Reconstruction of the Socio-Political Order after
Independence in Latin America.
A Reconsideration of Caudillo Politics in the River Plate*
by Valentina Ayrolo and Eduardo Míguez
Abstract. – The collapse of the social basis of legitimacy of the colonial political system was an unexpected consequence of the revolution of independence in the
Río de la Plata. The republican system failed to consolidate an effective base for
the new political order. The power vacuum thus created was occupied by the system of caudillos. In it, republican legitimacy converged with traditional representations of power, popular mobilization with the conservation of social hierarchies,
subaltern demands with the preservation of socio-economic order. Based on the
authors own research and on an extensive recent bibliography, this paper seeks
to give an account of the basic features of caudillismo and the montoneras,
­without ignoring the large regional peculiarities.
The end of colonial rule in Latin America gave way to a struggle for power
between competing factions that laid the ground for new forms of political
action. These struggles expressed social tensions and factional disputes that
were naturally present in colonial society. But as long as a royal authority
operated as legitimate arbiter of the socio-political order, it imposed a conflict resolution system that prevented violent outbreaks. Skirmishes and
rebellions had not been unknown, but until 1808 the Crown had been able to
stifle them and maintain its authority. The impact of the Napoleonic wars on
the Spanish Crown, combined with the eroding legitimacy of absolute monarchy as a socio-political system and the colonial status of Latin America,
inspired by the climate of revolutionary ideas of the late 1700s, triggered the
sub-continent’s need to redefine its system of power. It was against this
backdrop that the phenomena of caudillismo and montonera were born.
Comments and suggestions by Ariel de la Fuente and Gustavo Paz on an earlier
version of this paper have been very useful.
*
Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas 49
© Böhlau Verlag Köln/Weimar/Wien 2012
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Caudillismo was a form of social domination characterised by strong
leaderships built on close personal ties and popular support. The term montonera applies to various forms of military action, also with a popular basis,
which ranged from armed disturbances to poorly organised, non-professional armies, whose action could last several months.1 Caudillos often
seized or retained power through the actions of montoneras; but many also
frequently commanded small regular armies and militias, which acted similarly to montoneras when mobilised.2 Thus, a caudillo’s power could last
many years, transcending the spasmodic montonera cycle. While caudillos
stem from the wars of independence, they thrived in the civil wars that followed. In the River Plate, these wars typically pitted a centralist faction
(Unitarios) against a Federalist one, but the conflicts involved were much
more complex. Caudillos were usually Federalists as they defended local
autonomy; but there were also Unitario caudillos, and beyond political
sympathies, this stage was characterised by ongoing, complex struggles for
power. Drawing on original research and an increasing body of literature on
these phenomena during the period spanning from independence to the consolidation of the national State in the 1870s, this paper proposes a reinterpretation of caudillismo as a form of socio-political order and of montoneras as the typical expression of military action in the River Plate, in a
perspective that takes other Latin American experiences as a point of reference.3
At the peak of the caudillo era, Domingo F. Sarmiento (1845) offered
an explanation for the phenomenon, positing that the environment and solitude of the Pampas bred the obscure, coarse and irrational character that
was the central figure of nineteenth-century politics. Anarchy was the logical offshoot of caudillismo and its barbarism, spawned by the predominance of the countryside and its pastoral way of life over the city, centre of
illustration and knowledge. This classic interpretation, still influential, is no
longer fully satisfactory. This is not the place to revise the rich historiogra These very general definitions will be substantiated and expanded below.
Occasionally, caudillos could lead larger regular armies, such as Juan Manuel de
Rosas in Buenos Aires, or Justo José de Urquiza in Entre Ríos.
3
However, it would not be wise to generalize or extrapolate conclusions to other areas,
because while the phenomenon is found throughout Latin America, it would be bold to make
region-wide interpretations. Even in the River Plate area we find very different expressions
of caudillismo, which are linked to local social conditions that are also diverse. In his overview of nineteenth century Latin American politics, Frank Safford, “Politics, Ideology and
Society in Post-Independence Spanish America”: Leslie Bethell (ed.), Spanish America after
independence c. 1820–c. 1870 (Cambridge 1985), p. 48–123, offers a convincing general
perspective on Caudillismo, and explores more timidly its more profound causes.
1
2
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Reconstruction of the Socio-Political Order after Independence in Latin America
phy that followed this early view.4 It should be noted, though, that many of
the authors shared Sarmiento’s ambition of providing a comprehensive
interpretation for the phenomenon, generally applicable to all of Latin
America or to a specific country (Mexico being a favourite). Classic works
such as Chevalier’s (1963),5 Wolf’s and Hansen’s (1967),6 Díaz Díaz’
(1972),7 Lynch’s (1981, 1992),8 and Knight’s (1985),9 among others, have
been mandatory references for researchers, along with the more specific
bibliography on the River Plate, greatly expanded in recent years (only
partly quoted in this paper). In line with some of these authors (Díaz Díaz,
Knight), this study applies a Weber-inspired conceptual framework, albeit it
is not restricted to it.
The Political Framework of Caudillismo
Various forces contributed to shape a socio-political order in the revolutionary River Plate. On the one hand, there were what could be termed ‘reformist-programmatic forces,’ which saw the war for independence as giving
way to the construction of a new social system, based on well-defined ideological principles. Although with variations, these were basically consistent
with the liberal democratic ideas that were widespread in the western world
at the time. On the other, there were conservative forces that resisted reform
seeking to preserve traditions, which, even then, were actually being continuously redefined or reinterpreted to quickly adapt to an irreversible
republican-revolutionary context. Conservative tendencies obviously
include movements that invocated the old regime – as a whole or certain
aspects thereof – as a source of legitimacy (besides monarchic factions,
more or less extinguished by 1820, the most typical example is the defence
4
For interesting overviews, see Noemí Goldman/Ricardo Salvatore, Caudillismos rioplatenses. Nuevas miradas a un viejo problema (Buenos Aires 1998) and Tulio Halperín
Donghi, “Estudio preliminar”: Jorge Laforgue (ed.), Historias de caudillos argentinos (Buenos Aires 1999), p. 19–48.
5
Francois Chevalier, “The Roots of Caudillismo”: Hugh M. Hamill (ed.), Caudillos:
Dictators in Spanish America (2. ed., London 1992), p. 27–41.
6
Eric R. Wolf/ Edward C. Hansen, “Caudillo Politics: A structural Analysis”: Comparative studies in Society and History 9, 2 (Cambridge 1967), p. 168–179.
7
Fernando Díaz Díaz, Caudillos y caciques: Antonio López de Santa Anna y Juan
Álvarez (México 1972).
8
John Lynch, Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas, 1829–1852 (Oxford 1981),
and idem, Caudillos in Spanish America: 1800–1850 (Oxford 1992).
9
Alan Knight, “Caudillos campesinos en el México revolucionario”: David A. Brading
(ed.), Caudillos y campesinos en la revolución mexicana (México 1985), p. 32–85.
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of religion or traditional “fueros” (legal privileges) against liberal programmes), but also the popular appeal to protect traditional rights and customs.10
Also present was the threat of social breakdown, of true anarchy. This
was expressed through banditry, an expansion of the activities of highwaymen and gangs of outlaws devoid of political or social aims. This is no
doubt an element present in any society, and while its growth was favoured
by the political crisis and militarization of the period, it does not appear to
have ever posed a real challenge to the existence of a social order. There
are, however, two reasons to consider it. First, because, like Sarmiento,
many observers of the time and quite a few historians have confused banditry with caudillismo itself. Second, because montonera conflicts could
degenerate into anarchy, and being well aware of this possibility caudillos
made great efforts to prevent it and, above all, demonstrate that they were
far from promoting it. However, it is true that bands of outlaws were a usual
recruitment ground for montoneras.
