In the Supreme Court of the United States
March 12, 2013
JOE PUBLIC AND JANE PRIVATE,
PETITIONERS
v.
ENTERTAINMENT TABLOID, INC. AND RADTV,
RESPONDENTS
On Writ of Certiorari to
The Radnor Supreme Court
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
Counsel for Respondents,
Team 19
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented ............................................................................................................... VII
Statement of Jurisdiction ....................................................................................................... VII
Statement of Facts .....................................................................................................................1
Summary of the Argument .......................................................................................................4
Argument ...................................................................................................................................5
THE STATE OF RADNOR’S DECISION TO ELIMINATE ITS CITIZENS’ RIGHT TO
A CIVIL JURY TRIAL SOLELY BECAUSE OF FISCAL FINANCIAL CONCERNS
VIOLATES THE SEVENTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION. .....................................................................................................5
A. Standard of Review ...................................................................................................................... 5
B. The right to a civil jury trial is a fundamental right which is recognized by the United States
Constitution and every State other than Radnor. ............................................................................. 6
1. The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution grants citizens the right to a civil jury
trial. ................................................................................................................................................. 6
2. Every State other than Radnor recognizes and preserves the right to a civil jury trial. .................. 6
C. This Court should hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution incorporates the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial. ......... 8
1. This Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates
certain enumerated rights granted by the first eight amendments of the United States Constitution
and this Court has incorporated almost all those rights. .................................................................... 8
2. This Court has never decided whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the right to civil jury trials. ......................................................................................... 10
3. Justices of the Supreme Court have urged this Court to hold that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the entire Bill of Rights since its purpose is to make all
constitutional rights applicable to both federal and state action. ...................................................... 11
D. This Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury trial and the Seventh
Amendment right to a civil jury trial satisfies the same test for incorporation. ............................ 12
1. The right to a civil jury trial is a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which lies at the base
of the United States’ political and civil institutions. ........................................................................ 12
2. The right to a civil jury trial is basic to our system of jurisprudence. .......................................... 13
3. The right to a civil jury trial is fundamental and essential to a fair trial. ..................................... 13
THE RADNOR SUPREME COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE PETITIONERS’ FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO ACCESS THE COURT BY AFFIRMING THE RADNOR
CIRCUIT COURT’S STRIKING THE PETITIONERS’ MERITLESS CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING THEM TO AMEND
THE COMPLAINT. ...............................................................................................................16
A. Standard of Review .................................................................................................................... 16
B. The Petitioners’ cause of action for declaratory judgment is meritless and it was proper to
strike it from the complaint. ............................................................................................................ 16
II
1. Petitioners’ cause of action for declaratory judgment is not a procedural fundamental right that
would permit automatic access to the courts. .................................................................................. 17
C. The Respondents statements are protected by the Free Speech Clause because the Petitioners
are public figures and therefore the Petitioners must show actual malice, which has not been
shown here. ...................................................................................................................................... 18
1. Joe Public and his wife Jane Private are Public Figures as a matter of law. ................................ 18
D. The Court was correct in ordering Plaintiffs to re-file their amended complaint without the
declaratory judgment request for the shifting of the burden of proof. .......................................... 23
E. It was proper to strike the Amended Complaint from the record under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(f). ............................................................................................................................... 24
Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................25
III
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Point I
Cases
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) ............................................................................... 11
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) .........................................................................................9
Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935) ..................................................... 12
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) .............................................................6
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) ...................................................................................9
Blades v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317 (Colo. 1985) ...............................................................................7
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) .............................................5
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) .............................................................................9
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) ................................................9
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999)........................... 12
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) ....................................................................................9
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) ................................................................ 9, 12, 13, 14
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) ..................................................................................9
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) .......................................................................... 9, 12
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ....................................................................................9
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) .......................................................................................... 9, 12
Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752 (1942) ........................................................................ 13
Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. 274 (1869) .......................................................................................9
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) ..........................................................................9
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ...................................................................................... 9, 12
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ......................................................................................... 7, 9
Marcile v. Dauzat, 103 So. 3d 335 (La. 2010) .............................................................................7
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)............................................... 9, 10, 11
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894) .................................................................................. 14
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) ......................................... 10
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)......................................................................................9
Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) ......................................................... 13
Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. 433 (1830) ...................................................6
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) ................................................................................... 9, 12
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ..................................................................................... 12
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) ............................................................................. 10
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) .................................................................................. 14
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) ....................................................................................9
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) .................................................................................... 14
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ..................................................................................... 7, 9
IV
Statutes
COLO. R. CIV. P. 38.....................................................................................................................7
FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a) ...................................................................................................................6
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. Ann. art. 1731 ...........................................................................................7
Constitutional Provisions
KY. CONST. § 7 ...........................................................................................................................6
MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 5(a)(1) .......................................................................................6
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 3 ................................................................................................................7
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ............................................................................................................. 12
U.S. CONST. amend. VII ..............................................................................................................6
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ............................................................................................................8
Other Authorities
L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History 281
(1960) .................................................................................................................................... 13
Point II
Cases
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ....................................................................... 23
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556. U.S. 662 (2009) ............................................................................... 17, 22
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 500 U.S. 544 (2007) ................................................................ 22
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ........................................................................ 17, 18
Bose Corp v. Consumers Union of United States Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). .............................. 16
Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co., Inc., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980) .............................................. 19
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) ............................ 16
Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F. 2d. 206 (7th Cir. 1976) ................................................... 19, 20
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) ............................................... 18
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) ................................................................................ 23
Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) .............................................................................. 19
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) .................................................................................. 17, 18
Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1964) .......................................................................... 21
Milkovich v. Lorian Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). ................................................................. 21
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). ................................................................................. 17
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)................................................................ 19, 20
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1964) ............................................ 23, 24
Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2012)............................... 22
Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H.Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1983) .............................................. 24
Statutes
28 U.S.C.A. §1915(e)(2) ........................................................................................................... 16
V
FED. R. CIV. P 12(f) .................................................................................................................. 24
Other Authorities
Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 644 (1999). .................................. 16, 18
53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 192. ............................................................ 24
VI
Questions Presented
1.)
