Study Guide NATO EuroMUN 2016
Study Guide
NATO
EuroMUN 2016
Topic 1:
“The issue of Cyber Warfare and how to manage it in the 21st Century”
Topic 2:
“The North Pole and the potential military situation there”
Chairs:
Fédora Bernard
Geert de Vries
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Introduction to the North Atlantic Council & NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established in 1949 as a collective defence
organization, as a result of the tension that rose between the capitalist “West” and communist
“East” during the Cold War, which resulted in the Warsaw Pact being established, in order to
counter the North Atlantic Alliance. Like suggested by the name of the Cold War NATO did
not come into action much during the conflict itself, and after the fall of the Berlin Wall had to
redefine its purpose, with many believing it would soon come to an end. This, however, has not
been the case. On the contrary, it has since then been very active in the international field, taking
on important roles in for example the Bosnian War, Kosovo intervention, Afghanistan and Iraq.
The main decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), as established by
Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is therefore this body that will be simulated during
EuroMUN 2016. The Council is made up of the 28 members of NATO, of which the seats are
filled by the Permanent Representatives in Brussels. It is not a United Nations Committee, but
a regional collective defence body instead, which means that its decision-making process and
way of communication are slightly different. Instead of Resolutions the Council comes to its
decisions through its Communiqués, which have to be pass by consensus. These documents are
products of its deliberations, offering an opinion on the issue at hand and offering an actionplan to be enforced by the Alliance. They are legally binding for all members of the Alliance.
As can be seen in the example the use of language and format is substantially different from
resolutions, but amendments go through the same process.
Do not worry if you have any questions regarding the Council and Communiqués. We,
your chairs, will help you along the way and assist you wherever required. We will for example
be offering a template that will assist you in writing in the required format. If we leave a
question left unanswered you are always free to ask!
An example of what a Communiqué you will write should look like:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
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The issue of Cyber Warfare and how to manage it in the 21st
Century
Overview
Nowadays information systems dominate all of NATO’s members, making it a legitimate cause
of concern for the organization’s security. With continuing development of the internet as
global infrastructure for business, a tool for politics, military activities and espionage,
cybersecurity has become a central topic for national and international security. Cyberspace
offers great advantages, but at a potential cost for the national security. Therefore, more and
more the organization will have to focus on cyber warfare, which can be described as an
emerging form of combat where computers, the internet and other networks are the target and
vehicle of an attack. Note that such an attack can also be not directly targeted at the computer
itself, but at what the computer controls. Low costs and simplicity of conducting an attack can
mean it can be a compelling tactic for both state and non-state organizations.
There is a wider problem with the continuing development of cyber warfare capabilities. It is a
form of non-kinetic warfare it can be used in low-intensity conflicts, even in peacetime. It
usually does not entail loss of life, which means it has a far lower threshold to being used.
Additionally, if conducted properly, an attack can also not be traced. It also has extended the
theater of combat to organizations that before were not responsible for defending themselves
against nation-state aggressors. Whereas usually the Geneva Conventions assure that civilians
and organizations are safe from attacks, as long as all parties abide and are bound by them, this
is not the case when it comes to cyberattacks. Although most international humanitarian law
experts agree that cyber warfare does fall under for example the Geneva Conventions, most
attacks would not constitute a violation, since for example financial harm is not covered.1
For the time being no cyber-attack is known to have provoked death or physical damage to
human beings. However, an continuously growing number of states around the world are
preparing for conflict in the cyber domain and have been developing cyber defense strategies,
national doctrines and both defensive and offensive capabilities for cyber warfare. Additionally,
1
Tallinn Manual Process – Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare
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there are vast economic costs due to cyber crime and cyber espionage, estimated between 300
billion USD and 1 trillion USD, and 57% of industry experts in 2012 believed that “an arms
race was taking place within cyberspace.”2 It is often claimed that cyberspace is the fifth
domain of warfare, after land, sea, air and space.
Defining Cyber Warfare
Like most relevant international norms a definition of cyber warfare is yet to be fully developed.
