P E AC E S U P P O R T O P E R AT I O N S
C A N A D I A N D E P L OY E N T
AND THE
U N I T E D N AT I O N S
PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY
READINESS SYSTEM
FOR CONSIDERATION BY
THE SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
IN SUPPORT OF THE
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW
Submitted by
Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans’ Association
Brigadier-General (Retired) Gregory Blair MITCHELL, CD, BA, MPA, rmc, plsc, pcsc, ndc
22 August 2016
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Government of Canada (GoC) has expressed its intent to assume a greater role in United Nations Peace
Support Operations (UN PSO), and the Department of National Defence (DND), through its Defence
Policy Review, is currently conducting research on how best to achieve that objective.
As new PSO evolve to become ever-more complex, and multidimensional, there is a growing operational
requirement for well-qualified military troops, not only at the tactical level, but also at the operational level, to
provide expert leadership to the military functions within those multidimensional, complex, and integrated
missions. It is equally important that such troops are readily available and rapidly deployable, so that timely
establishment of PSO can be achieved.
The focus of this submission, therefore, is on the effective and timely provision of Canadian military troops
(and potentially police and other, government-provided civilian capabilities) to UN peace support operations.
Specifically, it recommends that Canada adhere to the standards and timelines of the UN Peacekeeping
Capability Readiness System. It further recommends reinstating military capabilities formerly provided by
Canada, working in concert with other nations, within the framework of the Multinational Standby High
Readiness Brigade for United Nations
INTRODUCTION
The Government of Canada (GoC) has expressed its intent to assume a greater role in United Nations Peace
Support Operations (UN PSO), and the Department of National Defence (DND), through its Defence
Policy Review, is currently conducting research on how best to achieve that objective.
The overall Canadian objectives of PSO deployment are contributing to achievement of mission success and
then returning our troops home safely. However, PSO have grown evermore challenging and dangerous.
“Peacekeeping today deploys into theatres where armed groups proliferate – some with extremist worldviews,
others with links to transnational organised crime. Many of these non-state actors are not readily drawn into a
negotiated political solution. Pockets of fighting may be ongoing. Political processes may be incipient or
faltering. The State and its institutions are often perceived to be partial, non-representative, and weak.
Consent for the presence of a peacekeeping operation may be uneven amongst the parties to the conflict, and
may shift over time. Peacekeeping operations must continue to help the main parties advance political
solutions, with Member States and regional support, yet be ready to face such heightened challenges.” i
As new PSO evolve to become ever-more complex, and multidimensional, there is a growing operational
requirement for well-qualified troops, not only at the tactical level, but also at the operational level, to provide
expert leadership to the military functions within those multidimensional, complex missions. Evolving
expertise is especially required in such major, cross-cutting issues as security system reform (SSR), including
Defence Sector Reform (DSR), justice and rule of law (ROL), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
(DDR), sexual and gender-based violence, protection of civilians, and mission integration, as well as a clear
understanding of, and capabilities to undertake robust operations ii and peacebuilding tasks. iii iv It is equally
important that such troops are readily available and rapidly deployable, so that timely establishment of PSO
can be achieved.
In order to assist the UN in meeting such evolving challenges effectively, as a troop-contributing country,
Canada will need to commit suitable time and resources to the development and provision of the required
expertise, and to train, prepare, deploy, and support its troops, police, and government-provided civilians
within a UN context – including within the guidelines of the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
for troop contributing countries.
AIM
The aim of this submission is to recommend a Canadian approach to provision of military support to United
Nations peace support operations, in alignment with the United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness
System for troop contributing countries.
SCOPE
The focus of this submission is on the effective and timely provision of military troops (and potentially police
and other, government-provided civilian capabilities) to UN peace operations. Specifically, it recommends that
Canada adhere to the standards and timelines of the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System. It further
recommends reinstating military capabilities formerly provided by Canada, working in concert with other
nations, within the framework of the Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations
Operations (SHIRBRIG). v
BACKGROUND
In an appearance before the Senate Standing Committee on Defence and Security, on 30 May 2016, M. Hervé
Ladsous, Head of Department in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, identified the
following requirement for military peacekeeping readiness and rapid deployment capabilities:
« La question de la rapidité du déploiement est cruciale. Nous avions un système que j'ai trouvé lorsque
j'ai pris mon poste il y a quelques années qu’on appelait le stand-by system, et cela ne marchait pas. Avec ce
vieux système, au mieux, il faut six à neuf mois pour déployer une unité sur le terrain. Tout a changé l'an
dernier avec l'aide des États-Unis. Le Président Obama s'est engagé personnellement. Nous avons monté un
sommet sur le maintien de la paix à notre assemblée générale en septembre, et une cinquantaine de pays nous
ont proposé environ 50 000 personnes disponibles rapidement avec une variété d’équipements et de
compétences.
Depuis, nous travaillons pour mettre en place le Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System, qui nous
permettra, à la fin de l’année, de disposer d'une capacité d'environ 15 000 hommes et femmes disponibles
pour déploiement en 30 à 60 jours. Cela nous permettra de monter une opération de maintien de la paix de
moyenne dimension rapidement et avec toutes les capacités techniques…these 15,000 are people on standby.
They are registered as being totally ready technically with equipment, with training to deploy the minute their
government decides to participate in a peacekeeping operation. It means that at the end of this year if the
Security Council were to decide on a new peacekeeping operation, I can say, “I'm ready to deploy up to
15,000 people within 30 to 60 days.”
