, the organizational basis of these communities changed, the stress on individual moral and physical discipline declined,
and the Muslim orders took on the form which attracted followers throughout
the Far and Near East and North Africa.5 By the end of the eleventh century the
informal communities of ascetics were being converted into organized brotherhoods whose members, living together in regulated communities, adhered to a
body of spiritual rites .6 The change in emphasis from individual self-discipline
to mystical theology, which is of particular importance to this study, came in
the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries and is often associated with Ibn
al-Arabi of Murcia (d. 1240 A.D.), whose esoteric mystical interpretation of
Islam pointed the way for the development of the later brotherhoods in which the
mass of brothers could satisfy their religious duties by devotion and obedience
to a handful of mystically adept leaders.
In addition the brotherhoods in the
later period softened the strict rules of orthodox Islam, stressing the state of
a man's heart rather than his actual behavior, and popularizing Muslim tradiLocal practices and
tions to make them understandable at the lowest level.
3.
4.
5.
6.
J. Spencer Trimingham, A History of Islam in West Africa (Glasgow,
1962), 156-160.
Octave Depont and Xavier Coppolani, Les Confr6ries Religieuses Musulmanes (Alger, 1897), x.
See Louis Massignon, Essai sur les Origines du Lexique Technique de la
Mystique Musulmane (Paris, 1914-1922), 5, 285-286; John Alden Williams,
Islam (New York, 1961), 149-150, 196-198; H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism, An Historical Survey (London, 1954), 143.
Louis Massignon, "Tarika, " Encyclopedia of Islam, M. Th. Houtsma et.al.,
eds., XLII (1929), 667-672.
62
LUCY BEHRMAN
beliefs alien to Islam were tolerated as long as they did not contradict the
desired union with Allah which all true brothers wished to achieve.7
Although these factors vulgarized and distorted Islamic teachings,
they also made Islam appealing to simple men. The mass of members of the
orders apparently often forgot the teachings of the Qu'ran and of Muhammad;
ignorant of the major doctrintes of Islam, they concentrated on obedience to
This attitude was made possible largely because of the emphasis
their leaders.
of later Sufism, which stressed the ability of the brotherhood leader to act as
intermediary between Allah and man. Whereas early Sufism had emphasized
individual effort, it was later believed that most men could not achieve union
Concurrent with the shift in emphasis prewith the Divine by themselves.8
Islamic beliefs in magic were mingled with Islam. Belief grew in legends about
the miracles performed by early mystics9 and the magical ability of current
leaders who had received divine grace or baraka from Allah. The leaders were
revered as saints, and their tombs became the centers of pilgrimages because
of the miracles which might occur there. Montet, a French writer, reports
that in Morocco in the nineteenth century such leaders were believed to have
innumerable powers: they could, for example, lift large loads alone, repel
bullets, or go for long periods without food and water; they could be ubiquitous,
become invisible, or be instantly transported to far-off places; or they could
walk on water or dry up an ocean; and they were capable of keeping away evil
spirits, healing the sick, and resurrecting the dead. Montet concludes from
his observations in Morocco that Sufism had degenerated into anthropolatry:
"Living or dead, the saints, however illiterate they may be . . . are adored."10
The leaders of the brotherhoods were called shaykhs, or in North and
West Africa, Marabouts. Marabout is a French term coming from the Arabic
word for fortified camp or monastery and is used for a Muslim holy man,
1
whether or not he is connected with the brotherhoods.
According to the
Gibb, Mohammedanism, 115, 142; Wilfred Cantrell Smith, Islam in Modern
History (New York, 1957), 44-45.
8. Gibb, Mohammedanism, 143; Williams, Islam, 169; P. J. Andre, L'Islam
et les Races. Vol. II: Les Rameaux (Mouvements R6gionaux et Sectes)
(Paris, 1922), 27.
9. A. J. Arberry, Sufism, An Account of the Mystics of Islam (London, 1950),
119.
10. Edouard Montet, Le Culte des Saints Musulmans dans l'Afrique du Nord et
plus specialement au Maroc (Geneva, 1909), 26-32.
11. Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Arabic, ed. J. Milton Cowen (Ithaca,
1961), 323. The word has come to mean generally a holy man but in some
instances has been extended also to the tombs of Muslim saints and to anyThere is
thing of sacred character including animals, tress, and stones.
even an exotic bird which the French call a "marabout." Montet, Le Culte, 16.
7.
WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS
63
French authorities on Islam in North Africa, Octave Depont
nineteenth-century
and Xavier Coppolani, the Marabouts prepared the way for the Berbers to receive
the brotherhoods, which then undercut the power of the Marabouts, thereby forcing them to join the tariqas. 12 This explains why in West Africa today Marabouts are almost always affiliated with Muslim brotherhoods.
In fact, the leaders
of the order come from these Marabouts.
A Marabout possessed baraka, which he could transmit to his sons or
perhaps to selected followers .13 At the outset a Marabout, like any early Sufi,
had to live a virtuous life, be versed in the Qu'ranic sciences,
and achieve grace
at least partially through his own efforts.
However, by the time the brotherhoods reached West Africa, the leadership of the orders had become the right
of certain families, whose members needed no special virtues to benefit from
their family's position.14
Certainly there were many Marabouts who were
highly trained and educated men and lived exemplary lives, but popular opinion
identified as a Marabout any man who was either descended from a Marabout,
had Qu'ranic education, or was reputed to possess magical powers, whether or
not he lived a virtuous life, resided with other members of his order, or had
many followers.
