Democratic Attitudes and Political Participation:
An Exploratory Comparison across World Regions
Michael Bratton (Michigan State University)
Paper prepared for the Congress of the International Political Science Association,
Santiago, Chile, July 2009.
The globalization of democratic ideals begs interesting research questions. To
what extent do popular attachments to democracy vary across the world? What regional
differences are observable in mass political behaviors? Are democratic attitudes and political
participation related? If so, how strongly? And – in terms of causes and effects – which comes
first?
The literature on these topics is nascent, fragmented, and inconclusive. The
major contribution to date has been the wave of studies based on the remarkable time series from
World Values Survey (WVS), soon to cover a thirty-year period across multiple continents.
Although the WVS probes deeply into subjective political, economic and religious values, it has
relatively little to say about objective political behavior.1 Moreover, Inglehart and colleagues
subsume political participation as one dimension of "self-expression values," which is a
syndrome of interpersonal trust, tolerance and political activism that contributes to the emergence
and survival of democracy. Finally, analysis of so-called “world” values tends to privilege
similarity over difference; the distinctive features of the world’s various geographical, economic
and cultural regions is downplayed in favor of a single “human development sequence” (Inglehart
and Welzel 2005).
The Global Barometer Surveys (GBS) have a separate set of strengths and
weaknesses. Based on stand-alone barometer surveys for various world regions – East Asia,
South Asia, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Arab Middle East – the GBS probes
public opinion on the performance of political regimes and has more to say about mass action. So
far, however, the GBS contains only a small module of common questions. In depth-analysis is
mainly possible within world regions, as illustrated by recent books and reports on how Africans,
Asians and Latin Americans independently and contextually approach democracy (e.g. Bratton,
Mattes and Gyimah Boadi 2005; Chu, Diamond, Nathan and Shin 2008; Corporacion
Latinobarometro 2009). Exploratory efforts have only just begun to test prospective “global”
generalizations about voter turnout, popular conceptions of democracy, and the sources of
democratic legitimacy (Bratton, Chu and Lagos, 2006; Dalton, Shin and Jou 2007; Chu et al
2008; see also Diamond and Plattner 2008).
Predictably enough, research to date suggests that democratic attitudes and
democratic behaviors are related. But we know little about precisely which attitudes are
connected to exactly which behaviors. Most importantly, the causal direction is unclear. As
Brady, Verba and Schlozman have put it, “political interest and political efficacy certainly
facilitate political activity, but activity presumably enhances interest and efficacy as well.” This
chicken-and-egg dilemma has usually been addresses at the macro-level using aggregate country
data. For example, following Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart (1990) asserts that civic
1
Under the heading “political action,” the 2005 WVS data set available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org
lists variables measuring only petition-signing, boycotting and demonstrating, which hardly exhausts the
range of possible participatory acts.
culture is a precursor of democracy; by contrast, Muller and Seligson (1994) prefer to see cultural
values as “a learned response to the experience of living in country that has a democratic
regime”(635). The few studies that have searched for causality at the micro-level tend to confirm
that mass democratic attitudes are learned from participatory behavior, rather than vice-versa
(Finkel 1987; Bratton et al 2005). Given the availability of new survey data, the time should be
right to settle this matter definitively across more than one country or world region.
Based on GBS data, this research note offers a preliminary description of popular
democratic attitudes and mass participatory behaviors from several world regions. To the limited
extent that one analyst is able to do so (and I emphasize that this is a binding constraint), the
paper selectively proposes interpretations of these results. In general, I find that an individual’s
democratic commitments are linked to various aspects of political participation, though less
consistently and more weakly than might be expected. Using an exploratory test, the paper
proposes that political behavior seems to drive political attitudes, all the while recognizing that
the relationship between attitudes and behavior is deeply endogenous. A key caveat is that
analysts must standardize data collection efforts before the question about causal direction can be
resolved. As such, this paper can be read as an agenda for the further development of the Global
Barometers project.
Barometer Surveys: How “Global”?
We have come a long way since the idea of merging regional public opinion
surveys into a “global barometer” was first mooted. Initially, when the Africa and East Asia
Barometers were just getting started, and the South Asia and Arab Barometers were still in the
planning stages, each regional survey team learned extensively from the experiences of our
colleagues who had launched comparative survey projects in Latin America and Eastern Europe.
In time, we expanded our ambitions to include cross-continental comparison, which required the
development of a common module of core questions for inclusion in each regional instrument. I
won’t pretend that reaching consensus on the content and format of the core module has been
easy; understandably, each regional team has its own research priorities, preferred questions, and
sunk costs in particular item wordings and response categories.