“The issue of mission start-up and mission surge…[are] highlighted as particular concerns given that the
timeliness of deployment not only affects the security of civilians and staff in any given context, but also plays
a vital role in ensuring the legitimacy of the UN and maintenance of political leverage.” vi
CANADA’S READIN ESS FOR UN OPERATIONS
For many years, Canada’s successful provision of troops was provided within the guidelines of the previous
UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS). But for 12 years, until 2009, we went much further than the
requirements of UNSAS, and partnered with like-minded nations to create the Multinational Standby High
Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG).
SHIRBRIG was a multinational brigade that could be made available to the UN as a rapidly deployable
peacekeeping force. It did not ‘belong to’ the UN, but rather was made available to the UN as required, and at
the discretion of the SHIRBRIG member countries. vii SHIRBRIG functioned under the guidance of a
Steering Committee, with representatives from all participating countries, and Chaired by a Presidency
whose nationality rotated annually. viii The Commander of SHIRBRIG was a Brigadier-General who served
for a two to three year term, also provided by a participating country, on a rotation between countries. ix
The SHIRBRIG Planning Element was a small, permanent Headquarters of approximately 15 officers
supplied by the participating countries, led by a Colonel Chief of Staff, x supported by Danish administrative
staff, and permanently housed in Denmark. xi The role of the Planning Element was to maintain close ties
with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and to monitor and prepare for operations
in areas of conflict that would potentially lead to a UN peacekeeping mission. The Planning Element worked
hard at aligning itself with UN peacekeeping policies and procedures so that it could rapidly deploy and
establish new UN missions. It therefore developed standing operating procedures, carried out operational
preparations for deployment, and conducted training of the SHIRBRIG staff and unit commanders in UN
methodologies and procedures. It regularly visited UN HQ and active Missions in the field. During
operations, the Planning Element served as the nucleus of the brigade headquarters and was augmented by
non-permanent staff from the member nations, as well as the Danish communications and security company.
A Brigade Pool of Forces, providing a full range of capabilities, ensured the deployment of the units
earmarked for the SHIRBRIG brigade. Units were provided to SHIRBRIG on standby, under pre-arranged
agreements (including the previous United Nations Standby Arrangement System, UNSAS) and remained
under national command until deployed. The SHIRBRIG Pool of Forces also allowed flexibility in structuring
the force for a specific mission, as well as redundancy to allow for situations in which some countries opted
not to participate in a specific mission.
The SHIRBRIG concept of operations was summarized as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Member countries decided on a case-by-case basis to participate on any given mission thereby
preserving national sovereignty;
Any deployment involving SHIRBRIG must have been mandated by the UN Security Council;
Although originally envisioned for operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, SHIRBRIG
nations were prepared to examine more robust operations on a case-by-case basis;
SHIRBRIG forces would deploy for a maximum of six months, following which the mission was
either terminated or SHIRBRIG’s elements were replaced by non-SHIRBRIG forces;
The Brigade’s reaction time was 15 to 30 days following the decision of participating countries;
The availability of forces would be based on a brigade pool of resources that would include
capabilities to carry out a peace support operation as well as provide for redundancies of these
capabilities; and
SHIRBRIG units would be self-sufficient for 60 days.
Sixteen nations were members of SHIRBRIG: Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland,
Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Five additional
countries participated as observers: Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Jordan and Senegal.
SHIRBRIG’s record speaks for itself. It was first declared available for deployment in 2000 and in that same
year deployed to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). The value of this
deployment was recognized by Secretary-General, Kofi Annan who stated “SHIRBRIG is a rapid deployment
formation available to the United Nations as part of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System. It has
already proven its utility in the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. There, a
force that had trained together and developed a high degree of coherence was able to arrive and establish itself
quickly in the theatre of operation, thereby sending a message of competence and commitment.”
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was the first new full UN mission since UNMEE and
SHIRBRIG again responded to UN needs by providing personnel to establish the Interim UN Headquarters
in Monrovia, Liberia. This ensured a smooth transition between the ECOMIL mission and the United
Nations-led mission in Liberia. In the case of UNMIL, SHIRBRIG personnel deployed and were active in
theatre within five days of the Security Council Resolution.
SHIRBRIG was also committed to flexible employment options to ensure it met the evolving needs of the
UN. In response to a UN request, in March 2003, SHIRBRIG provided a planning team to help the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to plan its peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire.
SHIRBRIG deployed to the United Nation’s Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) and to the United Nations
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), in both cases providing the core of the military HQ within the integrated mission
HQ in Khartoum, as well as providing the Joint Military Committee HQ in Juba, South Sudan. SHIRBRIG
later provided planning support to the UN and the AU for the Darfur Planning Team, and the PSO missions
AMISOM and MINURCAT.
When SHIRBRIG was not deployed, it was training and preparing for deployment. Recognizing the benefits
of encouraging development of similar standby brigades throughout the world, Canada encouraged
development of SHIRBRIG’s initiatives towards African peacekeeping capacity building. These initiatives
included:
1. Financial sponsorship, for three-month periods, of African Officers to obtain on-the-job training in
SHIRBRIG HQ in Denmark;
2. Assistance with establishment of the African Standby Force, based on the SHIRBRIG model; and,
3. Advice on the structure of the HQ facilities and manning of HQ of the East African Brigade
(EASBRIG), assisting the first EASBRIG Command Post Exercise, and supporting its Civili-Military
Cooperation exercise.
