70
State Board of Education Compelling Salute to Flag
Held Unconstitutional." The Georgetown Law
Journal 32 (1943): 93-98.
Taylor, Hobart, Jr. "Constitutional Law- Freedom of
Religion-Compuls01y Flag Salute." Michigan Law
Review 42 0943): 319-21.
Minersville School District v. Gobitis
Carl Reynolds
The 1940 case of Jl1inersuille School District u.
Gobitis (310 U.S. 586) presents a church-state issue
involving the constimtionality of a compulsory state
regulation, the adherence to which would result in the
violation of a personal, religious belief. The question
presented before the U.S. Supreme Court in this case is
whether or not a "state regulation requiring that pupils in
the public schools, on pain of expulsion, participate in a
daily ceremony of saluting the national flag" is in violation
of personal and religious freedom guaranteed by the
United States Constitution (310 U.S. 586).
"The Minersville School District, under claim of
authority conferred by the Pennsylvania School Code,
adopted a resolution which required teachers and pupils
to salute the American flag as a daily patriotic
demonstration" ("Constitutional Law- Compuls01y Flag"
124-5). The Gobitis children, "aged twelve and thirteen,
had been excluded from the public school because of
repeated refusal to salute the national flag and recite the
pledge of allegiance in accordance with an authorized
order of the school board" (Andersen 149). The Gobitis
children refused to salute the flag because they claimed
that it violated their religious beliefs as Jehovah's
72
Witnesses. As a result of their expulsion, the father was
found in violation of a Pennsylvania compulsory school
attendance law (Howard 110). ''The father of the children
obtained an injunction in the Federal District Court against
expulsion of the children by the school board on the
grounds that exaction of the t1ag salute as a condition of
attending a public school is an unconstitutional
infringement of religious freedom'' ("Constitutional
Law-Compulsory Flag" 125). The Federal District Court
granted the injunction and the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling. Arguments on
behalf of the petitioners included the following:
•
The resolution of the School Board
requiring pupils to salute the t1ag was
lawfully adopted, and the expulsion
of the children was within its power
and authority.
The expulsion of the children did not
•
violate any right under the
Constinnion of the United States.
•
The expulsion of the children did not
violate any right under the
Constitution of Pennsylvania.
The refusal of the children to salute
•
the national flag at school exercises
because they believed that to do so
would violate the written law of
Almighty God as contained in the
Bible was not founded on a religious
belief.
•
The act of saluting the tlag has no
73
bearing on what a pupil may think of
his Creator.
The act of saluting the flag does not
•
prevent a pupil, no matter what his
religious belief may be, from
acknowledging the spiritual
sovereignty of Almighty God by
rendering to God the things which
are God's. (310 U.S. 587-8)
Arguments for the respondents included the
following:
The rule compelling respondents to
•
participate in the ceremony of
saluting the flag and the act of its
School Board in expelling them
because they refrained, violate their
rights guaranteed by Art. I, § 3, of the
Constitution of Pennsylvania and the
Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.
The vital question is: Shall the
•
creature man be free to exercise his
conscientious belief in God and his
obedience to the law of Almighty
God, the Creator, or shall the creature
man be comp elled to obey the law or
rule of the State, which law of the
State, as the creature conscientiously
believes, is in direct cont1ict with the
law of Almighty God?
\XTill any court attempt to say that
•
72
Witnesses. As a result of their expulsion, the father was
found in violation of a Pennsylvania compuls01y school
attendance law (Howard 110). ·The father of the children
obtained an injunction in the Federal District Court against
expulsion of the children by the school board on the
grounds that exaction of the flag salute as a condition of
attending a public school is an unconstitutional
infringement of religious freedom" ("'Constitutional
Law-Compulsory Flag" 125). The Federal District Court
granted the injunction and the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling. Arguments on
behalf of the petitioners included the following:
•
The resolution of the School Board
requiring pupils to salute the flag was
lawfully adopted, and the expulsion
of the children was within its power
and authority.
•
The expulsion of the children did not
violate any right under the
Constitution of the United States.
•
The expulsion of the children did not
violate any right under the
Constitution of Pennsylvania.
•
The refusal of the children to salute
the national flag at school exercises
because they believed that to do so
would violate the written law of
Almighty God as contained in the
Bible was not founded on a religious
belief.