Did the Radnor Supreme Court err in affirming the Radnor Fiscal Emergency Plan which
eliminated individuals’ United States Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment right to a civil jury
trial, solely because of the State of Radnor’s fiscal financial concerns?
2.)
Did the Radnor Supreme Court violate the Petitioners’ First Amendment right to petition
the government for redress of grievances when it affirmed the Radnor Circuit Court striking the
Petitioners’ cause of action for declaratory judgment and ordered the Amended Complaint to be
re-filed without it?
Statement of Jurisdiction
The Petitioners filed their defamation action against the Respondents in the Radnor
Circuit Court, which has general jurisdiction over all civil matters. The Radnor Supreme Court
denied both the Petitioners and the Respondents discretionary jurisdiction according to the laws
of the State of Radnor, thus affirming the Circuit Court’s decision.
Petitioners Joe Public and Jane Private and Respondents Entertainment Tabloid, Inc.
(“ETI”) and RADTV filed separate petitions for writ of certiorari, which were granted and
consolidated by this Court. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
VII
Statement of Facts
Background
Joe Public is a well-known and beloved actor recognized for his role in the Radnor soap
opera Wild Flower. (R. 2). He recently married Jane Private. (R. 2). ETI is incorporated under
the laws of Radnor and produces many television broadcasts, including Gossip Show, a daily
tabloid entertainment news program. (R. 2). Gossip Show airs on Channel 5, which is owned by
Radnor corporation RADTV, a subsidiary of RAD International Group. (R. 2). Article III,
sections 1 and 5 of the Radnor Constitution provide a heightened standard of protection to its
citizens regarding their honor, reputation, private or family life, and their dignity. (R. 1).
The Radnor Fiscal Emergency Plan
Following decades of wasteful governmental spending in Radnor, the state Legislature
presented its citizens with a package of reforms to help balance the budget. (R. 1). The Radnor
Fiscal Emergency Plan sought to severely slash state spending and during the November general
election the citizens of Radnor voted in favor of the Plan. (R. 1). Among the cuts in the Plan,
Radnor eliminated the statutory right to civil jury trials, eliminated its Appellate Court, and
established discretionary-only jurisdiction for civil cases in the Radnor Supreme Court. (R. 1-2).
Initial Television Broadcasts
Gossip Show is the most widely viewed television show in Radnor. (R. 2). On May 23,
Gossip Show aired a segment about Joe Public and his recent marriage to Jane Private. (R. 2).
Gossip Show’s Paparazzi Dan tried to interview Joe Public on his arrival to Knighton City Hall.
(R. 2). When he was unable to do so, he stated that Joe Public’s city hall wedding had a slew of
bodyguards, that Jane Private tried to stay away from the public eye, and that the reason they
1
were marrying was because their sexual relationship began when she was still a minor. (R. 2).
He also reported that Jane Private was two months pregnant. (R. 2).
Four days after this initial broadcast, Joe Public appeared on Tabloid Zone, Gossip
Show’s main competitor. (R. 3).
During this interview he claimed that the information
broadcasted by the Gossip Show was false. (R. 3). Joe Public discussed that the rumors being
spread were upsetting and that they had to cancel their honeymoon. (R. 3). Joe Public claimed
that some of his endorsement deals had been terminated as a result of Gossip Show’s broadcast.
(R. 3).
Commencement of the Cause of Action
The Petitioners commenced this lawsuit on December 2 by filing their complaint against
ETI and RADTV in the Radnor Circuit Court. (R. 3). The Petitioners alleged three claims
against ETI and RADTV relating to the May 23 Gossip Show broadcast:
(1) the statements made during the broadcast were defamatory and slanderous;
(2) the statements caused the Petitioners mental pain and anguish; and
(3) Joe Public’s professional career has suffered as a result of the statements.
(R. 3-4). The Petitioners claimed that they are entitled to heightened protections of their privacy
rights as guaranteed by the Radnor Constitution. (R. 4). Thus, they sought declaratory judgment
to shift the burden of proof to ETI and RADTV. (R. 4). To support the Petitioners’ claims, a
marketing consultant conducted a preliminary evaluation of the statements made, which found
that eighty percent of Radnor citizens believed the statements to be true. (R. 4).
ETI and RADTV answered the complaint by denying most of the allegations, including
the declaratory judgment to shift the burden of proof. (R. 4). They argued that the Petitioners’
proposed burden-shifting scheme was contrary to Supreme Court precedent. (R. 4).
2
Additionally, ETI and RADTV filed a counter-request for declaratory judgment, questioning the
constitutionality of the Radnor Fiscal Emergency Plan’s elimination of civil jury trials. (R. 4).
