Central Asia and Russian
Relations:
Breaking Out of the Russian Orbit?
Niklas Swanström
Director
Institute for Security and Development Policy
The Central Asian states have been dependent on Russia since they gained
their independence in 1991, not just in economic and energy terms, but also
militarily and politically. In the years after the Central Asian states gained independence, the Russians largely ignored them, reflecting not just the financial
realities in Russia at the time but also Russia’s lack of interest in its former colonies. Even so, there has always been a large degree of reliance by these countries
on Moscow due in large part to the lack of alternatives and the long-established
linkages. Russia bounced back into the region under Putin’s leadership. However,
since 1991 a relative decline in Russian influence had already become clearly
visible. Some have even argued that Russian foreign policy effectively pushed
the Central Asian states away from the imperial embrace and toward real independence.1 To what degree this is true is open to discussion, but it is apparent
that the decline of Russian influence has worked to the advantage of China by
increasing its economic leverage in Central Asia and other areas as well.2 Even
though the Central Asian states have to some extent broken out of the Russian
orbit, their level of dependence on Russia (and, more recently, China) continues
to be unhealthy, much to Central Asia’s anguish.
This article will examine how the Central Asian states are increasingly breaking out of the orbit of Russia much to the benefit of China. It will also focus on
economic relations, particularly the important energy relationships that Russia
has been trying to control in an effort to dominate the export of oil and gas to
Niklas Swanström is Director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy. His main areas of
expertise are conflict prevention, conflict management, and regional cooperation; Chinese foreign policy
and security in Northeast Asia; and narcotics trafficking and its effect on regional and national security
and negotiations. His focus is mainly on Northeast Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.
Copyright © 2012 by the Brown Journal of World Affairs
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EU, China, and other actors. These energy relationships are predicated on the
political and security relationships between Moscow and the regional capitals.
Neither China nor Russia has been eager to allow the Central Asian states to
diversify their economic relations too much, which is even more accentuated
in the political and military spheres. Russia is wary of the Central Asian states
deepening their relations with China, and both Russia and China are concerned
about these states developing their political, economic, and military relations with
the United States and Europe. However, the political elite in Central Asia leans
toward Russia as well as China for support in sustaining their nondemocratic
regimes that are often criticized in the United States and Europe.
The attempts on the part of the Central Asian states to extend their political and economic relations beyond Russia (and China) have been made more
difficult by problems of infrastructure, geographical location, and history, as well
as by failures on the part of external actors (including Europe and the United
States) to act in Central Asia, despite some serious engagement in Afghanistan
from the United States and the European Union. However, the recent competition between China and Russia has created some space for the Central Asian
states to decrease one-sided reliance, something seen prominently in energy relations. In effect, despite supposedly strong Sino–Russian relations, the failure of
Russia and China to cooperate over a broad range of issues has opened up space
for other actors in Central Asia, if there would be an interest to do so. If this is
sufficient to allow the Central Asian states to break out of their authoritarian
structures is very debatable.
In any discussion of Central Asia, it should be noted that Central Asia as
a regional concept is extremely problematic, not least because the Central Asian
states do not view each other with a great deal of affection. Rather, these states
often define themselves against their neighbors. A cultural and historical animosity, reinforced during Russian occupation, has created problems in Central
Asia’s intraregional relations today. In military and economic terms, the states
differ greatly, with Kazakhstan as the region’s economic engine and Uzbekistan
as the military strongman. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan lack the mineral energy
resources that often characterize many Central Asian states, but control the
water resources that are crucial for the rest of the region. Moreover, the strategic
views of the Central Asian states differ. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan tend to be
politically and culturally more aligned with Russia than with China compared
to the other Central Asian states.3 However, all of the states are interested in
diversifying their strategic alternatives and are actively seeking to multiply their
options independently of each other. Moreover, all the regional leaders have a
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Central Asia and Russian Relations
strong interest in keeping the authoritarian structures, something Russia and
China see no reason to change.