Lastly, another factor was a social order formed under the auspices of
what could be termed popularly-based military señoríos.11 The disappearance of the superior power of the colonial monarchy gave rise to the emergence of military señoríos that imparted justice and guaranteed a certain
order in their territory in exchange for personal loyalty, reminding to a certain point the process of formation of the feudal system in Europe.12 This
was an element that is present in the shaping of the social order of the early
years of independent Latin America, and is maintained until the consolidation of the national State.
10
In recent work, José Carlos Chiaramonte, “The ancient constitution after independence (1808–1852)”: Hispanic American Historical Review 90:3 (2010), p. 455–488 has
referred to the institutional aspects of this traditional view as the “ancient constitution”.
11
Señoríos could be translated as fiefdoms, but it carries less of a feudal connotation.
As used here, señorios refer to territories over which a certain caudillo exerted influence and
authority, and in which he could mobilize men to form montoneras or militias. As we will
show below, caudillos could have some formal political function, such as justice of the peace
or militia commander, or simply wield personal influence built through personal ties.
12
For a classical view that associates caudillismo with military feudal lordships, see
Chevalier, “The Roots of Caudillismo” (note 5). The New Institutional Economics has sought
to work out the economic logic behind the European process, and the effects of the availability of factors and institutional traditions in the making of the systems. These models can be
applied to the development of the phenomenon of caudillismo, even though it is not evident
that they would significantly change their interpretation, nor is it the perspective adopted in
this study (the classical reference, obviously, is Douglass Cecil North/Robert Paul Thomas,
The rise of the Western world: a new economic history (Cambridge 1973); see also Olivier
Volckart, “Central Europe’s Way to a Market Economy, 1000­–1800”: European Review of
Economic History 6 (2002), p. 309­–337.
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Reconstruction of the Socio-Political Order after Independence in Latin America
Some historians have extended this similarity to other aspects, positing
the existence of a kind of feudalism, where the landlord is at the same time
commander of armed troops, and a link in a chain of loyalties that culminate in the main caudillo – the regional or national chief.13 However, more
recent studies have shown the limitations in this interpretation. There is no
feudal relation here linking large landowners to their men.14 Unlike feudal
landlords – who commanded their military followings and acted as judges
of their men and serfs –, the power of caudillos is not based, prima facie, on
the land, but rather on their capacity to mobilise men who are for the most
part free. And although some of these leaders were large landowners, even
using in some cases their estates to shelter and support their troops (for
example, Juan Bautista Bustos, a caudillo of the province of Córdoba),15
most built their leadership in connection with military structures – officers
who served in revolutionary armies or militias, including Bustos himself –
and did not rest their power on landed property. Naturally, many caudillos
who were not originally landowners eventually acquired rural properties
and wealth as they consolidated their power and became local or regional
chiefs. Thus, closer to Wolf’s and Hansen’s interpretation, caudillismo
involves local leadership structures that are in turn part of larger, regional
structures. Caudillos forge alliances among themselves or confront each
other, disputing men, territories, resources and influences. In some cases –
like in the province of Buenos Aires in Juan Manuel de Rosas’ time, or during the long rule of Santiago del Estero by Juan Felipe Ibarra, first, and
Manuel and Antonino Taboada, later, or Estanislao López’ Santa Fe – there
is certain leadership stability despite the disputes.16 In others, the political
turmoil produced continuous change in leadership, sometimes as a result of
caudillos being killed in the course of the struggle.
It would not be accurate to say that these political forces were expressed
in defined factions (for example, conservative monarchists, liberal-reformist centralists, federal caudillismo). Instead, each political faction contained
elements of the different forces. Royalists, for example, upheld the radical
reformist ideas of Spanish liberalism during the periods in which the liberal
Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America (note 8).
Jorge Gelman, Rosas bajo fuego (Buenos Aires 2009), and idem, “Un gigante de pies
de barro”: Goldman/Salvatore, Caudillismos rioplatenses (note 4), p. 221–240.
15
Gregorio Aráoz de Lamadrid, Memorias (Buenos Aires 1947), Vol. I, p. 258f.
16
Ibarra was a federal caudillo of Santiago del Estero who governed the province since
it was created in 1820 and until his death from natural causes in 1851, with few interruptions.
The Taboada brothers, Manuel and Antonino (nephews of the former and liberal Unitarians),
did the same in the 1850s–70s. López governed Santa Fe from 1818 to 1838, when he died
from tuberculosis.
13
14
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constitution of Cadiz was in force (1812–14 and 1821–23). After that, while
the River Plate lacked a conservador faction, as existed in other parts of
Latin America, reformist projects usually contained socially conservative
elements. On the other end of the political spectrum, popular and caudillo
leaderships incorporated traditions with popular roots, which were generally contrary to liberal reforms. However, the revolutionary discourse of
freedom, equality and democracy had a very profound and rapid impact on
the population of the River Plate, so that it was commonly found in every
caudillo-led mobilisation, or montonera.17
This last point is very important, because in the River Plate political
identities played a pivotal role in the mobilisation of montoneras. These
popular identities and in particular Federalism, which was the most
extended, were built on a diverse set of cultural experiences and aspects,
akin to what Raymond Williams has called a ‘structure of feelings’. Federalism was above all an expression of localism. So it was normal for federal
caudillos to fight each other, because, among other reasons, the basis of
their identity was essentially local (when they spoke of their ‘patria’ (homeland) caudillos and their followers were referring to their province). But
identity was not limited to localism. The imagery of certain past and present
leaders, the music and poetry that sang their praises, the language and
clothes used by the common folk, the formal defence of a religion, which
does not coincide with the canonical ritual forms, often being an expression
of what could be called a local religion,18 and the rhetoric of autonomy and
freedom, and the uniting experience of revolutionary war, are all part of an
identity capable of mobilising the rural masses.19 This was naturally combined with a web of personal ties of loyalty. What was this loyalty based on
and who participated in it?
17
In this respect, it is interesting to contrast the views on Rosas’ ideas by Jorge Meyer,
Orden y virtud. El discurso republicano en el régimen de Rosas (Buenos Aires 1995) and
John Lynch, “Rosas y las clases populares”: Sergio Bagú et al. (eds.), De historia e historiadores. Homenaje a José Luis Romero (Buenos Aires 1982), p. 311–344.
18
William Christian, Religiosidad local en la España de Felipe II (Madrid 1991).
19
Ariel de la Fuente, Children of Facundo (London 2000); Ricardo Salvatore, Wandering Paisanos (London 2003); Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Poder, Conflicto y relaciones sociales.
El Río de la Plata, XVIII­–XIX (Buenos Aires 1999), and idem, Construir el Estado, inventar
la nación (Buenos Aires 2007); Gustavo Paz, “El orden es el desorden. Guerrra y movilización campesina en la campaña de Jujuy 1815–1821”: Raúl Fradkin/Jorge Gelman (eds.),
Desafíos al orden. Política y sociedad rurales durante la revolución de Independencia
(Rosario 2008), p. 83–101.