Canada was a recognized leader within SHIRBRIG, contributing significantly to UN missions in Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Liberia and Sudan. Canada hosted SHIRBRIG training events, and throughout the 12 years of its
existence, continuously provided full-time staff to the SHIRBRIG HQ in Denmark.
From 1999 to 2001, Canada provided the Planning Element Chief of Staff, who also deployed to UNMEE as
the mission’s military Chief of Staff. In 2003, Canada provided the Presidency, responsible for initiating
SHIRBRIG’s African capacity building programs. From 2003 to 2006, Canada provided SHIRBRIG’s
Commander who assisted in Sudan’s ceasefire negotiations, helped the UN plan its peacekeeping missions,
then led SHIRBRIG’s deployments to the United Nation’s Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) as the first
Military Advisor, and to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) as the first Deputy Force
Commander.
By many measures, SHIRBRIG was a tremendous success, achieving recognition for its contributions to
peacekeeping missions, and its African Capacity building initiatives. It was both efficient and effective and was
a recognized model for other potential multinational peacekeeping organizations throughout the world.
However, despite these successes, SHIRBRIG was disbanded in 2009, when the governments of its key
member nations, including Canada’s, reduced their support for United Nations peacekeeping in favour of
participation in counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Since its withdrawal from SHIRBRIG, Canada’s participation in UN peace support operations has decreased
dramatically.
THE PROPOSED WAY AHEAD
If it has not already done so, Canada should become a signatory to the UN’s new Peacekeeping Capability
Readiness System, xii and take the necessary steps to ensure that it is compliant and can meet the standards
and timings at the highest readiness level, as laid out in that readiness system.
Ideally, SHIRBRIG would be resurrected as a multinational initiative, but with far greater operational
flexibility and capability. Such a venture would require significant levels of international diplomacy, and may
meet resistance from former SHIRBRIG members due to their current political and economic conditions and
military commitments.
Alternatively, and more simply, Canada could undertake a leadership role by focusing on providing the
framework of one vital contribution that SHIRBRIG provided – a multinational, UN military HQ, fully
trained and equipped with UN-compatible communications equipment, software and procedures, able to
integrate fully within a UN mission HQ, and deployable within a very short period to establish new military
command and control capacity within an integrated UN mission HQ. By recreating that key HQ capability,
Canada would be offering a unique, yet vital capability to the UN - something it cannot readily provide itself,
or obtain from anywhere else (with the possible exception of some regional HQs of the African Standby
Force, NATO and the EU).
The key to this proposal though, would be the multinational composition of the HQ, or it would not be
acceptable to the UN as a military mission HQ. To achieve that multinational character, Canada should
provide the basic building blocks, and then arrange to partner with like-minded nations to provide elements
to augment staff, equipment, and resources across the entire command and control spectrum. xiii
Once established and trained, it could be offered as a formed HQ, on standby and rapidly deployable, within
the timeframe required within the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System.
CANADA’S COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING
The AU and many individual nations currently lack the capacity adequately to train, prepare and support their
personnel to current UN standards, let alone to the evolving demands of complex and multidimensional
PSO. They need help from the UN, from more advanced regional organizations, and from individual nations
like Canada.
As the quality of its own PSO readiness and rapid-reaction capabilities are augmented, Canada could expand
its programs and employ existing mechanisms to share knowledge and enhance institutional training capacity
with the UN, with Regional Organizations, and with individual nations who need help.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are proposed:
1. If it has not already done so, Canada should become a signatory to the UN’s new Peacekeeping
Capability Readiness System, xiv and take the necessary steps to ensure that it is compliant and can
meet the standards and timings as laid out in that readiness system.
2. Additionally, although beyond the scope of this paper, within the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness
System, Canada should consider offering military resources that are either unique or difficult for the
UN to obtain, especially on a short-notice basis. xv
3. Canada should consider offering its training and other areas of peacekeeping expertise to assist in
international capacity-building ventures.
4. Canada should consider offering the core of a multinational, UN military HQ, fully trained and
equipped with UN-compatible communications equipment, software and procedures. The HQ should
be able to integrate fully within a UN mission HQ, and be ready to deploy rapidly, within the
timeframe required within the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System. xvi
List of Attachments
Annex A – United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
Annex B – Definitions
Annex C - SHIRBRIG Background Information
Endnotes
Annex A – United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
Overview
The United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) replaced the old United Nations
Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) in July 2015. The PCRS aims to establish a more predictable and
dynamic process of interaction between the UNHQ and the Member States for ensuring readiness and timely
deployment of quality peacekeeping capabilities.
Objectives
The PCRS aims to:
1. Improve efficiency in the management of commitments,
2. Achieve a greater degree of readiness and predictability through a more sustained and collaborative
approach between UNHQ and the Member States, and
3. In the longer term, provide a single window for the selection of a TCC for deployment.
Methodology
The new system, by adopting a clearly defined criteria and related steps, will reflect the actual commitments
of Member States. The levels of commitments and related steps are described as follows:
1. Level 1: TCC makes a formal pledge for a unit along with:
a. The table of organization,
b. List of major and self- sustainment equipment,
c. Details of specialists (if any), and,
d. Certification of completion of basic training. The Member States can include police and any
non-military capabilities. Emerging and aspiring TCCs that do not yet meet these basic
requirements will not be registered in Level 1 but will be engaged as part of a preparatory
process managed by the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell.
