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Operation Rolling Thunder
ered monetary aid, military advisors, and supplies.[6] Between 1957 and 1963, the U.S. found itself committed,
through its acceptance of the policy of containment and
belief in the domino theory, to defending South Vietnam
from what it saw as expansive communist aggression.[7]
Operation Rolling Thunder was the title of a gradual and sustained US 2nd Air Division (later Seventh
Air Force), US Navy, and Republic of Vietnam Air
Force (VNAF) aerial bombardment campaign conducted
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) from 2 March 1965 until 2 November 1968, during
the Vietnam War.
U.S. policy was for a time dictated by its perception of improvement in the Saigon government.[8] No further commitment by the Americans would occur without tangible
proof of the regime’s survivability.[9] Events in Vietnam,
however, outraced this policy. By the beginning of 1965,
it was stood upon its head—it was believed that without
further American action the Saigon government could not
survive.[10] However, as late as February 8, in a cable to
US Ambassador to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor, Johnson stressed that the paramount goal of a bombing campaign would be to boost Saigon’s morale, not to influence
Hanoi, expressing hope “that the building of a minimum
government will benefit by ... assurances from us to the
highest levels [of the South Vietnamese government] that
we ... intend to take continuing action.”[11]
The four objectives of the operation (which evolved over
time) were to boost the sagging morale of the Saigon
regime in the Republic of Vietnam, to persuade North
Vietnam to cease its support for the communist insurgency in South Vietnam without actually taking any
ground forces into communist North Vietnam, to destroy
North Vietnam’s transportation system, industrial base,
and air defenses, and to halt the flow of men and material
into South Vietnam. Attainment of these objectives was
made difficult by both the restraints imposed upon the
U.S and its allies by Cold War exigencies and by the military aid and assistance received by North Vietnam from
its communist allies, the Soviet Union and the People’s
Republic of China (PRC).
Questions then arose among the U.S. administration and
The operation became the most intense air/ground bat- military leadership as to the best method by which Hanoi
tle waged during the Cold War period; indeed, it was the (the perceived locus of the insurgency) could be dismost difficult such campaign fought by the U.S. Air Force suaded from its course of action. The answer seemed
since the aerial bombardment of Germany during World to lie in the application of air power. By 1964 most of
War II. Supported by communist allies, North Vietnam the civilians surrounding President Lyndon B. Johnson
fielded a potent mixture of sophisticated air-to-air and shared the Joint Chiefs of Staff's collective faith in the efground-to-air weapons that created one of the most ef- ficacy of strategic bombing to one degree or another.[12]
fective air defenses ever faced by American military avi- They reasoned that a small nation like North Vietnam,
ators.
with a tiny industrial base that was just emerging after the
First Indochina War, would be reluctant to risk its newfound economic viability to support the insurgency in the
south.[13] Constantly affecting this decision-making pro1 Gradually escalating action
cess were fears of possible counter moves or outright intervention by the Soviet Union, the PRC, or both.[14] The
For more details on on the origins of American involve- civilians and the military were divided, however, on the
ment in Vietnam, see Gulf of Tonkin Incident.
manner of affecting Hanoi’s will to support the southern
insurgency. The civilians thought in terms of changing
the regime’s behavior while the military men were more
concerned with breaking its will.[15]
1.1
Background
In August 1964, as a result of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, in which U.S. naval vessels claimed to have been attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats, President Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes (Operation Pierce Arrow) launched against the north.[16] This did not, however, satisfy the military chiefs, who demanded a wider
and more aggressive campaign.[17]
In response to President Ngo Dinh Diem's abrogation of
the 1956 reunification election and suppression of communists during the late 1950s, Hanoi had begun sending
arms and material to the guerrillas of the National Front
for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF), who were
fighting an insurgency to topple the American-supported
Saigon government.[5] To combat the NLF and to shore
up the government in the south, the U.S. initially deliv1
2
1.2
2
OVER THE NORTH
Implementation
shocked when six of their aircraft were shot down during
the mission.[25] Five of the downed crewmen were resBy the end of August, the Joint Chiefs had drawn up a cued, but it was a portent of things to come.[26]
list of 94 targets to be destroyed as part of a coordinated
eight-week air campaign against North Vietnam’s transportation network.[18] Bridges, rail yards, docks, barracks 2 Over the north
and supply dumps were all targeted. Johnson, however,
feared that such a campaign might trigger a direct intervention by Chinese or Soviets, which might, in turn, 2.1 Strategic persuasion
cascade into a world war.[19] With Robert McNamara's
support, the President refused to endorse such an unre- In keeping with the doctrine of “gradualism”, in which
threatening destruction would serve as a more influential
stricted bombing campaign.
signal of American determination than destruction itself,
it was better to hold important targets “hostage” by bombing trivial ones. From the beginning of Rolling Thunder,
Washington dictated which targets would be struck, the
day and hour of the attack, the number and types of aircraft and the tonnages and types of ordnance utilized, and
sometimes even the direction of the attack.[27] Airstrikes
were strictly forbidden within 30 nautical miles (60 km)
of Hanoi and within ten nautical miles (19 km) of the port
of Haiphong. A thirty-mile buffer zone also extended
along the length of the Chinese frontier. According to
air force historian Earl Tilford:
F-105Ds refueling en route to North Vietnam in 1965.