The Marabouts' power and authority, however, depended on their personal dynamism as well as on their family connections and their position in the
The most powerful Marabouts could
hierarchy of leaders of the brotherhood.
rely on the unquestioning obedience of thousands of followers whose fealty was
of a tariqa
repaid by the Marabout's prayers for them. It was characteristic
for the members blindly to obey the commands of their leaders in most secular
matters as well as in religious ones. The Sufi leaders were practically worshipped by their followers, who did not question the commands they received.
The devotion expected by, and given to, the Marabout can be seen from the
prescription of the founder of the Qadriyya brotherhood, Sidi Abd al-Kadar
al-Djilani, who advised the members of his order: "You should be in the hands
of your shaykh like the corpse in the hands of the mortician.
It is God himself
who commands by his voice. "15 The attachment of disciple to master could become so strong that a French administrator,
P. J. Andr6, like Depont and
Coppolani and others, could write that in North African brotherhoods "the
obedience to the shaykh has replaced the cult of Allah."16
Depont and Coppolani, Les Confreries, xii.
Andre, L'Islam, 26.
Depont and Coppolani, Les Confr6ries, 143-144.
Napoleon Ney, Un Danger Europeen; Les Societ6s Secretes Musulmanes
(Paris, 1890), 22; M. Charles Brosselard, Les Khouans: de la Constitution
des Ordres Religieux Musulmans en Algerie (Alger, 1859), 14; Louis Rinn,
Marabouts et Khouan: Etudes sur l'Islam en Alg6rie (Alger, 1884), 90.
16. Andre, L'Islam, 27; Depont and Coppolani, Les Confr6ries, xi.
12.
13.
14.
15.
64
LUCY BEHRMAN
this devotion of the brotherhood members to their
Not surprisingly,
leaders was practically demonstrated through material contributions.
An offering, or ziara, which was sometimes quite large, as well as the member's
Land around the
dime, or tenth of his crops, were paid to the brotherhoods.
center of the brotherhood was worked by the members (usually lay affiliates and
full brothers together), and the men made payments (habus or wakaf) to the
brotherhood for the use of this land. The leaders also received other types
of contributions including payments for initiation and labor corv&es since adepts
of an order were morally obliged to sow and harvest for their leader.
Through
these and similar contributions the brotherhoods, and more specifically the
leaders, had large material resources.
Indeed, the periodic payments and labor
corvees were not all that a Marabout could demand. As Depont and Coppolani
said, everything a man had could be taken by the leaders: "the goods of their
followers are their property, their horses are their mounts and their huts . . .
are accessible to these venerable parasites."17
Because of the frequent contributions of money by the members and the
absolute control exercised by the leaders, the brotherhoods appeared to many
French observers as states within the French colonial state. Indeed the French
commentators had to recognize that the members' blind obedience to the leaders
and their loyalty to the brotherhood as a whole were the major sources of political
With the brotherhoods tightly unified behind
strength of the Muslim orders.
them, the leaders could speak with great authority.
Consequently, the tariqas
As one
often wielded enormous political power in North Africa and elsewhere.
nineteenth-century writer aptly commented:
Never has autocracy shown itself with more prominent and decided
appearance; never either has the dogma of obedience been proposed
and accepted in more formal or absolute terms.
It is therefore
permissible to affirm that in this double principle of authority on one
side and personal abnegation and passive obedience on the other, resides the principal factor of the extraordinary power of the Muslim
religious orders. l8
The Advent of the Brotherhoods in West Africa
Thus, the tight organization of the Muslim brotherhoods and the unquestioned authority of the leaders made the brotherhoods particularly suited as
vehicles of social and political reform when they began to attract converts among
the Wolof at the end of the nineteenth century. Before this, although they had
17. Depont and Coppolani, Les Confreries,
18. Brosselard, Les Khouans, 22.
279, 239, 243-244.
WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS
65
been in contact with Muslims for many centuries, the Wolof had not felt the full
Soon after their appearance in the Middle East the brothimpact of the orders.
erhoods had spread to North Africa, where in the twelfth century they stimulated
the powerful Almohad (al-muwahhidun) movement with its strong appeal to the
mass of Berbers. 19 Shortly thereafter the North African brotherhoods began to
filter into West Africa, where their introduction coincided with and reinforced
the general Islamization of the area immediately to the south of the Sahara.
Alphonse Gouilly, a twentieth-century French administrator and scholar,
has divided the Islamization process into five periods which help to place the
advent of the brotherhoods in their proper context. The first period, which
Gouilly calls the Berber phase, was in the eleventh century, when the Almoravids (al-murabitun) conquered the hitherto pagan kingdom of Ghana in the
western Sudan. The second, or Mandingo, phase took place during the fifteenth
century, when converted Negro Africans, using Islamization as a weapon of
In the sixteenth century came
their states, began to convert other Africans.
the Sonrai period when, owing particularly to the kingdoms on the eastern
Niger, Islam spread rapidly in the Niger area. During the Peul phase in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Tukulors in the Futa Toro (Senegal),
the Futa Djalon (Guinea), and the Hausa regions (Northern Nigeria) conducted
holy wars to spread their version of Islam to neighboring pagan and Muslim
tribes.
The last phase came at the end of the nineteenth century when various
Islamic states fought to spread their authority, using the cover of Islam as a
and traders belonging to the orders
Although missionaries
justification.20
had entered West Africa long before, Sufi brotherhoods were particulary important in the fourth and fifth periods.
The brotherhood which apparently first appeared in West Africa was the
Qadriyya tariqa. Founded by the sharif21 Si Muhammad Abd al-Qadar al-Djilani
(1079-1166), originally from Baghdad, the order spread over the Middle East and
North Africa at an early date. It soon divided into myriad branches, some retaining only the most tenuous connections with the motherhouse in the Middle
East. The Qadiri order was introduced into the Sahel region in the fifteenth cenBut it was Al-Mukhtar ibn Ahmad
tury by Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Maghrib.