2. Level 2: Based on the UN operational requirements, selective pledges at Level 1 will be elevated to
this level through a process of preliminary MOU negotiation and an Assessment and Advisory Visit
(AAV) by a UN HQ Team comprising members of FGS and DFS.
3. Level 3: Following a satisfactory AAV, only those units will be upgraded to level 3 which have
achieved a reasonable degree of preparedness. A detailed MOU will have been negotiated and TCCs
will provide a load list as required by the DFS.
4. Rapid Deployment Level (RDL): Having reached Level 3, the TCC may pledge to deploy within
30/60/90 days of the request made by the UN HQ. In the case of enablers, this level will be linked
to the premiums for rapid deployment as well (if they are declared eligible for a particular mission in
accordance with the premium guidelines).
Annex B –Definitions
Definitions
Canadians who are “deployed by” the Government of Canada (GoC), include those assigned by Canada to
UN-mandated PSO including Military; Federal, Provincial and Municipal police; Civilian Government employees;
Civilian, non-government employees contracted by Canada, either for Canadian services or services rendered to the
UN or another regional organization engaged in a PSO; NGO workers with a contractual relationship with GAC;
and Interns, Volunteers, others as designated by the Government of Canada.
Faster Deployment - A renewed peacekeeping partnership must translate into action that delivers practical results
on the ground through faster deployment of the right capabilities at the right time, greater readiness to implement
critical mandated tasks, greater clarity on mandated tasks, and the ability to respond swiftly in times of crisis.
“The ability to rapidly deploy an initial presence and to begin operations is critical to the early establishment of
security. The Brahimi report posited a 90-day time frame for deployment of a large, multidimensional operation.
Past experiences with rapidly deployable headquarters elements, such as the Standing Police Capacity, serve as good
models on which to base this approach. A critical first step is the early preparation of an integrated deployment plan
that sets the targets and timelines for an agreed initial operating capacity (IOC) of a mission headquarters. The rapid
establishment of mission headquarters must be accompanied by a prioritized approach to mandate implementation
in the first year. An early robust presence is critical for the credibility of a new peacekeeping mission. Initial
deployment efforts should focus, therefore, on means to stabilize the conflict and on creating the basic political and
security conditions for peace consolidation. The deployment of subsequent mission elements would be driven by
mission planners – military, police and civilian – in consultation with UN headquarters and in dialogue with local and
international partners.” 1
CAF Planning Process - the CAF efficient and effective process for the consideration of its potential involvement
in operations, and for its provision of military advice to the GoC.
Capacity building - training to develop the skills, knowledge, and behaviors needed for effective participation in peace
support operations. For purposes of this paper, capacity building also refers to the provision of peace support training similar
in nature to that provided to the Canadians listed above, but internationally, for the benefit of selected nations and regions as
designated by the Government of Canada. It also refers to institutional capacity building that develops the capability of those
nations or regions eventually to undertake the peace support training by themselves.
Peace support operation - an integrated, multi-dimensional field operation which involves a range of activities
(political/diplomatic, military, humanitarian, human rights, governance, corrections, judiciary, police, development, etc.)
working together to help lay the foundations of a sustainable peace.
Training - the provision of the technical and procedural knowledge and skills required in the performance of
assigned duties; it generates a predictable response to a predictable situation.
Education - the provision of a base of knowledge and intellectual skills with which information may be interpreted
reasonably and sound judgment exercised. Education facilitates a reasoned response to an unpredictable situation.
A New Partnership Agenda: Charting A New Horizon For Un Peacekeeping. Department of Peacekeeping
Operations and Department of Field Support, UN HQ, New York, July 2009, page 19.
1
Peace support education and training - the full range of training required to carry out the activities in a peace support
operation, including directly related activities such as research and development.
Multidimensional Peacekeeping Missions
Depending on their mandate, multidimensional peacekeeping operations (also referred to as peace operations) may be
required to:
1. Assist in implementing a comprehensive peace agreement;
2. Monitor a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities to allow space for political negotiations and a peaceful
settlement of disputes;
3. Provide a secure environment encouraging a return to normal civilian life;
4. Prevent the outbreak or spillover of conflict across borders;
5. Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government based on democratic principles, good
governance and economic development; and
6. Administer a territory for a transitional period, thereby carrying out all the functions that are normally the
responsibility of a government.
While military personnel remain vital to most operations, civilians have taken on a growing number of responsibilities,
which can include:
1. Helping former opponents implement complex peace agreements by liaising with a range of political and civil
society actors;
2. Supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
3. Assisting with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants;
4. Supervising and conducting elections;
5. Strengthening the rule of law, including assistance with judicial reform and training of civilian police;
6. Promoting respect for human rights and investigating alleged violations;
7. Assisting with post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation; and
8. Setting up a transitional administration of a territory as it moves towards independence. [Handbook on UN
Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, 2003.]
Complex Missions - The coordination mandates of missions often extend beyond the UN system and include facilitating a
coherent approach among all international actors – bilateral, regional and multilateral – in support of national efforts.