Targeting bore little resemblance to reality in that the sequence of attacks was uncoordinated and the targets were approved randomly – even illogically. The North’s airfields,
which, according to any rational targeting policy, should have been hit first in the campaign,
were also off-limits.[28]
Instead, the U.S. launched more “tit-for-tat” airstrikes in
retaliation for a 7 February 1965 NLF attack at Pleiku
(Operation Flaming Dart) and for a bomb attack against
an American enlisted men’s billet at Qui Nhon on the
10th (Operation Flaming Dart II). These small-scale operations were launched against the southern region of Although some of these restrictions were later loosened
the country, where the bulk of North Vietnam’s ground or rescinded, Johnson (with McNamara’s support) kept a
tight rein on the campaign, which continuously infuriated
forces and supply dumps were located.[20]
the American military commanders, right-wing members
Surrendering to continued NLF advances and pressures
of Congress, and even some within the administration
from the Joint Chiefs, Johnson formally authorized a itself.[29] One of the primary objectives of the operation,
sustained bombing program, codenamed Rolling Thunat least to the military, should have been the closure of
der, which was not tied to North Vietnamese actions.[21] Haiphong and other ports by aerial mining, thereby slowRolling Thunder called for an eight-week air campaign
ing or halting the flow of seaborne supplies entering the
consistent with the restrictions that Johnson and Secretary north. President Johnson refused to take such a provocaof Defense Robert S. McNamara had imposed upon it.
tive action, however, and such an operation was not imIf the insurgency continued “with DRV support, strikes plemented until 1972. There was also little consultation
against the DRV would be extended with intensified ef- between Johnson and the military chiefs during the target
forts against targets north of the 19th parallel.”[22]
selection process. Even the chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
It was believed that selective pressure, controlled by General Earl G. Wheeler, was not present for most of the
Washington, combined with diplomatic overtures, would critical discussions of 1965 and participated only occaprevail and compel Hanoi to end its aggression.[23] The sionally thereafter.[30]
military was still not satisfied, since, for the time being, The majority of strikes during Rolling Thunder were
the bombing campaign was to be limited to targets below launched from four air bases, in Thailand: Korat, Takhli,
the 19th parallel, each of which would have to be cleared Udon Thani, and Ubon.[31] The aircraft refueled from
individually by the President and McNamara.[24]
aerial tankers over Laos before flying on to their targets in
The first mission of the new operation was launched on
2 March against an ammunition storage area near Xom
Bang. On the same day, 19 VNAF A-1 Skyraiders
struck the Quang Khe Naval Base. The Americans were
the DRV. After attacking their targets (usually by divebombing) the strike forces would either fly directly back
to Thailand or exit over the relatively safe waters of the
Gulf of Tonkin. It was quickly decided that, in order to
2.2
Changing priorities and POL strikes
3
limit airspace conflicts between air force and naval strike
forces, North Vietnam was divided into six target regions
called “route packages”, each of which was assigned to
either the air force or navy and into which the other was
forbidden to intrude.
sion of the ground forces was expanded to combat operations and, from that point onward, the aerial campaign
became a secondary operation, overwhelmed by troop
deployments and the escalation of ground operations in
South Vietnam.[41] Until the third week of April, Rolling
Navy strikes were launched from the aircraft carriers of Thunder had enjoyed at least equal status with air misTask Force 77, cruising off the North Vietnamese coast at sions conducted in the south. After that time, strikes that
southern battlefield
Yankee Station. Naval aircraft, which had shorter ranges interfered with requirements for the
were either cut back or cancelled.[42]
(and carried lighter bomb loads) than their air force counterparts, approached their targets from seaward with the By 24 December 1965, 170 U.S. aircraft had been lost
majority of their strikes flown against coastal targets.[32] during the campaign (85 air force, 94 navy, and one
corps). Eight VNAF aircraft had also been
On 3 April the Joint Chiefs persuaded McNamara and marine
[43]
lost.
Air
force aircrews had flown 25,971 sorties and
Johnson to launch a four-week attack on North Vietnam’s
dropped
32,063
tons of bombs. Naval aviators had flown
lines of communications, which would isolate that nation
28,168
sorties
and
dropped 11,144 tons. The VNAF
from its overland sources of supply in the PRC and the
had
contributed
682
missions with unknown ordnance
Soviet Union. About one-third of the North’s imports
[44]
tonnages.
came down the northeast railroad from the PRC, while
the remaining two-thirds came by sea through Haiphong
and other ports.[33] For the first time in the campaign, targets were to be chosen for their military, rather than their
psychological, significance.[34] During the four weeks, 26
bridges and seven ferries were destroyed.[35] Other targets
included the extensive North Vietnamese radar system,
barracks, and ammunition depots.
The panhandle of southern North Vietnam, however, remained the primary focus of operations and total sorties
flown there rose from 3,600 in April to 4,000 in May.[36]
Slowly moving away from the destruction of fixed targets, “armed reconnaissance” missions, in which small
formations of aircraft patrolled highways, railroads, and
rivers, searching for targets of opportunity, were authorized. These missions increased from two to 200 sorties
per week by the end of 1965.[37] Eventually, armed reconnaissance missions constituted 75 percent of the total
bombing effort, in part because the system through which
fixed targets were requested, selected, and authorized was
so complicated and unwieldy.[38]
2.2
Changing priorities and POL strikes
If Rolling Thunder was supposed to “send signals” to
Hanoi to desist in its actions, it did not seem to be working. On 8 April, responding to requests for peace negotiations, North Vietnamese premier, Pham Van Dong,
stated that they could only begin when: the bombing was
halted; the U.S. had removed all of its troops from the
south; the Saigon government recognized the demands of
the NLF; and it was agreed that the reunification of Vietnam would be settled by the Vietnamese themselves.[39]
Ominously, on 3 April the North Vietnamese Air Force
made its first appearance when American aircraft were
attacked by NVAF MiG-17s.
