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1
The Radio Age
The Growth of Radio Broadcasting, 1895–1940
When James Rorty looked back in 1934 on the beginnings of the radio age,
he remarked that “radio broadcasting came into the world like a child born
too soon and bearing the birthmark of a world culture which may never be
achieved.” Radio had emerged amidst high hopes of a new age of enlightenment and communication. Yet it had become a shabby and neglected child,
left out on the streets because neither art nor education had the resources or
the wit to adopt her. Eventually she had been picked up by businessmen and
put to work selling “gargles, and gadgets, toothpaste and stocks and bonds.”1
Rorty’s judgment was too harsh. In fact, scientists, inventors, businessmen,
politicians, and many listeners had all struggled to see radio fulfill its promise as the new century’s preeminent medium of mass communication. First
hypothesized in James Clerk Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism, the existence of radio waves capable of carrying signals at the speed of light had been
proved by Heinrich Hertz in 1887 and then put to practical use by Guglielmo
Marconi in 1895. By 1901 Marconi had succeeded in transmitting radio messages across the Atlantic Ocean, and soon radio proved itself as a lifesaver for
mariners—including passengers on the Titanic in 1912—and as a coordinator
of fleets and armies during World War I.
Marconi’s great achievement was to show that radio telegraphy—the transmission of code without the use of wires—was both technically feasible and
practically useful. Seeing radio as an improvement upon the telegraph, Marconi thought it best suited for point-to-point transmission—the sending of
messages to a single specified receiver—rather than broadcasting to an unspecified number of receivers. But new visions of radio began to impinge upon
4 | making the medium
Marconi’s point-to-point paradigm in the early years of the twentieth century.
The most significant of these was radio telephony, by which the human voice,
rather than coded messages, could be transmitted.
Successful radio telephony required new technological advances. The first
radio transmitters produced short, discontinuous bursts of radio waves which
varied in wavelength. Although these “spark” transmitters could send bursts
of code, they were incapable of transmitting the continuous waves required
to carry the undulations of the human voice. Reginald Fessenden, a Canadian-born inventor, persuaded the General Electric Company (GEC) in 1905
to produce a continuous wave transmitter, called the Alexanderson alternator. Combining this with his own receiving technology, Fessenden made the
first radio transmission of the human voice on December 24, 1906. That triumph marked the beginning of radio telephony and thus of the radio age as
we understand it today.2
Fessenden’s achievement was soon complemented by the work of Lee de
Forest, an Iowa electrical engineer. In 1907 de Forest patented his audion vacuum tube, which solved one of the great problems of early radio: that of rectifying and amplifying radio signals. Radio waves oscillate up and down; radio
receivers must rectify them into a one-directional stream in order to convert
the waves back into sounds. By improving an earlier tube designed by John
Ambrose Fleming, de Forest’s audion tube both rectified radio waves and significantly amplified them. This allowed receivers not only to pick up the
human voice and music but also to make those signals loud enough to be
heard easily through earphones and—later—loudspeakers. Although it took
many years to perfect, the audion tube marked the birth of electronics, and
made the modern domestic radio receiver technically feasible.3
Radio: Hobby and Industry, 1906–1918
The work of Marconi, Fessenden, and de Forest inspired many Americans
to explore the mysterious world of radio after 1906. Before 1920, however,
this required a high degree of skill and understanding of code and electrical
componentry. Receiving sets had to be put together from a mixture of manufactured parts and homemade ingenuity. Nevertheless, many thousands of
radio enthusiasts assembled primitive crystal receiving sets with the help of
an increasing number of periodicals and books. These amateur radio enthusiasts considered themselves to be the advance guard of the radio revolution,
and by 1912 there were more than 120 radio clubs across the United States.4
Wealthier amateurs even tried their hands at constructing home transmitters,
The Radio Age, 1895–1940 | 5
creating a two-way traffic in radio messages that was independent of commercial radio operations such as American Marconi. The majority of amateurs, though, were content to spend their evening hours, when reception was
best, scanning the airwaves for whatever signals they could detect.
Others were busy trying to make money from radio. The American Marconi Company quickly assumed a dominant position in the young radio industry, focusing upon ship-to-shore and transoceanic radio telegraphic service. The commercial and safety advantages of maritime point-to-point radio
communication were obvious, and organizations such as the United Fruit
Company were quick to use it to manage their fleets more efficiently. The
U.S. Navy also adopted radio after 1900, but in ways that unsettled the
emerging commercial contours of the industry. The navy refused to deal with
American Marconi on that company’s usual terms, which involved leasing of
sets with trained Marconi operators. Instead it took advantage of chaotic competition within the young industry by copying and improving patented equipment without authorization. Not surprisingly, relations between American
Marconi (as well as other radio manufacturers) and the navy were soon
strained.5
Radio remained a largely unregulated industry until 1912. By then growing numbers of amateurs, commercial operators, and naval stations had caused
interference and congestion of wavelengths. The Congress responded by
passing the Radio Act of 1912, which appropriated the airwaves as public
property, to be temporarily allocated to individuals or corporations through
a licensing regime. All nongovernmental operators required licenses from the
secretary of commerce, and the president was empowered to close down or
take over radio equipment “in time of war or public peril or disaster.” Regulations under the act established a spectrum of wavelengths for radio transmissions. The largest and most desirable segment of the spectrum was reserved for government purposes. Commercial operations were also given
generous allocations, but amateurs were pushed down to the least desirable
end of the spectrum. Other regulations outlawed the Marconi practice of noninterconnection, which had barred the exchange of radio messages between
it and other commercial operators.
