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Behavior and Social Issues, Double Issue 1993, Volume 3, No. 1 and 2
PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL:
THE CASE OF THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT
Richard F. Rakos
Cleveland State University
ABSTRACT: This article presents a content analysis of the Bush Administration's public statements
reported in the New York Times in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The content
is categorized into several types of stimulus control operations, including establishing operations, stimulus
equivalence, rules, and discriminative stimuli. A heuristic model is developed to help explain how these
stimulus control operations produced public consensus for war despite the public's continuing reluctance
to endorse military actioil. Several implications of the behavioral perspective are briefly entertained.
A classic dictionary (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1961) defines
propaganda as "any organized or concerted group, effort, or movement to spread
particular doctrines, information, etc." (p. 676). One major avenue through which
propaganda is disseminated is through the news media. Communication scholars
have investigated the propaganda functions of the news media at least since
Lasswell's (1927) landmark study Propaganda Technique in the World War.
Currently, a prominent communication research strategy is to directly examine the
functional nature of media content by assessing the effects it produces (Shoemaker
& Reese, 1991). The functional approach that examines "the correlation of parts of
society in responding to the environment" is most closely associated with
"propaganda activity-that is, with the production of appropriate responses to
problems" through "purposive communication that attempts to persuade" (Shoemaker
& Reese, 1991 p. 24-25). The problems alluded to are identified through news
content that raises awareness of the pressing concerns and dangers present in the
world (cf., Wright, 1986).
Shoemaker and Reese (1991) contend that the functional approach to content
analysis is compatible with the "behavioristic tradition," which "examine(s) the
effects external to and created by the message" (p. 28). They note that many
behavioral analyses stress quantification "in keeping with behavioral
stimulus-response psychology; that is, the more frequently a given stimulus is found,
the more potent is its presumed effect" (p. 28). But Shoemaker and Reese. also
recognize that behavioral analyses are not always quantitative since other forms of
emphasis besides simple repetition may be used. In the next section, I sketch the
parameters of such a nonquantitative behavior analysis.
AUTHOR'S NOTE:
This article is based on a paper presented at the Association for Behavior Analysis, San Francisco, May
1992. Address all correspondence to: Richard F. Rakos, Department of Psychology, Cleveland State
University, Cleveland, OH 44115.
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Propaganda: A Behavior Analytic Heuristic
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The concept of propaganda emphasizes function rather than content-and in
doing so, comports nicely with the behavior analytic approach to the understanding
of behavior.
From the behavioral perspective, "spread(ing) particular doctrines" describes
those stimuli that are intended to prompt the emission of target operant responses of
the many people who comprise the citizenry. These antecedent stimuli-the learned
and unlearned cues that alter the likelihood of performance of target
responses-constitute the content of propaganda.
Four types of antecedent stimuli are employed in the present study of
propaganda. An establishing operation (EO) alters an organism's motivation, and
thereby changes the effectiveness of reinforcing and discriminative stimuli in
controlling behavior (Malott, Whaley, & Malott, 1993; Michael, 1982, 1993 ). A
rule is a verbal stimulus that specifies or describes a behavioral contingency (Malott
et al., 1993; Schlinger, 1993). The impact of rules on behavior is somewhat
controversial: Some contend that they are basically discriminative stimuli (Cerutti,
1989; Skinner, 1969) while others assert that they are function-altering stimuli
(Schlinger, 1993) or perhaps establishing operations (Malott et al., 1993). A symbol
is a stimulus formed through stimulus equivalence operations; the key notion here is
that learned responses come under the control of stimuli that have not been directly
associated with reinforcement. In symmetrical relations, "the trained discrimination
'given A1, pick B1' leads to the derived discrimination 'given B1, pick A1 "' (Hayes
& Hayes, 1989, p. 163). In a transitive relation, "after the discriminations 'given
A1, pick B1' and 'given B1, pick C1' have been taught, 'given A1, pick C1'
emerges without additional training" (Hayes & Hayes, 1989, p. 163). Finally, a
discriminative stimulus (S 0 ) is a learned cue that evokes a response because that
response has been reinforced in the presence, but not the absence, of the stimulus
(Michael, 1980); in other words, the operation of a specific behavioral contingency
is more probable in the presence of an S0 (Malott, 1989).
How do these four stimulus operations combine when the stimulus function
is propaganda? The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 allows us to
generate a heuristic model to describe the influence of antecedent stimulus control on
the target responses of the "U.S. citizen" and perhaps also of the "U.S. congress
person."
To the Bush administration, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait threatened the
United States' economic· interests, especially in regard to its the supply of oil.
Shortly after the invasion, on August 15, Bush asserted that "our own freedom and
the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if all the world's
great oil reserves fell into the hands of that one man, Saddam Hussein" (Extra,
1991). The administration, therefore, desired an immediate, strong response to Iraq.
But to most Americans, the Iraqi invasion was a relatively weak "natural"
establishing operation that would not motivate them to forcefully oppose Iraq nor
defend Kuwait. Its weakness likely derived from Americans' appreciation of the
broader context of the relevant geopolitical relations: Iraq was somewhat of a U.S.
ally (e.g., in the Iraq-Iran war) and Kuwait was justly perceived as an unfriendly,
36
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PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
undemocratic, and sexist nation (MacArthur, 1992). Thus, the Iraqi invasion by
itself provided insufficient stimulus control to prompt Americans to emit the anti-Iraq
behavior that would provide the popular support upon which the Administration
could base an aggressive response. The Administration was forced into being the
"concerted group" that "spread particular doctrines, information, etc." As
MacArthur (1992) described it, "In August 1990, the Bush Administration's task was
to sell two images-an ugly one of Hussein and a handsome one of Kuwait-to the
American media. Then, God willing, the media would help sell it to the American
people" (pg. 43).
In fact, the Bush Administration had the willing media accomplice: The
mainstream press primarily reported pro-Administration perspectives and ignored its
critics (MacArthur, 1992; Parenti, 1993). "Lacking critical information and
argument to the contrary, the public rallied around the troops and treated the war as
a just undertaking" (Parenti, 1993, pg. 71).
Thus, the Administration engineered public support for war first, by
restricting information, and second, through intense public relations efforts that
promoted specific images of both Iraq and Kuwait. These concurrently enacted
operations-the restriction of information and the development and dissemination of
dogma-comprise the antecedent stimulus control commonly termed "propaganda."
Though both components are necessarily involved in propaganda stimulus control,
it is the manufacture of information that is more complex and interesting from the
behavior analytic perspective. It is in the use of information that the operation of the
four categories of stimulus control can be identified and their impact on behavior
assessed.
The behavioral model or heuristic describing the propaganda targeting Iraq
is presented in Figure 1 and described in some detail below. The Bush
Administration nurtured establishing operations (EOs) that would motivate citizens
to oppose Iraq's action; these included the deliberate use of stimulus equivalence
operations to develop symbols. We can summarize these cues as: "Iraq and Hussein
are very bad and a threat to our way of life." Simultaneously, the administration
asserted rules that specified the alleged contingencies: "Unprovoked aggression by
the malevolent must be stopped by the righteous (i.e., the U.S.) or it will be
rewarded and encouraged." These antecedent stimuli were intended to evoke specific
verbal responses by the "U.S. citizen" that "something" had to be done. These
verbal behaviors (response 1 in figure 1), which are termed "patriotic solidarity,"
were reinforced by peer social approval and by verbal self-statements that
acknowledged that "acceptable things were being done" by the Administration.