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Reconstruction of the Socio-Political Order after Independence in Latin America
Montoneras
Almost half a century ago, in line with the prevailing economic determinism of the time, Wolf and Hansen looked for an economic explanation for
the phenomenon of caudillismo. According to them, the ‘aim of the caudillo
band is to gain wealth; the tactic employed is essentially pillage’. 20 In light
of current research and conceptual developments, this view seems a little
simple and reductionist. If this phenomenon is examined on a small scale,
through the actions of montoneras commanded by minor caudillos, or caudillejos, this appreciation by Wolf and Hansen appears exaggerated. In a
detailed and well-grounded study of an 1826 montonera, Raúl Fradkin
stresses the political nature of the movement.21 Although he does not give a
precise meaning for the expression, he seeks to underscore that far from
being movements limited to pillaging, their aim was to influence the structures of power. This is not a unique case. To mention only a few examples,
the rebellions of Juan Pablo Pérez Bulnes or Pedro Grimau in Córdoba,22
the actions of Manuel Baigorria in San Luis from 1829 to1832,23 and Baldomero Lamela in the province of Buenos Aires in 1860,24 as well as the
uprising in Buenos Aires in 1829 in support of Rosas and against the government of Juan Lavalle after the assassination of the previous governor
Manuel Dorrego were all essentially political movements.25
On the other hand, most of the vast research on the Uruguayan (then
called Banda Oriental) caudillo Gervasio Artigas is consistent in maintaining that the expropriation of enemy property and the redistribution of their
Wolf/Hansen “Caudillo Politics” (note 6), p. 173.
Raúl Fradkin, La historia de una montonera. Bandolerismo y caudillismo en Buenos
Aires, 1826 (Buenos Aires 2006)
22
Valentina Ayrolo, “Entre la Patria y los ‘Patriotas ala rustica’: Identidades e imaginarios, armas y poder entre la independencia y la ‘anarquía’. Córdoba en las primeras décadas del siglo XIX”: Fradkin/Gelman, Desafíos al orden (note 19), p. 17–35, and eadem,
“Hombres armados en lucha por poder. Córdoba de la pos independencia”: Estudios Sociales
35, XVIII (Santa Fe 2008), p. 23–60.
23
Manuel Baigorri, Memorias (Buenos Aires 1975), the memoirs of a militia soldier,
small time caudillo and military man, written in the early 1870’s.
24
See Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Sala X, Legajo 20-4-6, also Eduardo J.
Míguez, “La construcción de un orden social en el Río de la Plata, 1810–1852”: Actas de las
Jornadas “Problemas y debates del temprano siglo XIX. Espacio, Redes y Poder” (Mar del
Plata 2005).
25
Prudencio Arnold, Un soldado Argentino (Buenos Aires 1970 [1893]), the memoirs of
a militia soldier, later a military man, written in the 1880’s. Pilar González Bernaldo, “El
levantamiento de 1829: el imaginario social y sus implicaciones políticas en un conflicto
rural”: Anuario del IHES 2 (Tandil 1987), p. 137–176.
20
21
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lands played an important role in the consolidation of his power.26 In
Güemes’ case,27 the most recurring motivation for recruitment appears to
have been the preservation of military privileges, which exempted mobilised men from the jurisdiction of Cabildo justice, and freed them, among
other things, from paying rent (which could be considered a form of disguised agrarian reform). Also in Entre Ríos under Justo José de Urquiza and
his predecessors,28 access to natural resources, cattle and lands was an
important element in the mobilisation of rural popular sectors. The La Rioja
caudillo Chacho Peñaloza, instead, exhibits a significant variation. The
mobilisation he promoted rested essentially on identity-centred political
grounds, but among the motivations for participating in his campaigns was
the possibility of access to cattle as the main food supply and the montonera
as a source of wages in cash.29 More generally, regardless of the motivation
for mobilising, the possibility of pillaging movable goods and rustling cattle from the enemy must have been no doubt a constant factor for securing
support.
Socially, the montoneras could only dwell on the larger sectors of the
rural population for their numbers. The question, therefore, is if it was a
specific sector of that population, or if instead the mobilisation equally
attracted various strata. There is no unequivocal answer. In general, those
who have criticised montoneras (both contemporaries and historians) have
described its participants as men on the fringes of society, vagrants, drifters
without property or regular work who wandered the countryside looking for
casual employment, along with criminals and bands of highwaymen and
outlaws. This view was consistent with the idea that the open Pampas were
populated by nomadic gauchos who fluctuated between working as ranch
hands in estancias and vagrancy.30
But there are several objections to this interpretation. Above all, rural
mobilisation was intense in very diverse areas, including some in which the
drifting population was not very significant. More importantly, the most
26
See Ana Frega, Pueblos y Soberanía en la Revolución artiguista (Montevideo 2007)
for references.
27
Paz, “El orden es el desorden” (note 19) and Sara E. Mata, Los Gauchos de Güemes
(Buenos Aires 2008).
28
Roberto Schmit, Ruina y resurrección en tiempos de guerra (Buenos Aires 2004)
29
Ariel de la Fuente, Children of Facundo (London 2000). A report filed against an
uprising in 1839 states: “It is also evident that they march with the utmost discipline, that the
troops they send receive ten pesos a month, that a payment was made yesterday and that they
always pay for the cattle they eat”, Historical Archive of the Province of Córdoba (AHPC),
Government Collection, Box 162, Folder 1, folio 25.
30
An example of this view in Richard Slata, Gauchos and the Vanishing of the Frontier
(London 1983).
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recent research on the countryside during colonial times and early independence suggests that even in the classic Pampean frontiers, Banda Oriental, Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos or Santa Fe, this structural vagrant population
was actually very limited in numbers, to say the least, and could hardly
have spawned the vast montonera mobilisations. A large part of the population was made up of small farmers, who were renters or squatters on public
lands or on properties unclaimed by their owners, or cattle tenders and
farmers tolerated by landowners for little or no compensation31, in addition
to the labourers and foremen of the large estates. What reasons could these
men – established as they were with their families – have for mobilising?
There were different reasons. To begin with: war. The region underwent
a process of militarisation that began when the Napoleonic wars impacted
the River Plate with the 1806 and 1807 British invasions (which affected
not only Buenos Aires), was intensified with the wars for independence,
beginning in 1810, and continued with the civil wars from 1820 on. In some
places, such as Salta, the Banda Oriental (Uruguay), or Entre Ríos, the
extent of the conflicts absorbed most of the able men. These men – who
“have lost everything”, as a retainer of Artigas claimed to justify his refusal
to give back occupied lands,32 were ready recruits for new conflicts. The
armies’ voraciousness for men, horses and cattle preyed on the property of
these people who owned no land, pushing them to join their ranks, followed
by their families. Gregorio Pino declared in 1826 that “his service had been
to combat in the montonera.”33 War was for them a way of life. These sectors formed the military core of the different factions. Many of the montonera forces were in fact formed essentially with regular army soldiers who
had either disbanded or rebelled. They preserved their military structure
and answered to the political programme of their leaders. Others wandered
the countryside in search of resources, until their numbers dwindled from
desertions, or they were incorporated into political forces with whom they
generally had factious similarities.34
Others were discharged from their armies or deserted, and unwillingly
became structural vagrants. Black men, who are frequently mentioned as
part of the montoneras, were probably ‘libertos’ (freed slaves) who were
31
This social type was known as “poblador” or “agregado”. Landowners, to whom they
were frequently linked by kinship or a common origin prior to migration, expected advantages from these friendly neighbours in the vast and solitary plains.
