STRATEGIC INDIA
S. Enders Wimbush
Prepared for
Smith Richardson Foundation
1
INTRODUCTION
India’s emergence as an independent power and possible strategic
partner (or rival) of the United States represents one of the most
portentous developments on the contemporary international security
landscape. Despite their adherence to common democratic values, until
recently Indian and American elites professed few common interests.
Given India’s close ties with the Soviet Union and the Sino-American
détente of the 1970s and 1980s, few Americans argued for engaging
India as a potential ally. Indians likewise saw little need to forge closer
economic and security ties with the United States.
For several reasons, this situation began to change during the
1990s. First, the USSR’s collapse and the end of the Cold War removed
a major source of tension in the U.S.-Indian relationship. Second, the
Tiananmen Square massacre reminded Americans that China remained a
communist dictatorship whose support for U.S. strategic interests had
become dubious with the end of the Soviet threat. Many Americans
began to see China more as a regional rival and an inveterate proliferator
than a potential contributor to the inchoate new world order preferred by
the United States. Third, the Indian government initiated wide-ranging
economic reforms that suggested to foreign investors—increasingly
disillusioned with the stagnation in Japan, persistent statism in China,
and crony capitalism in other Asian countries—India’s true economic
potential. Finally, Indian leaders increasingly saw value in improving
ties with Washington to counterbalance China, manage Pakistan, and
provide a surrogate for their defunct Soviet patron.
Building on the U.S.-Indian dialogue that burgeoned during the
second Clinton administration—which culminated in President Clinton’s
visit to India in March 2000—the Bush administration is currently
engaging India across a wide range of issues. The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, accelerated this rapprochement, which saw an
unprecedented degree of Indian-American military cooperation. Yet,
establishing a consensus view regarding shared strategic interests has
proved elusive, in large part because many American national security
and defense planners still possess only a superficial (and often
stereotypical) understanding of India’s strategic outlook, objectives, and
strategies.
2
This project explores the origins and consequences of India’s
growing economic, political, and military weight in the international
system. It attempts to address five overarching questions:
(1) What are the internal and external factors that explain India’s
increasing importance in world politics?
(2) How do Indian strategists and officials define the ends and
means of their foreign policy and national security? On what
issues do they share a consensus? Which issues remain
contentious?
(3) What are the key legacies, perceptions, and geostrategic
realities that influence India’s strategic culture and grand
strategy?
(4) What does India’s emergence as a global economic and
strategic actor imply for other countries’ national interests and
security strategies in the post-Cold War era?
(5) What opportunities are developing for convergent and
cooperative transactions between the United States and India?
What critical tradeoffs are involved?
PAST THINKING ON INDIA
When India achieved independence on August 15, 1947, the
country faced many contradictory strains. On the one hand, the end of
90 years of direct British rule, symbolized by India’s proclaiming itself a
republic with no allegiance to the British Crown, engendered a sense of
euphoria and an intense nationalist desire for an independent political,
economic, and foreign policy path. Upon becoming independent India’s
first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru in his stirring midnight “Tryst
with Destiny” speech to the Parliament offered a vision of India’s
achieving greatness amidst a community of newly free nations: “Long
years ago, we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when
we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very
substantially. At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps,
India will wake to life and freedom.”
On the other hand, serious problems lay behind the apparent
optimism. The British had left a legacy of widespread poverty and
illiteracy, an undeveloped economic infrastructure, and a backward
agricultural system that required food imports until the 1960s. During
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the first half of the century, the Indian economy grew at an annual rate of
only 0.7 percent, far less than the population growth rate, and the literacy
rate stood at only 14 percent. 1 This situation decisively shaped India’s
post-independence economic development strategy. Intellectuals,
politicians, and industrialists (e.g., the 1944 Bombay Plan) shared a
broad consensus on the preferred directions of economic policy: a vital
role for the public sector, the discouragement of foreign investment, the
development of heavy industries, and the need for centralized planning. 2
The country also faced the challenge of forging a strong unified national
identity and an effective state apparatus from the ravages of 1947
partition. The division of the formerly unified British colony into two
separate nation states engendered tremendously disruptive population
dislocations and unprecedented outbursts of religious hatred between
communities that had peacefully coexisted for centuries despite
occasional tensions. Perhaps one million people died in the process of
splitting British India into two separate states.
India’s partition had lasting repercussions not only for the region,
but also for the larger international community. On the Indian
subcontinent, it meant the birth of two states—the Republic of India and
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan—that soon fell into a chronic state of
tension. Differences between Hindus and Muslims in previous centuries
were manageable within a single nation, but partition both elevated that
conflict to the international level and exacerbated it. This transformation
resulted in three major conventional wars—in 1948, 1965, and 1971—as
well as numerous military clashes, including the Kargil conflict of 1999.
The problem of Indo-Pakistani tension assumed greater urgency when
both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998. 3
The Indian government’s concern for the issue of unity reflected
the need to integrate the more than 500 princely states that had enjoyed
virtual autonomy within the overall structure of British hegemony. If
these states had become independent, it would have laid the ground for a
cascading wave of political competition and conflict that would have
1
Prasenjit Basu, “Take a Better Look at the Work of a Rebounding India,”
International Herald Tribune, August 20, 1999.
2
Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of India
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 213. Another survey of
this period is Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India
After Independence: 1947-2000 (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000)
3
The protracted confrontation between the two states is reviewed in Sumit
Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2002).
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changed the course of South Asian history. The subcontinent would
have experienced the same problems that Europe and, more recently,
Africa have faced in forging modern nation states. In negotiations with
Britain, the leaders of the independence movement worked to ensure that
the princely states, including Jammu and Kashmir, would have no choice
but to enter India or Pakistan. Under the leadership of States Minister
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and his assistant V. P. Menon, India
successfully assimilated the overwhelming majority of these states
primarily through a negotiated process of peaceful integration that
occurred in stages during the first months after Independence. The
accession of Kashmir, Junagarh, and Hyderabad initially proved
problematic, but all three states had merged into India by the end of
1948. Pakistan’s new leaders, however, contested the legitimacy of
Kashmir’s accession on the grounds that, as a state with a Muslim
majority, it should have become part of Pakistan. 4
Between 1947 and late 1949, Indian leaders also were engaged in
defining their new country’s political structure as embodied in the new
Constitution. The Constituent Assembly met continuously for three
years, drawing in elected representatives and community leaders from
throughout the country. The resulting document, which both guaranteed
rights and enshrined duties, drew ideas and structures from India’s rich
history, the European Enlightenment, the 1935 Government of India Act,
the U.S. constitution (including a Supreme Court with the power of
judicial review of legislation), and the British parliamentary tradition. It
formally established a Westminister-type of government—with a
bicameral parliament, a president as a titular head of state, and a prime
minister selected by the lower house (the Lok Sabha), which itself was
elected in single-member voting constituencies (with some seats reserved
for minorities, such as the “untouchables,” that had suffered
discrimination in the past. The constitution’s underlying pillars were
universal adult franchise, federalism with a strong center, and a
democratic and secular political order.
In its foreign policy, the country followed the nationalist vision
and the spirit of freedom that had underlined its economic philosophy.
India declined to align with any of the major powers, and instead sought
constructive and cooperative ties with all countries, including both the
United States and the Soviet Union. It also promoted pan-Asian
solidarity to prevent the divisions of the Cold War from disrupting either
4
A history of the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir can be found in Owen
Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2002), pp. 56-108.
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the transnational decolonization process or India’s principal security,
economic, and political goals. By remaining within the newly structured
Commonwealth, however, India did retain friendly ties with Britain.
The internal and foreign strategies that India’s leaders followed
during the next several decades emanated from these initial principals
and structures. In effect, India had chosen a unique path by establishing
a democracy in a poor country, and a nonaligned state amidst a world
marked by tense divisions and tight alliances.
American thinking on India has been torn by the two seemingly
contradictory qualities of Indian reality. On the one hand, Americans
praise India for being the world’s largest democracy. Admittedly, the
country has wrestled for years with powerful cultural institutions (e.g.,
the caste system) that many criticize as inherently undemocratic.
Indians’ stress on economic justice and community rights and privileges
has sometimes clashed with the rights of individual political and
economic freedom so highly valued in the United States. On the whole,
however, the country’s political system has functioned remarkably well
in managing an immensely diverse religious, cultural, and linguistic
polity.
On the other hand, Americans became annoyed when Indian
governments, starting in the mid-1950s, began to affiliate themselves
closely with the Soviet bloc. A clear manifestation of the emerging
alignment occurred in 1956, when Indian leaders condemned the AngloFrench-Israeli attack on Egypt but said little about the concurrent Soviet
invasion of Hungary. Indian representatives soon supported, and
occasionally championed, Soviet positions on a range of security issues.
In August 1971, Moscow and New Delhi signed a friendship treaty, and
India began to import a range of Soviet weapons under generous
financial terms.
Other sources of Indo-U.S. tension, unrelated to India’s
burgeoning ties with America’s main Cold War adversary, emerged as
well. On the values front, Indian leaders adhered to an ideology of selfsufficiency (“Gandhism”) and self-reliance (“Nehruism”) that
caricatured Americans as wasteful and extravagant. Indian
representatives played leading roles in the Non-Aligned Movement,
which often adopted anti-American positions, at least rhetorically, on a
range of issues. India’s test of a nuclear device in 1974 simultaneously
irritated and alarmed Washington, which feared both Indian instability
and adventurism against Pakistan, the primary U.S. ally in South Asia
against Soviet influence in the region. Washington responded by
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imposing a range of economic sanctions on India, which limited
economic exchanges between the two countries in subsequent years.
For their part, Indians objected to Americans’ support for
Pakistan, India’s prime adversary in South Asia. U.S.-Pakistani ties
vitiated much of the goodwill Washington garnered when it provided
conventional arms to India after the 1962 Sino-Indian War and food aid
after the Bihar famine. Furthermore, Washington’s opening to China in
the mid-1970s convinced Indian strategists that the United States was
bent on “encircling” India through a combination of Sino-American
cooperation and deepening U.S. security ties with Pakistan. The
deployment of the USS Enterprise carrier task force around the Bay of
Bengal during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, which Indians widely
interpreted as an effort to deter Indian decision makers from seeking a
total victory in the conflict, stimulated the growth of anti-Americanism
throughout Indian society.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s initiated a
protracted shift in both American thinking regarding India and Indian
thinking about the United States. Leading Americans began to
appreciate that the forces that had separated the two countries had
weakened or disappeared entirely. Indian officials continued to refrain
from additional nuclear testing. They also signed international treaties
that suggested they could be trusted with their “virtual” nuclear
capability. Moreover, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship had become deeply
troubled. Despite assisting the U.S. effort to drive the Soviets from
Afghanistan, Pakistan had proved increasingly volatile and
unpredictable. A series of American measures designed to curb
Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions led to chronic disagreements between the
two governments. Finally, Washington’s relationship with China also
worsened for a variety of reasons, not least the brutal massacre at
Tiananmen Square and China’s crucial assistance to the Pakistani
nuclear program.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, furthered this
reassessment among many American strategists about India’s potential
contribution to the achievement of core U.S. objectives. First, U.S.
planners became increasingly aware of their need to ensure a continued
American military presence in Asia to supplement (and perhaps
eventually replace) traditional U.S. military relationships with Japan and
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South Korea that could easily change in ways that make it more difficult
to project American power in the region. 5
Second, some American planners worry about a future loss of
military access to the Persian Gulf. In the event that the U.S. military
presence there is either pushed out or pulled out, India’s offsetting
influence could be crucial to safeguard U.S. interests there.
Third, influential Americans in and out of government have
developed a growing appreciation of India’s possible role as a regional
counterweight to an economically dynamic and militarily assertive
China. Both countries share a common concern about growing Chinese
influence in Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. American planners
recognize India’s potential as an obstacle to possible Chinese efforts to
exploit targets of opportunity in other areas, including the South China
Sea and control of the sea lanes connecting Middle Eastern energy
producers to Asia’s voracious energy consumers. For their part, Indian
national security planners now openly discuss another kind of
“encirclement,” this time by the Chinese. Many of these Indian
strategists believe a better relationship with Washington will enhance
Indian efforts to resist China’s move toward regional hegemony.
(Conversely, strategists in both countries, but especially in India, also
fear that a weak and fractious China could export instability into
surrounding regions.)
Fourth, Americans have become more interested in enlisting
India as a key member of the global anti-terrorist coalition. Thanks to its
geography, India could provide bases of operations against terrorists in
Afghanistan and elsewhere in Eurasia, including against the terrorist
redoubts in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
As leaders of a fellow democracy who shares many U.S. values and have
themselves been the target of terrorism, Indians’ willingness to
contribute directly to the military effort against terrorism—including
offers to provide intelligence, bases, and logistics—have been sincere
and extensive. They also represented a significant and unprecedented
strategic leap away from past Indian positions.
Finally, U.S. strategists are beginning to appreciate India’s
potential contribution to the pursuit of other American goals. For
5
For more extensive discussions of these issues see the following studies
directed by S. Enders Wimbush: Asian Energy: Security Implications (OSD/Net
Assessment Summer Study, 1997); Asia 2025 (OSDC/Net Assessment Summer
Study, 1999), and Japan Futures (OSD/Net Assessment, December 2000).
8
example, India’s historically close ties with Iran hold out the possibility
that a closer Indo-U.S. relationship might facilitate efforts to improve
U.S.-Iranian relations. Similarly, India’s residual relationship with
Russia, which will likely include India’s continued dependence on
supplies of Russian military equipment, suggests the outlines of strategic
realignments in Eurasia that could bring together converging American
and Russian strategic visions and objectives in new ways and for new
purposes. In many ways, India’s strategic emergence has invigorated
American strategic thinking on a number of issues.
The convergence of these factors serves as the backdrop to this
study. The strategic environment facing both India and the United States
has changed profoundly in recent years. Indians have lost their secure
anchorage with the USSR’s demise, and now confront new and emerging
challenges on fronts they once considered secure or unimportant.
Americans now appreciate that the most serious challenges to U.S.
interests are likely to arise in a region (i.e., Asia) where traditional U.S.
influence can no longer be taken for granted, and where standard
strategies and tactics are proving less effective.
The “drivers” that increasingly will define the strategic
environment and comprise the catalysts around which Indian and
American interests are likely to converge or conflict remain inchoate.
Many elements, however, are coming into view. They include:
•
Actors with the ability to project power and influence in
regions of the globe (e.g., the United States in Central Asia, or
China in the Persian Gulf) that will affect India’s vital security
interests.
•
Highly lethal and accurate weaponry—including weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles—that will
empower many countries in Asia and the Middle East to pursue
novel strategies of coercion, intimidation, and denial.
•
The growing power and ubiquity of non-state actors—including
ethnic separatists, criminals, and terrorists—throughout India’s
strategic sphere of interest as a result of both the disintegration
of state authority and the vastly enhanced range of weaponry
available to them.
•
Failing states whose security interests are deeply intertwined
with that of India (e.g., Pakistan, Indonesia, and perhaps even
Russia) and whose collapse would raise the specter of political
chaos, civil disorder, disease, and tumult in their wake.
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•
New geopolitical alliances and relationships—from Japan and
Taiwan in Northeast Asia, to Israel in the Middle East, and to
the United States globally—that present both threats and
opportunities to Indian interests.
•
Competition for increasingly vital resources—especially energy
and water—that could see countries (including India) develop
novel diplomatic, economic, and perhaps military strategies to
guard their own access and to threaten that of their adversaries.
These and other characteristics of India’s future security
environment ensure that the pace of strategic change will accelerate, as
more and more actors seek to pursue objectives and strategies that were
neither possible nor necessary in the Cold War world. Neither the
challenges nor the threats to India’s interests can be confined easily to
discrete states or regions. By transcending traditionally defined regions,
they create dramatically different kinds of challenges. Taken together,
these paradigmatic changes in the character of India’s security
environment will challenge Indian and American national security
planners to create new goals and missions, new or enhanced capabilities,
and new strategic relationships.
ASSUMPTIONS AND APPROACH
This study is based on a number of assumptions. First, the end of
the Cold War, the advent of a new generation of political leaders in
India, and the intensification of shared challenges and opportunities have
redefined the context of U.S.-Indian relations. Elites in both countries
recognize that interests, alignments, and assumptions that were
appropriate until 1991 are now obsolete.
Second, much American thinking and writing on India has not
processed these changes and remains locked in the patterns and instincts
of the Cold War. This study seeks to displace ossified assumptions and
attitudes with new ideas about India’s strategic salience.
Third, any effective treatment of the emerging relationship
between India and the United States requires an approach that bridges
area studies (a knowledge of the politics, economics systems, and culture
of a group of countries that typically are situated in a geographically
distinct region of the world) and strategic analysis (especially an
understanding of core political-military problems and the interaction of
competitive strategies). Such a combination, which underpins the
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subsequent analysis, is rarely found today given the way most scholars
have compartmentalized area and security studies.
Fourth, India’s development of nuclear weapons constitutes an
accomplished fact that cannot be changed. Until the recent Bush-Singh
declaration, much American discussion regarding India remained fixated
on ways to change this new reality, or limit its assumed malign aspects.
The idea that a nuclear India could well be an asset to the United States
is rarely, if ever, subjected to serious analysis. This study explores such a
possibility.
Fifth, only a handful of U.S. specialists know about India’s
strategic culture, especially the ideas, assumptions, and policy
recommendations of the emerging generation of Indian strategists.
Indian strategic thought is robust, substantive, and contentious. Effective
American polices towards South Asia and elsewhere require that U.S.
decision makers possess a good understanding of its content and policy
implications.
This study analyzes the interplay between strategic culture, which
is treated as a dynamic process rather than fixed factor, and the changes
in the strategic environment. It explores how this interaction leads to reconceptualizations of strategies that in turn result in efforts to develop
new capabilities. It then examines how these capabilities enable wider
ambitions and, hence, new strategies.
The sources that underpin the analysis include an assessment of
the relevant primary (e.g., government documents, data, etc.) and
secondary literature (e.g., existing studies). Most important, the analysis
incorporates unique insights derived from structured in-depth interviews
with Indian national security elites, diplomats, scholars, and journalists.
These interviews have benefited from the extensive access the study
authors have enjoyed to Indian strategic thinkers and planners as the
result of many years of sustained contacts and exchanges.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
This study explores the validity (including the conditions
required for both their realization and sustainment) of a number of
propositions that arose in the course of these discussions:
•
American and Indian strategic interests are converging in
unprecedented ways. These interests encompass both regional
(e.g., Eurasia, South Asia, Persian Gulf) and functional (e.g.,
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nuclear weapons, energy security) dimensions. Therefore, the
scope for strategic cooperation is unusually broad and should be
pursued.
•
The time is opportune for this enhanced cooperation.
Intellectually and institutionally, Indians will welcome or at least
accommodate cooperation.
•
Indo-U.S. cooperation, or even some kind of more
institutionalized relationship, offers new opportunities for
American planners to pursue geopolitical realignments that could
dramatically improve the American strategic position in Asia.
For example, “horizontal” relationships across Eurasia that
includes Israel, Turkey, and India—and, perhaps, eventually
Iran—could alter regional power alignments and enhance U.S.
influence in vital areas.
•
A transformed Indo-U.S. relationship will give American
planners both the incentive and the freedom to reexamine other
relationships (e.g., with Iran, Vietnam, Russia) given their new
strategic implications.
•
An elevated Indo-U.S. relationship could help resolve key U.S.
operational concerns about forward presence, new missions, and
novel capabilities.
An important consideration in assessing the validity of these
assumptions is to determine whether both strategic communities properly
understand the growing number of converging interests that their
countries share. The most important of these interests include:
•
Balancing an assertive, or compensating for a weak, China. On
the one hand, both Indian and American national security and
defense planners seek the means to deter and, failing deterrence,
protect against a militarily aggressive China. On the other,
Indian and American interests converge in containing and
limiting the instability that could ensue from a fragile and
unstable China.
•
Sustaining energy security. Within five years, Asia will be the
world’s largest energy consumer. Most of this energy will come
from the Persian Gulf and potentially Central Asia. Although
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and other American allies will
import much of this energy, India’s energy security is also
becoming increasingly dependent on the Gulf and Central Asia.
Converging Indian and American interests in Gulf and Central
Asian security opens up opportunities for concrete cooperation in
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at least four areas: protecting the vital sea lines of communication
(SLOCs); defending the Persian Gulf in the event of instability or
hostile actions there; maintaining access to Central Asia’s energy
wealth; and protecting Indonesia’s energy infrastructure in the
event of state failure there.
•
Combating terrorism. Indians reside in a region permeated with
terrorism (e.g., Bangladesh, Central Asia, Indonesia, Iran,
Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka). The events of September
11 demonstrated the increasing ability of terrorists to project
power across borders at ever-greater distances. Combating
terrorism requires governments to coordinate their response in a
range of areas, from intelligence sharing to armed operations.
India’s extensive experience in managing terrorist threats
compliments Americans’ growing capabilities for combating both
the terrorist groups themselves and their means of support.
•
Managing new international realignments. Indian and American
leaders seek both to prevent or balance threatening realignments
and create or exploit favorable new alignments among other
countries. The tectonic plates of geopolitics are displacing
Eurasia’s existing security foundations. Significant strategic
realignments already have occurred, and more are probable.
Some realignments (e.g., a new Sino-Russian condominium, or a
Sino-Pakistani-Iranian alliance) could threaten U.S. and Indian
vital interests. Conversely, both countries might be able to
exploit changes to re-engage states like Iran, Russia, or Vietnam
within the framework of new kinds of strategies.
•
Stabilizing South Asia. The India-Pakistan conflict likely will
survive, and perhaps be accentuated by, the current war on
terrorism in Central Asia. On the other hand, American and
Indian interests converge in promoting stability in Pakistan and
preventing state failure there.
•
Curbing WMD proliferation. As a responsible nuclear weapons
state, India shares American interests in preventing the
proliferation of WMD, WMD-related elements (i.e., their
material, technological, and other precursors), and their means of
delivery to other state or non-state actors.
•
Promoting shared democratic values. India and the United States
constitute the world’s most populous and most powerful
democracies, respectively. India also has the world’s second
largest Muslim population (approximately 150 million out of a
total population of somewhat over one billion). The two
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democracies share a strong common interest in promoting
democratic values into states that lack them, especially in the
larger Islamic world. 6
A vibrant Indo-U.S. security relationship would be
unprecedented. Not surprisingly, its potential is largely unstudied, and
its possible dimensions and dynamics are poorly understood on both
sides. Already, one finds very different perceptions among both
countries’ national security elites regarding what the relationship should
entail and what objectives it should strive to achieve. On the American
side, this lack of a common set of strategic objectives for a new
relationship with India, even within core U.S. national security
institutions, already is causing misunderstandings and miscalculations.
For example, Americans’ failure to comprehend how Indians understand
their own vital interests in the fight against terrorism led to fundamental
miscalculations about India’s possible roles and responsibilities
following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
This study offers U.S. security planners a more complex and
dynamic picture of the implications of India’s emergence as a global
strategic actor than the current stereotypes permit. Indian leaders face a
growing number of security challenges and re-alignment opportunities
from more directions than ever before. They are developing strategies to
address these challenges and opportunities. Understanding how Indians
themselves understand these challenges and opportunities, and the
strategies they are adopting to pursue them, is essential for American
policy makers if they are to capitalize on these developments and best
promote U.S. interests under the new conditions characterizing the
emerging 21st-century global strategic environment.
6
The importance of promoting democratic values in the Muslim world, and
possible means to accomplish this objective, are discussed in Richard A. Clarke
et al., Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action (New York: The Century
Foundation Press, 2004). Typically, the authors neglect the possible
contribution of joint U.S.-Indian action in this area.
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THE MANIFESTATIONS AND CAUSES OF INDIA’S EMERGENCE
ECONOMICS
The main force driving India’s emergence has been the
accelerated rate of growth the country has experienced during the last
decade. During most of its history, India pursued an autarkic economic
strategy designed primarily to create the industrial and technological
capabilities required to sustain both defense and development goals with
minimum external assistance. For example, the ruling Congress Party in
1955 formally adhered to the position that “planning should take place
with a view to the establishment of a socialistic pattern of society where
the principal means of production are under social ownership and
control.” 7 One of the reasons Prime Minister Indira Gandhi broke with
the established Congress Party in 1969, and formed her own Congress (I)
Party, was her deeper commitment to economic socialism. This
orientation manifested itself in several ways. For example, she
nationalized India’s largest banks, coalmines, and insurance companies,
and secured a constitutional amendment that restricted the right of
private property.
The emphasis on autarky through import substitution and related
policies derived from the mistaken fear of India’s post-independence
leadership about the deleterious consequences of economic
interdependence. It was reinforced by their ideological preference for a
planned economy that, based on a widely shared misunderstanding of the
Soviet experience, was perceived to be the ticket to rapid
industrialization and high levels of growth. This misperception resulted
in the Indian economy consistently under-performing relative to its true
potential. For example, while it was the bigger of the two economies, it
grew at a relatively slower rate than its Pakistani counterpart during the
1960s and 1970s.
India’s economic shortcomings were painfully obvious. The
strategy of relying on a centrally planned economy (the so-called “permit
Raj”) that emphasized self-reliance (at least in the industrial sector) failed
to advance both political and development goals and instead
institutionalized poor management, pervasive inefficiency, a rentier
bureaucracy, the stifling of initiative, low rates of return, unnaturally high
consumer prices, limited internal and foreign competition, and a depressed
pace of economic growth. Although India’s national income rose by
almost 4 percent annually during the period of the first two economic
7
Cited in Metcalf and Metcalf, Concise History of India, p. 239.
15
plans (1951-56; 1956-61), the country’s annual population growth of 2
percent undermined net progress.