(1729-1811), the son of one of al-Maghrib's disciples of the Arab Kunta tribe,
who founded a center for the order north of Timbuktu which became the base for
the order in West Africa. 22
19. The Almoravid (llth century) movement was an orthodox group in contrast
See
to the Almohads, who were closely linked to the Sufi movements.
Gibb, Mohammedanism, 121.
20. Alphonse Gouilly, L'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale Frangaise (Paris,
1952), 47.
21. The title sharif indicates descent from Muhammad.
22. Andre, L'Islam, 32-33; Rinn, Marabouts, 173-200; Depont and Coppolani,
57; J. Spencer
Les Confreries, 293-355; Gouilly, L'Islam dans i'A.O.F.,
Trimingham, Islam in West Africa (Oxford, 1959), 94.
66
LUCY BEHRMAN
The second important brotherhood to come from North to West Africa
was the Tijaniyya order founded by a Qadiri named Sharif23 Ahmad ibn MuhamAt the age of twenty-one he traveled from Ain Mahdi
mad al-Tijani (1735-1815).
(Morocco) to Mecca. After his return to North Africa he had a revelation from
the Prophet (c. 1781) and, as a result, founded the Tijani brotherhood.
Sometime
thereafter al-Tijani sent a missionary from the Ida Ou Ali ethnic group, Muhammad al-Hafiz ibn al-Mukhtar ibn Habib al-Baddi, to Mauritania.
There, he converted the Ida Ou Ali, who then had considerable influence in the proselytization
of the surrounding area, including portions of Senegal.24
Following al-Tijani's death, his spiritual successors quarreled, causing
a division of the order into two motherhouses,
one at Fez and one at Ain Mahdi.
Most of the important Tijaniyya branches in West Africa are affiliated with the
former center. Intensive missionary activity was conducted in West Africa in
association with various commercial undertakings.
The most important conversion in this period was that of Umar Tall (1794/7-1864),
a member of the
Tukulor ethnic group in the Futa Toro. While in Mecca, where he arrived in
1828, he met one of al-Tijani's close companions, who named him Moqaddim25
of the order in West Africa. Umar Tall then returned to West Africa, going
first to the area presently called Northern Nigeria, where he remained until
1838. He then went to Massina and the Futa Djalon, and did not return to his
home territory until 1846, by which time he claimed the rank of khalif in the
In 1851-1852 he launched
Tijani order and had gathered an army of volunteers.
a holy war and conquered a large part of the Sudan touching on Senegal in the
Futa Toro region. When Al-Hajj Umar died in 1864, much of the large area
he had converted reverted to its old religious traditions.
The Futa Toro, however, because it was peopled by a majority of Tukulor, remained almost solidly
Tijani. Furthermore, the Islamization movement was continued by Umar Tall's
disciples, who conducted various smaller holy wars, some of which were of
major importance in the conversion of the Wolof.26
Equally important among the Wolof was the Murid brotherhood, which
was founded in 1866 by a Wolof Marabout of Tukulor ancestry of the M'Bake
family, Muhammad Ibn Muhammad ibn Habib Allah (1850-1927), called Ahmad
23. His descent from Muhammad is disputed. See Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, The
Tijaniyya, A Sufi Order in the Modern World (London, 1965), 116.
24. Trimingham, Islam in West Africa, 97.
25. Representative of and assistant to the head of the order. A khalif is the head
of an order for a region -- the term is also used for the head of the entire
brotherhood.
26. Abun-Nasr, The Tijaniyya, 101-128; A. Le Chatelier, L'Islam dans
l'Afrique Occidentale (Paris, 1899), 167-174.
WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS
67
Bamba.27 In approximately 1880 Ahmad Bamba was initiated into the Qadiri
tariqa by Shaykh Hajj Kamara, and later, judging this insufficient, he traveled
to Mauritania to be initiated by Shaykh Sidia, the head of a major Qadiri branch
derived from the Kunta center. He joined Lat Dyor's entourage, and, by 1886,
when Dyor was killed, Bamba hadgained a reputation for learning and piety.
In that same year he received a revelation of his mission to found his own order,
which he based in Touba (in Diourbel). 28
From the outset the French authorities feared Ahmad Bamba, 29 who they
believed hoped to reestablish a Wolof state under his own control. He had attracted followers of Lat Dyor, Al-Bur Ndyaye, Maba, and many others identified
Rumors circulated about his anti-government
with opposition to the colonialists.
statements and occasionally about the large scale collection of arms and volunBamba lived his life under close surveillance by the
teers by his followers.
French and was exiled in 1895 and again in 1897.
The Reasons for the Wolof Conversion
A partial answer to the second question raised in this paper, concerning
the factors in the Senegalese situation which made the brotherhoods particularly
attractive to the Wolof, is that the Wolof, already imbued with Islamic ideas,
27. Bamba's father, Momar Antisali, was also a Marabout. He married the
This exsister of Lat Dyor and became the teacher of MaBa's children.
plains Bamba's early contacts with these resistance leaders and their
supporters.