Nevertheless, by 2005 we had converged on a module of 50 items and 83
variables centered on attitudes to democracy, institutional trust, political participation, media
exposure, economic evaluations, and respondent demographics. While many questionnaire items
are identical – in both wording and response set – others are at least functionally equivalent. The
module has been applied in 55 countries across five world regions: East Asia, South Asia, Latin
America, sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab Middle East (see Table 1). As of July 2009, the GBS
has gone “on line” with an accessible data analysis tool that enables users, even those without
statistical software, to produce basic descriptive statistics – marginals, crosstabs, graphics – for
the various countries. This paper employs this data set, though the analysis (starting with a
grouping of countries into “world regions”) goes beyond what can be accomplished “on line.”
Despite progress in data collection, much remains undone in the quest for reliable
cross-national generalization about public opinion. We still have work to do in improving
sampling, extending coverage, standardizing survey items, confirming conceptual equivalences,
and gradually expanding the module in order to allow greater degrees of analytic freedom. In this
section of the paper, I identify additional issues that arise in trying to conduct a cross-region
comparison of democratic attitudes and mass political participation. The intent is to seek
solutions, not attribute blame. And, as a member of the GBS group, I must include myself in any
criticisms.
2
Table 1: Global Barometer Surveys:
Country Coverage by World Region
East
Asia
South
Asia
(9)
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Mongolia
Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam
(5)
Bangladesh
India
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Latin
America
(17)
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Sub-Saharan
Africa
(18)
Benin
Botswana
Cape Verde
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Middle
East
(6)
Algeria
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Morocco
Palestine
Source: GBS data set posted at www.jdssurvey.net/gbs
Horizontal Coverage. Although Global Barometer surveys aim at comprehensive
coverage, not all questions are asked across all countries. As Table 2 shows, whole world regions
are excluded from numerous key items. For the purposes of the present study, the GBS data set
includes seven items mapping democratic attitudes and eight items pertaining to political
participation. But data are available for all five regions for only three of these items: support for
democracy, rejection of strongman rule, and participation in protest demonstrations (see shaded
cells). The gaps in participation are especially debilitating, since protest action is an
unconventional form of participation; it would have been far preferable, for example to have
complete data on voting. With information available for only 76 percent of the cells in Table 2,
analysts continue to confront substantial problems of missing data.
Vertical Coverage. Ideally, barometer surveys test the political and economic
atmosphere at a common moment in time. But, as Table 3 reveals, the current GBS data set
draws on survey results that stretch over a full five years from the onset of Round 1 of the East
Asia Barometer in 2001 to the conclusion of Round 3 of the Afrobarometer in 2006. As such,
any attempt to compare these two world regions should take into account changes in the global
environment that occurred during this long interval, including the 9/11 attack on the World Trade
Center, the resultant “war on terror,” and an emergent period of economic growth in Africa. One
can easily imagine an alternate interval covering the onset of the global financial crisis in late
2007 that could easily skew comparisons across “pre-” and “post-crisis” surveys. Thus, in order
to minimize the effects of time, the GBS must strive for greater simultaneity in data collection.
3
Table 2: Global Barometer Surveys:
Availability of Data on Democratic Attitudes and Political Participation
(“Horizontal Coverage” by Region)
East
Asia
South
Asia
Democratic Attitudes
Meaning of Democracy
Characteristics of Democracy
Support for Democracy
Rejection of Strongman Rule
Rejection of Military Rule
Satisfaction with Democracy
Suitability of Democracy
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Political Participation
Interested in politics
Discuss politics
Belong to voluntary organization
Voted in last election
Contacted government official
Contacted elected official
Contacted traditional leader
Protested or demonstrated
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Latin
America
X
X
X
X
X
X
X = data available (76 percent of cells)
Highlight indicates questions for which data are available for five world regions
Source: GBS data set posted at www.jdssurvey.net/gbs
Table 3: Global Barometer Surveys:
Availability of Data
(“Vertical Coverage” Over Time)
Date of Survey
2001-2
2003
2005
2005
2005-6
Source: GBS data set posted at www.jdssurvey.net/gbs
4
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
East Asia
Latin America
South Asia
Middle East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle
East
X
X
X
X
X
World Region
SubSaharan
Africa
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Data Weights. Although the unit of analysis in GB surveys is the individual
citizen, GBS data sets contain higher-level composites – countries and regions – of vastly
different population sizes (ranging from under half a million in Cape Verde to over a billion in
India). How then should these units be weighted for purposes of making descriptive
comparisons? Consider four alternative schemes for weighting world regions:
(a) Simply use the raw data. But because GBS covers more countries in some regions than in
others, regional sample sizes are highly unequal. Thus the raw data over-represent sub-Saharan
Africa (with over 25,000 cases) and under-represent the Middle East (with under 7000 cases).