The entire complexion of the American effort was altered
on 8 March 1965, when 3,500 U.S. Marines came ashore
at Da Nang, ostensibly to defend the southern airfields
committed to prosecuting Rolling Thunder.[40] The mis-
An F-105D hit by an SA-2 missile
U.S. reconnaissance discovered on 5 April, 1966, that the
North Vietnamese were constructing positions for what
could only be surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries. The
air force and navy then filed a joint appeal to Washington for permission to strike the sites, but they were refused since most of the sites were near the restricted urban
areas.[45] Then, on 24 July, an F-105 was shot down by
a SA-2 Guideline missile. Three days later, a one-time
strike was authorized against the two offending missile
sites. The Americans, however, fell for an elaborate trap
when the sites turned out to be dummies surrounded by
anti-aircraft artillery defenses. One American pilot described the action which followed as “looking like the end
of the world.”[46] Six of the strike craft were destroyed
(two of the pilots were killed, one missing, two captured,
and one rescued) during the ambush.[47]
On 29 June, 1966, airstrikes against the North’s
petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) storage areas were
authorized by Johnson. The American military had advocated such strikes since the inception of the operation, believing that to deny North Vietnam its POL would cause
its military effort to grind to a halt. The strikes at first appeared successful, destroying tank farms near Hanoi and
Haiphong and leading the CIA to estimate that 70 percent of North Vietnam’s oil facilities had been destroyed
for the loss of 43 aircraft.[48] This proved only a short-
4
3 REACTIONS
term inconvenience for North Vietnam, however, since
Hanoi had anticipated just such a campaign and had dispersed the majority of its POL stocks in 50-gallon drums
across the length of the country. The POL attacks were
halted on 4 September, after U.S. intelligence admitted
that there was “no evidence yet of any shortages of POL
in North Vietnam.”[49]
3
3.1
ceeded to CINCPAC, who in turn reported to his superiors, the Joint Chiefs, at the Pentagon. After input from
the State Department and the CIA, the requests then proceeded to the White House, where the president and his
“Tuesday Cabinet” made decisions on the strike requests
on a weekly basis.[56]
Reactions
Problems
Rolling Thunder exposed many problems within the
American military services committed to it and tended
to exacerbate others. A key interservice issue (and one
which was not solved until 1968) was the command and
control arrangement in Southeast Asia. The Air Force’s
2nd Air Division (replaced by the Seventh Air Force on
1 April 1966) was ostensibly responsible for aerial operations over North and South Vietnam. It was subordinate, however, to MACV and its commander, U.S.
Army General William C. Westmoreland, who tended
to see his problems centered in the south.[50] The U.S.
Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force, based in Thailand (which
carried out the majority of the Air Force’s strikes in North
Vietnam), had a dual command structure. It reported to
the Seventh on operational matters and to the Thirteenth
Air Force (whose headquarters was in the Philippines)
for logistical and administrative concerns. These command and control complexities grew even more tangled
with the division of the aerial effort into four competing
operational areas (those in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and Laos (both north and south).[51]
The Navy’s Task Force 77 took its orders via 7th Fleet
from CINCPAC, a Navy admiral based in Honolulu,
through his subordinate, the Air Force commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF).[52] Due to their influence, the
Navy could not be persuaded to integrate its air operations over North Vietnam with those of the Air Force.
General William Momyer, commander of the Seventh,
had the impression that CINCPAC and PACAF wanted
to keep the Thai-based aircraft out of his hands. “By
denying Momyer, they were really denying Westmoreland and keeping air operations against the DRV under
their control.”[53] To complicate matters, the U.S. ambassadors to Thailand (Graham Martin) and Laos (William
H. Sullivan) exerted undue influence over operational and
command arrangements.[54]
U.S. Navy A-6A Intruder all-weather bombers, in 1968.
Another problem exposed by Rolling Thunder was the unpreparedness of the Air Force for the operations it was
undertaking. Its aircraft had been designed and its pilots
trained for strategic operations against the Soviet Union –
for nuclear, not conventional war.[57] The new campaign
exposed years of neglect in conventional tactics, while
aircraft capabilities and armament were ill-suited to the
task at hand. The Air Force was also embarrassed by
the fact that the Navy was better prepared. It possessed
the only all-weather fighter-bomber in the U.S. inventory
in the new A-6 Intruder and was also responsible for the
development of the F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber, which
became ubiquitous during the Vietnam War.[58]
Once air-to-air combat began over North Vietnam, the
Air Force was again found lacking. The mainstay missiles
of the air war turned out to be the Navy-developed AIM9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow, not its own AIM-4
Falcon.[59] The Air Force continuously opposed adapting to the war in Southeast Asia, since its leadership believed that it was an aberration that would be quickly resolved. It could then turn its attention (and its more modern weapons) against the greater threat posed by the Soviet Union. None in the Air Force high command foresaw
that the war would drag on for nearly a decade.[60]
The Air Force did possess an aircraft which had an
all-weather capability, radar-guided bombing equipment,
and awesome destructive potential – the B-52 Stratofortress. The civilian administration, however, never considered utilizing the big bombers (whose operations remained under the control of the Strategic Air Command)
very far north of the DMZ, believing that it was too overt
an escalation.[61] Air Force Chief of Staff John P. McConnell also opposed sending the bombers into the air
defense environment in the north and limited B-52 strikes
to Route Package One.[62]
This bizarre command structure went against the grain
of the Air Force’s single air manager concept, which dictated that one commander was to control and coordinate
all aircraft within a combat theater.[55] The chain through
which operational strike requests had to flow gave some
indication of the growing overcomplexity of the campaign. Requests for airstrikes originated with the 2nd Compounding these issues was the one-year rotation polAir Division and Task Force 77 in Vietnam and then pro- icy adopted by the Pentagon in Southeast Asia. Although
3.2
People’s War in the air
5
the first aircrews arriving in-theater were highly experienced, the rapidly growing tempo and ever-expanding
length of the operation demanded more personnel. This
exacerbated a growing lack of experienced aircrews. This
dilemma was further compounded by an Air Force policy
which dictated universal pilot training while proscribing
involuntary second combat tours, which combined, had
the effect of rotating personnel to different aircraft.[63]
Conversely, the Navy tended to maintain its aircrews
within the same community for the duration of their careers, thereby retaining their expertise, but also incurring
greater losses among experienced crews undergoing multiple combat tours.[64]
Another factor was the weather within the operational
theater. The cyclical monsoon patterns meant that the
weather was deplorable for flight operations eight months
of the year (from late September to early May) when rain
and fog tended to conceal targets. Lack of adequate allweather and night-bombing capability made it necessary
for the majority of U.S. missions to be conducted during daylight hours, thereby easing the burden on the air
defense forces of North Vietnam.