By the end of the Cold War, several factors led Indian officials to
alter radically their economic policies. First, Indian policy makers had
concluded that renewing India’s economic base and increasing its growth
rates were essential for maintaining continued social stability. Second,
the USSR’s demise deprived India of its main great power patron—and a
major source of subsidized arms imports. Third, Indian leaders saw the
successes China had achieved through its economic liberalization
program, and feared its balance-of-power implications for India.
Beginning in mid-1991, the Congress Party-led government
headed by Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister
Manmohan Singh responded to a severe national financial crisis (soaring
debt payments, exhausted foreign currency reserves, and a collapsing
credit rating among international borrowers) by initiating a dramatic and
extraordinarily successful economic liberalization program. These “first
generation” reforms focused on three components: stabilizing
macroeconomic forces by controlling fiscal and balance of payments
deficits and maintaining low rates of inflation; undertaking structural
adjustments aimed at opening the Indian economy to international trade
and investment; and initiating deregulation of domestic markets. 8 For
example, the government devalued the rupee by 20 percent and made it
partially convertible, abolished export subsidies and lowered import
tariffs, and ended the license system for many industries.
The 1996-98 United Front government and the 1998-2004
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance coalition
largely continued this economic restructuring program, and even
accelerated the reforms in some areas. For example, BJP ministers led
by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee abandoned their former
positions and now permitted foreign investment in the insurance and
consumer goods sectors, ended the requirement for Indian majority
control of joint ventures, and amended the Patents Act to conform to the
rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). They also reduced the
number of government monopolies and the role of licensing in
8
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Ashutosh Varshney, and Nirupam Bajpai, India in the
Era of Economic Reforms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). The
limited nature of the Rao reforms, especially the increased provision of
subsidies on a vast array of goods and continued support for unprofitable
public enterprises, is highlighted in James Manor and Gerald Segal, “Taking
India Seriously,” Survival, vol. 40, no. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 53-70.
16
telecommunications and other sectors, contributing to the subsequent
boom in software development and consumer affairs outsourcing.
Experts predict that, by 2010, such outsourcing will reach approximately
$56 billion a year. 9 Under the slogan “India Shining,” the BJP
unsuccessfully made its economic accomplishments the core of its 2004
general election campaign.
The success of the reforms rapidly became manifest. In contrast
to the meager average annual growth rate of 3.5 percent that India sustained
during much of the Cold War, the Indian economy grew between 5.0 and
7.5 percent annually during the 1990s. As a result, India’s GDP doubled
during this period. Although the growth rate fell in the early 2000s, it
has rebounded sharply since then. This performance has encouraged
Indian policy makers to target even higher yearly growth rates of about 9
percent annually. Attaining such levels consistently would require the
acceleration of what are commonly referred to as “second generation
reforms.” These focus on restructuring labor laws, the financial sector,
trading practices, and the regulatory system; on disinvesting
government-owned industries; and on increasing investment in
communications, health, physical infrastructure, and power generation. 10
The experience of the 1990s has illustrated India’s enormous
capacity for absorbing structural change—as well as the significant
benefits that sound policies can yield. Although India has
demonstrated it can develop many of the essential foundations of
national power in the 21st-century, the process of structural reform
remains unfinished. The successful introduction of second-generation
reforms could significantly enhance India’s growth potential, but this
question can only be answered through decisive political action that
addresses several critical issues currently limiting further economic
progress. These impediments include persistent rural poverty, the
increasingly stratified regional distribution of income, weak controls
over public expenditures at both central and state government levels, and
the need to extend reforms to new areas such as agriculture, small-scale
industry, and labor markets. 11 Until these issues are resolved, India will
continue to grow at 5-6 percent annually.
9
Pete Engardio, “A New World Economy: Balance of Power Will Shift to the
East as China and India Evolve,” Business Week (August 18, 2005).
10
Ruddar Datt, ed., Second Generation Economic Reforms in India (Delhi:
Deep & Deep, 2001).
11
India’s budget deficit amounts to approximately 10% of its GDP. Other
constraints on India’s sustaining 7-9 percent growth rates are its low level of
foreign direct investment (about one-tenth the level of China), its undeveloped
17
It is widely believed in India and the West that, even in the
absence of further reforms, India can continue to achieve 5–6 percent
growth rates indefinitely, and that this “new Hindu rate of growth” alone
would make the Indian economy among the best performing in Asia.
Many studies, including those conducted by the World Bank, suggest that
the Indian economy has, or soon will, become the world’s fourth largest
economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). Any acceleration in
growth rates to levels closer to 7–9 percent obviously would allow India
to make dramatic improvements, especially to per capita GDP, even
faster.
A major RAND study conducted a few years ago suggested that a
truly dramatic reordering of power is likely to occur in Asia given
India’s post-1991 economic performance relative to that of other Asian
countries such as Japan, Indonesia, and South Korea. Even with the
conservative assumption of 5.5 percent annual growth in India, the
Chinese and the Indian economies would more or less double in size
(when measured in terms of PPP) by the year 2015, with the latter
possibly growing at a marginally faster rate than the former over the
long-term. From the context of a larger intra-Asian comparison, even
more significant consequences are seen to emerge. First, China and
India would become the two largest economies in Asia by 2015 when
measured in 1998 PPP U.S. dollars. Second, Japan’s relative economic
and military power would diminish appreciably vis-à-vis China, South
Korea, and India. Finally, while China’s economic and military power
would remain almost twice as large as India’s when GDP is measured in
1998 PPP U.S. dollars and indexed to South Korea’s performance (and
between one-and-a-half to over two times as large when military capital
stocks are measured in 1998 purchasing power parity investment in U.S.
dollars and indexed to South Korea’s performance in the same year),
these relative balances could shift even further in favor of India if China
were to experience disrupted growth in the years ahead while the Indian
economy manages to sustain even a relatively modest 5.5 percent annual
growth rate. 12
The conclusions are clear. If India can sustain an average growth
rate of even 5.5 percent for the next two decades, it will become a
public infrastructure, inadequate protection of property rights (which among
other effects discourages foreign investment), and its paucity of indigenous
energy sources and raw materials.
12
Charles Wolf, Anil Bamezai, K.C. Yeh, Benjamin Zycher, Asian Economic
Trends and Their Security Implications (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000).
18
significant actor on the Asian stage. If it can increase its growth rates
even further, then India can become a core actor in Asian geopolitics
rather than simply dominating South Asia, as it has done until now.
What was previously a large but relatively underperforming economy
is now becoming a large but growing economy that, thanks to its
absolute size, could have a tremendous influence on developments
throughout Asia.
If India pursues a strategy that is more open to foreign trade, new
patterns of interdependence and influence will develop throughout Asia
from New Delhi’s integration into the global economic system. If India
sustains its growth trajectory primarily through expanding its internal
markets, its economic significance for Asia may not be as obvious, but
its political relevance could be even greater. If India achieves its ascent
primarily through internal market expansion supplemented by foreign
trade and investment, it would be able, ceteris paribus, to provide the
relevant resources to develop a significant military capability while
simultaneously avoiding all those political restraints associated with the
enmeshing effects of “dense” economic interdependence.
In short, India could follow one of three possible economic
trajectories, each with different implications for Asian geopolitics:
1)
a return to the approximately 3.5 percent growth rate
manifested during most of the Cold War, an economic
performance that would restrict India’s relevance to South
Asia alone and would warrant its neglect by the international
community at large;
2)
a continuation of the current approximately 5.5 percent
growth rate indefinitely, an economic performance that
enables India to slowly break out of the South Asian confines,
increases its relevance to the Asian power balance writ large,
and attracts international attention to itself as an emerging
regional power; or
3)
a realization of a consistent growth rate of 7 percent or higher,
an economic performance that inexorably transforms India
into a great power, positions it as an effective pole in the
Asian geopolitical balance, and compels international
attention to itself as a strategic entity with continent-wide
significance.
The current consensus among analysts studying South Asia
suggests that the first trajectory—a return to 3.5 percent growth rates—is
19
unlikely. The economic liberalization undertaken thus far, together with
the small prospects of major changes in the future, should by itself
prevent a return to the depressed growth grates that characterized India’s
past economic history. Furthermore, for the first time in Indian domestic
politics, good economic performance has become an electoral criterion
affecting the fortunes of political leaders in power. Given the intimate
link between high growth rates and social stability, moreover, Indians
increasingly view the current 5.5 percent growth rate as a floor below
which economic performance cannot be allowed to fall. Consequently,
India’s future reforms will aim to ensure at least such levels of
performance, if not better. 13
If a 5.5 percent or better growth rate can be sustained over the
next decade, the real question from the perspective of Asian
geopolitics is not whether India will matter, but how? Will India
remain merely an important actor in Asia, or will it become a
constitutive pole in the Asian power balance that other states must
engage as they pursue their own interests within the continent and
beyond? The answers to these questions largely depend on whether
the country can transition from the current improved 5.5 percent
growth rate to a 7 percent or higher growth rate. Achieving the higher
rates could halve the time for eliminating absolute poverty and
dramatically increase the discretionary government revenues available
for enhancing the country’s military and the other capabilities that
characterize a true Asian great power.
Overall trends suggest a cautiously optimistic answer to this
question, though not for the reasons often adduced in the popular
imagination. In the past, many casual observers attributed India’s poor
economic performance to “exotic” variables such as its culture and
religion, political and social disorder, and the peculiarities of its statesociety relations. Although these factors probably played some role in
India’s inability to effectively actualize its power in the past, more
“conventional” variables such as misguided political choices, the
economic regime constructed since independence, and the nature of
India’s economic institutions probably had a greater impact.
Unfortunately, India’s ability to administer the painful therapy
required to shock the economy into accelerating faster remains limited.
The reasons have less to do with the “exotic” variables discussed earlier
13
The declining ability of Indian governments to constrain India’s growth, even
through poor policy choices, is a major theme of Gurcharan Das, India
Unbound (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001).
20
than with pedestrian interest group politics, which flourish in India’s
democracy. 14 In particular, the costs of the second-generation reforms
would be borne asymmetrically by many politically influential
constituencies. The closing of inefficient government industries, for
example, likely would require massive layoffs. Similarly, the ending of
subsidies invariably annoys those affected groups who have to pay
higher prices. Thus, India’s very democracy circumscribes political
efforts at rapid liberalization. Unlike China, where economic reforms
could be imposed by fiat “from above” without any electoral
consequences, India’s democratic polity limits the pace at which its
political leadership—no matter how enlightened—can introduce drastic
reforms. 15
Fortunately, the nature of this problem is by now well
understood, as are the solutions. In addition, a variety of social
coalitions supporting reforms have emerged. These constituencies
could help reduce the invariable political costs that further reforms
would entail. Furthermore, India already possesses the political,
legal, and administrative framework to support further economic
reforms. The past 50 years have demonstrated this structure’s
durability and flexibility. The prospects for success, therefore, appear
propitious even though various conditions suggest that India’s
economic performance will improve at a slow if steady pace.
POLITICS
Since independence, India has had a secular democratic polity
that emphasizes fundamental rights, political freedoms, an independent
judiciary, and a representative government that guarantees India’s
diverse population the right to self-government through periodic free
elections based on universal suffrage. The democratic commitment
derived from the political liberalism of India’s Congress leaders and the
correct judgment that the country’s heterogeneous population could not
be managed except through responsive self-government. This
democratic dispensation, which survives robustly to this day, became the
critical mechanism by which India avoided the specter of violent
revolution. Even when its economic performance was least impressive
14
Marshall M. Bouton, “India’s Problem is not Politics,” Foreign Affairs
(May/ June 1998); and Rob Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic
Reform in India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
15
Burra Srinivas, “Liberalisation, Power and Politics in China and India,”
Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 27, no. 4 (1997).
21
and when its state-dominated economic institutions could do little but
redistribute inefficiency and poverty, India’s democratic system ensured
that discontent with its economic performance was alleviated through
peaceful electoral politics—a system that enabled both the rich and the
poor to participate, however asymmetrically, in decisions regulating the
distribution of benefits and burdens throughout the state.
Three dominant political trends characterize Indian politics today.
First, the country is experiencing the slow demise of the Congress Party.
Not only did the Party lead India to independence, but for much of the
country’s history it was the only political party sufficiently strong to
form a stable ruling coalition in parliament. The Party also functioned
traditionally as the critical mediator between the institutions of state and
civil society.
The second, and related, trend has been the gradual demise of the
“big tent” represented by the Congress Party. Beginning with Indira
Gandhi, Congress Party leaders have increasingly appealed to voters on
the basis of their ethnic and religious affiliation. 16 This development has
occurred concurrently with the growing influence of new parties based
on region, class, and caste. These new parties, led by a generation of
leaders who lack the stature of India’s founding fathers, are
comparatively less catholic and cosmopolitan in outlook, and do not
possess the support of a vibrant nationwide political base. 17
Third, the old ideologies of secularism and class conciliation are
increasingly under attack from a new set of political interests
represented, for example, by the BJP and the Bahujan Samajwadi Party
(BSP), which promise to make Indian politics a much more chaotic
environment. Logrolling over ideational and distributional issues has
increasingly taken place in the open as opposed to the closed confines of
intra-party politics (as was the case when the Congress Party was still
dominant). These changes do not necessarily bode ill for India, but they
do increase the levels of uncertainty in both domestic politics and
international relations and may create opportunities for miscalculation on
the part of India’s competitors, thereby increasing the possibility of
inadvertent conflict.
A particular concern is that India’s traditionally liberal and
16
Metcalf and Metcalf, Concise History of India, pp. 253-254.
V. S. Naipaul, A Million Mutinies Now (New York: Viking Penguin, 1991);
and Peter van der Veer, Religious Nationalism (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994).
17
22
secular character is increasingly contested by a variety of new Hindu
confessional groups in Indian politics. These groups seek to alter India’s
traditional vision of an inclusive, liberal, and secular polity with a new
monocultural vision centered on Sanskritik Hinduism. In an effort to
gain the political allegiance of India’s voting public, they have engaged
in a variety of political activities. Some are clearly legal, like mobilizing
interest groups through the use of religious imagery and idioms. Others
are more suspect, like attempting to rewrite school textbooks to reflect
Hindu ethnocentrism. And some are both illegal and unethical, including
inciting attacks against India’s various minorities. 18
For all the changes that have occurred during the last 50 years,
however, India’s democratic institutions remain both durable and robust.
There is no evidence that the new Hindu confessional groups have
actually succeeded in transforming India to their narrow political vision.
Moreover, their limited electoral base implies that their agenda will be
further weakened. First, they have been unable to alter the durable rules
codified in India’s liberal constitution. Second, the BJP’s coalition
partners have restricted its freedom of action. For reasons of both
ideological opposition and political survival, these other political parties
have resisted allowing these groups opportunities to advance their
exclusionary political agendas
The steady devolution of power to the states, the competition
among states for foreign investment, and the rise of regional political
parties more responsive to local demands represent more benign
transformations in Indian politics. Both federal and inter-state relations
will continue to be renegotiated in India—as they are right now—and the
strong centralized entity that India’s founding fathers created in 1947
will slowly be transformed into a true “union of states” that the country’s
constitution proudly advertises India to be. The success of India’s
democracy and the vigor of Indian nationalism, however, ensure that
even as this process of renegotiating internal political relations continues,
India’s fundamental unity (and its status as an independent political
entity in international politics) will not only survive but also flourish
18
The beliefs and activities of these new groups are discussed in Chetan Bhatt,
Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies, and Modern Myths (New York, Berg,
2001); H. D. S. Greenway, “Hindu Nationalism Clouds the Face of India,”
World Policy Journal (April 2001); Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist
Movement in Indian Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996);
Panka J. Mishra, “Hinduism’s Political Resurgence,” New York Times,
February 25, 2002; and John Zavos, The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in
India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
23
insofar as the polity has already internalized the idea of India as
something greater than the sum of its constituent parts.
For the foreseeable future, India likely will continue to
experience coalition governments in New Delhi since no single political
party currently appears able to dominate national politics as the Congress
Party did during the second half of the 20th century. Multi-party
governments imply that it will be rather difficult to secure a quick and
easy consensus on various contentious international issues such as
Kashmir, climate change, and international trade.
MILITARY
During the Cold War, India exploited its relatively larger
resource base (especially people) to progressively deploy sizeable armed
forces capable of defending those territorial claims that were challenged
occasionally by China and repeatedly by Pakistan. This entailed
primarily an emphasis on the army. A large army exploited India’s
comparative advantage in manpower while also being useful for internal
security tasks and “nation-building.” India also maintained a relatively
sizeable air force, importing weaponry from Western Europe and later
the Soviet Union. The navy was traditionally neglected and remained so
until the final decade of the Cold War.
The diverse range of security challenges facing India means that
its leaders likely will continue to maintain the large military
establishment necessary to defend a vast defensive perimeter; conduct
combat operations along two widely separated fronts if necessary;
undertake significant internal peace operations; and retain adequate
theater reserves to enable the Indian armed forces to sustain their
training, maintenance, and redeployment cycles. The Indian defense
budget should continue to hover around 3 percent of GNP, but a growing
economy implies that even small fractions of GNP allocated to defense
will yield ever-greater resources in absolute terms. According to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India’s
defense budget rose by 19% last year. 19 Unless popular demands on the
economy mount beyond their present levels, the defense budget should
exhibit a pattern of steady if measured growth.
19
Associated Press, “Report: Military Spending Tops $1 Trillion Mark,” New
York Times on the Web, June 7, 2005. Indian defense budgets fell below 3%
of GDP in 1990s, but rebounded following the 1999 Kargil crisis.
24
India has already launched another military modernization cycle,
which is now providing New Delhi with the first major infusion of bigticket weapons—advanced combat aircraft, airborne warning and control
systems, nuclear submarines, battle tanks and self-propelled artillery, and
surveillance and communications systems—since the early 1980s. 20 At
the end of this process, India likely will possess a significant naval
capability that will allow it to dominate the northern Indian Ocean; a
refurbished air force that will remain one of the most effective in Asia;
and large land forces that will be able to successfully defend Indian
interests against both Pakistan and China (along the Himalayan frontier).
The Indian government’s decision to formally become a nuclear
weapons power signals its intention to preserve its security by whatever
means it thinks are appropriate. For the foreseeable future, India likely
will possess a modest nuclear capability intended to deter both China and
Pakistan from mounting the most obvious forms of blackmail. These
capabilities probably will consist of a modest number of nuclear
weapons designed for delivery by aircraft and land-based missiles. 21 In
the future, India might also develop sea-based delivery systems. 22 In
addition, all three Indian armed services will continue to develop their
conventional capabilities to maintain superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan, and
thus be able to enforce some sort of deterrence by threat of denial. 23
Even as these military capabilities develop in the years ahead—
all, of course, profoundly linked to the future performance of the Indian
economy—India is unlikely to be transformed into an aggressive state.
India still remains a deeply conservative, relatively inward-looking state
20
This build-up is described in Asian Defence Yearbook: 2002-2003 (Malaysia:
Ministry of Defence, 2003), pp. 32-33.
21
India has a large indigenous missile development program that includes the
2,500-km-range Agni-II, which can reach southern China.
22
In January 2003, India signed a $3 billion deal with Russia to lease two
Akula-class nuclear submarines (The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, Strategic Survey 2002/3 (London: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.
216). On October 27, 2004, India test-launched a naval version of its Prthvi
short-range ballistic missile (K. Alan Kronstadt, “India: Chronology of Recent
Events” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, November 1,
2004), P. 1. See also Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture:
Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 2001).
23
India’s conventional advantage, however, is partially negated by the
country’s long coastline, its lengthy land frontiers with neighboring states, and
the need to deploy many troops to maintain internal security in troubled regions
like Kashmir, Assam, and Nagaland.
25
that has focused more on "satisficing" rather than "maximizing" military
power. It has an innate tendency towards moderation and a reluctance to
resort to the use of force to secure political outcomes. 24
Although India’s innate conservatism with respect to the
unilateral use of force is likely to remain intact, its ability and
willingness to provide military capabilities in support of coalition
operations, especially with regard to issues that command international
consensus, will increase. Continued economic growth also will make
India a more confident state deeply cognizant and desirous of the
symbols and privileges that accompany success in the international
arena. This development will be accompanied by even more insistent
claims for formal recognition in the institutions of global governance.
Furthermore, Indian policy makers are still likely to seek the
capability to prosecute a limited war successfully. The transparent
presence of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent makes unlimited wars
untenable as a matter of state policy, but nuclear weapons do not guarantee
the absence of conventional wars. 25 Confronted with this vise, Indian
policy makers are bound to think of how to manage and prosecute limited
wars successfully. 26 This is a challenge India faces with respect to both
Pakistan and China. India must be able to hit hard and effectively enough
to punish an adversary, but not hit so hard or so effectively as to cause
inadvertent escalation.
24
For more on India’s traditional policy of military restraint see Brahma
Chellaney, “After the Tests: India’s Options,” Survival, vol. 40, no. 4 (Winter
1998-99), pp. 93-111.
25
For a summary of the debate regarding whether India’s and Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons have served as a stabilizing or destabilizing in their bilateral
conflicts see Christopher Carle, “International Security in a Nuclear South
Asia,” in South Asia in the World: Problem Solving Perspectives on Security,
Sustainable Development, and Good Governance, edited by Ramesh Thakur
and Oddny Wiggen (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004), p. 60. See
also Devin T. Hagerty, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 IndoPakistani Crisis,” International Security, vol. 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995-96), pp.
79-114; and Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Stability-Instability
Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia (Washington,
D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2001).
26
The 1999 Kargil conflict led Indian officials to explore how to conduct
limited wars effectively without provoking escalation to nuclear weapons use
(The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2002/3
(London: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 209).
26
Dealing with the threat of escalation will require that Indian policy
makers and the defense establishment adopt a new style of warfighting
that they have traditionally avoided. It places a premium on achieving
rapid victories on the battlefield and then terminating offensive action
either before the international community intervenes or before the conflict
becomes a war of attrition. Thus far, the Indian military has been unable
to prosecute successfully a fast-paced war that generates quick decisions
(i.e., the kind of warfighting the U.S. military has perfected). For India
to prosecute this kind of war—fast, decisive, and yet limited—will require
an investment in new technologies, operating skills, doctrines, and new
concepts of operation.
Acquiring these capabilities is going to be costly. It also will
require changing certain political constraints. A country cannot win
limited wars successfully if it is hamstrung by the political constraint that
it cannot lose a single inch of territory in any circumstances. Indians also
need a readiness to change the inter-service resource balance away from
capabilities that are slow to those that are flexible, precise, speedy and
lethal.
Another issue related to capabilities is India's need to adopt an
appropriate defense industrial policy that recognizes and accepts the limits
to autarky. India's fear of vulnerability has driven its traditional strategy
of large-scale defense import substitutions. The time has come, however,
to resist the temptation of trying to develop everything from assault rifles
to main battle tanks to advanced combat equipment. An examination of
India's record in this area finds relatively few successes. 27 There are
things that can be done to remedy this. These may include creating better
institutional arrangements for coordination, technical audit, and hardnosed external review. But even when these are successful, there is a
simple economic fact of life that cannot be lost sight of. The demand for
advanced equipment in India's armed forces is relatively small, and the
resulting economies of scale often do not warrant India's undertaking the
effort required to create the end-to-end, design-to-production, capabilities
required to produce expensive, complex weapon systems.
27
The commitment of successive Indian governments to indigenous production
has resulted repeatedly in the Indian military purchasing expensive and
obsolescent equipment, or having to turn to foreign suppliers after years of
wasted efforts. Indian firms did develop short- and medium-range missiles
capable of delivering nuclear warheads, but efforts to develop modern tanks
(the Arjun project), warships (the Air Defense Ship a nuclear-powered
submarine), and military aircraft (Nishant UAV, Light Combat Aircraft) have
largely failed. Furthermore, government targets for defense exports also are
rarely met.
27
It must be emphasized that India needs to sustain its high levels
of economic growth for it to become a genuine great military power. A
competent military costs money. Acquiring the modern defense
capabilities associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) will
require India to sustain economic growth of at least 7 to 9 percent per
annum. China is a good example. A country that has experienced close to
double-digit growth for more than twenty years since 1978 still finds it
hard to develop the kinds of sophisticated military capabilities it seeks to
acquire across the board. Therefore, one must be prepared for the fact that
even if the Indian economy were to grow between 7 and 9 percent
consistently for the next twenty years, the best India would be able to do in
the area of cutting edge defense technology is to acquire niche capabilities.
But those niche capabilities may be enough for the specific strategic
circumstances that it faces.
Another prerequisite to India’s attainment of great power status is
dealing with internal security threats without undermining its capacity for
effective external defense. Maintaining this balance is harder than
sometimes imagined. The principal security threat that India will confront
on a day-to-day basis concerns internal security. 28 Historically, India dealt
with this challenge by essentially throwing manpower at the threat instead
of technology for the simple reason that the country enjoyed a surfeit of
people and a deficit of technology.
Two consequences ensued from this strategy. First, India’s
approach to preserving internal defense probably was less effective than it
could have been. Second, preserving internal security became extremely
expensive, and hindered India’s ability to acquire the new technologies
required of a modern military force. It is a myth that India's manpower is
cheap. Maintaining the size and types of forces that India currently
possesses undercuts its ability to acquire RMA capabilities. Indian policy
makers confront very painful choices about reducing manpower strength
and changing the inter-service budgetary balances. Internal security
commitments distract Indian policy makers from addressing these issues.
If India is to become a great power of the sort that it seeks to
become, it also has to become a net provider of regional security, both in
the subcontinental and in the extra subcontinental arenas. This is easier
28
Besides Kashmir, there are active insurgencies in four of India’s seven
northeast provinces (Richard W. Baker and Charles E. Morrison, eds., Asia
Pacific Security Outlook 2000 (Tokyo: Japan Center for International
Exchange, 2000), p. 79).