(b) Standardize sub-sample sizes. By weighting all regions (e.g. at a mean of 16,400 cases) we
could ensure that each region is represented equally within the sample. But this is a somewhat
artificial solution, since it assumes that regions with small populations (like the Middle East) have
equal influence on “global” generalizations as regions with vast populations (like South Asia).
(c) Based on this concern, a better solution is to weight world regions according to their relative
preponderance in the GBS sample. By this criterion, South Asians represents some 46 percent of
the current GBS universe and Middle Easterners just 3 percent. Recognizing that any weighting
scheme involves a tradeoff, I nevertheless chose this “GBS population weight” as the operating
norm for the analysis that follows.
(d) A fourth solution, not attempted here, would be to weight world regions by their share of total
world population. By this criterion, East Asia would account for 38 percent, South Asia for 29
percent, and Middle East for 7 percent. Although this distribution might seem attractive, it
neglects the fact that the current GBS data set (though not all GBS surveys) excludes China, East
Asia’s population behemoth. More importantly, it would give the false impression that countries
presently included in the GBS data set were chosen because they somehow “represent” their
regions. As the more open societies in their regions (i.e. those amenable to reliable survey
research), they clearly do not.
Table 4 illustrates the consequential effects of various weighting schemes on
“global” point estimates of public opinion. Take popular support for democracy. Without
weights, some 57 percent of individuals interviewed express support, compared to 59 percent
under equal weights and 52 percent using the preferred “GBS population weight.” I would argue
that a realistic estimate of mass support for democracy must represent the population from which
it was sampled. As we will see in the next section, the fact that South Asians express less
support for democracy than the citizens of other world regions tends to pull down the “global”
point estimate.
Table 4: Support for Democracy:
Comparison of “Global” Point Estimates by Weighting Scheme
Prefer democracy
Prefer non-democracy
Doesn’t matter
Refused to answer
No
Weight1
Equal Weight
by
World Region2
GBS
Population
Weight3
Global
Population
Weight4
56.9
26.9
15.3
0.7
59.4
25.9
13.8
0.9
52.0
27.9
19.4
0.6
54.1
27.7
17.5
0.7
5
Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
A. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government
B. In some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferable
C. For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have
1.
Raw data for five world regions (N= 82,017), with sample sizes ranging from n = 6,940 (Middle
East) to n = 25,387 (sub-Saharan Africa)
2. Five world regions standardized at n = 16,400 cases per region (N = 82,000)
3. Regions distributed by relative population size in a 55-country Global Barometer data set
(N= 82,000)
4. Regions distributed by relative share in world population (N = 91,974)
How “Global”? Beyond technical considerations, the quest for “global”
generalizations raises concerns about concepts and interpretations. One risk is conceptual
stretching. Especially in relation to subjective notions like “support for democracy,” but even
with regard to more objective indicators of political participation, we must ensure that analysts
and respondents alike, regardless of their region of origin, attach the same meanings to the same
concepts. As Richard Rose notes, to ignore the context of attitude formation and political
behavior, “replaces the minor problem of missing data with the major problem of missing
concepts” (2007, 297). Another risk is interpretive ignorance. Curtice (2007, quoting Jowell
1998) comments that, “the larger the number of countries included, the greater the likelihood that
those who attempt to analyze the resulting data do not have sufficient understanding of the social,
political, economic and cultural attributes of each country to be able to interpret the data
sensitively and sensibly” (2007, 900-1). The danger is that the extension of the reach of
barometer surveys on a global scale and the publication of data sets in convenient on-line formats
may “encourage the user(s) to analyze data from countries (or regions) about which he or she may
know little or nothing” (903). Teamwork is a good solution, with analysis conducted by teams
containing experts, preferably nationals, of each region covered. Until then, modesty is the best
default position for analysts of global barometer data. In short, unless fortified with deep
understanding of country and regional contexts, global generalizations are risky.
Attitudes to Democracy
This section of the paper, as summarized in Table 5, describes attitudes to
democracy, drawing attention to major regional differences. Let us discuss each attitude in turn.
Meaning of Democracy. Democracy is a meaningful concept to most citizens.
