Willam Henry Kellar. Make Haste Slowly: Moderates, Conservatives

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Canada and the United States
Kennedy or Eugene McCarthy, Humphrey won the
1968 presidential nomination but lost to Richard
Nixon, partly because of the white backlash against
integration, black nationalism, and urban violence.
Ironically, too, Humphrey ended his career as he
began it-as a party outsider. While Democrats in the
late 1970s grew increasingly skeptical of the welfare
state, Humphrey, who returned to the Senate in 1971,
insisted that a country with a $100 billion military
budget could "give every American a good job" (p.
237). The Humphrey-Hawkins bill, which would have
established mechanisms for providing full employment, was watered down into a symbolic admonition
when it passed in October 1978, nine months after
Humphrey's death.
This book's flaws appear when Thurber strays from
the thick record he has accumulated and indulges in
ideological or methodological asides. For instance, he
thinks Humphrey asked too little effort from the poor,
supposes that the political power wielded by conservatives went unnoticed by historians until roughly five
years ago, and cannot resist swipes at identity politics
as the bane of contemporary liberalism. Indeed, his
animus to identity politics leads him to exaggerate the
differences between the "old" liberalism and the
"new." Liberals did not write affirmative action into
law before the 1960s, but if Democratic presidents,
mayors, and ward leaders had not informally hired
men and women on the basis of religion and ethnicity,
there would have been no New Deal coalition. These
shortcomings are minor compared to Thurber's fresh
insights and reminders of the insights historians have
misplaced. During the 1950s, for example, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower received more than one third of
the African-American vote, many Republicans supported civil rights legislation, and Humphrey, among
others, feared that the Democrats would lose out
politically if they lagged behind on the issue. Although
the Cold War probably impeded the civil rights movement overall by giving segregationists the added
weapon of red baiting, this is a close judgment call,
because the anomaly of Americans preaching freedom
abroad while denying it to blacks at home provided a
powerful argument for supporters of racial equality.
As Humphrey's volatile exchanges with Fannie Lou
Hamer at the 1964 Democratic convention show, there
was no golden age of blissful relations between black
and white advocates of civil rights. Thurber also shows
that the private massaging of congressional egos, especially the ego of Senate minority leader Everett
Dirksen, played a role almost as important as public
demonstrations in passing a civil rights bill in 1964; he
highlights the significance of religious groups in lobbying for this measure. In the end, although studies of
the Vietnam War and the Cold War red scare would
show less admirable sides of Humphrey himself, he
emerges here as an unusually dccent,ambitious, mainstream politician.
LEO P. RIBUFFO
George Washington University
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW
Make Haste Slowly: Moderates,
Conservatives, and School Desegregation in Houston.
(The Centennial Series of the Association of Former
Students, Texas A&M University, number 80.) College
Station: Texas A&M University Press. 1999. Pp. xv,
226. $38.95.
WILLAM HENRY KELLAR.
In recent years, historians have published a significant
number of books examining the process of school
desegregation in local communities. Texas cities, however, have received less attention than have cities in
many other southern states. William Henry Kellar's
book helps to fill this gap by providing us with our best
understanding to date of school desegregation in
Houston, home to the country's largest de jure segregated school system in the 1950s.
Texans reacted to the Supreme Court's desegregation mandate in Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
with less defiance than did much of the South, indicative of Texas's border-state status. In the aftermath of
Supreme Court's May 1955 implementation decision
in the Brown case, school officials in a number of Texas
cities, such as San Antonio, Corpus Christi, Galveston,
Waco, and Austin, announced plans to desegregate
their schools. Although a few of these districts backed
off early decisions to cnd school segregation, several
Texas school districts, particularly in the state's mostly
white western counties, desegregated their schools in
the fall of 1955, becoming some of the first southern
school districts to do so. Several months later, only five
of Texas's twenty-two members of the House of Representatives signed the Southern Manifesto denouncing the Brown ruling. Although Governor Alan Shivers
did exploit the desegregation issue for his own political
advantage, his resistance efforts were less successful
than those of many other southern governors.
In Houston, many residents strongly opposed racial
mixing, but the city was less united in its opposition to
school desegregation than many other southern cities.
In 1957, a mere two weeks after federal district court
judge Ben Connally ruled that the Houston schools
were unconstitutionally segregated, Houston voters
elected the more racially liberal of two mayoral candidates with over sixty-three percent of the vote. One
year later, at the height of the city's struggle with the
school desegregation issue, Houston voters elected
their first African-American school board member,
Hattie Mae White, a forceful proponent of school
desegregation, and re-elected the racially liberal
Waiter Kemmerer, former president of the University
of Houston, even though African Americans comprised less than twenty-five percent of the city's population.
