Proceedings of The National Conference
On Undergraduate Research (NCUR) 2012
Weber State University, Ogden Utah
March 29 – 31, 2012
Is It Worth the Sweat?:
Effects on Human Rights caused by Sweatshops in El Salvador
Rachel Boyell
Justice Studies
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, Virginia 22807 USA
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Suraj Jacob
Abstract
Sweatshops do not have a good reputation, often deservedly so. However, despite popular belief, sweatshops can
also play a positive role in conditions of abject poverty, gender equality, and unemployment. Investigated in this
research are the consequences of sweatshops on a variety of outcomes (municipal services, employment, education,
gang violence, class/gender equality and workers' rights) through the application of a natural experiment
methodology to El Salvador. Two of the country's largest cities, which are otherwise very similar, have starkly
different incidences of sweatshops (high in Santa Ana, low in San Miguel). Using a mix of qualitative and
quantitative methods from several different sources (including reports from the CIA, USAID, UN, Human Rights
Watch, and the U.S. Department of State) this research argues that the presence of a large sweatshop industry in
Santa Ana improved economic opportunities and quality of life compared to those in San Miguel. Also considered
(and rejected) are alternative explanations for the better performance of Santa Ana. In a country reeking with havoc
since it’s founding, the examination on the progression of its economy specific to Santa Ana and San Miguel is
imperative. El Salvador originated as a monoculture export economy yet drastically flipped to a country of industry
(largely textile). After years of bloodshed, the apparent difference in two cities comparable in history, culture,
ethnicity, and geography in economic opportunity and poverty is a divide that simply cannot be ignored.
Keywords: Sweatshop, El Salvador, Human Rights
1. Introduction
Working for thirty-three cents an hour is not the epitome of the “American Dream”. Be that as it may, one man’s
trash is another man’s treasure. One must face the unfortunate truth: while it may not be the American dream, it just
may be the Central American dream. In a land so devastated from decades of war, revolution, violence, and overall
conflict, it is nearly impossible to focus on an economy. Neglected and undeveloped, the economies of the Central
American regions attempted to get back on their feet and catch up to the boat that they had long missed. The United
States jumped on the chance to get them on board and intervened. Through agencies like United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and treaties like Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), industry
moved into the region. In this deal with the devil, employment opportunity was up. The only downside was it was at
a sweatshop- a formidable option. It came with low wages, long hours, and abuse of basic worker rights. Accounts
from workers even stated that they would change their diet completely to prevent having to use the bathroom. This
diet was not by choice; these workers were denied time to use the bathroom.
However, sweatshops may be worth the sweat. Without dismissing or diminishing the injustices committed within
the textile industry, this paper seeks to suggest that sweatshops have positive implications on unemployment,
municipality, gender equality, and worker’s rights. A study between two starkly similar cities in El Salvador, Santa
Ana and San Miguel, suggests that Santa Ana, the more textile industry-populated city provides an overall improved
rights situation when compared with San Miguel. The two cities share similar geography, histories, and former
economies and are the second and third largest cities in El Salvador (behind San Salvador). 1
2. Methodology
This research employs the methodology of a natural experiment synergized with a case study. In a natural
experiment, the researcher seeks to compare two comparable regions that have experienced a significant divergence
after some sort of treatment. However, the term “natural” indicates that the researcher in fact is not administering the
treatment. Instead, the treatment was already in place; it naturally occurred. The regions of focus in this specific
experiment were Santa Ana, El Salvador and San Miguel, El Salvador. Both were agricultural powerhouses leading
up to the civil war, as they are approximately the same distance from the coast and have an abundance of fertile
land.2 This also set the stage for the devastation that the war (1980-1992) brought to wealthier areas of the nation,
considering their agricultural export of coffee was so great. San Miguel is 138 km east of the capital and Santa Ana
is approximately 64 kilometers west of San Salvador. San Miguel has 218,410 habitants and Santa Ana has 274,830
inhabitants. Both places have similar climates with the monthly average hovering in the high eighties. Furthermore,
both cities have extremely active volcanoes within their municipalities.4 Data collection for such an experiment
requires both qualitative and quantitative data. However, so much historical data had to be considered in this study
that an aspect of a case study became an important role for this research. It was imperative to find historical trends
within each Central American bordering country of El Salvador in order to effectively determine the explanations of
implications of sweatshops in two major El Salvadoran cities. Thus, qualitative history data was used to determine
historical parallel trends while a quantitative finance data collection played a role as well (ie: tax indexes, income,
collection of taxes in municipalities, aid from foreign countries). Furthermore, it was important to gain knowledge
from a source of interviews of scholars that had resided a number of years in El Salvador. Significant sources used
were Human Rights Watch, World Bank, United States Agency for International Development, and local municipal
data.