They asserted that the state cannot violate citizens’ right to a civil jury trial granted to them by
the Seventh, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. (R. 4). Additionally, depriving citizens’ right to a civil jury denies them of their
due process rights and their privileges and immunities as American citizens. (R. 4).
Investigative Report
Gossip Show aired an investigative report eight months after Joe Public’s appearance on
Tabloid Zone. (R. 5). The report included an interview with a young woman who claimed to
have had previous sexual encounters with Joe Public. (R. 5). Jane Private claimed that she
became distraught by this information. (R. 5).
She further claimed that she suffered a
miscarriage accompanied by depression and a hospital stay in a psychiatric ward. (R. 5). She
continues to receive treatment for her mental illness. (R. 5). The Petitioners filed an Amended
Complaint to include new causes of action related to this investigative report. (R. 5).
Motion to Dismiss, Striking of the Amended Complaint, and Subsequent Appeals
The Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss ETI and RADTV’s request for declaratory
judgment as to their right to a civil jury trial because Joe Public knew that a jury would find
against him. (R. 5). ETI and RADTV answered the motion to dismiss arguing that the right to a
civil jury trial is fundamental to the American scheme of justice and is deeply rooted in our
nation’s history. (R. 5).
The Radnor Circuit Court ordered the Petitioners’ Amended Complaint to be stricken
from the record and ordered the Plaintiffs to re-file their Amended Complaint without the request
for declaratory judgment to shift the burden of proof. (R. 6). The judge also affirmed the
3
sections of the Radnor Fiscal Emergency Plan which eliminated civil jury trials. (R. 6). Both
parties sought timely reconsideration of the Radnor Circuit Court’s decision. (R. 6). The court
denied both requests without opinion. (R. 6). Both parties sought discretionary review by the
Radnor Supreme Court. (R. 6). The court denied discretionary review by a vote of five to four,
thus affirming the Radnor Circuit Court’s decision. (R. 7). Each party filed separate petitions for
writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court of the United States. (R. 7). This Court granted and
consolidated both petitions. (R. 7).
Summary of the Argument
This case first presents the question of the constitutionality of the Radnor Fiscal
Emergency Plan which eliminated citizens’ United States Seventh Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment right to a civil jury trial. First, the right to a civil jury trial is a fundamental right
which is protected by the United States Constitution and by every state other than the State of
Radnor. Second, although this Court has incorporated nearly all of the enumerated rights granted
by the Bill of Rights, this Court has never decided whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the right to a civil jury trial. This Court should incorporate
said right. Lastly, the right to a civil jury trial is a fundamental principle of liberty and justice
which lies at the base of our political and civil institutions, is basic to our system of
jurisprudence, and is essential to a fair trial. Accordingly, the right to a civil jury trial satisfies
the same test this Court used to incorporate the right to a criminal jury trial. As a result, this
Court should reverse the decision of the Radnor Supreme Court, finding that the Radnor Fiscal
Emergency Plan violated Radnor citizens’ right to a civil jury trial.
This case next presents the question of whether it was a violation of the Petitioners’ First
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances when the Radnor Supreme
4
Court affirmed the Radnor Circuit Court’s striking the Petitioners’ cause of action and ordered
the Amended Complaint to be re-filed without it. The First Amendment grants two fundamental
rights; the procedural right to petition the courts for the redress of grievances and the substantive
right to Free Speech, both of which are applicable here. The Petitioners’ procedural First
Amendment right to petition the courts has not been violated because the request for declaratory
judgment to shift the burden of proof is baseless, as they have not provided only conclusory
allegations of defamation, which does not meet the actual-malice standard required for public
figures.
Further, the Respondents’ substantive First Amendment rights to free speech are
protected under the Free Speech Clause and thus the burden-shifting request by the Petitioners is
inappropriate. Because the Petitioners are both public figures, evidence of actual malice is
required to sustain a claim. The Petitioners have been unable to show in any way that the
statements were made with actual malice. Therefore, the Respondents’ speech falls within the
scope and protection of the Free Speech Clause. It was appropriate to deny the Petitioners’ right
of access to the courts as well as deny the request for the declaratory judgment to shift the burden
of proof to the defendant.
Argument
POINT I
THE STATE OF RADNOR’S DECISION TO ELIMINATE ITS
CITIZENS’ RIGHT TO A CIVIL JURY TRIAL SOLELY BECAUSE OF
FISCAL FINANCIAL CONCERNS VIOLATES THE SEVENTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review for constitutional issues in the United States Supreme Court is de
novo. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984).
5
B. The right to a civil jury trial is a fundamental right which is recognized by the United
States Constitution and every State other than Radnor.
1. The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution grants citizens the right to
a civil jury trial.
The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “[i]n [s]uits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial by a
jury, shall be preserved . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VII. This Court has long recognized and
protected the importance of the right to a civil jury trial. Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove &
Robeson, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830) (the right to a civil jury trial is “a fundamental guarantee of
the rights and liberties of the people”); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508
(1959) (held that in causes of action containing both legal and equitable aspects, courts must
adjudicate any and all legal issues before any equitable issues because an individual cannot be
deprived the right to a civil jury trial). The importance of the Seventh Amendment right to a
civil jury trial has also been codified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that “[t]he
right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution--or as provided
by a federal statute--is preserved to the parties inviolate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a). Additionally,
the right to a civil jury trial is not solely a federal right since the states have also recognized said
right.