However, most experts agree that cyber warfare constitutes an action by a nation-state to
penetrate another nation-state’s computers or networks that affects the latter in the way a
conventional attack would: by way of injury or death to people or damage to or destruction of
objects.3
One could say there is a ‘black hole' regarding what constitutes an act of cyber war, and what
the appropriate response might be, a definition of what constitutes cyber warfare and whether
it entails more than states as actors. For example, the United States Department of Defence has
defined cyber warfare as: “an armed conflict conducted in whole or in part by cyber means.
Military operations conducted to deny an opposing force the effective use of cyberspace systems
and weapons in a conflict. It includes cyber attacks, cyber defense and cyber enabling actions.”
Notable previous cyber attacks
Titan Rain
Titan Rain was a series of coordinated attacks aimed at various U.S. and British systems, which
lasted from approximately 2003 until 2006. The attacks were most likely Chinese in origin,
although their precise nature remains unknown. Some believe the Chinese armed forces were
responsible for the series of attacks. Titan Rain was successful in gaining access to many
defence contractor computer networks, which were targeted for getting access to sensitive
information, including Lockheed Martin, Sandia National Laboratories, NASA and Redstone
Arsenal. Additionally the U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom’s
Ministry of Defence were attacked, and the computer system of the House of Commons was
shut down. No access to classified information has been reported, but the attacks and hackers
2
3
IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security
European Parliament Briefing – Cyber defence in the EU, preparing for cyber warfare?
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accessing unclassified information has led to significant friction between the U.S. and Chinese
governments.
Stuxnet/Operation Olympic Games
Stuxnet was a computer worm aimed at slowing down the Iranian nuclear program, which was
active from 2008 until it was detected by security companies in June 2010. Although it has not
been confirmed openly, it was almost certainly jointly built by the United States’ National
Security Agency, CIA and Israel. It managed to destroy approximately 1000 out of the 6000
Siemens uranium enrichment centrifuges Iran had managed to obtain. It did so by taking over
the software controlling the centrifuge, and making it go beyond normal speeds. The worm was
developed in such a way that it would not destroy all centrifuges immediately, but slow and
steadily slow down the program and make the Iranian nuclear engineers look incompetent.
#OpIsrael
#OpIsrael was a coordinated cyber-attack by various anti-Israel groups and individuals, using
denial of service attacks, database hijacking, admin panel takeover, defacement, and database
leaks. The goal was to “erase Israel from the internet” on the eve of Holocaust Remembrance
Day, 7 April 2013. The event was organized by factions associated with the Anonymous
Collective. #OpIsrael caused no physical damage and has been assessed by the Israeli
Government, security experts and journalists to have been a failure. One of the defaced websites
was that of an Israeli hair salon, Peter Hair. The website showed a masked person holding a
sign, saying “Indonesian Security Down #OP ISRAHELL”, signed “We are Muslims, Soldier
[sic] of Allah”. Peter, the owner of the salon, was called by the New York Times that night, and
was unaware of the attack, it had not affected his business. Upon being asked why he thought
his website was targeted, he answered “I don’t have a clue. It’s very strange.” Overall, several
websites were taken down or defaced during the attacks, but no significant security-breaches or
hindrance has been reported.
2007 Cyberattacks on Estonia
Beginning on 27 April 2007 the websites of Estonian organizations, such as the Estonian
parliament, ministries, banks and newspapers were swamped by distributed denial of service
attacks and were taken down. Some attacks were by individuals using ping floods, whereas
other attacks were carried out by rented botnets. The attacks continued for more than three
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weeks, isolating the country and paralyzing public services. This triggered the first time a
request to NATO to assist in defending against a cyberattack. NATO wasn’t ready for this,
since it was unprepared and it had never happened before. NATO only had experience in
defending its own networks and communication systems, and it has since developed the
capability of assisting its members and partner nations in defending against cyberattacks.