Acceptable "things" (s•+) included diplomatic efforts, the prompting of United
Nations action, coalition formation, and various penalties (e.g., sanctions, boycotts,
embargoes).
On the other hand, throughout the first months of the Iraqi occupation, the
American public's reluctance to endorse massive troop deployment and hasty military
fighting (see below) suggests these outcomes were "unacceptable actions" (S•"). As
S0 s in the chain, these latter, aversive possibilities were problematic from the
Administration's point of view: they prompted verbal behavior from the "U.S.
citizen" that was incompatible with Administration efforts to garner popular support
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Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and U.S. propaganda
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EO---> RULE CUES---> RESPONSE 1--- > SRI
(S")--- > RESPONSE 2--- > S"'
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Notes:
EO (Establishing Operation): IRAQ IS VERY BAD AND A DANGER TO OUR WAY OF
LIFE
RULE CUES: UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION MUST BE STOPPED BY THE RIGHTEOUS
u.s.
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RESPONSE 1: VERBAL AGREEMENT BY U.S. CITIZENS AND CONGRESS TO
"DO SOMETHING": "PATRIOTIC SOLIDARITY"
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SOCIAL REINFORCEMENT AMONG PEERS; VERBAL SELF-STATEMENTS
ACKNOWLEDGING THAT "ACCEPTABLE THINGS ARE BEING DONE"
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ACCEPTABLE THINGS (s••):
* DIPWMATIC EFFORTS
*PROMPTING U.N. ACTION
*COALITION FORMATION
* SANCTIONS/BOYCOTT/EMBARGO
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UNACCEPTABLE THINGS (S•·):
* TROOP DEPLOYMENT
*MILITARY FIGHTING
gn (AVERSIVE): TROOP DEPLOYMENT AND MILITARY ACTION
*PRESENTED WITHIN GRADED STIMULUS HIERARCHY (INITIALLY
BELOW THRESHOLD LEVEL NECESSARY TO PROMPT
AVOIDANCE OR NONCOMPLIANT RESPONSE)
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* PRESENTED W!Tll POSITIVE STIMULI
* OPERATION: COUNTERCONDITIONING
HABITUATION TO INCREASINGLY AVERSIVE
STIMULI; NO AVOIDANCE (APPROACH MAINTAINED); S"
BECOMES NEUTRAL OR POSITIVE
RESPONSE 2: COGNITIVE, VERBAL, AND OVERT BEHAVIORS THAT "ACCEPT"
INCREASED MILITARY ACTIONS: "PATRIOTIC STOICISM"
SR2:
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SOCIAL REINFORCEMENT; SELF-REINFORCEMENT VIA
SELF-STATEMENTS
Figure 1. The behavioral chain of the "U.S. citizen": A heuristic.
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PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
I
for active military intervention.
Therefore, in the five months after the Iraqi invasion, these aversive stimuli
(i.e., troop deployment, military action) were presented through the media to the
public within a graded stimulus hierarchy. Initially, the aversive stimuli were
introduced at a low level-below the threshold necessary to prompt avoidance or
noncompliant responses. In addition, the aversive stimuli were paired with positive
stimuli such as sanctions and embargoes, diplomatic efforts, alliance building both
within the U.N. and independently, and foreign and U.S. diplomatic efforts. This
operation continued by pairing increasingly aversive stimuli with the positive ones
as habituation to the previous level of aversiveness occurred. Under these
conditions, avoidance responses and noncompliant responses were virtually
nonexistent and approach responses maintained by the American public and
Congress. The aversive S0 s became neutral or even positively valenced as
counterconditioning proceeded. Thus, the newly conditioned S0 s now prompted
cognitive, verbal, and motoric behaviors that "accepted" increased military actions
(response 2 in figure 1), as "patriotic stoicism" blossomed on top of the "patriotic
solidarity" already established. The final SR2 was positive social reinforcement and
self-reinforcement, setting the stage for overt military action on January 16, 1991.
The media presentation of Bush administration statements and actions
provided the means for the stimulus control to develop and exert its influence. This
will be demonstrated in the content analysis presented below, which employs the
correlation function strategy (cf., Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). Rather than
quantification, the temporal relationship between media messages and subsequent
relevant citizen responses is delineated.
METHOD
Source
The New York Times, commonly considered the U.S.'s "newspaper of
record" (cf. MacArthur, 1992) was selected as the source of propaganda for the
study. Parenti (1993) considers the Times, along with the Washington Post, to be
the two most influential American papers, because they and their respective news
services provide information to both the public and to other news media as well. ·
Parenti (1993) includes the three major networks (the Columbia Broadcasting
System, the American Broadcasting Company, and the National Broadcasting
Company) among the most influential media. However, this content analysis is
limited to the print media, represented by the Times.
Procedure
Every New York Times between August 1, 1990 and January 17, 1991 was
reviewed for content pertaining to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. All content
concerning Bush administration statements and actions relevant to Iraq or Hussein
were considered for inclusion, as were statements by Iraqi leaders and actions by
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Iraq. Content describing domestic reaction (i.e., the public, Congress, military
leaders) was also included. Content related directly to Kuwait alone or to the
development of the international alliance against Iraq, such as negotiations and
meetings, was. excluded.
The relevant content was then categorized into one of four types of stimulus
control: stimulus equivalence (symbolism), establishing operations, rules, and
discriminative stimuli. Additionally, the discriminative stimuli were temporally
correlated with public, congressional, and military leader reactions in an effort to
demonstrate the operation of the counterconditioning process.
RESULTS
P.
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The content analysis is organized by stimulus operation. For each operation,
the date the categorized items were reported in the New York Times and brief
descriptions of the news items are presented first. Following the brief synopsis,
extensive quotes or additional context is provided for content items preceded by a
star (*). In both the brief synopsis and in the additional context sections, content
items that contradict Bush Administration assertions are placed within brackets ([ ]).
Establishing Operations
As discussed earlier, .the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by itself was a weak
establishing operation; in other words, the invasion alone did not alter the
effectiveness of the discriminative and reinforcing stimuli and hence did not impact
on the probability of 1he target response (i.e. "patriotic solidarity"). The Bush
administration used the media to develop Iraq as a potent establishing operation
through at least six distinct avenues: (1) symbolism (stimulus equivalence), (2) Iraqi
"threats" beyond the initial aggression, (3) Iraqi hostage-taking, (4) Iraqi arrogance,
(5) Iraqi human rights violations, and (6) Iraqi treachery.
Symbolism (Stimulus Equivalence)
Symmetry
BUSH = CHAMBERLAIN
.
*AUG 05, 1990-' HADASHOT (ISRAELI DAILY)
Aug 5: Hadashot: "Bush, until now [referring to decision to send troops to
Saudi Arabia] at least, resembles Chamberlain in his capitulation to Hitler." [While
not a Bush administration statement about Iraq, inclusion seemed justified as
background context, i.e. a possible EO for Bush's response to Iraq].
