961 Canada and the United States Kennedy or Eugene McCarthy, Humphrey won the 1968 presidential nomination but lost to Richard Nixon, partly because of the white backlash against integration, black nationalism, and urban violence. Ironically, too, Humphrey ended his career as he began it-as a party outsider. While Democrats in the late 1970s grew increasingly skeptical of the welfare state, Humphrey, who returned to the Senate in 1971, insisted that a country with a $100 billion military budget could "give every American a good job" (p. 237). The Humphrey-Hawkins bill, which would have established mechanisms for providing full employment, was watered down into a symbolic admonition when it passed in October 1978, nine months after Humphrey's death. This book's flaws appear when Thurber strays from the thick record he has accumulated and indulges in ideological or methodological asides. For instance, he thinks Humphrey asked too little effort from the poor, supposes that the political power wielded by conservatives went unnoticed by historians until roughly five years ago, and cannot resist swipes at identity politics as the bane of contemporary liberalism. Indeed, his animus to identity politics leads him to exaggerate the differences between the "old" liberalism and the "new." Liberals did not write affirmative action into law before the 1960s, but if Democratic presidents, mayors, and ward leaders had not informally hired men and women on the basis of religion and ethnicity, there would have been no New Deal coalition. These shortcomings are minor compared to Thurber's fresh insights and reminders of the insights historians have misplaced. During the 1950s, for example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower received more than one third of the African-American vote, many Republicans supported civil rights legislation, and Humphrey, among others, feared that the Democrats would lose out politically if they lagged behind on the issue. Although the Cold War probably impeded the civil rights movement overall by giving segregationists the added weapon of red baiting, this is a close judgment call, because the anomaly of Americans preaching freedom abroad while denying it to blacks at home provided a powerful argument for supporters of racial equality. As Humphrey's volatile exchanges with Fannie Lou Hamer at the 1964 Democratic convention show, there was no golden age of blissful relations between black and white advocates of civil rights. Thurber also shows that the private massaging of congressional egos, especially the ego of Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen, played a role almost as important as public demonstrations in passing a civil rights bill in 1964; he highlights the significance of religious groups in lobbying for this measure. In the end, although studies of the Vietnam War and the Cold War red scare would show less admirable sides of Humphrey himself, he emerges here as an unusually dccent,ambitious, mainstream politician. LEO P. RIBUFFO George Washington University AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW Make Haste Slowly: Moderates, Conservatives, and School Desegregation in Houston. (The Centennial Series of the Association of Former Students, Texas A&M University, number 80.) College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 1999. Pp. xv, 226. $38.95. WILLAM HENRY KELLAR. In recent years, historians have published a significant number of books examining the process of school desegregation in local communities. Texas cities, however, have received less attention than have cities in many other southern states. William Henry Kellar's book helps to fill this gap by providing us with our best understanding to date of school desegregation in Houston, home to the country's largest de jure segregated school system in the 1950s. Texans reacted to the Supreme Court's desegregation mandate in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) with less defiance than did much of the South, indicative of Texas's border-state status. In the aftermath of Supreme Court's May 1955 implementation decision in the Brown case, school officials in a number of Texas cities, such as San Antonio, Corpus Christi, Galveston, Waco, and Austin, announced plans to desegregate their schools. Although a few of these districts backed off early decisions to cnd school segregation, several Texas school districts, particularly in the state's mostly white western counties, desegregated their schools in the fall of 1955, becoming some of the first southern school districts to do so. Several months later, only five of Texas's twenty-two members of the House of Representatives signed the Southern Manifesto denouncing the Brown ruling. Although Governor Alan Shivers did exploit the desegregation issue for his own political advantage, his resistance efforts were less successful than those of many other southern governors. In Houston, many residents strongly opposed racial mixing, but the city was less united in its opposition to school desegregation than many other southern cities. In 1957, a mere two weeks after federal district court judge Ben Connally ruled that the Houston schools were unconstitutionally segregated, Houston voters elected the more racially liberal of two mayoral candidates with over sixty-three percent of the vote. One year later, at the height of the city's struggle with the school desegregation issue, Houston voters elected their first African-American school board member, Hattie Mae White, a forceful proponent of school desegregation, and re-elected the racially liberal Waiter Kemmerer, former president of the University of Houston, even though African Americans comprised less than twenty-five percent of the city's population. When Houston began its decidedly token school integration in the fall of 1960, there was virtually no violence, in sharp contrast to the simultaneous and far more tumultuous desegregation of the New Orleans schools. As Kellar notes, "Houston's business and political leaders acquiesced in limited school