3.2
People’s War in the air
Before Rolling Thunder even began the North Vietnamese leadership knew what was coming. It issued a
February 1965 directive to the military and the population to “maintain communication and transportation and
to expect the complete destruction of the entire country,
including Hanoi and Haiphong.”[65] The communist leadership declared “a people’s war against the air war of destruction...each citizen is a soldier, each village, street,
and plant a fortress on the anti-American battlefront.”[66]
All except those deemed “truly indispensable to the life of
the capital” were evacuated to the countryside. By 1967,
Hanoi’s population had been reduced by half.[67]
Since gaining air superiority over U.S. forces was out of
the question, the northern leadership decided to implement a policy of air deniability. At the beginning of
the campaign, North Vietnam possessed approximately
1,500 anti-aircraft weapons, most of which were of the
light 37 and 57mm variety. Within one year, however, the U.S. estimated that the number had grown to
over 5,000 guns, including 85 and 100mm radar-directed
weapons.[68] That estimate was later revised downward
from a high of 7,000 in early 1967 to less than a thousand
by 1972.[69] Regardless, during Rolling Thunder, 80 percent of U.S. aircraft losses were attributed to anti-aircraft
fire.[70]
Backing up the guns were the fighter aircraft of the North
Vietnamese Air Force, which originally consisted of only
53 MiG-17 Fresco fighter aircraft.[71] Though considered
antiquated by the Americans when compared to their supersonic jets, the North Vietnamese turned their aircraft’s
weaknesses into strengths. They were fast enough for hit
North Vietnamese air defense weapons.
and run ambush operations and they were also maneuverable enough to shock the American fighter community by shooting down more advanced F-8 Crusaders and
F-105 Thunderchiefs, which had to quickly develop new
tactics. The newer missile-armed F-4 Phantom would become the American’s primary dogfighting platform.
The simple appearance of MiGs could often accomplish
their mission by causing American pilots to jettison their
bomb loads as a defensive measure.[72] In 1966, the MiG17 were joined by more modern Soviet-built MiG-21
Fishbeds, which could fight on a more equal footing with
the U.S. aircraft. By 1967, the North Vietnamese Air
Force was maintaining an interceptor force of 100 aircraft, many of which were based on PRC airfields and
out of reach of American air attack.[73]
The northern economy was decentralized for its protection and large factories, located in the heavily populated
Red River Delta region, were broken up and scattered
into caves and small villages throughout the countryside.
In the more heavily bombed southern panhandle, entire
villages moved into underground tunnel complexes for
the duration. Food shortages in North Vietnam became
widespread, especially in the urban areas, as rice farmers went into the military or volunteered for service repairing bomb damage.[74] When the nation’s transportation system came under attack, destroyed bridges were
6
4 BIGGEST SHOOTING GALLERY ON EARTH
repaired or replaced by dirt fords, ferries, and underwater
and pontoon bridges. The system proved to be durable,
well built, easily repaired, and practically impossible to
shut down.[75]
Perhaps North Vietnam’s ultimate resource was its population. During 1965, 97,000 North Vietnamese volunteered to work full-time in repairing the damage inflicted
by U.S. bombs. Another 370,000–500,000 worked parttime.[76] When the nation’s lines of communication came
under attack, railroad supply trains and truck convoys
were split into smaller elements which traveled only at
night. The logistical effort was supported by citizens on
sampans, driving carts, pushing wheelbarrows, or manportering supplies on their backs to keep the war effort
going. They were motivated by slogans like “Each kilogram of goods...is a bullet shot into the head of the American pirates.”[77]
4
4.1
Biggest shooting gallery on Earth
SAMs and Wild Weasels
North Vietnam’s deployment of SAMs forced American
pilots to make hard choices: either approach targets at
higher altitudes (to avoid anti-aircraft fire) and become
prey to SAMs, or fly lower to avoid the missiles and become the target of anti-aircraft batteries. Due to altered
tactics and the increased use of electronic radar jamming,
the record of SAM kills decreased over time. The already dismal missile success rate fell from one kill for
30 launches to less than one kill for 50.[78] Those figures
do, however, say a great deal about the inefficiency of
Rolling Thunder, since North Vietnam’s SAM batteries
never lacked sufficient stocks of missiles, regardless of
efforts to interdict the supply system.
sile launchers each) which rotated among approximately
150 sites.[79] With the assistance of the Soviet Union, the
North Vietnamese had also quickly integrated an early
warning radar system of more than 200 facilities which
covered the entire country, tracking incoming U.S. raids,
and then coordinating SAMs, anti-aircraft batteries, and
MiGs to attack them.[80] During 1967 U.S. losses totaled
248 aircraft (145 Air Force, 102 Navy, and one Marine
Corps).[81]
To survive in this ever more lethal air defense zone, the
U.S. had to adopt newer, more specialized tactics. Largescale strikes, known as force packages in the Air Force
and multi-carrier "Alpha strikes" by the Navy, were assigned numerous support aircraft to protect the fighterbombers. First into the target areas were specialized
Iron Hand flak suppression missions. These consisted of
F-105 Wild Weasel hunter/killer teams configured with
sophisticated electronic equipment to detect and locate
the emissions associated with SAM guidance and control
radars.
The Wild Weasels also carried electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment to protect themselves. They
directed flak suppression strikes and carried AGM-45
Shrike anti-radiation missiles (another Navy development), which homed in on the radar systems of the SAMs.
The SA-2 had greater range than the Shrike, but if the
Shrike was launched and the radar operator stayed on the
air, the American missile would home in on the signal and
destroy the radar source. A sophisticated cat and mouse
game then ensued between North Vietnamese radar operators and the Wild Weasel pilots. The Navy also utilized
aircraft in a similar role, but did not create a specialized
unit like the Wild Weasels to conduct SAM suppression.
An USAF “Iron Hand” SAM-suppression team late in the war.
Next came the bomb-laden strike aircraft protected by escort fighters (Combat Air Patrol or MIGCAP) and electronic jamming aircraft to degrade enemy radar. New
ECM devices had hurriedly been deployed to protect aircraft from missile attacks, but they remained subject to
frequent breakdowns because of climate conditions in
U.S. Navy A-7B Corsairs armed with Shrike anti-radiation misSoutheast Asia. Also included in the missions were KCsiles, 1969.