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PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
Transitive
HUSSEIN = UNSPEAKABLE EVIL
*AUG 16,
*AUG 21,
*OCT 02,
*OCT 16,
*OCT 17,
*OCT 24,
A=B: HUSSEIN = HITLER
(NEW MATCH)
B=C: HITLER =UNSPEAKABLE EVIL
(OLD MATCH)
A=C: HUSSEIN= UNSPEAKABLE EVIL
(NEWRELATION)
199019901990 19901990 1990 -
BUSH
BUSH
BUSH
BUSH
BAKER (Secretary of State)
BUSH
Aug 16: Bush: "A half century ago our nation and the world paid dearly
for appeasing an aggressor who should, and could, have been stopped. We are not
going to make the same mistake again."
Aug 21: Bush: "Half a century ago, the world had a chance to stop a
ruthless aggressor and missed it. And I pledge to you, we will not make that mistake
again. Together-for you see, together we can successfully oppose tyranny and help
those nations who look to us for leadership and vision."
T""~'
Oct 2: Bush: Speech at U.N.: refers to Hussein as "the dictator."
Oct 16: Bush [commenting on reported Iraqi atrocities]: "Hitler revisited.
But remember, when Hitler's war ended, there were the Nuremberg trials."
Oct. 17: Baker: "We made this mistake in the thirties. We did not stand
up in opposition to unprovoked aggression. And we remember what happened in
Europe when we refused to take a principled stand."
Oct 24: Bush: "I'm reading a great book, and it's a book of history, a
great, big thick history about World War II and there's a parallel between what
Hitler did to Poland and what Saddam Hussein has done to Kuwait."
N.Y. Times reports that Bush "once again compared" Hussein to
Hitler.
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Iraqi "Threats" Beyond Initial Aggression
Troop Strength and Troop Movements
AUG 04:
*AUG 08:
*AUG 11:
SEPT 24:
*NOV 20:
*DEC 14:
IRAQI TROOPS MASS ON SAUDI ARABIA BORDER
FITZWATER (White House spokesperson): IMMINENT
THREAT TO SAUDI ARABIA
IRAQI ARMY ESTIMATED AT 1,000,000, "4TH
LARGEST"
IRAQ THREATENS ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA
IRAQ TO SEND 250,000 MORE TROOPS TO BORDER
AREA
IRAQ'S "MASSIVE MILITARY MACHINE"
Aug 8: Fitzwater: "There have been changes of a sort that cause us to
believe there is a growing and continuous threat to Saudi Arabia."
Aug 11: But only 400,000-500,000 are "first line" troops.
Nov 20: Iraq sends 250,000 additional troops to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Dec 14: US announces sanctions to remain even if Iraq withdraws due to
fear of Iraq's "massive military machine."
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Iraq's Unconventional Weapons
•I;.:
Chemical.
AUG 08:
*AUG 09:
SEPT 25:
OCT 08:
*NOV23:
DEC 27:
SAUDIS FEAR USE
"TO BAGDAD, POISON GAS IS 'POOR MAN'S
A-BOMB'"
IRAQ PREPARING DECONTAMINATION SITES
ISRAELIS RECEIVE GAS MASKS
BUSH TALKS TO TROOPS IN DESERT
PENTAGON WARNS OF LIKELY USE AGAINST U.S.
"I
Aug 9: N. Y. Times headline.
Nov 23: Bush to troops: "A dictator who has gassed his own people,
innocent women and children, unleashing chemical weapons of mass destruction,
weapons that were considered unthinkable in the civilized world for over 70 years."
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PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
Nuclear.
*NOV 18:
*NOV 23:
*NOV 25:
[*NOV 28:
[*NOV 30:
*DEC 23:
IRAQ COULD HAVB BOMB WITHIN 10 YEARS
BUSH TO TROOPS IN DESERT
CHENEY, SCOWCROFT RAISE CONCERNS
International Atomic Energy Agency: IRAQ NOT
DIVERTING NUCLEAR FUEL]
U.S. INTELLIGENCE LACIGNG ("MUSH")]
"IRAQ'S NUCLEAR QUEST: TENTACLES IN FOUR
CONTINENTS"-N.Y. TIMES HEADLINE
Nov 18: NY Times reports that U.S., British, and Israeli intelligence believe
Iraq could have nuclear weapons within 10 years. Consequently, Iraqi threats must
be taken more seriously.
Nov 23: Bush to troops: "And let me say this, those who would measure
Saddam Hussein's, those who would measure the timetable for Saddam's atomic
program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of the situation and the
gravity of the threat. Every day that passes brings Saddam one step closer to
realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal. And that's why, more and more,
your mission is marked by a real sense of urgency. You koow, no one koows
precisely when this dictator may acquire atomic weapons, or exactly who they may
be aimed at down the road. But we do koow this for sure: He has never possessed
a weapon he didn't use."
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Nov 25: Cheney (Secretary of Defense): "A (crude atomic) weapon might
be developed (by Iraq) in a year or less."
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Scowcroft (National Security Advisor): Waiting for sanctions to work
"raises the possibility that we could face an Iraq armed with nuclear weapons, which
would change the character of any conflict."
[Nov 28: International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iraq's stock of
nuclear fuel has not been diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.]
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[Nov 30: N.Y. Times analysis: Bush's recent remarks were based on a
secret report of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. Government
officials who have read the report noted it is full of caveats and qualifications omitted
by Administration public statements. "The estimate is said to be based on the
assumption that Iraq will mount a crash program to build a bomb, that it will use its
only koown stocks of enriched uranium, which were inspected by international
officials last week and deemed intact, and that Iraq possesses advanced bomb-making
technology. Even then, the estimate concludes, the bomb would be low-yield, too
bulky to deliver by missile or even by aircraft, and might not detonate."]
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Dec. 23: Despite the Nov. 30 analysis, the Times offered this inflammatory
headline and asserted that Iraq could produce nuclear weapons within the decade.
Biological. ·
DEC 28:
DEC 29:
JAN 06:
CIA REPORTS IRAQI POSSESSION; GI'S
VACCINATED
BRITAIN TO VACCINATE ITS TROOPS
ARMY READY FOR "GERM WARFARE"
Iraq Takes Hostages
*AUG 19:
AUG24:
[*AUG 30:
*SEPT 04:
*OCT 19:
IRAQ DETAINS CIVILIANS AS "HUMAN SHIELDS"
HUSSEIN SHOWS HOSTAGES ON TV
TV CRITIC REVIEWS THE SHOW]
HOSTAGE RELEASE DELAYED (NO LANDING
RIGHTS)
U.S. EMBASSY SHREDS PAPER IN FEAR
Aug 19: Iraq declares blockade an "act of war" and takes hostages.
•
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Aug 30: N. Y. Times TV critic: "All one could think of as he [Hussein]
spoke for half an hour was how the children were feeling. They were so still. Were
they frightened by the big man with the big moustache and his escort of officers?
Melodrama bulks so large on television that even reality conforms to its rules. It was
enough to blow the cool of some correspondents."
Sept 4: Iraq refuses to grant foreign airlines landing rights in Iraq, thus
delaying any hostage release.
Oct 19: U.S. Embassy shreds papers, lacking confidence that Iraq will
observe diplomatic protocol "forever."
Iraqi Arrogance
*AUG 09:
*AUG 26:
*OCT 04:
OCT 10:
*NOV 20:
*NOV 28:
HUSSEIN DECLARES KUWAIT ANNEXED
OUTRIGHT
AT U.N.: IRAQ WILL "BURN ALL"
HUSSEIN: "BUSH CAN'T DO WHAT HE SAYS."
