Labor@Wayne Presents
Fraser Paper Series
#6 Marick F. Masters. 2013. “Union Power: The Role
of Labor Money in Politics,” presented to the 2013
annual meetings of the Labor and Employment
Relations Association in San Diego, CA in January
2013.
UNION POWER: THE ROLE OF LABOR MONEY IN AMERICAN POLITICS
Marick F. Masters
Director, Labor@Wayne
Professor of Business
Adjunct Professor of Political Science
Wayne State University
5401 Cass Avenue
Detroit, MI 48202
Email: [email protected]
TEL: 313.577.5358
FAX: 313.577.5359
January 2013
Presented at the 2013 annual meetings of the Labor and Employment Relations Association on
January 5, 2013 in San Diego, CA.
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INTRODUCTION
The weakened state of organized labor in the United States has made it increasingly
vulnerable to attack and exploitation. A recent wave of legislative attacks across several states
has taken various forms, with a primary emphasis being to limit the capacity of unions to raise
dues-based income to fund major operations. These efforts, which have led to the enactment
of right to work (RTW) laws in Indiana and Michigan and the rollback of collective bargaining
rights in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio (the last to be rescinded in a statewide ballot initiative),
have put unions squarely on the defensive, precipitating a major political counter-response.
The resulting increased politicization of labor has produced its own controversy, raising anew
concerns about the legitimacy of union political action and its impact on the democratic
process. Directly or indirectly, the ongoing attacks on labor have as an objective marginalizing
the political effectiveness of unions, especially by choking the source of funding electoral and
lobbying activities.
Despite the extensive media attention to the legislative battles involving labor rights,
collective bargaining, and right to work in such states at California, Indiana, Michigan, New
Hampshire, Ohio, and Wisconsin, we know remarkably little about the current nature and scope
of union political expenditures, notwithstanding the unprecedented availability and usability of
relevant data. To what extent, for example, has labor engaged in making contributions in
federal and state elections? To what extent has labor been involved in lobbying? How much of
their treasury-based income have unions spent on politics? To what extent does political
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spending vary across unions? At a time when labor’s share of the electorate is declining and its
ability to influence politics through get-out-the-vote drives among its own ranks is dwindling,
labor’s financial capacity to influence politics becomes all the more important, because money
enables unions to expand their political reach.
We address these questions in a preliminary study on the role of union money in
American politics. Specifically, we examine how much money labor as a whole has spent in
making contributions in federal and statewide elections in 2000-2012. We examine the amount
of money unions have spent on lobbying at the federal level over a similar period. We compare
these expenditures to total interest-group spending in the same areas. We also examine the
amount of money the 20 largest national/international unions, based on membership, have
spent on politics in 2011-2012, focusing on their contributions and outside spending (“soft
money”) or independent expenditures made to influence elections. We conclude by suggesting
areas for future research.
BACKGROUND
Labor unions have long engaged in political activities to bolster their economic position
and otherwise influence society (Zeigler 1964; Bok and Dunlop 1970). The nature and scope of
such involvement has varied widely over historical periods, but labor has converged on a more
or less common approach to politics since the New Deal (Barbash 1948). Three basic qualities
have characterized union political involvement since then. First, unions have operated more or
less within the two-party system, eschewing third parties, including the formation of a separate
labor party. Second, unions have allied themselves closely with the Democratic party,
particularly its moderate-to-liberal wing. Finally, unions have developed their own
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organizational political infrastructure to engage politically, including political action committees
and lobbying offices.
With government having become intimately involved with the economic and social
affairs of society, union political action has become more a matter of necessity than choice.
Labor’s discretion in terms of politics has revolved more around the degree and technique of
engagement. In this regard, the ability of unions to finance political activities has become
increasingly important. The price of influencing the politics of elections and lobbying has risen
dramatically in recent decades, with the capacity to spend money being practically equated
with the ability to have a political voice. Unions, like other interest groups, have to “pay for
play.”