•
The act of saluting the flag has no
73
bearing on what a pupil may think of
his Creator.
•
The act of saluting the flag does not
prevent a pupil, no matter what his
religious belief may be, from
acknowledging the spiritual
sovereignty of Almighty God by
rendering to God the things which
are God's. (310 U.S. 587-8)
Arguments for the respondents included the
following:
The rule compelling respondents to
•
participate in the ceremony of
saluting the flag and the act of its
School Board in expelling them
because they refrained, violate their
rights guaranteed by Art. I, § 3, of the
Constitution of Pennsylvania and the
Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.
The vital question is: Shall the
•
creature man be free to exercise his
conscientious belief in God and his
obedience to the law of Almighty
God, the Creator, or shall the creature
man be compelled to obey the law or
rule of the State, which law of the
State, as the creature conscientiously
believes, is in direct conflict with the
law of Almighty God?
Will any court attempt to say that
•
74
respondents mistakenly believe what
is set forth in the twentieth chapter of
Exodus in the Bible?
•
The saluting of the tlag of any earthly
government by a person who has
covenanted to do the will of God is a
form of religion and constitutes
idolatry.
•
The rule certainly abridges the
privileges of the respondents and
deprives them of liberty and property
without clue process of law. (310
U.S. 589-90)
Justice Frankfurter delivered the Opinion of the
Court. He asserted that the main preliminary question of
the case was ·'whethe r school children, like the Gobitis
children, must be excused from conduct required of all
the other children in the promotion of national cohesion"
(310 U.S. 595). Justice Frankfurter argued that national
cohesion is "an interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of
legal values. National unity is the basis of national
security" (310 U.S. 595). He claimed that free society is
ultimately founded on this national cohesion, the Jlag
being the symbol of such. As a result, Justice Frankfurter
held that the Gobitis children, despite their religious
beliefs, should be subject to the ultimate cause of national
cohesion and security.
Having answered the preliminary question, Justice
Frankfurter stated that "the precise issue, then, for us to
decide is whether legislatures of the various states and the
authorities in a thousand countries and school districts of
75
this country are barred from determining the
appropriateness of various means to evoke that unifying
sentiment without which there can ultimately be no
liberties, civil or religious" (310 U.S. 597). Justice
Frankfurter proceeded to address this issue by contending
that "p ersonal freedom is best maintained-so long as the
remedial channels of the democratic process remain open
and unobstructed-when it is ingrained in a people's
habits and not enforced against popular policy by the
coercion of adjudicated law" (310 U.S. 599). Since he
maintained that judicial review should not be "enforced
against popular policy,'' Justice Frcmkfurter asserted that
legislation should be excluded from adjudication and left
to the political processes (as long as the political processes
were free from intetference) unless a constitutional
violation is blatantly obvious. He concluded that "to fight
out the wise use of legislative assemblies rather than to
transfer such a contest to the judicial arena, setves to
vindicate the self-contlcl.ence of a free people" (310 U.S.
600). As a result, the Court reversed the decisions of the
lower federal courts.
A<> the lone dissenter, Justice Stone emphatically
stated that "by this [compulsory llag salute] law the state
seeks to coerce [the Gobitis] children to express a
senliment which, as they interpret it, they do not entertain,
and which violates their deepest religious convictions''
(310 U.S. 601). He conceded that individual liberties are
not always absolutes, providing examples of the
governmental right to sutvive by compelling citizens to
give military service and to undergo militaty training. ·'But
it is a long step," Justice Stone argtued, "and one which I
74
respondents mistakenly believe what
is set forth in the twentieth chapter of
Exodus in the Bible?
•
The saluting o f the flag of any earthly
government by a person who has
covenanted to do the will of God is a
fo rm of religion and constitutes
idolatry.
•
The rule certainly abridges the
privileges of the respondents and
deprives them of liberty and property
without due process of law. (310
u.s. 589-90)
Justice Frankfurte r delivered the Opinion of the
Court. He asserted that the main pre liminary question of
the case was ''whethe r school children, like the Gobitis
children, must be excused from conduct required of all
the other child ren in the promotion of national cohesion"
(310 U.S. 595). Justice Frankfurter argued that national
cohesion is ·'an interest inferior to none in the hie rarchy of
legal values. National unity is the basis of national
security'' <310 U.S. 595). He claimed that free society is
ultimately founded on this national cohesion , the llag
being the symbol of such. As a result, Justice Frankfurter
held that the Gobitis children, despite their religious
beliefs, should be subject to the ultimate cause of national
cohesion and security.