2. Every State other than Radnor recognizes and preserves the right to a civil jury trial.
Every state, with the exceptions of Colorado and Louisiana, protects its citizens’ right to
a civil jury trial in their state constitutions. Although each state’s constitutional provisions
protecting the right may differ slightly in its language, the states agree that the right is a
fundamental right. See KY. CONST. § 7 (“The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred,
and the right thereof remain inviolate, subject to such modifications as may be authorized by this
Constitution.”); MD. CONST. DECL.
OF
RTS. art. 5(a)(1) (“That the Inhabitants of Maryland are
6
entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury according to the course of that
Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July,
seventeen hundred and seventy-six.”); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The right of trial by Jury shall be
secured to all and remain inviolate forever.”).
Notwithstanding that Colorado and Louisiana do not include the right to a civil jury trial
in their state constitutions, they have nonetheless codified the right in their state Codes of
Procedure. COLO. R. CIV. P. 38; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. Ann. art. 1731. Furthermore, the highest
courts in both Colorado and Louisiana have recognized that although the right is not written into
their state constitution, the legislatures in both states have granted the right to its citizens. Blades
v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317, 320 (Colo. 1985) (stated that although the right to a civil jury trial is not
granted by the state constitution, those entitled to the right by statute are entitled to a fair trial);
Marcile v. Dauzat, 103 So. 3d 335, 341-42 (La. 2010) (held that the trial court erred in denying a
motion for a jury trial because although it is not a constitutional right, the Louisiana Legislature
mandates a civil jury trial in certain cases).
This Court has given weighty consideration to a survey of the states in determining
whether a federal constitutional right is applicable to the states. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 29-30 (1949) (holding that the Exclusionary Rule is not applicable to the states because
nearly two-thirds of the states did not recognize the Exclusionary Rule and the Supreme Court
chose not to compel the states to recognize it), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52
(1961) (stated that the landscape of the Exclusionary Rule has changed now that the majority of
states recognize it). Since forty-eight states recognize the right to civil jury trials in their state
constitution and Colorado and Louisiana recognize the right in their Codes of Civil Procedure,
which has been upheld by each state’s highest appellate courts, the states clearly agree that right
7
to a civil jury trial is a fundamental right which must be protected against state action in order to
be properly preserved. As a result, Radnor is the only state that seeks to deprive its citizens of
the right to have juries adjudicate their causes of action in state courts.
In passing the Radnor Fiscal Emergency Plan, which eliminated the right to civil jury
trials solely for fiscal financial concerns, Radnor has chosen to repair its budget concerns at the
expense of its citizens’ civil liberties. (R. 1-2). Neither fiscal financial concerns nor a mere
public vote should serve to deprive individuals of their constitutional rights. Every state has
experienced, or is currently experiencing, budgetary concerns, but Radnor is the only state which
has failed to protect their citizens’ fundamental right to a civil jury trial due to alleged fiscal
financial concerns. This Court must therefore protect its citizens’ civil liberties from due process
violations by incorporating the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. This Court should hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution incorporates the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury
trial.
1. This Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates certain enumerated rights granted by the first eight amendments of the
United States Constitution and this Court has incorporated almost all those rights.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868 to ensure
that “[n]o State shall… deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This Court has decided on a case-by-case basis whether certain
enumerated rights granted by the Bill of Rights Amendments, all of which originally applied
only to federal action, are incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In one of the first instances of this selective incorporation, this Court held that the
Fifth Amendment protection against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment because otherwise due process
8
rights are violated. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 231 (1897). This
Court stated that the purpose of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to bind
the states to the same rights and protections granted to citizens against federal action. Id.
Since Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., this Court, in a long history of cases, has held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates almost all of the enumerated rights
protected by the Bill of Rights. All five enumerated rights granted by the First Amendment were
among the first rights to be incorporated.1
In 2010, this Court incorporated the Second
Amendment right to bear arms. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010).
The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, 2 the remedy for
such violations, 3 and the warrant requirements 4 have been incorporated by this Court. Two of
the three rights within the Fifth Amendment have been incorporated. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 9 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969)
(protection against double jeopardy). The entire Sixth Amendment has been incorporated. 5 This
Court has even incorporated a portion of the Seventh Amendment. Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S.
274, 281-82 (1869) (re-examination clause). Lastly, the Eighth Amendment protection against
1
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668-670 (1925) (freedom of speech); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (freedom of press); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)
(freedom of assembly); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (free exercise of
religion); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1947) (establishment of religion).
2
Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33
3
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (the Exclusionary Rule)
4
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964)
5
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948) (right to a public criminal trial); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (right to assistance of counsel); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403
(1965) (right to confront an adverse witness); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223
(1967) (right to a speedy criminal trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) (right to
compulsory process); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968) (right to a criminal jury
trial).
9
cruel and unusual punishment has been incorporated by this Court. Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
Although only a handful of enumerated rights granted by the Bill of Rights are not yet
incorporated, this Court has never had the opportunity to decide whether the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates those remaining rights.
Since this Court has
incorporated all the rights that have come before it, the right of civil jury trial should be
incorporated as well.
2. This Court has never decided whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the right to civil jury trials.
This Court has never reached the issue of whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial. Nearly a
century ago this Court held that the Seventh Amendment was inapplicable to the states.