Consequently, the regulation of union (as well as other interest group) political spending
has become an ever-growing topic of concern. Since the World War II era, federal law applying
to union electoral spending has grown vastly complex and intricate, focusing on three
objectives: (1) limiting the sources of funds that can be contributed directly to candidates; (2)
imposing ceilings on the amount that can be contributed to candidates; (3) and requiring the
timely disclosure of such contributions. In addition, federal law has required the more
extensive disclosure of union (and other interest group) lobbying expenditures. Furthermore,
in administering the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 (the socalled Landrum-Griffin Act), the Department of Labor (DOL)has required since 2005 that unions
report their political expenditures funded by treasury-based income in their annual financial
disclosure forms. At the same time, states have adopted their own campaign finance and
lobbying regulations, and the courts have made several significant rulings on the
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constitutionality of regulations involving the expenditure of union funds. As a result of recent
federal court decisions, unions, corporations, and financial moguls have much more latitude to
spend vast amounts of their wealth to influence elections to the Congress and the presidency.
Indeed, we have entered the era of the “Super-PAC.”
Congress passed the first major law pertaining specifically to union political spending in
1943 with the adoption of the Smith-Connally Act (see Table 1 for a list of major federal
statutes regulating union political spending, plus the Department of Labor disclosure
requirements and two recent federal court rulings). This wartime measure prohibited unions
from making contributions to federal candidates in general elections for the Congress and
presidency. Unions proved agile in escaping this ban, developing the modern political action
committee (PAC) as an effective workaround. Through PACs, unions raised money voluntarily
from union members and made contributions of PAC funds to congressional and presidential
candidates. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 extended the ban to union (and corporate)
expenditures and contributions to primary and general elections, though it did not diminish the
use of the PAC.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
In 1971, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act, which has been amended
on several occasions. The FECA of 1971 explicitly sanctioned labor and corporate PACs as long
as they relied on “separate, segregated funds” (SSFs) that collected donations (in the case of
unions) from members and their families on a purely voluntary basis. As amend, the FECA has
imposed limits on the amount of PAC money that can be given to a federal candidate in primary
and general elections and the amount that individuals can donate to PACs. In addition, it has
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mandated disclosure of such donations and contributions to the Federal Election Commission,
which was established by the 1974 amendments. The FECA preserved the ban on the
contribution of treasury-based income from unions and corporations to federal candidates’
campaigns. None of these laws, however, prohibited unions from spending their treasurybased income to lobby lawmakers, though the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act has required the
more comprehensive disclosure of interest group lobbying expenditures and activities. And the
aforementioned DOL regulations implemented in 2005 have required unions covered by the
LMRDA to disclose “direct and indirect disbursements to all entities and individuals…associated
with political disbursements or contributions in money.” It also required the disclosure of
“direct and indirect disbursements to all entities and individuals…associated with the dealing
with executive and legislative branches of the Federal, state, and local governments and with
independent agencies and staffs to advance the passage or defeat of existing or potential
laws…”
In the 1990s, interest groups, including unions, found several ways to funnel their
treasury-based income (i.e., soft money) to influence federal elections. Specifically, they used
such funds to support various party-building activities at the state and local level, which would
indirectly aid federal candidates, and to finance issue ads, which provided information about
federal candidates in the media but did not directly urge a vote for or against that candidate in
the voting booth. Concerns about the influx of such soft money into federal elections
prompted the enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, so-called the
McCain-Feingold Act, which prohibited the use of soft money expenditures and banned
specifically so-called “electioneering communications,” which mentioned a federal candidate by
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name in a publicized advertisement within 30 days prior to a primary election or 60 days prior
to a general election.
The BCRA provoked significant legal controversy, and in 2010 the United States Supreme
Court, in its Citizens United v. FEC ruling, invalidated the prohibition on the use of treasurybased income by unions and corporations to advocate expressly for or against federal
candidates as long as their expenditures were made without coordination with the candidates’
campaigns. At the same time, the ruling upheld the ban on the direct contribution of such
income to candidates. In another important federal court ruling, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in SpeechNow.org v. FEC, invalidated limitations on
the amount of money that corporations and unions, as well as individuals, can make PACs that
make only so-called “independent expenditures” or expenditures that are not funneled to
candidates or made in coordination with the candidates’ campaigns. Such independentexpenditure-only PACs are labeled colloquially as the Super-PACs.
Under the current state of federal law, unions (and corporations) are forbidden from
making contributions to federal candidates from their treasury funds, but they may contribute
up to $5000 per candidate per general and primary election if such contributions are financed
by voluntarily raised donations to SSFs. They may, however, spend as much of their treasurybased income on independent expenditures, as long as they are not given to PACs that donate
to candidates or made in coordination with the candidates. Furthermore, no limits exist on the
amount of treasury-based expenditures corporations and unions may make on lobbying.