NATO’s actions regarding cyber warfare
Cyber defence was included for the first time in NATO’s political agenda at the Prague Summit
in 2002. The 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia initiated a shift in the attention the alliance pays to
cyber defence ever since. Its first cyber defence policy followed in 2008, and at the Lisbon
Summit of 2010 cyber defence came to be included in NATO’s strategic Concept. The summit
declaration also stated that there would be an update to the Cyber Defence Policy in 2011,
followed by the creation of an Action Plan in 2012. This however was delayed until the
September 2014 Wales Summit. Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging
Security Challenges, commented on the conference by stating that “for the first time we are
making an explicit link in this policy between cyber attacks at a certain threshold and the
invocation of a NATO Article 5 collective defence as part of the treaty.” What that exact
threshold is however remains secret, to act as a deterrent and making sure that a potential
aggressor does not get the idea to go up to a certain level with impunity. The new policy also
further improves mutual assistance between allies and information-sharing. Additionally it
enhances cooperation with industry and training and exercises.
The relevant paragraphs of the Wales Summit Declaration read as follows:
“As the Alliance looks to the future, cyber threats and attacks will continue to become more
common, sophisticated, and potentially damaging. To face this evolving challenge, we have
endorsed an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy, contributing to the fulfillment of the Alliance's
core tasks. The policy reaffirms the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and of
prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, and defence. It recalls that the fundamental cyber
defence responsibility of NATO is to defend its own networks, and that assistance to Allies
should be addressed in accordance with the spirit of solidarity, emphasizing the responsibility
of Allies to develop the relevant capabilities for the protection of national networks. Our policy
also recognises that international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN
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Charter, applies in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national
and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to
modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm therefore that cyber defence is part of
NATO's core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the
invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.
We are committed to developing further our national cyber defence capabilities, and we will
enhance the cyber security of national networks upon which NATO depends for its core tasks,
in order to help make the Alliance resilient and fully protected. Close bilateral and
multinational cooperation plays a key role in enhancing the cyber defence capabilities of the
Alliance. We will continue to integrate cyber defence into NATO operations and operational
and contingency planning, and enhance information sharing and situational awareness among
Allies. Strong partnerships play a key role in addressing cyber threats and risks. We will
therefore continue to engage actively on cyber issues with relevant partner nations on a caseby-case basis and with other international organisations, including the EU, as agreed, and will
intensify our cooperation with industry through a NATO Industry Cyber Partnership.
Technological innovations and expertise from the private sector are crucial to enable NATO
and Allies to achieve the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy's objectives. We will improve the
level of NATO's cyber defence education, training, and exercise activities. We will develop the
NATO cyber range capability, building, as a first step, on the Estonian cyber range capability,
while taking into consideration the capabilities and requirements of the NATO CIS School and
other NATO training and education bodies.”
Annually in September the “Cyber Coalition” exercise is held. During these exercises hundreds
of cyber defenders from across NATO test for several days their capabilities to defend their
networks from complex security challenges. During “Cyber Coalition 2015” 600 experts took
part at the exercise which was held at NATO’s Cyber Range in Estonia and locations in
participating nations. During the exercises scenarios increasing ion complexity are thrown at
the cyber defenders, aimed at drilling procedures and coordination between NATO bodies and
national institutions.
Besides the “Cyber Coalition” exercises also other regular cooperation exists. For example, in
February 2016 the Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence was concluded between the
NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and the Computer Emergency
Response Team of the European Union (CERT-EU). It provides an exchanging information
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framework and the sharing of best practices between the two institution’s emergency response
teams.
NATO Bodies dealing with cyber defense
Multiple bodies collectively form NATO’s cyber defense, being:
-
North Atlantic Council (NAC) – Any collective defense response to a cyber attack is
subject to the decisions of the NAC, NATO’s supreme body.
-
Cyber Defence Committee (CDC) – Formerly known as the Defense Policy and
Planning Committee the CDC acts as the senior advisory body to the NAC when it
comes to cyber defence. It is also in charge of NATO’s internal cyber defense
governance and provides consultation to the NATO members.