desegregation, because the alternative-a city disrupted by JUNE 2000 962 Reviews of Books racial violence-seemed more distasteful. Houstonians had learned the lessons of Little Rock and desegregated the country's largest segregated school peacefully" (p. 138). Kellar suggests that the experience of Little Rock .influenced Judge Connally in his handling of the Houston desegregation litigation. Although Connally found the city's schools unconstitutionally segregated in 1957, shortly after the onset of the Little Rock crisis, he waited three years, until 1960, before ordering the school board to implement a very modest, one-grade-per-year desegregation plan. Kellar focuses his attention on the 1954-1960 time period. Although Kellar does consider the post-1960 era in an epilogue, this time period, in many ways the most interesting phase of the city's desegregation history, invites further exploration. In the fall of 1970, the Houston schools opened under a much more extensive court-ordered desegregation plan. This desegregation plan triggered extensive white flight from the city school district, as well as protests from black and Hispanic parents who argued that the burden of desegregation plan fell primarily on their children. At the same time, residents of Houston's largely Anglo westside neighborhoods initiated efforts to secede from the Houston school district. One leader of this separatist effort, former school board president Robert Eckels, announced that he would "go to jail before seeing white children bused to predominantly black schools" (p. 159). This secession movement was ultimately thwarted by the courts, but white flight from the Houston school district proved dramatic. Whereas non-Hispanic whites comprised fifty percent of the school district population in 1970, by 1980 that figure was twenty-five percent, and by 1995, twelve percent. Like so many large urban school districts, white flight in Houston led to an overwhelmingly non-white school district. Closer scholarly examination of this aspect of urban school desegregation across the nation will be welcomed. DAVISON M. DOUGLAS William and Mary School of Law ERIC C. SCHNEIDER. Vampires, Dragons, and Egyptian Kings: Youth Gangs in Postwar New York. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999. Pp. xx, 334. $29.95. Urban gangs come to public attention periodically as the result of a gruesome killing or a serious rumble or sometimes as the subject of a lengthy report or government hearing. Although this has been less the case during the 1990s, gangs seized a good deal of attention during the 1940s through the 1970s-a period that, incidentally, also saw the rapid decline and transformation of America's older cities. If any city was the focus of this national concern over juvenile delinquency and gang behavior, it was New York, and Eric C. Schneider makes New York the site for his narrative. The result is a very fine analysis that mixes history, sociology, cultural studies, and ethnology with per- AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW sonal observations and a talent for sensible conclusions. In fact, this book recounts several parallel and intersecting stories, each of which is crucial to the whole. These include the economic and demographic history of the city over the postwar decades, the changing residential and job structures, the shifts in attitudes of private and public agencies toward various child and adolescent-saving programs, changing governmental strategies, and the larger political climate. Other stories have to do with shifting gender relations and the growth of the drug culture. All of these strands weave a context for the central chapters, which explore questions of masculinity, culture, and adulthood as they defined the gang. Schneider's sources range from his close reading of the voluminous juvenile delinquency literature about New York, the sociology and ethnology of gangs and immigrant communities, documents relating to community agency and government interventions, newspapers, and interviews with former gang members. The interviews form an important part of the evidence used in the central chapters to explore the culture and motivations of gangs. The author concludes that gangs had multiple and changing functions. During and after World War II, and in the decades of rapid demographic changes in the city, they defended ethnic and racial turf. They tended to be Italian, Irish, Puerto Rican, and African Americans fighting over access to public facilities like swimming pools or preventing changes in neighborhoods. But gangs also had another function, which Schneider speculates was responsive to the thwarted needs of adolescents to express their masculinity. Raised in dysfunctional families, schooled in inept and failing institutions, and facing dead-end work, young men found in the culture of the gang an outlet for their aggressiveness, independence, and competitiveness. Within such groups, they could find ways to dominate others and express their frustration with the outside world. In addition, female auxiliaries provided a sexual outlet. Although this may have been a temporary solution to a problem that ultimately only maturity could resolve, the gang provided a temporary refuge where alienated individuals could band together. This is not to say, however, that the author romanticizes gangs; he does not, and he is well aware of the toll that this sort of behavior exacted from the individual gang member and from the community. But his point is to demonstrate the power of their attraction and the force that maintained their social, cultural, and psychological cohesion. Schneider attributes this version of masculinity to (if anything) working-class, immigrant culture. I have no doubt that this is true. At the same time, I wish he had inquired further to explain why this particular construction of masculinity developed at the time it did in American culture. Was it universal? Did it pertain primarily to working-class men? Was it regional? Did JUNE 2000
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