3. Literature Review
3.1 Central American Unrest
The Central American region was and remains destitute of political, economical, and social stabilization. The
territory watched civil wars spring up in country after country beginning in the twentieth century and going well into
the 1990’s. Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras all experienced a span of unrest. Dissatisfaction
within these countries led to the political unrest that would cause the civil wars. Acts of violence were not restricted
to opposing parties. There were not two distinct military entities that would battle. Effecting every inch of the
population, historians have dubbed the series of wars more of a massacre nature. The Truth Commission
documented abuses including, “burying some alive in the village well, killing infants by slamming their heads
against walls, keeping young women alive to be raped over the course of three days.”3 Unfortunately, these acts
were far from uncommon and devastated villages to their core.
Honduras was entirely a militarily run regime. It was not until 1982 that the government turned over, and even
then political instability sustained. 4,5 Attempting to attract foreign investment, Honduras created free trade zones
(known as ZOLIs) beginning in the 1970’s. However, “political instability, inflation, corruption, and the violent civil
war in neighboring Nicaragua scared off potential investors, thwarting the industry's growth.”6 It was not until the
late 1980’s and early 1990’s that foreign apparel investors poured into Honduras. They settled heavily into one
specific region, the San Pedro Sula Valley. San Pedro Sula Valley offered a world class port, five ZOLIs, eight ZIPs
(industrial export processing zones), and especially cheap labor.
Meanwhile, Guatemala’s government was committing genocide on its’ indigenous peoples. Over 200,000 people
were killed during their civil war, beginning in 1960. Finally, the United Nations stepped in and forced the war to an
end in 1996. Nicaragua’s war beginning in 1979 left 50,000 dead and approximately 600,000 homeless.
3.2. United States Involvement
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Since the era of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States had a foothold in Central America. In the decades to follow
the doctrine, the United States committed horrific blunders that left a lasting negative impact. Shaking their heads
and throwing their arms up in the air in utter disgust, the global realm questioned and scorned the United States’
involvement. Despite speculations, opinions, and disgust, one cannot ignore the United States’ consistency of poor
involvement among the region; an unfortunate truth. The United States managed to undermine efforts in El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras.
In El Salvador, the United States funded the military fighting against the FMLN (the aforementioned party and
also known as “guerillas”). With so much pressure from the United States, El Salvador was the first to sign CAFTA.
The CIA took necessary steps to aid the Contras Rebellion (a violent group against the newly instated government
of Nicaragua) and to mine the harbors of Nicaragua. In 1981 the international community felt the United States had
crossed the line and the case went to the International Criminal Court, ruling that the United States had breached
several provisions of international law. Despite such a ruling, the United States flexed their muscles and in 1985
implemented a full economic embargo on Nicaragua that remained in effect until 1990.
The 1954 CIA executed coup d’état in Guatemala resulted in the overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, the
democratically elected President of Guatemala. It is widely conjectured that the overthrow led to the death of over
200,000 lost through the years of the war.