28
said than done, but at one level it is the quintessential part of the definition
of a great power. After all, what is the meaning of having great power
capabilities if at the end of the day you cannot extend net security to
others? And yet any Indian attempt to contribute to regional security, even
in the sub-continental arena, is fraught with hazards because it risks
deepening intra-regional rivalries and the suspicions India’s weaker
neighbors have of its capabilities and intentions. Indian policy makers
need to answer some important questions: What exactly is India prepared
to do in practical terms to secure its interest in its extended neighborhood?
Is India interested in peacekeeping? Is India interested in post-conflict
stability operations? And even if India’s policy makers could decide what
they want to do, they must determine what framework they are willing to
accept. Are they willing to provide security unilaterally? Are they
willing to provide security only through the U.N.? Or are they willing to
provide security through coalitions of the willing?
Assuming India’s leaders resolve the above questions, they are still
faced with another issue. Does India have, or is it willing to acquire, the
capabilities required for even the most minimal set of imaginable
contingencies in its extended neighborhood? Even if one presumes that
India will engage only in post-conflict stabilization operations in coalitions
under the U.N. flag, India must undertake expensive choices with respect to
force modernization. India will need to develop at least a small subset of
formations that have world-class capabilities in terms of interoperability.
Otherwise, it risks becoming an ineffective member of the force.
Participating in low-intensity stability operations also would require India
to develop capabilities for increased endurance and reach. A country
cannot provide extra-regional security if its navy has only two underway
replenishment vessels. It cannot be a serious aerospace power if its
fighters cannot move from a rear base of operations to a forward facility
abroad. India also will need to develop the organizational structures
required to maintain and operate these capabilities if it wants to provide
the kind of regional security expected of a great power.
29
IMPACT OF INDIA’S EMERGENCE ON REGIONAL AND
GLOBAL POLITICS
THE POWER TRANSITION
In relative terms, the general strategic balance between India,
Pakistan, and China around 2010–15 will look similar to what it is today,
but such similarities hide as much as they reveal. Although India will still
be weaker than China and stronger than Pakistan, the qualitative character
of this ordering will have changed substantially. The power relationships
between India and Pakistan will be confirmed even more strongly in favor
of the former. As far as the Sino-Indian balance is concerned, India will
have moved a modest distance in erasing the asymmetries currently
existing between the two states even as it will continue to maintain a
significant conventional superiority over China along the Himalayan
border. By the end of this timeframe, India’s ability to dominate the
Northern Indian Ocean and its environs against any local opposition will
be obvious and, should U.S.-Indian relations improve further in the
interim, the Indan Navy’s and Air Force’s ability to participate in coalition
operations will further improve to the advantage of India’s expanding
strategic reach.
The ongoing modernization of the conventional and nuclear forces
of India, Pakistan, and China will pose challenges for regional stability. It
is not an exaggeration to assert that deterrence stability on the Indian
continent today is simply a function of the Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese
inability to prosecute and win major conventional wars. As research
elsewhere has demonstrated, India's gross numerical superiorities vis-à-vis
Pakistan are misleading and do not enable it to win a major war within a
short period. 29 The Sino-Indian balance along the Himalayas is similarly
stable for now, because the Chinese do not have the logistics capability to
sustain any major conventional conflict in support of their territorial
claims, whereas the strong and refurbished Indian land defenses, coupled
with their superiority in air power, enable New Delhi to defend its existing
positions but not to sustain the large-scale acquisition of new territory.
Consequently, deterrence stability exists along this frontier as well.
Indian and Chinese innovations in the realm of technology,
organization, or warfighting doctrine could change the status quo. The
29
Ashley J. Tellis, Stability in South Asia (Santa Monica, California: RAND,
1997), pp. 12-33.
30
continuing strengthening of the Chinese and Indian economies could
improve their abilities to acquire new military capabilities, increasing
their range of strategic choices. Chinese improvements in logistics, air
power (both defensive and offensive), communications, and the capacity
to unleash accurate deep fires could undermine deterrence stability along
the Himalayas. Similarly, Indian improvements in the realm of
combined-arms maneuver warfare, especially involving organization and
warfighting doctrine and in the arena of strategic applications of air
power, could tilt the stand-off in India's favor, thereby increasing
deterrence instability if larger political considerations do not hold in
these military developments in check.
A similar set of transitions in the nuclear realm could worsen
instability. Most of these transitions will occur in the Indo-Pakistani
case rather than in the Sino-Indian case for reasons explored earlier.
Furthermore, most of them will in fact occur even before potential
transformations in the conventional arena. The principal changes in
question concern mostly the kinds of nuclear weapons, delivery systems,
and deterrence doctrines that both states may develop. The issue of
stability becomes particularly urgent, because both India and Pakistan
are in the process of acquiring relatively short-ranged theater ballistic
missile defense (BMD) systems, some of which may not be survivable
but may nonetheless be armed with (or, at any rate, be perceived as being
armed with) nuclear warheads. The instabilities caused by such
deployments were in many ways a staple of Cold War concerns, but
often do not appear to be publicly understood or discussed in South Asia.
Mutual deterrence in the Sino-Indian case is today an oxymoron, but
even when that changes, the transition is likely to be less troublesome
than the Indo-Pakistani case.
INDIANS’ FOREIGN-POLICY WELTANSCHAUUNG
Ensuring the security of the Indian polity, preserving its democratic
way of life, and creating the preconditions for comprehensive economic
development form the core objectives of India’s security consciousness. 30
Many such objectives are obviously common to other states in the
international system as well, but the indelible experience of repeated
foreign invasions and lengthy colonial domination embedded this
coloration in the Indian mindset. This history has resulted in a fierce
determination to preserve Indian independence no matter what the
cost and, in particular, has given rise to the belief that preserving
30
Raju G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1986).
31
independence requires the absence of all competing influences along
India’s immediate periphery. This vision of security, readily
consistent with a realpolitik (or realist) tradition of politics, could in
principle justify a relatively muscular regional security policy—
something India’s smaller neighbors, especially Pakistan, fear and
often accuse New Delhi of. Such tendencies have usually been
tempered by India’s civilizational ethos and a political culture that,
emphasizing moderation and conciliation (often to the point of
inaction), places a great premium on negotiating political
compromises rather than pursuing military strategies aimed at
administering absolute defeat on others.
The realist traditions underlying contemporary India’s security
policy derive directly from its British inheritance, although the ideas
inherent in political realism in fact found their earliest articulation in
India through Kautilya’s Arthashastra in circa 300 BC. It may seem
ironic that despite the rhetorical rejection of the British colonial ethos,
modern India’s strategic Weltanschauung has been inherited from the
security policy of the Raj. The British colonizers treated India as the
Crown Jewel of the Empire, and operating on the assumption that India
was an “English Barrack in the Oriental Seas,” developed a strategy akin
to that employed by the medieval systems of siegecraft and fortifications
to ensure its security. Thus, the northern contiguous areas were
neutralized by the creation of a “ring fence,” where the “inner ring”—
immediately adjacent to the Indian subcontinent and consisting of the
northwestern and northeastern borderlands, minor Himalayan states, and
contiguous Indian Oceanic waters—was actively controlled by a policy
of dominating political absorption. In turn, the “outer ring”—consisting
of the Persian Gulf sheikdoms, Iran (Persia), Iraq, Afghanistan, Tibet,
and Thailand (Siam)—was effectively neutered into a gigantic buffer
zone (by a system of extensive alliances) through which the major external powers were prevented from intruding upon the security cynosure of
the subcontinent. 31
This external stratagem of pushing back all northern landward
opponents, with the object of creating a cordon sanitaire capable of
deflecting any direct threat to the subcontinent, was complemented by a
stratagem “within the barrack” as well. India was governed not just as
another colony but as an autonomous subject-kingdom, with its own
treasury, foreign office, war office, and under a viceroy enjoying a wide
latitude of discretion and able to conduct a British Indian policy with
31
Lorne J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947–1965
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967).
32
respect to the adjacent strategic quadrants, particularly the Persian Gulf
and East Africa. These areas were for all practical purposes governed
from Delhi.
Although India’s independence in 1947 marked an administrative
and ideological break between India and Great Britain, continuity has
largely defined Indian geostrategic policy. The chief objective has been
to prevent the emergence of a genuinely independent power along
India’s borders. Unlike traditional British policy, however, India has not
pursued this goal by seeking direct political control over the inner ring
areas in order to serve a larger imperial design. Rather, it has aimed to
prevent—by a combination of diplomatic maneuver, economic
blandishments, and military coercion—the neighboring states from
pursuing policies inimical to Indian interests.
Another core strand of Indian foreign policy since 1947 has been
“nonalignment.” Despite the end of the Cold War, the desire to pursue
an autonomous course in international politics remains the bedrock of
New Delhi's grand strategy. It is based on the belief that a country of
India's size, heritage, power, and overall potential cannot flourish as an
appendage of any ideological or power bloc. Although the demise of the
bipolar order implies that the specific circumstances which gave rise to
nonalignment have long disappeared, the intrinsic logic of pursuing an
independent foreign policy—at least to the degree that one can do so
within the constraints of a capabilities-driven global powerpolitical system—remains in place in New Delhi. Thus, even in the
present unipolar order, Indian policy makers intend neither to ally
permanently with the United States nor permanently to oppose it.
Instead, they envisage creating the requisite political space within which
India’s national capabilities can increase and its stature can be
universally recognized. To the degree that creating this space—wherein
India can flourish in the safety that enables it to develop, maintain, and
prosper—requires coordination with Washington, New Delhi is prepared
to countenance and, indeed, even pursue such coordination even as it
continuously affirms its right to choose a course of action that may
deviate from U.S. preferences, especially on issues perceived to be
central to India's quest for greater security, standing, and autonomy. 32
32
The critical importance of the desire for autonomy in Indian grand strategy is
explored in detail in Kanti Bajpai, "India: Modified Structuralism," in Muthiah
Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice, Material and Ideational Influences
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 157-197.
33
Within this broad conception of grand strategy, Indian security
concerns in Asia can be usefully analyzed through a range of three
concentric circles: the subcontinental setting, which in terms of the
earlier description would constitute the Indian barrack and its “inner
ring”; the extra-subcontinental setting, roughly analogous to the “outer
ring,” would encompass the extended security environment to include
the Middle East, Central Asia, China, and the ASEAN states; and the
global setting, which consists today primarily of Russia, Japan, Europe,
and the United States.
On the whole, Indian geopolitics has adopted a remarkable new
flexibility since the end of the Cold War. Within the subcontinental
setting of the “inner ring,” India has focused on economic renewal in
order to secure the great power capabilities that eluded it during the Cold
War. Toward this end, it has begun economic reforms at home while
pursuing a good-neighbor policy toward the small South Asian states,
with the intent of both minimizing resistance to the growth of Indian
power and securing joint gains by assisting elites within these countries
to resolve various internal problems. Simultaneously, in the “outer
ring,” it has pursued a policy of deepened engagement in order to
minimize emerging threats, while assiduously working to develop
cordial relations and enhanced economic, political, and strategic ties
with a variety of regional states that might serve as de facto allies in
case some significant challenge to Indian interests were to appear from
within this area over time.
Finally, and in what is the most remarkable transformation of
all, India has refocused its attention within the global setting—on the
major powers that affect its security in different ways but especially the
United States—in order to, first, enhance India’s ability to achieve its
own development and power political goals and, second, leverage the
resources resident in this sphere to shape, contain, and ultimately
neutralize any emerging threats to Indian security that may materialize
from within the “inner” and “outer” rings. Unlike the 1962–91 period,
when India had all but abdicated its interest in the “outer ring,” Indian
policy makers today recognize that active engagement with states
within both the outer ring and the global setting is essential if they are
to succeed in their efforts first to provide a modicum of stability within
the inner ring itself and, thereafter, to enhance India’s presence within
both the outer ring and at the global table.
THE INNER RING: SOUTH ASIA
34
Within the “inner ring,” India has traditionally sought the
regional hegemony it believes is warranted as heir to an ancient
civilization, possessing a large population and an extensive landmass,
and having great economic, technological, and military potential.
Nevertheless, India has always seen itself as a benign hegemon that
provides a modicum of stability that preserves its immediate security,
enhances its stature, and provides various “public goods” to the region at
large. This in turn implies that Pakistan—traditionally India’s most
insistent political challenger—must either be neutralized or
accommodated so as to cease becoming a constant irritant (and possibly
even a drag on Indian ambitions, if only by collapsing). India is also
required to preserve the security of the smaller states within South Asia
such as Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and, more remotely,
Myanmar (Burma). This in turn entails remaining sensitive to their core
interests, their desire for respectful treatment, and their yearning for
rapid economic development. Although none of these states either
singly or in combination can threaten India militarily, their internal
ferment often expresses itself in consequences that are deleterious to
Indian security.
As a result, New Delhi is faced with a variety of delicate
challenges. On the one hand, it has to restrain the temptation to
intervene in the domestic affairs of its smaller neighbors (even though
various factions in these countries often expect Indian assistance)
because such intervention could have the effect of making things worse,
not better. On the other hand, it has to insulate itself from the worst
outcomes that could occur if the internal rivalries in these countries were
to get out of hand and in the process threaten India on an even more
significant scale than would have been possible had New Delhi
intervened early. Even as this delicate balance is pursued at the political
level, India is faced with the task of increasing the pace of regional
economic integration in order to enhance prosperity through growing
local interdependence and, more importantly, to attenuate those security
threats that emerge from poverty and deprivation. The principal
instrument that New Delhi has used in this regard with its smaller
neighbors is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) Preferential Trading Agreement, but their fears of economic
domination by India have resulted in slow progress on this issue.
These concerns about security in the “inner ring” are
complemented by the growing perception that India must be able to
dominate the waters of the Northern Indian Ocean (in a way that the
British Navy did traditionally) in order to contain potential threats to
Indian commerce and to its security more generally. Although this
35
requirement presupposed a certain opposition to the United States during
the Cold War, today New Delhi views Washington (and the U.S. Navy in
particular) as an ally in this effort along multiple dimensions: search and
rescue, anti-piracy, and freedom of navigation.
Despite occasional appeals by its neighbors, India has worked to
avoid creating any regional security forum in which the smaller states
might bandwagon against New Delhi, even as it sought to dissuade extraregional powers from getting involved in the security competition within
the subcontinent. The goal of this policy was to isolate the region from
the larger and more menacing pressures associated with Cold War
competition. Such isolation was intended in the first instance to allow
the regional states, including India, to focus on economic development
rather than security competition, but in the final analysis such a strategy,
if successful, would also have magnified India’s relative power
superiority, which could then be brought to bear within the region
whenever necessary and outside it whenever possible. In any event, this
component of Indian strategy was relatively unsuccessful because
Pakistan’s intense dissatisfaction with the regional status quo—
originating in its claims on Kashmir and eventually reinforced by its
defeat in 1971—intermeshed perfectly with the larger U.S.-Soviet
struggle for allies on the periphery. Pakistan’s success in securing
membership in the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) had the effect not only of
transforming the Indian subcontinent into yet another battleground of the
Cold War, but also of devaluing India’s power-political advantages
within the region through Pakistan’s ability to draw in outside powers to
balance India.
PAKISTAN
Since 1947, the conflict between India and Pakistan has
dominated the strategic environment of South Asia. To be sure, there
were external interactions with major powers like China, the Soviet
Union, and the United States, but these relations were mostly overlays
that fed into the primary bilateral security competition. Until recently,
the Indian subcontinent has remained a relatively autonomous security
enclave in international politics.
The relationship between India and Pakistan has been
competitive from the beginning because each sprang from a deeply held
premise that in effect served to challenge the other’s legitimacy. India
sought to transform a multilingual, multiethnic, multicultural empire into
a unified secular state governed by liberal principles, while Pakistan
36
attempted to consolidate linguistically and ethnically disparate groups
into a single state based on a common religion, Islam. Pakistan, born out
of the insecurity of some South Asian Muslims, challenged India’s claim
that its secularism was genuine enough to allow different religious,
linguistic, and cultural groups to survive and flourish within it. Pakistan
believed India had never come to terms with Pakistan’s existence or its
self-image as the guardian of the region’s Muslims. India was
consequently perceived as being willfully determined to “undo” the
partition of the subcontinent and, by implication, to end Pakistan’s
independence. On the other hand, if India were successful in
maintaining a free political system that allowed its various groups
(especially its approximately 150 million Muslims) to live together
peacefully and prosperously, it would undercut the reason for which
Pakistan was established in the first place. 33
The tensions between these competing principles over time found
manifestation in conflicting territorial, ideological, and power-political
claims that consolidated the Indo-Pakistani rivalry in the subcontinent.
From India’s point of view, the creation of Pakistan affected its strategic
prospects in multiple ways. To begin with, it upset the natural
geographical unity of the region by creating a new military threat, now
emerging from within, in addition to all those dangers traditionally seen
as arising from without. Further, it complicated Indian efforts at
unifying its diverse regional, linguistic, and cultural subgroups by
serving as a source of both material assistance and ideational inspiration
for various separatist claims. Finally, it forced India to allocate
economic and military resources to consolidate its political primacy
within the South Asian region when it could otherwise have allocated
such resources to pursue a larger extra-regional and, perhaps, even a
global role. For these reasons, Pakistan came to represent the principal
impediment to India’s core grand strategic objective: thriving as a great
power, with all the security accruing from the possession of that status.
A major conflict between India and Pakistan occasioned by
miscalculations over Kashmir remains the most important geopolitical
contingency that could emerge in South Asia today. As recently as 1999,
the U.S. intelligence community estimated the chances of a major war
33
This clash of basic identities is discussed in K. Shankar Bajpai, “Untangling
India and Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2003), pp. 119-120. Interviews
with leading Pakistanis about their relationship with India during the past few
decades can be found in Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan in the Shadow of Jihad
and Afghanistan (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002).
37
between the two countries over Kashmir as fifty-fifty. 34 Such a war is
not likely to arise, however, because of premeditated actions on either
side. Despite what Islamabad may believe, New Delhi today simply has
no interest in pursuing any military solutions aimed at destroying,
occupying, or fractionating Pakistan. 35 And whatever Pakistan’s desires
may be, it simply does not possess the capabilities to pursue any of these
three courses of action vis-à-vis India. Consequently, a major
subcontinental war, were one to emerge, would probably be the
unintended result of limited actions undertaken by various parties.
The key choices here remain the future of Pakistani support for
the Kashmiri insurgency and Indian decisions about continuing its past
policies of dealing with domestic militancy through purely internal
counterinsurgency operations (as opposed to cross-border penetrations,
which could include joint operations of limited aims). 36 Thus far, both
sides have been careful to avoid provoking the other to the point where
escalation to conventional war became inevitable even though crossborder artillery exchanges, infiltration across the Line of Control, and
terrorist acts of various sorts have persisted. 37
Pakistan's willingness to continue baiting India is rooted in
structural constraints that are ultimately personified by two simple
realities. First, Pakistan remains the "anti-status quo" state in South
34
Robert Harvey, Global Disorder (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003), pp. 156157.
35
Amitabh Mattoo, “India’s Nuclear Status Quo,” Survival, vol. 38, no. 3
(Autumn 1996), p. 49. For an analysis questioning the ability of the Indian
military even to accomplish these objectives if it attempted to do so see Stephen
P. Cohen, “South Asia,” in Strategic Asia 2002-03: Asian Aftershocks, edited
by Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle, Washington: National
Bureau of Asian Research, 2002), pp. 287-289.
36
In early 2003 Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha affirmed India’s right
to conduct “preemptive” military action against alleged terrorist training camps
located in Pakistan-administered Kashmir; The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2003/4 (London: Oxford University Press,
2004), p. 229.
37
Analysts who have “wargammed” an Indo-Pakistani conflict find the
prospects of escalation to nuclear use disturbingly high; see for example Sam
Gardiner, “Learn from War Games,” The Washington Post: National Weekly
Edition (January 28, 2002-February 3, 2002), p. 22. Terrorist infiltration
across the Line of Control appears to have declined substantially in the last year
following U.S.-led international pressure and several failed assassination
attempts against Pakistani President Musharraf.
38
Asia. 38 This phrase is not meant to convey any normative stance but is
merely a description of Pakistan's circumstances: Islamabad today is not
satisfied with the existing territorial order primarily because of its longstanding claims to the former princely kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir,
significant portions of which are currently governed by India. Second,
Pakistan is not only weaker than India but probably growing weaker in
absolute terms as well. This implies that Islamabad simply lacks the
resources to secure its claims over Jammu and Kashmir by force. The
military solution has in fact been tried on several occasions in the past
and has in all instances been unsuccessful.
Pakistani efforts to inveigle the international community into
pressing India to negotiate the Kashmir issue have not worked
satisfactorily either. Most of the great powers have failed to demonstrate
any serious interest in enforcing the existing U.N. resolutions on
Kashmir given that the issue has been far removed from their vital
interests. Moreover, the great powers' abiding respect for India's greater
geopolitical weight, the lack of clarity about the equities of the issue
after several decades of complicated regional developments, and
Pakistan's own relatively poor standing in international politics have
combined to make the Kashmir problem the orphan of international
causes. Even China, one of Pakistan’s closest allies and a country with
its own border disputes with India, has failed to provide much support
for Islamabad's position on Kashmir. Although the United States and
other governments have become more involved in recent years in
seeking a solution to the Kashmir dispute, this heightened activism
results less from skillful Pakistani diplomacy than from India’s
newfound interest in exploiting its growing influence in Washington to
induce American diplomatic intervention for its own purposes. 39 After
9/11, moreover, foreign governments increasingly saw the issue as one
of curbing state-supported terrorism (i.e., by Pakistan) rather than of
averting nuclear escalation or managing India’s perceived violations of
civil and human rights in Kashmir.
These failures at securing international intervention, combined
with growing pressure from Washington and other foreign actors fearful
of a possible nuclear exchange and desirous of focusing Islamabad’s
attention of countering terrorism, have led Pakistan to show a greater
38
Neil Joeck, "Pakistani Security and Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia,"
Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 8, no. 4 (December 1985), p. 80.
39
George Friedman, America’s Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide
Struggle Between America and its Enemies (New York: Doubleday, 2004), pp.
200-202.
39
interest in achieving a negotiated solution to Kashmir. In May 2003,
India and Pakistan restored full diplomatic ties, and in November 2003
they agreed to a ceasefire along their disputed Jammu-Kashmir border,
which was extended in September 2004. In December 2003, Pakistani
President Pervez Musharraf said he would consider other solutions to
Kashmir besides Pakistan’s long-standing demand for a mutual troop
withdrawal followed rapidly by a UN plebiscite. In January 2004,
Musharraf met with then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee at the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit in Islamabad. The
two leaders agreed to adopt additional confidence-building measures and
initiate wide-ranging discussions on their bilateral disputes (including
their nuclear arsenals and Kashmir) without preconditions.
Since then, both sides largely have upheld a cease-fire across the
Line of Control that divides Kashmir. In November 2004, the Indian
Prime Minister even announced India’s first declared force reduction in
Kashmir since the latest insurgency began there in 1989. The two
governments subsequently agreed to a formal system for advance
notification of missile tests to replace their previous informal notification
procedures. They also negotiated measures to reduce the risk of nuclear
accidents or the unauthorized use of their nuclear weapons. Most
visibly, in February 2005, the two governments established a Kashmir
bus line between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad.
Nevertheless, several factors make the nuclear competition
between India and Pakistan especially dangerous. 40 First, active political
disputes between the two entities have resulted in three past wars and a
protracted war waged by proxy. Pakistani leaders in particular appear to
have concluded that their nuclear arsenal has deterred India from again
using its conventional forces to attack Pakistani territory (as opposed to
the insurgents operating inside India’s frontiers). As a result, their
implicit nuclear doctrine presumes the possible first use of nuclear
weapons. 41 Second, both sides’ nuclear programs are currently in a state
of precarious evolution; any weapons stockpile is likely to be relatively
small and possibly unreliable. The level of deterrent efficacy is
uncertain, and the newer delivery systems exhibit characteristics that
40
For the opposite argument that nuclear weapons have circumscribed recent
military confrontations between the two countries see Matthew Parris, “Without
Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Subcontinent Would Be a Lot Less Stable,”
The Spectator, June 22, 2002, p. 32; and Fareed Zakaria, “In Praise of Nukes
(Gulp),” Newsweek (June 10, 2002).
41
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2003/4
(London: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 232-33.
40
could contribute to crisis instability. 42 Finally, Pakistan may find its own
nuclear program increasingly inadequate as India begins to respond to
the Chinese nuclear arsenal.
The second factor reflects the pervasive misperception that exists
on both sides about the extent of the other’s achievements with respect to
nuclear weaponization. Should the received wisdom on this question
suddenly be punctured either by unexpected revelations of capability or
by asymmetric increases in transparency resulting from an intelligence
coup, the stage could be set for a sharp acceleration in some dimensions
of strategic programs that, because of the fear and uncertainty induced by
such actions, could precipitate countervailing responses that set off a
destabilizing action-reaction spiral between both states.
The third factor results from the fact that both India and Pakistan
have set out to develop their nuclear deterrents at roughly the same time.
While New Delhi’s concerns in this regard certainly transcend
Islamabad’s, the latter’s orientation will remain fixed on New Delhi for
some time to come. In effect, India’s attempts to develop a deterrent that
is viable against Pakistan and China simultaneously will have the
consequence of raising the threshold of sufficiency for Pakistan.
Determining the appropriate equilibrium between both states will
unfortunately be both a reflexive and an interactive process in which the
distinctions between sufficiency and equality may easily be blurred. 43
Several plausible scenarios highlight the potential for instability
in the two countries’ nuclear relationship. For example, Islamabad could
become emboldened to pursue even riskier strategies vis-à-vis New
Delhi were it suddenly to discover that its nuclear capabilities are far
more effective than it gave itself credit for. On the other hand, New
Delhi could be provoked into a substantial acceleration of its own
42
The close physical proximity of the two countries combined with their
reliance on solid-fuelled ballistic missiles as delivery vehicles means that early
warning times might be as little as 5-10 minutes (Lloyd Axworthy, “Forward:
Mutual Interest-The United Nations and South Asia,” in South Asia in the
World: Problem Solving Perspectives on Security, Sustainable Development,
and Good Governance, edited by Ramesh Thakur and Oddny Wiggen (Tokyo:
United Nations University Press, 2004), p. 5). Such a precarious situation
increases the risks of both accidental and catalytic war (i.e., a nuclear conflict
between both governments precipitated by a third party, such as a terrorist
group).