When asked an open-ended question – “what, if anything, does democracy mean to you?” (or
words to that effect) – 68 percent can offer a substantive definition of the term. Note, however,
that only a minority – 42 percent – is able to propose more than one meaning for this complex
concept. Two additional caveats are in order. First, the “global” mean is a crude estimate,
constricted as it is by the absence of data from Latin America and the Middle East in the present
version of the GBS data set.2 And, second, there are large cross-regional differences in the
popular grasp of the meaning of democracy, ranging from 80 percent in East Asia to 47 percent in
2
The meaning of democracy question was apparently not asked in the 2003 Latinobarometro or 2005 Arab
Barometer, though it was asked in Latinobarometro 2001as “To you, what does ‘democracy’ mean? What
else?” (Dalton et al. 2008, 13)
6
South Asia. This stark regional gap might close if other countries, notably China, are added to
the East Asian sub-sample.3
The most common meaning of democracy – after “don’t know” (40 percent) – is
a regime of civil liberties, which includes freedom of speech, freedom of association, and
freedom in general (19 percent). Fewer than 5 percent respond to the open-ended question by
referring to democracy as a regime of social rights or economic development. This common
pattern of shared meaning across all world regions offers a prima facie justification for
proceeding, at least cautiously, with comparative analysis of other survey questions that employ
the word “democracy.”
Table 5: Attitudes to Democracy, by World Region
Democratic Attitudes
Meaning of Democracy1
Characteristics of Democracy2
Support for Democracy3
Rejection of Strongman Rule4
Rejection of Military Rule5
Satisfaction with Democracy6
Suitability of Democracy7
East
Asia
South
Asia
80
18
57
72
79
62
78
47
29
44
26
53
45
64
Latin
America
SubSaharan
Africa
Middle
East
“GLOBAL”
MEAN
75
54
78
28
63
76
73
46
15
79
78
61
Source: GBS data set posted at www.jdssurvey.net/gbs , with GBS population weight
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Percentage of respondents who can offer a meaning to the term “democracy” (first response)
Percentage of respondents who associate democracy with the fulfillment of basic needs
Percentage of respondents who “prefer democracy”
Percentage of respondents who reject rule by a strong leader who “decides everything”
Percentage of respondents who reject the prospect that “the army comes in to govern the country”
Percentage of respondents who are “fairly satisfied” or “very satisfied”
Percentage of respondents who think that democracy is a “suitable” form of government for their
country.
Characteristics of Democracy. In a puzzling contradiction, however, the rank
order of responses changes once a related question about the characteristics of democracy is
posed in a closed-ended format. When asked to choose from a preset list of options, citizens
place socioeconomic characteristics above political ones. On average, they associate democracy
with the following, in priority order: (a) basic necessities like food, clothing and shelter (28
percent); (b) a small income gap between rich and poor (25 percent); (c) opportunity to change
the government through elections (21 percent); and (d) freedom to criticize those in power (8
percent). The tendency toward economic instrumentalism is most marked in South Asia and least
so in the Middle East (note: this question was not asked sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America).
But the large population share of the South Asian countries in the GB sample skews the “global”
3
Chu et al. (2008) report that, in 2001, only 65 percent of respondents in China could offer an answer to a
“cognitively demanding question” phrased as “What does democracy mean to you?” China excluded from
the current GBS data set apparently for reasons other than the availability of data.
7
68
28
52
52
63
46
67
mean: in both East Asia and the Middle East, citizens prioritize electoral choice above the
provision of basic needs in terms of what they expect from democracy.
Support for Democracy. Just over half (52 percent) of the 82,000 citizens
interviewed in GB surveys express support for democracy. The prompt is a standard question
about whether democracy or “a non-democratic government” is preferable, with a third optional
response being “it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.” The “global” mean for
support for democracy is relatively reliable in the sense that it is based on data for all five of the
world’s regions. If it seems unexpectedly low, this outcome is again partly due to the suppressive
effects of the heavily weighted South Asian cases, where almost one-third (31 percent) either
“don’t know” what kind of regime they prefer or say that, “it doesn’t matter.” Nonetheless, the
GB data reveal an unusually strong popular yearning for democracy in regions where political
freedoms are largely lacking, such as sub-Saharan Africa (63 percent) and the Middle East (79
percent).