Having a nswe red the preliminaty question, Justice
Frankfurter stated that ''the precise issue, then, for us to
decide is whether legislatures of the various states and the
authorities in a thousand countries and school districts of
75
this countty a re barred from determining the
appropriateness of various means to e\·oke that unifying
sentiment without wh ich there can ultimately be no
liberties, civil or relig io us" (310 U.S. 597). Justice
Frankfurter proceeded to address this issue by contending
that ·'personal freedom is best maintained-so long as the
remedial channels of the democratic process remain open
and unobstructed-when it is ingrained in a people's
habits and not enforced against popular policy by the
coercion o f adjudicated law" (310 U.S. 599). Since he
maintained that judicial review should not be "enforced
against popular policy,'' Justice Frankfu rter asserted that
legislation should be excl uded from adjudicatio n and left
to the political processes (as long as the political processes
were free from interference) unless a constitutional
violation is blatantly obvious. He concluded that "to fight
out the wise use of legislative assemblies rathe r than to
transfer such a contest to the judicial arena, serves to
vindicate the self-confidence of a free people'' (310 U.S.
600). As a result, the Court reversed the decisions of the
lower feder<ll courts.
As the lone dissente r, Justice Stone emphatically
stated that ''by this [compulsory nag salute] law the state
seeks to coerce [the Gobitis] children to express a
sentiment which, as they interpret it, they do not e ntertain,
a nd which violates their deepest re ligious convictions"
(310 U.S. 601). He conceded that individual liberties are
not always absolutes, providing examples of the
governmental right to su rvive by compelling citizens to
give military service and to undergo militaJy training. ''But
it is a long step," Justice Stone argued, "and one which I
76
am unable to take, to the position that government may,
as a supposed educational measure and as a means of
disciplining the young, compel public affirmations which
violate their religious conscience" (310 U.S. 602).
Justice Stone contends further against the
compulsory flag salute regulation, arguing that there are
ways to foster national cohesion and security other than
compelling a student to comply with something the
student does not believe and which violates the student's
religious beliefs. He claims that civil liberty rights allow
an individual to believe whatever the individual will and
that such an individual right is guaranteed, despite any
legislative rationale of a compulsory act to the contrary.
Justice Stone deduced that the compuls01y flag salute
statute is "no less that the surrender of the constitutional
protection of the liberty of the small minorities to the
popular will" (310 U.S. 606). He concluded that such
circumstances are within the limits of strict judicial ·
scrutiny, and are indeed the Court's responsibil ity, and
should be held unconstitutional.
There is no doubt that the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) would agree with the dissenting opinion of
Justice Stone. In fact, the ACLU filed a brief of arnici
curiaeurging affirmation of the holdings of the lower
federal courts granting the injunction. In its publication,
''The Right to Religious Liberty," the ACLU sets forth the
rights it seeks to defend: ·'freedom of inquiry and
expression; due process of law, equal protection under
the law; and privacy" (Lynn, Stern, and Thomas vii).
According to this ideology and the arguments contained in
its brief of amici curiae, the ACLU would concur with
77
Justice Stone's dissent that flag saluting ·'compulsion is a
prohibited infringement of personal liberty, freedom of
speech and religion, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights" (310
u.s. 601).
Robert L. Cord, on the other hand, would be at
odds with Justice Stone and the ACLU regarding the
holding and reasoning in the case. In the preface to his
book, Separation of Church and State, Cord states that ·'the
constitutional doctrine of separation of Church and State
meant that no national religion was to be instituted by the
Federal Government, nor was any religion, religious sect,
or religious tradition to be placed in a legally preferred
position" (xiv). This fundamental, orthodox view of the
separation of Church and State doctrine allows religion to
affect government, and government to affect religion, so
long as the religion is not "placed in a legally preferred
position." Cord argues further that "all governmental
association with religion is not necessarily a violation of
the First Amendment" (xiv). In the Minersville District v.