Honduras used to be known as an “Oasis of Peace”. It was not until the Reagan Administration implemented illadvised policies that Honduras’ oasis began to deplete to a wasteland. Externally, El Salvador guerillas were stirring
up trouble in that region and Nicaragua was on the brink of revolution. The Reagan administration attempted to use
Honduras as a springboard with several intentions: first, to kill the Nicaraguan revolution, second, to tame the
guerillas in El Salvador, and finally, to use Honduras as a model for a success story in free market capitalism. After
the United States’ blunder in Chile, they had to prove to the world that free market capitalism, not communism,
would bring these third world countries up to speed.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) appears to have good intentions with Central
America. After every war, every natural disaster, and every dead end, the agency swept in to pick up the pieces.
Funded by the United States, they provide funds for grants and loans for a wide spectrum of purposes. Roads,
bridges, and other imperative forms of basic infrastructure are often the result of USAID support and financial
backing. They create programs to further education, end gang violence, provide healthcare, and promote economic
growth/opportunities. The annual GDP growth rate in every country has increased (with the exception of when the
economic crisis hit the United States in 2008) since the beginning of the USAID involvement began. Once the HIV/
AIDS epidemic hit Central America, USAID sought and proactively raises awareness and behavioral prevention.
Finally, they implement programs to decrease gang violence. 7
The aid comes with strings. Politically, some claim that this foreign aid to Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and
Guatemala has actually done more hurt than good. First, it is said that the pressure put on said countries by USAID
forced them to sign CAFTA, and ultimately led to the allowance of the textile industry moving in and getting away
with their low wages and lack of worker’s rights. Secondly, it is speculated that it centralizes the government’s
power more than it already is. In Honduras specifically, USAID continues to balance the dramatically increasing
deficit of Honduras. The deficit is caused by an overvalued exchange rate that the government refuses to rectify
because it would be admitting a mistake. Thus, “with USAID's support, the Honduran government is repressing the
symptoms while continuing to cause the disease”. 8 The USAID-backed land reforms (the redistribution the
agricultural lands to the poor) in El Salvador actually led to a decrease in their major agricultural export, coffee, by
thirty percent in 1980. The government regulates the sale of the crops, forcing farmers to sell them for much less
than the crops are actually worth. CAFTA eliminates nearly all tariffs to the United States between the countries in
which the agreement is made. This international law includes the aforementioned countries: Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Despite international scholars’ dispute, CAFTA, “opens services sectors; and creates
clear and readily enforceable rules in areas such as investment, government procurement, intellectual property
protection…also provides for protection of internationally recognized labor rights and environmental standards.”9
3.3 Gang Violence
The civil wars spurred the growth of gangs. The infamous gang MS-13 is directly related to El Salvador’s war. In
1980, it is approximated that over 300,000 Salvadorans sought refuge in Los Angeles. 10 Celinda Franco, specialist in
domestic security, wrote in her report for Congress that the gangs were often comprised of former guerrilla soldiers
that had had experience with such extreme violence. 11 Salvadorans come from a patriarchal society after being
settled by the Spanish. It is inherently in their culture that women are beneath men. Dr. William Van Norman stated
that El Salvador does not pursue equality, but equality among the gender’s differences. 12 In several Human Rights
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Watch reports concerning El Salvador, the gang violence toward women is unimaginable. With rape being the most
common crime, and homicide coming at a close second, women (especially at risk in urban areas) are not safe. Often
said crimes go unreported due to the culture. In August 2008, a Human Rights Watch reported: “Despite the
presence of criminal laws against rape, for example, incidents of such violence are underreported in good part
because of societal and cultural pressures against any victim complaints, fears of reprisal, inadequate and
unsupported responses by the authorities, and the ineffective prosecution of the complaints of rape”. 13
4. Analysis
4.1. Historical Background Of El Salvador From 1979-1992
Preceding 1979 El Salvador was a military-run regime. The country revolved around their main export coffee. The
social structure was staggering. There was the landed elite and then those that worked the landed elite’s land. Those
working the land were completely tied to the land and completed lacked mobility in the class system. Decades of
such disparity led to extreme tensions. It was also a mono-export economy, meaning the country solely depended on
their one export (that of which being coffee). About 98% of the country’s wealth was held by only 2% of the
population. In 1979, a political party known as the Juntas overthrew the government. They had promised the people
land reforms, a better economy, and more stability. Unfortunately, these promises were not kept and the Junta party
was not capable of providing such things. The Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) Party overthrew the
Juntas and became the reigning party in government. However, the revolution did not come peacefully and cost
75,000 people their lives, often civilians. The country experienced extremely violent warfare and guerilla tactics.