135 aerial tankers and Search and Rescue (SAR) heThe nature of the gradual escalation had given Hanoi time licopters, which were, in turn, protected by propellerto adapt to the situation. By 1967, North Vietnam had driven A-1 escorts.
formed an estimated 25 SAM battalions (with six mis- From mid-1966 until the end of 1967, President Johnson
7
continued to dole out sensitive targets one by one to the
generals while simultaneously trying to placate the doves
in Congress and within his own administration with periodic cutbacks and half-hearted peace initiatives.[82] In
the end, this erratic course satisfied no one and did little
to alter the course of the war.[83]
The nature of the targets and the risks involved in striking
(and re-striking) them began to take a toll. Chief of Naval
Operations David McDonald reported to his co-chiefs
after a trip to South Vietnam in September 1966, that
Rolling Thunder aircrews were angered with the targeting
process and that they faulted the campaign due to “guidelines requiring repetitive air programs that seemed more
than anything else to benefit enemy gunners.”[84] During
1967, the second full year of Rolling Thunder operations,
362 U.S. aircraft had been lost over North Vietnam. (208
Air Force, 142 Navy, and 12 Marine Corps).[85]
4.2
MiGs and interdiction
Rolling Thunder reached the last stage of its operational
evolution during 1967 and 1968. The chief purpose of
the American air effort in the higher Route Packages of
North Vietnam was slowly transformed into that of interdicting the flow of supplies and material and the destruction of those segments of the north’s infrastructure that
supported its military effort. Although most U.S. aircraft
losses continued to be inflicted by anti-aircraft fire, U.S.
Air Force F-105s and Navy A-4 Skyhawks increasingly
encountered SAMs and MiGs. North Vietnamese fighters also became a particular problem because of the lack
of radar coverage in the Red River Delta region, which
allowed the MiGs to surprise the strike forces. Airborne
early warning aircraft had difficulty detecting the fighters
at low altitudes and the aircraft themselves were difficult
to see visually.[86]
sustained attempt to force North Vietnam into peace negotiations. Almost all of the targets on the Joint Chiefs’
list had been authorized for attack, including airfields that
had been previously off limits.[88] Only central Hanoi,
Haiphong, and the PRC border area remained prohibited
from attack. A major effort was made to isolate the urban areas by downing bridges and attacking LOCs. Also
struck were the Thai Nguyen steel complex (origin of the
Pardo’s Push), thermal and electrical power plants, ship
and rail repair facilities, and warehouses. North Vietnamese MiGs entered the battle en masse, as their capital was threatened and kill ratios fell to one U.S. aircraft lost for every two MiGs.[89] During 1968, MiGs accounted for 22 percent of the 184 American aircraft (75
Air Force, 59 Navy, and five Marine Corps) lost over the
north.[90] As a result, operations against the last of North
Vietnam’s airfields, previously off-limits to attack, were
authorized.
Despite the best interdiction efforts of Rolling Thunder,
however, the NLF and PAVN launched their largest offensive thus far in the war on 30 January 1968, striking
throughout South Vietnam during the lunar new year holiday. The Tet Offensive concluded as a military disaster
for North Vietnam and its NLF allies, but it also adversely
affected U.S. public opinion, which in turn affected the
will of Washington.[91] Fortunately for North Vietnam,
many U.S. bombing advocates (including Air Force Chief
of Staff McConnell) did not want to risk the one aircraft
capable of delivering a lot of bombs in bad weather – the
B-52. Without them, there was little that could be done
over the north in response to Tet, since bad weather minimized fighter operations until the beginning of April.[92]
5 End of the line
5.1 Opposition
For more details on the positions of the secretary of
defense, see Robert S. McNamara.
For more details on the negotiations, see Paris Peace
Talks.
A missile-armed VPAF MiG-21PF landing.
While F-105s did score 27 air-to-air victories, the overall exchange ratio was near parity. In January 1967,
the Americans sprang a surprise on the MiGs when
they launched Operation Bolo. F-4 Phantoms, using the
same radio call signs, direction of approach, altitude, and
speed as a typical flight of bomb-laden F-105s, lured the
MiGs toward what the MiG pilots thought would be easy
prey. The result was seven MiGs shot down within 12
minutes.[87]
Later in the year, the U.S. launched its most intense and
Writing after the war, Robert McNamara stated that by
spring 1967 he and other civilians in the administration
had become convinced that both Rolling Thunder and the
ground war in South Vietnam were not working.[93] McNamara claimed that he and others within the administration continuously opposed the Joint Chief’s recommendations for an increased tempo of bombing and the loosening of target restrictions.[94] The generals found themselves on the horns of a dilemma of their own making.
They continuously claimed that the campaign was working, yet they also had to continuously demand greater
latitude in order to make the campaign succeed.[95] The
limited goals entailed in American foreign policy and the
military’s goal of total victory were simply not reconcil-
8
5 END OF THE LINE
able. The great conundrum had then become how to de- that a complete bombing halt over North Vietnam would
feat North Vietnam without defeating North Vietnam.[96] go into effect on 1 November 1968, just prior to the U.S.
On 9 August 1967 the Senate Armed Services Commit- presidential election. Although the bombing halt was to
tee opened hearings on the bombing campaign. Com- be linked to progress in the peace talks, the Joint Chiefs
the
plaints from the armed services had sparked the interest were skeptical that the administration would reopen
[108]
bombing
campaign
under
any
circumstances.
They
[97]
of some of the most vocal hawks on Capitol Hill. The
military chiefs testified before the committee, complain- were correct.
ing about the gradual nature of the air war and its civilianimposed restrictions. It was obvious that McNamara, the
only civilian subpoenaed and the last to testify before the
committee, was to be the scapegoat.[98] The Secretary
of Defense marshaled his objections to an indiscriminate
air war and adeptly rebutted the charges of the military
chiefs.[99] He bluntly admitted that there was “no basis
to believe that any bombing campaign...would by itself
force Ho Chi Minh's regime into submission, short, that
is, of the virtual annihilation of North Vietnam and its
people.”[100]
5.2 Conclusions
Between March 1965 and November 1968, aircraft of the
U.S. Air Force had flown 153,784 attack sorties against
North Vietnam, while the Navy and Marine Corps had
added another 152,399.[109] On 31 December 1967, the
Department of Defense announced that 864,000 tons of
American bombs had been dropped on North Vietnam
during Rolling Thunder, compared with 653,000 tons
dropped during the entire Korean War and 503,000 tons
It had now become clear to President Johnson that Mcin the Pacific theater during the Second World War.[110]
[101]
Namara had become a liability to the administration.
