1
Demography of Illicit Emigration from China: A Sending Country's Perspective
2
Zai Liang
This paper examines the demographic trends of international migration from China, particularly
from Fujian Province in the 1980s and 1990s, comparing the characteristics of emigrants with
nonemigrants. This research yields two major findings. First, Fujian Province became a leading
immigrant-sending province in the mid-1990s. Second, there have also been changes in SES
selectivity of emigration from Fujian from 1990 to 1995. In particular, this change in
emigration selectivity is characterized by a significant shift from urbanites to rural peasants. The
future prospects of emigration from Fujian and China are explored.
KEY WORDS: emigration; migration networks; floating population; Fujian; China.
1
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the conference on “International Migration and
Transnational Crime”, Rutgers University-Newark, May 15, 1998 and the annual meetings of the
American Sociological Association, Washington, DC, August, 2000.
2
Department of Sociology, Queens College and CUNY Graduate Center, Flushing, New York
11367; e-mail: [email protected].
Introduction
In recent years, the patterns of Chinese immigration to the United States have undergone
major changes. On a casual stroll along East Broadway in Manhattan's Chinatown, one sees
many restaurants, driving schools, matchmaking services, and employment agencies with the
Chinese sign "Fu." "Fu" represents the first character of Fujian or Fuzhou, the area in China that
in recent years has been sending thousands of immigrants, many undocumented, to the United
3
States as well as other countries. In another newly established Chinatown in Flushing, Queens,
one sees a similar trend though to a lesser degree. This simple observation suggests a major
change in Chinese immigration patterns, i.e. a substantial increase in immigration to the New
York metro area from China's Fujian Province in the last ten to fifteen years. The arrival of a
large number of Fujianese has important implications for Chinatown and beyond. Already, most
of New York's Chinese fast food restaurants are owned by Fujianese. Some have attributed this
to the Fujianese's willingness to work hard and to engage in price wars (Kwong 1997; Lii 1996).
As the tide of Fujianese immigrants gathers momentum, the Fujianese are getting more and
more involved in the politics and governance of Chinatown. Many events in Chinatown are now
sponsored by the United Chinese Association of New York, which is controlled by the
Fujianese, instead of the old Chinatown governing body, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolence
Association (Zhonghua Gongsou), whose members are mostly from Canton (Liang and Ye
2001).
4
3
Some businesses use the Chinese term "min", i.e. an abbreviation for the Fujian Province, in their
names.
4
The large volume of emigrants from several regions within Fujian has immediate implications on
Fujian's infrastructure. For example, one of Fujian's newly built international airports is located in
Changle City (a major immigrant-sending region), instead of Fuzhou City, the province's capital.
2
Unlike other Chinese immigrants, many in the recent wave from Fujian are
undocumented, this difference poses serious challenges and provides opportunities for students
of international migration. It poses serious challenges because data on these undocumented
immigrants are very difficult to obtain--those without legal papers are less likely to participate in
surveys or censuses. In addition, unless they obtain permanent resident status, they are not
included in the data collected by the Immigration and Naturalization Service; the federal agency
only keeps information for legal immigrants. It is also impossible to identify Fujianese who
have permanent residence status from surveys or censuses conducted in the United States
because all Chinese are lumped together regardless of their province of origin. At the same
time, networks connecting Fujian and New York City are gradually forming. As more and more
immigrants from Fujian arrive in New York, information (often along with a success story) is
fed back to Fujian, which further stimulates more people to migrate. Indeed illegal migration
from Fujian continues to rise steadily in recent years (Holmes 1998; World Journal 1999). The
study of emigration from China also has the potential to make a contribution to study of
international migration both theoretically and empirically. As Massey et al. (1994, p.739)
remarked "Far too much research is centered in Mexico, which because of its unique
relationships with the United States may be unrepresentative of broader patterns and
trends...more attention needs to be devoted to other prominent sending countries, such as the
Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Colombia, El Salvador, Korea, and China."
Although researchers have studied the commercialization of migration in Asian countries, they
focused more on government-sponsored contract labor in foreign countries than on clandestine
migration (Abella 1992).
Primarily relying on survey and census data from China, this paper provides a new
3
perspective and methodology for studying Fujianese emigration. This approach of using survey
and census information gathered in China takes advantage of the fact that these data sources
have information on household registration status at the time of data collection and information
5
on emigration is available. Though such an approach is not without limitations, I argue that it
provides significant insight into understanding the recent trend of international migration from
China in general, and Fujian Province in particular. A major merit of these kinds of data is that
the province of origin is known, which allows us to compare the basic characteristics of those
who emigrated with those who stay. A successful application of such an approach also has the
potential to open up new avenues to study international migration from other provinces in China
or other countries where similar data are available. In addition to the survey and census data
from China, the current research is supplemented by interviews that I conducted in Fuzhou in the
summer of 1998.
In this paper, I first discuss recent emigration from Fujian within the larger context of
China's transition to a market-oriented economy that began in the late 1970s and a "fever of
going abroad" in the 1980s. I review the pattern of emigration from China during the period of
1982-1995, and highlight Fujian's increasing importance in sending emigrants. Then, I examine
changes in the socioeconomic selectivity of Fujianese emigrants over time and its implications.
Finally, I discuss future prospects of emigration from Fujian and China and discuss factors that
5
For example, in the 1995 China 1 Percent Sample Survey, among those who used to a reside in the
census district and had left the country by the time of the survey, household registration status is
considered to be suspended (zhan wu hukou) and the information is recorded in the survey (China
Population Sample Survey Office 1997, p.641). This applies only to emigrants who left during the
six-month interval prior to the 1995 survey. According to regulations of household registration,
individuals who leave China for more than six months must cancel their household registration (Wan
1989, p.175). In addition, because of the sensitivity, undocumented migration is likely to be underreported in the survey.