Background
Russia’s role in Central Asia remains a sensitive issue for the Central Asian states
due to Russia’s prolonged history as a colonizer in the region. Russia first took
control of Central Asia by force in the beginning of the 18th century. Thereafter,
Russia successfully disrupted regional identities and existing political structures.
Today the Russian language and, to a large extent, culture are embedded in each
Central Asian state. This, combined with a great distrust and fear between the
Central Asian states and China that dates back to early conflict between China
and the nomadic tribes, makes Russia the natural powerhouse in the region. The
connections at a cultural and linguistic level cannot be overestimated—even if
both the Chinese and English languages are rapidly gaining ground, their level
of penetration does rival the dominance of the Russian language.4 It is apparent
that the elite in Central Asia have a Russian bias culturally, but more importantly,
the connection goes much deeper and affects society at large in Central Asia
with strong cultural, linguistic, and historical connection among all walks of life.
Russia’s attempt to regain the military, economic, and political clout in what
Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev termed its “near abroad” (ближнее
зарубежье) in the early 1990s has been partially successful, especially in the
energy sector. To accomplish this, Russia has been trying to regain control of
much of the crucial transport infrastructure used for trade and the oil and gas
industry. Moreover, military cooperation between Russia and the Central Asian
states continues to be high; no other country approaches the level of security
cooperation that Russia has had with the region. In other areas, such as trade in
general, Russia’s position remains secondary to that of China, much to Russia’s
chagrin.5 China has taken a much larger role in the economic sector since 1991
and is since 2010 the largest trading partner with Central Asia (€23 billion)
after the EU (€21 billion) according to European Commission statistics.6 Taking into account the consumer goods that are not reported the picture is even
more accentuated, the World Bank estimates that China controls some 93–95
percent of the US$7 billion Bazaar trade.7 This is not entirely to the liking of
the Central Asian population at large, which has often clashed with the Chinese
traders whom they considered to have taken control over the economic sector
in their native states.
Moscow’s role in Central Asia is not just a question of trade figures and of-
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ficial numbers. Russia’s soft power, especially in terms of impact in the cultural,
societal, as well as other nonmilitary means, is notable in every corner of the
region. Most prominently, Russian is the regional lingua franca, and leaders often
speak better Russian than their local languages.8 Culturally many, at all levels
in the society, are closely connected to Russia, not least in music and literature.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many ethnic Russians departed
Central Asia to Russia, but most countries have small but significant pockets
Politically, the leaders of Central Asia have of Russians remaining. The
exception is Kazakhstan,
relied greatly on Russia to maintain and sus- which has a large Russian
tain the political systems that tend to be more minority that dominates the
northern part of the country;
authoritarian and somewhat dysfunctional. Kazakhstan’s officer corps
also tends to be ethnically Russian. In Tajikistan the Russian population declined
with roughly 85 percent, from 334,000 thousand in 1989 to 50,000 in 2007,
in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan they declined from 1,665,000 to 800,000 and
916,500 to 500,000 respectively.9 Peyrouse also points out that the Russian
minority in Kazakhstan has declined most in absolute numbers but still number
approximately 4,000,000 (from 6,227,000 in 1989).
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Politically, the leaders of the Central Asian states have relied greatly on Russia to maintain and sustain the political systems that tend to be more authoritarian, and—in the case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—somewhat dysfunctional.
At a time when authoritarian governments have been criticized in the United
States and Europe, Russia has been a staunch supporter of the ruling governments in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and has often come to the rescue in crises,
such as during Kyrgyzstan’s recent political change and Tajikistan’s civil war.
This policy has guaranteed Russia a great deal of influence in the region. For
example, military exercises between Russia and all Central Asian states, even if
Uzbekistan has been more reluctant than the other states, have often been more
similar to joint operations against domestic opposition in Central Asia rather
than operations against terrorists. The often weak and unpopular governments in
Central Asia know very well that without Russian support, their positions could
quickly become unstable. This is not only securing the authoritarian regimes in
Central Asia but also the Russian political and military clout in Central Asia.