28. For detailed information on the origin, development, and major characteristics of the Murids, see CheikhTidjane Sy, "Traditionalisme Mouride et
Modernisation Rurale au Senegal, Contribution a l'Etude des Rapports entre
Socialism et Islam en Pays Sous-Developp&s, " (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Paris, 1965). See also Vincent Monteil, "Une
Confr6rie Musulmane; Les Mourides du S6engal," Archives de Sociologie
des Religions, XIII-XIV (1963), 77-104; E. Marty, "Les Mourides
d'Ahmadou Bamba (Rapport a M. le Gouverneur General de l'Afrique Occidentale), " Revue du Monde Musulman, XXV (Dec. 1913), 3-164; M. Chailley
et al., eds., Notes et Etudes sur l'Islam en Afrique Noire (Paris, 1962),
53-74, 127-194, 115-125; Medoune Thiam, Cheickh Ahmadou Bamba, Fondateur du Mouridisme (1850-1927) (Dakar, 1962); Muhammad Mustafa An,
Hyattu Shaykh Ahmad Bamba (2 vols., Dakar, n.d.). See also the unpublished reports on the Murids in Dakar Archives.
29. See Lucy Behrman, "Ahmad Bamba, 1850-1927, " in John Ralph Willis, ed.,
Studies on the History of Islam in West Africa, forthcoming.
68
LUCY BEHRMAN
were particularly receptive to an intensive Islamization effort by the brotherhoods. But more fundamental reasons can be found from an examination of
traditional Wolof society at this time.
The nineteenth century was a period of confusion and insecurity for the
Wolof, who sought first to express their opposition to the colonial authorities
Their
both as individuals and as a group, by adherence to the brotherhoods.
organizational strength and the authority of their leaders made the brotherhoods
particularly suitable organizations for political protest, providing the members
with strong protection against injury or punishment in a fight against any hated
group and promising them Paradise if they died fighting for the brotherhood.
Religious sects or "revitalization movements" have played such roles at various
times in Africa: The Christian Harris movement in the Ivory Coast was, for
and Suret-Canale states that the development of new
example, such a group;
religious groups is a response to "the sharpening through the effects of colonialism, of the internal contradictions of African society."30
Respected authorities
on North African Islam, such as Depont and Coppolani, complained that the
orders there were recruiting many discontented elements of society and were
Of the brotherhoods in Senegal
becoming major centers of resistance.31
some of the most powerful were branches of
which resisted the colonialists,
the Tijaniyya led by Umar Tall and his disciples and Ahmad Bamba's Murid
order, which became a symbol of resistance shortly after it founding in 1866.
It is hard to know whether or not Bamba deliberately attempted to opposed the
French; indeed, it is quite probable, as Suret-Canale has suggested, that the
Murids did not have "a revolutionary character principally and directly turned
" but that
they were led to express protests
against the colonial domination,
against colonial oppression only to the extent that the colonial regime oppressed
them.32 It makes little difference in this context what Ahmad Bamba's actual
intentions were, for the results were similar whether or not he wished to fight
the French. His reputation among the Africans, as well as among the French,
was that of opposing the colonialists; the discontented flocked to him as they had
to the brotherhoods in North Africa, and, although their first strong following
came principally from the Wolof, the Murids later drew from other ethnic
groups as well.
A second factor in the Senegalese situation which pushed the Wolof
toward the brotherhoods was the Muslim orders' initial stance as vehicles
of social reform.
There were conflicts among the social classes or sectors
within the Wolof as there were within other ethnic groups in Senegal. Although
30. Jean Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire Occidentale et Centrale: G6ographie,
Histoire (Paris, 1964), 128-129.
Civlisations,
31. Depont and Coppolani, Les Confr6ries, xxi.
32. Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, 128-129.
WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS
69
this attraction is the most nebulous to speculate upon because of the extreme
difficulty of knowing exactly which social sectors within the ethnic groups were
opposed or allied, it is a vital consideration, for friction among various parts
A disruption
of the population was an important element in Senegalese politics.
of the balance between sectors could and did in many cases lead to the emergence of certain sectors' interests in a new group which would be a stronger
champion of its interests than the individual sector had been. The brotherhoods
thus provided a chance for the dissatisfied sectors of the Senegalese population
to seek to better their position.
This was true not only among the Wolof, but
also among the Tukulor and other tribes in the area. Thus Suret-Canale, as
well as the Senegalese scholar Chiekh Tidjane Sy and others, believes that Al
Hajj Umar's Tijani branch expressed "the need for liberation of former captives, of women, of youth, against the tyranny of traditional 'feudal' or familial
cadres. "33 In the early twentieth century the nearby French Soudan provides
another example of such a group when the Rimaybe and the Bella, former captives of the Peul and the Tuareg respectively,
sought a change in their situation
through joining the Hamalliyya, a Tijani sub-group.
People of low social caste,
unsatisfied chiefs, and Marabouts all tried to find the solution to their problems
in this brotherhood.
Thus, in his explanation of one of the major Hamallist
uprisings in 1930, a French commandant notes that the major Hamallist
Marabout in his region was recruiting former captives who, upon joining the
Muslim order, broke completely with their former masters and even tried
to kill them.34
In Wolof territory in the end of the nineteenth century the Islamic holy
wars led by the successors of Al Hajj Umar, such as Maba, expressed the
desires of large groups of the population for an improvement in their position
relative to other groups. Vincent Monteil, a noted French scholar, suggests
in fact that the Muslim leaders sided with the Wolof peasants against the warriors and the nobles in a class war over frictions that had built up between the
two groups over centuries, as the nobles and warriors pillaged the peasants at
will. Thus, jihad leaders, in carrying out their holy missions, were also acting
as heads of a class revolution.35
Monteil's view is not difficult to support, as many early European
writers describe widespread pillaging by kings and nobles. There is additional
proof in local traditions, such as the tale of the revolt in the Djolof kingdom in
33. Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, 129; Sy, "Traditionalisme Mouride," 26-27.
34. R. L. Moreau, "Les Marabouts de Dori, " Archives de Sociologie des
Religions (1964), 113-134; Dakar Archives, Queqneaux, Commandant
de Cercle de Gorgol, "Rapport sur les Causes de l'Incident du 15 F6vrier,
1930, " CI 848.