HUSSEIN THREATENS ISRAEL
INCREASED TROOPS: "IRAQI SUPERIORITY"
AT U.N.: IRAQ "WILL NEVER SUCCUMB TO
PRESSURE"
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PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
NOV 30:
JAN 07:
JAN 10:
JAN 11:
JAN 12:
HUSSEIN DEFIES U.N. RESOLUTION
AUTHORIZING
FORCE AGAINST IRAQ
HUSSEIN: IRAQ PREPARED FOR WAR TO KEEP
KUWAIT
HUSSEIN: U.S. FORCES WILL "SWIM IN THEIR
OWN BLOOD"
AZIZ (Iraqi Foreign Minister) REFUSES BUSH'S
LETTER TO HUSSEIN
HUSSEIN: PREPARE FOR "HOLY WAR"
Aug 9: Iraq declares "merger" in response to U.S. troop deployment.
Aug 26: Iraqi delegate to the U.N., after the Security Council adopted a
resolution permitting the use of force to effect the blockade: The "use of force ... will
lead inevitably to a number of explosions which will burn all in their path."
Oct 4: Hussein visits his troops in Kuwait: "Bush can't do what he says."
Nov 20: Hussein sends 250,000 new troops to Kuwait and Southern Iraq,
providing "Iraqi superiority" that he says can't be matched.
Nov 28: Iraqi Foreign Minister, in response to U.N. draft of resolution
offering Iraq "one final opportunity" to pull out by mid-January: Iraq "will never
succumb to pressure."
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Iraqi Human Rights Violations
*OCT 17:
*OCT 23:
*OCT 27:
*OCT 30:
*OCT 31:
*NOV 01:
*NOV 02:
*DEC 02:
[*DEC 16:
FLEEING KUWAITIS REPORT ATROCITIES AND
EXECUTIONS
BUSH: "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY"
U.S. WARNS OF TERRORIST ATTACK ON
PASSENGER SHIP
BUSH AND BAKER RECOUNT ATROCITIES
U.S. AND BRITISH HOSTAGES REPORTED TO
SUFFER MOST
BUSH: HOSTAGES AT AMERICAN EMBASSY
"STARVED"
BUSH: HUSSEIN "BRUTAL DICTATOR", WORSE
THAN HITLER
REFUGEES PROVIDE ADDITIONAL REPORTS OF
TERROR
N.Y. TIMES: ESTIMATES OF VIOLATIONS LOWER
FROM HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS]
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[*DEC 20:
Oct 17:
consistent.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ISSUED:
VIOLATIONS LOWER]
Reports of terror by fleeing Kuwaitis are unconfirmed but
Oct 24: Bush: Iraqi army committing "crimes against humanity" and "there
can never be any compromise, any compromise, with this kind of aggression."
Oct 27: N.Y. Times reports U.S. warning that is "most direct and detailed"
to date.
Oct 30: Bush: Siege on foreign embassies "unconscionable and inhumane."
Baker: "It is a story of barbarism in its most crude and evil form,
the rape of Kuwait. Many of the reports seem unbelievable." He cited examples:
An Iraqi soldier shot two sick children, '"curing them' in his words"; "Iraqi soldiers
released the lions and tigers [at the Kuwait Zoo], and then tried to shoot them for
target practice. Their efforts, however, were not entirely successful. A lion escaped
and mauled a young Kuwaiti girl."
Oct 31: French hostages w4o were released reported that U.S. and British
hostages suffered most, serving as "human shields" at army plants.
Nov 1: Bush: U.S. Embassy officials are being "starved" by Hussein and
mistreated in other ways. "I have had it with that kind of treatment of Americans."
Nov 2: Bush: "The brutal dictator" is worse than Hitler in terms of using
hostages as human shields. Asked how Hussein could be worse than the man
responsible for the Holocaust, Bush said: "I didn't say the Holocaust. I mean that
is outrageous. But I think brutalizing young kids in a square in Kuwait is outrageous
too. I was told that Hitler did not stake people out against potential military targets
and that he did, indeed respect-not much else, but he did indeed respect the
legitimacy of the embassies. So we've got some differences there."
[Dec 16: According to Middle East Watch and Amnesty International, Iraq
has committed violations of human rights but they are much less than reported in the
press. The director of Middle East Watch said: "We deplore and would never want
to minimize the grave human rights abuses taking place in Kuwait. But neither do
we wish to see them overstated or exaggerated in an exercise to whip up war fever."
An interviewer who conducted hundreds of interviews in compiling the report
concluded: "We simply cannot find persuasive evidence of the thousands of deaths
and mass rapes and many of the other abuses that have been reported in the press."
The human rights groups confirmed 250 deaths rather than the thousands alleged.]
46
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I ' :1
i
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PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
[Dec 20: Amnesty International official report confirmed torture and abuses
but deaths were in the hundreds not the thousands as reported.]
I
I
I
Iraqi Treachery
i
*AUG 5:
*AUG 12:
*OCT 08:
OCT 17:
[OCT 22:
[OCT 23:
*OCT 24:
*NOV 02:
NOV 16:
NOV 27:
*DEC 7:
DEC 18:
*DEC 19:
DEC 27:
JAN 05:
j
N.Y.TIMES: HUSSEIN: "ARABOFVAST
AMBITION"
U.S. VITAL INTERESTS IN GULF
IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WOULD LEAVE HUSSEIN AS
THREAT
IRAQI COMPROMISE OVERTURE REJECTED BY
u.s.
SAUDIS HINT AT COMPROMISE]
HUSSEIN DISCUSSES HOSTAGE RELEASE]
BUSH: "MORE DETERMINED THAN EVER"
BUSH REFUSES TO CLOSE EMBASSY TO AVOID
CONFLICT
REJECTION OF HUSSEIN OFFER TO NEGOTIATE
U.S.: IRAQ'S GOAL HIGH U.S. CASUALTIES IN
LOSING EFFORT
BUSH LUKEWARM TO FREEING OF ALL
HOSTAGES
BAKER FEARS "PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL PLOY"
U.S.: PARTIAL PULLOUT A "NIGHTMARE
SCENARIO"
PENTAGON: IRAQ LIKELY TO ATTACK ISRAEL
BUSH: GENEVA MEETING ONLY TO "INFORM"
IRAQ OF CONDITIONS
Aug 5: N.Y. Times analysis:
dominate his [Arab] world. "
"The Iraqi sees himself as destined to
Aug 12: N.Y. Times reports that U.S. has vital interest in the region:
money, oil prices, control of oil, friendly nations, border integrity.
Oct 8: Iraqi unconditional withdrawal and call for free elections in Kuwait
"would leave Saddam Hussein with his army and · his nuclear and biological
capabilities as well as his chemical arsenal intact" (anonymous foreign diplomat,
echoed by Administration officials).
Oct 24: Bush: "I am more determined than ever to see that this invading
dictator gets out of Kuwait with no compromise of any kind whatsoever."
·
Nov 2: Bush refuses to close the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait on principle,
though keeping it open increases the likelihood of armed conflict.
47
.,
i I,
:I
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:.I
ll"
II! ·.
'
RAKOS
Dec 7: Bush welcomed Hussein's announcement that all hostages would be
freed, but insisted that Iraq must withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait.
Dec 19: "We can't let him [Hussein] maneuver us into a position where the
stakes seem too petty to fight over, which is what he seems determined to do,"
according to a senior intelligence official. A pledge by Hussein to vacate all but a
fraction of Kuwait and/or withdraw after the U.N. deadline would "complicate our
position enormously." It would be "the nightmare scenario facing us" in the words
of a second official.