-
Cyber Defence Management Board (CMDB) – The CMDB consists of all the cyber
security major stakeholders within NATO, such as for example the Allied Command
Operations (ACO), the NATO agencies and the Allied Command Transformation
(ACT). It is overseen by the Emergency Security Challenges Division and is in charge
of executive direction and strategic planning of NATO networks. Furthermore it signs
so-called Memoranda of Understanding with Members in order to coordinate
assistance and facilitate information exchange. A NATO member suffering a
significant cyber attack can approach the CDMB for assistance. In case it is approved
the Rapid Reaction Team (RRT) will be activated. The RRT has a permanent core of
six experts
-
NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) – This body was created to
merge the seven NATO agencies which dealt with communication and information
systems (CIS) and cyber activities. It is the primary NATO CIS provider and entails
the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability. NCIRC is the body responsible
for cyber defence of all NATO sites such as NATO headquarters in Brussels and
operation or exercise headquarters. In the event of an attack one of NATO’s
information systems the NCIRC expert meet and draw up a plan of action with the aim
of restoring the system and allow continued operation as soon as possible.
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-
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) – NATO
CCD COE was founded as a result of the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia. It is a
research and training facility in the field of cyber security, and deals with education,
lessons learned, consultation, research and development.4 It was founded in May 2008
by seven NATO members, and has since grown to include 16 sponsoring NATO
Members, and Austria and Finland are contributing Participants. Membership is open
to all NATO Members, and the Centre can establish cooperation with non-NATO
states, research institutions, universities and business as contributing Participants.
Between 2009 and 2012 the Tallinn Manual was written at the invitation of the NATO
CCD COE by a group of international humanitarian law experts. This is an academic,
non-binding study on how international humanitarian law applies to cyber warfare and
cyber conflicts, and was the first effort to bring clarity to the associated legal issues.
Currently Tallinn 2.0 is being drafted, which, as opposed to the first which addressed
attacks of such level that self-defence would be legal on a national level, will address
cyber operations of a lesser threat or aggression.
-
Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development (MN CD2) – Although not
directly part of NATO, this organization was established in March 2013 by five
NATO countries, and membership is open to all NATO members. The aim of this
project is to pool resources in order to lower the costs of developing cyber defence
capabilities. By joint funding for research and development capabilities can be
emplaced at a lower cost and higher quality. It has for example the Cyber Information
and Incident Coordination System (CIICS), which is a web-based application enabling
governments to share cyber defence information within what is called the NATO
CIICS Federation.
Suggestions for further preparation
The information included is necessarily selective and by far does not cover everything with
which delegates should be familiarized prior to the session. Therefore, we are attaching a list
of suggested online resources to begin advancing your research.
4
NATO CCD COE, About us http://www.ccdcoe.org/about-us.html
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UNIDIR Resources – Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare
http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cybersecurity-and-cyberwarfare-preliminaryassessment-of-national-doctrine-and-organization-380.pdf
NATO’s website on the topic of Cyber Defence
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm
NATO’s Multimedia Library on the topic of Cyber Defence
http://www.natolibguides.info/cybersecurity
NATO Cyber Defence State of Play – Achievements and Challenges
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4TqnMjipUis
NATO Review Magazine – Cyber, the good, the bad and the bug-free
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/cyber/EN/index.htm
THE QUESTION OF: The role of NATO in the Arctic and the possible
security issue there
Introduction
The North Pole or “the Arctic” has always been seen in the past as one of the most inhospitable
places on Earth. This frozen ocean never drew that much attention politically, especially
because not many foresaw the possibility of it melting. Today however, the situation is
changing. Climate change is affecting both Polar Regions and while Antarctica has a special
legal status and is subject to many international agreements, it is not the case for the Arctic.
While the rise of the sea levels might bring unprecedented challenges to countries in order to
avoid the disastrous consequences it might have on their cities, the melting of the Arctic would
not only bring challenges but also opportunities. It is estimated, in fact, that around 30% of the
world’s undiscovered reserves of natural gas, and 13% of undiscovered reserves of oil are
situated in the North Pole5. Secondly, the melting of the ice would open the barrier between
5
Åtland, K. (2013). The security implications of climate change in the Arctic Ocean. InEnvironmental Security in
the Arctic Ocean (pp. 205-216). Springer Netherlands.
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Russia and the United States, but even more, the US and other European NATO allies6. It would
therefore open up new shipping routes. On the other hand however, one major challenge exists.
As mentioned, the Arctic was never at the center of the international attention and lacks a
distinct legal status. The question is therefore: who owns what?