Central Asia’s connection to its old master has made Russia a hub for some
three to four million Central Asian guest workers, many of whom live without
proper paperwork under harsh conditions.10 However, few alternatives exist for
these groups. Economic development in their homelands has been stagnant due
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Central Asia and Russian Relations
to weak economies and rampant corruption, as well as competition from Chinese
merchants and construction workers have been fierce. In fact, the remittances
from Central Asian workers in Russia are essential for local economies with many
villages relying upon them as their only legal income. Tajikistan is especially
exposed, there may be as many as one million Tajik labor migrants in Russia,
earning between 35 and 45 percent of the legal GDP.11 Moscow has repeatedly
called attention to these circumstances, using the threat of sending these workers
back to Central Asia as leverage whenever political relations go sour.12
The military field is the single area in which Russia retains significant
control compared to China and the United States. Despite some inroads from
Washington (military bases) and Beijing (weapon sales and exercises), Russia
houses an estimated 7,000 troops in Tajikistan, and maintains close military links
with Kazakhstan. These regional influences have proven strongest in terms of
weapons sales and the security leverage, particularly after the expected withdrawal
of foreign troops from Afghanistan. The committee for Military and Economic
Cooperation (ICMEC) forms part of the strategy for closer integration of the
military–industrial complexes in the region, a process highly subsidized by Russia.
ICMEC was created in 2005 to systematize cooperation in military technology
and make military integration more effective by controlling both purchases and
development of new technology, something that has not been fully realized due
to the suspicion the Central Asian states has shown toward Russia.
Such connections have given Russia sizable leverage. Even if there is a
decline in trade figures and military control, it might take centuries for Central
Asia to escape the Russian grip. However, the current trend has been a limitation
of Russia’s influence in the military areas. This has largely been due to Chinese
sales to the region and increased military cooperation with other states (such
as China) through bilateral trade as well as SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and the United States through Partnership for Peace initiative. As
such, it would seem to be difficult for Russia to return to its former position of
strength in the military sphere.
Regional Structures and Control
Central Asia has several regional organizations working to increase intraregional
trade as well as political and military cooperation. However, success in creating
effective regional structures has proven relatively modest. The utilization—or lack
thereof—of regional structures has been telling when it comes to Russia’s relative decline. Russia has been eager to establish multilateral ties with the Central
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Asian states (and excluding China, the EU, and the United States), particularly
in the energy field. However, thus far, Russia has found only limited success as
most cooperation has been bilateral. This has made multilateral cooperation in
the energy sector redundant as bilateral cooperation has taken precedent over
multilateral decision making, and regional organizations have failed to form a
truly regional structure in spite of some impressive paperwork that often is cited
as evidence of success. This has made it more difficult for Russia to establish a
regional energy structure that could strengthen their position over time.
Nevertheless, there have been a number of regional attempts with some
success that have aimed at strengthening Russian leverage over Central Asia,
such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991, the Eurasian
Economic Community (EEC or EurAsEC) in 2002, and the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002. These organizations were designed to
promote specifically Russian interests and have effectively circumvented any
involvement from other crucial actors such as China and the United States.