4
are likely to affect a trend of future emigration. I argue that emigration from Fujian still has not
run its course and will surely continue to grow. I also discuss the extent to which a large volume
of internal migrants will migrate internationally and thereby create a market for migration
merchants. I suggest that it is uncertain whether China's huge floating population will join the
wave of emigration from China.
From the "fever of going abroad" to snake people and snakeheads
China has a long history of sending immigrants abroad. The large number of Chinese
living in different countries around the world today is the result of a large flow of emigration
that began about 150 years ago (Poston, et al. 1994; Zhu 1990). Emigration came to a virtual
halt when the Chinese Communist took power in 1949; and for the next three decades or so, as
various political campaigns, such as the Cultural Revolution, were waged. During this time,
China did send a small number of students to study abroad, but they primarily went to the former
Soviet Union, and other Socialist allies. A tight political control of individual freedom, together
with countless incidents of human sufferings and calamity, characterized this period. Because of
the Cold War, China was totally isolated from the rest of the world. Having friends or relatives
abroad was a source of liability, let alone emigration (Zhou 1992).
In the late 1970s, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China began to open itself to
the outside world. When Mr. Frank Press, the science and technology advisor for the American
President Jimmy Carter visited China in July, 1978, the two countries agreed to exchange
students and scholars (Qian 1996). In December 1978, about fifty Chinese students enrolled at
several elite American universities. On January 1, 1979, the United States and China established
a formal diplomatic relationship.
5
The significance of sending abroad Chinese students has more far-reaching implications
than the small number of the first group might suggest. It signaled an initial intention that China
was ready to join the international community after thirty years of complete isolation. The
"fever of going abroad" came first. It began in earnest on college campuses around the country
and then spread into the rest of society. In 1981, China's Ministry of Education issued a
"Circular Regarding Self-supporting Students Going Abroad," formally summarizing the
procedures for students who intended to go abroad (Qian 1996). As a result, the number of
students who went abroad mushroomed. In 1983, only 1000 students studied abroad. By 1986,
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the number soared to 100,000 (Qian 1996, p.40). The fever spread to university campuses
throughout China in a short period of time (Hu and Zhang 1997).
During this time, the Chinese government also modified its policies regarding
emigration, in general, especially for individuals who wanted to reunite with family members.
In 1986, the People's Congress of China passed a law regarding emigration of Chinese citizens
(Research Group on New Emigration 1997; also see detailed discussion of policy changes in
Skeldon (1996)). The law essentially stipulates that emigration is a basic right of Chinese
citizens. Despite many practical difficulties and complexities in implementing this law, the law
clearly sets forth a set of procedures; and it was one of the first steps in allowing average
Chinese citizens to travel abroad or to emigrate. This law is especially relevant in several
Chinese provinces, such as Guangdong and Fujian, which have a long history of sending
emigrants. By the mid-1980s, the fever of going abroad was running high; but the choices were
limited. One would either go as a student (which normally required a minimum of a college
6
There are two categories of students who study abroad: government-sponsored and privately
sponsored. The figures reported here reflect only students who are privately sponsored.
6
degree) or to reunite with family members already abroad. These requirements excluded many
people; there was a clear demand to leave by people who did not fit into either of those two
categories. It was under these circumstances that "snake people" (ren she)-illegal migrants and
"snakeheads" (she tou)-smugglers began to emerge and that the tidal wave of emigration began
to swell. According to Xin (1993, p.131), these terms were first used by people from
Guangdong Province which is where the process of undocumented migration to the United
States began. Legend has it that if one transports a single snake, it is very likely that the snake
will die on the road. However, if one transports many snakes together they are expected to rely
on each other and, as a result, all reach their destination. Historical records also suggest that the
indigenous Fujianese use snakes as totems for worship (Wang 1994, p.15). There is no doubt
7
that Fujian is the province where most illegal migrants originate. Conservative estimates
suggest that some 200,000 illegal immigrants have come from Fujian to the United States in the
last fifteen years or so (Kwong 1997, p.9).
To examine changes in emigration patterns over time, I will analyze data from the 1982
China Population Census, the 1990 China Population Census, and the 1995 China 1 Percent
Population Sample Survey (State Statistical Bureau 1991; China Population Sample Survey
Office 1997). All three data sets share the same characteristics--they all have information on the
respondent's household registration status; they include information, e.g. sex, age, educational
level, for individuals who emigrated from China but previously lived in the community. Table 1
shows how the distribution of emigrants from China changed between 1982 and 1995. The
second column in Table 1 indicates the number of emigrants from each province in 1982. The
7
For a detailed discussion of why so many undocumented immigrants are from China's Fujian
Province, see Hood (1997), Liang and Ye (2001), and Xin (1993).
7
total number of emigrants (56,930) was very small in 1982. The "fever of going abroad" had just
begun. The emigrant population consisted primarily of students and a small number of people
who were joining family members. Since Beijing has many universities, it is not surprising that
Beijing accounted for 22 percent of China's emigrant population in 1982. Shanghai, another big
city in China, followed next, with about 10 percent of China's emigrants in 1982.
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)
The emigrants from Guangdong province represented primarily those who were reuniting
with relatives abroad, i.e. the so-called family reunification immigrants. In 1982, Fujian
represented less than 2 percent of China's emigrant population, suggesting that the illegal
emigration from Fujian probably did not start in significant numbers until the middle of 1980s.
By 1990, the pattern had begun to change. In a matter of eight years, from 1982 to 1990,
the magnitude of the emigrant population quadrupled to 234,000. Although Beijing and
Shanghai still accounted for the largest proportion of China's emigrant population, Fujian began
to catch up quickly. Surpassing Guangdong in 1990, Fujian accounted for more than 13 percent
of China's emigrant population. By 1995, Fujian topped the list with 28 percent of China's
emigrant population; it dominated all other provinces by the mid-1990s. This fact is consistent
with the observation that Fujianese abound in New York City and other cities in the United
States.