According to the International Convention of the Law of the Sea, states can claim an
exclusive economic zone, up to 200 nautical miles from their coasts7. There have been some
territorial claims from all the so-called Arctic states in the past years, claims that have always
been resolved through cooperation. This however, does not mean that tensions do not exist,
since all Arctic states apart from Russia are NATO members, the question is now “What should
be the role of NATO towards the possible security situation in the North Pole?”
6
Ibid.
General Assembly, Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, Art. 57: “The exclusive economic
zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured.”
7 UN
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Main actors
Arctic
Territorial
(Arcticweb, n.d.)
Claims.
Source:
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Russia – Russia always made its interest in the region very clear. After stating that the Arctic
was Russian territory, it submitted an official territorial claim to the UN commission on the
Limits of Continental Shelf in 2001. The commission concluded that additional research must
be performed in order for the claim to be on good grounds8. Russia always maintained a quite
provoking position towards the Arctic, in 2007 for example, it planted a rust-proof Russian flag
under the North Pole. In 2008 it adopted an official Arctic strategy that aims at turning the
region into a Russian strategic base. For this purpose, it has been increasing its military activity
both in the sea and in the air9. Furthermore, in 2015-2020 the country plans on spending $4,3
billions on projects to develop its resources in the Arctic.10
The United States of America – Although to a much lesser extent that the Russian Federation,
the United States also has recently taken steps to redefine its interests in the region and
strengthen its military capabilities there. A presidential directive 66 and the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 25 lists their key interests in the region, among which are security
interests such as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for
strategic sealift; strategic deterrence; maritime presence and maritime security operations.11
The main issue concerning the US interests in the region however is that the country has not
signed the UNCLOS, therefore it cannot make official claims concerning the Arctic.
Canada – Canada has the second largest border to the Arctic, which makes it one of the most
important stakeholders. Canada is traditionally opposed to more intervention by NATO in the
area and promotes intervention through the Arctic council. Its main concern is that an increase
in the role of NATO may make dispute settlement harder to achieve and might damage relations
with Russia.12
Dodds, K. (2010). Flag planting and finger pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the political
geographies of the outer continental shelf. Political Geography, 29(2), 63-73.
8
9
Ibid.
BBC. (2015). Norway in Arctic dispute with Russia over Rogozin visit. Retrieved from:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32380101
11 Åtland, K. (2014). Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?. Comparative
Strategy, 33(2), 145-166.
10
12
Ibid.
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Denmark –Greenland, which is part of the Kingdom of Denmark has significant territory in
the North Pole area. The government hence published its first strategy policy for the Arctic in
2011, its main aim being to see a “peaceful, secure and safe Arctic growth and development”.13
Denmark is currently in a territorial dispute with Canada over the Hans Island, but is certain
that the disagreement will be solved in a peaceful fashion. However, its new policy includes
military investment in the region and is willing to see NATO involvement in the region. 14
Norway – The government of Norway sees the Arctic as its top foreign policy priority and is
highly committed in safeguarding its economic and security interests there. 15 It is the member
state most eager to see NATO intervention in the area, especially because Russia showed an
aggressive behaviour towards the country in recent times.16
The European Union – The EU defines itself as a relevant stakeholder in the area. Since the
EU is at the edge of sustainable development, it is highly concerned about how the resources
of the Arctic might be used. Its Arctic Policy has three main objectives: “Protecting and
preserving the Arctic in cooperation with the people who live there, promoting sustainable use
of resources, and international cooperation” and it focuses on three main areas: “Supporting
research and channelling knowledge to address environmental and climate change in the
Arctic, acting responsibly to help ensure that economic development in the Arctic is based on
sustainable use of resources and environmental expertise, and stepping up constructive
engagement and dialogue with Arctic states, indigenous peoples, and other partners.”17
13 The Arctic governance project. (2011). Kingdom of Denmark: strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. Retrieved
from:
http://www.arcticgovernance.org/kingdom-of-denmark-strategy-for-the-arctic-20112020.4951722-142902.html
14 ibid.