35. Monteil, "Lat-Dior, " 103-104; Sy, "Traditionalisme Mouride, " 26-27.
70
LUCY BEHRMAN
which the Mauritanians and Marabouts sided with the people against the ruling
classes, although these eventually reasserted their authority.36 French
colonial authorities also tended to interpret the Muslim wars among the Wolof
as class wars. Robert Arnaud wrote in 1912:
In Wolof country formerly the intrusion of Islam constituted a veritable
social revolution and was in reality an opposition of the proletarian
caste to the aristocracy, a class struggle; the cultivators had very
strong sentiments of repulsion against the warriors who exploited them.
Thanks to Islam they formed a bloc against the aristocracy which had
remained fetichist, the crowd against its oppressors. The warriors
did not conceal the dislike they felt for the Marabouts.37
However, to explain the Muslim holy wars simply as social revolutions
is probably not sufficient. Even accepting that there was a widespread and
fixed enmity between the Wolof peasants and nobles, it appears that not only,
or even mainly, the peasants sought to improve their social position by joining
All dissatisfied sectors of the Wolof turned to the Muslim
the brotherhoods.
orders, including the nobles who had lost their power through the French invasion.
A glance at the Murid movement shows some of the complexities of the
situation. Ahmad Bamba, as the French administrator Paul Marty points out,
was surrounded by warriors and nobles who had been involved in the last
struggles against the French, although the mass of his followers came from
the rural population which was composed of former slaves or poor freemen.
This combination indicates that the nobles saw in the Murid movement an opportunity to regain their authority, whereas the former slaves, Marty suggests,
saw in the Muridiyya a new form of security to replace the old, tightly controlled system to which they had been accustomed -- a security which was no
more than a new type of slavery under the descendants of their former rulers 38
Marty may have overlooked the fact that many peasants must have turned to
the Murids because the brotherhood seemed to provide an escape from control
by their former rulers, but his analysis does illustrate the point made here
that the motivations of the men who became Murids were varied and complex;
that the desire for social reforms was certainly a major factor stimulating the
36. P. Cultru, Premier Voyage du Sieur de la Courbe fait a la Coste d'Afrique
en 1685 (Paris, 1913), 132-133.
37. Robert Arnaud, "L'Islam et la Politique Musulmane Francaise en Afrique
Occidentale Frangaise, " Renseignements Coloniaux et Documents Publies
par le Comit6 de l'Afrique Frangaise et le Comit6 du Maroc (1912), 9.
38. Paul Marty, Etudes sur l'Islam au Senegal, Vol I: Les Personnes (Paris,
1917), 206.
WOLOFADHERENCETO MUSLIMBROTHERHOODS
71
Wolof to join the brotherhoods, but that one cannot therefore interpret the success of the brotherhoods among the Wolof as being solely, or even primarily,
due to the desire of the lower classes to assert themselves against the nobles.
It would also be a mistake to ignore the important social implications
of the Muridiyya (and other brotherhoods) since the new lords, the Marabouts,
were drawn from a wider section of the population than the old ruling class, at
least in the early years. There was in the early years, moreover, a degree of
social mobility in the brotherhoods which the old tribal system lacked. Land
ownership and political power in general were now divided between the aristo crats, who became Marabouts, and the old maraboutic families, some of which
had been poor and without power before the nineteenth century. In addition
a peasant disciple, if he worked hard and obeyed his Marabout, could hope to
be elevated to the position of a lesser Marabout, an advance in status not normally possible in the secular tribal system. Nonetheless, the nobility together
with the maraboutic families provided the bulk of the Marabouts, especially
the important ones, and the mass of peasants and low caste artisans remained
subjected as they had been under the tribal system.39
Whatever the nature of the social reforms which the Muslim brotherhoods espoused in the middle and late nineteenth century, the "sclerosis"
which Suret-Canale mentions soon set in. The momentum for change was
lost and the maraboutic leadership became closely associated with the colonial
regime and the old aristocracy. This had occurred in the Umarian Tijani
brotherhood in Senegal before the Murids rose to importance, 40 and by the
early 1900's it was true of the latter brotherhood as well. Colonial authorities
began to remark on these alliances which became increasingly evident. A
political report of 1904 states:
It is therefore necessary for us to observe with care the alliance which
tends to be formed between the aristocracy
. . . and the Marabouts.
The Marabouts enrich themselves by their (alms) collections, the
aristocracy
. . . to the contrary,
which only drew its fortune from
its arbitrary power and its attacks which are no longer permitted,
grows poorer from day to day. The descendants of the old families,
therefore, give to the rich "sikh" [Marabout] their daughter or their
relative in exchange for a large dowry. 41
39. Cheikh Tidjane Sy states that Bamba was a reformer who was able to detach
himself from the traditional caste system in order to judge men by their
merit rather than by their class status. Nevertheless, few low caste men
became important in the Murid hierarchy, even in the early years. See
Sy, "Traditionalisme Mouride," 56-57.
40. Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, 129.
41. Dakar Archives, "Rapport sur la Situation Politique - AOF" (1st and 2nd
Trimestre, 1904), 2G 4.5.
72
LUCY BEHRMAN
The 1915 political report comments
with the colonialists:
on the Marabouts' increasing
collaboration
And it is precisely because these religious chiefs profit from these
situations that they have an interest in being with us and in that case
they would be our support. Their interests are in effect linked with
ours and the more we develop the acquisitive faculty of the indigene
by the creation of new needs, the more we augment the wealth of the
brotherhoods through the followers and of which the sum is higher
than the taxes paid to the administration.