43
These complexities are discussed at length in Francois Heisbourg, “The
Prospects for Nuclear Stability between India and Pakistan,” Survival, vol. 40,
no. 4 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 77-92.
41
weaponization efforts were it suddenly to discover that Pakistan’s
strategic capabilities were far more sophisticated than was previously
believed. The former outcome would ensure that the “ugly stability”
currently prevailing in South Asia would be replaced by even uglier
versions of the same, whereas the latter outcome could provoke a
destabilizing arms race that would undermine the interest both sides
currently express in deploying relatively small and finite nuclear
deterrents. 44
Whether a destabilizing arms race would actually materialize is,
however, hard to say, because Indian state managers appear at least at the
moment to be unconcerned about Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities.
Convinced of their own superior nuclear prowess as well as Pakistan's
stark geophysical vulnerability (which its acquisition of more
sophisticated strategic capabilities will not change), Indian policy makers
have shown no sign of accelerating their own strategic development
efforts. To the contrary, these efforts appear to be proceeding at roughly
the same pace that has characterized all past activity relating to Indian
strategic development programs. Despite substantial increases in the
nuclear, outer space, and defense research and development budgets
since the May 1998 tests, it is therefore hard to uncover any evidence
that India has embarked on a "crash" program to expand its nuclear
capabilities in particular and its strategic development programs in
general. 45
Although one can plausibly sketch out the reasons for another
war between the two countries, India’s ongoing emergence as a great
power is making it increasingly difficult to think of India and Pakistan as
being in the same category. The expansion of India’s economic and
military capabilities means that, within and immediately around South
Asia, India will matter in a way that no other neighboring state will.
With the growth of Indian power, the older, “hyphenated” notion of
India and Pakistan will rapidly become anachronistic, if it is not already.
More importantly, India will be able to dominate the South Asian region
in a manner akin to possessing “veto power,” such that even other great
powers would be unable to intervene in intra-regional affairs without
incurring the high costs associated with Indian opposition. Although
44
Both the logic and the structure of “ugly stability” are detailed in Ashley J.
Tellis, Stability in South Asia (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), pp. 30–33.
45
For a description of the non-military focus of India’s space program see Clive
Cookson, “India Goes Into Space on a Shoestring: Programme’s Main Aim is
to Bring High Technology Benefits to the Poor,” Financial Times, May 4,
2005.
42
geography, continuing bilateral problems, and strong security
interdependence will continue to link them together, their political
destinies will increasingly diverge. India increasingly will become the
country of the future. Pakistan, unless it reverses its current troubling
trends, will become a nation of the past.
THE “OUTER RING”: THE EXTENDED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Even as India seeks to cement its primacy within South Asia—a
primacy that has repeatedly been challenged by Pakistan—it has to
confront the fact that the “outer ring” today has become more critical to
Indian security than ever before. Three factors account for this renewed
significance.
First, the outer ring itself now harbors important prospective
threats to Indian security. In this context, China, an emerging great
power with an ongoing if presently latent territorial dispute with India,
remains the most important potential future threat. Furthermore, the
emerging changes in military technologies—particularly those that
permit extended range and enhanced lethality—will compel India and
other countries to operate along wider geostrategic spaces, even if only
to resolve local security dilemmas. In fact, all South Asian states are
increasingly taking their bearings from strategic developments along a
wider canvas than the local arena alone.
More positively, Indian power will be most relevant in those
geographic and issue areas lying in the “interstices” of Asian geopolitics.
The term interstice is loosely used here to denote those geographic,
political, or ideational issues lying along the fracture lines separating
the continent’s most powerful and significant geostrategic problems.
In these areas, great power interests are neither obvious nor vital.
Consequently, their incentives to enforce certain preferred outcomes
unilaterally are poor. In such circumstances, rising powers like India
can make a difference because their substantial, though still not
dominant, capabilities can swing the balance in favor of one coalition
or another, depending on the actors, issues, and circumstances
concerned. Thus, for example, in geographic areas like the island
states in the Indian Ocean, and in issue areas like the environment,
Indian resources and commitments could make a significant
difference to the final outcomes obtained.
Second, the relationships between states in the “outer ring” and
the “inner ring,” those within the “outer ring” itself, and those between
43
states in the “outer ring” and sub-national groups in India have a direct
bearing on Indian security in ways that did not previously matter. A few
examples of each of these three relationships should underscore this
point clearly. China’s transfers of nuclear and missile technologies to
Pakistan, China’s growing influence in Myanmar, and North Korea’s
transfers of missile technologies to Pakistan remain good examples of
relationships between states in the “outer ring” and the “inner ring” that
not only affect Indian security directly but also serve to constrain its
primacy in South Asia via “encirclement,” limit its freedom of maneuver
within the region, and increase the burdens imposed upon the exercise of
Indian power. The relationship between China and various key states in
Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf—which have the
effect of marginalizing India, reducing its access to the region, and
creating pockets of Chinese influence in areas where natural resources,
physical access, markets, and sources of capital are increasingly
coveted—remain a good example of how the relationships among
various states within the “outer ring” could directly affect Indian
interests. Finally, future Chinese decisions with respect to assisting subnational groups resisting Indian authority—a problem that was
particularly acute during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and could flare up
again—offer an illustration of how interactions between states in the
“outer ring” and sub-national groups in India could have a direct bearing
on Indian security.
Third, the “outer ring” hosts a variety of entities that have
become steadily more important from the perspective of India’s
economic growth and geopolitical interests. Viewed in an arc starting
from India’s western periphery, the following examples ought to
suffice. To begin with, the Persian Gulf will remain the most critical
supplier of the energy required to fuel Indian economic growth if it is
to sustain the growth rates required to make it a major Asian power. 46
From New Delhi’s perspective, a free and stable energy market offers
the best hope for continued access to needed resources. Should this
prove impossible, however, either because U.S. hegemony decays or
because its military capabilities are overextended, India will have to
reckon with the possibility of confronting its second best option:
ensuring preferential access to energy through exclusive supplier
agreements and dedicated security-for-energy deals, both of which
could involve direct rivalry with China. Energy-related
considerations also drive Indian interests in Iran and Central Asia,
though in this instance, fears about political instability, terrorism,
narcotics trafficking, and Sunni extremism further cement the bilateral
46
India depends on imports for approximately 70% of its energy needs.
44
interests. Along the eastern arc, Southeast Asia has become an object
of Indian strategic attention because it hosts a variety of potential
markets for Indian goods, remains an attractive source of capital and
medium technology, and promises to become the new “shatterbelt”—
an area of contention lying between the spheres of interest of two
major powers—in the event that serious Sino-Indian rivalry
materializes in the future.
These three reasons together imply that India cannot remain
indifferent to developments in the “outer ring” as it had during most
of the time between its defeat in the 1962 war with China and the
Cold War’s end. Instead, New Delhi has clearly recognized that
attaining both direct and indirect objectives in this area require India
to remain diplomatically engaged if it is to secure its strategic
objectives. In fact, the most significant lesson that India has drawn in
the aftermath of the Cold War is that the goals of cementing its
primacy within the “inner ring” and effectively influencing outcomes
within the “outer ring” actually require it to reinvigorate its relations
with each of the key actors that populate the global setting of India’s
grand strategy, especially China, Russia, Japan, and the United States.
45
INDIA’S CHANGING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS
CHINA
If India pursues continuing reform (whether on its own initiative
or in response to a crisis) that moves it closer to the 7 percent or higher
growth rate, it will not only cement its regional hegemony within South
Asia, but also position itself as a significant rival to China. Even today,
India clearly has many advantages compared to China that could well
enable it to become the region’s next economic success story. 47 It has a
vigorous high-tech sector supported by high-quality academic
institutions; it enjoys a functioning legal system that can protect property
rights; it will not face an aging-population problem in the next two
decades or a gender imbalance over the longer term; and, most
important, it has a political system that is not threatened by opening up to
the world. Although India faces a large task in privatizing various stateowned industries, it does have the legal infrastructure in place for doing
so. Moreover, unlike China, India need not be concerned that increasing
links to the rest of the world and growing prosperity will place
potentially fatal stresses on its political system. If anything, such forces
could be expected to strengthen India’s democracy. India has clearly
made its mark in the global software market, with several of its new
software companies having become Wall Street darlings. And lured by
the opportunities created by previous economic reform, entrepreneurial
members of the Indian diaspora, including the hugely successful Indian
population of Silicon Valley, have been investing their effort and money
in developing India’s high-tech sector. 48
This by no means implies that India’s significant weaknesses can
be disregarded, especially where core demographic indicators vis-à-vis
47
For more on these advantages see Zalmay Khalilzad, et al., The United
States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (Santa
Monica, California: RAND, 2001), pp. 24–25; and James Manor and Gerald
Segal, “Taking India Seriously,” Survival, vol. 40, no. 2 (Summer 1998), pp.
53-70.
48
Pete Engardio, “A New World Economy: Balance of Power Will Shift to the
East as China and India Evolve,” Business Week (August 18, 2005).. The
problems China has been experiencing in integrating into the global software
market are discussed in U.S. Department of Commerce, ExportIT China:
Telecommunications and Information Technology Market Opportunities for
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (Washington, D.C.: April 2003); and
Evan A. Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security and
Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2003).
46
China are concerned. India’s basic educational system is not well
funded, and its literacy rates are lower; its developmental indicators are
still embarrassing even though it has had reasonable success in reducing
absolute poverty; it has still not overcome many of the debilitating
effects of the caste system; and it remains subject to internal strains and
secessionist tendencies that have the potential to cause political
disruption. For all these weaknesses, however, India remains remarkably
well positioned to augment its power in the post-industrial age. Thanks
to the traditionally large state-mandated investments in both higher
education and science and technology, New Delhi manages to compare
quite favorably with Beijing where investments in the knowledgeproducing foundations of national power are concerned. A welleducated population could prove a substantial asset given that
demographic forecasts indicate that India will surpass China as the most
populous nation during the next few decades.
In the security realm, India and China confronted each other,
predominately through indirect means, during most of the Cold War. 49
The one direct confrontation occurred in 1962, when Chinese troops
seized some disputed territory by force, much to the chagrin of the
Indian government. 50 More common has been their indirect
confrontations. China and India have engaged in low-intensity conflicts
in the past. China has supported insurgencies in the Indian northeast off
and on for more than four decades, and India, historically, has assisted
the Tibetan insurgents in their struggles against Beijing. 51 This pattern
of interactions could become more significant over time, in part because
geographic limitations constrain but certainly do not eliminate more
conventional forms of military competition. Moreover, both India and
China have relatively less well-integrated, but nonetheless strategic,
border areas that lend themselves as arenas for low-intensity war.
Nevertheless, China’s security ties with Pakistan have served as
a more serious source of tension. Since the mid-1970s, China has been
a critical source of conventional military technology for Pakistan.
49
For a review of these conflicts see John W. Garver, Protracted Conflict:
Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle, Washington: University
of Washington Press, 2001).
50
The specific territory at issue between the two countries was the Aksai Chin
region north of Kashmir. The British had claimed that the territory as part of
India, but had never occupied the region. Even when the Chinese withdrew
their military from the plains of Assam across the Himalayas, they kept forces
in the Aksai Chin plateau.
51
The extent of China’s involvement, if any, in the approximately forty armed
separatist groups now operating in India’s northeast is unclear.
47
Even more important, however, China has provided key political and
diplomatic support. Both countries viewed India and its ally, the Soviet
Union, as potential threats to their common security. As the U.S.
security relationship with Pakistan gradually atrophied after the 1971
war, Pakistan's link with China came to be seen more and more in
Islamabad as the single best external guarantee against Indian
aggression.
This by no means implied that China had become a formal
guarantor of Pakistan's security. Consistent with its insular foreign
policy, Beijing had never expressed any interest in playing such a role,
and carefully avoided making any commitments to Islamabad that
would have entailed such obligations. Indeed, this posture had already
become clear during the 1971 war, when China vociferously criticized
Indian actions but astutely chose not to intervene militarily on
Islamabad's behalf, despite desperate Pakistani entreaties to that effect.
This restraint clearly signaled the sharp limits of Beijing's support for
Islamabad. In short, China would extend Pakistan every form of
diplomatic and moral support that it believed to be justified, and would
even be willing to provide Islamabad with the military instruments
necessary to preserve its security and autonomy, but it would neither
provide Pakistan with any formal guarantees of security nor make any
efforts at extending deterrence or preparing joint defenses that implied
coordinated military action vis-à-vis India. These factors suggest that
China has pursued a subtle partnership with Pakistan. It appears
willing to do the minimum necessary to preserve Pakistani security
from a distance, but has sought to avoid all overt entanglements in
Islamabad's challenges to Indian primacy in South Asia. 52
The assistance China has extended Pakistan over the past two
decades—including the transfer of nuclear and missile technologies—
has in fact been entirely consistent with this premise. From Beijing's
point of view, this assistance was a low-cost investment that had the
potential to increase Islamabad's capability to defend itself, but
involved no public obligations or open-ended commitments on China's
part to transfer technology or especially come to Islamabad's direct
defense. Even as the fruits of this assistance have been exploited by
52
This critical point is correctly emphasized in Leo E. Rose, “India and China:
Forging a New Relationship,” in Shalendra D. Sharma, ed., The Asia-Pacific
in the New Millennium: Geopolitics, Security, and Foreign Policy
(Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California,
Berkeley, 2000). See also Swaran Singh, "Sino-South Asian Ties: Problems
and Prospects," Strategic Analysis, vol. 24, no. 1 (Apri1 2000), pp. 31-49.
48
Pakistan over the years, China has moved explicitly to distance itself
from those Pakistani actions that could undermine stability in South
Asia. Thus, for example, China moved away from its previously
unqualified support of Pakistan's position on Kashmir and became
increasingly, and even visibly, uncomfortable with Islamabad's support
of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Beijing's unique, low-cost, low-key
commitment to Pakistani security therefore failed to translate into
support for Pakistani revisionism.
Beijing has deliberately imposed these subtle limits on its
relationship with Islamabad because China does not today view India
today as its principal long-term threat. Because India could turn out to
be a power that is troublesome to China over the long haul, it is seen as
meriting prudent scrutiny and limited efforts at local containment. 53
The strategic assistance offered by China to Pakistan serves this
purpose admirably. It keeps New Delhi focused on Islamabad, limits
India's freedom of action in South Asia, and helps minimize the
possibility that India will emerge as a rival to China on the larger Asian
theater. While these considerations no doubt cause concern in New
Delhi, Beijing views its assistance to Pakistan (as well as to the smaller
South Asian states) as relatively small prudential investments that are
mainly justified by continuing uncertainty about India’s long-term
capabilities and intentions.
Given these complexities, it is perhaps somewhat surprising
how much relations between India and China have improved in recent
years. The two countries have intensified their efforts to resolve their
boundary disputes and conducted an unprecedented number of high-level
military exchanges. For example, an April 2005 agreement specified
steps India and China should take to demarcate their disputed boundary
based on a “fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution, through
equal and friendly consultations.” 54 Bilateral trade also has increased to
the point that China became India’s second-largest trading partner in
2004, behind only the United States. Nevertheless, feelings of tension
and mistrust lie just beneath the surface. 55 Although the possibility of
53
Gary Klintworth, "Chinese Perspectives on India as a Great Power," in Ross
Babbage and Sandy Gordon, eds., India’s Strategic Future (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1992), p. 96.
54
Nirmala George, “Border Deal Reached with China,” Washington Times,
April 12, 2005. See also Jo Johnson, “China and India Pledge to Boost Trade
and End Border Dispute,” Financial Times, April 12, 2005.
55
Possible reasons for a sharp decline in Sino-Indian relations are discussed in
Stephen P. Cohen, “Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War in South Asia:
Unknowable Futures,” in South Asia in the World: Problem Solving
49
another bilateral military confrontation are minimal in the near-term,
other issues still bear on Indian security: the future of Chinese Tibet,
including the relationship between the Tibetan diaspora in India and
their counterparts in Tibet, and the peculiarities of intra-Tibetan
monastery politics; the challenges imposed by China’s water
management policies, especially Beijing’s plans to dam Himalayan
rivers upstream and their consequences for survival and productivity in
South Asia; and the future of China’s infrastructure modernization in
the border areas. Another irritation for India has been China’s
persistent covert assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and ballistic
missile programs. 56 The two sides also see each other as economic
competitors in many sectors, especially with respect to energy—as
testified by the recent bidding war between their state-run energy firms
for control of PetroKazakhstan. For its part, Beijing watches warily as
India strengthens its military ties with the United States and modernizes
its own strategic arsenal (including a growing interest in deploying
ballistic missile defenses). 57
India has pursued a subtle, multidimensional strategy vis-à-vis
China that has several different, sometimes even competing,
components. First, it has sought to avoid picking rhetorical, political,
and military fights with China to the maximum degree possible. 58 For
example, it has negotiated a variety of military confidence-building
measures with Beijing (e.g., the 1993 and 1996 Peace and
Tranquility Agreements). It has persisted in negotiations relating
to the Sino-Indian border dispute even in the face of sluggish
progress due to Chinese prevarication and has respected Chinese
preferences that intractable issues be relegated to the back burner so
Perspectives on Security, Sustainable Development, and Good Governance,
edited by Ramesh Thakur and Oddny Wiggen (Tokyo: United Nations
University Press, 2004), p. 44.
56
For details of China’s assistance to Pakistan’s military programs see Manjeet
S. Pardesi, Peace and Conflict in India-Pakistan Relations: Implications for
East Asia (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, March 17,
2004), available at www.idss.edu.sg; and Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment:
South Asia, no. 13 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group Limited,
2004), p. 383.
57
Besides their ongoing dialogue on BMD, Indian officials are considering
either purchasing the Arrow ballistic missile defense system from Israel, which
would require U.S. approval because of its American components, or
developing an indigenous BMD capacity.
58
For a good survey see Sujit Dutta, “Sino-Indian Diplomatic Negotiations:
A Preliminary Assessment,” Strategic Analysis, vol. 22, no. 12 (March
1999), pp. 1821-1834.
50
that they do not become impediments to improving relations. India
also has attempted to assuage core Chinese concerns on important
sovereignty disputes over Taiwan and Tibet, essentially by
accepting Beijing's claims on these issues, even as it has sustained a
tacit dialogue with the Taiwanese and provided asylum to thousands of
Tibetan refugees. Even on issues that directly threaten India's
security—such as the transfer of Chinese nuclear and missile
technology to Pakistan and the Chinese targeting of India with nuclear
weapons—Indian policy makers have traditionally been reticent to
challenge Chinese actions publicly (the one notable exception being at
the time of India’s May 1998 nuclear weapons tests.) Instead, they
have responded either by politely complaining to the United States and
other third countries (anticipating the message would find its way to
Beijing) or by obliquely articulating objections to various Chinese
counterparts during bilateral meetings.
Second, India has sought to improve relations with China in
those issue areas where rapid progress is possible. The most critical
area of convergence is economic relations, particularly in the realm of
cross-border trade. India has made concerted efforts to increase the
volume and composition of its trade with Beijing, which has resulted in
China’s becoming India’s second-largest trading partner, though still at
a lower level than one might expect from two large neighboring
countries. 59 It also has sought to enlarge the number of border outposts
through which local, cross-Himalayan trade is conducted. Chinese and
Indian interests also converge with respect to the fight against
terrorism; the threat of Islamic fundamentalism; Western pressures for
human rights; fears of American intervention in sensitive domestic
political questions; and a gamut of international problems such as the
environment, intellectual property rights, and restrictive technology
control regimes. Although India has not gone out of its way to seek or
express solidarity with Chinese positions on these issues, Indian policy
makers clearly recognize that the potential exists for convergent
political action on many of these questions. Hence, they have been
careful not to foreclose any possibilities related to coordinated action
should they become necessary in the future.
Third, the prospect of having to cope with a powerful China in
the future has stimulated India to revitalize its relations with all the
peripheral Asian states. Indeed, Southeast Asia and East Asia—long
neglected by Indian diplomacy—now form the core of India's extra59
Jo Johnson, “China and India Pledge to Boost Trade and End Border
Dispute,” Financial Times, April 12, 2005.
51
regional economic and political outreach, leading one prominent
Western analyst to conclude that India's efforts to join regional
organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and
(unsuccessfully) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
implicitly suggest a new "Look East" thrust in its overall geopolitical
grand strategy to complement its earlier, primarily economically
focused, efforts to deepen maritime ties with Southeast Asia. 60 This
effort to reach out to other states that might one day feel threatened by
Chinese actions represents an attempt to add India’s geopolitical weight
to the evolving regional balance of power without compromising its
cherished desire to maintain freedom of action. As it has reached out to
the Asian rimlands, moreover, India has managed to salvage its
previously disrupted military supply relationship with Russia while
forging significant new relations with second-tier suppliers such as
France and Israel. It also has continued to achieve gradual
improvements in its relations with the most important power in the
international system, the United States. 61
Even as India has attempted to minimize the possibility of
discord between itself and China, it has attempted to protect itself
against the worst possible outcomes should Sino-Indian relations truly
deteriorate. India’s decision to test its nuclear capabilities and develop
a modest deterrent offers the best example of such an insurance policy.
One of the main Indian objections to the NPT was that it grandfathered
China’s possession of nuclear weapons while excluding India’s
acquisition of a nuclear counterforce. 62 India's commitment
(admittedly long-postponed in realization) to conventional force
modernization, either through domestic production or foreign
acquisition, represents another example. Others include its various
research and development efforts in the realm of information
60
V. Jayanth, "India's 'Look East' Policy," The Hindu, Apri1 2, 1998. For a
systematic analysis of this policy shift, see Sandy Gordon, India’s Rise to
Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 290-317.
61
Since 1998, Israel has become India’s second most important source of
foreign weapons. New Delhi has already spent $750 million acquiring Israeli
UAVs. In 2003, India signed an agreement to purchase three Phalcon airborne
early warning and control systems (AWACS) for $1.1 billion (they will be
mounted on Il-76TD aircraft). India’s possible purchase of the Arrow-2 antimissile system is awaiting U.S. government approval. Israel also has agreed to
train and equip (with special assault and sniper rifles) four additional Indian
Special Forces battalions.
62
Even the Clinton administration acknowledged the logic of India’s position in
this regard; see Strobe Talbott, “A Bad Day For Nonproliferation,”
International Herald Tribune, July 23, 2005.
52
technology, biotechnology, aviation, and advanced materials and
manufacturing. The pursuit of these insurance policies suggests that,
while New Delhi seeks to improve relations with Beijing, it is by no
means blind to the ways in which Chinese power could undercut its
interests. Therefore, a continued commitment to maintaining India's
defensive capabilities, primarily through domesticating the best
military technologies available to India on the international market,
remains at the heart of Indian security policy.
India’s decision to undertake its May 1998 nuclear weapons
tests was overtly motivated by concerns about China. Indian officials
claimed at the time that their resumption of nuclear testing was
precipitated at least in part by various Chinese actions such as the
transfer of nuclear weapon designs, short-range ballistic missiles, and
assorted technologies intended to enable Islamabad to produce strategic
systems indigenously. 63 It also signalled that India was capable of
defending its own security interests, if necessary through unilateral
solutions. It further communicated that improvements in some aspects
of Sino-Indian bilateral relations could not be sustained if it came at the
expense of undercutting the core objective of preserving India's safety,
integrity, and primacy in South Asia. 64
The decision to develop a nuclear deterrent implied that New
Delhi would at some point seek to target China with nuclear weapons.
This effort at replacing abject vulnerability with mutual vulnerability,
no matter how asymmetrical it might be, suggested that Indian policy
makers were unprepared to place their hopes solely on China’s
presumed peaceful intentions. Over the long term, Beijing's power is
expected to grow even further and the relative differential in its strategic
capabilities vis-à-vis New Delhi is likely to become even more manifest.
India's decision to develop a nuclear deterrent thus suggests that it
seeks at a minimum to possess the kinds of deterrent capabilities that
will immunize it against possible Chinese nuclear blackmail in a crisis.
Concerns about a Sino-Indian nuclear arms race arise mainly
because the Indian nuclear program, when complete, will transform the
extant Sino-Indian strategic equilibrium. With India’s acquisition of
63
See for example Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter to UN Security Council
members France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as
described in Jane’s World Armies, no. 15 (June 2004), p. 377.
64
This theme is emphasized in J. Mohan Malik, "India Goes Nuclear:
Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications," Contemporary Southeast Asia,
vol. 20, no. 2 (August 1998), pp. 191-215.
53
the Agni III or a comparable ballistic missile capable of reaching
eastern China, New Delhi will be able to target China’s most important
political, economic, and military assets for the first time in much the
same way that Beijing has been able to threaten Indian targets since the
early 1970s. Similarly, as soon as the Indian Navy can deploy a SSBN
fleet capable of surviving a Chinese first strike and retaliating with a
robust nuclear missile strike against Chinese targets, both countries will
find themselves in a classic situation of mutual assured destruction.
The imminence of this new relationship of mutual vulnerability
often provokes concern because it is feared that China, seeking to
recover its previous strategic advantages, might respond through a
major nuclear buildup directed against India’s nuclear deterrent. Such
an outcome is unlikely, however, largely because historically China has
never viewed India as a “peer competitor.” Any strategic reactions
suggesting otherwise at this point would only undercut Beijing’s
traditional attitude of treating New Delhi as a parvenu that seeks to
punch above its own weight. Furthermore, the gap in numbers and
technological capabilities between the mature Chinese nuclear deterrent
and India’s evolving force-in-being is so large that Beijing does not
have to respond in any way to New Delhi’s incipient efforts at
developing a minimum deterrent.