15 Åtland, 2014
16
BBC, 2015
17
The European External Action Service. (n.d.). EU Arctic Policy. Retrieved from:
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/
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China – although China is not an Arctic state, its interest in the region is quickly increasing. It
recently became an observer in the Arctic council and is now claiming membership.18 It is
especially interested in the possible resources there, more than seeking territorial disputes.
Issues
Four main issues could raise security concerns in the area: unresolved territorial disputes; the
traditional problem of the shipping routes; control over natural resources and lastly,
militarization.
Territorial disputes
Despite countries agreeing to solve their issues in the Arctic peacefully and diplomatically,
some unsettled territorial claims still persist; some are among NATO members themselves and
other between NATO members and Russia.
First, regarding Russia. It is relevant to mention that the country considers most of the
Arctic as being its own. It claims a very large part of the Arctic seabed on the grounds that it is
an extension of the Eurasian continent.19 However, as already mentioned, the commission said
that more research has to be done. One of the most important territorial dispute in the Arctic
lasted over 40 years and was solved in 2010 and regarded Norway and Russia. Both countries
claimed a territory as large as half the surface of Germany, situated in the North of the Kola
Peninsula (Russia) and the coast of Norway. The bilateral treaty divided the territory equally
between the two states.20 However, this does not settle the territorial claims of the Russian
Federation since it considers most of the Arctic as a “Soviet heritage.” Besides this, three main
disputes that still exist.
18
Jakobson, L. (2010). China prepares for an ice-free Arctic. SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, 2010(2).
BBC, 2015
Wang, R. A. N. (2014). Arctic Security-An Equation with Multiple Unknowns. Journal of Military and
Strategic Studies, 15(2).
19
20
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The Hans Island for example, is situated on a straight between Canada and Greenland.
When in 1973 Denmark and Canada negotiated their borders, disagreement arose around the
island because it is situated in a slight area not covered by the treaty. Denmark tried numerous
times to put Danish flags on the Island, provoking Canadian anger. In 2005, the former defense
minister of Canada stopped on the Island after a trip, triggering another diplomatic crisis. The
two countries have been working on splitting the Island in two, but this has not been successful.
The matter is still unsettled.21
Another territorial claim that has not been settled regards the Beaufort Sea, between
Canada and the United States. The problem here stems from the boundaries of the territorial
sea. The US position is that the maritime boundary should follow a path equidistant from the
coast of the two countries. Canada on the other hand, argues that it should follow the land
boundary. This dispute is relevant because the disputed area is a possible significant source of
hydrocarbon. There have been some diplomatic tensions following the US exploitation of some
of those sources. Since the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, the matter cannot be solved
in tribunal. As of now, the negotiations have been tense but peaceful. It is of vital importance
however, to avoid that any unsettled claim between NATO members become a security issue
since it would undermine the very existence of the alliance.22
A third dispute concerns the Lomonosov Ridge a 1800 km long submarine mountain that
divides the Arctic into two, passing through the Danish, Canadian and Russian territorial claims.
The Danish however, claims that the ridge is the natural extension of the Greenland shelf. The
states have called for the matter to be resolved under the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea.23
The main problem with possible territorial claims is that they are likely to increase in
the future, when more natural resources become available and states will seek their commercial
interest.
Island, A. H., Island, V., Island, E., Territories, N., & Iqaluit, N. (2014). Canadian Arctic Archipelago.
Antarctica and the Arctic Circle: A Geographic Encyclopedia of the Earth's Polar Regions [2 volumes], 163.
21
Baker, J. S., & Byers, M. (2012). Crossed lines: The curious case of the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary
dispute. Ocean Development & International Law, 43(1), 70-95.
22
BBC. (2014). Denmark challenges Russia and Canada over North Pole. Retrieved from:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30481309
23
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Natural Resources
One possible source of conflict among nations is the control of resources. As mentioned in the
introduction, the North Pole supposedly comprises around 30% of the world’s undiscovered
reserves of natural gas, and 13% of undiscovered reserves of oil. Canada was one of the first
countries to exploit (or at least tried to) the resources of the North Pole. It performed extensive
drilling during the 1970s and 1980s, although they quickly concluded that it was not costefficient.24 However, Greenland, the US, Russia and Norway are currently involved in
petroleum exploration projects, if those are successful, the extraction of resources in the Arctic
could have significant economic impacts on the country who owns them. This is why countries
such as China, who is not part of the Arctic Five, is interested in the region. Such states call for
a status similar to the one Antarctica has: res communis (i.e. common heritage, which resources
ought to be shared).25
Militarization
Having unsettled territorial claims is not a problem per se if resolved by peaceful means.