It is for this reason that
in this period of crisis [the first world war] we have nothing to fear
from the maraboutic influence.42
Most of the Muslim orders in Senegal, then, had become part of the "Establishment" by the early twentieth century. After this period only the Hamalliyya,
which developed in the early twentieth century, was identified with social reforms, but it did not have much influence in Senegal and, like the other orders,
lost most of its reforming character once it had become established.
Closely connected with the whole question of the reformist character
of the Muslim brotherhoods at their foundation is the attraction which these
This is the
groups had as substitutes or reinforcements for tribal society.
third, and perhaps the most important, reason for the conversion of the
Wolof to Islam in the end of the nineteenth century. The phenomenon involved
is not at all unique to Senegal or to Africa. It is readily observable that, when
the equilibrium of a group is disturbed, the members of that group tend to
compensate by actions foreign to their normal pattern of living and often join
substitute groups which promise to restore the lost balance. 43 Another example of this behavior seems to be that described by David Apter among the
Fon of Dahomey.44
The Wolof had a highly developed state system, and their social struc The arrival
ture was tightly connected to their religious beliefs and customs.45
and entrenchment of the colonialists destroyed these living patterns and introduced
42. Dakar Archives, Lieutenant Governor to Governor General, July 22, 1915,
No. 695, 2G 15.6.
43. See discussions of this phenomenon in David Truman, The Governmental
Process, Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York, 1964), 30-31;
V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York, 1958), 46-47.
44. David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965), 99, 81-122.
45. For general information on the history and customs of the Wolof see the
following: David P. Gamble, The Wolof of Senegambia (London, 1957);
Henri Gaden, "Legendes et Coutumes Senegalaises,
Cahiers de Yoro Dyao,"
Revue d'Ethnographie et de Sociologie, III (1912), 119-137, 191-202;
Les Peuplades de Senegambie (Paris, 1879);
L. J. B. Berenger-F6raud,
articles in Coutumier Juridiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise, Vol. I:
Senegal (Paris, 1939); L. Geismar, Recueil des Coutumes Civiles des Races
WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS
73
new elements which challenged old values and habits. In order to conquer the
The
area, the French had to break the power of the Wolof kings and nobles.
Wolof kingdoms were broken into smaller units: those who resisted were beaten
in war; those who did not, or who eventually made peace, found themselves dependent on the colonial system for their authority, as their former sources of
Thus the Wolof
power were destroyed and their lines of revenue abolished.46
were forced to look for a means of replacing their old way of life.
A major factor in the disintegration of Wolof society for which the French
were responsible was the introduction of peanuts as a commercial crop into the
Wolof family living patterns were closely tied
traditional agricultural system.
Land was owned by the family as a whole and could not be sold.
to agriculture.
It was the duty of the chief of the family to distribute some of the land among the
members of his family, who would work the major part of their time in the common field. The cultivation of a commercial crop of peanuts changed this system
Farmers now had the strong incentive of money and the new goods
altogether.
it could buy to cultivate the small private plots which had hitherto been an unimportant addendum to their principal work in the common field. However,
many farmers apparently continued to show token recognition to the position of
the heads of their families through annual gifts in money or kind. One administrator wrote:
du Senegal etabli par L. Geismar, Administrateur en Chef des Colonies
(St. Louis, 1933); David Ames, "Belief in Witches among the Rural Wolof
of Gambia," Africa, XXIV (1959), 263-273; David Ames, "The Selection
"
of Mates, Courtship and Marriage among the Wolof, Bulletin de 1'IFAN,
XVIII (1956), 156-168; David Ames, "Wolof Cooperative Work Groups, "
in Continuity and Change in African Cultures, William Bascom and Melville
Herskovits, eds. (Chicago, 1959), 237; R. Rousseau, "Le Senegal d'Autrefois, Etude sur le Cayor, Cahiers de Yoro D~ao, " Bulletin du Comite
d'Etudes Historiques et Scientifiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise
[BCEHSAOF], XVI (1929), 133-211; R. Rousseau, "Le Senegal d'Autrefois,
"
Etudes sur le Oualo, Cahiers de Yoro D~ao, BCEHSAOF, XIV (1931),
133-211; R. Rousseau, "Le Senegal d'Autrefois, Etude sur le Toube,
Papiers de Rawane Roy, " BCEHSAOF, XIV (1931), 334-364; R. Rousseau,
"Le Sene6gal d'Autrefois, Seconde Etude sur le Cayor (Compl6ments tir6
des Manuscrits de Yoro D~ao)," Bulletin de l'IFAN, III (1941), 79-144;
R. Rousseau, "Le Village Ouoloff (S6n6gal), " Annales de Geographie, XLII
(1933), 88-94.
46. Julian Wood Witherell, "The Responses of the Peoples of Cayor to French
Penetration, 1850-1900" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of
Wisconsin, 1964), 160-161.
74
LUCY BEHRMAN
The personal goods, formerly of negligible quantity now surpass in
importance the collective family goods. Thus, by the force of things,
a disaggregation of family solidarity [occurs] which has shown its
consequences in all domains.47
The disintegrative force of the introduction of peanuts into the agricultural system
was beginning to be felt in Senegal by the end of the nineteenth century. Peanuts
had been grown in Senegal for a long time -- the sixteenth-century traveler
Andre Alvarez de Almada had noted them during his visit48 -- and the French
had begun to foster their growth long before the mid-nineteenth century, but it
was around this date that they began to encourage their cultivation in earnest
in an attempt to make Senegal a profitable colony. After 1850 peanuts were
being produced for export in significant amounts, and by the end of the century
peanut growers were moving from the center of production at Cayor to other
regions to look for new fields and thus to extend the impact of peanuts .49
The undermining of the powers of the chiefs and the introduction of
commercial agriculture by the French are only two of the many factors contributing to the breakdown of the Wolof living patterns. In addition, the mere
presence of the colonialists with their apparently superior way of life raised
questions about old ways of doing things, and the establishment of French forts
and trading centers drew increasing numbers of people into French service as
clerks, soldiers, domestics, etc., thus adding a new dimension to the economic
and social options open to the Wolof. Furthermore, population movements to
the north of the Senegal as well as increased contact through trade and war with
the Futa Toro peoples are additional kinds of influences which may have contributed to the insecurity of the Wolof in the nineteenth century, leading them to
turn to the brotherhoods for reinforcement.