Rejection of Strongman Rule. Of course, it is all too easy for respondents to pay
lip service to support for democracy, a universal ideal. To test the depth of popular regime
commitments, it is important therefore to explore whether self-professed democrats also detach
themselves from authoritarian regimes. Majorities in all three regions studied (East Asia, South
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa) concur that the army should stay in the barracks rather than
“coming in to govern the country.” But people from various regions disagree on the desirability
of government by a “strong leader” in civilian garb. The main contrast here is between South
Asia, where barely one quarter reject strongman rule, and the other four regions, where about
three quarters do so. South Asians apparently associate democracy with weak leadership and
harbor a deep nostalgia for effective political management that can demonstrably get things done.
Satisfaction with Democracy. We now turn to a concrete question about popular
satisfaction with “the way democracy (actually) works” in each country. On average, fewer than
half (46 percent) of all adults interviewed across 55 countries are satisfied – either “fairly” or
“very” – with the performance of their elected regimes. In this regard, Africans (46 percent) and
South Asians (45 percent) are typical of the prevailing “global” norm. East Asians are unusual,
not only because more than half express satisfaction with democracy, but also because more of
them are satisfied than supportive. In this regard, the performance of the regime apparently
exceeds low expectations about what democracy can deliver. Latin Americans display an
opposite set of characteristics. They are only half as satisfied as supportive, which suggests that
the performance of democratic regimes in this region have fallen well short of (perhaps
excessively) high expectations.
The Suitability of Democracy. Finally, do citizens consider that democracy is
suitable, given the existing level of political development of their countries? In other words, do
they feel that local circumstances are ripe to adopt democracy? A question on this topic was
asked in only three regions, excluding sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Responses were
consistently positive, ranging from 61 percent in the Middle East to 78 percent in East Asia. On
average, two-thirds of all respondents in three world regions say that they find democracy
“suitable.” Thus, notwithstanding diverse cultural legacies and levels of economic development,
citizens of different regions apparently share a readiness to try democracy on for size.
8
Political Participation
Popular political values alone do not a democracy make. In addition to studying
attitudes, analysts must also ask whether citizens also behave politically in ways that reinforce
and deepen democratic procedures and institutions. Do people actually take advantage of new
opportunities for political action that a democratic regime supposedly offers?
Conventionally defined, political participation consists of “legal activities by
private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government
personnel and the actions they take” (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978, 46). As previously indicated,
this paper takes a broad view political participation: it includes showing an interest in politics,
discussing politics with others, and joining protest demonstrations; and it centers on conventional
core activities like voting, joining voluntary organizations, and contacting political officials.
With reference to Table 6, these activities are now discussed in the order they tend to occur in any
open, democratic society.
Table 6: Political Participation, by World Region
East
Asia
Political Participation
Interested in politics1
Discuss politics2
Belong voluntary organization3
Voted in last election4
Contacted government official5
Contacted elected official6
Contacted traditional leader7
Protested or demonstrated8
51
67
33
82
31
19
29
4
South
Asia
44
56
81
28
18
Latin
America
SubSaharan
Africa
Middle
East
“GLOBAL”
MEAN
73
28
66
69
80
74
11
10
22
14
40
61
50
51
79
24
15
25
14
14
17
54
7
5
6
27
Source: GBS data set posted at www.jdssurvey.net/gbs, with GBS population weight
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Percentage of respondents who say they are “somewhat interested” or “very interested”
Percentage of respondents who claim to discuss politics “occasionally” or “frequently”
Percentage of respondents who claim membership in a voluntary, including religious, association
Percentage who say that they turned out to vote in the last national-level election
Percentage reporting contact with a government official during the past year
Percentage reporting contact with an elected official during the past year
Percentage reporting contact with a traditional leader during the past year
Percentage of respondents who say they have participated in a protest or demonstration.
Interest in Politics. As a prerequisite for autonomous participation in the political
process, an individual must first evince an interest in politics. A count of those who say they are
“somewhat interested “ or “very interested” in politics puts Latin Americans at the forefront (73
percent), with Middle Easterners lagging behind (40 percent), perhaps reflecting the relative
openness of political processes and the availability of opportunities for participation in each of
these regions. By these criteria, however, one would expect East Asians to convey more interest
than Africans, which is not the case (51 percent versus 66 percent). It seems likely, therefore,
that the openness of society interacts with the intensity of political grievances in determining
9
actual levels of political interest. The fact that, as we have seen, East Asians express much
higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than Africans – or especially Latin Americans –
lends credence to this interpretation.