However, when this is coupled by an increase in the military presence.
The military strategic relevance of the North Pole began to be taken into account during
the Cold War. In October 1987, Gorbachev claimed: “The Arctic is not only the Arctic Ocean,
but also the northern tips of three continents: Europe, Asia and America. It is the place where
the Euroasian, North American and Asian Pacific regions meet, where the frontiers come close
to one another and the interests of states belonging to mutually opposed military blocs and
nonaligned ones cross.”26 With this speech, Gorbachev was actually auspicating cooperation in
this area, but it was far from being the case. In fact, during the Cold War, the Arctic became
Åtland, 2013
Jakobson, 2010
26 Milazzo, E. (2015). Prospects of Arctic governance: critical analysis of current trends and future scenarios.
p. 9
24
25
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one of the numerous places where both blocs tried to show their supremacy. However, what
made the Arctic even more strategically importance was its position, if a nuclear weapon was
to be launched from either one of the two superpowers, it would have almost certainly crossed
the Arctic. Control of the Arctic was hence seen as essential by both the Soviets and the US in
order to detect a nuclear attack. Because of this, both powers built numerous military bases in
the North Pole.27
The Cold War ended 25 years ago, however, this did not stop the Arctic nations from
continuing to increase their military capabilities in the region. For example, soon after Denmark
filed its claim to the UN commission, Russia reacted by placing a number of bombers in the
area. Those also entered the US airspace a couple of times, provoking further tensions. 28
Shipping routes
There are two main shipping routes through the Arctic. The first is called the “Northern Sea
Route” and is situated along Russia’s northern coast. Since it entails primarily Russian coastal
waters there has traditionally been little disputes concerning Russia’s control over the route.29
However, if tensions arise because of security issues, the route might be object of controversies.
The second route however, the Northwest Passage is more controversial. It is composed
of a variety of interconnected sea-routes that pass between the islands of the Canadian Arctic
Achipelago and already has been the subject of disputes between Canada and the US since
1969.30 We do not believe it will be subject to any significant security issues between the two
countries though, being that the US and Canada are both NATO members.
Young, O. R. (2005). Governing the Arctic: From cold war theater to mosaic of cooperation. Global
Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 11(1), 9-15.
28 Åtland, 2014
29 Rothwell, D. R. (2008). The Arctic in International Law: Time for a New Regime?. ANU College of Law
Research Paper, (08-37).
27
30
Ibid.
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Relevant bodies and treaties
UNCLOS
The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea was signed in 1982 and came into force
in 1994. It is a very comprehensive body of laws concerning the law of the seas and is now
regarded by many as embedding customary laws. It is extremely important in the case of the
Arctic since, as mentioned in the introduction, Art. 57 defines the Exclusive Economic Zone as
“up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.”31 This very article is the source of the overlapping territorial claims.
UN commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf
It was created in 1994, as a response to all the new territorial claims that the UNCLOS gave
rise to.32 Its role is to settle possible territorial disputes regarding EEZ. However, it has often
been criticised for being too slow.
Arctic Council
The Arctic council is currently the main body responsible for all issues in the region. It is
composed of 8 member states (the Arctic 5 and Finland, Iceland and Sweden), 12 permanent
observer states, 2 ad hoc observer states but also numerous non-governmental observers such
as the EU or the Red Cross Organization.33
UN General Assembly, Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, Art. 57: “The exclusive
economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured.”