The SCO from 2001 (derived from the Shanghai Five from 1996) includes
China, but arguably initially only for the purpose of monitoring the Chinese
expansion into the region. The reality has become that the SCO has developed
a more independent role; this has increased the Chinese influence in the region
and for this reason Russian trust in the SCO has been limited.13 Russia has been
reluctant to allow the SCO to play a more direct role in the creation of true
multilateral structures because China has the leading role in this organization,
and if further developed the SCO could be seen as a competing organization
for CIS. For Russia, it seems that the most important purpose of the SCO is
to get an overview of the Chinese strategies and intentions in Central Asia and
retain the ability to counter them. However, the SCO has emerged as the most
interesting regional organization in Central Asia with the potential to establish
the multilateral structures that could make deep inroads into regional integration. However, at this time, it is evident that the most important decisions in
the region in relation to Russia are made bilaterally outside of the SCO or even
unilaterally. On the other hand, the Chinese intention is to create a more multilateral organization as it is perceived that this would be more effective in dealing
with Central Asia and would accommodate a more acceptable Chinese rise in
the region. China could then rely on the SCO rather than national strategies,
which could potentially be seen as threatening to the Central Asian states and
to Moscow that looks toward Beijing with great suspicion. Moreover, due to the
fact that most of the Central Asian states are small, it would be more effective
to deal with them multilaterally over time.
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Central Asia and Russian Relations
Apart from the SCO, the EEC has been active in trying to deepen economic integration multilaterally, and as one example, the Interstate Council of
the EEC has managed to ease some customs duties within the area. This has
increased sales of agricultural and consumer goods, but merchants in Central
Asia claim Russian goods are in increasingly short supply. The improvements
in the multilateral trade structures have been far from sufficient in countering
the low prices offered by China in both licit and illicit trade. Furthermore,
Moscow’s efforts to decrease the bottlenecks in trade with the Central Asian
markets has been hampered by problems at customs as well as by the issue of
the lack of complementary goods. Moreover, the very low GDP in Central Asia
has yielded limited Russian sales to Central Asia as consumers opt for cheaper
products, which are mainly Chinese.
CIS members account for only about 15 percent of Russian foreign trade,
in spite of strong verbal commitments from Russia to increase trade. China has
overtaken Russia as Central Asia’s largest trading partner even when taking into
account the energy resources still controlled by Russia. Military cooperation
through CIS and CSTO is still Russia’s single largest success in Central Asia,
partly due to the track dependency involved in military affairs but also to the
fact that Russia has been one of the few states willing to sell to the Central Asian
states with few limitations. Yet this is arguably a large drain on its resources because Russia currently has major difficulties in replenishing its own accounts and
does not have extensive financial resources to spend in Central Asia. Moreover,
Moscow lacks a clear and unified vision about the future of regional structures
such as CSTO and CIS, which cripples the potential of these organizations.14
As noted before, the military exercises are crucial for the Central Asian governments since these will both train them for possible domestic unrest and secure
Russian support to counter such events. This was particularly noticeable after
the Tsentr-2011 exercises, which involved 12,000 mostly Russian soldiers.
Although publicly presented as an antiterrorist exercise, it had all the characteristics (in terms of armament, size of the troops, and strategy) of fighting a
more traditional conflict, potentially aimed at securing friendly governments in
the region. Neither the exercises in themselves nor their political outcome have
been very clear among the participating states, leading to distrust among some
of the smaller states concerned about aggression from more powerful states, not
least of all Russia.
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Energy and Economic Control
108
In the energy field, the success of regional attempts has been limited. Despite
some serious Russian efforts to coordinate energy relations, the Central Asian
states have vigorously resisted, often with the tacit support of China and Iran.
Nevertheless, Russia has been important in the energy sector, largely due to its
earlier monopoly over oil and gas transit routes. However, Russia’s monopoly in
the energy sector has ended and today the situation is much more diverse—in
terms of buyers, sellers, and transport—than it has ever been.
Russian trade with Central Asia has significantly decreased relative to other
actors over time. This has especially been the case since 2007 when the trade
decline accelerated as financial crisis hit the international community.15 China
has been able to offer commodities of equal or better quality at a substantially
lower price compared to those produced in Russia. Today the volume of Chinese
trade—even taking weapons sales and the energy sector into account—is roughly
10 to 15 percent larger than the Russian volume of trade, according to various
and greatly differing estimates.16 The same trend is apparent when considering
loans to the Central Asian states. Foreign governments have promised a great deal
to the Central Asian governments from foreign states, but relatively few loans
have been implemented. This is a product of both a lack of engagement and the
failure of the Central Asian governments to fulfill the terms of the agreements.