Political Discussion. Interest in politics usually prompts people to engage in
political discourse. In three world regions (Middle East, Africa and East Asia), the proportions of
citizens who take part in political discussions with family, friends, neighbors and workmates
closely parallel the proportions that express a sense of intellectual engagement. But Latin
America appears to be an anomaly: whereas almost three quarters express interest, just over one
quarter reports entering discussions; fully 71 percent say they “never” discuss politics. Unless
there is a simple technical reason (for example a coding error in the GBS data set), this
disconnection demands interpretation. Why do people in this region, including those who are
cognitively predisposed to be active interlocutors, apparently feel constrained to engage in open
political discussion?
Organizational Membership. Civil society is a common portal into public
activism. Voluntary organizations not only serve as venues of political discussion but, as interest
groups, they project popular preferences, often in aggregate form, into the political process.
Joining with others in a voluntary association, therefore, is itself an act of political participation.
Yet the “global” mean value, which shows about half (51 percent) of all survey respondents
engaging in this form of collective action, may be somewhat misleading. The reason is that there
is a wider range in organizational membership across world regions than for any other indicator
of participation. Whereas 80 percent of Africans claim to belong to a voluntary group – usually a
church, mosque or religious sect – only 17 percent of Middle Easterners say the same thing.
Since it would be hard to argue that Middle Easterners are less pious than Africans, one is forced
to conclude that the people of these regions must have very different views about what it means
to “join” a religious association.
Voting. Even though voting lies at the heart of political participation in a
democracy, different approaches to measuring voter turnout yield divergent results. Invariably,
survey respondents over-report their electoral participation as compared to the official statistics
produced by electoral management bodies. The Global Barometer surveys indicate a “global”
mean of 79 percent who voted in their country’s last election, a high level that implies inflated
responses. Indeed, a comparison with a standard source reveals that a systematic margin of overreporting in three world regions, ranging from 11 percentage points in East Asia to 17 percentage
points in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.4 These discrepancies should be born in mind when
comparing descriptive statistics across world regions, especially with the Middle East, where
over-reporting was negligible (just 2 percentage points). As long as over-reporting is randomly
distributed among democrats and non-democrats, however, then self-reported voter turnout may
be used as an acceptable proxy in preliminary efforts to explain possible linkages between
democratic attitudes and political participation.
Contacting Leaders. In periods between elections in representative democracies,
citizens attempt to stay involved in politics by contacting political leaders. On average, only
about a quarter of survey respondents report making such contacts in the past year, though levels
4
Official turnout was measured as total votes cast divided by voting-age population in the last
parliamentary election before 2002 (International IDEA, 2002). This is a relevant comparator since GBS
surveys were administered to a cross-section of the voting-age population in the period 2001-2006. The
official mean voter turnout figures for each region are: East Asia = 71 percent, South Asia = 64 percent,
sub-Saharan Africa = 57 percent, and Middle East = 52 percent.
10
vary by world region and type of leader. In a discouraging sign for democracy, citizens generally
seem to find appointed civil servants or hereditary traditional leaders more accessible than elected
officials. And, on average, East Asians are four times more likely than Middle Easterners to
report such contacts. Finally, while it is obvious what Africans mean by traditional leaders –
local chiefs and headmen – it is less clear (at least this analyst) exactly who occupies equivalent
positions in East Asia.
Protest. The founding human rights charters embody a citizen’s right to
peacefully rebel against unjust government. Popular protest therefore plays a defining role in
attaining and sustaining democracy. On average, some 14 percent of citizens report attending a
political protest or demonstration in the course of the previous year, a level exactly represented by
Africans and Latin Americans and closely approached by South Asians. Perhaps again reflecting
relatively deep reservoirs of democratic satisfaction, East Asians report very little protest activity
(just 4 percent take part). This stands in sharp contrast to the 27 percent of Middle Easterners
who claim involvement in protest activity against a background where levels of popular
satisfaction with democracy are presently unknown, at least as far as GB surveys are concerned.
Democracy and Participation
We now turn from description to analysis. With reference to democratic
citizenship, are an individual’s attitudes related to her behavior?