32
Archivo Artigas, Vol. XXI, p. 265–267.
33
This he declared upon being detained for participating in the montonera of the caudillo
Juan Pablo Pérez Bulnes. AHPC, Criminal Records Collection, Case 26: ‘Criminal Cause
against Gregorio Pino (a.k.a. Mazapa)’.
34
Ayrolo, “Entre la Patria” (note 22), and eadem, “Hombres armados” (note 22).
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seeking a place in society after their passage through the army.35 Nonetheless, the bulk of the population was able to maintain or reconstruct civilian
life, in spite of the military turmoil. Rural people were organised in militias,
either to defend the frontier from Indian raids, or to protect their provinces
from aggressions by neighbouring provinces. They were more reluctant
participants in the strife between factions, and their involvement was usually more limited in time. Their participation could be motivated by a number of reasons: a sudden uneasiness, such as the fear of a new generalised
draft by the existing government; a call from an old military chief whom
they were loyal to; the promise of a reward or payment of military wages;
or an identity-based political appeal.36 Patronage and family relations certainly played an important role in mobilization, in a society in which, in
part because of the weakness of the State, personal ties played a major role
everyday life. Many were often forced to participate through the violent
pressure that the initial core group of a montonera exerted over other men
to join the group. And if the movement was too drawn out, they deserted.
This last argument was almost invariably used by those who came to justice
and needed to justify their involvement in a defeated movement.37
Various indigenous groups also participated in the civil wars. Although
ethnicity was less important as a social factor in much of present day Argentina and Uruguay than in other areas of Latin America, Indian communities
did play an important role in popular mobilization at different times and in
different areas of the region. Güemes of Salta had a strong Indian following, as occurred in movements in the Alto Perú.38 In Córdoba in the 1830’s
Indian settlements located in the territory of a rebellious communal chief
35
Fernando Pérez Bulnes’ troop, for example, was formed by some two hundred men,
including Spanish soldiers freed from the Trinchera Fort on the Chaco border, and black men.
Norma Pavoni, “Córdoba y los movimientos anárquicos de Juan Pablo Pérez Bulnes en los
años 1816 y 1817”: Investigaciones y Ensayos 8 (Buenos Aires 1970), p. 357–406.
36
For colourful examples of the arguments used to mobilise men, see in AHPC, Criminal Records Collection 1664–1902, File 129, Case 2, Grimau, Pedro Antonio, ‘Sedition, For
Having Secretly Attempted the Corruption of Garrison Soldiers to Attack Barracks.’
37
AHPC, Criminal Records Collection, Case 26: ‘Criminal Case Against Gregorio Pino
(a.k.a. Mazapa)’, Córdoba Archbishop Archive (AAC), File 28, No. 6 and Case 37, Vol. II,
‘Criminal Case Against Don Vicente Torres and His Absolution from Censures’. Or AHPC,
Fund: Crime, File 185, Folder 8, ‘Investigation into the Existence and Escape of La Rioja
and Catamarca Insurgents Who Came Into This Province’, f. 130. See also, Gelman, Rosas
bajo fuego (note 14).
38
Alto Perú is, today, Bolivia, but was part of the Virreynato del Río de la Plata in
­colonial times; María Luisa Soux, “Los caudillos insurgentes en la región de Oruro: entre la
sublevación indígena y el sistema de guerrillas”: Beatriz Bragoni/Sara Mata (eds.), Entre la
colonia y la República. Insurgencia, rebeliones y cultura política en América del Sur ­(Buenos
Aires 2009), p. 125–142.
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would find themselves involved in the conflict. Their participation was
motivated by the benefits that they could obtain in the future.39 In certain
regions of north-western Argentina the identity of Indian communities persisted into the second half of the nineteenth century, and played an important role in montoneras. In general, Indians blended in with popular sectors
as part of the following of a caudillo. But they had their own leaders, that
acted with certain independence, and sometimes their own specific grievances. In La Rioja, for example, Severo Chumbita, an Indian leader from
Aymogasta, became an important local caudillo in the early rebellions
against the formation of the national state in the 1860’s.40 An in the following decade, the leader of an Indian community in the Puna (Jujuy, near
Bolivia), Anastacio Inca, conducted a caudillo rebellion that was mixed
with electoral politics, and that claimed land for his community.41 Whereas
these Indian leaders could at times achieve considerable powers, in contrast
with other areas of Latin America, they never went as far as controlling a
whole province or having national influence.
Also frequent was the participation of Indians tribes who, maintaining
their socio-cultural structures, lived near the frontier, enjoying Christian
protection and subsidies, providing in return military service (called indios
amigos). But there were also Indians who lived totally outside Christian
influence who occasionally allied themselves with a caudillo or montonera
leader. In both these cases, especially in the second one, the prospect of pillaging the enemy – traditional among Araucanian warfare – was the main
motivation for participating in military action.42
In sum, montoneras were broadly composed of members of rural popular sectors, although participation varied. Various groups who lacked any
other form of livelihood, or who had lost their property or occupation during the wars, or who had weak ties in civil society were the natural recruits
of the montonera movements. These included groups of actual highwaymen
and outlaws, often deserters from a previous conflict. They formed a natural
39
See AHPC, Government Collection, Vol./Box 126, Letter to ‘Captain Santos Pérez’;
AHPC, Government Collection, Vol./Box 126 C, ‘Criminal Case Against Ischilín priest,
Father Gaspar de Martierena’, 1831, f. 225; and AHPC, Criminal Records Collection, 16
Mar. 1839, when local caudillo Igarzabal rebelled against the governor, he is said to have
troops “[...] of considerable force, plus the Indians of that little town [Quilino], which he has
also rounded up.”
40
De la Fuente, Children of Facundo (note 29).
41
Gustavo Paz, “Liderazgos étnicos, caudillismo y resistencia campesina en el norte
argentino a mediados del siglo XIX”: Goldman/Salvatore, Caudillismos rioplatenses (note
4), p. 319–346.
42
Martha Bechis, “Fuerzas indígenas en la política criolla del siglo XIX”: Goldman/
Salvatore, Caudillismos rioplatenses (note 4), p. 293–317.
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following for caudillos and were part of military life.43 In contrast, in critical moments a wide range of peasants or ranch hands and foremen of the
large estancias could become involved; but most of them would try to
demobilise as soon as possible to go back to their civilian lives. Once incorporated into the militias, they could be mobilised by the institutional structure that often contained the caudillo system itself. In extreme cases, like
the Banda Oriental throughout the 1810s, Salta from 1815 to the early
1820s, Entre Ríos at several stages, there are long periods of recurring
mobilisation involving vast rural sectors. But even then it was common that
the bulk of the men would divide their time between military and productive activities. Lastly, there are also examples of brief rebellions made up
essentially of civilian rural population (many of whom no doubt had prior
military experience), which were predictably joined by groups of men living on the fringes of society.