The brotherhoods, despite their tight hierarchical organization, had a
long history in the Muslim world of a flexibility characterized by their habit of
accepting the customs of the people among whom they found themselves, imposing
only their political authority and a few major Islamic prescriptions. Thus it was
not difficult for the tariqas to adjust themselves to the Wolof situation, acting as
a replacement for the old framework of political and social authority and providing a structure in which the Wolof could find a defined role to play. As else where in Africa, where, as Marcel Cardaire points out, Islam succeeded be cause of the isolation of pagan tribesmen who, finding their old system crumbling,
turned away to find a new one, 50 the Muslim orders were able to help the Wolof
adapt to changes in Senegal.
47. Geismar, Recueil des Coutumes, 35.
48. Joseph Foquet, La Traite des Arachides dans le Pays de Kaolack et ses Consequences Economiques, Sociales et Juridiques (Saint Louis, 1958), 19.
49. Witherell, "The Responses of the Peoples of Cayor, " 23.
50. M. Cardaire, L'Islam et le Terroir Africain (Koulouba, 1954), 49; Marty,
Etudes sur l'Islam au Senegal, I, 192.
WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS
The Political
Significance
75
of the Wolof Conversion
While in general the Wolof as members of brotherhoods followed their
old ways, despite the overlay of Muslim customs and sayings, their political
leadership was definitely modified by the new affiliation.
They now turned to
the Marabouts when they wanted anything done, and the former nobles and kings,
as they were absorbed into the ruling structure of the Muslim orders, found as
Marabouts an even greater authority than their pagan counterparts had had.
The Marabouts combined the feudal-type authority over land of the nobles with
a much greater authority, based on religion as well as force, over the lives of
their subjects.
In different brotherhoods the position of the leaders was, not
different.
Of the branches of several orders which the Wolof
surprisingly,
joined, the Murid order had a noticeably more powerful leadership because of
the emphasis which Ahmad Bamba had placed on the virtues of working for one's
The Murids' first loyalty was to their brotherleader and of complete discipline.
hood personified by its Marabouts, whose every command had a considerable
degree of authority. While the stress on discipline was less in other orders,
all of the leaders of the brotherhoods among the Wolof had considerable political
power.
It seems clear that the answer to the third question raised in the beginThe Wolof conversion in the end
ning of this paper has been largely answered.
of the nineteenth century was politically significant because the political leaders
of the ethnic group became the Marabouts.
How important and unusual this
fact was for the development of Senegalese politics can be seen by comparing
the Wolof with their neighbors the Tukulor, who had been in contact with Islam
at least since the eleventh century.51
Thorough Islamization of this group did
not take place until the torodo (torodbe) drove out the pagan Peul Denyianke
dynasty in 1776, but thereafter the Islamization of the Tukulor was intensified,
and a series of Muslim chiefs called almanys ruled until the end of the nineteenth century, when the French took over the area.52 Islam was thus a factor
51. For general information on the history and customs of the Tukulor see the
following: Felix Brigaud, Connaissance du Senegal, Fasicule 11: Histoire
Traditionelle du Senegal (Saint Louis, 1962); J. Lombard, Connaissance du
Sen6gal, Fasicule 5: Geographie Humaine (Saint Louis, 1963); Henri
Labouret, Paysans d'Afrique Occidentale (Paris, 1941); L. Geismar, Recueil des Coutumes, Coutumiers Juridiques, I; Henri Gaden, "Du Regime
des Terres de la Vallee du S6negal au Fouta ant6rieurement a l'Occupation
For modern statistics,
see
Frangaise," BCEHSAOF, XVII (1935), 403-414.
J. L. Boutillier et al., La Moyenne Valee du Senegal (Dakar, 1962).
52. Abdoulaye Diop, Soci6et Toucouleur et Migration (Enquite sur la Migration
Toucouleur a Dakar) (Dakar, 1965), 10, 84; Vincent Monteil, L'Islam Noir
(Paris, 1964), 62-63, 77; Labouret, Paysans d'Afrique, 82.
76
LUCY BEHRMAN
of great importance in Tukulor history for many centuries, and that ethnic
group traditionally felt it was the carrier of Muslim civilization and was superior
to the pagan groups around it. 53 Since the early eighteenth century, the Tukulor,
led by the torodo, had launched holy wars on their neighbors. By this time they
were in direct contact with representatives of Muslim brotherhoods. Indeed,
the Qadriyya orders, led by members of the Ida Ou Ali and later of the Kunta
groups, had many followers among the Tukulor, although with the coming of
Umar Tall the overwhelming majority of the group became Tijani. Interestingly enough, however, the Tukulor Marabouts did not become a major political
force in the Futa Toro as they did among the Wolof. This fact is all the more
striking when one considers that the major branches of the Sufi brotherhoods
among the Wolof were founded by Marabouts of Tukulor ancestry. 54 There
were, of course, powerful Tukulor Marabouts on regional and local levels, but
most of the nationally politically important Marabouts who appeared in the early
twentieth century had a largely Wolof following and did not live in the Tukulor
regions. Why, then, should the brotherhoods among the Tukulor, who were exposed to Islam longer than were the Wolof, be of significantly less political
importance ?