Table 7: Support for Democracy and Rejection of Strongman Rule,
Correlations by World Region
World Region
R
Country Range
East Asia
.173***
Japan
Singapore
South Asia
.038***
Latin America
.055***
Sub-Saharan Africa
.178***
India
Sri Lanka
Nepal
Paraguay
Bolivia
Panama
Ghana
Mozambique
Middle East
.143***
“Global”
.134***
***p<.001
11
Lebanon
Palestine
R
.226***
.022
.128***
.025
-.036
.250***
.015
-.042
.261***
.031
.213***
.001
As a first step in analysis, I explore the depth of personal democratic
commitments. As argued earlier, democratic citizenship requires that an individual’s professed
support for democracy be backed up by a rejection of strongman rule. Table 7 shows that, in
every region of the world, preferences for democracy are positively related to denials of
dictatorship. The connection is not especially sturdy anywhere, implying that autocratic
alternatives can never be counted out, but it is always statistically significant. Africans and East
Asians are most likely to display a consistent commitment to democracy, regularly valuing it
above authoritarian rule. The Japanese are the staunchest democrats among East Asians, as are
Ghanaians among Africans. But South Asians – and, to a lesser extent, Latin Americans – are
somewhat more ambiguous about democracy since, for some members of these societies, a
preference for popular rule apparently coexists with residual nostalgia for the heavy hand of a
strongman. Within these regions, democratic commitments are least consolidated in Nepal and
Panama, where preferences for democracy are negatively correlated with rejection of strongmen,
which suggests that some citizens in these countries apparently perceive autocrats as being
democratic!
Despite these few exceptions, the overall pattern of correlation permits us to
construct a composite measure of commitment to democracy. It is a three-point scale, where 2 =
both support democracy and reject strongman rule, 1 = either support democracy or reject
strongman rule and 0 = neither support democracy nor reject strongman rule. No such index
construction is possible for political participation since we presently possess data for only one
variable (protest) across all five regions.
Thus Table 8 presents bi-variate correlation coefficients between commitment to
democracy and eight single-item indicators of political participation. At this stage, I purposely
employ a technique of statistical association that carries no implication of causality in either
direction. Noteworthy results are as follows:
(a) Of the eight modes of participation, seven are associated with commitment to democracy at
meaningful levels of statistical significance. Only contact with government officials is unrelated,
which suggests that democrats and non-democrats alike seek to influence bureaucrats.
(b) Moreover, all are positively associated, implying that democrats evince a connected syndrome
of attitudes and behaviors. The strongest association is between democratic commitments and
discussion of politics, which suggests that democrats are active debaters in public settings.
Whether commitment begets discussion, or vice versa, remains to be settled.
(c) The one striking exception is voter turnout. While positive and significant within four world
regions, this relationship is negative and significant at a “global” level. One possible explanation
is that, while committed democrats and voting go together in South Asia, there are so many
ambiguous or uncommitted citizens who vote in this region that their presence swamps the link at
the “global” level. This result stands as a stark illustration of the dangers of asserting “global”
generalizations without understanding particular contexts.
(d) There are clear distinctions in the attitude-behavior link across regions. In Table 8, the shaded
cells indicate the region in which the strongest relationship pertains. The Middle East leads other
regions in the tie between democratic commitments on the one hand and, on the other, political
interest and protest action. South Asia leads with regard to political discussion, voluntary
memberships and contacts with government officials. In East Asia, the bond is strongest between
democratic commitments and other forms of political contact. And it is in sub-Saharan Africa
where the clearest link between democratic commitment and voting can be found, though this
12
link is not especially strong. Indeed, the voting connection is so humble that I am led to the
general inference that, alongside committed democrats, many non-democrats are also active
participants in open elections.
Table 8: Commitment to Democracy: Correlations with Political Participation
Interested in politics
Discusses politics
Belongs to a voluntary organization
Voted in last election
Contacted government official
Contacted elected official
Contacted traditional leader
Protested or demonstrated
“Global”
East
Asia
.055***
.187***
.047***
-.025***
.008
.052***
.025***
.035***
.118***
.065***
.076***
.029**
.034***
.082***
.131***
-.011
South
Asia
.277***
.105***
.052***
.163***
.088***
Latin
America
SubSaharanA
frica
Middle
East
-.117***
.100***
.141***
.176***
.071***
.055***
.077***
.071***
.017*
.001
.194***
.043***
.079***
.048***
.028*
.034*
.002
.150***
Cell entries are Pearson r correlations
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
Causes and Contexts
Ideally, the next step in analysis would be a multivariate causal explanation. But
the problem of missing observations in the GBS data set limits our ability to proceed beyond
statements about bi-variate association among stand-alone variables. We are inhibited from
proceeding to comprehensive causal analysis based on regression methods by at least three
considerations.
(a) First, it is difficult to construct comprehensive indices that can serve as dependent variables.
At present we have only two democratic attitudes and one form of participation (protest) that are
measured in the same way in all five regions of the world.
(b) Second, regression procedures require a complete data set without missing cases. Most
statistical packages automatically delete all cases for which there is even a single missing
observation. Under these circumstances, any attempt to run a regression with up to seven or eight
predictor variables would rapidly diminish the number of available data points.