8
A portrait of Chinese and Fujianese emigrants in the 1990s
8
In Appendix 1, I compare the characteristics of Fujianese emigrants in the 1995 1% Population
Sample Survey with a survey of undocumented Fujianese immigrants conducted by Ko-lin Chin
(1997) in New York's Chinatown. The results are remarkably similar. This similarity may suggests
that many of Fujianese emigrants identified in the 1995 survey are undocumented.
8
In this section, I give a overall description of emigration from China. Specifically, two
levels of comparisons will be made. First, I will compare the basic characteristics of emigrants
and nonemigrants for China as a whole. Second, I will compare basic characteristics of
emigrants from Fujian, Beijing, and China.
Even though Chinese citizens officially are guaranteed the freedom to emigrate, the
reality is that emigration is highly selective. Using data from the 1995 China 1 Percent
Population Sample Survey, I compare emigrants and non-emigrants by several major individual
characteristics. The results are summarized in Table 2.
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)
In general, the proportion of males in the emigrant population (62 percent) is higher than
in the nonemigrant population (51 percent). The most striking difference is that emigrants are
much younger than non-emigrants: the percentage of emigrants in the eighteen to thirty-nine age
group is nearly 72 percent as compared to 38 percent among nonemigrants. Emigrants are also
much more educated than nonemigrants. Thirty-seven percent of emigrants are collegeeducated; the percentage of those without any education is negligible. In contrast, 41 percent of
nonemigrants have only an elementary school education, while a significant proportion have no
formal education at all. Finally, there is an urban bias--emigrants tend to come from cities. One
factor for the urban bias is that many students who went abroad were college graduates; all
universities in China are located in urban areas.
From Table 2, the general impression is that a "typical" Chinese emigrant in the 1990s is
a young male from the city and with a high-level of education. This image is clearly different if
we focus on emigrants from Fujian. Table 3 compares emigrants from Fujian and Beijing on
several important sociodemographic characteristics. Seventy-four percent of emigrants from
9
Fujian are male. In contrast, the sex ratio is much more balanced among emigrants from
Beijing. Emigrants from Fujian are 20 percent more likely to be in the eighteen to thirty-nine
age group than emigrants from Beijing. As far as education is concerned, the contrast is even
more striking. Among emigrants from Fujian, almost 80 percent have an education level of
junior high school and lower. In contrast, 76 percent of emigrants from Beijing have a college
degree. Finally, about two-thirds of emigrants from Fujian are of rural origin; in comparison, as
compared to almost all emigrants from Beijing are former city residents. Clearly, emigrants
from Fujian represent a lower level of the socioeconomic stratum than emigrants from Beijing
and it is possible that a significant number of Fujianese emigrants are undocumented.
9
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)
This comparison between Fujian and Beijing suggests a divergent pattern of Chinese
emigration in the 1990s. On the one hand, emigrants from Beijing are more likely to be highlyeducated and to have a balanced sex ratio. On the other hand, emigrants from Fujian province
9
Admittedly there is no way to identify whether an individual immigrated through legal or illegal
channels from the Chinese Census or other survey data used in this paper. However, statistics in
Table 3 show that emigrants from Fujian are very different from emigrants from other parts of China.
For emigrants from Beijing, the most likely channels of emigration are (1) going abroad as students
and then adjustment for permanent resident status later, (2) getting employment related visas, and (3)
family reunification. In the case of Fujian, the first two channels are closed to them because of their
low level of education. Although it is true that many Fujianese emigrants have relatives already in the
United States, it is questionable whether or not they will use it. One possibility is that some of their
relatives are still undocumented migrants. Even if their relatives have green cards, unless for
immediate family members, there are numerical limitations for immigration under most categories.
A very limited number of Fujianese expect to immigrate to the United States through family
reunification, which usually takes a long time because of the backlog. It seems that most Fujianese
do not have the patience to go through this channel. A private communication with Ko-lin Chin in
May 1998 confirms this point. In addition, results from Appendix 1 suggest that most emigrants from
Fujian in the mid-1990s (as identified from the 1995 survey) resemble that of the undocumented
migrants on many characteristics. Based on the above evidence, I argue that substantial portion of the
emigrants from Fujian are likely to be undocumented.
10
are heavily dominated by rural, young men with a low level of education. This polarization in
socioeconomic origin is reflected in the Chinese immigrant population in the countries of
destination.
Do those findings hold if we compare Fujian with emigrants from China as a whole?
Column 3 provides the basic characteristics of emigrants from China (excluding emigrants from
Fujian). Again, we see sex ratio is much more balanced among emigrants from China than that
of Fujian. The comparison between emigrants from Fujian and China is equally striking, with
emigrants from Fujian are much more likely to come from rural areas with low levels of
education. Comparing to Beijing as well as to the rest of China, emigrants from Beijing really
represent a different population, which I will further explore in the following section.
Changes in the selectivity of emigrants from Fujian by socioeconomic status (SES), 1990 to
1995
For a long time, students of migration have been interested in the socioeconomic
selectivity of migrants (Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994; Findley 1987). The general
consensus is that, at the initial stage of the migration process, it is generally those people in the
middle of the socioeconomic hierarchy who are most likely to migrate. This is because
individuals at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy cannot afford the trip. This is
particularly true for those who wish to be smuggled because large sums of money are demanded
by the snakeheads. Individuals who are prosperous have no incentive to migrate. Therefore,
only individuals at the middle level of the socioeconomic hierarchy have both the incentive and
means to migrate.