Entire villages were burned; women were raped, and agricultural as well as infrastructure was destroyed. Nearly a
million Salvadorans sought refuge. From 1980 to 1992, the country saw no peace. Finally, the United Nations
stepped in and forced the political parties to sign a peace accord. By that time, the damage was already done. With
unemployment and underemployment rates as high as eighty percent, the country was floundering. Such conflict set
the stage for international involvement (USAID) and for the textile industry to move in. 14
Figure 1. Rate of Maquila Exports compared to Traditional and Non-Traditional Exports in El Salvador
4.2. The Puzzle
The World Bank reported in 1998 a severe puzzle. Approximately fifty percent of the economically active were
employed by the non-agricultural sector in the West (within the departments Santa Ana, Chalatenango, and La
Union). Thirty percent of those people were employed by the textile, carpentry, and manufacturing in general
industry. However, in departments such as San Miguel, only 23.2% was employed by the non-agricultural sector.
This is was not by choice. The World Bank later reported that Salvadorans would actually prefer to work in the nonagricultural sector. Employment in agriculture was a last resort for a household. “Only 2.7% of the rural population
falls in the category of engaging simultaneously in farming, agricultural labor and non-agricultural labor. In contrast,
30% of the rural population is engaged in only non-agricultural activities. And this segment is the least poor of the
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entire population”. 15 In a country where 20.6% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is textile and apparel and 95%
of the exports in the free trade zones are textile and apparel, the effects of an invasion of such an industry are vast.
4.3 . Municipal Services
An indicator of a city’s wealth, as well as the quality of life the citizens of the city possess is a city’s municipal
services. Thus, in this research three aspects of life and municipal services were studied. The first being palpable
water. The ability to obtain clean water in third world countries is not always a guarantee. Clean drinking water
prevents disease, promotes health, and provides an overall better lifestyle. It is seen in the figure below that Santa
Ana a significantly higher percentage of palpable water to domestic households. Overall, Santa Ana’s percentage of
palpable water exceeds San Miguel by twenty five percent; a staggering difference.
1
84
54
Santa Ana
San Miguel
2
96
65
3
98
67
4
99
79
5
100
86
Overall
95
70
Figure 2. Palpable Water To Domestic Households
Another municipal service to recognize is sewage connection to households. Below are the statistics for five
different districts in each city. In each district, Santa Ana has a consistently superior percentage of households
with a sewage connection. The difference between Santa Ana and San Miguel reached as much as twenty one
percent.
Santa Ana
San Miguel
1
57
43
2
76
59
3
80
59
4
84
75
5
92
82
Figure 3. Sewage Connection To Domestic Households
Such a lead in municipal service stems from a simple logic; the wealthier municipality is, the more they are able to
offer their citizens better services. That wealth is attributed to taxes. However, if said municipality is extremely poor
and the citizens are unemployed, the municipality would not be capable of collecting those taxes. Furthermore, as
will be discussed further in this research, sweatshops wages are actually higher than the average income. Thus, while
the percentage of the amount of income being taxed may remain the same, if the income is higher the city is
obtaining more money. Below, the figure shows that the overall municipal services in Santa Ana are vastly superior
with an index of 7.53 compared to 4.34 (San Miguel). Santa Ana has an overall Municipal Tax Index of 6.02, a
statistic greater than San Miguel’s, 5.54. This disparity explains the difference in the wealth of the municipalities. 16
Figure 4. Overall Municipal Services In Santa Ana and San Miguel
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Figure 5. Municipal Tax Index, Santa Ana, San Miguel
4.4. Education
In a poverty stricken household, the lack of income often falls on the shoulders of the children. Every member of the
family must work to contribute an income. If the parents are not capable of providing, then the children become
responsible as well. If a child is working, he or she often cannot attend school. Many drop out as early as the fifth
grade, and even that is deemed an accomplishment. Thus, illiteracy rates can be used as an indicator for the ability of
an adult to provide for his or her family based solely off of their income while the children may attend school and
become literate. Below, the figure shows the difference in illiteracy rates for Santa Ana and San Miguel. In this case,
Santa Ana’s illiteracy rates are consistently and drastically lower than that of San Miguel with a difference reaching
as much as ten percent.