One reason often put forward in Senegal by Tukulor and non-Tukulor
alike is that the Tukulor, through their long contact with Islam, became more
closely acquainted with the Qu'ran and the doctrines of Islam than did the Wolof
and, being more educated in the religion, had less need for the Marabouts to
act as intermediaries between them and Allah. Furthermore, with a better
knowledge of Islam, they were less likely to glorify the powers of their Marabouts. Since the intellectual gap between the Marabouts and their disciples
was smaller among the Tukulor than among the Wolof, the Marabouts could
therefore gain less authority. 55 But this interpretation is difficult to accept.
Blind obedience and extreme respect for the Marabout could be found in many
brotherhoods, even among peoples in North Africa with as long an acquaintance
with Islam as the Tukulor. Nor does the lack of Qu'ranic education explain the
exceptions
to the rule who are Tukulor and have Tukulor followers.
A more satisfactory answer is found in the traditional socio -economic
structure of the Futa Toro, where politics and society in general were directed
by important clan leaders, a clan in the Futa being comprised of several families, although not all of one family necessarily belongs to one clan. The leaders
53. Diop, Societe Toucouleur, 13.
54. Bamba's ancestors were Tukulor, as were those of Al Hajj Malik Sy, founder
of the most important branch of the Tijaniyya among the Wolof.
55. Interviews with: Ibrahima Faye, Governor of Sine-Saloum, Feb. 4, 1966,
Kaolack; Alphonse N'Diaye, Governor of the River Region, March 10, 1966,
Saint Louis; Madior Cisse, Marabout and employee of the regional court in
Saint Louis, March 10, 1966, Saint Louis. Also interviews with government
officials and relatives of the major Marabouts, March 14, 1966, Saint
Louis.
WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS
77
of these clans headed important families which owned large concessions of the
land in the nineteenth century, and indeed still do, despite land reforms. 56
While the social structure of the Tukulor in the Futa Toro by no means remained
unchanged throughout the many centuries since the introduction of Islam, the
changes resulted only in an accretion of custom. Thus the fall of the Denyianke
led to the rule of the Muslim almamys but did not alter the economic and political
In fact, the almamys were named
control of the area by Tukulor clan leaders.
by the great families, 57 so that their power stemmed not from their role as
The Marabouts in the Futa,
Muslim leaders but from their family connections.
then, never had the opportunity to rise to power. Even Al Hajj Umar, who
united many clans for a short time in a religious war, did not change the Futa
This continued social, economic, and political power of the clans
system.
among the Tukulor should be compared to the decline in power of Wolof traditional rulers in the nineteenth century when the political and social system of
that group was threatened by contacts with the French, and Marabouts and
brotherhoods stepped in to reinforce and replace a disintegrating tribal system,
thereby becoming politically powerful because they replaced the traditional
kings and nobles. Thus, it is primarily in the differences between the preIslamic social structure of the two groups that the differences in their response
to Islamization lie, resulting in the political dominance of Muslim leaders
among the Wolof.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper has proposed that the reasons for the political power of the
Marabouts among the Wolof can be found in the nature of the brotherhoods and
in the general insecurity of the ethnic group at the time at which it joined the
The brotherhoods had developed by the twelfth century into
Muslim orders.
tight hierarchical organizations whose leaders had unquestioned authority over
The orders attracted followers in Senegal because they symtheir followers.
bolized opposition to the colonialists,
expressed the desire of various parts of
the population for social reform, and provided a framework of security for the
The Wolof joined
Wolof whose social and political system was disintegrating.
the Muslim orders whose leaders replaced the traditional kings and nobles as
social, economic, and political rulers.
56. Diop, Societe Toucouleur,
57. Ibid.
11.
LUCY BEHRMAN
78
It is useless to speculate at this point on what would have happened to the
Wolof had the brotherhoods not come into Senegal in the nineteenth century. It
seems clear, however, that in the almost seventy years of this century the
political dominance of the brotherhoods has had both negative and positive effects
on the political development of the group. On the one hand the Marabouts have
facilitated the Wolof's adjustment to new ways of doing things. For example
when they embraced commercial peanut production and set their followers to
and
raising the crop, as well as encouraging the use of new tools, fertilizers,
Moreover, the Marabouts have acted as intermediaries between
techniques.
their adherents and first the French and then the Senegalese political leaders;
they have organized political support for politicians and have explained in a
simplified form the duties which new political programs calls for among the
Wolof. 58 On the other hand, the Marabouts' authority is based in the almost
slave-like position of their disciples, which contradicts and blocks the development programs espoused by the politicians; the political development of the
Wolof must eventually involve their liberation from such domination and insofar as this is accomplished seriously threatens the power of the Marabouts.
Whatever its effects, however, it is evident that adherence of the Wolof to the
brotherhoods in the nineteenth century had enormous political significance.
58. See Sy, "Traditionalisme Mouride, " 135-150; Lucy Behrman, "The
Political Influence of Muslim Brotherhoods in Senegal" (Unpublished
Boston University, 1967).
Ph.D. Dissertation,
A
AFRICAN
MATERIALS
SOME
AND
EUROPEAN
REPORT
ON
IN
ACTIVITIES
INSTITUTIONS
by
Daniel
F.
McCall
An introductory guide to African collections in certain archives
and museums in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Sweden, and Switzerland.
Monograph Series Number I, 1967
(Mimeographed, soft cover. 59 pages. $1.50)
Boston University African Studies Center
Orders may be addressed to Susanne Marcus, African Studies
02146.
Center, 10 Lenox Street, Brookline, Massachusetts