China has also emerged in this capacity as the primary actor and over time it
has become apparent that Russia simply does not have the economic strength
to back its promises. The reduced level of trade with Russia is due to the simple
fact that many of the potential exports from Russia to Central Asia are similar
and lack complementary goods.
This picture of Russian failure is flawed, however, because Russia is still
crucial in some of the key industries, especially in the energy sector. Russia has
been eager to continue to controlling exports from the Central Asian states—
not because Moscow needs the extra oil and gas imports but rather because it
wants to re-export the petroleum for a profit. The Central Asian energy market
has in fact sustained the Russian market with low-cost energy while sales to
Europe are made at much higher prices. For example, Russia imports gas from
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan at prices as low as $100 per 1,000 cubic meters,
but Russia sells gas of the same quality for as much as $250 per 1,000 cubic
meters in the West.17 This is a trend that has neither benefitted the producers nor
consumers. As a result, Central Asian governments have chaffed at this policy,
as these governments have realized the potential benefit of avoiding Russia as a
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Central Asia and Russian Relations
transit route. Increasingly, Chinese, European, and Central Asian governments
are interested in developing alternatives to today’s most-used energy infrastructure and security agreements, which are controlled by Russia.
The control over the pipeline system and the energy trade, in general, reinforces the Russian desire to reconnect with the region politically and militarily,
even if at a more modest level than in the past. The reasoning behind this lies
in the fact that the region is an important source of income for Russia. The
substantial markup on energy product resale to Europe imported from Central
Asia is one of the driving factors for Russian interest in the region today. A primary motive for the Russian strategy in Central Asia has been to prevent any
attempts to circumvent Russia’s control over Central Asian energy sales, such as
the Trans-Caspian, Nabucco, Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India, and
Trans-Anatolian pipelines.18 Moscow has applied significant pressure to prevent
circumvention. As a result, Turkmenistan has temporarily turned its back on
the Southern Corridor Energy Projects even though China, Iran and Europe
have pushed for a more diversified energy network that would avoid Russia to
a significant degree.19
It would be naïve to assume that Russia has no political motives behind its
control of the pipeline structures. The country has openly asserted that it is ready
109
to use either military or economic force to preserve its control. Foreign Minister
Lavrov has even publicly threatened to use “every conceivable economic pressure
tactic” against uncooperative CIS governments, something that sounds more
alarming after the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008.20 Not even Kazakhstan,
the single largest economy in Central Asia, is free from Russian pressure. The
bulk of its energy exports
are still linked to Russia, It would be naïve to assume that Russia has
as it either still depends on no political motives behind its control of the
the Russian distribution
pipeline structures. The country has openly
system or exports directly
to Russia.21 Impressive and asserted that it is ready to use either military
much-discussed Chinese or economic force to preserve its control.
investments in new pipelines
are still limited in scope compared to the old and reinforced Russian structures.
In terms of Tajikistan, and to a certain degree Kyrgyzstan, Russia is not only
the main supplier of energy (it provides more than 80 percent), but also clearly
has tied this to the security situation by demanding concessions of Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan in stationing Russian troops and excluding foreign troops.22
Moreover, Russia finances the crucial hydroelectric power plants in Tajikistan
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(Sangtuda) and Kyrgyzstan (Kambarata), further tying these Central Asian states
politically to the Russian energy orbit.
Russia’s strategies to control energy have decreased internal trade among
the Central Asian states such that today there is very low intraregional energy
trade. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan are now primarily exporting
their energy products out of the CIS and EEC area (apart from Russia). In turn,
Russia provides energy for the states—Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—that lack
energy. Moreover, consumer trade between the Central Asian states is notably
low because they are competing against rather than complementing each other
due to the lack of economic diversification in Central Asia. This intraregional
drawback has propelled Russia and China into the region’s the primary trading
partners. If the Central Asian states are serious about decreasing their dependency
on Russia and China, intraregional trade must increase and the infrastructure
will need to be improved. However, it would seem to be unrealistic to expect
this in the short term due to the reluctance of Russia and China to allow new
actors into the region, problematic government structures, and an investment
climate that is far from secure.