Ru1es (Contingency-specifying Stimuli)
The Bush Administration introduced several rules that specified the
contingencies to be invoked by the U.S. in response to the Iraqi invasion. The two
primary rules declared that "Iraq must be punished" and that "the U.S. must
prevail." These rules were asserted as inflexible and nonnegotiable dicta. Their
function in the propaganda etfort was to prompt the emission by the public of the
"patriotic solidarity" responses.
Iraq's Actions Are Bad and Iraq Must Be Stopped/Punished
Unprovoked Aggression Must Be Stopped
*AUG06:
*AUG 09:
*AUG 16:
*AUG 21:
*SEPT 05:
*SEPT 12:
*OCT 18:
[*OCT 21:
*OCT 24:
BUSH
BUSH
BUSH
BUSH
BAKER
BUSH
BAKER
DOLE: CONFLICT ABOUT OIL]
BUSH
Aug 6: Bush at news conference: "Iraq, having committed brutal, naked
aggression must get out" of Kuwait ... "The vicious aggression against
Kuwait. .. speaks for itself... these are qutlaws-international outlaws and renegades."
Aug 9: Bush: "A line has been drawn in the sand."
Aug 16: Bush: Iraqi aggression threatens "our way of life."
Aug 21: Bush: "Iraq's invasion ... was a ruthless assault on the very essence
of international order and civilized ideals."
48
.,
i ij
PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
Sept 5: Baker to House Foreign Affairs Committee: "(W)e face a simple
choice. Do we want to live in a world where aggression is made less likely because
it is met with a powerful response ... a world where civilized rules of conduct apply?
Or are we· willing to live in a world where aggression can go unchecked, where
aggression succeeds because we somehow cannot muster the collective will to
challenge it? ... (W)e must seize the opportunity to solidify the ground rules of the
new order ... we must show that intimidation and force are not successful ways of
doing business ... anywhere ... "
Sept 12: Bush to Congress: Hussein "is literally trying to wipe a country
off the face of the earth."
Oct 18: Baker: "If we were willing to go for that [compromise], we would
be permitting an aggressor to profit from his aggression ... We are indeed unwilling
to participate in a search for a partial solution."
·
[Oct 21: N.Y. Times reported Senator Dole contradicted the rule one week
earlier when he said: "America is in the Gulf for one reason only-O-I-L-and that
is not something parents are anxious for their sons and daughters to die for."]
Oct 24: Bush: "What happens in Bagdad matters in Burlington, because our
concern, far beyond the price of oil, is the fate of sovereign nations. There's a
moral underpinning, a strong moral underpinning to what's happened in the United
Nations as we've stood up unanimously against Saddam Hussein's aggression-a
world order, free from unlawful aggression, free from violence, free from plunder."
Bush: "It isn't oil that we're concerned about, it is aggression, and
this aggression is not going to stand."
Taking Hostages Must Be Opposed
*AUG 19:
*AUG 21:
*SEPT 12:
*NOV 02:
BUSH
BUSH
BUSH
BUSH
Aug 19: Bush: Taking hostages "totally unacceptable (and) contrary to
international law and indeed to all accepted norms of international conduct."
Aug 21: Bush: "And now, in a further offense against all norms of
international behavior, Iraq has imposed restrictions on innocent civilians from many
countries. This is unacceptable."
Sept 12: Bush to Congress: "America and the world will not be blackmailed
by this ruthless policy."
49
. !
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:IIil
iii
RAKOS
I
Nov 2: Bush: "The Embassy should remain open because I don't believe
a dictator should violate international law by starving out or isolating another
person's embassy. I think there's a fundamental principle in that."
The U.S. Is Good/Right and Must Get Its Way
*AUG
*AUG
*AUG
*SEPT
21:
21:
21:
07:
BUSH
BUSH
BUSH
BUSH
Aug 21: Bush to Veterans of Foreign Wars convention: "We're engaged
in a cause larger than ourselves ... (quoting General Eisenhower addressing Allied
forces) 'The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with
you ... Let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble
undertaking' . "
Aug 21: Bush at political fund-raiser: "I took this action, not out of some
national hunger for conflict, but out of the moral responsibility, shared by so many
committed nations around the world, to protect our world from fundamental evil."
,.
:;
: ,,
Aug 21: Bush: "America will not be intimidated ... America stands where
it always has, against aggression, against those who would use force to replace the
rule of law."
; ,i
Sept 7: Bush: "Our cause may not be easy but it will always be right."
Discriminative Stimuli
I
·'
The introduction of establishing operations and rules combined to produce
the responses from the populace that have been termed "patriotic solidarity" -the
verbal agreement "to do something." These verbal statements were socially
reinforced (SR 1) by other statements that described the "acceptable" initiatives of the
Bush administration: the diplomatic efforts, the prompting of United Nations action,
the coalition formation, and· the imposition of economic punishments (sanctions,
boycotts, embargoes). "Patriotic solfdarity" verbalizations at this point did not
produce verbalizations that endorsed massive troop deployment and actual military
fighting. These initiatives were "unacceptable" to the public and constituted aversive
stimuli.
Nevertheless, the Bush Administration employed a mechanismcounterconditioning-to introduce these aversive stimuli into the behavior chain and
maintain the compliant behavior of the public.
In terms of the behavior chain depicted in Figure 1, SRI reinforced Response
1 ("patriotic solidarity") and also functioned as a discriminative stimulus (S0 ) for
Response 2 ("patriotic stoicism"). The Bush Administration was able to maintain
50
1,"t',"'
PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
"patriotic solidarity" (Response 1) and prompt "patriotic stoicism" (Response 2) by
using the acceptable initiatives as the combination reinforcing-discriminative stimuli
and then pair those positive stimuli with the unacceptable aversive initiatives. These
noxious S0 s were introduced on a graded stimulus hierarchy: The early stimuli were
presented in weakened versions that were below the threshold level necessary to
prompt avoidance or noncompliant behavior. Because these weakened aversive
stimuli were paired with the positive ones (diplomacy, alliance building, economic
consequences, etc.) the process corresponds to that of counterconditioning: the
organism habituates to increasingly intense aversive stimuli while maintaining
approach behavior. The aversive S0 becomes a neutral or even positive stimulus.
In the present heuristic, Response 2 encompasses those cognitive, verbal, and overt
behaviors that "accept" increased military actions-what I have above termed
"patriotic stoicism."
In the next section, the operation of this counterconditioning process will be
illustrated by presenting, first, the Bush Administration pronouncements that form
the basis for the citizens' S0 s, and second, the indices of the popular response
(Response 2). Over the course of the 5 1/2 months, though the S0 s become
increasingly noxious, the "approach" responses of the populace are maintained with
only sporadic evidence of incompatible avoidance or noncompliant responses (e.g.,
see mid-November below). In fact, most of the very limited noncompliant behavior
was emitted in December 1990 by current and former public officials-rather than
by the public.