Massey, Goldring, and Durand (1994) argue that this SES selectivity in the initial stage
11
of migration can change over time. As more and more migrants from the same community go
abroad, information about the destination spreads across the community; the accumulation of
social capital that connects the place of destination and the place of origin increases
correspondingly. In the words of Massey et al. (1993), "as the stock of social ties and
international migrant experience grows over time, migration should become progressively less
selective and spread from the middle to the lower segments of the socioeconomic hierarchy
(p.461, emphasis added)." As a result, migration becomes less dependent on SES and more and
more accessible to all individuals in the community of origin. Using measures of migration
prevalence at the community level and life history data from nineteen Mexican communities,
Massey, Goldring, and Durand (1994) showed that the migration process indeed grew less
selective as the level of migration prevalence increased.
Following this rationale, I looked for changes in SES selectivity over time for emigrants
from Fujian, using data from the 1990 Chinese Census and the 1995 China 1 Percent Population
Sample Survey. The results are in Table 4. First, I compared education. In 1990, emigration
was quite selective by educational level; 43 percent of the emigrants had completed senior high
school and above and 11 percent have some college level education. By 1995, however, a high
level of education was less of a factor. Almost half of the emigrants from Fujian had only
completed a junior high school, and more than a quarter had just an elementary school
education. Likewise, in 1990, about 11 percent of emigrants from Fujian were professionals; by
1995, that number had dropped to only 2 percent. Most of the emigrants in 1995 were
previously in service occupations, doing manual labor or working in agriculture. Indeed, as
emigration became more prevalent over time in the Fujian Province, emigration became much
more accessible to the average Fujianese; so much so that one did not have to possess a high
12
prestigious occupation or a high level of education in order to make the trip.
10
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE)
As emigration became less selective along the socioeconomic dimension, there was also a
shift in other demographic characteristics. In 1990, 77 percent of emigrants were males; that
declined slightly to 74 percent in 1995. In 1990, young adult children were the most likely to
emigrate; by 1995, emigration included across all kinds of household members: household
heads, spouses, children, and others. Finally, in 1990 almost 70 percent of emigrants were
former city residents; by 1995, emigrants were much more likely to come from rural areas. This
change from city to rural origin among emigrants perhaps reflects combination of several
factors. One is that by mid-1995, China's urban reform has made life for city residents rather
comfortable so that there are fewer incentives for them to immigrate, especially to endure
sufferings that usually are associated with the smuggling journey. This is consistent with the
statistical evidence that between 1985 and 1995 per capita income among urban households in
Fujian increased seven times whereas the per capita inome for rural households increased by five
times (Fujian Statistical Bureau 1997). At the same time, China stepped out its antihuman
smuggling effort. Smugglers turn to the countryside where peasants who are still willing to
immigrate and at the same time it is a lot more difficult to detect by law enforcement officials.
This change in SES selectivity among emigrants from Fujian has important implications
10
It should be noted that our findings could be affected by the undercount of illegal migrants. Given
the fact that illegal migrants more likely to come from rural areas and with less favorable
socioeconomic characteristics, the finding of the increasing "negative" selection in Table 4 could be
even more pronounced if more illegal migrants are identified in the survey. Furthermore, this
undercount would affect findings for China as a whole in a different way. Table 2 suggests that in
general emigrants are more likely to be highly selective on socioeconomic variables. Thus, if illegal
migrants are more accurately counted in the survey, this socioeconomic differential between
emigrants and nonemigrants would be mitigated.
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for future emigration trends. In 1995, Fujian's agricultural population was approximately 25
million (Fujian Statistical Bureau 1997). If we accept the proposition that 25 percent of China's
rural population is surplus (Li 1996), i.e. not needed for agricultural production, and if we apply
this percentage to Fujian's agricultural population, this translates into a 6.3 million rural
population surplus in Fujian. This figure could represent the potential pool of customers for
migration merchants in Fujian.
Future prospects
Several analysts have attempted to articulate how illegal emigration from China will
unfold in years to come. This issue is important because of China's huge population size: a large
number of emigrants from China could impact any country in the world in significant ways. In
the following section, I examine some important factors that are likely to shape the future of
emigration from Fujian, and China, in general: the tidal wave of internal migrants, and the
formation and maturation of international migration networks linking China and other countries.
The floating population and emigration
In China, internal migration--as much as international migration-- is on the rise. Indeed,
the so-called floating population (liudong renkou) is constantly a hot topic for the Chinese
media. In general, both internal and international migration flows are in response to similar
market forces. In the history of European urbanization, a large number of peasants became
jobless when economic development and industrialization spread over European countries in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While some migrated to cities in search of work, others
inevitably immigrated to the United States (Williamson 1988; Massey 1988). In the case of the
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Chinese, the magnitude of the internal migrant population is much larger than the emigrant
population and therefore likely to have much more significant consequences for the Chinese
society. Nevertheless, a portion of the peasants will migrate internationally.
In this section, I discuss the impact of internal migration on emigration. Before doing so,
let me first define what internal migration means within the Chinese context. China has a
household registration system that requires each individual to register at his or her place of usual
residence. The system was implemented in the late 1950s in an effort to control rural-urban
migration and to protect the privileges of urban residents (Cheng and Seldon 1994; Yang 1993).
Whenever an individual intends to migrate, he or she must obtain permission from both the
place of origin and of destination. Two types of migrants exist: permanent migrants are those
who have obtained permanent household registration status at their place of destination, while
temporary migrants, often referred to as "floating population," are those who do not have
permanent household registration status at their place of destination (Goldstein and Goldstein
1991; Liang and White 1997).
Figure 1 shows the growth of China's temporary migrant population between 1982 and
1997. From 1982 to 1989, the temporary migrant population increased by 8 million. However,
from 1995 to 1997, the temporary migrant population jumped from 56 million to nearly 70
million--a difference of 14 million in just two years! Note that the data are collected in national
sample surveys and censuses and that temporary migrants must have resided at the place of
destination for at least six months to be included in the survey (or one year for census).