Robust Peacekeeping - A robust approach is guided by the mission objectives established by the Security Council and
should be driven by a clear political strategy. It requires confident and credible military and police postures. At the tactical
level, a robust approach means that contingents may be required to use force in defence of the mandate. Such operations
would always be limited in time and space. Competent leadership at political and contingent levels is essential in
implementing this complex political-military concept. A robust approach carries significant implications for the wider
mission, its partners and the local population. It therefore requires the support of host authorities and effective
communication and coordination with other partners.
Most effective instrument - an agency whose services are delivered on time, to a range of participants, appropriate
to the need and of a high quality.
Annex C - SHIRBRIG Background Information
Multi-National Stand-By High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations
The Multi-National Stand-By High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG) was a
multinational brigade that could be made available to the UN as a rapidly deployable peacekeeping force.
Sixteen nations were members of SHIRBRIG: Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland,
Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden (Argentina had
temporarily suspended its membership). Five additional countries participated as observers: Chile, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Jordan and Senegal.
The SHIRBRIG concept of operations is summarized as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Member countries decided on a case-by-case basis to participate on any given mission thereby
preserving national sovereignty;
Any deployment involving SHIRBRIG must be mandated by the UN Security Council;
Although originally envisioned for operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, SHIRBRIG
nations were prepared to examine more robust operations on a case-by-case basis;
SHIRBRIG forces would deploy for a maximum of six months following which, the mission was
either terminated or replaced by non-SHIRBRIG forces;
The Brigade’s reaction time was 15 to 30 days following the decision of participating countries;
The availability of forces would be based on a brigade pool of resources that would include
capabilities to carry out a peace support operation as well as provide for redundancies of these
capabilities; and
SHIRBRIG units would be self-sufficient for 60 days.
The elements of SHIRBRIG comprised the following three entities:
• The Steering Committee – This executive body was a political-military structure responsible for
oversight and supervision, policy-making, and for the SHIRBRIG decision-making and force
generation processes. The Chair of the Steering Committee rotated annually amongst the full
member participants. A Canadian, Lieutenant-General (Retd) Ray Crabbe was one of the more
influential and successful Chairs.
• A Planning Element – Located at Høvelte Barracks in Denmark, the Planning Element was the
permanent multinational military staff composed of about 15 officers from member countries that
had signed all the SHIRBRIG documents. The Planning Element developed standing operating
procedures, carried out operational preparations for deployment, and conducted training of the
SHIRBRIG staff and unit commanders. During operations, the Planning Element served as the
nucleus of the brigade headquarters and was augmented by non-permanent staff from the member
nations.
• A Brigade Pool of Forces providing a full range of capabilities ensured the deployment of the
brigade. Forces earmarked for the SHIRBRIG brigade remained under national command until
deployed. The SHIRBRIG pool of resources also allowed flexibility in structuring the force for a
specific mission.
SHIRBRIG forces could be used as follows:
•
•
•
•
As a complete brigade or as a force smaller than brigade size,
For an observer or monitoring mission,
The SHIRBRIG Headquarters could be called upon to form the nucleus of a UN Force Level
Headquarters, and
The Planning Element could be used to assist UN Headquarters with the startup of a new
peacekeeping mission.
Following is the chronology of SHIRBRIG:
1994 Denmark launched an initiative to create the multinational stand-by high readiness brigade for un
operations (SHIRBRIG).
1995 Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, and Sweden participated at Denmark’s working group to develop the concept for a
multinational stand-by high readiness brigade for UN peacekeeping operations. UN DPKO secretariat took
part as an observer.
1996 An implementation group was formed to prepare legal and technical documents. This group
established the overall agreement on how SHIRBRIG should be managed. A letter of intent was prepared,
requesting nations to commit to its establishment. Two memoranda of understanding established the
modalities and mandate of the Steering Committee and Planning Element (Planelm).
1997
The planning element was officially created by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.
1999 Member nations concluded that the SHIRBRIG force pool had reached a sufficient level, and was to
be declared available to the UN in January 2000.
2000 SHIRBRIG deployed a headquarters (all member countries), an infantry battalion (the Netherlands
and Canada) and a headquarters company (Denmark) to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
(UNMEE) in November.
2001 SHIRBRIG redeployed from UNMEE in May.
2002
SHIRBRIG was once again declared ready for UN deployment in January.
2003 In March, SHIRBRIG provided a planning team to assist ECOWAS in the planning of a
peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire.
2003 In September, SHIRBRIG deployed 20 members to assist the UN to form the core of the Interim
UN headquarters in Liberia (UNMIL).
2004 Assisted UN DPKO to plan the peacekeeping mission in Sudan, and Commander assisted the UN
efforts in Naivasha, Kenya as part of the Ceasefire talks between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese
Peoples Liberation Movement / Army.
2004 to 2005 Provided the core of the military element, including the Acting Military Advisor, to the UN
Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS)
2005 Provided the core military HQ, including the Force’s Deputy Force Commander and Chief of Staff,
the Joint Military Coordination Centre, the Integrated Support Services, and the HQ security company (Italy),
to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
2005 Commander SHIRBRIG provided planning assistance to the UN and AU for the planned UN/AU
hybrid mission in Darfur, and participated in preparatory training with the African Mission in Darfur (AMIS)
2006 SHIRBRIG provided Staff Officers to NY for planning assistance to the UN for the planned UN/AU
hybrid mission in Darfur.
2007 SHIRBRIG provided Staff Officers for planning assistance to the AU for the planned UN/AU hybrid
mission in Darfur.