Caudillos and Caudillejos
The leaders of these movements were not from the same social sectors as
their followers, or were only partially so. Different categories of caudillos
must be distinguished. In the case of Mexico, caudillos have been identified
as leaders who had national significance, while those with only local influence have been referred to as caciques.44 The term cacique was not used in
the River Plate, and it may lead to confusion with caciquismo, a different
and later phenomenon related to electoral systems in Spain and Latin America. Moreover, while Rosas and Urquiza may have exerted influence beyond
their provinces, there were no truly national caudillos, in particular because
the bases of popular power were always linked to local spaces. Thus, the
caudillos with the greatest influence were provincial or regional chiefs. In
the long period of caudillos and montoneras that extends from the 1811
Artigas rebellion to the consolidation of the power of the national State in
Again, an example from Córdoba, in this case from Tulumba, 1825, where the presence of scattered groups of armed men is mentioned. These men are seen as wrongdoers,
public thieves, including black men, and the groups are incorporated into larger groups commanded by a local chief: “[...] who at late hours of the night meet in suspicious and secret
places with their leader Don Manuel Figueroa y Cáceres, who has twelve armed men in his
house”, AHPC, Criminal Records Collection 1664–1902, File 156 (1825), Case 7: ‘Representation of the Local Judge of Villa de Tulumba (Pedro Celestino Celiz) Regarding Don
José Manuel Figueroa’s Removal Thereof ’.
44
For classic examples, see Chevalier, “The roots of Caudillismo” (note 5) and Díaz
Díaz, Caudillos y Caciques (note 7).
43
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1880, dozens of leaders of such hierarchy can be identified. They all invariably belonged to local elites.45 In some cases they came from the oldest and
most powerful families in their provinces (Ramírez in Entre Ríos, or Rosas,
for example). More often, they were from less central sectors of the elites
(Facundo Quiroga in La Rioja, Güemes, Artigas, López in Santa Fe, José
Felix Aldao in Mendoza, among others), who took advantage of the revolutionary crisis to raise themselves to a position that they most likely would
not have been able to achieve in the more controlled colonial context. But
even these more marginal members of the elites were closely interconnected through blood ties to distinguished families, frequently even beyond
their city of origin. These figures included large landowners, but also merchants, career army officer (naturally, they all eventually became military
officers), and even priests. In sum, they were members of different sectors
of the elite who had ambitions of power and who found in their military
charisma the way to further their political careers.46
Below them was a dense network of local leaders and subordinates.
Two different groups may be distinguished. On the one hand, leaders who
had a territorial base and who reproduced the main caudillo’s leadership on
a smaller scale in their territory. They often performed administrative functions, or acted as militia chiefs or officers in regular armies. They answered
to the provincial caudillos but enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy and
their actions were decisive for mobilising the men in their territory. Their
alliances could at times change, and the more successful among them could
hope to achieve power over their provinces.
The other type was made up of military leaders, retainers of the more
important caudillos, who enjoyed prestige and influence over mobilised
men but had no precise territorial base. Their autonomy and chances of
progress were more limited, although they were sometimes appointed to
military or administrative positions that enabled them to build local bases,
thus assimilating themselves to the prior group. These categories of leadership were less limited socially. While many of these smaller caudillos came
from well-established families, with local roots, including some large landowners, there are numerous examples of members of popular sectors, even,
for example, Indians as in the cases of Chumbita and Inca already mentioned, or Afro-Argentine men who, through their military careers, or as
45
Tulio Halperín Donghi, “El surgimiento de los caudillos en el cuadro de la sociedad
rioplatense post revolucionaria”: Estudios de Historia Social 1 (Buenos Aires 1965); and
Rubén Zorrilla, Extracción social de los Caudillos, 1810–1870 (Buenos Aires 1972).
46
In other Latin American countries, examples may be found of caudillos of prime
importance who emerged from popular sectors; but this is not the case in the River Plate.
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part of the close group of followers of their chiefs, attained positions as
high-ranking retainers. They even acquired lands, taking advantage of their
place in the political system, and became powerful landowners. But that
was as far as these kinds of characters were able to advance. Only territorial-based chiefs from respectable families could aspire to become provincial leaders.
Lastly there were the small or ‘grassroots’ leaders. Local small-time
caudillos, or caudillejos, who acted as lieutenants for lower-ranking leaders,
and who, like these leaders, could have territorial bases or not. Many of
them were no more than simple peasants, sometimes militia officers or non
commissioned officers (NCOs), who through charisma or military skills, or
other such qualities, achieved a certain leadership over the people of their
area. In some cases, like Cipriano Benítez’ montonera,47 they were able to
command an autonomous movement, but they usually acted as lesser intermediaries in the chain of loyalties that linked the rural population to the
more powerful caudillos. An important variation was that of young men
from respectable families who began their military careers in the army (usually as ‘alferez’48) or in mobilised militias. With time, their military skills
turned them into small leaders of troops, and they launched careers in the
military or in montoneras that might ultimately make them powerful leaders.
Many variations and combinations of these sketchy models can be
found looking at the individual careers of these men. What is in any case
evident is that as a caudillo’s career advanced and his power and influence
grew, the possibilities of continuing to expand that power became increasingly limited for anyone other than those who belonged to respectable families. Caudillismo was a career open to personal merit, but the dividing line
between common and respectable people established during colonial times
was not erased with independence, and the higher levels of power, unlike in
other Latin American experiences, were reserved for those who had been
born on the right side of the social cleavage. Thus, even though popular sectors had a key role in political struggles, and in more than one occasion
their support was decisive in the success of one or the other side, the real
struggle for power was still restricted to factions within the elites.49
This description leads to the question of the foundations of the bonds
linking major caudillos to their followers. This is in some sense a reformulation of the question of the basic motivations for participating in a montoFradkin, La historia de una montonera (note 21)
An alferez was a sort of an apprentice stage for young elite members in the military
career.
49
Míguez, “La construcción de un orden social” (note 24).
47
48
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nera. Various factors operated in the creation of the mobilising bond between
a leader and his people. Personal charisma played a major role, and was
often firmly grounded in the command these leaders gained in military bodies. Wolf and Hansen, Chevalier, and others, associate this charisma with
‘machismo,’ expressed in the capacity to dominate women and the readiness to use violence to reduce rivals. Although these factors were not
absent, the bases of charisma were more complex and varied, and personal
influence was not necessarily associated to machismo. For example, River
Plate folklore does not exalt the caudillos’ romantic feats or interpersonal
violence, but rather their military achievements and, above all, their loyalty
to the people and courage, along with qualities such as simplicity, intelligence, cunningness, cleverness, wisdom.50 The conglomerate of caudillo
units reproduces the structure of command in the armies or militias, where
NCOs and even the lowest-ranking officers were promoted based on their
popularity and leadership skills, when not directly chosen by their subordinates.51 Linked to this is the connection that men felt with their leader, based
on the structure of feelings mentioned above.
The distribution of material goods obtained through pillage naturally
played an important role in mobilising men. Another element was the
administration of justice. Being associated with a military leader could
exempt an individual from being judged by ordinary justice and it afforded
him protection. As a way of securing the loyalty of their men, caudillos
limited punishment to cases in which there was a moral pressure from the
group itself to make justice, or when the caudillo’s authority was questioned.52 Because even if the caudillo was by origin a member of the elites,
and his actions were never aimed at significantly altering the foundations of
the social order, his way of relating to the subordinate sectors that supported
him was undoubtedly very different from the distance and deference that
50
Domingo Sarmiento, Facundo. Civilización o barbarie (Buenos Aires 1938 [1845]);
De la Fuente, Children of Facundo (note 29) among others. John Charles Chasteen, Heroes
on Horseback. A Life and Times of the last Gaucho Caudillos (Albuquerque 1995), in a
somewhat romantic version of caudillismo, associates charisma with heroic qualities. He also
underlines the importance of interpersonal relations.