Therefore, the results shown in Figure 1 are likely to underestimate the size of the floating
15
population during those years.
11
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE)
It is important to realize that other provinces have a large number of temporary migrants;
temporary migration is not limited to large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Results from a
1995 sample survey suggest that in almost all provinces (save Tibet and Hainan), a sizable
temporary migrant population exists (China Population Sample Survey Office 1997). In Fujian,
for example, temporary migrants account for about 6 percent (1.9 million) of the total local
population. Not surprisingly, the largest temporary migrant population is in Guangdong, which
has one of the most dynamic economies in China (Vogel 1989).
12
The existence of this large, unsettled population in all parts of China can be a source of
instability because Chinese history shows that these footloose people were the most zealous
11
Data for 1982 and 1990 for taken from China's 1982 and 1990 Census (State Statistical Bureau,
1991). Data for 1989 are taken from the 1989 China Survey of Population Dynamics (State
Statistical Bureau, 1991). Data for 1995 are taken from the 1995 China 1 Percent Population Sample
Survey (China Population Sample Survey Office 1997). Finally, data for 1996 and 1997 are taken
from the 1996 and 1997 China Survey of Population Dynamics (State Statistical Bureau, 1997,
1998). It should be noted that identical definitions of temporary migration was employed for 1982,
1989, and 1990 data. This means to be counted as a temporary migrant, an individual must have
resided at the place of destination for at least a year or left the place of household registration for
more than a year. Identical definitions for temporary migration were also used in data collection of
1995, 1996, and 1997 (a six-month instead of one-year criterion was used). Because of these
differences in definition of temporary migrants, caution must be exercised in interpretation of the
data. Due to the differences in data definitions, we need to note: (1) the changes in temporary
migration during 1982-19190 can be assessed unambiguously and the same thing can be said the
period of 1995-1997; (2) the magnitude of change in temporary migration between 1990 and 1995,
however, is overestimated. There are at least two advantages of using these data. One is that they are
nationally representative samples and therefore we are more confident about making generalizations
to the Chinese population. In addition, even in the case of differences in definitions across different
data sets, we know the likely direction of the bias of the estimate.
12
Zhao (1998) reported that in the middle or western parts of rural China, migration is not just a
means of socioeconomic mobility; it has also become a culture, the thing to do--young people are
expected to move to cities (p.88).
16
participants in rebellions to overthrow the prevailing regime (Li 1996; Goldstone 1997; Solinger
1999). But are temporary migrants potential customers for migrant merchants? The issue has
recently drawn attention from scholars on internal and international migration from China
(Goldstone 1997; Li 1997; Poston, et al. 1998). Undoubtedly the economic incentive for the
temporary migrants to go abroad is high, given the fact that a majority of the temporary migrants
are from the Chinese countryside and the large wage differential between China and the United
States. Although historical experience of European migration to the United States suggests that
emigration was significantly influenced by domestic conditions and demographic factors
(Thomas 1941), one cannot apply this logic mechanically to the Chinese situation at the end of
the twentieth century because of immigration restrictions in sending and receiving countries.
Regarding the relationship between internal migration and emigration, Li (1997), for
example, argued that "for most peasant workers, although income differentials are a powerful
‘pull’ factor, the perceived difficulty in finding work, the exorbitant trafficking fees, and the
risks of living in an unfamiliar foreign country are all intervening obstacles that appear to
restrain them from resorting to the snakeheads (p.41)." Therefore, Li (1997) is clearly
unconvinced that this floating population will be drawn to the illegal migration process.
In contrast, with an eye on the political and economic changes down the road, Goldstone
(1997) foresaw real possibilities of a large emigration flow from China. He examined several
different scenarios of potential political and economic changes, and predicted their consequences
on emigration in the decades to come. In another recent work examining the floating
population's impact on China for illegal migration to the United States, Poston and his
colleagues (1998) provided a series of population projections for illegal Chinese migrants, based
on certain assumptions. For example, assuming that 15 percent of China's emigrants illegally
17
enter the United States and assuming also that between 25 to 60 million floaters will seek to
emigrate in the year 2005, this would produce 4 to 9 million Chinese illegally entering the
United States in 2005!
In sum, both Li (1997) and Goldstone (1997) systematically and logically articulated the
relationship between internal migration and emigration; yet neither presented sufficient evidence
to substantiate their argument. In this section, I attempt to provide an empirical basis for making
any projections on the number of Chinese emigrants. I use data from the Fujian Province to
compare the characteristics of the emigrant population, the floating population, and nonmigrant
population. In particular, I focus on the differences and similarities between the emigrant and
the floating populations. If the floating population and emigrant population share certain crucial
characteristics, we will have some good reasons for believing that the floating population serves
as a pool for illegal migration in the future. The results are summarized in Table 5.
(TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE)
Table 5 reveals that men and women participate almost equally in internal migration.
However, men are represented disproportionally in the emigrant population. This again
highlights the fact that international migration (especially undocumented) involves long
distances and risks; therefore women have yet to be drawn in a large proportion. About half of
the emigrants are between the ages twenty to twenty-nine, and another 30 percent are in the age
group of thirty to thirty-nine; this suggests that emigration favors young and working-age
individuals at a higher rate than for temporary internal migrants, i.e. floating population.
International migration also tends to require a minimum level of literacy; therefore, the process
is selective according to one's educational level, favoring individuals who are in the middle of
educational hierarchy, i.e. completed junior high school. The educational level for internal
18
temporary migrants is much lower; 11 percent have no formal education. Emigrants and internal
migrants are very similar in their occupational distribution. Most emigrants and internal
migrants work in low-level jobs, such as in sales, service, agriculture, and manufacturing.