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217-18 (1916). However, this
Court did not address the question of whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the right to a civil jury trial. Id. None of the enumerated rights granted
by the Bill of Rights were incorporated by only examining the specific Amendment which
originally granted the right, as this Court did in Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. Id. For this
reason, this Court acknowledged that Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. “long predate[s] the era
of selective incorporation” since this Court has determined the applicability of the Bill of Rights
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as opposed to
through the Bill of Rights Amendment itself. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3046 (2010) (“cases that
predate the era of selective incorporation held that… the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury
requirement do[es] not apply to the states”). Therefore, this issue is one of first impression for
this Court. Consistent with this Court’s history of finding that the Due Process Clause of the
10
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates certain rights, this Court should find that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not treat the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial differently than
every other incorporated right.
3. Justices of the Supreme Court have urged this Court to hold that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the entire Bill of Rights since its
purpose is to make all constitutional rights applicable to both federal and state action.
Justice Hugo Black, joined by Justice William O. Douglas, famously advocated for the
incorporation of every enumerated right in the first eight amendments instead of deciding the
issues on a case-by-case basis. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J.
concurrence). In Adamson, Justice Black stated:
[H]istory conclusively demonstrates that the language of the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, taken as a whole, was thought by those responsible for
its submission to the people, and by those who opposed its submissions,
sufficiently explicit to guarantee that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens
of the privileges and protections of the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 74-75.
Justice Black concluded that the purpose of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights, not to pick and choose which
civil liberties should be afforded the same protections by the states. Id. at 90-92.
Although this Court decides whether particular enumerated rights are applicable to the
states on a case-by-case basis, “[o]nly a handful of the Bill of Rights protections remain
unincorporated” and have never been determined by this Court. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035.
Justice Black’s theory is consistent with this Court’s approach to incorporation, particularly the
right to a civil jury trial since this right satisfies the same test this Court used to determine
whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates other rights, specifically the Sixth Amendment
right to a criminal jury trial.
11
D. This Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury trial and the
Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial satisfies the same test for incorporation.
This Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to criminal jury trials, which states that
“the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,” is
incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan, 391 U.S. at
157-58; See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
This Court acknowledged that the test for
incorporation has been phrased many different ways. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148. Accordingly,
this Court adopted a three prong test by combining previously used language to determine
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth
Amendment right to a criminal jury trial. Id. The three prong test requires this Court to
determine whether the right is (1) among the “fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions” (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
67 (1932)), (2) whether the right is “basic in our system of jurisprudence” (citing Oliver, 333
U.S. at 273), and (3) whether the right is “a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial” (citing
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-44; Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6; Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403). Duncan, 391 U.S.
at 148-49.
The right to a civil jury trial satisfies each of these elements for the test for
incorporation.
1. The right to a civil jury trial is a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which lies
at the base of the United States’ political and civil institutions.
This Court has stated that “[t]he right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which
existed under the English common law when the [Seventh Amendment] was adopted.” Baltimore
& Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935). Therefore, this Court uses a historical
approach to determine whether particular causes of action are entitled to a civil jury trial. City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 718 (1999). In Duncan, this
Court provided an extensive history of trial by jury, but no distinction was made between civil
12
trials and criminal trials since both rights are equally held sacred to safeguard one’s “life, liberty,
and property.” Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151-54. The importance of the jury trial was recognized in
the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, the Declaration of the Causes
and Necessities of Taking Up Arms, and the Declaration of Independence as a prominent reason
for the American Revolution due to royal interference with the right. Id. at 151-52.
As a result, the right to a civil jury trial was one of the only fundamental rights
unanimously included in the original state constitutions following the Revolution. Parklane
Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 341 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissent) (“[t]he right to trial
by jury was probably the only one universally secured by the first American state constitutions.”)
(citing L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History
281 (1960)). Since no distinction can be made between the historical significance of criminal
jury trials and civil jury trials from this Court’s historical reasoning in Duncan, the right to a civil
jury trial satisfies the first prong of the Duncan test.
2. The right to a civil jury trial is basic to our system of jurisprudence.
This Court has already stated that the right to civil jury trials is basic to our system of
jurisprudence. This Court stated:
The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental
feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh
Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether
guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be jealously guarded
by the courts.
Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942). Therefore, the second prong of the
Duncan test has been satisfied.
3. The right to a civil jury trial is fundamental and essential to a fair trial.
In Duncan, this Court held that juries in criminal trials were essential to a fair trial
because juries provide common sense judgment based on the facts of the case, which is
13
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice,” but made no distinction that juries were only
essential to criminal trials. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56. This Court found several reasons why
juries were essential to a fair trial, including protecting citizens from arbitrary actions, providing
the common sense judgment of a jury, and alleviating the fear of an unchecked power. Id. at 15658. The only difference between the jury in a civil trial and a jury in a criminal trial is the result
they are asked to reach, but the role of the jury remains the same in both civil and criminal
tribunals.
This Court has recognized the crucial role that juries play as the neutral fact-finders in
order to provide both parties with a fair trial. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)
(“The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power to make available the
commonsense judgment of the community . . .”); See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100
(1970) (“The purpose of the jury trial… is to prevent oppression by the Government”). The role
of the judge is to ensure that the law is properly followed by guiding the jury throughout the trial
and to correct any errors as they occur.