51
For examples of lesser chiefs chosen by montonera troops themselves, see Baigorria,
Memorias (note 23), or Arnold, Un soldado (note 25).
52
There is an extensive literature on local justice and social relations in the River Plate
during this period. For references, see Melina Yangilevich/Eduardo J. Míguez, “Justicia
criminal y Estado en la frontera de Buenos Aires, 1852–1880”: Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani 32 (Buenos Aires 2010), p. 107–136.
Even as late as 1862, a local caudillo like Benito Machado offered legal protection for his
men as a means of ensuring a leadership that strengthened his capacity for mobilising militias. Tandil Municipal Archive, 1862 File, doc. 092.
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the old colonial elites demanded. Caudillos sought to identify themselves
with popular culture, become one of the common people, while at the same
time maintaining that superior aura derived from their origin and power.
Caudillos and Political and Military Institutions
At this point it is necessary to distinguish two related but different phenomena. On the one hand, caudillo regimes that used armies with various
degrees of institutionalisation as the basis for their power. Though their
methods of combat, their social makeup, and the fact that the armies did not
necessarily wear a uniform led their rivals to label them as montoneras,
they were the actual bases of established political regimes, with popular
support. It should be noted that in contrast to the writings of the most
­fervent reformist supporters – which the historiography has frequently followed –, these caudillos were truly concerned with establishing institutional
bases for their power.53 The organisation of almost all the River Plate pro­
vinces was based on constitutions, charters or constitutional laws, many of
which were promoted by the provincial caudillos themselves, who in nearly
every case implemented in their territories forms of government in line with
such institutions, parallel to their own personal influence, naturally.
Roughly, these institutions drew on the republican ideas upheld by the revolution, so that caudillos have been seen as the most radical tendency in the
revolutionary process. It is true, however, as Chiaramonte has noted, that
they also appealed to classical institutions, as the facultades extraordinarias, or to juridical forms typical of the “ancient constitution”.54 However, in actual fact the political practices they implemented were frequently
closer to military señoríos than to a liberal or traditional constitutional
order.
Even so, the greater provincial caudillos occupied the position of governor, or, if they wanted to elude administrative tasks or taking up residence
in the capital city, they delegated such position on a close follower and
53
José Carlos Chiaramonte, “Legalidad constitucional o caudillismo: el problema del
orden social en el surgimiento de los estados autónomos del litoral argentino en la primer
mitad del siglo XIX”: Desarrollo Económico 102 (Buenos Aires 1986), p. 175–196; Noemí
Goldman, “Legalidad y legitimidad en el caudillismo. Juan Facundo Quiroga y La Rioja en
el interior rioplatense 1810–1835”: Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana
Dr. Emilio Ravignani 7 (Buenos Aires 1993) p. 31–58; Noemí Goldman/Sonia Tedeschi,
“Los tejidos formales del poder. Caudillos en el interior y el litoral rioplatenses durante la
primera mitad del siglo XIX”: Goldman/Salvatore, Caudillismos rioplatenses (note 4)
54
Chiaramonte, “The ancient constitution” (note 10).
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occupied instead the post of rural militia commander. His retainers usually
held officer positions in the provincial army or militias. They could also be
justices of the peace, performing administrative, political and judicial duties
in their districts. At times they acted as regional chiefs, combining military
and administrative duties. In this sense, caudillismo was merged into the
institutional system, and montonera forces consubstantiate with a regular
army or militia.
This institutional caudillismo is very different from popular revolts.
Montoneras occasionally took place against authorities that had come to
power with little popular support. They could be sparked by a critical situation – for example, recruitment pressures from the government to form
armies for international wars.55 But in general they responded above all to a
political stance. Invariably these mobilisations occurred at moments of
political turmoil and they supported one of the sides in conflict. These
rebellions could vary in scale, and therefore in nature. On one end, was the
large montonera, with a provincial leader, often with national repercussions
and clearly defined political objectives. On the other is the small montonera
band, which could sometimes be a basic unit of a larger mobilisation, and at
other times a somewhat autonomous phenomenon. There is often an intermediate scale, formed by groups of no more than 100–200 men (in turn
formed by even smaller units). At times their leaders were spurred into
action by a provincial or national faction and operated under its coordination; but at other times they mobilised spontaneously, although siding with
a faction. They even anticipate the main leaders’ intentions and pressured
them into action. Sometimes they succeeded, and the provincial leaders
went on to head a movement that had originated with subordinate caudillos.
But at other times they failed, and the montonera had limited influence and
was repressed, accused of being a mere band of outlaws.
What interconnects these two types of situations is that the actors were
actually the same in both. When a popular revolt was successful in conquering power for the main caudillo, the winning faction incorporated many of
the lower leaders into the state structure, and the men who had fought were
turned into regular paid troops, or militias with other kinds of benefits (legal
protection, lands, public jobs, etc.). When a caudillo was forced out of
power in his province, if his local command structure was not co-opted by
the new authorities – not always possible, among other things because of
the endurance of political identities –, it could stay dormant, potentially
mobilised again by the leaders’ efforts to regain power. At other times, the
It has also been suggested that they could be triggered by adverse economic conditions, such as droughts.
55
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new provincial chiefs were fearful of the power of local caudillos and
respected their position, even if they could not guarantee their loyalty. Thus,
an incumbent local chief could join a rebellion (perhaps in support of his
former, defeated leader), turning into a montonera commander.
Caudillos, Montoneras and Popular Politics
By insisting on the political nature of montoneras – even when they were
minor local movements that failed to turn into generalised rebellions and
lacked an important leader – some historians have sought to distinguish
them from mere highwaymen bands. Although not posed in such terms, the
issue evokes the classic motive of ‘class consciousness.’ In the 1960s and
1970s, very influential works by Hobsbawm, Rudé and others established a
sort of hierarchy (to some extent implicit) of social movements, based on
their degree of autonomy, their anti-establishment nature and the degree of
popular solidarity. The lowest form of social discontent was that of the
criminal, totally devoid of social conscience.56 The social bandit was somewhat higher in the conscience scale. The highest point was occupied by
autonomous political movements that clearly and cohesively expressed the
sectorial demands of workers and peasants.
This model has since been questioned,57 but the issue of political
awareness in popular movements has not lost its interest. In this respect, at
one extreme, montoneras have been seen as the manipulation of the lower
sectors in conflicts commanded by large landowner caudillos;58 on the
other, as popular rebellions against the establishment.59 There were naturally a wide variety of situations, so a common denominator would be
somewhat strained. Two things are evident, however. First, montoneras
were not autonomous movements in the sense of expressing social discontent outside the framework of the political conflicts of the traditional governing elites. They did not aspire to gain power with the purpose of overturning the socio-political order. Second, the subaltern sectors that
participated in the movements had their own agendas, which colour the
politics of the movements they participated in, so that these contained popular demands, at least to a certain extent. In extreme cases, like Salta and
56
George Rudé, Criminal and Victim. Crime and Society in Early Nineteenth Century
England (Oxford 1985).
57
See, for example, James Scott’s works, or ‘subaltern history’, applied to this context
by Salvatore, Wandering Paisanos (note 19).
58
Lynch, Argentine Dictator (note 8).
59
Frega, Pueblos y soberanía (note 26); Mata, Los gauchos de Güemes (note 27).