13
These results suggest caution in assuming that temporary migrants will serve as potential
customers for migration merchants. They may be targeted for recruiting by smugglers because
they lack permanent resident status at their place of destination; they tend to work in similar
occupations as the general emigrant population. However, not all temporary migrants are good
candidates because of specific selectivity mechanisms such as age, gender, and education. The
fact of the matter is that China has a huge floating population. We know that its lower-bound
estimate was about 70 million in 1997; the number of the floating population is likely to be
larger in years to come. On top of this, figures released from China's State Statistical Bureau
reveal that by the end of 1997, 11 million workers were laid off (Deng 1998). These 11 million
unemployed will compete with the 70 million temporary migrants for jobs. The two together
form a total footloose population of 81 million.
According to a recent survey of unemployed workers, 62 percent of the respondents said
that their major preference for their next job was job security (World Journal 1998). This
suggests that most unemployed workers may not want to join the tide of illegal international
migration because of the high risk involved. However, one cannot rule out the possibility that
some unemployed workers seek to emigrate in desperation. Anecdotal evidence from my recent
fieldwork in New York City does suggest that a new group of immigrants (former employees of
state-owned enterprises) is emerging, even though the precise magnitude is admittedly difficult
13
For emigrants, occupations reported in the survey are those they held before emigration. For
internal migrants, occupations refer to the job held at the time of survey.
19
to quantify. In sum the likelihood of competition for jobs between internal migrants and
unemployed workers is clear. The net result of this competition may squeeze out some members
of the floating population and unemployed workers and push them onto the market for illegal
transnational migration.
Formation of migration networks
Students of migration have long realized the importance of migration networks (Gurak
and Caces 1992; McDonald and McDonald 1974; Massey, et al. 1994). As defined by Massey et
al. (1994), "migration networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former
migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kingship and shared
community origin (p.728)." The availability of migrant networks increases the probability of
migration by lowering the costs and raising the benefits of migration. Migration networks
constitute a valuable social capital that potential migrants can draw upon to gain access to
employment in their place of destination.
Since the 1965 U.S. Immigration Act, immigration from China has increased steadily.
During the decade of 1970s, a total of 237,793 Chinese immigrants were admitted to the United
States. In the 1980 decade, 444,962 Chinese immigrants became U.S. permanent residents,
almost doubling the number for the previous decade. The trend seems to have accelerated even
more in the 1990s. In just the first half of the 1990s alone, a total of 280,678 Chinese
immigrants were admitted (Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997).
14
Combining the
three figures for the period of 1970-1995 gives a total of new Chinese immigrants approximating
14
The number of Chinese immigrants includes immigrants from mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong.
20
1 million by the mid-1990s. If we count illegal Chinese immigrants, the figure will be even
higher. Such a large and sudden increase in Chinese immigration has many implications for the
Chinese community in the United States. As far as their influence on future emigration from
China is concerned, the large number of Chinese immigrants who came in the 1990s and 1980s
are likely to serve as important social networks, linking China with the United States; the
network will provide a flow of information, immigration through family reunification channels,
and job hunting assistance in the U.S. labor market. The maturation of migration networks
linking China and the United States will be very likely to lead to a continuing increase in
immigration from China (both legal and illegal) in years to come. For example, the maturation
of migration networks actually facilitates illegal migration of friends and relatives in that illegal
migrants who came earlier lend money to potential migrants to pay smugglers for trips to the
United States. A population saying in immigrant-sending communities in Fujian these days
captures this new sentiment: “the more people go abroad, the easier it is to borrow money
(World Journal 1999).”
Although networks linking the United States and China are still maturing, the networks
have a clear regional basis and direction; the pattern suggests migration will not multiply at
random. For example, a network connects potential migrants in Fujian with townsmen
(tongxian) in New York City. As a result, immigrants from Fujian are more likely to choose
New York City as their destination. This is true for both legal and illegal migrants. Recently
Ko-lin Chin (1997) interviewed 300 illegal migrants from the Fujian Province who work in New
York; his results show that about 70 percent of those illegal Chinese immigrants had relatives
who had previously settled in the United States.
The maturation of migration networks is likely to increase the flow of migration because
21
people will have more confidence about arriving at their destinations and finding a job.
Interviews with local people in Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian Province, corroborate this point. In
Fuzhou, everybody seems to be an expert on migration. On a hot summer day in 1998, I had a
long conversation with Lin Haisheng, a former employee of state-owned enterprise, who now
works at a local museum for 350 yuan a month.
15
Lin, who is in his early fiftieth, has a nephew
who migrated to New York with the help of snakeheads. His nephew later called and told him
what a wonderful life he had in New York. There are thousands kinds of bread in the United
States and even the tap water tastes sweet, his nephew told Lin. Concerned about the risk
involved in the smuggling process, I asked "Did your nephew worry about his safety at all before
his departure"? Lin smiled and responded "Hey, 400,000 Fuzhounese have gone to the U.S.
What do you worry about?" Seeing that I was unconvinced, he even added, "If I were twenty
years younger, I would have gone to the U.S., instead of making 350 Yuban a month working
here." Clearly, in Lin’s mind, the success rate of going to the United States is 100 percent.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I provide a demographic foundation for understanding the illegal migration
from China, and particularly, Fujian. I give an overview of Chinese emigration patterns from
1982 to 1995 and examine how the sociodemographic selectivity of emigrants from Fujian has
changed. It is worth noting that the increase of emigration from China happens precisely at a
time when China tries to integrate into the world economy. A measure of this effort is the
increase of foreign investment. Scholars such as Saskia Sassen (1988) have explored the
15
At the exchange rate of 1998, 1 US dollar=8.07 yuan.
22
relationship between foreign capital investment and migration. In particular, Sassen (1988)
contended that foreign investment is a leading indicator of the capitalist market's penetration and
the principal cause of emigration. This line of reasoning has its roots in world system theory
which "sees capitalist development as inherently disruptive, bringing about social and economic
transformations that displace people from traditional livelihood and force them onto
transnational labor markets" (Massey and Espinosa 1997, p.9).