Figure 6. Illiteracy rates in Santa Ana and San Miguel, Poor, Non-Poor, and Overall
4.5 Gang Violence
As previously explained, gang violence in El Salvador is rampant, with El Salvador holding the title of having one
of the highest homicide rates in the entire world. Such lack of safety stems from gang association. Statistics from the
El Salvador Municipal Competitiveness Index show that Santa Ana has a slightly higher public safety rating of 5.01
over San Miguel (4.84).
The interesting consequence is the positive impact that the deplorable conditions of the sweatshops had on the
city’s public safety. It had a boomerang effect, an international effect used in Ralph Armbruster-Sandoval’s
research.17 In this case, the human rights violations in the sweatshops brought in non governmental actors that
strived for better humanitarian conditions. In the midst of this, they not only revitalized speech freedom, a worker’s
right to assemble, unions, they also noticed the necessity for safety and the need to extinguish the violence. In a
United States Agency for International Development Report, USAID began working with NGO’s and regional
alliances to catch the gang violence while the growing members were still in their youth and provide programs and
activities to prevent continued membership and violence. 18 Women are eighty five percent of the textile industry’s
workforce. A vast amount of the violence gangs execute is the crime of rape. If more women are employed and not
vulnerable on the streets, they are not as susceptible to be a victim.
4.6. Employment
In 2001, the free zones employed 81,220 workers, almost 20% of total manufacturing industry employment. 19
However, the department of San Miguel in its’ entirety does not have any free trade zones (out of El Salvador’s
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eighteen). Yet, Santa Ana is home to the Santa Ana Free Trade Zone, providing thousands with jobs. With
unemployment for 2011 at 7.3% (and far more of the population is underemployed), many people are lucky to be
employed at all.20 El Salvador was hit hard by the current economic crisis. Deplorable conditions in tow, a
Salvadoran is willing to take a harsh job over no job at all. The World Bank even suggested that such jobs in the
textile industry provide a chance for mobility and a route out of poverty.21 The wages provided in sweatshops are
often higher than the nation’s average income. In Benjamin Powell’s study on eleven countries deemed loaded with
sweatshops, he found that the conditions in said sweatshops were comparable and even better than the other
alternatives. As stated before, citizens of El Salvador preferred to go to the non-agricultural sector. There is a reason
that the sweatshop industry is so successful in Santa Ana; it is better than the alternative.
5. Alternative Explanations
5.1. FMLN Disintegration Of Land
Throughout the civil war period and post-civil war period, the FMLN disintegrated the land of the landed elite. They
were determined to break such a class structure and as a party that incorporated Marxist beliefs, they were striving
for class equality. Thus, one must consider the breakup of the agricultural land and how it would affect the future of
industry in Santa Ana and San Miguel and ultimately the citizens of said cities’ life. If San Miguel was undivided
and Santa Ana experienced the disintegration, it would explain the difference in the two cities currently. However,
before the war even began the two cities were both in the top three important cities in the nation. They were both
huge coffee exports and both held a lot of the country’s wealth.22 In a report after the war by the Salvadoran
Foundation for Economic and Social Development, it was stated that San Miguel actually had a slightly higher area
of land that was arable, 81, 420 square hectometers to Santa Ana’s 79,410 sq. hectometers.23 One would conclude
that the FMLN would actually go more strongly after San Miguel than Santa Ana, shaping it for non-agricultural
development. As aforementioned, that is not the case.