110
Future Role of Russia
When talking about Central Asia and foreign interest it is worth noting that
Central Asia is relatively unimportant for all its neighbors as all have their primary
interest directed toward different regions. Despite substantial energy resources
and a geostrategic position in Central Asia, there is very little interest in the
region. Furthermore, policies toward Central Asia have been more reactive than
proactive—something that severely underestimates the importance of Central
Asia, not least if one or several countries would implode and serve as a regional
point of destabilization. This has made policies toward Central Asia relatively
safe to mismanage. Even if a repetition of the 1991 failure to act in Central Asia
was repeated it would have little resonance in Moscow. There is a perception
among many in Moscow, especially the Europe-friendly people, that the costs
of engaging Central Asia are higher than the potential worth.
China has taken over much of the traditional role of Russia in the economic area. Russia is unlikely to reemerge as the most important producer of
consumer goods due in large part to its own economic weakness, with a devastating population decline that threatens the very economic base, rampant corruption, and unsound political initiatives that limits the personal freedom and
socioeconomic improvements for the population at large.23 Moreover, in many
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Central Asia and Russian Relations
other areas (not least in the energy sector but also in the military and political
fields) China has made important inroads in Russia’s traditional monopoly, and
this is likely to continue. To make things worse for Russia, new economic actors
such as the United States, South Korea, Japan, the European Union, and India
have increased their political and economic clout in Central Asia at the expense
of Russia. Sino–European trade would benefit greatly from establishing direct
landlines over Central Asia, and the Central Asian states themselves would benefit
by collecting transit fees from the trade. This trade development has been and
will continue to be positive for the economic and political independence of the
Central Asian states. Such diversification not only creates political independence
but also yields higher returns on natural resources, particularly in the energy
sector. Russia has done a great deal, with quite some success, to prevent this
process, such as actively working against alternative pipeline structures and tying
producers up against Russia. However, even if Russia will continue to be crucial
to the energy sector in the region for a long time to come, a more diverse policy
is being initiated that will decrease its influence over time.
All of this is not necessarily bad for Russia, which will benefit from greater
regional competitiveness, increased GDP, stability, and higher-quality goods and
products. However, as the Russian monopoly is increasingly challenged, not least
by Europe and China, Moscow will see its opportunities to control and benefit
from forwarding oil and gas to other states in Europe decline. Turkmenistan
and Kazakhstan are leading the economic break with Russia while Uzbekistan
leads the military break (even though Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are to some
degree orbiting back into the Russian embrace due to their own fear of China
and their need to rely on Russia for internal security).
This development will not in any way force Russia out of Central Asia.
Moscow will continue to be a centerpiece in the region (if not the most important
actor) for the Central Asian states in the years to come. This is particularly due
to the cultural clout it has and continues to have because of the high numbers
of guest workers, infrastructural ties, and military cooperation. Russia is the only
state that the governments in Central Asia trust in terms of political and military
security and the presence will secure some of the more authoritarian regimes.
A great deal of effort is given both from Russia and the Central Asian states
to strengthen these military and political ties. Neither Russia nor the Central
Asian governments would like to see a change of the current political system,
whether in democratic or religious terms. It is difficult to see Russia leaving
Central Asia as it did in 1991 without actively making the decision itself. Even
so, the linguistic and cultural influence will remain for a long time to come.
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This said, Russia’s role has decreased over time, and it is now only one of many
strong actors in Central Asia. China has now taken over many of the roles that
Russia once played, including that of being feared and distrusted. WA
Notes
112
1. Dmitri Trenin, “What Russian Empire?” New York Times, August 23, 2011; Dmitri Trenin, “The
Russian Empire is Gone for Good,” Globalist, May 7, 2012.