(c) Third, given that certain survey questions were never asked in entire world regions, the empty
cells in the 2005 GBS data set are clearly not “missing at random.” In this instance, the
systematic characteristic of “missing-ness” makes it impossible (or at least inadvisable) to use
techniques of data imputation to fill gaps, whether by simply inserting mean values or employing
advanced techniques of multiple imputation.
All that is defensible at this stage, therefore, are indicative investigations. In
Table 9, I use OLS regression to begin to explore two questions about the development of
democracy. Which come first: democratic attitudes or democratic behaviors? And, where does
most variation in attitudes and behaviors reside: among individuals or across world regions? For
reasons spelled out above, I cannot pretend that these tests are definitive. They simply provide
13
hints of relationships that may be embedded in the more complete data sets that have yet to be
assembled.
The four regression models in Table 9 employ different combinations of eight
variables: one democratic attitude (an additive index of an individual’s commitment to
democracy), two participatory behaviors (indicators citizen involvement in protest and political
discussion) and five world regions (each scored as a dummy variable). Indicators for the world
regions are added to the pooled data set to control for fixed geographical, cultural and economic
effects. The dependent variables for each model are designated with a “DV” in Table 9. The
shaded cells show which independent variables are operating in each model. Finally, an upper
case “X” marks a variable not entered, a lower-case “x” an excluded dummy variable, and an “m”
stands for missing data.
Table 9:
Attitudes or Behaviors? Individuals or Regions?
Indicative Regression Models
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Democratic Attitude
Committed to Democracy
DV
.050***
DV
.171
Political Participation
Protested or demonstrated
Discussed politics
.044
X
DV
X
X
.166
X
DV
-.044
-.038
x
-.384
.065
-.094
.006
x
.071
.101
.258
.371
.384
x
m
.062
-.199
.169
x
m
World Regions
East Asia
Latin America
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
Middle East
Constant
Variance explained (adjusted r square)
1.382***
.107***
.438***
1.456***
.149
.028
.158
.134
DV = dependent variable
X = variable not entered
x = excluded dummy variable
m = missing data
Otherwise, cell entries are standardized OLS regression coefficients (beta).
All b coefficients (not shown) are statistically significant at***p<.001.
Let us begin with the question of causal order: do attitudes drive behavior or
vice-versa? In Models 1 and 3, the object of explanation is an individual attitude, namely
commitment to democracy. In the other models, the objects of explanation are citizen
behaviors: participation in a protest or demonstration (in Model 2) and engagement in political
discussions (in Model 4). Which of these sets of models has greater explanatory power? Take
the amount of explained variance is a guide: the adjusted r square statistics for Models 1 and 3
are consistently higher than for Models 2 and 4. While hardly conclusive, this outcome implies
14
that democratic behaviors (protesting and discussing) have more effect on attitudes (commitment
to democracy) than the other way around.
In other words, citizens in new democracies around the world seem to learn by
doing, that is, to develop their commitments to democracy as a result of having engaged in
discussions or demonstrations. Although they may also take action as a result of having
previously adopted democratic values (inevitably, the relationship is endogenous), the effect of
attitudes on behaviors seems to be weaker than the effect of behaviors on attitudes. Once a more
complete data set is available, we will proceed to test this finding more rigorously using
simultaneous equations modeling.
And what about the source of these variations? At what level of analysis is there
greater fluctuation in attitudes and behavior? Does most variance in the attitude-behavior
relationship occur among individual citizens or across world regions? In every model in Table 9,
there is at least one (and usually more than one) region that has a greater impact on the dependent
variable than the operative independent variable. For example, in Model 1, the negative effects
on commitment to democracy of the South Asia region are far stronger than the positive effects of
protest action. And in Model 3, although the effects of political discussion are quite strong and
positive for commitment to democracy, they are relatively weak compared to the powerful
positive effects of the regional dummies for East Asia, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa (at
least when these three regions are compared to the excluded category of the Middle East).
In short, the impact of behavior on attitude formation seems to be contextspecific. In becoming a committed democrat, it matters more that one is an African (and not a
South Asian) than whether one chooses to engage in discussion or protest. In other words, when
seeking the sources of democratic commitments, we neglect at our peril the regional (or even the
country) context in which they are embedded. It is for this reason, that I think there is more
analytic leverage to be gained by sustaining a strong emphasis on the contexts in which
democratization is occurring than on trying to subsume it into a single “human development
sequence” on a “global” scale.
15
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