To be sure, Chinese nuclear capabilities will expand in the
decades ahead. But this expansion will be driven more by its own
modernization efforts (which were under way for at least a decade prior
to the Indian tests of May 1998), its perceptions of U.S. nuclear
capabilities, and the future character of the nuclear regime in East Asia
than by developments to the south of China. Chinese nuclear
deterrence vis-à-vis India is in fact so robust that no capabilities India
develops over the next decade will allow it to systematically interdict
Beijing’s nuclear forces either for purposes of ensuring damage
limitation or for achieving counterforce dominance. Given this fact,
China needs to do little in the face of an evolving Indian nuclear
capability except what it might choose to do purely for symbolic
reasons. Both the range of Beijing’s missiles and their warhead yields
already allow it to hold numerous Indian targets at risk from far beyond
China’s periphery. Consequently, dramatic alterations in current
Chinese deployment patterns or operating postures vis-à-vis India are
unnecessary and likely will be avoided.
These considerations suggest that the interaction of the two
countries’ strategic forces (primarily nuclear weapons and their means
of delivery) will be less threatening than the Indian-Pakistani dyad.
54
China already possesses a substantial nuclear arsenal (at least in
relation to India) capable of inflicting unacceptable punishment on New
Delhi, if it so chooses, without worrying about the survivability of its
own nuclear forces. Indian nuclear efforts over the next few decades
will thus be oriented primarily toward playing catch-up. India will
probably develop only a relatively small and mostly land-based deterrent
force—oriented toward countervalue attacks on a small, fixed, target
set—that will nonetheless be immune to a disarming strike by virtue of
its mobility, sheer opacity, and covertness. India will acquire the
capabilities to hold major Chinese population centers and some military
targets at risk, but it will still be weaker than China in terms of the
overall nuclear balance. It will remain unable to threaten the elimination
of China’s nuclear forces in a way that might lead to first-strike
instability. Other factors also will limit the worst effects of a future
Sino-Indian nuclear competition. First, the development and deployment
of these capabilities will not take place simultaneously or interactively
(as seems to be the case in Indo-Pakistani interactions). Second, both
India and China are large land powers with less asymmetry in their
power relations (compared, once again, to the Indo-Pakistani case).
Nevertheless, China’s growing military capabilities likely will
compel India to modernize and expand its own strategic capabilities as a
deterrent to potential coercion by Beijing. Any increase in the level of
direct Sino-Indian competition itself would threaten to alter the
prevailing balance between India and Pakistan. This outcome also could
occur if India’s military power grew simply as an autonomous
consequence of its increased economic strength. These developments
could lead to several unpalatable possibilities that, though presently
remote, merit continual observation: deepening Pakistani hostility toward
India in the face of vanishing windows of opportunity; increased Indian
truculence as a result of its growing strength; expanding Sino-Pakistani
collusion due to converging fears about a rising India; and spreading
Sino-Indian political-military competition along their common border
and elsewhere in Asia. While domestic political developments in each
of these states will have a critical bearing on the outcome, the
power transitions themselves could engender structural incentives
for continued conflict.
In the near-to-medium term, however, Sino-Indian competition is
likely to be muted as both states attempt to secure breathing space to
complete their internal economic and political transformations. India's
recent decision to conduct nuclear tests, develop a nuclear deterrent, and
accelerate the oft-postponed modernization of its conventional forces has
often engendered the conclusion that New Delhi now views Beijing as a
55
"clear and present danger" to its security. This is not the case. 65
Officials in New Delhi believe that the future of Sino-Indian relations is
much more open-ended than most commentators usually assert.
Predictions that the two countries are doomed to antagonism, strife, and
rivalry are viewed by Indian policy makers as premature at best. This is
mainly because they recognize that both China and India are still
subordinate states in the international system. The future state of SinoIndian relations depends largely on the future intentions, capabilities, and
actions of many other actors, including the United States.
Indian policy makers, while recognizing the especially rapid
growth of Chinese economic power, still perceive Chinese national
power on balance as hobbled by significant domestic and external
constraints. Indian analysts remain uncertain over whether China can
sustain its high growth rates. Even if this turns out to be the case,
applying these expanding resources for power-political purposes could
prove difficult given the vast domestic development demands Beijing
will continue to confront for years to come. Given these considerations,
Indian analysts conclude that the relatively small difference in power
capabilities between India and China provides New Delhi with a large
margin within which to maneuver. As a result, India can respond to the
growth of Chinese power with much more equanimity than both foreign
and domestic observers might deem prudent.
In fact, it is often insufficiently appreciated that, as far as its
conventional security is concerned, India is actually relatively wellsituated vis-à-vis China. For example, the Himalayan mountain ranges
that divide the two countries provide a natural defensive shield against
any Chinese aggression. In addition, India's conventional forces
currently enjoy several advantages over their Chinese counterparts in the
Himalayan theater. The Indian Army has superior firepower, bettertrained soldiers, carefully prepared defenses, and more reliable logistics.
Similarly, the Indian Air Force has better aircraft, superior pilots, and
excellent infrastructure. It would most likely gain tactical superiority
over the battlefield within a matter of days if not hours in the event of
renewed Sino-Indian hostilities. The Indian Navy is superior to the
65
A good description of the complexity of Sino-Indian relations can be found in
Surjit Mansingh, "Sino-Indian Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," Asian
Survey, vol. 34, no. 3 (March 1994), pp. 285-300. For a summary of the
arguments of those Indian “realists” who consider China a threat see Stephen P.
Cohen, “South Asia,” in Strategic Asia 2002-03: Asian Aftershocks, edited by
Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle, Washington: National
Bureau of Asian Research, 2002), p. 280.
56
Chinese Navy in technology, training, and war-fighting proficiency. It
would have little difficulty enforcing effective surface and subsurface
barrier control should any Chinese naval units seek to operate within the
Andaman Sea.
Only in the realm of nuclear capabilities does China currently
enjoy overwhelming superiority over India. Here again, however, this
superiority is attenuated by two simple realities. First, the political
disputes between China and India are too small to warrant any recourse
to nuclear weaponry on either side. Second, the development of India's
own nuclear deterrent over time will provide New Delhi with a modest
means of deterring all but the most extreme Chinese threats.
All official Indian assessments of China reflect this recognition that,
while China represents India's strongest neighbor, it is by no means a
“hegemonic" power in the international system. Chinese capabilities are
still regarded as insufficient to compel New Delhi to acquiesce to Chinese
preferences and actions when they undercut India's interests. Thus, even
as they remain conscious of growing Chinese power, Indian state managers
continue to seek to avoid becoming locked into an antagonistic relationship
with China. They believe that the best antidote to any Chinese threat lies
not in joining any evolving anti-China alliance, but in emerging as a
strong and independent power on China’s periphery, especially by
revitalizing the Indian economy. Even if growing fears of Chinese
assertiveness were to provoke the formation of such a coalition in the
future, New Delhi’s intuitive preference would be to assert its strategic
independence even more forcefully. Short of the most extreme threats to
its security and independence, India would prefer to deal with Beijing
independently, from a position of strength. 66
RUSSIA
During the Cold War, India pursued a political strategy of
nonalignment intended both to maintain its freedom of action with respect
to the great powers and to avoid entanglements in their disputes. The
bipolar structure of international politics during the Cold War, however,
led India to develop a close relationship of convenience with Moscow as
66
Although many Americans would favor a more explicit Indian-US alignment
against China, they also increasingly appreciate the limits Indians likely would
impose on such cooperation; see for example “The India Imperative: A
Conversation with Robert D. Blackwill,” The National Interest, no. 80
(Summer 2005), pp. 9-17.
57
a counterbalance to Islamabad’s episodic alignment with Washington
and its close relationship with Beijing. 67 These ties enabled India to
secure relatively sophisticated military hardware at favorable terms while
simultaneously providing diplomatic and political cover against U.S. and
Chinese pressures. It also served to ward off potential Soviet overtures
toward Pakistan. 68
Russia’s diminished strength and status mean that its relationship
with India will not have the same weight as the former Indo-Soviet
connection. Former Russian Prime Yevgeny Primakov’s 1997 proposal
to establish a strategic partnership between Russia, India, and China had
little resonance in New Delhi. Yet, Indian analysts appreciate that, for
geopolitical reasons, Russia will remain a natural strategic partner of
India. This judgment is driven by the perception that Russia shares
certain common interests with India vis-à-vis China. Despite
Primakov’s professions, Indians believe Russians cannot afford to be
indifferent to the long-term growth of Chinese power. 69
In addition, while Russia has become increasingly sensitive to
the problem of nuclear proliferation, its own precarious economic
condition, and its willingness to treat India as differently from other
proliferators for both geopolitical and historical reasons, have given
New Delhi critical opportunities to acquire Russian military
technology. Unlike other bilateral relationships, the Russian
connection can thus be seen as vital in that it directly advances India’s
strategic capabilities and, by implication, determines the kind of
nuclear force architecture that India could develop over time.
On the other hand, Russian-Indian economic ties remain
undeveloped. At present, only 2 percent of India’s exports go to
Russia. Its imports from Russia constitute an even lower share (under
1 percent). Bilateral Indian-Russian trade amounted to only $1.3
67
India’s ties with Moscow manifested themselves most clearly in 1982, when
the Indian government abstained during the voting in the UN General
Assembly on a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
68
A. P. Rana, The Imperatives of Nonalignment: A Conceptual Study of India’s
Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period (Macmillan Co. of India, 1976).
India has imported from Russia and manufactured under license more than $30
billion worth of defense items since the early 1960s (Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessment: South Asia, no. 13 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group
Limited, 2004), p. 272).
69
Brahma Chellaney, “Shoring Up Indo-Russian Ties,” The Pioneer, July
16, 1997; and Vidya Nadkarni, “India and Russia: The End of a Special
Relationship?,” Naval War College Review, vol. 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1995).
58
billion in 2004, a sharp drop from the $5.5 billion figure in 2003. 70
Nevertheless, India remains a major purchaser of Russian military
equipment, which is attractive from both a technical and a pecuniary
point of view. Even today, the Indian Armed Forces buy almost 40% of
Russia's military exports. 71 The Indian-Russian ten-year bilateral
defense cooperation agreement, signed in 2000, allows New Delhi to
purchase directly almost all types of Russian equipment. It also provides
for the joint development and production of certain items and includes an
extensive training program for Indian personnel. Current Indian defense
acquisitions from Russia include the continued licensed production in
India of 140 SU-30MKIs multi-role aircraft, the ongoing sale of 310 T90S tanks (half to be assembled from kits in India), the recent purchase
of Antey-2500 surface-to-air missile systems (which also have a limited
BMD capacity), and an order for 36 9A52-2 Smerch-M long-range
multiple rocket launchers. Other deals and rumored negotiations involve
Indian plans to lease TU-22M3 Backfire strategic bombers and to
purchase Akula-class nuclear-powered submarines and a Russian aircraft
carrier (the 44,000-ton Admiral Gorshkov), which could enter the Indian
fleet as early as 2008. 72
The continuation of the close ties between Russia and India
became evident when Russian President Vladimir Putin visited India in
October 2000. The two governments signed a “Declaration of Strategic
Partnership” as well as 15 bilateral agreements dealing with economic,
military, and scientific cooperation. When Putin again went to India in
December 2004, he signed a further set of 10 bilateral agreements. One
accord deals with long-term cooperation in the joint use of Russia's
global navigation satellite system, known as GLONASS, for peaceful
purposes. Furthermore, the Russian gas joint-stock company Gazprom
and the Gas Authority of India agreed to continue their joint efforts to
develop a natural gas deposit on the shelf of the Bay of Bengal. The two
entities also plan to cooperate on building and servicing major energy
pipelines, processing natural gas, and supplying energy equipment.
Russia is already helping India build two nuclear reactors, and both sides
are contemplating building additional units. In another agreement, India
and Russia reaffirmed their joint efforts to exploit outer space for
peaceful purposes. Putin also endorsed India’s desire to become a
permanent UN Security Council member providing Russia’s veto power
70
Peter Kammerer, “Right Wing Wary of a New Order,” South China Morning
Post, December 26, 2004.
71
Vladislav Vorobyov, “Putin Scores a 'Ten' in India,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta,
December 4, 2004.
72
Manoj Joshi, “Nuclear Wish-List is Heart of Carrier Deal,” Times of India,
January 21, 2004.
59
was not compromised. For its part, the Indian government pledged to
sign an agreement on protecting Russian intellectual property rights by
April 2005. The latter issue had arisen in the context of plans to coproduce Russian military equipment in India and sell it to third parties.
JAPAN
Although China has replaced Japan as India’s largest trading
partner in Asia, Japan remains the most important economic power in
Asia and is currently India’s largest aid donor. Inasmuch as Japan is
viewed as having the potential to become a nuclear weapons power like
India and remains China’s most conspicuous regional adversary, the
Indo-Japanese relationship is seen as having the potential of becoming
the fulcrum of a future geopolitical alignment that ties the entire
maritime Asian rim into a cooperative force that could help contain any
local challenger that threatens the Asian balance of power. For this
reason, New Delhi has sought to maintain correct relations with Tokyo.
Despite Japan’s displeasure with India’s 1998 nuclear tests,
New Delhi has attempted to encourage Tokyo to continue its private
investments in India while struggling for a way to make the latent
convergence of interests in the political realm more manifest in
bilateral terms. 73 In the immediate future, India seeks more commercial
interactions, especially Japanese investment that could over time
motivate greater Indo-Japanese strategic interaction. Concerns over
China’s growing conventional and nuclear capabilities, the problems of
freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean, and the dependence of both
countries on Persian Gulf energy supplies, could result in the Japanese
increasingly appreciating the value of India’s conventional and nuclear
capabilities. India and Japan have already begun tentative steps in
military-to-military cooperation. Similar considerations have led the
Japanese view favorably India’s new “Look East” policy of improving
ties with other East Asian states, including Indonesia, Singapore,
Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
THE UNITED STATES
Since the end of the Cold War, India’s leaders have increasingly
appreciated how better relations with the United States could help them
73
C. Raja Mohan, “Managing Indo-Japanese Nuclear Divergence,” The
Hindu, March 6, 1999.
60
achieve their goals for regional leadership, rapid economic growth, and
social stability. 74 In recent years, American support has been useful in
helping New Delhi deal with a wide range of potential threats—
Pakistani adventurism, Chinese opposition, violent domestic
challenges, WMD diffusion, economic instability, and Islamist
terrorism.
A high-level strategic dialogue between the two countries began
to develop even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In
particular, during the second Clinton administration, U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant
Singh engaged in wide-ranging discussions about a range of regional
security issues. 75 For example, the two countries established a U.S.India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism in January 2000. 76
The Bush administration began to build on this dialogue even
before 9/11. 77 Subsequently, shared concerns about terrorism, China,
and other issues led to enhanced intelligence sharing (e.g., the 2002
agreement on sharing of classified military information) and expanded
cooperation on a “quartet” of issues under the rubric of the “Next Steps
in Strategic Partnership” (NSSP) initiative. The NSSP, launched in
January 2004, has now progressed to phase II issues after the successful
conclusion of phase I. Setting aside differences over nuclear weapons,
Iraq, and other disputes, the NSSP has involved a wide-ranging dialogue
and exchanges between the two countries in the areas of high-technology
trade, outer space exploration (expect for rocket technology that could
improve India’s offensive missile capabilities), civilian nuclear energy
(specifically regarding regulatory and safety issues) and, most recently,
missile defense. 78 The NSSP has proceeded on the basis of a series of
74
Stephen Philip Cohen, “The United States and India: Recovering Lost
Ground,” SAIS Review, vol. 18, no. 1 (1998).
75
These meetings are described in Strobe Talbot, Engaging India: Diplomacy,
Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2004).
76
The Working Group held its sixth session in August 2004. U.S. military
sales to India have included equipment to improve the counterterrorist
capabilities of India’s special forces.
77
“The India Imperative: A Conversation with Robert D. Blackwill,” The
National Interest, no. 80 (Summer 2005), p. 9.
78
At a joint U.S.-Indian American meeting in March 2005, Raytheon briefed
Indian officials for the first time on its Patriot ballistic missile defense system;
see Wade Boese, “Pakistan, India Get Green Light to Buy U.S. Fighter Jets,”
Arms Control Today (May 2005).
61
reciprocal steps leading to ever-greater cooperation. 79 For example,
during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s February 2005 visit to
India, she announced that the administration was committing to helping
develop India’s civilian nuclear power industry because of the country’s
tremendous energy needs, India’s commitment not to use such assistance
to advance its strategic weapons program, and the progress that has been
achieved in other dimensions of the U.S.-Indian relationship. 80
For its part, the Indian government was one of the first to endorse
the Bush administration’s decision to pursue a National Missile Defense
program, ostensibly because it would help secure deep cuts in the U.S.
offensive nuclear arsenal. 81 More fundamentally, the continuing gap in
military power between the two countries implies that the United States
is in a position to block many Indian aspirations in the realms of politics,
economics, and strategy. India invariably will matter least in Asia with
respect to those geographic and functional issue areas where the existing
superpower, the United States, has such compelling geopolitical interests
that would warrant both the independent commitment of superior power
and the pursuit of unilateral policies if necessary. For example, the
security of the Persian Gulf, freedom of navigation in the Southeast
Asian straits, and the protection of Taiwan represent issues where India
will continue to remain a peripheral actor because the stark disparity in
relative U.S.-Indian capabilities makes Indian preferences largely
irrelevant. 82 In these kinds of issues, however, Indian power could be
79
For more on this process see U.S. Department of State, “United States–India
Joint Statement on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership,” September 17, 2004,
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36290.htm; and Ashley J.
Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 58.
80
Michael Tackett, “U.S. Backs India Effort to Build Nuclear Plants,” The
Chicago Tribune, March 17, 2005.
81
Amit Gupta, The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or
Complementary Interests? (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Strategic Studies
Institute, February 2005), p. 5.
82
Such considerations may explain why the United States has not heeded
Indian objections about U.S. military assistance to Pakistan, considered by
many in Washington as an indispensable American ally in the Global War on
Terrorism. Despite Indian concerns, the administration recently notified
Congress of another $1 billion in arms sales (including 8 P-3C Orion
surveillance aircraft, 2,000 TOW-2A missiles, and upgraded Phalanx naval gun
systems) to Islamabad. Nevertheless, the decade-long suspension of the
delivery of some two dozen F-16s Pakistan purchased in the 1980s suggests
that U.S. policy makers pay some heed to India’s legitimate security
consideration even in this sensitive area
62
dramatically magnified if applied in concert with the United States.
Indian resources could help to ease U.S. operational burdens and provide
the United States with those benefits arising from more robust
international solidarity—and in the process actually enhance Indian
power in multiple ways. In July 2003, U.S. policy makers tried
unsuccessfully to entice India to deploy troops in Iraq to achieve some of
these very advantages. New Delhi declined due to the absence of a
UNSC mandate or the establishment of a UN forces command.
Recognizing these considerations, New Delhi has made great
efforts in the post-Cold War period to convince the United States to
perceive an Indian managerial role in South Asia as conducive to its
interests. India’s generally responsible behavior in its relations with its
neighbors has assisted this process. With the exception of its nuclear
tests in 1998, whose harmful legacy has dissipated with time, India’s
strategic restraint (in contrast to say Pakistan’s adventurism in Kargil,
which required high-level American intervention to resolve), its
impressive economic performance since 1991, and the great
improvement in U.S.-Indian diplomatic relations since 1999 have
convinced Washington that very few disagreements exist on issues of
vital importance to the United States. As a result, the initially limited
U.S. interest in India has steadily given way to a broader acceptance of
New Delhi’s “stabilizing” role in the region. This process will only
deepen if India persists with its current policy of geopolitical restraint
vis-à-vis its South Asian neighbors.
For its part, Indian officials’ dialogue with the United States have
centered on persuading Washington that New Delhi’s independent
foreign policy and eventual emergence as a regional power will benefit
U.S. global interests. This argument draws strength from a variety of
factors: a common commitment to democracy, liberalism, and secular
institutions at home; a mutual desire to see a stable balance-of-power
emerge in Asia; a shared fear of both religious and secular extremist
movements that espouse violence as a means to attain political goals; a
joint concern about the proliferation of strategic technologies and
weapons of mass destruction; and their desire for a stable global order
that balances the respect for national interests with institutions and rules
that minimize the use of force as a means of settling disputes. 83
83
These common interests led former Prime Minister Vajpayee to refer to India
and the United States as “natural allies.” On the strength of these ties see
Thomas Donnelly and Melissa Wisner, “A Global Partnership between the U.S.
and India,” AEI Asian Outlook (September 7, 2005), available at
http://www.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?pubID=23139; and Granger M.
63
Given these common interests, New Delhi has attempted to
persuade Washington to alter its policies in three basic areas. First,
Indian policy makers want the United States to allow the loosening of the
restrictive technology control regimes that impede Indian access to
sophisticated civilian, dual-use, and military technologies. 84 Second, they
desire U.S. leaders to recognize India as a great power, both regionally and
globally. This development would strengthen New Delhi’s ability to
contain Pakistan’s repeated challenges and deal with Beijing on an
equitable footing. Third, they want increased Indian access to the best
U.S. military technology, weapons systems, doctrine, and training.
With such assistance, India’s military-industrial complex and its
armed forces would improve through greater military-to-military
cooperation and selective technology and weapons acquisitions. 85
It is important to bear in mind that the pursuit of these objectives
is driven by the Indian conviction that the best insurance against
emerging threats to Indian security, including the rise of assertive
Chinese power in the future, lies not in becoming a junior partner in any
existing or evolving alliance system, but rather by emerging as a strong
and independent center of power in its own right. One of the motivations
to develop an indigenous nuclear arsenal has been to enhance India’s
freedom of maneuver and security regardless of American preferences or
even threats. 86 To the degree that India can secure U.S. assistance to
emerge as such a power center, New Delhi would avoid its worst
conceivable threats without suffering any diminution in its own
cherished autonomy.
Morgan, K. Subrahmanyam, and Robert M. White, “India and the United
States,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 2 (1995). On their limits,
especially with respect to values and ideas, see Rahul Sagar, “What’s in a
Name? India and America in the Twenty-First Century,” Survival, vol. 26, no. 3
(Autumn 2004), pp. 115-136.
84
Past U.S.-Indian disagreements in this area are reviewed in Virginia Foran,
“The Case for Indo-US High-Technology Cooperation,” Survival, vol. 40, no. 2
(Summer 1998), pp. 71-95.
85
Joint training and exercises (including between both countries’ navies and
special forces) resumed in 2002 for first time in 40 years. For a summary of
these numerous interactions, as well as recent U.S. arms sales to India, see K.
Alan Kronstadt, India-U.S. Relations (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service, November 4, 2004), pp. 9-10, 16.
86
Victor M. Gobarev, India as a World Power: Changing Washington’s Myopic
Policy,” Policy Analysis (September 11, 2000), pp. 1-22.
64
In the near-term, India’s strategic mark will be left most
obviously in its immediate environs, in the interstices of Asian
geopolitics, and, to the degree that Indian and U.S. preferences coincide,
the core issues of Asian high politics. The United States will derive
several benefits from this situation. First, India’s presence will be most
salient in areas where the United States has few competing interests.
Consequently, the possibility of friction between the United States and
India is minimized. Second, both in the interstices and in the core of
Asian and global geopolitics, American and Indian interests have
gradually converged since the Cold War. Third, for many issues of great
importance to the United States—the balance of power in Asia, the
security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, WMD proliferation, terrorism,
narcotics trafficking, and the rise of religious and secular extremism—
Indian interests comfortably dovetail with those of the United States.
For example, while Indian leaders have declined to identify themselves
as formal members of the U.S.-led international anti-terrorist coalition,
they have supported many American anti-terrorist-related initiatives, and
contributed some of their own (e.g., Indian Navy escort patrols in the
Strait of Malacca). 87
The New United Progressive Alliance government thus far has
perpetuated the enhanced level of U.S.-Indian security cooperation that
began in the 1990s and intensified greatly under the BJP-led coalition.
India seeks a new, more normal, relationship with Washington that
erases the mixed memories of the Cold War years and allows for at least
some degree of tacit cooperation in managing future threats. Since
emerging as a true great power with both security and status remains at
the heart of India’s grand strategy, it seeks to deepen its engagement
with the United States, but not at the cost of its independent foreign
policy. This implies that India seeks a bilateral relationship that allows
for differences in opinion when New Delhi’s preferences do not
completely align with Washington’s; is not encumbered by restrictive
technology control regimes; and offers opportunities for greater political
and military cooperation without making New Delhi appear to be a
87
According to one analyst who has discussed the issue with many Indian
leaders, “while India is popularly regarded as a coalition partner in the war on
terrorism within Washington, New Delhi does not see itself in this way. Indian
(and some American) government representatives stress that India has neither
been asked to participate in the global coalition nor has it deliberately
contributed to it. India prefers to see counterterrorism as in its core strategic
interest and a major source of strategic consonance with the United States” (C.
Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and
India (Santa Monica, RAND: 2004), pp. 1-2). This paper provides an extensive
review of India’s counterterrorism policies.
65
junior ally. India’s traditional desire for political autonomy, and its
continuing search for greatness, will prevent it from ever becoming a
formal U.S. alliance partner. Nonetheless, it seeks to develop close
relations with the United States in order both to resolve its own security
dilemmas vis-à-vis Pakistan and China and to develop cooperative
solutions to various emerging problems of global order.