Counterconditioning Noxious sns
Graded Stimulus Hierarchy:
Noxious Discriminative Stimuli
Public Response (Response 2)
August 1990
*AUG 04: VERBAL INDICANT: MILITARY
INTERVENTION (MI)
*AUG 09: U.S. MAY SEND 50,000 TROOPS *AUG 09: "CAUTIOUS SUPPORT"
76% YES TO EMBARGO
66% YES TO TROOPS
40% TROOPS TOO SOON
48% DIPLOMACY FAILED
*AUG 11: TROOP ESTIMATE 100,000
*AUG 14: POSSIBLE CALL-UP OF
SOME RESERVISTS
*AUG 18: BUSH APPROVES RESERVE CALL-UP
AUG 19: LARGEST FORCE SINCE VIETNAM
"FEW PROTEST
*AUG 21:
BUSH'S BIG STICK"
51
•
!I.''I,,
RAKOS
*AUG 22: 40,000 RESERVISTS
CALLED UP
I
I
Aug 4: "Top American officials indicated that military intervention of some
kind was rising rapidly to the top of the list of options." U.S. to ask U.N. to
boycott Iraq.
~
I
Aug 9: U.S. may send 50,000 troops to Gulf.
I
I
N.Y. Times headline:
support."
II .
I
I
I:. I
Ji'i
'.·..
1
Aug 11: N.Y. Times headline: "In just 2 days, a doubling of U.S. troop
Aug 14: Reservists may be called up-tens of thousands but not full call up
of 200,000.
·~ i i
I. ,
I
"Around U.S., a cautious chorus of
estimate."
li
I
BUSH POPULARITY
SOARS: 77% YES
TO TROOPS TO
SAUDI ARABIA
*AUG 25: MILITARY RECOMMENDS ALL-OUT
RESPONSE TO AN IRAQI ATTACK
ON SAUDI ARABIA.
I
I
AUG 22:
Aug 18: N.Y. Times: The Administration is "reluctant to disclose the full
extent of its military commitment" ... 20,000-plus in Saudi Arabia, 35,000 on 59 ships
in Gulf, 45,000 marines on the way.
Aug 21: Support is evident from the left and the right as long as any action
is defensive and of relatively short duration.
Aug 22: 40,000 reservists may not be the limit.
I
Aug 25: Top military commanders recommend all-out response if Iraq
invades Saudi Arabia. On Aug 26, U.S. officials emphasized that an Iraqi attack will
set off a huge military response by tlie U.S.
I
September 1990
i
I I
I
*SEPT 01:
*SEPT 05:
*SEPT 06:
*SEPT 07:
*SEPT 10:
*SEPT 12:
SCHWARTZKOPF: FORCE IS
DEFENSIVE (OFFENSIVE "HYPOTHETICAL")
BAKER: U.S. FORCES TO STAY
EVEN IF IRAQ WITHDRAWS
U.S. TO REVIEW OPTIONS
OFFENSIVE MI POSSIBLE BY 10115
U.S. AND U.S.S.R. PLEDGE ACTION
BUSH HINTS AT FORCE
52
PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
*SEPT 15:
*SEPT 16:
*SEPT 18:
*SEPT 20:
*SEPT 27:
*SEPT 29:
FIRST COMBAT: U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN
SHIPS FIRE WARNING SHOTS
BUILD-UP TO GIVE MORE WAR OPTIONS;
AIR FORCE CHIEF REVEALS FIGHT PLANS
AIR FORCE CHIEF DISMISSED FOR
"POOR JUDGMENT AT A SENSITIVE TIME"
BUSH MORE OPEN ON WAR OPTION
BUSH OPTION INCLUDES *SEPT 27:
SUPPORT FOR MI
OFFENSIVE FORCE
CONDITIONAL
SCOWCROFT: TIME IS SHORT
DOD CONSIDERING ADDITIONAL
RESERVE CALL-UP
Sept 1: General Schwartzkopf (Commander of Coalition Forces): "There
is not going to be any war unless the Iraqis attack." The force is "for the defense
of Saudi Arabia" and discussions of offensive force are only "hypothetical."
Sept 5: Baker tells Congress that the U.S. intends to maintain a long-term
military presence in the Gulf even if Iraq withdraws.
Sept 6: U.S. must have patience, then "we will review our options,"
according to an administration official, implying a threat to use force.
Sept 7: Administration officials assert that the U.S. will have sufficient
troops and equipment to mount an offensive attack by October 15.
Sept 10: U.S. and U.S.S.R. pledge to reverse Iraqi conquest of Kuwait
"even if that cannot be accomplished peacefully." But Gorbachev refused to
explicitly endorse military action. Bush observed "we may have a difference on
that."
Sept 12: Bush to Congress on Sept 11: "Iraq will not be permitted to annex
Kuwait." He hints at use of force, declaring America's credibility as a superpower
is at stake.
Sept 15: "American warship fires warning shot at Iraqi tanker."
Sept 16: Troop build-up to give Bush "additional military options."
General Dugan (Air Force Chief) writes in the Washington Post and
Los Angeles Times that the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that heavy bombing of
Bagdad will be necessary to force Iraqi withdrawal. "The cutting edge would be
downtown Bagdad. If I want to hurt you, it would be at home ... "
Sept 18: Cheney dismissing Dugan on Sept 17: "To speculate about what
may or may not be included in a plan that might or might not be implemented is
53
RAKOS
inappropriate." [Note that Dugan's remarks upset the stimulus hierarchy; on
September 19, the Times observed that Dugan's mistake was one of timing not
content.]
Sept 20: Bush: "We are, as I have said before, prepared to take additional
steps if sanctions and the quest for a political resolution do not work .... We will
continue to review all options with our allies ... " Aides said this represented a
"nuance" not a change in policy. The Times specifically noted that "the White
House has tied its talk of 'options' to the idea of expanding the current sanctions."
Sept 27: A N.Y. Times news analysis concluded that the receptions Bush
received and opinion polls show that an overwhelming majority backs his moves to
date-which are purportedly defensive. "So far Mr. Bush has sought support only
for defensive action: guarding Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations. Neither the
White House nor anyone else really knows how enthusiastic the public would be, and
for how long, about a desert campaign against the Iraqi army or an air offensive."
.
'
Sept 29: Scowcroft (National Security Advisor): the systematic destruction
"of Kuwait by Iraq shortens the time that the U.S. can wait for sanctions to take
effect." The Department of Defense (DOD) begins to debate the call-up of additional
combat reservists to join the 27,000 support reservists already called up .
October 1990
*OCT 12:
*OCT 16:
*OCT 20:
*OCT 21:
*OCT 24:
*OCT 26:
KEY UNITS REACH SAUDI ARABIA;
32 DEATHS REPORTED ("ACCIDENTS")
CHENEY: "IN FOR THE LONG HAUL"
U.S. BUILD-UP OF TROOPS
CONTINUES
OCT 18:
CONGRESS WANTS
RIGHT TO
APPROVE WAR
U.S. TO SEND 400-500 TANKS
BUSH: "CONSIDER ALL OPTIONS"
ADMINISTRATION: MILITARY THREAT
NEEDS MORE CREDIBILITY
U.S. CONSIDERS INCREASING FORCE
BEYOND 240,000
CONGRESS WANTS
OCT25:
RIGHT TO
RECONVENE
U.S. TO ADD AS MANY AS
100,000 TROOPS
DEFENSIVE NOW OFFENSIVE
CHENEY: "NO UPPER CEILING"
54
PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
OCT 30:
"BUSH AND BAKER EXPLICIT IN
THREAT TO USE FORCE": TIMES
HEADLINE
FITZWATER: SANCTIONS
UNLESS...