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UNION POLITICAL SPENDING
We report on several areas of union political spending: (1) aggregated union
contributions to federal candidates and political parties made by unions through PACs,
individuals, and (before 2004) soft money; (2) aggregated union expenditures made on lobbying
at the federal level; (3) aggregated union contributions make in connection with statewide
elections (gubernatorial, legislative, and statewide judicial) and ballot initiatives; (4) political
spending made by international/national labor organizations reported in their LM-2 financial
disclosure forms; (5) and the top 20 labor unions’ [based on 2011 membership] contributions to
federal candidates, parties, and PACs made by individuals affiliated with labor and by union
PACs and the top 20 unions’ independent expenditures or outside spending made to influence
federal elections (this would include money from their treasury-based funds). Data on electoral
activities are from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) web site and from the web site of
the National Institute on Money in State Politics. Data on lobbying are from CRP, and LM-2
data are from the Department of Labor’s online public disclosure room. We obtain data for the
time period between 2000 and 2012, to the extent available. Data on electoral and lobbying
spending are incomplete for the 2012 year or election cycle, and LM-2 data on political
expenditures, as previously noted, were not required to be disclosed until 2005.
Table 2 reports the data on aggregated contributions made by all labor organizations to
federal candidates and parties during the past seven election cycles. It shows that labor
political contributions dropped significantly after the passage of the BCRA, which banned soft
money. However, labor contributions have climbed significantly in absolute amounts since
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2004, though they remain a relatively small percentage of total contributions in federal
elections.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Table 3 reports aggregated data on union lobbying expenditures. Between 2000 and
2011 (the last year for which complete data have been compiled by CRP), union spending rose
from about $27.4 million to over $50 million. However, it has never surpassed more than 1.8
percent of the total interest group spending reported on lobbying under the 1995 Lobbying
Disclosure Act.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Table 4 reports union spending contributions made in statewide elections and ballot
initiatives. While union spending as a share of overall spending has never exceeded 20 percent
in any of the reported years, it has increased as a relative share from 2008-2012 compared to
2000-2004.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Table 5 reports the total political expenditures, excluding those made separate from
treasury-based funds, made by all international/national labor organizations, including the AFLCIO, its various departments, and Change to Win. Clearly, union spending grew significantly
after 2007, with labor spending nearly $344 million at this organizational level in 2008. It
appears, based on 2011 data, that the international and national labor organizations were
gearing up for the various state-level challenges they faced and the 2012 elections, spending
$343 million in an “off” year. Unfortunately, complete 2012 data on union spending from
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treasury-based income will not be available until all of their fiscal year 2012 LM-2 reports have
been filed.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Table 6 takes a peak at the level of inter-union variation in 2012 federal election cycle
contributions and outside spending. It reveals vastly different levels of spending across unions,
both in terms of contributions made to candidates, parties, and Super-PACs and outside
spending or independent expenditures. Clearly, one of the things these data inform us about is
that, in today’s political area, in light of recent court rulings, contributions tell only part of the
story. Independent expenditures financed by treasury-based income cannot be ignored. For
example, whereas SEIU contributed about $18.7 million, it spent an additional $31 million to
influence the elections, for a grand total of nearly $50 million.
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
This very preliminary examination of union political spending will be extended in several
main directions. First, a model will be developed to explain, at least theoretically, inter-union
variation in union political spending. Second, we will attempt to explain variation in several
different types of spending, including contributions from PACs, contributions from individuals,
independent expenditures, contributions in state elections, and lobbying. Third, we will explore
how political spending has changed over time both between and within unions. Finally, we will
compare more precisely labor political spending to disaggregated segments of the larger
interest group community, such as defense contractors, pharmaceuticals, lawyers, and
ideologically conservative groups.
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REFERENCES
Barbash, Jack. 1948. Labor Unions in Action. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
Bok, Derek C. and John T. Dunlop. 1970. Labor and the American Community. New York: Simon
and Schuster.