66
THREE KEY ISSUES:
ENERGY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND CHINA
By 1991, many Indians realized that new challenges had arisen
for which their country was ill-prepared. The USSR’s collapse deprived
India of its strategic anchor of the past 40 years. Although most Indians
today sincerely affirm that Indo-Soviet ties were never as strong as
Americans and Europeans insisted, the relationship nonetheless provided
both a sense of security and the analytical framework for much Indian
thinking about their country’s place in the world. By the early 1990s,
China’s economic dynamism already was evident. Flows of foreign
direct investment bypassed stagnant India for this more attractive venue.
India’s defense and military planners appreciated that China’s growing
resources allowed it to spend more on its military, including purchasing
advanced military platforms from Russia. Pakistan remained a constant
military threat. With its acquisition of nuclear weapons and its support
for terrorism in Kashmir, the specter of Pakistan as an unpredictable wild
card became entrenched in Indian thinking. In Central Asia, the turmoil
following the USSR’s abortive war in Afghanistan, the ethnic instability
unleashed by the subsequent Soviet collapse, and the rise of militant
Islamic fundamentalism in the region caused many Indians to fear they
might soon confront a geographically connected continuum of hostile
Islamic states. India continued to lack the means to assure access to the
vital oil resources of the Persian Gulf despite the dramatic growth of its
energy requirements. To its southeast, turmoil in Indonesia presented
threats to Indian maritime interests that also lay beyond the reach of its
navy.
India’s systemic response to these new realities saw it transition
from essentially a contented observer to a strategic actor. As C. Raja
Mohan observes, India’s reaction involved policy changes in five main
areas: a retreat from socialism to a consensus on building a capitalist
society; a new stress on the importance of India’s competing
economically on a global scale; an assertion of the primacy of selfinterest rather than Third Worldism; the abandonment of anti-Western
principles that had animated Indian politics for decades; and the adoption
of a new pragmatism at the expense of traditional Indian idealism.
India’s commitment to becoming a nuclear weapons power, its increased
spending on defense, and its search for new strategic partners punctuated
this radical departure from the status quo.
How this extraordinary change came about is the subject of
considerable debate among India’s strategic planners and foreign policy
67
elite. Interviewees stress the protracted nature of this transformation.
Most date its beginnings to the mid-1980s, when evidence that India’s
poor economic performance was undermining its global position led
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89) to embrace polices of economic
globalization (such as simplifying the import licensing system for
consumer durables and high-technology products like computers, and
replacing quotas on imported goods with tariffs), political modernization,
and diplomatic outreach. Gandhi’s initiatives paved the way for P.V.
Narasimha Rao’s deeper economic reforms and his rejection of nonalignment as the organizing principle of Indian foreign policy. Later in
the decade, the BJP adopted an even more assertive foreign policy,
culminating in the nuclear tests of May 1998: a move calculated to
enhance India’s status as a global actor even in the face of—or perhaps
because of—strenuous American objections.
India’s economic takeoff, which began in the mid-1990s, is
probably the single most important reason for the new sense of
confidence and optimism about India’s strategic direction. Today,
Indian planners routinely assume that economic growth will continue at a
significant rate, somewhere above 5-6 percent annually. They point to
the recent projection by the financial firm Goldman Sachs that, if India
can stay on course and avoid substantial mistakes, it likely will become
the fastest growing economy among the world’s leading economic
powers by the year 2050. According to the Goldman Sachs analysts,
even in absolute terms, only the economies of the United States and
China will be larger. 88 Many of our interviewees cite a variety of
internal and external studies that suggest that India could achieve growth
rates of 7-8 percent annually for at least several decades, with economic
acceleration powered by India’s strong technology and service sectors
(e.g., information technology, biotechnology, and software engineering).
ENERGY SECURITY 89
Among the many strategic challenges that India could face in the
next several decades, energy security may be among the most serious.
Two ineluctable considerations characterize the overall context in which
88
Goldman Sachs, “Dreaming with the BRICS: the Path to 2050,” Global
Economics Paper No: 99 (October 1, 2003).
89
This section draws heavily on Juli MacDonald’s work on Indian energy
security and energy strategy issues. See for example Juli MacDonald and Amy
Donahue, Energy Futures in Asia: Final Report, prepared for the Director, Net
Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense (November 2004).
68
Indian strategic planners must plan for India’s energy security. First, the
growing global demand for energy emanates largely from developing
Asia. Second, supplies from outside Asia will have to meet most of the
this growing demand for oil and gas.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that
world energy demand will increase by 58 percent in the first two and half
decades of the 21st-century. Most of this expansion will occur in North
America and in developing Asia, as depicted in Figure 1. If one only
looks at the demand growth in oil, Asia will account for more that 80
percent of the projected world demand growth over the next two
decades, totaling approximately 36 million barrels of oil per day
(mbd). 90 Starting from a low base, developing Asia’s energy
consumption is projected to double as industrialization and personal
mobility increase in these developing countries. In contrast, energy
needs in industrialized Asia remain relatively stagnant. Indeed, China’s
voracious demand for energy is the primary, but not the only, driver of
developing Asia’s demand growth over the next two decades. China’s
requirements are projected to more than double between 2001 and 2025.
But, as Figure 2 demonstrates, the same is true for India and other parts
of Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Only Japan’s
energy consumption is projected to stay relatively constant through 2025.
Even this situation could change if Japan’s economy begins to recover
rapidly. All of these countries, but particularly China, could compete
with India for access to energy in the future.
90
EIA projects world oil demand to grow by 45 mbd from 75 mbd in 2004 to at
least 120 mbd by 2025.
69
FIGURE 1: WORLD ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY REGION (2001-2025)
200
180
North America
160
Developing Asia
140
Quadrillion BTU
Western Europe
120
EE / FSU
100
Middle East
80
Industrialized Asia
60
Central and South
America
40
Africa
20
0
2001
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
Year
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, 2003.
Note: Industrialized Asia is Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Developing Asia includes all other Asia (except the
Middle East), including China, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Malaysia, and others.
EE/FSU is Eastern Europe/Former Soviet Union.
FIGURE 2: ASIAN ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY COUNTRY (2001-2025)
100
90
80
Quadrillion BTU
70
60
South Korea
India
50
Japan
Other Asia
40
China
30
20
10
0
2001
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
Year
Source: US Energy Information Administration International Energy Outlook 2003.
Note: ‘Other Asia’ includes Bangladesh, Brunei, Burma, Guam, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, North
Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Vietnam.
Consumption in Asia will far outstrip the region’s ability to
produce oil and natural gas locally. The handful of sizeable oil
exploration/production projects in Asia, most of which are located
offshore, produce approximately 9 mbd. This total production level is
not anticipated to grow as mature fields go offline and territorial disputes
70
continue to impede offshore exploration. By 2025, the gap between
projected consumption and production in Asia could grow to just over 30
mbd, as depicted in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3: ASIAN OIL CONSUMPTION AND SUPPLY PROJECTIONS (20012025)
45
40
Millions of barrels/day
35
30
25
Asian Production
Asian Consumption
20
15
10
5
0
2001
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
Year
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, 2003.
The same growing gap is also evident with natural gas, which is
abundant in Asia. Natural gas will be the fastest growing primary energy
source in Asia over the next two decades, as developing Asia builds the
natural gas infrastructure to support widespread distribution and
consumption. But the demand for natural gas in Asia already surpasses
regional production, and new production will not keep pace with
growing demand (see Figure 4). India plans to rely on gas as part of its
diversification strategy, particularly after large natural gas fields were
discovered off India’s East Coast in the Bay of Bengal.
FIGURE 4: ASIAN GAS CONSUMPTION AND
SUPPLY PROJECTIONS (2001-2025)
71
25
Trillion Cubic Feet
20
15
Consumption
Production
10
5
0
2001
2010
2015
2020
2025
Year
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, 2003.
Asian consumers will become increasingly dependent on a single
source of oil—the Persian Gulf, as demonstrated in Figure 5. Imports
from Central Asia and Russia are projected to increase, but they will do
little to diminish Asia’s heavy dependence on the Persian Gulf in 2025.
In addition, the Middle East will also be a significant source of natural
gas, particularly liquefied natural gas (LNG), for Asian consumers.
FIGURE 5: ASIAN OIL IMPORTS BY REGION (2001 AND 2025)
10
9
8
7
6
Millions of barrels/day
5
4
3
2
1
0
Industrial Asia Industrial Asia
2001
2025
China 2001
China 2025
Pacific Rim
2001
Pacific Rim
2025
Persian Gulf
4.1
6
0.9
5.2
4.8
9.4
North Africa
0
0
0
0.2
0.2
0.6
West Africa
0
0.3
0
0.3
0.7
1.8
South America
0.2
0.1
0
0
0.1
0.4
Asia
0.3
0.2
0
0.2
0.2
1.5
0
0
0
0
0
0.1
0
0.1
0
0
0.1
0.5
0.3
0.8
0
1.4
0.2
0.6
North Sea
Caribbean Basin
FSU
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, 2003.
Note: Industrial Asia includes Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Pacific Rim includes non-industrialized Asia-Pacific,
including China, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
72
Dependence on Middle Eastern suppliers to satisfy growing
energy demand afflicts not only India and China but also Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, and even Indonesia, which in the next few years is
projected to become an energy-importing nation. Consequently, the
energy demand trends, and a spate of recent energy deals (e.g., China
and India signing billion dollar deals with Iran to secure long-term
supplies of LNG and oil) portend a growing strategic linkage between
Asia and the Middle East. In this context, the Middle East could become
a new area of competition among Asian actors as they vie for influence
with the oil and gas suppliers. One of the most interesting arenas to
watch will be Iran. China, India, and Japan already compete for projects
and influence in the Iranian energy sector.
With respect to its own energy demand, India is forecast to be
among the top consumers in the world of hydrocarbon products in the
next twenty years. Two factors will drive India’s surging demand: the
burgeoning middle-class and a rapidly expanding transport sector around
which much of India’s future economic growth is based. India will lag
somewhat behind China, Japan, and the United States, but surge ahead of
large European industrialized countries like France and the United
Kingdom. Coal will continue to play a dominant role in India’s energy
mix, perhaps as much as 50 percent in the next two decades given India’s
large coal reserves. Consumption of natural gas, India’s preferred fuel,
also will remain important, though its share of India’s energy
consumption probably will not exceed 20 percent in the same time
frame. Nuclear energy also is projected to grow significantly during the
next two decades. India currently has 14 nuclear plants, and aims to
triple its reactor capacity during the next eight years. 91 Even with the
realization of these ambitious plans, however, the share of India’s energy
needs that will be met by nuclear power by 2025 is unlikely to exceed
three percent. Oil, imported mostly from the Persian Gulf, will remain
India’s energy Achilles heel.
Indian strategists see the energy supply issue as a two-sided
problem. On one hand, India must provide for its own energy, which is
increasingly imported from abroad. On the other, India must compete
for energy resources that, while not necessarily scarce, are concentrated
heavily in regions like the Middle East that are magnets for great power
competition. As noted above, all major Asian states will require
increasing quantities of hydrocarbons in the next 20 to 30 years, even if
91
Katrin Bennhold, “Nuclear Comeback Stokes Terror Fears,” The
International Herald Tribune, October 18, 2004.
73
one allows for paradigm-shifting technological breakthroughs that either
lower demand or increase supply.
Indian national security planners have focused much attention on
securing India’s own energy supply while at the same time developing
strategies for contingencies, including military contingencies, which
could arise if the world suffers any significant constriction of overall
energy supply. An obvious example would be some kind of crisis in the
Middle East that might intensify competition among the major energy
consumers (e.g., India and China) for increasingly scarce energy
resources.
Indian strategists have been concerned about the vulnerability of
India’s energy supply at least since the former Soviet Union’s collapse
and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In 1999, the Minister of External
Affairs said that energy security came second only to economic security
as the primary pillar of India’s national security policy. Indian officials
convened a number of high-level bodies to explore the dimensions of the
country’s energy security and possible Indian responses to its emerging
vulnerabilities. 92 Nevertheless, the Indian government has yet to create a
centralized authority with decision-making power to develop and
coordinate a government-wide energy strategy. Currently, five
ministries—those for Coal, Power, Petroleum and Natural Gas, Atomic
Energy, and Non-conventional Energy Sources—operate independently,
with agendas that frequently conflict with one another. Hydrocarbon
Vision 2025 represents the only major government plan for India’s
energy sector, but it provides more of a reform agenda than an energy
security strategy. The advent of the new Congress-led coalition
government in May 2004 may be changing the situation. In June 2004,
the government convened the new National Security Advisory Board
(NSAB) and asked it to assemble an inter-disciplinary team of experts to
analyze India’s energy security vulnerabilities and develop a
comprehensive national energy security strategy.
Indian interviewees identified several factors driving Indians’
concerns about energy security. These considerations have both internal
and external dimensions. The former include:
•
92
Financial security. Indian policymakers are concerned that
India’s growing dependence on imported oil will be financially
unsustainable. The current drain of foreign exchange reserves
A typical and thoughtful exploration is Jasjit Singh, ed., Oil and Gas in
India’s Security (New Delhi: Knowledge World and the Institute for Defense
Studies and Analyses, 2001).
74
(approximately $40-48 million per day) already poses a serious
threat to India’s financial security.
•
Constraint on economic growth. The Indian economy will face
numerous bottlenecks and constraints on its potential growth if
the energy distribution infrastructure is not upgraded or
expanded.
•
Meeting rising demands. Securing low-priced and reliable
energy is essential to meeting the rapidly rising expectations of
the growing young population and middle class. As standards
of living increase, more people are able to purchase
automobiles or cooling systems for their homes. Both
appliances will increase energy demand significantly. 93
External dimensions include:
93
•
Growing dependence on oil imports. Given stagnant domestic
production, imported oil, coming primarily from the Persian
Gulf, will have to satisfy a growing share of India’s energy
needs. During the past decade, India’s dependence on imported
oil already has jumped from 50 percent to nearly 75 percent of
total oil demand.
•
Falling behind China. For years, Indian strategists have been
concerned that Chinese thinking on energy security has
developed much further than India’s. They worry that China’s
activities in the Persian Gulf, in Central Asia, and in energyrich states in the Indian Ocean (e.g., Bangladesh and Myanmar)
have the potential to limit India’s energy options, and could
also position China to encircle India. These concerns are not
lost on the new Congress government, which in early 2005
expressed public alarm that “China is ahead of India in
planning for the future in the field of energy security.”
Government leaders urged Indians to be more aggressive and
strategic about securing energy deals around the world. 94
•
Securing the sealanes and pipelines. During the next two
decades, India’s oil and gas imports will be coming from
multiple directions—by sea from the Persian Gulf, East Africa,
and Southeast Asia, and by pipeline from Iran, Central Asia,
One interviewee noted that the transportation industry is the fastest growing
sector in India and is the fourth largest in the Asia after Japan, China, and South
Korea.
94
Keith Bradsher, “Alert to Gains by China, India is Making Energy Deals,”
New York Times, January 17, 2005.
75
and Bangladesh/Myanmar. Multiple energy fronts will require
sophisticated military planning to protect sealanes, pipelines,
and other energy infrastructure from various contingencies.
India is pursuing a wide range of policies in response to these
vulnerabilities, with the aim of enhancing the country’s energy security
in the future. Components of India’s energy strategy include:
•
Increasing domestic exploration and production. Indian
planners have focused on increasing domestic exploration and
production, particularly after the discovery of large gas fields
off India’s east coast in the Bay of Bengal. They are
optimistic about finding similar gas deposits in the many
hitherto unexplored areas in their economic exclusion zone.
Attracting foreign investment represents the most important
requirement for developing internal resources and
infrastructure. Creating an investment climate to attract the
financial and technical resources of the major international
energy companies constitutes one of the most important
policy challenges of the new Congress-led government.
•
Building a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). India is
committed to building an SPR, but progress has been slow.
Indian leaders have been talking about the importance of an
SPR since the first Gulf War. However, Indian strategists
believe that the second Iraq war may provide the impetus the
Indian government needs to bring plans for an SPR to
fruition.
•
Investing in natural gas. India is investing heavily in its
natural gas infrastructure to ease its dependence on imported
oil. India will be importing liquid natural gas (LNG) from
Southeast Asia and the Middle East a few years from now.
•
Giving Indian energy companies a global presence. Indian
energy companies, which are wholly-owned by the Indian
government, are investing in equity positions around the
world, including in Russia (Sakalin), Central Asia, West and
North Africa, and the Middle East.
•
Maintaining close ties with Middle East suppliers. Over the
short-term, the bedrock of India’s energy strategy is to
maintain close relations with all the states in the Middle East.
•
Pursuing multiple pipeline projects. Over the long-term,
Indian strategists hope that pipelines from Iran, Central Asia,
76
Bangladesh, and Myanmar (Burma) will offer additional
diversification options.
•
Engaging in energy diplomacy. India is cultivating
diplomatic relationships with many important energyproducing states, such as Iran, Sudan, Libya, Myanmar,
Russia, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
•
Bolstering Indian naval capabilities. The Indian government
has embarked on a massive modernization of its military,
including upgrading and expanding its maritime capabilities.
The Indian Navy’s energy security mission is growing for several
reasons. First, Indian companies are constructing more deep-sea oil
exploration and production platforms in India’s Economic Exclusion
Zone. These assets require protection. Second, Indian oil and natural
gas imports will be coming from multiple directions, not just the Persian
Gulf as has been the case in the past. Third, Indian faces many potential
maritime threats to its energy supplies. These threats include piracy,
terrorism, a natural disaster, or possible interdiction or attack by a great
power competitor. The Indian Navy is taking steps to strengthen its
position along the sealanes by conducting joint military exercises with
regional militaries and the U.S. Navy, by escorting U.S. and other ships
from the Straits of Malacca to the Arabian Sea, and by giving the Far
East Naval Command in the Andaman Islands (which belong to India but
are situated some 1,200 miles from India’s coasts) an explicit energy
security mission. (The Indian Air Force also plans to periodically deploy
its Su-30s to the Islands. 95 )
Emerging Energy Competitions
Indian strategists are under no illusion regarding the identity of
their main competitors for energy. Chinese planners, too, have placed
energy security near the top of their list of national security concerns,
and for good reason. China’s energy market is huge and growing, and
now consumes nearly 10 percent of the world’s total. Only the United
States consumes more. China’s energy mix resembles India’s. Like
India, China has enormous coal reserves, which remain China’s primary
source of energy, but it is poorly endowed with oil and natural gas, the
two types of energy that will account for most of China’s growing
demand over the next two decades. China’s demand for oil alone is
projected to reach approximately 13 mbd within two decades. Like
95
Gupta, U.S.-India Relationship, p. 35.
77
India, China is reaching beyond its borders in many different directions
to secure access to oil and gas supplies.
These trends in Asia’s demand for energy alone create the
conditions for an intense competition between India and China for
foreign energy imports. Indian strategists, however, are also sensitive to
the mercantilist thinking that permeates most Asians’ thinking, including
Indian thinking, about energy. Unlike Americans and Europeans, Asians
tend to distrust international energy markets as adjudicators of energy
security. Asians typically believe that energy security is achieved either
through self-sufficiency or through the physical possession or control of
energy supplies. This view, which sees energy security as a zero-sum
game, has driven some Asian states, particularly China, to pursue
policies that non-Asians might consider excessively costly (e.g., buying
equity in far-flung oil fields, overpaying for oil imports, and building
their own refineries). 96
When considering their potential energy competition with China,
Indians envisage the following dimensions:
96
•
Competition for influence and access in energy-rich countries.
Indians believe that they are already competing with China for
access to preferential treatment, special supply relationships, and
investment opportunities with critical energy suppliers. These
key supplier countries include Iran, Russia, and countries in
Africa (Sudan and Libya). Indians place a premium on close
economic, political, and increasingly strategic relationships with
all countries in the Middle East. India’s long-standing
relationship with Russia has a growing energy component to it,
with Indians becoming major investors in Russia’s energy sector
(e.g., in Sakalin and through potential joint ventures with the
largest Russian energy entities). In Africa, India is one of the few
outside countries—others include China and Malaysia—that is
willing to risk oil exploration and production in war-torn Sudan.
•
Positioning in Central Asia. China’s prescient policies and
strong presence in Kazakhstan worry Indians. They believe that
Central Asia will be an arena of competition, not cooperation,
between China and India for energy resources. Indians view
Central Asia as an arena to outflank Chinese influence in South
For a survey of various views regarding Asian energy security see Juli
MacDonald, “Energy Futures in Asia: After Action Report,” prepared for the
Director, Net Assessment (Office of the Secretary of Defense), July 2004.
78
Asia. They are already actively positioning themselves in all
Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, to counter Chinese
influence. Indian companies are acquiring equity stakes in fields
throughout the Central Asian and Caspian regions. They
anticipate that, in the medium-term, Iran might serve as a transit
state for Kazakh oil or Turkmen gas for the Indian market.
Indians already are investing in a transit route that links
Afghanistan and Central Asia to Iranian ports to give India easier
access to Central Asian markets. Nevertheless, Indian
investments and pipeline plans are relatively inconsequential
compared to China’s investments in Kazakhstan’s oil fields and
its ambitious plans to build a pipeline that links the northern
Caspian to China’s western province, Xinjiang. At the same
time, China is modernizing and building a deep-water port in
Gwadar so that Pakistan also could provide a gateway to
international markets for Central Asian energy and goods.
•
Control of the sealanes. Indian strategists view sealane
protection as a critical component of the Indian military’s energy
security mission. Oil and LNG tanker traffic will put increasing
pressure on critical choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz, the
Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and the South China Sea.
Asian consumers invariably will become increasingly concerned
about the safety of these tankers. In this context, Indians
strategists anticipate that more militaries will become active in
the Indian Ocean, creating the potential for either more
cooperation or armed confrontations there. Indians consider
sealane protection a shared interest and a sound strategic basis for
cooperation with the U.S. Navy and other regional navies. India
has been pursuing a strategy of enhancing military relationships
with the states along the sealanes to maintain its predominance in
the Indian Ocean. At the same time, China is pursuing a parallel
sealane strategy. It has developed strategic relationships with key
states (e.g., Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Cambodia) that
have the potential to enhance China’s strategic position in the
Indian Ocean and along the sealanes.
•
Development of Himalayan hydropower resources. Some
Indians worry that they might find themselves competing with
China to develop the enormous hydropower potential of the
Himalayan region. They believe that the Chinese have the
distinct advantage there. In particular, some Indians fear that the
Chinese, after completing their Three Gorges Dam, might try to
initiate a hydropower project in the eastern Himalayas, which
79
remains a disputed territory between the Indians and the Chinese.
The Indians have no current plans to develop a hydropower plan
for themselves there since they have yet to tap the potential in
some of the lower lying regions. They worry therefore that the
Chinese will move aggressively to develop this rich energy
resource before they can adequately respond.
Indian strategists are aware that the outlines of these types of
energy competitions, particularly with China, are already evident in the
policies and strategies that both states are pursuing. But even more
worrisome is how the potential for competition might develop, and what
types of military contingencies might arise, if the world suffers any
significant constriction in the overall energy supply. A debilitating
political crisis in the Middle East might propel a more aggressive
competition between India in China for increasingly scarce regional
energy resources.
NUCLEAR INDIA
Gaining the recognition and respect due a respected nuclear
weapons state constitutes a core attribute of Indians’ new strategic
attitude. India's first nuclear weapons tests in 1974 were an indication
that, even then, Indian leaders believed they had a strong case for
acquiring nuclear weapons. Following these tests, which Western
governments strongly condemned, India entered a period of "strategic
ambiguity" that lasted until the early 1990s, when Indian leaders decided
to transform the country into a real rather than merely virtual nuclear
weapons power at the appropriate time. That moment arrived in May
1998.
A number of histories and participants have made clear that the
decision to test had been well considered, and made in the certain
knowledge that India would suffer international opprobrium. This
assessment proved correct. The resulting international sanctions,
especially those imposed by the United States, severely limited important
technology flows to India and strained relations with many foreign
governments.
Indian leaders accepted these risks for a number of reasons.
First, they recognized that the strongly anti-nuclear Clinton
administration was trying to write a new set of nuclear rules that
threatened to relegate India permanently to the ranks of nuclear
aspirants, an unacceptable discrimination for a country with great power
80
pretensions like India. Without nuclear weapons, many Indians believed
their country simply would not be taken seriously as the dominant
regional power, much less as a significant global actor.
Second, Indian leaders were becoming increasingly concerned by
China’s rising power. Indians still recalled their humiliating military
defeat in 1962. Most Indian strategists have viewed China as the most
serious long-term threat to India, necessitating a slow but inexorable
Indian military buildup, including the development of nuclear forces that
would eventually counter China's growing military might. Indians
believe classic nuclear deterrence would operate in the case of China.
Indian officials publicly justified the 1998 tests as necessary to manage
the emerging Chinese threat.
Third, Chinese officials have sought to deal with a perceived
long-term threat from India through sharing nuclear weapons expertise
and technology with Pakistan. Indians complain bitterly about the
ineffectual response of the international community to this deliberate
Chinese policy of regional nuclear proliferation, despite strong and
persistent Indian warnings that Chinese actions were disturbing the
nuclear balance in South Asia.
Fourth, Indian national defense and military planners by the mid1980s had become increasingly convinced that nuclear weapons
proliferation was almost inevitable, at least in Asia. They therefore
concluded that India would require a more robust nuclear strategy that
could manage new threats from many more state and even non-state
actors that might threaten India with small asymmetrical nuclear
arsenals. Many Indian strategists became particularly concerned that
Pakistan was becoming more politically fragile and might eventually
collapse. They derived little comfort from the fact that the Pakistan
military nominally controlled the country’s nuclear weapons given that
hostile members of the Pakistani military might exploit a crisis to
transfer nuclear weapons to other countries or terrorist groups.
These genuine concerns about the emerging nuclear world mean
that few Indian strategists support rolling back India's nuclear weapons
capability. Rather, discussions among them center on how to become a
successful nuclear weapons power. In particular, they debate the
meaning of nuclear weapons in the strategies of potential adversaries on
the one hand, and of the potential for nuclear intimidation, coercion,
denial, and even use on the other.