In February 1968, McNamara resigned his position and The CIA estimated on 1 January 1968 that damage inwas replaced by Clark Clifford, who was chosen because flicted in the north totaled $370 million in physical deof his personal friendship with Johnson and his previous struction, including $164 million worth of damage to capopposition to McNamara’s suggestions that the number of ital assets (such as factories, bridges, and power plants).
troops in the South Vietnam be stabilized and that Rolling The agency also estimated that approximately 1,000 caThunder be ended.[102] McNamara’s position, however sualties had been inflicted on the North Vietnamese popwas almost immediately taken up by Secretary of State ulation per week, or approximately 90,000 for the 44[111]
Due
Dean Rusk, (until then an ardent advocate of the bombing month period, 72,000 of whom were civilians.
campaign). Rusk proposed limiting the campaign to the to combat and operational circumstances, 506 U.S. Air
panhandle of North Vietnam without preconditions and Force, 397 Navy, and 19 Marine Corps aircraft were lost
[112][113]
During the operaawaiting Hanoi’s reaction.[103] Within months Clifford over or near North Vietnam.
too began to adopt the views of the man he had replaced, tion, of the 745 crewmen shot down, the U.S. Air Force
gradually becoming convinced that the U.S. had to with- recorded 145 rescued, 255 killed, 222 captured (23 of
[114]
Figures on
draw from an open-ended commitment to the war.[104] whom died in captivity), and 123 missing.
Disappointed by perceived political defeats at home and U.S. Navy and Marine Corps casualties were harder to
hoping that Hanoi would enter into negotiations, Pres- come by. During the 44-month time frame, 454 Naval
ident Johnson announced on 31 March 1968, that all aviators were killed, captured, or missing during com[115]
bombing north of the 19th parallel would cease.[105] As a bined operations over North Vietnam and Laos.
result of that decision, into the area between the 17th and Rolling Thunder had begun as a campaign of psycholog19th parallels, the Air Force and Navy began to pour all ical and strategic persuasion, but it changed very quickly
the firepower that they had formerly spread throughout to interdiction, a tactical mission.[116] Its ultimate failNorth Vietnam. The Air Force doubled the number of ure had two sources, both of which lay with the civilsorties sent into Route Package One to more than 6,000 ian and military policy-makers in Washington: first, neiper month with the campaign concentrated on interdic- ther group could ever conceive that the North Vietnamese
tion “choke points”, road closing, and truck hunting.[106] would endure under the punishment that they would unOnce again, the military commanders were faced a famil- leash upon it. The civilians, moreover, did not understand
iar dilemma: having opposed the bombing cutback, they air power well enough to know that their policies might
then decided that the new policy had a lot of merit, es- be crippling it; second, the American military leadership
pecially when considering the alternative of no bombing failed to initially propose and develop, or later to adapt,
at all.[107] The North Vietnamese responded by doubling an appropriate strategy for the war.[117]
the number of anti-aircraft batteries in the panhandle, but
most of their SAM batteries remained deployed around Along the way, Rolling Thunder also fell prey to the
same dysfunctional managerial attitude as did the rest
Hanoi and Haiphong.
of the American military effort in Southeast Asia.
Hanoi, which had continuously stipulated that it would The process of the campaign became an end unto itnot conduct negotiations while the bombing continued, fi- self, with sortie generation as the standard by which
nally agreed to meet with the Americans for preliminary progress was measured.[118] Sortie rates and the numtalks in Paris. As a result, President Johnson declared ber of bombs dropped, however, equaled efficiency, not
8.1
Notes
9
effectiveness.[119] There is an argument that it was not
even efficient since in order to increase the sortie rate
sometimes eight planes were sent with small bomb loads
when one or two planes could have carried out the same
mission.
[7] In its public defense of its policies, the State Department
argued that South Vietnam was “fighting for its life against
a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the communist regime
in Hanoi. U.S. Department of State, Aggression from the
North. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965, p. 60.
6
[8] The coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem had unleashed
a maelstrom of political unrest and communist victories.
Coup followed coup in Saigon as ARVN generals vied for
power. There were seven governments in Saigon in 1964,
three between 16 August and 3 September alone. Robert
M. Gillespie, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Escalation of
the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1965. Unpublished Master’s
Thesis, Clemson University, 1994, p. 63.
Legacy
The U.S fighter community was shocked by the news that
elderly subsonic fighters were inflicting losses against the
F-105 Thunderchief, the fastest and most sophisticated
strike fighter then in the Air Force inventory. One result
was a drastic rethinking of air combat and aircraft design, which had been centered around delivery of nuclear
weapons in Europe and missile interception. As a result,
the F-4 Phantom became the primary U.S. air superiority fighter for both services in the later days of the war.
The Air Force’s F-4E was fitted with maneuvering slats
and an internal gun, while the Navy cancelled an expensive new fighter design General Dynamics/Grumman F111B in favor of a plane that would be more, rather than
less effective, in a short-range dogfight than the Phantom.
Analysis of the campaign resulted in the creation of new
pilot training programs, such as the famous TOPGUN,
utilizing F-5 Tigers and A-4 Skyhawks to simulate the
threat of small subsonic and supersonic MiG fighters. The
U.S. also started the design of a new generation of fighters
that were optimized for visual-range dogfights. Although
the first of these “teen” fighters would not enter service
soon enough to cover America’s withdrawal from Vietnam, they would dominate future air battles, serving well
into the 21st century. Many remain in service today.
7
See also
• Action of 23 August 1967
8
References
[9] Senator Mike Gravel, ed., The Pentagon Papers. Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971, vol. 3, pps. 17–20.
[10] George M. Kahin, Intervention. New York: Knopf, 1986,
p. 272.
[11] Needless to say, Rolling Thunder failed to achieve any
such objective. VanDeMark, Brian (1991). Into the
Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 69. ISBN
0195065069.
[12] Tilford, p. 92. See also Gillespie, pps. 64–69.
[13] Tilford, p. 92.
[14] Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point. New York: Holt,
Rhinehart, and Winston, 1971, pps. 66–67.
[15] Gillespie, p. 70.