Zeigler, Harmon. 1964. Interest Groups in American Society. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
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TABLE 1: SELECTED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
Law, Regulation, or Court Ruling
Smith-Connally Act of 1943
Short Explanation
Banned union contributions to federal
candidates in general elections
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947
Banned union contributions and expenditures
to candidates in federal general and primary
elections
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
Allowed corporations and unions to establish
(amended in 1974, 1976, and 1979)
PACs funded by SSFs to contribute to federal
candidates in general and primary elections;
imposed limits on PAC contributions; required
the disclosure of PAC contributions to the FEC
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995
Required more comprehensive and
understandable disclosure of interest group
lobbying expenditures and activities to the
Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the
Senate
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
Prohibited soft money expenditures for
electioneering communications
DOL Disclosure Requirements (2005)
Required reporting of political expenditures
on unions’ annual financial disclosure forms
Citizens United v. FEC, U.S. Supreme Court, No. Court invalidated limits on soft money
08-205, January 21, 2010
expenditures for electioneering
communications
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, U.S. Court of Appeals
Court invalidated limits on the amount of
for the District of Columbia Circuit, No. 08independent expenditures unions and
5223, March 26, 2010
corporations can make
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TABLE 2: AGGREGATED UNION PAC AND INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2000-2012 FEDERAL
ELECTION CYCLES
($ in thousands)
Election Cycle
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
Total Interest Group
Contributions (Individuals,
PACs)
$1,551,000
$1,304,806
$1,920,990
$1,508,431
$2,652,046
$1,817,885
$3,100,402
Total Union Contributions (%)
$90,220 (5.8%)
$96,787 (7.4%)
$61,942 (3.2%)
$66,839 (4.4%)
$74,947 (2.8%)
$96,639 (5.3%)
$127,026 (4.1%)
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TABLE 3: AGGREGATED UNION EXPENDITURES ON LOBBYING, 2000-2012
($ in thousands)
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total Interest Group Lobbying
Expenditures
$1,560,000
$1,640,000
$1,820,000
$2,040,000
$2,180,000
$2,240,000
$2,610,000
$2,850,000
$3,300,000
$3,500,000
$3,520,000
$3,330,000
$2,450,000
Total Union Lobbying
Expenditures (%)
$27,433 (1.8%)
$28,842 (1.8%)
$29,145 (1.6%)
$31,444 (1.5%)
$31,961 (1.5%)
$31,134 (1.3%)
$31,958 (1.2%)
$43,748 (1.5%)
$40,846 (1.2%)
$43,196 (1.2%)
$46,339 (1.3%)
$50,206 (1.5%)
$35,355 (1.4%)
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TABLE 4: AGGREGATED UNION CONTRIBUTIONS IN STATE ELECTIONS AND BALLOT INITIATIVES,
2000-2012
($ in thousands)
Year
Labor Contributions (%)
2000
Total Interest Group
Contributions
$1,486,299
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
$188,915
$2,690,844
$384,114
$2,123,919
$743,630
$3,455,399
$440,408
$2,696,864
$7,676
$149,185
$19,331
$142,776
$148,138
$210,137
$19,962
$224,774
2009
2010
2011
2012
$413,098
$3,500,087
$575,273
$2,125,227
$37,011
$266,397
$64,407
$222,087
$82,238 (5.5%)
(4.1%)
(5.5%)
(5.0%)
(6.7%)
(19.9%)
(6.1%)
(4.5%)
(8.3%)
(9.0%)
(7.6%)
(11.2%)
(10.5%)
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TABLE 5: AGGREGATED INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATIONS’ POLITICAL EXPENDITURES
REPORTED IN LM-2 ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, 2005-2011
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Total Political Expenditures
$219,959,759
$221,688,429
$252,888,207
$343,914,796
$337,073,392
$315,058,630
$343,154,344
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TABLE 6: TOP 20 UNIONS’ PAC AND INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND OUTSIDE SPENDING,
2011-2012
Union
NEA
SEIU
AFSCME
IBT
UFCW
AFT
IBEW
USW
IAM
LIU
CWA
UBC
IUOE
UAW
PPJ
IAFF
AFGE
NALC
APWU
UNITE-HERE
Contributions
$14,847,448
$18,701,624
$38,541,766
$4,165,954
$7,229,832
$8,693,592
$6,613,791
$2,688,276
$2,315,290
$4,995,851
$4,894,329
$11,588,522
$5,884,421
$12,330,324
$10,581,451
$3,735,627
$1,089,909
$4,253,669
$3,324,234
$2,071,473
Outside Spending
$6,640,551
$31,020,485
$17,135,509
$68,493
$1,561,243
$1,530,877
$36,363
$264,859
$22,001
$184,838
$895219
$43,607
$0
$67,899
$159,459
$1,432,944
$0
$0
$167,398
$0
17
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