OCT 31:
*OCT 31:
,,I
CONGRESS URGES
PATIENCE; BUSH
DOMESTIC POLICY
UNPOPULAR
Oct 12: American deaths in Gulf-related moves reaches 32 in "accidents."
Oct 16: Cheney: U.S. forces in Gulf are "in for the long haul."
U.S. build up is to give Bush "additional military options";
Times observes that the distinction between defensive and offensive force is reduced.
Oct 20: U.S. to send 400-500 tanks; Bush reiterates tough stand ("prepared
to consider all options").
Oct 21: Administration official: unless the effect of the sanctions increases,
"we will have to make the military threat more credible."
Oct 24: U.S. announcement of possible troop increase follows Saudi hint at
compromise (Iraq to keep some territory) and Hussein's discussion of freeing
hostages. An increased force is seen as a sign of offensive preparations.
Oct 26: Cheney announces up to 100,000 additional troops would be sent
to gulf. At this time, the U.S. had 210,000 of the planned 240,000 troops there.
The exact number was not worked out yet, but there was "no upper ceiling." More
troops provide "a range of options should another option be necessary ... to deal with
any contingency. "
:J --·
",'i
If '
Oct 31: Fitzwater: The Administration will adhere to sanctions as the major
intervention unless "circumstance or a provocation" indicate otherwise.
November 1990
'
',
'!I
*NOV 01:
*NOV 02:
*NOV 05:
*NOV 08:
*NOV 09:
FITZWATER: "GET PEOPLE READY
FOR ANY EVENTUALITY"
SCHWARTZKOPF: WAR "ANYTIME"
BUT NOT SOON
U.S. TO ACTIVATE COMBAT RESERVES.
U.S. TO ADD 100,000 (350,000 TOTAL)
BUSH ORDERS 150,000 ADDITIONAL TROOPS
(380,000 TOTAL) TO GIVE OPTION
OF OFFENSIVE MI
55
j
.• , I
'I•··
. ·II'
RAKOS
*NOV 10:
NOV 11:
*NOV 15:
I~. '·
1..
;
''
I' ....,
NOV 22:
,,
NOV 24:
.I
:!_I
•
'I
*NOV 25:
*NOV 27:
I
'i
I I'
:·,;
I,
*NOV 30:
U.S. WILL NOT ROTATE TROOPS DURING
CRISIS
TOP MILITARY OFFICER: OFFENSIVE
MI NOW POSSIBLE
CONGRESSIONAL
[*NOV 12:
LEADERS DEBATE
WAR OPTION]
NOV 14:
CONGRESS WANTS
SPECIAL SESSION
NOV 15:
BUSH: POLICY
AMERICANS
SAME BUT
UNEASY AND
OFFENSIVE MI
FEARFUL
CREDIBLE
[*NOV 17:
SINCE NOV 8,
ANTIWAR
ACTIVITY]
NOV 20:
BUSH SUPPORT
DROPS TO 50%
(BELLICOSITY)
ARMY CAN HALT RETIREMENTS,
EXTEND ENLISTMENTS INDEFINITELY
BUSH "TIRED OF STATUS QUO,"
WANTS U.)•ol. OK
ADMINISTRATION DOUBTS SANCTIONS,
"NOT PREPARED" TO WAIT
DRAFT OF U.N. RESOLUTION
APPROVING FORCE;
ARMY EXTENDS ENLISTMENTS
INDEFINITELY
[*NOV 29:
FORMERMIUTARY
CHIEFS URGE
DELAY]
U.N. AUTHORIZES FORCE
Nov 1: Bush intensifies war of words with Iraq. N.Y. Times: Bush and
Baker "underlining the threat of force." Fitzwater: "get people ready for any
eventuality."
Nov 2: Schwartzkopf: Military action must be cautious and limited to avoid
upsetting balance of power and stability in region; war "anytime" but not soon.
I
I;'
Nov 5: U.S. to activate more combat reservists.
Nov 8: U.S. to add 100,000 troops by mid-December to bring force to
350,000.
56
PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
Nov 9: Bush orders 150,000 additional troops to provide force of 380,000.
"I have today directed the Secretary of Defense to increase the size of the U.S.
forces committed to Desert Shield to insure that the coalition has an adequate
offensive military option ... "
Nov 10: U.S. will not rotate troops during crisis; troops will remain until
crisis over.
[Nov 12: Senator Nunn: no troop rotation is "fast track to war."]
Nov 15: Bush tries to placate Congress: Policy has not changed, the
doubling of troops is "to make the threat of offensive action more credible."
[Nov 17: Times reports Congress and left-liberal publications increase the
questions of and/or opposition to current policy.]
Nov 25: Administration officials doubt sanctions can have impact, the
earliest possible time would be spring: "We're not prepared to give this guy
unlimited time."
Nov 27: U.N. resolution to give "one final opportunity" for withdrawal.
[Nov 29: Two former Chairs of Joint Chiefs of Staff urge delay of military
action for at least a year to give sanctions time to work; this follows recent comments
by Schwartzkopf and Gray (Marine Corp Commander) also counseling patience.]
Nov 30: U.N. authorizes force after Jan 15.
December 1990
[*DEC 03:
*DEC 04:
CHENEY TO CONGRESS: MI
NECESSARY; CALL-UP LIMIT
RAISED FOR RESERVISTS
(FROM 125,000 TO 188,000)
DEC 05:
[*DEC 06:
DEC 07-12:
HOSTAGES FREED AND LEAVE;
U.S. EMBASSY CLOSED
57
FORMER DEFENSE
SECRET ARIES URGE
DELAY]
HOUSE DEMOCRATS
WANT CONGRESS TO
APPROVE MI
CIA DIRECTOR:
SANCTIONS WILL
IMPACT; DEMOCRATS
ATTACK BUSH]
RAKOS
DEC 13-17:
*DEC 21:
*DEC 22:
*DEC 27:
U.S. AND IRAQ
FAIL TO AGREE
ON TALKS
DEC 14:
48% WAIT PAST 1115
40% START OFFENSIVE
Ml 1115
[DEC 20:
U.S. GENERAL WALKER:
FORCES NOT READY BY
1115]
PENTAGON: TROOPS WILL BE READY
CHENEY: FORCE LIKELY
BUSH WILL NOT HEED ARMY
DESIRE FOR DELAY
[DEC 30/31:
PRESSURE ON
BUSH FOR TALKS
INCREASES]
[Dec 3: Majority of former Defense Secretaries urge patience, give sanctions
additional time to work.]
Dec 4: Cheney tells congress military intervention, not sanctions, will be
necessary to effect withdrawal. Call-up limit for reservists raised from 125,000 to
188,000.
t,.
[Dec 6: Webster (CIA Director) in testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee: Sanctions' impact to be felt by Spring (3-9 months),
particularly on Iraqi military.]
Dec 21: Pentagon seeks to minimize damage from remarks a day earlier by
General Walker, second in command, that U.S. forces will not be ready for offensive
action on Jan 15.
Dec 22: Cheney to troops: "It increasingly looks like ... we'll have to use
force to get him [Hussein] out."
Dec 27: The N.Y. Times reports that aides say the Army warning will not
stop Bush from ordering action: "The military are always more comfortable with
more time."