This Court has held that there is no constitutional or statutory right for any individual to
automatically appeal a judgment from the trial court. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88
(1894). Any alleged errors at the trial level are unlikely to be resolved in Radnor. The same
section of the Radnor Fiscal Emergency Plan which eliminated civil jury trials also eliminated
the Radnor Appellate Court. (R. 1). As a result, the only court of appeals in Radnor is the
Radnor Supreme Court, which has a limited, discretionary-only jurisdiction. (R. 1). Even if a
party can afford an expensive appeal, the chances of any alleged errors being reviewed are slim
to none because the Radnor Supreme Court must be selective in determining what is worthy of
an appeal. The elimination of juries in civil cases coupled with the elimination of the Radnor
14
Appellate Court diminishes the benefits of the judge to correct errors as they happen and
deprives the parties of a fair review process. Radnor has changed the entire landscape of civil
trials in the state by eliminating juries, altering the role of the judge, and depriving its citizens
from a fair review process. Since the elimination of jury trials in Radnor prevents a fair review
of the facts and further hinders a litigant’s ability to appeal a civil verdict, this Court may never
be afforded the opportunity again to decide this issue. It will be rare that citizens of Radnor will
have the same opportunity to correct errors under these circumstances.
This Court incorporated the right of criminal trials because it is a fundamental principle
of liberty at the base of our civil and political institutions, is basic to our system of jurisprudence,
and is essential to a fair trial. For these reasons, this Court should also incorporate the right to a
jury in civil cases. Every state other than Radnor has recognized a citizens’ right to a civil jury
trial and therefore this Court should recognize it is a fundamental right in order to preserve the
role that judges and juries have in the administration of a fair review process. If this Court does
not incorporate the right of the citizens to have civil juries as being applicable through the
Fourteenth Amendment, then citizens’ civil liberties will continue to be violated without due
process of law. Every United States citizen is entitled to a civil jury trial, no matter the tribunal,
and this Court should find that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the right to be applicable to the states.
15
POINT II
THE RADNOR SUPREME COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE
PETITIONERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO ACCESS THE
COURT BY AFFIRMING THE RADNOR CIRCUIT COURT’S STRIKING
THE PETITIONERS’ MERITLESS CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING THEM TO AMEND
THE COMPLAINT.
A. Standard of Review
This Court must review constitutional claims in a defamation case de novo. Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
B. The Petitioners’ cause of action for declaratory judgment is meritless and it was proper
to strike it from the complaint.
For a defamation claim to be meritorious, Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof to show that
defendants have acted with actual malice. The issue here is that the declaratory judgment has no
place in this case because the petitioners have not shown evidence of actual malice in their
complaint. As such, the declaratory judgment is baseless and it was right to deny Petitioners
access to court based on this cause of action.
This Court has held that “an individual's right of access to court is protected by the First
Amendment's clause granting the right to petition the government for grievances.” California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
However, the
government, whether through its courts, legislature, or executive, may define, alter, and even
eliminate causes of action without infringing the right to petition. Id.
In fact, the First
Amendment does not guarantee boundless access to courts, and the mere right to petition does
not guarantee that the government will grant the Petitioners’ request. The government is free to
deny the request. Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of
the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 644 (1999).
16
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §1915(e)(2) judges have the power to “pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly
baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Baseless claims are those claims that
do not state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556. U.S. 662, 667
(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. In the case at bar, the court has reviewed the claim and
the Amended Complaint and determined that the factual allegations are baseless, and have thus
rightfully denied the Petitioners access to the courts for redress of grievances. The Petitioners’
claim and Amended Complaint lacks sufficient evidence to move their complaint from the
category of “threadbare allegations,” Iqbal at 677, (as the Petitioners have only stated that the
Respondent’s statements were “defamatory” and “slanderous”), to state a claim that is “plausible
on its face,” Id. at 678 (where sufficient factual matter would support the claim).
1. Petitioners’ cause of action for declaratory judgment is not a procedural fundamental
right that would permit automatic access to the courts.
The Petitioners’ right of access to the courts would be proper if their claim involved a
procedural, fundamental due process right. Two seminal cases established the circumstances
under which the procedural fundamental rights of an individual would be infringed if the right of
access to the courts were denied. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), this Court
recognized the due process right to access only where judicial access is the exclusive means of
resolving the issue and no alternative method of solving the dispute is available. Further, in
Griffin v. Illinois this Court determined that it is a violation of an individual’s fundamental right
to not have access to the courts, but only in certain conditions. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). These
conditions were limited to divorce, eviction, paternity, and parental rights, and were focused on
indigent persons who may be precluded from their day in court because of lack of financial
17
funding. Id. It is apparent that using either the Griffin or Boddie categories, Petitioners do not
qualify. This is not a matter involving divorce, paternity, parental rights, or eviction, and he is
not indigent. As such, the court was right to deny him access.
The Tenth Amendment of the United Stated Constitution provides that powers not
granted to the federal government by the Constitution are reserved to the States or the People.
U.S. CONST. amemd. 10. Since a defamation claim is a state law action, “[a] state may set the
terms on which it will permit litigation in its courts.” Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp
337 U.S. 541, 552 (1949). The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution does not prevent a
State from prescribing a reasonable and appropriate condition precedent to the bringing of a suit
of a specified kind or class so long as the basis of distinction is real, and the condition imposed
has reasonable relation to a legitimate object. Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court
Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 691
(1999). Here, Petitioners have filed a defamation claim. Litigation is not the only means by
which a defamation claim could be settled. As a result, and because defamation does not fall
under a procedural fundamental right as defined by Griffin and Boddie, the Radnor Courts are
free to determine how and when a case may be brought into the courts. Likewise, the words
allegedly spoken by the Respondent that constituted the Petitioners’ defamation claim is a
protected substantive fundamental right of free speech.