The outbreak of World War I in August 1914 created a powerful new dynamic in the development of radio in the United States. Radio quickly became embroiled in the complexities of American neutrality between August
1914 and April 1917. With its undersea cables cut, Germany relied heavily on
radio telegraphy to communicate with its American interests. Two powerful
German-owned radio transmitters at Tuckerton, New Jersey, and Sayville,
6 | making the medium
New York, were capable of trans-Atlantic transmissions, and they came under
suspicion of unneutral activities almost as soon as the war broke out. At first
the Wilson administration was content to censor German radio traffic, but by
the end of 1915 both Tuckerton and Sayville were under complete navy control.6 The navy strengthened its hold over American radio after the United
States’ declaration of war in April 1917. Almost immediately President Wilson used his power under the Radio Act to place all private radio stations
under naval control. The navy then ordered amateurs to cease operations and
to dismantle their sets, beginning a period of enforced silence that would last
until September 1919.
Although the navy’s primary purpose in controlling radio was to ensure
that its radio operations were properly equipped and staffed, it also made
some attempt at broadcasting. News transmissions were beamed at France
and the Low Countries from Tuckerton, and a radio “home news” service for
U.S. troops began, in which newspaper columns were read out over the airwaves and then transformed into print for distribution at the front. Radio also
played a role at the end of the war; Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points were
broadcast to Europe in 1918, and on October 12 of that year the German parliament transmitted a request via radio to the United States for an armistice.
Postwar Maneuvering and the Formation of RCA
Radio had impinged lightly upon American political culture and institutions before 1918. The Radio Act of 1912 enjoyed smooth passage through
Congress, and it provoked little sustained criticism after its enactment. The
industry’s emphasis upon radio telegraphy rather than telephony in the prewar years meant that the enormous communicative potential of the new
medium was still more imagined than real. Although Americans were aware
of the importance of radio in maritime and military affairs, and were exposed
to some of its romance and mystery through periodicals and newspapers, it
had yet to affect their lives and perceptions in concrete ways. All this was to
change after 1918.
Radio became politicized when it was caught up in wider debates over the
role of government in postwar society. The catalyst for this struggle was Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, who was determined to achieve permanent government control of American radio.7 In December 1918 Daniels told
a congressional hearing that the war had shown that radio communication
was most effective when it was under government control. The American
The Radio Age, 1895–1940 | 7
Marconi Company, he thought, was inherently British in its loyalties. Permanent naval control of all radio operations would ensure that this vital form
of modern communication would be safe from foreign domination.8
Daniels failed to persuade Congress, which was anxious to roll back the
wartime powers of the federal government. Many in Congress and industry
were also disturbed by the prospect of permanent government control of a
formerly private enterprise. George Davis, general manager of the United
Fruit Company’s radio operations, warned, “We have just fought a great war
to make the world safe for democracy, but if legislation such as this is to be an
outcome of the war, the United States will have been made unsafe for business.” GEC, through its vice-president Owen D. Young, also attacked
Daniels’s scheme as un-American.9
Although Daniels lost his battle for government-controlled radio, even his
opponents acknowledged that radio should continue to develop under American control. The cutting of the German cables in 1914 had shown that the
United States was ill-equipped to communicate independently with the outside world. The British now enjoyed a monopoly of oceanic cable facilities,
but radio promised a worldwide communication network that bypassed this
monopoly. It therefore assumed a vital role in furthering the United States’
new position in world politics and commerce.10
While doing public battle with GEC over federal ownership, the navy was
also engaged in secret negotiations with it to delay the sale of Alexanderson
alternators to American Marconi. Admiral William Bullard, Director of Naval
Communications, put the case to Young and other GEC executives that the
proposed sale would “fix in British hands a substantial monopoly of world
communications” at this “critical period of the history of radio.” Young remembered that Bullard ended his presentation by appealing to them “as patriotic American citizens not to make the transfer.” GEC agreed to buy out
British Marconi’s patents and shares in American Marconi.11 GEC then incorporated the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), 59 percent owned by
GEC and capitalized at $12 million, in October 1919. RCA’s charter provided
for a maximum of 20 percent foreign ownership and an American board of
directors.