[16] The most accurate description of the incidents is Edwin
E. Moise, Tonkin Gulf.
[17] Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower New York: Free
Press, 1989, p. 47.
[18] Jacob Van Staaveren, Gradual Failure. Washington DC:
Air Force Museums and History Program, 2002, p. 46.
See also Tilford, p. 93.
[19] Gillespie, p. 71.
8.1
Notes
[1] http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HH18Dg02.html
[2] Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and
Military History by Spencer C. Tucker p. 617
[3] http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP4.HTM
[4] http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/timeline/index2.
html Battlefield Vietnam: Timeline
[5] Stanley Karnow, Vietnam. New York: giants, 1983, pps.
237–239.
[6] Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support. Washington DC:
United States Army Center of Military History, 1983, pps.
275–373.
[20] H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty. New York: Harper
Collins, 1997, 218–222.
[21] Although some within the administration believed that the
campaign would be costly, and that it might not work, they
reasoned that it was “an acceptable risk, especially when
considered against the alternative of introducing American combat troops.” Morocco, p. 40. For the Secretary
of Defense’s thoughts on the planning and implementation
of the air campaign see Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect. New York: Times Books, 1992, pps. 171–177.
[22] McMaster, p. 226.
[23] Col. John Schlight, A War Too Long. Washington DC:
Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996, p. 46.
10
[24] John Morocco, Thunder from Above. Boston: Boston
Publishing Company, 1984, p. 56. The daily target selection meetings were soon replaced by weekly sessions
and finally by the creation of bi-weekly “force packages.”
8
REFERENCES
[52] Thompson, p. 18.
[25] Jacob Van Staaveren, Gradual Failure. Washington DC:
Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002, p. 86.
[53] Thompson, p. 15. This policy was ultimately unsuccessful. In November 1965, bombing in the area abutting the
DMZ (Route Package One) was handed over to Westmoreland as part of the “extended battlefield.” Schlight,
A War Too Long, p. 48.
[26] Morocco, p. 54.
[54] Thompson, p. 15.
[27] Morocco, p. 55.
[55] See Operation Niagara
[28] Tilford, p. 109.
[29] Morocco, p. 57.
[30] Wayne Thompson, To Hanoi and Back. Washington DC:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002, p. 80.
[56] Van Staaveren, pps. 72–76. The meetings were usually
attended by the president, McNamara, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, and the president’s special assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy
[57] Tilford, p. 113.
[31] Only one South Vietnam-based squadron (based at Da
Nang) participated in the DRV missions.
[32] This also helped account for the lower number of aircraft
and pilot losses suffered by the navy. Fighters had only to
defend a 90 degree arc in front of the strike force, SAM
exposure was more limited, and coastal targets made the
shorter distances of search and rescue operations more
conducive to success.
[33] Thompson, p. 26.
[34] Morocco, p. 58.
[35] Morocco, p. 61.
[36] Morocco, p. 63.
[37] Morocco, p. 63.
[58] The Air Force’s unpreparedness was further revealed by
its lack of adequate aerial reconnaissance aircraft (e.g. 0–
1 and 0–2 observation aircraft used for crucial Forward
Air Control missions over South Vietnam, which it originally had to borrow from the Army) and tactical fighterbombers (e.g. Korean War-era A-1 Skyraiders, which it
had to obtain from the Navy). The F-4 Phantom that the
Air Force fielded was not equipped with a gun since it was
expected to conduct air-to-air combat operations solely
with missiles. General Momyer had long opposed putting
a gun on the F-4 and was convinced to do so only after
air-to-air engagements in 1966. The first Air Force version equipped with an internal gunsystem only appeared
in 1968. Thompson, p. 64.
[59] Thompson, p. 91.
[38] Tilford, p. 108.
[60] Tilford, p. 113.
[39] Morocco, p. 62.
[61] Morocco, p. 85.
[40] Karnow, p. 415.
[62] Schlight, A War Too Long, p. 48. This policy compounded already existing tensions between airmen and
their Army and Navy counterparts. The airmen were already upset that Westmoreland was ordering the greatest
strategic bomber ever built into a ground support role, but
then to have a naval officer (CINCPAC) pick their targets was simply unbearable. William P. Head, War Above
the Clouds. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University
Press, 2002, p. 23.
[41] NSAM 328, 6 April 1965. Neil Sheehan, et al. The Pentagon Papers. New York: Ballentine, 1971, pps. 442–
443. See also Tilford, p. 115.
[42] Schilght, Air War in South Vietnam. p. 33.
[43] Chris Hobson, Vietnam Air Losses. Hinkley UK: Midland
Press, 2001, pgs. 15–166. These losses include not only
combat shootdowns, but those due to accidents, mechanical failure, and unknown causes.
[44] Van Staaveren, p. 316.
[45] Morocco, p. 107.
[46] Morocco, p. 109.
[47] Morocco, p. 109.
[63] Marshall L. Michel Clashes: Air Combat Over North Vietnam 1965–1972. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press,
1997, pg 163. An experienced F-4 pilot could end up
flying FAC missions in an O-2 Skymaster during a subsequent tour whereas an SAC or Military Airlift Command
pilot could end up flying the F-4 Phantom.
[64] Michel, p. 168
[48] Morocco, p. 130
[65] Van Staaveren, p. 83.
[49] Morocco, p. 131.
[66] Morocco, p. 96.
[50] Thompson, p. 14.
[67] Morocco, p. 137.
[51] Schlight, Air War in South Vietnam, p. 24.
[68] Morocco, p. 102.
8.1
Notes
[69] Thompson, p. 40. The 1972 figure might also reflect the
redeployment of anti-aircraft battalions after the end of
Rolling Thunder to the defense of the Ho Chi Minh Trail
in Laos. See Operation Commando Hunt.
[70] Thompson, p. 311.
[71] Morocco, p. 102.
11
[94] McNamara, pps. 275–277. See also Morocco, pps. 153–
154.
[95] Tilford, p. 120. The military men could not back down.
Unless given the opportunity to demonstrate the full potential of their services, they feared the loss of future roles
and diminished budgets. Morocco, p. 153
[72] Thompson, p. 35. During the last four months of 1966,
192 American aircraft were intercepted by MiGs. Of
these, 107 (56 percent) were forced to jettison their bombs
. Morocco, p. 142.