5.2 Educational Opportunities
Both cities share a similar infrastructure for public education. Up to the ninth grade, education is free. Santa Ana had
four major universities and San Miguel has two, and all six rank in the nation’s top universities’. Finally, both cities
have over 150 public and private schools to attend. 24
5.3 Volcanic Eruptions
A natural disaster such as that of a volcanic eruption could be quite the setback for a city. Natural disasters can cost
millions upon trillions of dollars in repairs and rehabilitation, not to mention the profit they can cause a municipality
to lose. In the case of Santa Ana and San Miguel, both municipalities are home to very active volcanoes. Both
volcanoes sporadically damage their surrounding areas. For example, in 2005 Santa Ana experienced an eruption
that forced people to leave their villages.25 In 1995, ash erupting from the volcano in San Miguel reached such high
levels it ruined much of San Miguel’s crop that year. In 2000, there was damage to houses and infrastructure. 26
5.4 Access To Non-Agricultural Employment
Basic infrastructure is not a guarantee in El Salvador. In fact, their scarcity (especially immediately outside of cities)
immensely impacts the opportunity for employment outside of the agricultural industry. It is logical to examine
whether or not Santa Ana was bestowed with a better road system from the start. If that were the case, then a strong
explanation for the increased quality of life in Santa Ana would be its’ road infrastructure and negate the sweatshop
industry as being the root. However, as early as 1995, San Miguel was put on the priority list to be included in the
roads investment program. Santa Ana was not. Yet, the two regions were both devastated by the war. Santa Ana was
even mentioned in a table of needing improvement along with San Miguel, yet San Miguel was the city that received
millions in funding to construct roads and improve transportation.27 Thus, even if Santa Ana had a better road
system, with such a program, San Miguel would have caught up. Yet, the need for better road infrastructure in Santa
Ana was clear as well. Road infrastructure is not a valid explanation for the deviation of indicators in quality of life.
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6. Conclusions
To report that sweatshops are a favored place to work would be a vast overstatement. However, they are a preferred
alternative of employment for the poor. They are a step in the right direction out of poverty and ultimately impact
the surrounding municipality positively as seen in the variables education, unions, municipal services, gang
violence, and overall employment. Santa Ana and San Miguel’s economic devastation after the civil war would
ultimately lead to the intrusion of the textile industry. The United States’ intervention decided El Salvador’s
economic model. Now, it is difficult to account whether it was the right choice. Unfortunately, a proposal for a
different economic model for third world, economically lagging countries is not an option. One must face the reality
that the decision was made and the industry must be dealt with. Thus, the tragedy of the textile industry’s conditions
is completely relevant. Without disregarding the deplorable conditions, one must look at the overall picture:
sweatshops provide a place of employment for these citizens, and often an even better place of employment than
alternative options. The next step is to recognize the positive implications the industry does for cities such as Santa
Ana and countries such as El Salvador, and continue to forge forth in the fight for better working conditions and
better workers’ rights as a whole and not simply confine the fight exclusively to the textile industry.
7. Acknowledgments
I would like to begin by thanking my academic advisor, Dr. Suraj Jacob, who not only motivated me toward the light
at the end of the tunnel, but also was there every step of the way.
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24 United Nations International Children Emergency Fund, "At a Glance: El Salvador Statistics." Last modified
March 2, 2010. Accessed December 16, 2011. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/elsalvador_statistics.html.
25 Smithsonian Institution's Global Volcanism Program Website, February, 2001. From: Major, et.al., 2001,
Lahar-Hazard Zonation for Santa Ana Volcano, El Salvador: USGS Open-File Report 01-395
26 Smithsonian Institution's Global Volcanism Program Website, February, 2002, From: Major, et.al., 2001,
Lahar-Hazard Zonation for San Miguel Volcano, El Salvador: USGS Open-File Report 01-395
27El Salvador, Rural Development Study. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1998. http://books.google.com/
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