Gobitis case, Cord observes that "as long as the state was
pursuing a valid constitutional goal through its legislation,
religious beliefs that the state had no aim or intent in
violating would have to give way, despite the First and
Fourteenth Amendment religious guarantees-neither of
which is absolute'' (150-1).
My view of this case relies on precedent, both in
relation to footnote four of the Carotene Products case,
and to Justice Holmes' present danger test in Schenck u.
United States. A close review of the facts of these two
precedents leads to the conclusion that the injunction
granted by the lower federal courts in Minersville District
76
am unable to take, to the position that government may,
as a supposed educational measure and as a means of
disciplining the young, compel public affirmations which
violate their religious conscience" (310 U.S. 602).
Justice Stone contends further against the
compulsory flag salute regulation, arguing that there are
ways to foster national cohesion and security other than
compelling a student to comply with something the
student does not believe and which violates the student's
religious beliefs. He claims that civil liberty rights allow
an individual to believe whatever the individual will and
that such an individual right is guaranteed, despite any
legislative rationale of a compulsoty act to the contrary.
Justice Stone deduced that the compulsoty flag salute
statute is "no less that the surrender of the constitutional
protection of the liberty of the small minorities to the
popular will" (310 U.S. 606). He concluded that such
circumstances are within the limits of strict judicial ·
scrutiny, and are indeed the Court's responsibility, and
should be held unconstitutional.
There is no doubt that the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) would agree with the dissenting opinion of
Justice Stone. In fact, the ACLU filed a brief of amici
curiae urging affirmation of the holdings of the lower
federal courts granting the injunction. In its publication,
"The Right to Religious Liberty," the ACLU sets forth the
rights it seeks to defend: ·'freedom of inquiry and
expression; due process of law, equal protection under
the law; and privacy" (Lynn, Stern, and Thomas vii).
According to this ideology and the arguments contained in
its brief of mnici curiae, the ACLU would concur with
77
Justice Stone's dissent that flag saluting ·'compulsion is a
prohibited infringement of personal liberty, freedom of
speech and religion, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights" (310
u.s. 601).
Robert L. Cord, on the other hand, would be at
odds with Justice Stone and the ACLU regarding the
holding and reasoning in the case. In the preface to his
book, Separation of Church and State, Cord states that ''the
constitutional doctrine of separation of Church and State
meant that no national religion was to be instituted by the
Federal Government, nor was any religion, religious sect,
or religious tradition to be placed in a legally preferred
position" (xiv). This fundamental, orthodox view of the
separation of Church and State doctrine allows religion to
affect government, and government to affect religion, so
long as the religion is not "placed in a legally preferred
position." Corel argues further that "all governmental
association with religion is not necessarily a violation of
the First Amendment" (xiv). In the Minersuille District v.
Gobitis case, Cord observes that ''as long as the state was
pursuing a valid constitutional goal through its legislation,
religious beliefs that the state had no aim or intent in
violating would have to give way, despite the First and
Fourteenth Amendment religious guarantees- neither of
which is absolute" (150-1).
My view of this case relies on precedent, both in
relation to footnote four of the Carotene Products case,
and to Justice Holmes' present danger test in Schenck u.
United States. A close review of the facts of these two
precedents leads to the conclusion that the injunction
granted by the lower federal courts in Minerst1il!e District
Gobitis must be upheld.
Footnote four in United States t'. Carotene Pmducts
Co. states the following:
There may be a narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten Amendments, \Yhkh are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within
the Fourteenth.
[Prejudice] against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to cu rtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry. (304 U.S. 144,
164)
"Justice Stone's dissent was clearly cast along the lines" of
this footnote (Danzig 687). It is reasonably clear that the
compulsory flag salute rule is "on its face" a prohibition of
the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and
freedom of religion. Additionally, the minority status of
the Jehovah's \Vitnesses likewise mandates a ·'narrower
scope" and a "more searching judicial inquiry" into the
Jllinerst•ille Districtu. Gobitis case. If the Court had
correctly applied strict scrutiny to this case, the holdings of
the lower courts would have been affirmed. In l~1ct,
Justice Frankfurter conceded that reversal of the injunction
would subject personal religiosity (a form of free speech)
t'.