2008 SHIRBRIG provided a Staff Officer, Mines and Engineering, to the HQ of the United nations Mission
in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), to act as liaison between the UN and the EU.
2009 SHIRBRIG disbanded
SHIRBRIG FAQs
Question # 1 - How did SHIRBRIG decide to which missions it would deploy?
Response # 1 - After the SHIRBRIG Presidency received a request from the UN, SHIRBRIG members
were contacted and informed of the request. Once a Steering Committee consensus was reached, the
Presidency informed the UN of SHIRBRIG’s decision.
Member countries decided on a case-by-case basis whether or not they would participate in any given
mission. Their national decision making procedures (and thereby their national sovereignty) was not affected
by participation in SHIRBRIG.
SHIRBRIG only deployed to missions mandated by the United Nations Security Council. Although
deployments were initially envisioned under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, the members had agreed to
consider more robust operations on a case-by-case basis.
Question # 2 - Was SHIRBRIG just a “paper tiger” for Western nations to hide behind rather than truly
contributing to UN peace operations?
Response # 2 - SHIRBRIG’s record speaks for itself. SHIRBRIG was first declared available for
deployment in 2000 and in 2000, SHIRBRIG deployed to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
(UNMEE). The value of this deployment was recognized by Secretary-General, Kofi Annan who stated
“SHIRBRIG is a rapid deployment formation available to the United Nations as part of the United Nations
Standby Arrangements System. It has already proven its utility in the deployment of the United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. There, a force that had trained together and developed a high degree of
coherence was able to arrive and establish itself quickly in the theatre of operation, thereby sending a message
of competence and commitment.”
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was the first new full UN mission since UNMEE and
SHIRBRIG again responded to UN needs by providing personnel to establish the Interim UN Headquarters
in Monrovia, Liberia. This ensured a smooth transition between the ECOMIL mission and the United
Nations-led mission in Liberia. In the case of UNMIL, SHIRBRIG personnel deployed and were active in
theatre within five days of the Security Council Resolution.
SHIRBRIG was also committed to flexible employment options to ensure it met the evolving needs of the
UN. In response to a UN request, in March 2003, SHIRBRIG provided a planning team to help the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to plan its peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire.
Question # 3 - Should rapid reaction be left to organizations that have a more robust capability such as
NATO, the EU or coalitions of the willing?
Response # 3 - According to the Brahimi Report, experience has shown that in the context of modern peace
operations dealing with intra-State/transnational conflicts, consent may be achieved in various ways. Nonthreatening presence once characterized traditional peacekeeping. However, modern peacekeepers need to
pose a credible deterrent and are often called upon to enforce the peace. As such, the Brahimi Report
recognized that where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of
willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. The
Charter clearly encourages cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations to resolve conflict and
establish and maintain peace and security. The United Nations is actively and successfully engaged in many
such cooperation programmes.
Nonetheless, SHIRBRIG was a capable rapid deployment formation available to the United Nations as part
of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System.
Question # 4 - How often did SHIRBRIG units train together?
Response # 4 - SHIRBRIG operated within established UN operating procedures and concepts of
operation. Commander SHIRBRIG was responsible for training the SHIRBRIG staff and unit commanders
on these procedures, while it remained a national responsibility to train and prepare units. SHIRBRIG staff
and unit commanders trained together several times a year. This included staff training, rapid deployment
exercises, command post exercises for the Headquarters, and specialty training in logistics and
communications. A priority had been placed on civil–military coordination training – a reality of modern
peacekeeping.
Question # 5 - What was SHIRBRIG’s relationship to the UN?
Response # 5 - SHIRBRIG was not a part of the United Nations. However, SHIRBIRG only deployed to
missions mandated by the United Nations Security Council. SHIRBRIG enjoyed a very close and
cooperative relationship with United Nations officials and adhered to UN policies and procedures.
Question # 6 - What were the criteria for SHIRBRIG membership?
Response # 6 - There were no criteria, per se, however general guidelines included the following:
1. Small and Middle-sized Nations. SHIRBRIG was best suited for small to middle-sized nations who
would not perhaps be capable on their own of providing a large force to a peacekeeping mission.
2. Peacekeeping Experiences. It was preferable to have nations that had peacekeeping experience and
who were willing to participate in the UN standby arrangement system.
3. Ability to Pay for their Participation. Financial responsibilities varied with the level of membership.
For example, member nations paid for participation at Steering Committee meetings. Those
countries that had pledged units to the force pool paid to train their personnel and staff officers. Full
SHIRBRIG participants committed a full-time officer to the Planning Element in Copenhagen and
shared the operating costs of the Planning Element (approximately USD $50k per annum per
country) and were requested on a rotational basis to host and support SHIRBRIG training.
4. Well-Equipped and Trained Units. Nations must have been able to provide well-equipped and
trained units at the required levels of readiness.
5. Global Representation. Representation from different regions was an important issue that the
Steering Committee was pursuing to ensure that the composition of SHIRBRIG reflected, to the
extent possible, the global nature of the United Nations.
SHIRBRIG members had also embarked on a number of initiatives to help increase geographic
representation and to help other countries or regions create a similar multinational force as called for in the
Report of the Special Committee on Peace Operations (The Brahimi Report). Notable success was achieved
in Africa, where the African Standby Force and its five brigade-sized, sub-regional organizations were based
on the SHIRBRIG model.