[96] Tilford, p. 138.
[73] Morocco, p. 148.
[98] McNamara, pps. 284–291.
[74] Morocco, pps. 135–139.
[99] Thompson, pps. 81–82.
[75] Tilford, p. 112.
[97] Morocco, p. 154.
[100] Morocco, p. 156.
[76] Morocco, p. 98.
[101] Karnow, p. 454.
[77] Morocco, p. 100.
[78] Thompson, p. 50.
[102] Tilford, pps. 149–150.
[79] Thompson, p. 40. Average time for the displacement of a [103] Thompson, p. 135-136.
SAM battery was four hours. Two more hours produced
an operational site.
[104] Morocco, p. 183. See also Thompson, pps. 136–139.
[80] Thompson, p. 41.
[105] Morocco, pps. 183–184.
[81] Hobson, pgs. 15–166.
[106] Thompson, p. 145.
[82] The most complete treatment of the search for peace is
Allen E. Goodman, The Search for a Negotiated Settlement [107] Thompson, p. 141.
of the Vietnam War.
[83] Van Staaveren, p. 147.
[108] Thompson, p. 151.
[84] Van Staaveren, p. 187.
[109] Thompson, p. 303.
[85] Hobson, pgs 15–166.
[86] Thompson, p. 17.
[110] Berger, Carl, ed., The United States Air Force in Southeast
Asia. Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977,
p. 366.
[87] Schlight, A War Too Long, p. 52.
[89] Morocco, p. 159.
[111] Texas Tech University, Vietnam Virtual Archive, Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam (through 1 January 1968), p. 32.
[90] Hobson, 15–166. See also Morocco, p. 159.
[112] Hobson, pgs. 15–116.
[88] Morocco, p. 159.
[91] Contrary to opinion, the U.S. public still supported the
American effort in South Vietnam. It was disturbed by
the magnitude of the offensive only in that its military
and civilian leadership had constantly reassured them that
American goals were being achieved and that there was
“a light at the end of the tunnel.” Tet merely served notice
to the administration that the public wanted either victory
or an end to the open-ended commitment of American
resources and manpower. Clark Dougan, et al Nineteen
Sixty-Eight. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1983,
pps. 68–70.
[113] Schlight, A War Too Long, p.53
[114] Schlight, A War too Long, p. 53.
[115] Marolda, p. 82.
[116] Tilford, p. 106.
[117] Tilford, p. 155.
[92] Thompson, pps. 124–125.
[118] Tilford, p. 132.
[93] McNamara, pps. 265–271.
[119] Head, p. 37.
12
8.2
8.2.1
8
Sources
Published government documents
• Berger, Carl, ed, The United States Air Force in
Southeast Asia, 1961–1973. Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977.
• Corum, Col. Delbert, et al and Maj. Paul Burbage,
et al, The Tale of Two Bridges and The Battle for the
Skies over North Vietnam, 1964–1972. Maxwell Air
Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1976.
• Department of State, Aggression from the North:
The Record of North Vietnam’s Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.
• Head, William P. War Above the Clouds: B-52 Operations During the Second Indochina War and the
Effects of the Air War on Theory and Doctrine.
Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press,
2002.
• Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in
Southeast Asia. Washington DC: Naval Historical
Center, 1994.
• Schlight, Col. John, A War Too Long: The USAF
in Southeast Asia, 1961–1975. Washington DC: Air
Force History and Museums Program, 1996.
• Schlight, Col. John, The War in South Vietnam: The
Years of the Offensive, 1965–1968. Washington DC:
Air Force History and Museums Program, 1999.
• Spector, Ronald H. The United States Army in Vietnam: Advice and Support, 1941–1960. Washington
DC: United States Army Center of Military History,
1983.
• Thompson, Wayne, To Hanoi and Back: The U.S.
Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966–1973. Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002.
• Tilford, Earl H. Setup: What the Air Force Did in
Vietnam and Why. Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press, 1991.
• Van Staaveren, Jacob, Gradual Failure: The Air War
Over North Vietnam, 1965–1966. Washington DC:
Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002.
• Declassified CIA documents concerning Operation
Rolling Thunder
8.2.2
Document collections
• Gravel, Senator Mike, ed., The Pentagon Papers:
The Defense Department History of United States
Decisionmaking on Vietnam 5 vols. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1971.
REFERENCES
• Sheehan, Neil, Hedrick Smith, E.W. Kenworthy, &
Fox Butterfield, The Pentagon Papers as Published
by the New York Times. New York: Ballentine,
1971.
8.2.3 Biographies & memoirs
• McNamara, Robert S. with Brian VanDeMark, In
Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam.
New York: Times Books, 1995.
• Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspective
on the Presidency, 1963–1969. New York: Holt,
Rhinehart, and Winston, 1971.
8.2.4 Secondary sources
• Clodfelter, Mark, The Limits of Airpower: The
American Bombing of Vietnam. New York: Free
Press, 1989.
• Dougan, Clark, Stephen Weiss, et al., Nineteen SixtyEight. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1983.
• Gillespie, Robert M. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Escalation of the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1965.
Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Clemson University,
1994.
• Goodman, Allen E., The Search for A Negotiated
Settlement of the Vietnam War. New York: Berkeley
CA: University of California Press, 1986.
• Kahin, George M. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986.
• Hobson, Chris, Vietnam Air Losses: U.S. Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses
in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973. Hinkley UK: Midlands Press, 2001.
• McMaster, H.R. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. New York:
Harper Collins, 1997.
• Moise Edwin E., Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of
the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill NC: University of
North Carolina Press, 1996.
• Morocco, John Thunder from Above: Air War,
1941–1968. Boston: Boston Publishing Company,
1984.
• Nichols, John B. On Yankee Station: The Naval Air
War over Vietnam. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2001.
• Smith, John T. Rolling Thunder: The Strategic
Bombing Campaign, North Vietnam, 1965–1968.
Kensington Publishing Group, 1987.
13
• VanDeMark, Brian, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon
Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
9
External links
• Bibliography: Operation Rolling Thunder
• Pilots from Takhli and Korat Airbases shot down between 1965–1972