C. The Respondents statements are protected by the Free Speech Clause because the
Petitioners are public figures and therefore the Petitioners must show actual malice, which
has not been shown here.
1. Joe Public and his wife Jane Private are Public Figures as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs who thrust themselves into the limelight and are well known in the public are
public figures and thus subject to the actual malice standard set forth by this Court in New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The actual malice test requires that if the plaintiff is a
18
public figure, he must prove that the defamatory statements made by a defendant were false or
made with reckless disregard for the truth. Here, since the Petitioners are both public figures,
this Court should apply the actual malice standard in regards to the statements made by
Respondents. This Court held in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., that an all-purpose public figure is
a private individual who occupies “[a] position of such persuasive power and influence that they
are deemed public figure for all-purposes. . . . They invite attention and comment.” 418 U.S. 323,
325 (1974). Examples of all-purpose public figures are entertainers 6, and professional athletes7.
For these people, the actual malice standard extends to virtually all aspects of their lives. The
Court in Carson v. Allied News Co., supported this proposition by stating that an entertainer is an
“all-purpose public figure and thus subject to the New York Times rule.” 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th
Cir. 1976). In that case, the Court determined that the Plaintiff “has been an entertainer and
ha[d] earned his livelihood as such primarily in the television industry, and that he enjoyed an
excellent name and reputation both internationally and throughout the United States.” Carson,
529 F.2d at 210. Here, Joe Public closely parallels this description of an all-purpose public
figure. He has been on a long running television show and is a very “well-known entertainer.”
Gertz, at 341.
Jane Private is also a public figure by virtue of her marriage to Joe Public. There is
further similarity between Carson and the Petitioner here. In Carson, the plaintiff brought an
action against the defendant when defendant published a story that Plaintiff had moved his
television show to be with a woman who had eventually broken up the existing marriage. 529 F.
2d (1976). The court in Carson held that that the entertainer and his wife were both public
6
7
Gertz, (1974).
Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co., Inc., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980).
19
figures, reasoning that one can assume that the wife of a public figure...automatically becomes at
least a part time public figure herself.” Id. at 210. Here, the broadcast discussed Joe Public and
Jane Private’s marriage and pregnancy, but in the context of their Joe Public’s life as a wellknown entertainer. At bar, Jane Private’s marriage to Joe Public, a well-known and regarded
public figure and entertainer puts her into the limelight. Her marriage to Joe Public has thrust
her into the public domain thus diminishing her expectation of privacy.
Unlike the wife of the heir to the Firestone Empire, whose divorce proceedings became
of public interest, that court found that the wife was not a public figure because she was not the
subject of the public’s interest. The Court did not address if the heir was a public figure by virtue
of his wealth. But here, Joe Public’s career as an entertainer made him and his wife of public
interest, and not any solely the proceedings in which the couple was involved. Thus, both
Petitioners are subject to the application of the actual malice standard of New York Times.
2. In order to sustain a defamation claim, actual malice must be proven.
Under the “actual malice” test set forth by New York Times v. Sullivan, actual malice
must be proven in order to sustain a defamation claim. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Actual malice
requires that public-figure plaintiffs in a defamation case bear the burden of proof to show that
the publisher knew that the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard of its truth or
falsity. Id. The Petitioners herein relied on the statements made during the initial report as well
as those made during the broadcast of the “investigative report” and the emotional damages they
suffered as a consequence as the basis of their complaint.
However, none of these statements
made rise to the level of actual malice. Under most state laws, defamation claims are proven by
the Plaintiff showing that the assertions made are false8 and can be proven true or false by
8
53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 192.
20
comparing statements made to actual evidence surrounding the statement. Here, Plaintiffs are
unable to do that. Rather, this Court should first find that the statements made in response to Joe
Public’s arrival at Knighton City Hall were merely statements of opinion, and the statements
made in the investigative report do not rise to the level of actual malice.
The Petitioners state that the Respondents defamed them by calling the Petitioners’
wedding as a “mafia wedding” (R.2) and Jane Private as being a “stolen hog.” (R. 2). However,
these are not facts that can be proven or disproven by evidentiary material. This Court in
Milkovich v. Lorian Journal Co. expanded the scope as to what could be said in the press without
fear of litigation, focusing specifically on statements of opinion. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
In
Milkovich, the Defendant called the Plaintiff a “liar”, which the court determined could be
factually proven true or untrue by looking at Plaintiff’s past statements. However, a statement
made that is couched hyperbolically or figuratively or in a way that would mean that the writer
seriously didn’t mean it, cannot be proven true or false through objective fact. Id. Likewise, this
Court in Letter Carriers v. Austin held that use of the word “traitor” to describe a union member
who would not follow in a union strike was not actionable because the statements made could
not be representations of fact. 418 U.S. 264 (1964). Here, the Respondent’s act of calling the
wedding a “mafia wedding” and Jane Private a “stolen hog” are statements of opinion that
cannot be proven or disproven as matters of fact. There is no way to gauge the truth or falsity of
these statements and there is no relatable representation of fact where evidence can be proffered
to prove or disprove the remarks. Thus, these statements are opinions and are not actionable
under the Free Speech Clause.