Question # 7 - What did the different levels of membership mean?
Response # 7 - There were four official SHIRBRIG documents that needed to be signed in order to become
a full SHIRBRIG member as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Letter of Intent (LOI);
Memorandum of Understanding for the Steering Committee;
Memorandum of Understanding – Operation, Funding, Administration; and,
Status and the Memorandum of Understanding for the Planning Element.
While all SHIRBRIG nations and observers could attend Steering Committee meetings, nations that had
signed all the SHIRBRIG documents assisted with an equal shared cost to operate the Planning Element,
contributed forces, participated in training exercises, contributed to the Planning Element in Denmark, and
participated in on all Steering Committee proposals.
Nations that had signed all the documents, except the Memorandum of Understanding for the Planning
Element (PLANELM) participated in the Steering Committee Meetings on all but financial matters,
contributed forces and participated in training exercises.
Members who signed the Letter of Intent and the Memorandum of Understanding for the Steering
Committee participated in the Steering Committee meetings on all matters except those regarding troops and
finances.
Those nations that had only signed the Letter of Intent could attend the Steering Committee Meetings.
Question # 8 - In what other ways did SHIRBRIG contribute to global peacekeeping?
Response # 8 - SHIRBRIG members had approved a very significant concept development proposal that
included a much more flexible employment of SHIRBRIG in response to a wide range of potential UN
peacekeeping requirements. In addition, member nations had agreed to assist in capacity-building roles with
the intent of assisting developing nations in enhancing their peacekeeping capabilities. This included the
secondment of officers from developing nations to the Planning Element, offering training opportunities to
developing nations providing planning teams (similar to SHIRBRIG’s support to ECOWAS in Cote d’Ivoire),
and inviting regional and national officials to observe Steering Committee meetings. In this regard,
SHIRBRIG had developed close cooperative ties to the African Union and African regional organizations
that had indicated a strong interest in adopting SHIRBRIG as a model for developing the African Standby
Forces.
Endnotes
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous - Statement to the Fourth Committee
30 October 2015.
i
“The concept of ‘robustness’ in UN peacekeeping is a political and operational strategy to signal the
intention of a UN mission to implement its mandate and to deter threats to an existing peace process in the
face of resistance from spoilers. The concept is rooted in the guiding principles that are the foundations of
UN peacekeeping: nonuse of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, consent of the main
parties and impartiality in implementation. Although it was introduced in the Brahimi report, questions
remain as to what robust UN peacekeeping means in practice.
A robust approach is guided by the mission objectives established by the Security Council and should be
driven by a clear political strategy. It requires confident and credible military and police postures. At the
tactical level, a robust approach means that contingents may be required to use force in defence of the
mandate. Such operations would always be limited in time and space. Competent leadership at political and
contingent levels is essential in implementing this complex political-military concept. A robust approach
carries significant implications for the wider mission, its partners and the local population. It therefore
requires the support of host authorities and effective communication and coordination with other partners.
Robust peacekeeping has significant operational and support implications and requires agreed minimum
standards among contributing countries. It demands a high degree of mobility of military and police
personnel and the willingness and capacity to operate at a high tempo for sustained periods, night and day.
The approach requires effective mission command and control structures and units that can work together in
larger formations. This demands regular joint training and exercises in the field. Robust peacekeeping requires
enhanced situational awareness and risk analysis to better anticipate and prepare for potential challenges.
Scenario-based planning and reliable contingency arrangements are important for responding to threats to
mission personnel and local populations. Robust peacekeeping calls for the introduction of modern
technology, responsive logistics support and delegated authority to take difficult decisions in the field.
Ultimately, a successful robust approach depends on the commitment of the Security Council and the
willingness of troop and police contributors to implement it. Lack of shared understanding among Member
States on the scope and function of robust peacekeeping has prevented a full examination of its operational
implications for missions, other partners and local populations. This has serious repercussions for those
missions confronting volatile conflict situations without the political consensus and practical support
necessary to deliver on mandated tasks.” A New Partnership Agenda: Charting A New Horizon For Un
Peacekeeping. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, UN HQ, New
York, July 2009, page 21.
ii
“UN peacekeepers play a critical role in building peace after conflict, in establishing the conditions for
recovery and development activities, and in carrying out some of the tasks essential to stabilization and early
consolidation of peace. The recent Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding (A/63/881–S/2009/304)
identified recurrent immediate priorities, some of which UN peacekeeping operations are mandated to
support. In complex missions, UN senior leaders are responsible for shaping a common vision and the
integrated delivery of the peacebuilding activities of all parts of the UN family. And on occasion, UN
peacekeeping missions are tasked to coordinate overall international efforts.
The diversity of peacebuilding needs and the gaps in international and national capacity to meet them pose
real challenges for the successful exit of complex peacekeeping missions. Peacekeepers are often the largest
iii
and most visible international presence on the ground and face unrealistic expectations as to what they can
reasonably achieve. At times, peacekeepers try to fill gaps in the provision of international support in areas
where they have little capacity or resources and, in so doing, risk being stretched or ineffectual. Peacekeepers
cannot anticipate all the tasks critical to a country’s transition, and approaches will differ in each situation. In
integrated missions, leaders should have the capacity to assess progress, draw on specialized expertise to
identify critical gaps, and to work with a range of partners to meet peacebuilding needs. Among the core
capacities and comparative advantage that UN peacekeeping can bring to a collective peacebuilding efforts
are support to national political processes and the provision of basic safety and security. Within the former,
complex missions provide good offices and promote dialogue and reconciliation. In many situations, they are
mandated to support the re-establishment of frameworks for governance and strengthening national
institutions. Support for the provision of basic safety and security, through the activities of military
peacekeepers, police as well as mine action, DDR, judicial and corrections reform, is critical to effective
stabilization and consolidation of the peace.