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particularly the Banda Oriental, these demands could include significant
economic issues, including land ownership. Most of the times, however,
popular objectives were more modest, such as resisting reform projects or
recruitment for regular armies, preserving traditional rights, seeking a political climate more in line with popular sensitivity and trying to preserve
their symbolic space in social representation.
None of the caudillo-based regimes that dominated for a significant
length of time would introduce significant changes in the socio-economic
structure. Güemes’ or Artigas’ extreme measures were in fact applied, as
seen above, in particularly critical situations, with widespread mobilisations, and were short-lived. However, if popular experience during this
period is compared to the marginal place reserved for Creole rural masses
in the regimes headed by reformist elites in the consolidation of the national
State in the last forty years of the nineteenth century, it is evident that popular participation in political conflicts following independence was not in
vain, as it allowed popular sectors to maintain a political climate that was
clearly more favourable to them. Not much, but to them it was certainly
very significant.
The Economics of Montoneras
These modest achievements did, however, have their costs. While it is quite
evident that the goals of montonera movements were essentially political –
in the terms defined here –, it is also clear that obtaining resources to support the armies was a vital requirement for this form of political action.
More importantly, once montonera groups had been formed, pillage was
inevitable, as seen above. The possibility of looting the enemy was one of
the motivations for attracting men, and the rewards that caudillos of various
influence could offer them. It was not easy, however, to limit looting to the
enemy. There are numerous testimonies of the difficulties leaders had to
control their men after a battle.60 This was true for regular armies, and more
so in the case of militias and montoneras. The worst situations naturally
occurred when non subdued Indians were brought into the conflict. But
there are numerous testimonies of how pillage of the enemy degenerated
into pillage of neutral parties and ultimately even of allies.61 Wolf and
Arnold, Un soldado (note 25), p. 31­f.
This was not a very unique problem. It has been discussed in the case of the raiding of
haciendas of Gachupines (pejorative name given to Spaniards living in Mexico) and Americans during Mexico’s wars for independence; see Díaz Díaz, Caudillos y caciques (note 7).
60
61
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Hansen saw this, noting that one of the skills caudillos needed to have was
the ability to identify what was ‘safe game’ as a source of resources.62 But
they probably required even more skill in limiting looting to just ‘safe
game’.
This posed a great paradox for montonera leaders. In order to satisfy
their men and their military needs, they had to resort to whatever resources
were available, live off the land, so to speak. At times they had support
from local people, who were even able to derive some advantage from the
disruption of order.63 This support was vital in terms of military tactics, but
also for strategic reasons in terms of the construction of a political order.
However, there was frequently a great risk of turning the local population
against them.64 A common situation in civil conflicts was that between large
battles, small, scattered bands would wander the countryside in search of
their troops, looking to recruit more men among other scattered groups or
the civilian population. They could spend months living in temporary
camps, off local resources, waiting for the opportunity to attack the enemy.
Whenever possible they preferred to rely on partisan support or help from
friends or families. But this was not always possible. The caudillo Manuel
Baigorria gives an account of how in his youth he formed part of such a
group that wandered across San Luis, commanded by a leader named
Chamorro. He says in his memoirs (written in the third person):
“Baigorria, as a son of the country and someone who understood men, would tell
Chamorro: Friend, this gathering is not wise. We will have to seize what does not
belong to us and take on the label of facciosos [did he mean bandits?] and these
men, who know nothing of delicacy, will grow bored with time and will compromise us even more.”65
Regardless of the political goal behind the mobilisation, the dividing line
between montoneras and outlaw bands was very thin. Both Arnold (1970)
and Baigorria (1975) recall having been accused of mere robbers and defend
themselves from such accusation. Baigorria mentions once and again in his
memoirs that he acted “with delicacy” (Arnold suggests the same), which
probably means that, whenever possible, he stopped his men from being too
violent, robbing abusively or committing rape and kidnapping. Córdoba
Wolf/Hansen, “Caudillo Politics“ (note 6), p. 173.
Ayrolo, “Entre la patria” (note 22), and eadem, “Hombres armados” (note 22).
64
In 1822, the priest Pedro I. Vieyra, of the Tercero Arriba parish, denounced the aftermath of a montonera’s passage through the area: “[...] there is destruction everywhere and the
parish and its people are in a deplorable state; the montonera has left us almost without food
[...].” AAC, File 40, Vol. I.
65
Prudencio Arnold makes similar comments in his memoirs, Un soldado (note 25), p. 62.
62
63
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leader Manuel Torres (with Pérez Bulnes’ group) had a difficult time controlling his men – almost all Afro-Argentines – who had rebelled and wanted
to kill the local parish priest.66 But control was not always possible, and the
situation became especially critical when the so-called ‘resources war’ – the
appropriation and destruction of available property to curtail the supplies of
enemy forces – was resorted to, as it often was.
In short, the war was a great destroyer of wealth, causing chaos and
violence, not just in the battlefield. And while both regular armies and montonera troops preferred to avail themselves of the resources of large establishments, expropriating the enemy and issuing attachment deeds to supporters so they would receive state compensation after the expected
victory,67 as the conflicts dragged on, the entire rural population was
affected by depredation.68 And participants in montonera movements were
themselves highly aware that this weakened their position, precisely
because their political motivations made seeking the approval of the rural
population one of their main goals. Raiding was inevitably a form of livelihood for montonera bands, but it was far from being their goal. On the
contrary, the ultimate goal of every caudillo was re-establishing peace and
order, thus obtaining the consensus and support of the bulk of the population.69 A frequent accusation made by Rosas against reformist elites was
that their projects for establishing centralised power and reforming social
practices generated constant conflicts, wars and disturbances.
Conclusión: Caudillismo as a Socio-Political Order
In this context, montoneras were not just occasional manifestations of discontent in situations that challenged legitimacy, but rather the expression of
the fragile grounds on which the very social order rested. The limit between
banditry and montoneras is not, therefore, marked by the State – which did
AAC, Legajo 37, vol. VI.
For examples of montonera troops who tried to keep up this practice, see reference in
note 17.
68
In one extreme case, in the province of Entre Ríos, from 1810 to 1823, cattle stock
dwindled from 2.5 million heads to some 40,000 animals. Roberto Smith, Ruina y resurrección en tiempos de guerra. Sociedad, Economía y poder en el oriente de Entre Ríos posrevolucionario, 1810–1852 (Buenos Aires 2004), p. 97–102. Not all had been killed; many
had wandered into the wilderness in an area that still had much unoccupied land.
69
In reference to the city of Buenos Aires, Mark Szhuchman “Household Structure and
Political Crisis: Buenos Aires, 1810–1860”: Latin American Research Review XXI, 3 (1986),
p. 55–93 has suggested in an award-winning article that Rosas’ support was gained in part
through his capacity to preserve peace and order.
66
67
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not have legitimacy to do so – but by society itself. If they were no more
than predatory forces they would lack any form or attempt at building legitimacy and the situation would be closer to Hobbes’ anarchy. In fact, whenever the opponents of any montonera accused it of ‘anarchism’ they clearly
reflected this situation. Wolf and Hansen suggest that caudillismo was a
form of social organisation in which resource pillaging, war and violence
were a dimension of economy and society. This type of phenomenon is
known in different societies, especially in frontiers – the Christian-Muslim
frontier in Spain, for example –,70 or in other medieval conflict areas. But
that was not the case with montoneras and caudillos in the River Plate.