In China, foreign capital investment has skyrocketed in the last fifteen years or so.
Consider Fujian, in 1990, total foreign capital investment added up to $379 million in 1990; just
five years later, the total amount of foreign capital investment rose to $4.1 billion--an increase of
more than ten times (Fujian Statistical Bureau 1997)! Note that during the same time period,
Fujianese emigration more than doubled: from 32,000 in 1990 to 66,200 in 1995. China, as a
whole, experienced a similar increase in foreign capital investment. From the perspective of
emigration, China's effort to boost foreign investment is likely to build "new links of
transportation, telecommunications, and interpersonal acquaintance, connections that are
necessary for the efficient movement of goods, information, and capital, but which also
encourages and promotes the movement of people--students, business executives, tourists, and
ultimately undocumented workers (Massey and Espinosa 1997, p.992)." Indeed, in early 1998,
China's Ministry of Security of China released information about entering and exiting China in
1997, the volume broke a historical record. The data show that a total of 131 million people
have passed through China's customs in 1997, an increase of 10 percent from 1996 (People's
Daily 1998a). What is also important is that investment from Taiwan is very noticeable: about
$7 billion from 1978 to 1999 (People's Daily 1999). Kwong (1997) has suggested that there is a
clear "Taiwan connection" in smuggling Fujianese to the United States. In addition to the shared
23
ethnic cultural homogeneity between Fujian and Taiwan, perhaps smugglers with Taiwan
connections also take advantage of the experiences of these Taiwanese business people who have
invested in Fujian Province.
The future of emigration from China is understandably a major concern of many scholars
and policymakers. It is easy to predict that emigration from China will increase. Yet to predict
China's size of illegal migrant population based on untested assumptions is specious and
alarming. Regarding China's huge floating population, at this point, we lack sufficient evidence
to support the argument that they will be involved substantially in illegal migration. Some will
perhaps be deterred by the high risks and the large sums of money involved (approximately
$47,000 in late 1998) (Holmes 1998). Others will simply not go because they worry that they
will have no one to rely on, even if they arrive safely in New York.
16
Thus I argue that it is more
relevant and realistic to suggest that there is still a significant potential for emigration from
Fujian in the years to come. This conclusion itself should draw the attention of scholars and
policymakers. My argument is based on the following reasons:
First, an examination of sociodemographic profiles of Fujianese emigrants over time
suggests that the emigrant population is clearly expanding and growing more diverse.
Emigration is including old and young, men and women. More importantly, in the mid-1990s,
emigrants are more likely to come from Fujian's countryside. In 1995, the rural population was
25 million, a number equivalent to the population of many countries in the world; given this
large number, there is still a significant potential for illegal migration from rural Fujian in the
1990s and, perhaps, years ahead. Most likely, emigration from Fujian has not yet run its course.
16
Again, Chin (1997) shows that 70 percent of illegal migrants already have relatives in the United
States.
24
Indeed, on June 1, 1998, a powerboat carrying twenty-two illegal Chinese immigrants ran
aground at Bay Head, New Jersey. All the illegal immigrants aboard were from the Fujian
Province (Dugger 1998; McFadden 1998). The saga continued to the end of 1998. On
December 10, Doris Meissner, the Commission of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
announced the crackdown of a smuggling ring that had brought more than 3,600 Fujianese
immigrants into the U.S. over the last two years (Chen 1998; Holmes 1998).
Second, the maturation of migration networks linking Fujian and New York is likely to
further facilitate the migration process and to draw more people into the migration process. The
expansion of networks is happening at a time, when state-owned enterprises are beginning to lay
off a large number of workers and the volume of temporary migrant population continues to
increase in Fujian. Given their physical and cultural proximity, other nontraditional immigrantsending regions in Fujian that have not been sending immigrants will be able to take advantage
of established networks and to send more immigrants to the United States.
Finally, some have argued that emigration from well-known sending regions in Fujian,
e.g. Changle, Fuqing, and Lianjiang, has dried up (Kwong 1997; Poston, et al. 1998). Using
data from the 1995 China 1 Percent Population Survey, I compared the sociodemographic
profiles of several major immigrant-sending regions with other regions in Fujian (the results are
not reported here).
17
Generally, I detected no significant difference in major characteristics, such
as sex ratio or dependency ratio between traditional immigrant-sending communities and other
communities in Fujian. This means that even these traditional immigrant-sending regions have
the potential to send more people to the United States, perhaps quite easily.
17
I used county as unit of analysis. It is possible that results may be different if village level data are
used.
25
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Comments from David Kyle, Min Zhou, Rose Kim, and four anonymous reviewers, and former
editor Richard Hall helped to improve the paper. This project is supported by grants from the
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (1R55HD/OD3487801A1 and
1R29HD34878), PSC-CUNY Research Award Program, and the 1998 Queens College
Presidential Research Award. I gratefully acknowledge their support.