January 1991
*JAN 2:
*JAN 4:
I
''
*JAN 6:
BUSH AND
*JAN 2:
REPORT SANCTIONS
ADVISORS MEET
WORKING
BUSH OFFERS
[JAN 4:
SUPPORT FOR WAR LOW]
GENEVA MEETING
BUSH: DELAY WILL GIVE HUSSEIN
MORE TIME
58
'llr
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PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
JAN9:
*JAN 10:
JAN 11:
JAN 12:
JAN 14:
JAN 16:
JAN 17:
BUSH SEEKS
JAN 9:
CONGRESSIONAL
SUPPORT FOR MI
CHENEY SEEKS EMERGENCY
AUTHORITY TO JAN 10-12:
RETAIN RESERVISTS U.S.
PLANS MASSIVE AIR STRIKES
BAKER AND SAUDI KING FAHD
DISCUSS TIMING OF ATTACK
[*JAN 12:
BAKER: U.S.
TO STRIKE SOON
JAN 13:
BAKER: ALLIES
*JAN 14:
AGREE ON NECESSITY
FOR AND TIMING OF ATTACK
JAN 15:
I
i
CBSIN. Y. TIMES POLL:
SO% YES TO FORCE ON
1/15
CONGRESS
WAR
DEBATES
I
ANTIWAR ADS APPEAR]
CONGRESS BACKS
ATTACK
AMERICAN "FEAR AND
RESOLVE"
55% AGREE BUSH DID
EVERYTHING TO AVOID
WAR
U.S. WEIGHS TIMING OF ATTACK
TIMES HEADLINE: U.S. AND
ALLIES OPEN AIR WAR ON IRAQ
LATE JAN:
75% APPROVAL
RATING FOR BUSH
Jan 2: Bush and advisors meet to review options amid reports that sanctions
are working and food rationing in Iraq has intensified.
'
'·
.
.
.,
Jan 4: N.Y. Times: "The latest move on an increasingly muddled diplomatic
exchange with Iraq." The meeting is for public consumption, to quiet public debate
and raise support for war.
,: I! it
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II:
li:
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d
Jan 6: Bush: "Delay may give Saddam more time to prepare ... " He sends
letter to Hussein: "Withdraw ... or face the terrible consequences."
..
.·'.I''.'.1
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i
Jan 10: Cheney seeks emergency authority to keep reservists in military for
two years. U.S. reveals plans for massive air strikes.
i
rt;
·I
:t
:1
Jan 11-15: U.S. and Allies discuss timing of attack.
II
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[Jan 12: A full page ad in the Times showed a massive cemetery, and under
it: "Talk is cheaper."]
i:
! .
1
Jan 14: N.Y. Times: "(O)n the eve of war. .. the United States was a nation
divided." Many supported "the right more precious than peace" while many others
participated in antiwar protests. "And everywhere lurked undercurrents that were
II
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59
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: II
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not easy to define-a sense that the crisis was moving inexorably out of control, that
one's own voice had been lost in the rush of events."
DISCUSSION
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In one sense, the content analysis presented here details the obvious:
Government controls information and its dissemination and thereby controls the target
response of the populace. This power was evident years ago; for example, the
Nazi's effective use of propaganda led to the establishment of the Institute for
Propaganda Analysis in 1937, which tried to alert school children to the insidious
techniques of "name calling," "glittering generalities," and "card stacking," among
others (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). Obviously, these techniques not only endured
but prospered, most recently resurfacing in the Bush administration's effort to
marshal public opinion in favor of military action in response to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990.
The ability of government to control information increased markedly after
World War Two as government centralization provided routines that institutionalized
control (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). The Reagan presidency refined the "public
relations model of information management" (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991, p. 109).
The White House, various federal departments, and the Pentagon (with its own
public relations staff of over 3QOO) disseminate information and misinformation to
suit their own purposes (Parenti, 1993). The White House, for example, decides on
a daily basis what information it wants covered and how: Reagan's former chief of
staff succinctly confirmed that stories were routinely planted in the press: "We fed
it to them and they ate it" (Parenti, 1993, p. 63). This public relations mechanism
bolted into action within days of Iraq's invasion, as a navy captain drafted a secret
ten-page memo that would become known as "Annex Foxtrot" (MacArthur, 1992).
MacArthur reports that the now-declassified memo, first disclosed in the New York
Times in May 1991, developed the plan for the military operation's information
dissemination policy. The goal, endorsed by senior Administration staff including
Bush, was to control the flow of information in a manner that supported the
operation's political goals and avoided the errors committed during the Vietnam era.
The cardinal rule advanced to attain this end was: "News media representatives will
be escorted at all times. Repeat, at all times." (MacArthur, 1992, p. 7). The
success of the Bush informational control strategy was clear to the news media
almost from the outset, yet only token opposition was voiced (MacArthur, 1992).
The mainstream media, in effect, merged with the government in supporting the
status quo (Mowlana, 1992).
Consequently, "In the seven months beginning with the invasion of Kuwait
in August 1990 ... the Gulf War offered a spectacular opportunity for information and
opinion management. In retrospect and on balance, the remarkable control of
American consciousness during and after the war must be regarded as a signal
achievement of mind management" (Schiller, 1992, p. 22). 1
The issue, then, is the extent to which a behavioral understanding of this
"mind management" can contribute to effective countercontrolling responses in the
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PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL
future. The behavior analysis clarifies the potential points for intervention.
Establishing operations that provide motivation may be altered. The rules that
describe contingencies can be more accurately formulated and more responsive to the
changing contingencies. The graduated hierarchy through which the aversive
discriminative stimuli are presented might be disrupted. However, each of these
strategies requires influence within the mainstream media, indicating that a fuller
understanding of the phenomenon of propaganda will require a metacontingency
analysis (Glenn, 1991) that places the functioning of the media within the larger
culture.
Obviously, additional behavioral content analyses beyond the initial effort
presented here would be useful to articulate the specific behavioral processes
involved in propaganda. Future research should include interrater reliability checks
of both the content extracted from the media source and the categorization of the
content. In addition, the reliability of the content extracted from one source should
be checked against alternate presentations (e.g., other
newspapers and
newsmagazines) and forms of the media (e.g. television). A sophisticated behavioral
content analysis research agenda has the potential to provide a wealth of data from
which effective countercontrol skills relevant to propaganda can be developed.
REFERENCES
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Extra!, May 1991, p. 9. [quoted public statement of August 15, 1990]
Glenn, S. S. (1991). Contingencies and metacontingencies: Relations among behavioral, cultural, and
biological evolution. In P. A. Lamal (Ed.), Behavioral analysis of societies and cultural
practices (pp. 39-73). New York: Hemisphere Publishing.
Hayes, S. C. & Hayes, L. J. (1989). The verbal action of the listener as a basis for rule-governance. In
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Schlinger, H.D. (1993). Separating discriminative and function-altering effects of verbal stimuli. The
Behavior Analyst, 16, 9-23.
Shoemaker, P.J. & Reese, S.D. (1991). Mediating the message: Theories of influences on mass media
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Skinner, B. F. '(1969). Contingencies of reinforcement: A theoretical analysis. New York:
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Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1961). Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Co.
Wright, C. (1986). Mass conununication: A sociological perspective (3rd Ed.). New York: Random
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NOTE
1. Bush actually aknowledged his Administration's successful endeavor in politically motivated,
deliberate, "mind management." On ABC's Nightline on October 28, 1992, Bush talked candidly about
the Gulf War and his popularity during and after it, stating flatly that "we [the Administration] shaped
public opinion. "
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