Looting was a consequence of war, not a way of life. Though war implied
depredation, its ultimate goal was the restoration of order. A key factor is
what kind order was to be restored. The demise of Bourbon legitimacy did
not lead to a total absence of social order. Social order was reconstructed at
two levels.
On a more narrow level, it was supported by the traditional rules that
governed the daily coexistence of communities. What role did the State
play here? Was there a Hobbesian guarantor of this micro-social order? Or
was the social order maintained only by an agreed consensus, without any
authority – an established constituted and financed power – to guarantee it,
like in a stateless society?71 In this aspect, the situation varied widely from
one place to another. In provinces such as La Rioja or Santiago del Estero,
virtually without State resources and therefore with limited administrative
structure,72 the State’s presence was merely symbolic. In practice, the local
arbiter was a caudillo or caudillejo, who generally occupied an ad-honorem
post of chief of militias or justice of the peace.73 In Buenos Aires or Corrientes, the State, though weak, had resources with which to finance a
somewhat more effective presence throughout the territory, although it also
depended on local leaderships to enforce its authority. But in both cases, the
construction of a centralised order, with legitimacy bases that exceeded
local leaderships (the reformist liberal programme), clashed with this
micro-social order, and was another source of conflict. Only the consolidation of the central State in the second half of the nineteenth century gradu-
Chevalier, “The Roots of Caudillismo” (note 5) makes this comparison.
An example of this type of situation in Mexico may be found in the description of the
early stage of San José de Gracia by Luis Gonzáles Gonzáles, Pueblo en Vilo (México 1968).
72
As an indicator, in the 1850s La Rioja, with two-thirds the surface area of England
(90,000 km.) and some 50,000 inhabitants, only had 64 employees on the payroll, including
everyone from the governor down to three regiment drummers.
73
Ariel De la Fuente aptly illustrates this for La Rioja, Children of Facundo (note 19).
70
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ally overcame and eventually suppressed this form of resistance, subjecting
all the social space to State institutions.
In a broader level, the power structure articulated by caudillismo consisted in a relative change in the weight that different already-existing
mechanisms had. In the hierarchical colonial society the leading local factor
in the construction of power was the recognition obtained by other members of the social elites, besides, naturally, the external sanction by the
Crown. Those who participated in power were not only members of the
elites, they formed their core, and that was precisely the source of their
prestige and power. The Cabildo was the emblematic space where their
power was established. The elites naturally had patronage connections outside their ranks, in wider society. But these only fulfilled marginal functions
in the structure of authority, as the situation of subaltern sectors in colonial
society was normally that of generic submission to social hierarchies (which
did not mean renouncing the defence of individual or collective rights and
interests).
The revolution eliminated the external factor and in a short time altered
the mechanisms on which social domination rested. While the predominance of the elites was not altered, the way in which power was defined
within it varied significantly. Although the role of recognition by the elite
did not disappear – and this explains why caudillos attributed considerable
importance to the maintenance of institutional forms –, the capacity to win
support and mobilise sectors outside the elite became a decisive element in
the determination of power. The ruralisation of power so stressed by Sarmiento has to do with this change in the mechanisms for determining power.
In the countryside, the autonomy and relative weight of the subaltern sectors was greater than in urban spaces. And because of its lifestyle, the countryside was an easier recruitment ground for montoneras. But, while with
lesser weight, popular urban sectors played a role in this democratisation of
government.74
This in part implied an increase of the relative weight of charismatic
factors. But it also implied the existence of certain rational factors, as the
implementation of policies that favoured subaltern sectors was obviously an
important element for securing their support. This rationality was not necessarily conducive to change. Instead, it often sought to preserve certain
forms that were perceived as part of the traditional social order. But that
does not mean that from the perspective of subaltern actors the support they
gave to certain leadership was not grounded to a certain extent on an
Gabriel Di Meglio, ¡Viva el bajo pueblo! La plebe urbana de Buenos Aires y la
política entre la revolución de mayo y el rosismo (Buenos Aires 2007).
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‘agenda.’ The fact that the more influential caudillos belonged to the elite
shows the permanence of traditional forms of social domination. But these
are strengthened by elements that go beyond the Weberian framework. If
the traditional factor can be essentially translated into the availability of a
broad symbolic capital, the availability of economic, relational and cultural
resources undoubtedly played an important role in preserving the predominance of these families as the origin of the more powerful caudillos.
But if the members of the elite maintained their role of exclusive candidates to the highest positions of social control, the way power was distributed within the elite changed. Players who were relatively marginal to the
world of the powerful could now move into centre stage pushed by the support of subaltern sectors, making the main mechanism of power in the caudillo era one which had only occupied a subsidiary place during colonial
times. Moreover, popular support was structured in a pyramid of leaderships that gave some individuals outside the traditional groups the possibility of acquiring an unprecedented leading role in the command structures.
And while after 1810 voting was rapidly sanctioned institutionally as
the means for legitimising government, the lack of transparency to make it
effective, and above all the absence of a tradition in this form of legitimisation, meant that armed struggle was the usual way of resolving power disputes. It may even be argued that when government disputes were effectively solved through institutional means it was above all because of the
preservation or reconstruction of power mechanisms more characteristic of
colonial times, through which a relatively consensual agreement within the
elite placed its more prestigious men in power.75 In this sense, the increasing institutional stability after 1853 gradually led to the regime of notables
known as ‘oligarchic order’, consolidated in 1880. But in the era of caudillos, the use or threat of force was a vital element in their power bases.
There were no doubt times in which obtaining armed support was based
on traditional power structures, or on the application of economic resources,
even the State’s own economic resources, with regular armies maintained
by tax collection (an alternative that was almost exclusively possible in the
province of Buenos Aires, due to the fiscal weakness of the other provinces). It is also unquestionable that in certain circumstances, particularly
when political and military unrest was greatest, the acquisition of resources
through looting and its ensuing distribution among military contingents
(basis of caudillismo according to Wolf’s and Hansen’s interpretation) was
an important element of the system. But the stability of the caudillo regime,
Marcela Ternavasio, La revolución del voto. Política y elecciones en Buenos Aires,
1810–1852 (Buenos Aires 2002).
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the predominant form of power in the River Plate from 1820 until its gradual decline starting in 1853, was sustained by personal relations that were
not exclusively economic. In this sense, the militias, by generating a civilian and military basis for caudillo power, grounded on identity factors and
the institutional legal protection granted by the caudillo, in addition to the
channelling of material resources – through various means, from the payment of wages to facilitating access to land – were a crucial factor in the
caudillo system.
To ensure their basis of support, caudillo regimes that sought to establish themselves firmly in power had to make concessions to the subaltern
sectors that had supported them, in order to retain their loyalty. The already
mentioned examples of Artigas, Güemes and Urquiza are perhaps the most
eloquent. It was not the permanent looting of resources what they sought,
but means for a rather modest redistribution of wealth, aimed at ensuring
the loyalty of their following. In many cases, such as Rosas’, López’, Bustos’ and others, the most significant permanent concessions were mainly
limited to local leaders, and the wider sectors that participated in the mobilisation had to settle for symbolic rewards, the restriction of reforms that
could aggravate them and a generic popular style in government. Following
the dismantling of the form of social domination typical of the colonial era,
caudillismo opened a new stage in which popular participation was
expanded as a basis of power. The consolidation of the national State in the
second half of the nineteenth century gradually brought with it a reconstruction of a more pronounced verticality in social hierarchies, which marked
the end of the era of caudillismo.
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