26
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34
Table 1. Number and Distribution of Emigrants from China by Province
Province
1982
%
1990
%
1995
%
12,565
1,353
2,554
828
272
22.07
2.38
4.49
1.45
0.48
70,100
8,300
800
800
3,200
28.85
3.40
0.33
0.33
1.31
21,700
4,300
900
300
1,600
9.19
1.82
0.38
0.13
0.68
0.00
NORTHEAST
Liaoning
Jilin
Heilongjiang
2,099
552
907
3.69
0.97
1.59
9,400
3,800
1,700
3.86
1.56
0.70
5,700
12,500
15,400
2.42
5.30
6.53
EAST
Shanghai
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
Fujian
Jiangxi
Shandong
5,457
2,750
822
1,442
997
1,568
1,270
9.59
4.83
1.44
2.53
1.75
2.75
2.23
54,900
7,600
2,100
3,400
32,500
1,500
10,000
22.51
3.21
0.86
1.39
13.33
0.62
4.10
36,000
15,000
10,000
1,800
66,200
900
14,300
15.25
6.36
4.24
0.76
28.05
0.38
6.06
1,607
2,647
2,370
2,950
575
2.82
4.65
4.16
5.18
1.01
600
1,600
2,700
16,400
900
0.25
0.66
1.11
6.73
0.37
5,700
2,100
1,700
7,200
1,500
600
2.42
0.89
0.72
3.05
0.64
0.25
4,579
1569
790
8.04
2.76
1.39
3,500
500
1,900
100
1.44
0.21
0.78
0.04
5,800
300
600
300
2.46
0.13
0.25
0.13
2,947
693
24
576
167
5.18
1.22
0.04
1.01
0.29
3,100
500
300
200
700
1.27
0.20
0.12
0.08
0.29
1,900
500
100
100
1,000
0.81
0.21
0.04
0.04
0.42
NORTH
Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shanxi
Inner Mongolia
CENTRAL AND
SOUTH
Henan
Hubei
Hunan
Guangdong
Guangxi
Hainan
SOUTHWEST
Sichuan
Guizhou
Yunnan
Tibet
NORTHWEST
Shannxi
Gansu
Qinghai
Ningxia
Xinjiang
CHINA
56,930
234,800
236,800
Sources: the 1982 China Population Census, the 1990 China Population Census, and
the
1995 China 1 Percent Population Sample Survey.
35
36
Table 2. Sociodemographic Characteristics of Emigrants and Nonemigrants
China, 1995
Variables
Emigrant (%)
Non-emigrant (%)
Sex
Male
Female
62.03
37.97
51.03
48.97
Age
0-17
18-39
40 and over
4.60
71.47
23.93
30.91
37.82
31.27
Married
Yes
No
37.87
62.13
42.81
57.19
Education
No formal education
Elementary school
Junior high school
Senior high school
Some College+
1.15
11.97
27.75
22.09
37.05
16.50
40.96
29.85
9.97
2.71
Place of Origin
City
Town
Rural
64.04
7.37
28.59
23.33
8.19
68.17
Source: the 1995 China 1 Percent Population Sample Survey.
37
Table 3. Comparison of Emigrants from Fujian, Beijing, and China, 1995
Variables
Fujian (%)
Beijing (%)
China* (%)
Sex
Male
Female
74.10
25.90
47.28
52.72
41.60
58.40
Age
0-17
18-39
40 and over
1.93
85.40
12.67
6.69
66.11
27.20
5.40
67.30
27.30
Married
Yes
No
61.22
38.78
64.53
35.47
62.40
37.60
Education
No formal education
Elementary school
Junior high school
Senior high school
Some college+
0.28
27.42
47.92
19.39
4.99
0.43
1.71
7.26
14.10
76.50
1.40
7.40
21.70
22.90
46.60
Place of Origin
City
Town
Rural
17.36
17.08
65.56
99.58
0.00
0.42
77.90
4.50
17.60
Source: the 1995 China 1 Percent Population Sample Survey.
* For comparison purpose, statistics for China as a whole do not include Fujian
Province.
38
Table 4. Comparison of Emigrants from Fujian, 1990 and 1995
Variables
1990 (%)
1995 (%)
Sex
Male
77.00
73.96
Female
23.00
26.04
Age
15-19
6.30
8.31
20-29
47.80
49.58
30-39
30.80
29.36
40+
15.10
12.75
Mean age
30.00
29.00
HH relationship
HH head
10.70
28.81
Spouse
23.30
13.57
Children
56.90
46.81
Other
9.10
10.81
Married
Yes
60.40
61.77
No
39.60
38.23
Education
No formal education
0.28
Elementary school
22.30
27.42
Junior high school
33.60
47.92
Senior high school
32.40
19.39
Some college+
11.00
4.99
Occupation
Professional
11.10
2.13
Cadre
2.20
1.22
Office worker
0.70
0.61
Sales
4.40
5.79
Service worker
22.90
38.11
Agriculture
31.40
14.63
Manufacturing worker etc.
27.30
37.50
Place of Origin
City
68.60
17.17
Town
5.30
17.17
Rural
26.10
65.65
Source: China 1990 Population Census and 1995 China 1 Percent
Population Sample Survey.
39
Table 5. Sociodemographic Characteristics by Migration Status: Fujian, 1995
Variables
Temporary
Emigrant
s
migrants
%
Non-migrants
%
%
52.36
46.64
73.96
26.04
49.88
50.12
Age
15-19
20-29
30-39
40+
11.71
38.85
24.08
25.36
8.31
49.58
29.36
12.75
11.65
26.02
22.01
40.33
HH relationship
HH head
Spouse
Children
Other
26.95
24.42
8.71
39.92
28.81
13.57
46.81
10.81
35.11
27.82
23.70
13.37
Married
Yes
No
66.29
33.71
61.77
38.23
69.91
30.09
Education
No formal education
Elementary school
Junior high school
Senior high school
Some college+
10.64
32.17
32.94
17.42
6.83
0.28
27.42
47.92
19.39
4.99
24.10
41.03
24.17
8.96
1.75
4.73
5.25
5.19
14.96
9.97
12.36
2.13
1.22
0.61
5.79
38.11
14.63
37.50
2.45
1.58
1.92
6.16
2.48
65.81
19.60
43.21
12.65
44.14
17.17
17.17
65.65
14.49
8.43
77.08
Sex
Male
Female
Occupation
Professional
Cadre
Office worker
Sales
Service
Agriculture
Manufacturing worker etc.
47.72
a
Place of origin
City
Town
Rural
7003
361
126469
N
Source: the 1995 China 1 Percent Population Sample Survey.
a
: for temporary migrants and non-migrants, this refers to current place of residence.
40
41
42