When Houston began its decidedly token school
integration in the fall of 1960, there was virtually no
violence, in sharp contrast to the simultaneous and far
more tumultuous desegregation of the New Orleans
schools. As Kellar notes, "Houston's business and
political leaders acquiesced in limited school desegregation, because the alternative-a city disrupted by
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Reviews of Books
racial violence-seemed more distasteful. Houstonians had learned the lessons of Little Rock and
desegregated the country's largest segregated school
peacefully" (p. 138). Kellar suggests that the experience of Little Rock .influenced Judge Connally in his
handling of the Houston desegregation litigation. Although Connally found the city's schools unconstitutionally segregated in 1957, shortly after the onset of
the Little Rock crisis, he waited three years, until 1960,
before ordering the school board to implement a very
modest, one-grade-per-year desegregation plan.
Kellar focuses his attention on the 1954-1960 time
period. Although Kellar does consider the post-1960
era in an epilogue, this time period, in many ways the
most interesting phase of the city's desegregation
history, invites further exploration. In the fall of 1970,
the Houston schools opened under a much more
extensive court-ordered desegregation plan. This desegregation plan triggered extensive white flight from
the city school district, as well as protests from black
and Hispanic parents who argued that the burden of
desegregation plan fell primarily on their children. At
the same time, residents of Houston's largely Anglo
westside neighborhoods initiated efforts to secede
from the Houston school district. One leader of this
separatist effort, former school board president Robert Eckels, announced that he would "go to jail before
seeing white children bused to predominantly black
schools" (p. 159). This secession movement was ultimately thwarted by the courts, but white flight from the
Houston school district proved dramatic. Whereas
non-Hispanic whites comprised fifty percent of the
school district population in 1970, by 1980 that figure
was twenty-five percent, and by 1995, twelve percent.
Like so many large urban school districts, white flight
in Houston led to an overwhelmingly non-white school
district. Closer scholarly examination of this aspect of
urban school desegregation across the nation will be
welcomed.
DAVISON
M. DOUGLAS
William and Mary School of Law
ERIC C. SCHNEIDER. Vampires, Dragons, and Egyptian
Kings: Youth Gangs in Postwar New York. Princeton:
Princeton University Press. 1999. Pp. xx, 334. $29.95.
Urban gangs come to public attention periodically as
the result of a gruesome killing or a serious rumble or
sometimes as the subject of a lengthy report or government hearing. Although this has been less the case
during the 1990s, gangs seized a good deal of attention
during the 1940s through the 1970s-a period that,
incidentally, also saw the rapid decline and transformation of America's older cities. If any city was the
focus of this national concern over juvenile delinquency and gang behavior, it was New York, and Eric
C. Schneider makes New York the site for his narrative. The result is a very fine analysis that mixes history,
sociology, cultural studies, and ethnology with per-
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW
sonal observations and a talent for sensible conclusions.
In fact, this book recounts several parallel and
intersecting stories, each of which is crucial to the
whole. These include the economic and demographic
history of the city over the postwar decades, the
changing residential and job structures, the shifts in
attitudes of private and public agencies toward various
child and adolescent-saving programs, changing governmental strategies, and the larger political climate.
Other stories have to do with shifting gender relations
and the growth of the drug culture. All of these strands
weave a context for the central chapters, which explore
questions of masculinity, culture, and adulthood as
they defined the gang.
Schneider's sources range from his close reading of
the voluminous juvenile delinquency literature about
New York, the sociology and ethnology of gangs and
immigrant communities, documents relating to community agency and government interventions, newspapers, and interviews with former gang members. The
interviews form an important part of the evidence used
in the central chapters to explore the culture and
motivations of gangs.
The author concludes that gangs had multiple and
changing functions. During and after World War II,
and in the decades of rapid demographic changes in
the city, they defended ethnic and racial turf. They
tended to be Italian, Irish, Puerto Rican, and African
Americans fighting over access to public facilities like
swimming pools or preventing changes in neighborhoods. But gangs also had another function, which
Schneider speculates was responsive to the thwarted
needs of adolescents to express their masculinity.
Raised in dysfunctional families, schooled in inept and
failing institutions, and facing dead-end work, young
men found in the culture of the gang an outlet for their
aggressiveness, independence, and competitiveness.
Within such groups, they could find ways to dominate
others and express their frustration with the outside
world. In addition, female auxiliaries provided a sexual
outlet. Although this may have been a temporary
solution to a problem that ultimately only maturity
could resolve, the gang provided a temporary refuge
where alienated individuals could band together. This
is not to say, however, that the author romanticizes
gangs; he does not, and he is well aware of the toll that
this sort of behavior exacted from the individual gang
member and from the community. But his point is to
demonstrate the power of their attraction and the
force that maintained their social, cultural, and psychological cohesion.
Schneider attributes this version of masculinity to (if
anything) working-class, immigrant culture. I have no
doubt that this is true. At the same time, I wish he had
inquired further to explain why this particular construction of masculinity developed at the time it did in
American culture. Was it universal? Did it pertain
primarily to working-class men? Was it regional? Did
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