31
UN division for Ocean Affairs and the law of the sea. (n.d.). Commission on the limits of the continental
sheld. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_purpose.htm#Purpose
33 Arctic Council. (n.d.). The Arctic council: a backgrounder. Retrieved from: http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us
32
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Iliussat declaration
The Iliussat decleration was signed in 2008 by the Arctic-Five. It points out the sovereignty of
each state in the North Pole and reaffirms their legal jurisdiction in the area. What makes it even
more important is that it accepts the UNCLOS as the legal framework for the area, hence, it is
the document to be used to resolve disputes. Lastly, it reaffirms that the area must be one of
cooperation among member states.34
NATO’s current role and possible roles
The main reason why NATO is/should be a stakeholder in the security situation of the Arctic is
the derived from the states themselves. Besides Russia, all the other Arctic states are NATO
members and the North Pole is the only region that borders European and Northern American
member states.35 The Russian Federation on the other hand, has been the very reason our
alliance came into place. Hence, the involvement of NATO is implied in any possible security
issue on the Arctic.
Inside NATO however, the involvement of the organization has been highly debated.
On the one side, countries such as Norway are pressing for more NATO intervention in order
to secure their interests in the region and slow Russia down. On the other hand, members such
as Canada see negatively an increased role of the alliance in the region, afraid that it could
trigger Russian aggressiveness.36
Besides meeting in 2011 to discuss its possible role,
inconclusively, up until now NATO did not really get involved on the continent; however,
Russia’s intervention in the Ukraine has changed many perceptions about the nature of the
The Arctic governance project. (n.d.). The Iliussat declaration. Retrieved from:
http://www.arcticgovernance.org/the-ilulissat-declaration.4872424.html
35 Stokes, J., Smith, J., Bensahel, N., & Barno, D. (2014). Charting the Course Directions for the New NATO
Secretary General. Center for a New American Security, 6.
34
Coffey, L. (2012). NATO in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities. The Heritage Foundation Issue Brief,
22.
36
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Russian Fed.’s intentions.37 Increasing NATO’s role in the area would mainly focus on ensuring
the protection of Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty: the principle of collective defence. 38
Increasing the importance of Arctic issues within the alliance would lead to structural
benefits. Firstly, because it would tie Northern American members more closely with the EU
members of the alliance, since the issues at stake regard the territorial security of both.39
Secondly, an increased NATO presence in the Arctic would allow members easier shipping
connections to Asia, the Arctic routes could be used instead of the traditional Suez Canal.
Some have suggested that it is not the role of NATO to intervene in the area, and call
for more action by the Arctic Council or bilateral agreements. However, the Arctic council
charter clearly mentions that “The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to
military security.”40 Hence, NATO seems to be best fitted and could institute an Arctic Security
Initiative to begin coordinating regional maritime security.
It is important to remember however, that the Arctic is a place where cooperation with
Russia is possible, the nations have pledged to solve their territorial disputes in a peaceful way.
The challenge for NATO therefore lies in making sure that its members are safe and could
benefit from the resources the North Pole has to offer while avoiding the increase of tensions
with the Russian Federation.
Conclusions and possible questions
The Arctic has always been a debated territory but in the past, no country assigned it great
political importance. Today however, the melting of the ice is making its resources more
available and hence, the Arctic as a whole became more interesting. The Arctic is highly
strategic, it is the place where Russia, America and Canada meet. No one in the past foresaw
37
Stokes, Smith, Bensahel, & Barno, 2014
ibid.
ibid.
40 Koivurova, T. (2010). Limits and possibilities of the Arctic Council in a rapidly changing scene of Arctic
governance. Polar Record, 46(02), 146-156. p.149
38
39
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that the ice would have melted one day, hence turning the Arctic into the place where NATO
members could increase their exchange of goods and communication.
So far, tensions have been controlled and the states have pledged to resolve their issues
diplomatically. However, both Russia and the United States still have important military
capabilities in the area and are actually increasing them, making possible tensions over
resources a security issue. Because all the stakeholders except for Russia, are NATO members,
the role of the alliance has been questioned. Some of the issues to be discussed at
EuroMUN2016 hence are:

Is the current militarization of the Arctic a real threat to international
security?

Should NATO intervene in the Arctic at all? Or should states decided to
give more importance to the Arctic council?

Should NATO have a role in regard to territorial settlements?

How could we avoid military tensions with Russia, and keep the Arctic an
area of cooperation?

Should NATO have a role concerning resources management?
References
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