Further, with regards to the statements made regarding Jane Private’s pregnancy and the
comments made regarding Joe Public’s previous sexual encounters (R. 4, 5), the Petitioners bear
21
the burden of proof to show that these statements were false under the actual-malice standard.
The Petitioners have failed to show any evidence in regards to the Respondent’s state of mind or
that the Respondent actually knew the information was false. As a general rule, it is not enough
for the Petitioners to simply state that the comments were untrue, or that the source was
unreliable. New York Times (376 U.S. 254).
Lastly, the Petitioners must plead facts that are plausible to support actual malice in order
to state a viable claim. A complaint that only alleges “actual-malice buzzwords” is insufficient to
substantiate actual malice itself. The court in Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669
F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2012) held that a plaintiff's “complaint us[ing] actual-malice buzzwords
were merely legal conclusions. These “buzzwords” must be backed by well-pled facts” to be a
viable claim. In this holding, the court applied the Iqbal and Twombly tests, which stated that
“conclusory allegations” were merely legal conclusions and must be backed by well-pled facts.
Schatz, 669 F.3d at 56 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 500 U.S. 544, 557 (2007);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). Here, the Petitioners’ pleading only stated “defamation,”
“slander,” and “emotional damages”, which were merely actual-malice buzzwords. Without
further evidence supporting their claim, there is no clear and convincing evidence to meet the
actual malice standard.
Thus, the Court should regard Respondent’s statements in relation to the Petitioners’
wedding as opinion, and further find that the statements regarding the pregnancy and sexual
encounters were not made with actual malice. Therefore, all of the Respondent’s statements
made are not actionable under the substantive Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
22
D. The Court was correct in ordering Plaintiffs to re-file their amended complaint without
the declaratory judgment request for the shifting of the burden of proof.
In determining fault in a defamation case, the question for the court is “whether the
evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury might find that actual malice had been shown
with convincing clarity.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 245 (1986). Thus, the
Plaintiff must show that through the defendant's own actions or statements, the nature of his
sources, the inherent improbability of the story or other circumstantial evidence...the defendant
himself entertained a “high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity.” Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). Further, authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment have
consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth, whether administered by
judges, juries, or administrative officials, and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth
on the speaker. New York Times at 271 (1964). These well-settled propositions dictate that the
burden of proof must remain with the Petitioners to show clear and convincing evidence of
actual malice. In the case at bar, Petitioners have claimed that the Respondents defamed them.
They are both public figures and are thus subject to the “actual-malice” test. It so follows, then,
that the Petitioners must retain the requisite burden of proof to show that the statements made by
the Respondents were done with actual malice and therefore disallowing the declaratory
judgment was proper.
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the Court held that in matters of public
figures and public concern, it is a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of
proof to show falsity in defamation matters, and cannot be superseded by a common-law rule for
the defendant to bear the burden to prove truth. 475 U.S. 767 (1964). While it is true that Radnor
provides a heightened protection to its citizens in order to protect their private lives and dignity,
in no way does this heightened state protection allow a shift in a constitutional requirement. To
23
allow the burden to shift to the Respondents would be asking this Court to amend the First
Amendment Constitutional right to Free Speech that is so deeply ingrained in case law and
history. Thus, it was proper for the Court to disallow the request for declaratory judgment to
shift the burden of proof.
Further, shifting the burden of proof would create a “chilling effect” for the media and
obliterate the “breathing room” that protects the media in its freedom of speech. If there were no
breathing room available to cushion the speech of the media, and if the burden was placed on the
defendant to prove truth, then a chilling effect would take place. Critics would be deterred from
“voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true,
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court for fear.” Hepps, 475 U.S. at 772 (1986).
Thus, this breathing room is crucial to prevent the chilling effect of “self-censorship.” Here, the
media has the protection of the First Amendment to share information about the Petitioners
because they are public figures. The Respondents have published their opinions regarding public
figures and should be afforded the breathing room to speak without fear of litigation. For these
reasons, the Radnor Circuit Court was correct in ordering that the declaratory judgment be
stricken from the Amended Complaint.
E. It was proper to strike the Amended Complaint from the record under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(f).
The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money
that arises from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial. SidneyVinstein v. A.H.Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) states:
The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act:
(1) on its own motion; or
24
(2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a
response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). Here, the court correctly struck the request for the cause of action for
declaratory judgment in shifting the burden of proof to the Respondents because it is an
immaterial matter. The Petitioners are both public figures, and they are unable to prove clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice in regards to the statements made by Respondents. As a
result, it would be inappropriate to sustain a cause of action that would be inapposite to the
established provisions of a defamation case and the actual malice standard. The Petitioners have
set forth only conclusory allegations of defamation using actual-malice buzzwords, but have
proffered no further evidence that the statements made were done so with actual disregard for the
truth. As such, it would be a waste of time and judicial resources for the court to litigate the
cause of action for declaratory judgment as to the shifting of the burden of proof. Thus, the court
was correct in striking it from the record.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing it is our contention that the State of Radnor’s elimination of civil
jury trials based solely on fiscal financial concerns violates the Seventh Amendment and Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Further, this
Court should affirm the Radnor Supreme Court’s decision to strike the Amended Complaint and
order the Petitioners to re-file without the request for declaratory judgment to shift the burden of
proof.
Respectfully Submitted,
Team 19
Counsel for Respondents
25