81
In discussing how to think about nuclear conflict in new ways,
Indian strategists have begun to explore the range of plausible nuclear
futures, the events that might occur in those futures, and the
circumstances that might bring them about. Indian strategists have
begun to identify "drivers" of nuclear strategies and "game" the
conditions that might relate to them. They have begun to consider
creative political and coercive uses of nuclear weapons that have little or
no military salience. Their discussions also consider the probability that
someone will actually use nuclear weapons.
Indian strategists believe that a number of Asian leaders will find
it difficult to resist the prestige associated with possessing nuclear
weapons. Some states will pursue nuclear weapons as a way to resist the
influence of larger nuclear states like the United States, China, and even
India, and seek to influence their strategic direction. Others will pursue
nuclear weapons to avoid “falling behind.” In short, Indian defense and
military planners envisage an Asian security landscape that could
plausibly include many nuclear-capable or actual nuclear weapons
powers within only a few years.
Indian strategists also worry about the potential for non-state
actors to acquire nuclear weapons. They have no doubt regarding the
likely source of these weapons. The revelations that Pakistan’s principal
nuclear architect had been systematically sharing nuclear technology and
expertise with other Asian states, some of which are real or potential
adversaries of India, merely confirmed their long-held suspicions.
Besides Pakistan, Indian strategists believe proliferation could occur in
any state with a weak government, a condition that could describe many
Asian countries today and likely will characterize many more in the
future. They seem most concerned about threatening transfers to nonstate actors.
Indian strategists fear that they cannot be certain of
understanding the nuclear weapons doctrine that these state and non-state
actors might employ. They worry that these forces will use nuclear
weapons in ways unrelated to traditional military doctrine (i.e., as a form
of deterrence against other nuclear powers). Instead, they might see
actually using nuclear weapons as genuinely advancing their cause.
They acknowledge that a key challenge will be to understand the
decision-making calculus of an unfamiliar nuclear world. India’s nuclear
debate—bounded in large part of by the anti-proliferation preoccupations
of the original major nuclear powers, especially the United States—of
necessity will explore all facets of nuclear warfare (e.g., deterrence,
reserves, targeting, crisis management, arsenal size). Indians stress that
82
they cannot effectively undertake this reevaluation as long as others treat
India as a nuclear pariah. To the contrary, many Indian strategists
believe that dealing with the challenge of countering a small nuclear
arsenal by actors that might pursue novel asymmetric strategies will
require India’s participation as a full-fledged member of the nuclear
club.
Most Indians firmly believe that India will become a robust
nuclear weapons power that will manage its nuclear capabilities
responsibly. At present, analysts estimate India has approximately 100
nuclear weapons, though the government has not officially indicated how
many nuclear weapons it has now or plans to produce in the future. 97
The nuclear tests of 1998 received strong support in India’s strategic
planning community. For some Indians, the tests represented their first
proactive security decision—a stark break from its traditional reactive
approach. An unspoken nuclear deterrent has existed on the subcontinent for decades. With the nuclear tests, however, Indians strategists
believe that it now becomes unlikely that the conflicts on the subcontinent will cross the nuclear threshold.
Indians offer a number of propositions for conducting a dialogue
with the United States on these issues. First, Americans need to accept
India as a nuclear weapons power, even if this requires redefining the
attributes of a “nuclear weapons state.” In the view of most Indian
strategists, Americans must realize that India has critical security needs
that require nuclear weapons: deterring a potentially unstable or
aggressive China, and managing a hostile if fragile Pakistan. Although
most Indians acknowledge that testing nuclear weapons enhanced India’s
status, at least as a regional great power, they insist that security rather
than status considerations determined their decision. India confronts a
growing number of security threats that cannot be fully managed without
nuclear weapons.
Second, Indians argue that Americans should adopt a benign
interpretation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They complain
about U.S. actions that disadvantage India and make productive strategic
cooperation impossible. For example, Indians note with extreme irony
that North Korea may receive reactors from the United States but India
cannot. They see this not just as a different set of rules, but as different
playing fields altogether. In their view, sanctions against India for
97
Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly
Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, second edition
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).
83
testing nuclear weapons were a psychological stumbling block in IndoAmerican relations and have denied India the technologies it needs to
fight terrorism aggressively.
Third, Indians suggest that it will be useful for Americans and
Indians to establish “core” issues with respect to nuclear weapons that
can guide the relationship in the future. In particular, they want the
United States to adopt their more nuanced understanding of the politics
of nuclear balance in South Asia. South Asia is not on the verge of a
nuclear war merely because both India and Pakistan have tested nuclear
weapons. They insist that this misperception suits the military regime in
Pakistan because American sanctions have disproportionately affected
India.
STRONG CHINA – WEAK CHINA
Indian planners see China as both a model to be emulated and a
challenge to be balanced. For them, China’s rise as one of the world’s
major economic powers has been at once startling and threatening. The
speed with which China has grown was largely unanticipated by the
Indians, but they well understand that China’s economic power will
eventually be translated into military strength. India’s military
embarrassment at China’s hands in 1962 still looms large in Indians’
perceptions of their foremost security challenges.
Indian analysts believe that, over the long-term, China’s growing
economic influence threatens to alter the strategic balance in Asia
fundamentally. Smaller economic players in Asia are already being
sucked into China’s economic vortex. This is most evident in East and
Southeast Asia, where the economies of most states—including Japan,
South Korea, Australia and Thailand—now feature China as their
leading trading partner. But China’s influence now extends still further
westward, presently encompassing most of Central Asia and,
increasingly, the Persian Gulf. Not all Indians believe that China intends
to use its economic position across much of Asia to India’s disadvantage.
Nonetheless, many fear that China’s long-term grand strategy includes
the objective of marginalizing India’s influence in Asia. For obvious
reasons, China would want to make it more difficult for other Asian
states that have become dependent on China’s goodwill and economic
power for their own stability to see India as a potential partner for
containing China’s excesses.
84
China remains a preeminent strategic preoccupation of most
Indian strategists. If anything, concerns about China’s intentions and
growing capabilities have intensified during the last few years. Indian
strategists uniformly discount the American version of the strategic
competition in South Asia, which elevates the Indo-Pakistan conflict
above all else. They are concerned that American policy makers do not
understand the threat to India from China. For example, Indians greeted
President Clinton’s pronouncements toward the end of his second term
that South Asia is the “most dangerous spot on earth” with disbelief and
derision. Likewise, they responded with disappointment and disapproval
when the Clinton administration appeared to accept China as a “strategic
partner.”
A strong China with a seemingly unstoppable economy that is
capable of both pursuing an aggressive diplomatic approach in the
regions surrounding India and developing new military capabilities that
threaten India directly lies at the forefront of Indian thinking about longterm strategic threats. Indians see China reorganizing and modernizing
its military forces, and they believe that the end of the Cold War has
given China more room within which to maneuver, particularly since
China is viewed around the globe as a legitimate nuclear weapons power.
Above all, Indians fear Chinese encirclement. They watch with
concern as China strengthens its influence in Bangladesh, Central Asia,
Myanmar, and Pakistan. For some time, Indians expected Pakistan
would eventually extend basing rights to the Chinese Navy in the
vicinity of Karachi, a prospect that the new naval base at Gwadar has
made even more vivid. In the words of a senior naval officer, this will
place the Chinese “at the jugular of South Asia,” giving China “a
stranglehold” on South Asia. Recent concessions to China by Pakistan
have been mirrored by similar concessions in Myanmar. Indian defense
planners increasingly are forced to consider how best to compete with a
strong, assertive China on many fronts: close to home, in the Bay of
Bengal and in the strait of Malacca, and further away, in the Middle East
and Central Asia. Despite concern about China’s ability to manage its
internal problems (see below), the fear of a strong China encroaching on
the Indian Ocean is a major driver behind India’s growing focus on
developing its maritime power.
The question for India’s strategists is how the Chinese might plan
to encircle India without actually coming into military conflict with New
Delhi. They typically offer four general predictions regarding Chinese
behavior. First, the Chinese will use propaganda and subtly push a
strong peace offensive to cloak their expanding influence. Second,
85
China will avoid conflicts that expose weakness or disrupt its
evolutionary penetration into South Asia. Third, Beijing will emphasize
the putative advantages of a Sino-Indian condominium, including
keeping the United States at a distance and forging a distinctly South
Asian strategic identity that pools the Asian powers’ common interests
and objectives. Fourth, the Chinese will rely most heavily on diplomacy
tied to underlying military and technological power, particularly in the
maritime dimension.
Indian strategists give the Chinese high marks for strategy, while
assigning themselves low marks. Whereas for the Chinese,
statesmanship and generalship come together, Indian security debates
tend to remain outside of public view. The Indians subscribe to the
belief, common also in the West, that the Chinese think ahead in spans of
hundreds of years. Therefore, they can envisage both opportunities and
challenges in ways that planners in India, with shorter strategic horizons,
cannot. The Indians claim they lack the institutions to generate serious
strategy or weigh a range of strategic views. In fact, the quality of the
strategic debate in India has improved in recent years. The Indian policy
making community clearly is creating new processes and mechanisms to
develop strategies for dealing with Asia’s new strategic environment.
For example, it has formed both a National Security Council and an
advisory board to promote strategic thinking among senior policy
makers.
If a strong China is a concern to Indian defense and military
planners, then a fragile China with deep political, economic, and social
fault lines would be a nightmare. Some Indian experts point to the
inability of China’s communist leaders to understand how to
accommodate China’s emerging capitalists. They note, for example, that
the communists have instituted vastly different approaches towards
autonomy in China’s regions, engendering uneven and often
contradictory freedoms in local economic affairs. These differences will
make any accommodation between free market forces and statist forces
impossible to achieve, in their view. They point out that at least seven
distinct and often contradictory economic and legal models operate
simultaneously in the country: in China proper; in the autonomous
regions; in Xinjiang and Tibet; in the free-trade areas; in the coastal
regions; in Macau; in Hong Kong; and finally that planned for Taiwan
after its re-incorporation into the mainland. These regions invariably
will develop at different paces. The competitive pressures that this
differentiation generates could tear China apart. Indian analysts also cite
other forces that could contribute to China’s disintegration: separatist
movements in key border regions; a social structure that may not be able
86
to meet the growing demands on it (e.g., unemployment, AIDS, and
critical shortages of vital resources); and political instability at the top
combined with popular impatience for change from below.
87
TWO FUTURES
The state of India’s economy will most heavily determine India’s
future strategic role. Indian interviewees were generally optimistic about
India’s economic prospects, but they typically tempered their optimism
with cautionary warnings about the negative consequences should the
current economic reforms stall or fail. One can readily envisage two
plausible if ideal-type scenarios regarding India’s role in the world based
on different Indian growth rates.
SCENARIO 1: INDIA’S ECONOMIC TAKEOFF
In this scenario, India attains a high level of political stability.
Power devolves successfully to the states, which exercise their new
autonomy responsibly. While they increase their power vis-à-vis the
federal center, they do so in a way that strengthens the Indian political
process both by promoting widespread political inclusion and by creating
additional safety valves for political dissent. Local political institutions
become more robust, and minorities in particular enjoy a much higher
degree of protection and freedom of action. As a result, communal
violence diminishes to a level that is easily contained or redirected.
Increasing tax revenues enable large-scale investments for social projects
that meet constituent demands. Corruption declines because the political
process punishes it. The role of bureaucracy decreases at all levels of
government.
Economically, India’s “second generation” reforms take root,
creating a vastly more attractive target for international investment.
Foreign ownership laws are loosened, and labor and contract law gain
transparency and clarity. The Indian government places a high priority
on attracting foreign investment. Tax regimes are restructured to favor
outsiders. The states enjoy wide discretion in structuring incentives to
attract foreign investment. Privatization gains momentum. Virtually all
the old state industries are privatized. Foreign direct investment (FDI)
soars, based largely on heightened investor confidence and an absence of
government interference. FDI flows into virtually all parts of India,
leaving none of the traditionally impoverished regions untouched.
Americans lead all investors, pushing total FDI in India to $30 billion.
They also are investing heavily in India’s stock market. Most
restrictions on the transfer of critical U.S. technologies to India have
been eliminated. Reforms in many sectors (e.g., power generation,
telecommunications, information technology, insurance, transportation)
88
create a snowball effect. Most critical industries make significant strides
forward. Lured by unprecedented opportunities and higher wages at
home, India’s large and prosperous diaspora population returns in evergreater numbers. High-technology “cities” proliferate, especially in
southern India, formed in part by Indo-US partnerships. India becomes
the world center for services and “backroom” outsourcing. The Indians
remaining in the United States become a powerful constituency lobbying
for closer ties with their mother country.
In this take-off scenario, India’s large working-age population
imparts a tremendous boost to economic growth. Education programs
sponsored by government and multinational corporations show marked
results, enabling millions of young Indians to hold well-paying jobs in
expanding industries and promoting labor mobility more generally.
Some of these efforts are “virtual” classroom programs that tap India’s
extensive expertise in information technology to reach even the most
remote villages. Illiteracy declines dramatically. India’s fertility rate
drops to almost a replacement level, reducing pressures on social
programs aimed at alleviating poverty.
Under this scenario, military modernization proceeds rapidly, as
past resource constraints have been overcome. Developing a robust
nuclear triad (with land-, air-, and sea-based systems) to give India an
assured second-strike capability becomes a priority. Military acquisition
emphasizes nuclear submarines and other maritime platforms, with the
specific aim of exploiting China’s underdeveloped naval tradition. The
military successfully integrates information warfare, space-based assets,
and long-range precision strike capabilities with innovative
organizational and operational concepts.
Many Indian strategists believe that this India, one that has
sustained a robust economic takeoff, would make a particularly good
partner for the United States. They argue that an economically vibrant
India that would make a sustained investment in military power would
figure in U.S. strategies for pan-Asian security (from Japan to the
Persian Gulf) in new ways. While few of them are willing to sign up for
an American-led containment strategy of China, these Indians emphasize
that others powers, including the United States, will need to help manage
a rising China—and even more so a collapsing one. Of particular
interest, they argue that a strong Indo-U.S. relationship could provide the
United States with opportunities to improve relations with presently
unfriendly regimes in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.
89
SCENARIO 2: INDIA MUDDLES THROUGH
This scenario, which many Indians consider most likely, sees
sporadic bursts of rapid growth for several years, followed by a rapid
slowdown as the economy slips back into its historically lethargic growth
rates. Economic reforms are implemented in a piecemeal fashion with
many mistakes and embarrassing retreats. As in the past, India has a
succession of governing coalitions that fail to achieve a consensus on
economic reforms, with predictable results: investor confidence erodes,
expected foreign investment fails to materialize, and yearly economic
growth rates fall to the 3-4 percent range. Some sectors of the Indian
economy fall on especially hard times, while even India’s prized
information technology and software development sectors weaken
slightly, as necessary investment dwindles. Depressed regions of India
spiral downward. On the other hand, several regions with well-known
high technology sectors attract even more foreign investment, causing
the economic gap between Indian states to widen.
These economic trends contribute to social stress and political
turmoil. Limited but serious unrest results from increasing income
inequalities. Unemployment grows, and dissent expands. In some
regions, foreign investors are accused of corrupt practices and taken to
court, further depressing FDI. Governments are paralyzed: too weak to
take decisive political action, and too vulnerable to political opponents to
pursue a stronger reform agenda. Meanwhile, government revenues
begin to slide. Promised investment in education does not take place.
Many students fail to find their desired skilled jobs. India’s growing
population, which would represent an advantage in a rapidly growing
economy, becomes a source of potential instability in a slowly
developing one.
Like other state investment sectors, the military receives a budget
inadequate to cover rapid military modernization. India’s military power
expands, but not sufficiently to allow it to become a dominant regional
power, let alone a global one. Nevertheless, the military in this scenario
does pursue a number of outstanding programs. For example, it acquires
a credible information warfare and nuclear weapons capability. These
world-class assets tend to absorb most new investment revenues.
Consequently, other capabilities remain modest. By at least the second
or third decade of the 21st-century, India still cannot project power
effectively beyond the Indian Ocean. Limited resources breeds a
military leadership that is both cautious and risk averse, and is incapable
of producing an integrated military doctrine or coherent strategy.
90
Under this scenario, Indian strategists would be unable to realize
their geopolitical ambitions. More dynamic economies, such as China,
further enhance their relative positions vis-à-vis New Delhi. Not
receiving their desired recognition as global players, Indian elites easily
could fall back on a resentful, anti-American nationalism. As a result,
rapprochement with the United States would become more difficult.
Indeed, many Indians might feel inclined to compete directly with the
United States on a variety of regional issues. At the same time, Indian
elites might act to prevent any further diminution of their country’s
status through adventurism in surrounding areas (e.g., Sri Lanka or
Bangladesh). Relations with Pakistan likely would deteriorate even
further, but because China protects Pakistan, the Indian intelligentsia
curb their resentment. Without a strong relationship with the United
States, and increasingly isolated in its own region, this India probably
would seek out other relationships that could strengthen its deteriorating
position. Iran would offer an obvious target for such cultivation because
it would implicitly threaten Pakistan in the west and reduce worries
about India’s energy security. Deepening Indian-Iranian ties would
further worsen U.S.-Indian ties.
91
OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDO-AMERICAN COOPERATION
The last decade has seen relations between India and the United
States improve substantially across a variety of sectors and activities,
though some Indians argue that the Americans’ confidence about where
this relationship could lead may be misplaced.
CONTEXT FOR INDO-AMERICAN COOPERATION
Interviewees stress that the emerging Indian-U.S. relationship
must be seen against a broad historical backdrop. From this perspective,
the last few years of cooperative relations take on a decidedly different
hue. Most interviewees point out that cooperation between India and
United States did not emerge naturally in the early years of the
relationship. To the contrary, Indo-U.S. relations were marked from a
very early date by mutual distrust, misperceptions, cultural
misunderstandings, and strong conflicting convictions. This legacy
continues to influence the way Indians think about the United States.
At one level, Indians reject the argument that, because India and
the United States are both democracies, they naturally share a great deal
in common. While all interviewees underlined the value of our common
democratic heritage, almost no one argued that democracy alone would
sustain a broad and multi-layered partnership. To the contrary, many
Indians dismiss as empty rhetoric American assertions that democracy
provides an essential connective tissue between friends. In their opinion,
interests, not ideology, lie at the center of the American view of the
world. And interests, not ideology, kept the world’s two largest
democracies apart during the Cold War.
Indian strategists and security planners highlight the half-century
of U.S. military support for Pakistan as an example of how little ideology
shapes American foreign policy. In many respects, they found it easier
to understand U.S. support for Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960s than
today. Most Indians could appreciate that American support for Pakistan
during the Cold War represented an attempt to balance the Soviet camp,
of which India was an affiliate if not a true member. Even during the
1980s, U.S.-Pakistani cooperation appeared logical given the two
governments’ shared sense of threat following the December 1979
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
92
Today, however, Indians see no reason for continued close U.S.Pakistani ties. According to the interviewees, U.S. support for Pakistan
helps sustain an unstable military dictatorship by indirectly legitimizing
the Army’s claims and demands, particularly with respect to the IndoPakistani conflict in Kashmir. Although many Indians share the
prevailing U.S. opinion about the need to keep Pakistan stable given the
war on terror, it is understandable that Indians lack enthusiasm for the
American practice of transferring sophisticated U.S military platforms to
Pakistan, which easily could be used against India, just to reward
Pakistan for not failing? 98 Even the most “pro-American” Indians find it
hard to imagine that the “democratic affinity” between the two countries
can overcome Washington’s policy of maintaining close military ties
with India’s main foreign security threat.
Beyond Pakistan, one finds in Indians’ attitudes and perspectives
a thinly veiled feeling of resentment that the United States does not
“value” India sufficiently as a global player. Precisely because India is a
fellow democracy, Indians believe Americans should be the first to
recognize the moral and spiritual qualities that their country brings to
international politics. Indian strategists see themselves as deserving
“status” in the international arena, and express exasperation that
Americans do not show them the deference they expect. Although
presently muted, the Bush administration’s failure to endorse Indian
aspirations to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council
likely contributes to Indian resentment.
AREAS OF INDO-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN THE NEAR TERM
These two issues—Americans’ continued support for Pakistan
and their seeming reluctance to accord India greater international
status—emerge repeatedly in discussions with Indian strategists and
planners. Despite these obstacles, Indo-U.S. political relations today are
probably the best they have been for many years, as former Secretary of
State Colin Powell recently affirmed. 99 The growing convergence of
98
The most recent public manifestation of these disagreements occurred in
February 2005, when the Bush administration announced it would permit
Pakistan to purchase F-16 warplanes from the United States despite Indian
opposition; see for example Peter Baker, “Bush: U.S. to Sell F-16s to Pakistan,”
The Washington Post, March 26, 2005.
99
“We have, perhaps, the best relationship with India that we've had in many
decades” (“Secretary of State's Powell's Interview at Christian Science
93
interests on many dimensions points to real opportunities for deepening
advancing ties even further and for constructing a solid foundation on
which to build an enduring long-term strategic relationship.
Indian strategists and defense planners identify several areas
where cooperation is already producing results, and where opportunities
for further collaboration exist in the near and medium term. These areas
include protecting the sealanes, prosecuting the global war on terrorism,
preventing Pakistan’s collapse, and broadening and deepening IndianU.S. economic ties. Many of these subjects could fall under the purview
of the three separate high-level bilateral dialogues—dealing with energy,
economic cooperation, and especially global security—that Indian and
American officials are currently undertaking. 100
Protecting Sealanes
Indian interlocutors identified protecting maritime passages from
the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca as the strongest area of
near-term strategic convergence between India and the United States,
and potentially the most promising area for military cooperation. The
importance of these sealanes for India’s Navy will continue to grow,
particularly given India’s concerns about energy security. The number
of tankers from the Middle East bound for India and East Asia is rising
rapidly, as is the construction of deepwater, offshore energy assets (e.g.,
oil and gas platforms) off India’s east and west coasts.
American strategists are equally concerned about the security of
the maritime lines of communication that link the Middle East to U.S.
friends and allies in East Asia. They would welcome the assistance of a
capable regional navy to share the burdens of an increasingly complex
mission. Both navies agree that sealane protection encompasses a wide
range of operations, including suppressing piracy, countering narcotics
and arms trafficking, curbing pollution and environmental damage, and
conducting search-and-rescue missions. Both navies are increasingly
worried about the possibility that maritime terrorist attacks could have
devastating consequences for the region’s economies.
Monitor's Newsmaker Press Briefing Luncheon,” US Fed News, December 21,
2004).
100
“America, India and Pakistan: A New Approach from Washington,” IISS
Strategic Comments, vol. 11, no. 2 (March 2005).
94
Military cooperation has been the most successful aspect of the
emerging Indo-U.S. relationship over the past several years. Their
military services are now regularly conducting exercises together that are
enhancing their ability to conduct joint operations in arguably the most
vital sealanes in the world. The overstretched U.S. Navy has relied on
the Indian Navy for assistance in escorting high-value cargo through the
Strait of Malacca since 2001-02. Indian defense planners would like to
see Indo-U.S. naval cooperation expand from the Bay of Bengal to the
Arabian Sea, which Indian strategists see as the source of many potential
threats.
Such collaboration will require further reductions in
interoperability barriers, such as those arising from differences in the two
countries’ tactics, procedures, and equipment. Relaxing restrictions
governing the transfer of U.S. military technologies to India would help
overcome the latter problem in particular. The June 2005 signing of a
ten-year bilateral defense agreement, entitled the “New Framework for
the U.S.-India Defense Relationship,” could make a substantial
contribution in overcoming many interoperability impediments.
Replacing the outdated January 1995 Agreed Minute on Defense
Relations, the new accord establishes a basis for deeper cooperation in
the areas of missile defense cooperation, combined military training,
joint weapons production, and a more permissive U.S. policy regarding
conventional arms sales to India (including Israeli weapons systems,
such as the Arrow BMD system, incorporating substantial U.S.
technology). Officials in the U.S. Department of Defense anticipate the
agreement will result in India’s purchasing up to $5 billion worth of
additional American conventional military equipment, a stupendous
jump from the current $90 million a year. 101
The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
Indo-U.S. cooperation against terrorism has made mixed
progress. The potential for close cooperation in this area—and for
creating a more general framework for the relationship—started on the
wrong foot when the Bush Administration decided against accepting
India’s unprecedented offer of direct support for the U.S. counter-attack
101
For assessments of this agreement and its effects see Bruce Fein,
“Embracing India,” Washington Times, July 19, 2005; Jo Johnson and Demetri
Sevastopulo, “US Signs Formal Defence Pact with India,” Financial Times,
June 30, 2005; and Dafna Linzer, “Bush Officials Defend India Nuclear Deal,”
Washington Post, July 20, 2005.
95
against al-Qaeda. Instead, the administration chose Pakistan as its
primary partner. Since then, India and the United States have used the
Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism, which existed prior to 9/11,
to full advantage. They also have created several other high-level bodies
to coordinate policies on a wide range of GWOT-related issues,
including a working group at the level of the NSC and NSCS on cyberterrorism.