79
to the ultimate goal of national unity. Such subjection
must be strictly scrutinized, generally resulting in the
im·alidation of the statute in question.
In addition to the precedent set by th e Carolene
Products footnote four, the present danger test of Justice
Homes in Schenck likewise urges affirmation of the lower
courts' holdings in Gobitis. ·'If freedom of religion from
control or interference by the state, as supposedly
protected by the clue process clause of the Fourtee nth
Amendment, is to have any real meaning, it ~·ould seem
that only in case of actual necessity as required by the
clear and present danger test of Mr. Justice Holmes in the
case of Schenck z•. United States, would the state be
allowed to invade this freedom'' (Howard 107). Justice
Frankfurter asserted that the government has the right to
preserve itself and to enforce national security, "but to
exercise such power the re must be a 'clear and present
danger' to the State, and 'the limitation upon individual
liberty must have appropriate relation to the safety of the
State'" (D.E.S. 446). It would be a far stretch indeed to
argue that the refusal of two minority children to salute
the Ame rican flag, on the ba~ is of religious belief,
constitutes a ·'clear and present cia nger" to the national
security of the United States.
That the reasoning in the Opinion of the Court in
Gobitis was flawed is evident in the opinion of Justices
Black, Douglas and Murphy, who had joined in Justice
Fr:mkhtrter's opinion, and in the overruling of the case by
the Court three years later in West Virginia State Board of
Education £'. Bamette. Justices Black, Douglas and
Murphy announced the following in a dissenting opinion
78
Gobitis must be upheld.
Footnote four in United States L'. Carotene Products
Co. states the following:
There may be a narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten Amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within
the Fourteenth.
[Prejudice] against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquity. (304 U.S. 144,
164)
'Justice Stone's dissent was clearly cast along the lines" of
this footnote (Danzig 687). It is reasonably clear that the
compulsory flag salute rule is "on its face" a prohibition of
the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and
freedom of religion. Additionally, the minority status of
the Jehovah's Witnesses likewise mandates a ·'narrower
scope" and a ·'more searching judicial inquiry" into the
Jl!inerst•ille District l'. Gobitis case. If the Court had
correctly applied strict scrutiny to this case, the holdings of
the lower couns would have been affirmed. In fact,
Justice Frankfurter conceded that reversal of the injunction
would s ubject personal religiosity (a form of free speech)
L'.
79
to the ultimate goal of national unity. Such subjection
must be strictly scrutinized, generally resulting in the
im·alidation of the statute in question.
In addition to the precedent set by the Carolene
Products footnote four, the present danger test of justice
Homes in Sche11ck likewise urges affirmation of the lower
cou rts' holdings in Gobitis. ·'If freedom of religion from
control or interference by the state, as supposedly
protected by the clue process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is to have any real meaning, it would seem
that only in case of actual necessity as required by the
clear and present danger test of Mr. Justice Holmes in the
case of Schenck l'. United States, would the state be
allowed to invade this freedom" (IIoward 107). Justice
Frankfurter asserted that the government has the right to
preserve itself and to enforce national security, ''but to
exercise such power the re must be a 'clear and present
danger' to the State, and 'the limitation upon individual
liberty must have appropriate rehltion to the safety of the
State'" (D.E.S. 446). It would be a far stretch indeed to
argue that the refusal of two minority children to salute
the American flag, on the ba8is of religious belief,
constitutes a "clear and present danger" to the national
security of the United States.
That the reasoning in the Opinion of the Court in
Gobitis was flawed is evident in the opinion of justices
Black, Douglas and Murphy, who had joined in Justice
Frankfuner's opinion, and in the overruling of the case by
the Court three years later in West Virginia State Board of
Education L'. Barnette. Justices Black, Douglas and
Murphy announced the following in a dissenting opinion
80
in ]ones l '. Opelika: "Since we joined in the opinion in the
Gobitis case, \Ve think this is an appropriate occasion to
state that we now believe that it also was wrongly
decided" (316 U.S. 584, 623-4).