2. Niklas Swanström, “Transformation of the Sino–Russian Relationship: From Cold War to the Putin
Era,” in Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or Partnership for China, Russia, and Central Asia?,
ed. Robert Bedeski and Niklas Swanström (London: Routledge, 2012).
3. “The Next Stage of Russia’s Resurgence: Central Asia,” Stratfor, February 11, 2012, http://www.
stratfor.com/sample/analysis/next-stage-russias-resurgence-central-asia.
4. Jos Boonstra, “Russia and Central Asia: From Disinterest to Eager Leadership,” FRIEDE, October
2008, http://www.fride.org/publication/519/russia-and-central-asia:-from-disinterest-to-eager-leadership.
5. James Brooke, “China Displaces Russia in Central Asia,” Voice of America, June 15, 2010.
6. The trade statistics are notoriously unreliable and each country has their own figures that differ from
the other statistics. See, Niklas Swanström, China and Greater Central Asia: New Frontiers (Stockholm:
Silk Road Papers, Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2011).
7. Bartlomiej Kaminski and Saumya Mitra, Borderless Bazaars and Regional Integration in Central Asia
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2012).
8. “Russia’s Interests in Central Asia Not to Be Ignored,” RT, April 13, 2011, http://rt.com/politics/
russias-interests-foreign-ministry.
9. Sebastien Peyrouse, The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics, and Language, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Occasional Paper No. 297 (2008), 4.
10. Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Twilight World of Central Asian Migrants, April 27, 2011,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dbfa43bc.html.
11. “Tajikistan’s Lack of Private Business Unsustainable,” ADB, Eurasianet, April 12, 2012, http://
www.eurasianet.org/node/65261.
12. Konstatin Parshin, “Tajikistan: Moscow Trying to Send Dushanbe into Nosedive,” Eurasianet
November 15, 2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64516.
13. Robert Bedeski and Niklas Swanström, eds. Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or
Partnership for China, Russia, and Central Asia? (London: Routledge, 2012).
14. Joshua Kucera, “Russia: Moscow Strives to Clarify Vision for Central Asian Alliance,” Eurasianet,
September 30, 2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64248.
15. Swanström, China and Greater Central Asia, 45.
16. The figures differ greatly between different statistics, but the trend is evident in all statistical analysis:
Russia is declining in a relative perspective and greatly to the favor of China.
17. Scott Frickenstein, “The Resurgence of Russian Interests in Central Asia,” Air and Space Power
Journal (Air Force Research Institute, Spring 2010): 67–74.
18. Robert Cutler, “Trans-Caspian Pipeline Pact to Energize EU Gas Project,” Asia Times, March 23,
2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/NC23Ag02.html; Pepe Escobar, “Russia Rules Piplineistan”, Asia Times, March 23, 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/NC23Ag04.html.
19. Catherine Fitzpatrick, “Turkmenistan Asks for Help in Building East–West Pipeline,” Eurasianet,
November 21, 2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64550.
20. Stephen Blank, “The Strategic Importance of Central Asian: An American View,” Parameters 38,
no. 1 (Spring 2008); Frickenstein, “Resurgence of Russian Interests,” 67–74.
21. “The Next Stage of Russia’s Resurgence: Central Asia,” Stratfor, February 11, 2012, http://www.
stratfor.com/sample/analysis/next-stage-russias-resurgence-central-asia.
22. “Tajikistan: Russia Uses Energy to Elicit Security Concessions,” Stratfor, September 14, 2011.
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Central Asia and Russian Relations
23. Nicolas Eberstadt, “The Dying Bear: Russia’s Demographic Disaster, Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (2009):
95–108; Walter Kego, Internationally Organized Crime: The Escalation of Crime within the Global Economy,
Institute for Security and Development Policy, March 2009.
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