Ultimately, the successful departure of peacekeepers and continued peacebuilding depend on how quickly and
effectively national capacities for the provision of security can be put in place. Support to early SSR is
therefore one of the most critical tasks of UN peacekeeping to assist national actors to define and put in place
functioning and legitimate frameworks for security and safety as early as possible. In core capacity areas,
peacekeepers must be able to plan, lead and deliver a prioritized and sequenced set of activities. DPKO is
already working to identify essential early tasks as the first step to a coherent post-conflict stabilization
strategy.
In other peacebuilding areas, such as the provision of basic services, peacekeepers may be called on to
support others as part of an integrated effort. UN peacekeeping is not well equipped to tackle the social and
economic dimensions of peacebuilding and relies on others to provide sustainable development and capacitybuilding support. But successful transition depends on the ability of these partners to engage as early as
possible. Support to basic infrastructure, remuneration for national armed forces and police, and investment
in emergency employment initiatives are particularly critical for early peacebuilding. Member States must
invest in the capacity of UN and other partners to perform in these areas and continue to make progress in
establishing predictable divisions of labour between UN peacekeeping missions, UN development partners,
the international financial institutions and bilateral donors.” Ibid., page 23.
See Annex B for further information concerning the broad range of tasks of multidimensional UN
missions.
iv
These recommendations are made in the full knowledge that commitment of standby forces to rapidly deploy
requires a full range of pre-conditions and activities that ensure provision of the appropriately trained
individuals or units into a complex, multidimensional PSO, in a timely manner, suitably prepared, trained and
equipped, and ready to conduct operations in an austere and potentially hostile environment. Provision of
standby forces for rapid deployment should be considered within that broader range of activities.
v
Thematic Series on Building More Effective UN Peace Operations “Field Support for Peace Operations ”, The
Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations and the NYU Center on International Cooperation, 12
February 2010.
vi
“A globally representative mix of contributors is a critically important strength of UN peacekeeping.
Broad-based, global participation underpins legitimacy and strong partnership, offering both greater depth
and flexibility to deploy the right combination of actors and capabilities in a particular situation. Greater
participation enables more collective burden-sharing and helps build a shared understanding of the challenges
to be met. To optimize this global capacity, the Secretariat should be capable of undertaking forward-looking
analyses of the willingness and readiness of countries to contribute. However, existing force generation
capacity is fully absorbed in meeting current demands. Unlike many other UN agencies or departments, UN
peacekeeping has no regional representation outside mission areas. Its capacity to build deeper contacts and
vii
longer-term relationships with current or potential contributing countries is sorely limited.” A New
Partnership Agenda: Charting A New Horizon For Un Peacekeeping. Department of Peacekeeping
Operations and Department of Field Support, UN HQ, New York, July 2009, page 33.
viii In 2003, the Chairman was Lieutenant-General (Retd) Ray Crabbe, a Canadian, who presided over one of
the most proactive and successful Presidencies in the history of SHIRBRIG.
From 2003 to 2006, Canada provided Brigadier-General Gregory Mitchell as the only Canadian ever to
command SHIRBRIG.
ix
From 1999 to 2001, Canada provided Colonel Ray Romses as Chief of Staff, the only Canadian ever to fill
that position.
x
xi At various times, Canada provided the Presidency, the Commander of SHIRBRIG, the Chief of Staff of the
Planning Element and numerous Staff Officers of the Planning Element.
“TCC/PCCs can pledge military units/personnel, police units, vessels, aircrafts, government-provided
civilian capability and/or offers of specific capacity-building, equipping or training assistance.” - Lt Gen
Maqsood Ahmed, UN Military Advisor, 24 Sep 2015.
xii
Although the specific details of this proposal are beyond the scope of this paper, Canada has many experts
who could assist in development of workable options. The author is fully prepared to assist in their
development.
xiii
“TCC/PCCs can pledge military units/personnel, police units, vessels, aircrafts, government-provided
civilian capability and/or offers of specific capacity-building, equipping or training assistance.” - Lt Gen
Maqsood Ahmed, UN Military Advisor, 24 Sep 2015.
xiv
According to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, M. Hervé Ladsous, in an address
before the Senate Standing Committee on Defence and Security : « Nous manquons de matériel comme des
hélicoptères, surtout des hélicoptères de combat. Nous avons commencé à utiliser la surveillance aérienne par
drone il y a trois ans, et elle nous est essentielle aujourd’hui. Nous avons besoin d'une capacité en matière de
renseignements, d'unités de génie, et — dans le cas du Canada, j'en parle avec une demande particulière — de
personnel francophone. »
xv
To paraphrase Michael Ignatieff, multilateral commitments are rightly held to be essential for any midpower like Canada. Multilateralism is valuable to the extent that it allows us to make our voice heard and our
influence felt, in order to safeguard our independence and increase our national power.
xvi