The illinersl'ille District l'. Gobitis case did little to
impact the interpretation of subsequent cases because its
holding was overmled in West Virginia State Board of
Education l'. Barnette. One commentator has made the
following observation, which I see to be a correct
summaty of n·hat may be concluded from the Gohitis
case:
In Barnette the majority opinion, written by
justice Jackson, held that the coerced t1ag
ceremony contravened the freedom of
speech guarantee of the first amendment.
Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy added
concurring statements that the compelled
pledge and sa lute also \'iolated the
constitutionally protected religious freedom
of the children. In stark contrast to Justice
Frankfurter's leadership of the court in
Gobitis, no other Justice joined his dissenting
opinion in Barnette. (Gard 420)
Works Cited
Andersen, William F. "Constitutional Law-Due
Process-Freedom of religion and
Conscience-Compulsory Flag Salute.·· Michigan
Law Review. 39 nl 0940): 149-152.
··Constitutional Law-Compulsoty Flag Salute Sustained:·
New York University Law Quarterlr Review 18 n1
0940): 124-127.
Cord, Robert L. Separation of Church and State. New York:
Lambeth, 1982.
D.E.S. "Constitutional Law-Religious Freedom and
Compulsory Saluting of the Flag.·· University of
Cincinnati Law Review 14 n2 0940): 444-447.
Danzig, Richard. "Justice Frankfurte r's Opinions in the
Flag Salute Cases: lllending Logic and Psychologic
in Constitutional Decision Making." Stanford Law
Review. 36 n3 (1984): 675-723.
Gard, Stephen W. "The Flag Salute Cases and the First
Amendment.'' Cleveland State Law Review. 31 n3
0982): 419-513.
Howard, Freel L. ·'Constitutional Law-Civil
Liberties-Freedom of Religion-Compulsory Flag
Salute.'' Missouri Law Review 6 n1 0941): 106-11.
Lynn, Bany, Marc D. Stern, and Oliver S. Thomas. The
Right to Religious Libern:. Carbondale and
Edwardsville, II.: Southern Illinois UP, 1995.
80
in ] ones L'. Opelika: .. Since we joined in the opinion in the
Gobitis case, we think this is an appropriate occasion to
state that we now believe that it also was wrongly
decided" (316 U.S. 584, 623-4).
The 1l1inersuille District u. Gobitis case did little to
impact the interpretation of subsequent cases because its
holding was overruled in tl7est Virginia State Board of
Education l '. Barnette. One commentator has made the
following obsetvation, which I see to be a correct
summaty of what may be concluded from the Gobitis
case:
ln Bamette the majority opinion, written by
Justice jackson, held that the coerced flag
ceremony contravened the freedom of
sp eech guaramee of the first amendment.
justices I3lack, Douglas and Murphy added
concurring statements that the compelled
pledge and sa lute also violated the
constitutionally protected re ligious freedom
of the children. In stark contr<1st to Justice
Frankfurter's leadership of the court in
Gobitis, no other Justice joined his dissenting
opin io n in Barnette. (Gard 420)
Works Cited
Andersen, William F. ''Constitutional Law-Due
Process-Freedom of religion and
Conscience-Compulsoty Flag Salute ." Michigan
Law Review. 39 nl 0940): 149-152.
'"Constitutional Law-Compulsory Flag Salute Sustained."
New York Un iversity Law Quarterly Review 18 n1
(1940): 124-127.
Cord, Robe rt L. Sepa ration of Church and State. New York:
Lambeth , 1982.
D.E.S. "Constitutional Law- Religious Freedom and
Compulsory Saluting of the Flag.·· University of
Cincinnati Law Review 14 n2 0940): 444-447.
Danzig, Richard. 'J ustice Frankfurter's Opinions in the
Flag Salute Cases: I31ending Logic and Psychologic
in Constitutional Decision Making." Stanford Law
Review. 36 n3 (1984): 675-723.
Gard, Stephen \V. ''The Flag Salute Cases and the First
Amendment. '' Cleveland State Law Review. 31 n3
(1982): 419-513.
Howard , Fred L. "Constitutional Law-Civil
Liberties-Freedom of Religion-Compulsory Flag
Salute." Missouri La~\' Review 6 nl 09'+1): 106-11.
Lynn, Barty, Marc D. Stern, and Oliver S. Thomas. The
Right to Religious Liberty. Carbondale and
Edwardsville, II.: Southern Illinois UP, 1995.