Indians want to pursue opportunities to widen and deepen current
dialogues, particularly in the area of developing strategies to expand the
voice, presence, and influence of moderate Muslims. Indians believe
that, given their history and ethnic diversity, they are well placed to be a
model and source of inspiration for moderate Muslims. In addition, they
believe that the Indian military, which has been fighting terrorism for
decades, could play an important role in training the U.S. military in
counter-terrorism operations and intelligence gathering. Indian soldiers,
who have already participated in over fifty peacekeeping operations,
could help prevent the kind of domestic and regional chaos that in the
past has provided a vacuum for terrorists and other extremist groups to
enter. Certainly, the overstretched U.S. military would appreciate
receiving additional manpower in post- (or even pre-) conflict stability
operations. The formal involvement of India also could enhance the
endeavor’s perceived legitimacy, both within the affected region and
internationally. 102
Indians lament that the United States defines terrorism
exclusively in terms of its own interests (i.e., attacks that affect the
United States and its close military allies), thereby discounting the
terrorist threat emanating from Pakistan. In a September 2004 speech
before the United Nations, Prime Minister Manmohan complained: “We
speak about cooperation [against terrorism] but seem hesitant to commit
ourselves to a global offensive to root out terrorism, with the pooling of
resources, exchange of information, sharing of intelligence, and the
unambiguous unity of purpose required. This might change. We do
have a global campaign against terrorism. We must give it substance
and credibility, avoiding selective approaches and political
102
Indians’ past activities in this area are summarized in Embassy of India, A
History of Indian Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (Washington,
D.C.), available at
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Peace_Keeping/history_india_UN_peace
_keeping.htm.
96
expediency.” 103 Whatever their relative merit, such disagreements over
the definitions of terrorism should not constrain opportunities to draw on
Indian insights and other assets to support U.S. operations in the GWOT.
Preventing Pakistan from Failing
Indian and U.S. security experts agree an intact Pakistan that has
moderated its policies would present less of a threat than a failed state or
one ruled by hardliners. Both groups would most prefer the development
of a democratic, stable, and prosperous Pakistan. Beyond this
generalization, however, Indians stress that stabilizing Pakistan is
probably beyond anyone’s capabilities. Moreover, they appreciate that,
under some conditions, India might benefit from Pakistan’s collapse.
For example, a collapsed Pakistan would present less of a menace than
an aggressive nuclear-armed rogue.
These different perceptions about the desirability of Pakistan’s
collapse present an opportunity for joint analysis. In particular, Indians
and Americans could conduct mutually profitable scenario-building
sessions that have a disintegrating Pakistan as a core component of their
alternative futures. The objective of such exercises would be to develop
a common operational language about the character, shape, and scope of
a potential Pakistani collapse. Another goal would be to consider
possible plans and hedging strategies, including those conducted jointly
by India and the United States, in the event such a collapse actually
occurred. The sensitivity of such an exercise suggests it can make most
progress if undertaken outside of formal bilateral institutions such as the
bilateral Defense Planning Group. Instead, it could proceed as a track II
initiative under the auspices of one or more nongovernmental
organization, but with the participation of influential civilian and military
strategists from both countries.
Central Asia and Iran
Indian strategists view Central Asia from four overlapping, and
occasionally contradictory, perspectives: (1) as the cauldron for a
dangerous socio-religious infection that could spread instability in all
directions; (2) as the focus of a Chinese strategy to dominate the region
103
Cited in Harish Khare, “We will Carry Forward Composite Dialogue, Says
Manmohan,” The Hindu, September 24, 2004.
97
and potentially encircle India; (3) as a source of energy; and (4) as a
possible area of cooperation with United States. 104
Even before the recent war in Afghanistan, Indian strategists saw
Central Asia as a tinderbox that could explode at any time. They still
fear that Pakistan’s intrigues in Afghanistan, even after the elimination
of the Taliban, have irreversibly poisoned the Central Asian region.
Indians believe that no key regional state can, by itself, contain the
spread of Islamic fundamentalism, terrorist cells, narcotics trafficking,
and ethnic unrest. Russia is too weak. Even if it were stronger, its
leaders likely would remain preoccupied with internal matters. China is
concerned mostly with preventing the spread of these maladies into
Xinjiang, where they might find strong resonance in the local ethnopolitical milieu.
Nevertheless, Indians fear that China aims to establish hegemony
over Central Asia. They attribute several strategic objectives to Beijing.
First, it seeks to “cover an exposed flank” to prevent the spillover into
China of ethnic unrest from other parts of Central Asia. Second, China
desires to assume control over Central Asia’s energy supplies, either
directly, through the presence of Chinese firms or troops, or indirectly,
through strategic agreements with other states. Third, China seeks to
expose India’s northern flank as part of a strategy of encircling India
through strategic relationships with India’s neighbors. Fourth, China
wishes to thwart an incipient U.S.-led containment strategy that could
eventually involve India. In the view of many Indian strategists, China’s
key targets in this regard are Russia, which needs both China’s markets
and breathing space to recover its strength, and Iran, which needs
regional allies to counter American hostility and possible sanctions.
Indian strategists see a natural convergence of interests with the
United States regarding Central Asia. For the most part, they welcome
the new U.S. military presence there. They constantly remind American
planners that Central Asia is a natural extension, indeed a historical part,
of India’s security space. They believe that they understand the region
well, and have often expressed the desire to help American planners
acquire knowledge about it.
A key element of this understanding, from the Indians’
perspective, is “getting Iran right.” They share Americans’ fear that Iran
104
India’s growing interests in Central Asia are discussed further in Stephen
Blank, “India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 22,
no. 2 (2003), pp. 131-148.
98
wants to acquire nuclear weapons, but beyond this there are few points
of agreement with American policy toward Iran. Indians point out that
Iran is linked historically and culturally to India in many ways, and that
any security development affecting Iran likely will impact India as well.
In their view, stability in Central Asia is impossible without Iran’s active
cooperation. They view Iran principally as a Central Asian, not a Persian
Gulf, power—a view shared by many Iranians. Indian ties to Iran are
multifaceted, involving growing economic ties (including a joint
economic commission), energy cooperation, cultural exchanges,
scientific and technological collaboration, and regional security issues
such as Afghanistan and international terrorism. While Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice expressed concern about the proposed $4 billion,
1,700-mile Indian-Pakistan-Iranian “peace” gas pipeline project during
her recent visit to South Asia, Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh
said, “We have no problems of any kind with Iran.” 105 In June 2005,
India signed a $22 billion deal to purchase 5 million tons of Iranian
liquefied natural gas over a 25-year period.106 Indian strategists insist
they “understand” Iran. They routinely request that American planners
consult with them about how to engage more effectively with what they
see as Eurasia’s strategic pivot point. In particular, Indian strategists
worry that Americans do not appreciate how precipitous U.S. actions
toward Iran could inadvertently unhinge other elements of the Central
Asian equation.
Indian strategists believe that an intimate dialogue with their
American counterparts on Iran, especially how it fits into the larger
strategic landscape of the Central Asia and the Middle East, would pay
great dividends. They have frequently suggested this, but have yet to
receive a positive response.
Broadening and Deepening Bilateral Economic Ties
Despite a dramatic increase in Sino-Indian trade, the United
States remains India’s largest trading partner and biggest source of
foreign direct investment, although at disappointingly low levels—a
legacy of India’s only recently discarded autarkic economic strategy.
105
Cited in Glenn Kessler, “India Protests Possible Sale of Fighter Jets to
Pakistan,” Washington Post, March 17, 2005. See also David J. Lynch,
“Despite U.S. Pressure, India Unlikely to Drop Pipeline Deal with Iran,” USA
Today, March 17, 2005.
106
Andrea R. Mihailescu, “Despite Sanctions, U.S. Allies Aid Oil, Gas Pipeline
Projects,” Washington Times, June 29, 2005.
99
India’s emergence as an important strategic power and potential partner
for the United States in Asia depends, on many issues, largely on its
ability to sustain high levels of economic growth for a considerable
period. As the scenarios in this report strongly suggest, India’s
attractiveness as a strategic partner, and its ability to perform adequately
as one, would become doubtful without such growth. It is very much in
Americans’ interest to see India’s economy expand and prosper.
The Indian diaspora in the United States could play a special role
in this regard. Their economic potential became evident in the 1990s,
when Indians or Indian-Americans helped establish some 40% of all
start-ups in the Silicon Valley. Today, its 1.8 million members represent
one of the most wealthy and well-educated ethnic groups in the United
States, with approximately 200,000 of them millionaires thanks
especially to their achievements in the U.S. high-technology and lodging
industries. Many Indians and India-Americans in the United States are
playing a leading role in developing U.S.-Indian economic ties, including
by pressing for a relaxation of American export controls and by
organizing an influential India Caucus in Congress. 107
Both sides have taken some recent steps to stimulate trade
between the two countries and to make India a more attractive venue for
U.S. investment, but much more is required. The NSSP process has
produced some progress in this area, and the Bush administration,
seeking to balance its March 2005 decision to resume F-16 sales to
Pakistan, recently announced that it would allow Indians to bid for
licenses for co-production of advanced military equipment such as
warplanes, early warning, and command and control systems. 108 At
present, both Boeing (with its new F/A-18E/F) and Lockheed Martin
(with its venerable F-16) are competing with Russian, French, and other
foreign companies to sell advanced fighter aircraft to India. The Indian
government has announced its intentions to acquire 126 multirole
combat aircraft in the next few years through a co-production agreement
107
Gautam Adhikari, “U.S.-India Relations: Report on AEI’s Roundtable
Discussions,” AEI Working Paper No. 112 (June 22, 2005), p. 5, at
http://www.aei.org/publication22743; and Bruce Fein, “Embracing India,”
Washington Times, July 19, 2005.
108
Wade Boese, “Pakistan, India Get Green Light to Buy U.S. Fighter Jets,”
ACT News Update, April 18, 2005, at
http://www.armscontrol.org/aca/midmonth/2005/april/F16s.asp; and U.S.
Department of State, “Background Briefing by Administration Officials on
U.S.-South Asia Relations,” March 25, 2005, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/43853.htm.
100
with a foreign company. 109 Furthermore, Indians and Americans are
presently discussing possible free trade areas that could embrace
services, manufacturing, agriculture, and other sectors.
Any serious Indo-U.S. security partnership will require more
cooperation on technology transfer issues. The U.S. Department of
Commerce and other American government agencies have made some
progress in this area, especially in the area of civilian space technology.
In September 2004, the Department decided it would now adopt a
“presumption of approval” for U.S. sales to India of items not explicitly
on American or international export control lists. (U.S. officials would
continue to assess requests for the sale of controlled items on a case-bycase basis.) 110 The American government has set forth a “glide path”
involving the further gradual relaxation of various export control lists.
Although some progress has been achieved, Indians believe the
impediments to technology transfer from the United States to India
should be removed more rapidly, unless evident security issues warrant
otherwise. (The main American concern about transferring dual-use
technologies to India appears to be the potential transfer of these items to
third parties.) Indians strive to be treated the same as the many other
countries that enjoy broad access to security-related technology transfers
from the United States. Most Indian national security planners insist that
the NSSP, let alone the larger Indo-U.S. security relationship, cannot
progress without some kind of protocol for the transfer of securitysensitive technologies to India. They express doubts about Americans’
reliability as suppliers and about the degree to which U.S. export
restrictions have been removed de facto as opposed to just de jure.
109
Philip Dine, “Boeing Seeks To Persuade India To Buy Super Hornet
Fighters,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 27, 2005; and Jonathan Karp, “Boeing
and Lockheed Scramble For Prize Fighter Market: India,” Wall Street Journal,
June 17, 2005.
110
Specifically, the Commerce Department announced that it would remove
dual-use exports to the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) from its
license entity list. It also indicated it would eliminate the need for many of the
ISRO’s subsidiaries to obtain licenses for importing “low-level U.S. dual-use
goods.” Finally, the Department announced U.S. exporters would now presume
that Indian facilities subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
should be allowed to import certain U.S. nuclear-related equipment that is not
explicitly restricted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group; see Gabrielle Kohlmeier
and Miles A. Pomper, “Pakistan Advances Export Controls,” Arms Control
Today (October 2004).
101
India’s choice of Israel as a strategic partner results in part from
its flexible approach towards technology transfers, such as those
embodied in the Elta Electronics Green Pine early warning radar India
purchased in 2000, and the planned sale of the Phalcon Airborne
Warning and Control System. Despite having only granted full
diplomatic recognition to Israel in 1992, India now imports more
weapons from Israel than from any other country besides Russia. 111
While it may serve U.S. interests to encourage, or at least allow, Israel to
serve as an American surrogate for transferring security-sensitive
technologies to India, the importance of this issue to Indians ultimately
will require U.S. strategists to confront this question directly. The Bush
administration’s recent decisions to allow the sale of advanced U.S
warplanes to India, and to cooperate on enhancing India’s early-warning
and command-and-control systems, suggest an American appreciation
that defense industrial cooperation has now become an ineluctable
element of the Indian-U.S. security dialogue.
AREAS OF INDO-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN THE MEDIUM- AND LONGTERM
Over the longer term, Indians envisage several large, very
important projects for enhancing Asian and global security that will
require active American participation, or even leadership. Two such
issues stand out: creating a new security architecture for Asia, and
establishing a new nuclear regime.
Creating a New Security Architecture for Asia
Many of the challenges to India’s security described in this study
(e.g., energy security, terrorism, China, failing states) affect other Asian
states. Beyond some tentative bilateral arrangements, however, little
cooperation for addressing these larger issues exists. Currently, no
multilateral organization in Asia is structured to deal directly with major
security issues. None has even shown an inclination to do so. In
addition, no multilateral Asian organization has its own military
capability. Thus, even if they were inclined to address these security
issues, they would lack the requisite power to do so. In any event, India
111
For a discussion of the factors underlying the recent improvement in the
Indian-Israeli relationship, as well as the factors that constrain deeper ties, see
Rajan Menon and Swati Pandey, “An Axis of Democracy?,” The National
Interest, no. 80 (Summer 2005),
102
is not a full member of the most important of these organizations (e.g.,
ASEAN or APEC). These limitations explain why, during the recent
Tsunami relief operations, the United States, India, Australia, and Japan
initially found it necessary to create their own temporary multilateral
institution (the Core Group) to integrate their predominantly bilateral
emergency assistance programs. (Despite itself being hard hit by the
Tsunami, India’s military conducted rapid and extensive humanitarian
relief operations in Ceylon, Indonesia, and other fellow Asian countries.)
Indian strategists increasingly raise the idea of establishing a new
security architecture for Asia. Some envisage a kind of Asian NATO,
though most admit this is an inexact analogy. Any new security
architecture for Asia, Indians realize, must feature the United States at
the center, Japan and India in the north and south, and Australia and
Singapore having prominent roles. Indians insist that any new security
architecture must accommodate China, even though one of the key
objectives of the new architecture would be to ensure that China follows
the accepted rules of behavior. Indians describe this not so much as
promoting China’s containment—or at least they are reluctant to use that
word—as a form of structured engagement.
Indian strategists’ nightmare scenario would be for China to take
the lead in designing, promoting, and implementing a security
architecture that would severely limit India’s strategic options. Indian
strategists therefore are eager for the United States to assume the role of
master builder. They believe that an enhanced Indo-U.S. security
dialogue should provide the basis for discussing the main features of the
new security architecture.
Creating a New Nuclear Regime
According to Indian strategists, any future security architecture
for Asia must include a new nuclear weapons regime. Indian resentment
of American pressure to reduce or abandon their nuclear arsenal runs
high. As noted elsewhere in this study, the chances of either happening
are remote. Indians see themselves as a highly responsible nuclear
weapons power—and not part of the proliferation problem, which is how
Americans traditionally have characterized them. They have continued
to develop their nuclear weapons capability because they believe their
security requires it. Indians point out that there is no evidence of nuclear
proliferation from India. In fact, they assert they were the first to alert
the world to the proliferation threat from Pakistan. Indians consider a
significant change in American attitudes and positions as an essential
103
prerequisite for attaining shared new understandings regarding the role
of nuclear weapons, how they might be used, and efforts to control their
proliferation.
Indian strategists expect that a broadened bilateral dialogue on
these topics could produce great benefits because they believe American
and Indian interests converge on most nuclear weapons issues. First,
they share the immediate concern that a fragile Pakistan will eventually
leak its weapons or sell them to eager clients in and outside of the region.
Second, Indian strategists are concerned about the general problem of
proliferation in Asia and elsewhere. Many believe that the world will
soon witness a larger number of nuclear actors, including some with very
small arsenals that are not easily deterred. These new nuclear players
could include non-state actors. Third, like their American counterparts,
Indian security and defense planners worry that many of these new
actors will incorporate nuclear weapons into warfighting rather than
deterrence doctrines. Meeting this challenge probably will require
Indians and Americans to assess different concepts of deterrence and
preemption. Indians place great stock on intelligence sharing and on
cooperating with Americans to better understand the cultures and
mindsets of potential nuclear users. Fourth, Indians are concerned about
the effects of smaller nuclear arsenals on deterrence. They believe that
lower numbers create incentives for states to acquire nuclear weapons.
Finally, Indians speculate about how the advent of another nuclear
weapons power in Asia could have a snowball effect across the region
and perhaps the globe.
Indian strategists stress the need for a broader exchange of views
with their American counterparts on many fundamental questions,
including: How can we discourage further nuclear proliferation? How
can we best plan for the likelihood that some actor will eventually use
nuclear weapons? How should we operate in an environment where
nuclear use has occurred? What critical contingency plans do we need in
advance of such an eventuality? Indians call for additional workshops
and other opportunities to share assessments on these issues face-to-face
with Americans.
POSTSCRIPT: JULY 2005 U.S-INDIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION
AGREEMENT
On July 18, 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced an agreement to expand
bilateral cooperation in outer space, dual-use technology, and civil
104
nuclear energy. With respect to the latter issue, Bush said his
administration would pursue “full civil nuclear cooperation with India.”
Specifically, the administration would “seek from Congress to adjust US
laws and policies” and would “work with friends and allies to adjust
international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and
trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious considerations
of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.” It also
would consult with the other participants in the six-country International
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) fusion energy consortium
about India’s possible participation and, more generally, support India’s
efforts to develop advanced nuclear reactors with better safety and
security features. 112
The planned agreement would break with almost three decades of
U.S. nuclear non-cooperation with India following the 1974 Indian
nuclear test and the ensuing Congressional enactment of the 1978
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which emended the 1954 Atomic Energy
Act by adding nonproliferation considerations as criteria for U.S. nuclear
cooperation and exports. The Act resulted in a cessation of American
nuclear fuel exports to India’s Tarapur reactors (which ironically do fall
under IAEA safeguards). U.S. officials even refused to cooperate on
basic nuclear safety issues. For example, they rejected an Indian
proposal that both countries’ nuclear experts share the results of their
computer codes (but not the codes themselves) used to simulate certain
kinds of nuclear accidents. 113
In return, Singh said India would adopt “the same responsibilities
and practices” as other states possessing advanced nuclear programs.
These will include: separating its military and civilian nuclear facilities
and programs; declaring and placing its current and future civilian
facilities under the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), including its Additional Protocol; continuing its
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; cooperating with the United
States to enact a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; and implementing
comprehensive domestic export control laws and procedures, and
112
Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, White House Press Release, July 18, 2005, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html. See also
Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet on “U.S.-India
Civilian Nuclear Cooperation,” July 22, 2005, at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/49969.htm.
113
Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John P. Holdren, Controlling Nuclear
Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Kennedy School of Government, March 2003), p. 125, note 31.
105
supporting similar multilateral efforts to prevent the transfer of uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology to states that do not
already possess them. Many of these practices correspond to those
pursued by the group of nuclear weapons states formally recognized by
the NPT. India already adheres to many of them. For example, the
Indian parliament in June 2005 enacted legislation, the Weapons of Mass
Destruction and their Delivery Systems Bill, to strengthen India’s export
controls regarding WMD and their potential delivery systems. 114
The two governments have established a working group to
negotiate during the next few months the precise details of their
reciprocal commitments. Effectively implementing any agreement will
prove difficult. Both the U.S. Congress and the 45-member Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), created in 1975 at U.S. initiative in reaction to
India’s first nuclear test, must endorse any agreement. Section 123 of
the Atomic Energy Act requires that Congress approve any new U.S.Indian civil nuclear cooperation accord (the two countries had an
agreement from 1963 to 1993) and any Presidential waivers of U.S.
nuclear export control legislation. The administration would need to
overcome a Congressional ban prohibiting countries that have not signed
the NPT from purchasing American “dual-use” technologies that
potentially could be used for military purposes. The NSG must alter its
multilateral export control guidelines that prohibit participating
governments from supplying nuclear equipment, material, or technology
to any country not placing its nuclear facilities under the IAEA’s fullscope safeguards, or in cases when such transfers could be diverted to
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities. The
Indian government itself will need to determine how to separate India’s
hitherto closely integrated civil and military nuclear programs.
Even if an agreement could be implemented, many
nonproliferation specialists argue it should not be. Opponents of the
proposed accord claim it would further undermine international efforts to
resist the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and other WMD, by
providing a “virtual endorsement of India’s nuclear weapons status.” 115
For example, they highlight that, even in return for access to foreign
peaceful nuclear technology, the agreement does not impose any
constraints on India’s nuclear weapons program (such as ceasing its
114
Paul Kerr, “India Passes Nonproliferation Legislation,” Arms Control Today
(June 2005); and Ray Marcelo, “India To Strengthen Nuclear Arms Curbs,”
Financial Times, May 11, 2005.
115
Daryl G. Kimball, “U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Reality Check,”
Arms Control Today (September 2005).
106
production of fissile material like the other NPT-designated nuclear
weapons powers) other than continuing its unilateral testing moratorium.
The Clinton administration had insisted that India would have to accept
meaningful constraints on its nuclear weapons program in return for
enhanced international cooperation for its civilian nuclear program. 116
Critics also argue that India’s energy needs would be better met
through other means besides nuclear power, and that India itself insists
on cooperating with the anti-American government in Iran for this
reason. More generally, the critics worry that the nonproliferation
regime currently finds itself in a precarious position. Not only did the
recently concluded 2005 Nonproliferation Review Conference fail to
adopt any final declarations, but possibly Iran and certainly North Korea
have been brazenly exploiting loopholes in the NPT to acquire
technologies and equipment that they could use to develop nuclear
weapons. According to its critics, in seeking to relax restrictions on
nuclear cooperation with India, the United States will reward a country
that has developed nuclear weapons regardless of the principles
embodied in the NPT. Other nuclear suppliers and recipients also might
demand special treatment, undermining the nonproliferation regime. The
Iranian government, for example, has accused the Bush administration of
pursuing a double standard by seeking to deny Iran, a NPT signatory that
has never tested nuclear weapons, from pursuing its own civilian nuclear
power program with international acceptance, if not assistance. 117
Countries seeking to acquire nuclear weapons might conclude from the
agreement that they could continue to obtain international assistance for
their civilian nuclear power programs even after their nuclear aspirations
become apparent. Critics argue that the agreement also would result in
the administration’s reversing its long-standing, and increasingly
successful, efforts to strengthen the NSG by more rigorously limiting
members’ cooperation with the civilian nuclear power activities of states
not adhering to the NPT.
116
For other critiques of the agreement see Dennis M. Gormley and Lawrence
Scheinman, “Implications of Proposed India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation,”
NTI Issue Brief (July 2005), at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_67b.html;
Lawrence J. Korb and Peter Ogden, “A Bad Deal with India,” Washington Post,
August 3, 2005; and Henry Sokolski, “The India Syndrome: U.S.
Nonproliferation Policy Melts Down,” The Weekly Standard (August 1, 2005);
and Strobe Talbott, “A Bad Day For Nonproliferation,” International Herald
Tribune, July 23, 2005.
117
Simon Tisdall, “Tehran Accuses US of Nuclear Double Standard,” The
Guardian, July 28, 2005.
107
The administration and other supporters of the agreement say its
implementation will promote the interests of India, the United States, and
the larger international community. 118 First, the agreement’s supporters
say it would promote the safe and secure development of nuclear energy
in a country that is desperately seeking new sources of power, and would
otherwise draw on scarce global supplies of oil and gas, or burn
pollution-producing coal. India’s purchase of American technology,
reactors, and fuel would help revitalize the U.S. civilian nuclear power
industry, thereby positioning it to respond better to a possible resurgence
in the demand for nuclear energy within the United States. The
relaxation on NSG restrictions also would allow India to purchase
reactors and other civilian nuclear technology from France, Germany,
Russia, and other potential suppliers.
Second, while not meeting India’s desire for formal recognition
as a nuclear weapons state, the administration’s decision acknowledges
the reality of India’s nuclear weapons program, and instead exploits the
joint interests of both countries in preventing further nuclear
proliferation. Not only does the agreement formalize India’s
commitment to adhere to international nonproliferation norms, but it
expands the opportunities for concrete Indian-American initiatives to
promote them. Although India has never transferred sensitive nuclear
technologies to other states, the expected expansion in India’s civilian
and nuclear power activities during the next few decades means that,
absent U.S. and other international assistance, the opportunities for
unauthorized diversion, terrorist seizure, or catastrophic accidents
involving fissile materials could increase. The accords’ supporters also
point out that the NPT itself discriminates among countries by treating
the specified nuclear weapons states differently than it does other
countries.
118
Besides administration statements, supportive commentary on the agreement
appears in Sumit Ganguly, “Giving India a Pass,” August 17. 2005, at
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050817faupdate84577/sumit-ganguly/givingindia-a-pass.html; Selig S. Harrison, “Why the India Deal Is Good,”
Washington Post, August 15, 2005; Jacob Heilbrunn, “Bush Is Facing Reality
On India,” Los Angeles Times, July 28, 2005; Jim Hoagland, “Bush’s Bold Bet
On India,” Washington Post, July 24, 2005; and Ashley J. Tellis, “ Bold Step
Forward,” India Today International, September 12, 2005. For a more cautious
and conditioned endorsement see Baker Spring, “India and a Two-Track Policy
to Combat Nuclear Proliferation: Guidelines for Congress to Balance Regional
Security with Nonproliferation,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 810 (July
29, 2005), at http://www.heritage.org/Resaerch/NationalSecurity/wm810.cfm.
108
Third, it would promote the burgeoning U.S-Indian strategic
partnership by setting aside a perennially divisive issue. Over time, this
partnership should help advance U.S.-Indian cooperation in a range of
areas—from managing China and to countering terrorism. As the
preceding sections have shown, such Indian-American cooperation will
help advance the interests of the larger international community as well.