RCA consolidated its position through a series of patent agreements between 1919 and 1922. RCA began its corporate life with GEC radio patents
as well as those belonging to American Marconi. RCA and GEC then agreed
with Western Electric (a subsidiary of AT&T), Westinghouse, United Fruit,
and other smaller firms over the next three years to share their radio patents
8 | making the medium
and markets. GEC and Westinghouse were allowed to manufacture radio
equipment, which would then be sold through RCA. In a move that would
soon prove crucial to its future, RCA also won the right to operate radio telephony stations.12
RCA’s initial commercial mission focused upon transmission of point-topoint commercial messages in competition with undersea cables and the overland telegraph. Very soon, however, the company also began to see the potential of radio broadcasting within the United States. RCA’s general manager,
David Sarnoff, wrote to Owen Young at the beginning of 1920, “I have had
in mind a plan . . . which would make radio a ‘household utility’ in the same
sense as a piano or phonograph.” Noting that it was now possible to transmit music and to manufacture domestic receiving sets at a reasonable price,
Sarnoff argued that RCA could become a radio broadcaster as well as a pointto-point transmitter. Concerts, baseball scores, lectures, and other important
events could now be transmitted into people’s homes. Even if only 7 percent
of America’s 15 million families bought a “radio music box” at $75 each, RCA
stood to make $75 million in sales.13
The formation of RCA, the end of wartime radio control, and advances
in radio technology all contributed to the birth of domestic broadcasting.
RCA was interested in new markets, and the prominence of GEC executives
in its ranks created a more conducive atmosphere for expansion beyond the
old Marconi company’s focus upon marine telegraphy. The potential market
for broadcasting was also liberated by the lifting of the wartime ban on amateur radio receiving in September 1919. In June 1920 RCA’s board of directors authorized Sarnoff to explore further the possibility of making and selling “radio music boxes.”
Other companies moved in the same direction even more quickly. The
Westinghouse Company, GEC’s major rival in electrical manufacturing, applied for a license from the Department of Commerce to begin regular programming from its Pittsburgh headquarters. That license was granted on October 27, 1920, and a week later station KDKA made radio history by
transmitting progress reports of the Harding-Cox presidential election results. Although other stations have vied for the title of America’s first radio
broadcaster, KDKA’s program on November 4, 1920 is widely recognized as
the nation’s first scheduled radio broadcast.14 Westinghouse had thus stolen a
march on RCA, allowing it to force itself into the radio pool established by
GEC when it formed RCA.
The Radio Age, 1895–1940 | 9
The Radio Boom: Stations and Broadcasters
Despite its importance to the history of radio, KDKA’s first broadcast did
not begin the radio boom of the 1920s. It was not mentioned in the New York
Times’s election coverage, and neither set sales nor broadcast licenses boomed
in 1921. A postwar economic slump depressed consumer income and confidence, and the radio industry had not yet transformed its products into easily accessible consumer goods. Only nine new stations began operating in the
first six months of 1921, although one of those was RCA’s WJY in New York.
Improving economic conditions at the end of 1921 and the appearance of
complete sets that required little home assembly created the first signs of a
radio boom. As more consumers bought radios, more stations rushed on to
the airwaves. Newspapers began to devote attention to radio, providing information about programs, set construction, and improving reception. Suddenly radio became a fad, and one of the major beneficiaries of the economic
good times after 1921.15
In January 1922 there were 30 broadcasting stations on air; 12 months later
there were 556. The total number of stations hovered around 600 between
1929 and 1936, as federal regulation brought order to the radio boom. Below
this superficial stability, however, lay great volatility. Hundreds of small and
undercapitalized broadcasters entered the market, eager to join the boom but
ill-equipped to stay with it. During 1922, 642 new stations began broadcasting, while 94 disappeared. In 1923, 298 station closures easily outnumbered
249 new entries. The early broadcasters were predominantly radio and electrical manufacturers and dealers. In February 1923 nearly 40 percent of the
576 stations on air belonged to this group; educational institutions (13%) and
newspapers (12%) were also well represented.16
Map 1 shows the geographical distribution of the 578 stations that were
operational in March 1923. Every state except Mississippi had at least one station, and 39 had more than three. Station power varied immensely, from
RCA’s 50kW stations in New York down to the 100W local stations run by
amateurs, colleges, or stores. Although their location became a hot political
issue at the end of the 1920s, stations sprang up haphazardly in the early years
of the decade.
The radio industry enjoyed a production boom during the 1920s. Figure
1 shows that growth in the number of radio households continued at a rate
that defied the Depression.
10 | making the medium
Image not available.
Map 1. Distribution of Radio Stations, March 1, 1923.
Source: Mapped from data in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 173,
entry 1, file 1179, box 101.
By 1924 sales of radio equipment were double those of sporting goods and
three quarters of those of the much older phonograph industry. The radio
manufacturing industry now had about 2,000 manufacturers, 31,000 retailers, and more than 30 radio periodicals, all contributing to an industry worth
$450 million per year in sales. Three years later, at the beginning of 1929,
radio sales had reached $650 million and sets in use had nearly doubled to 9
million.17
Crystal sets, the cheapest type of radio to produce, sold in kit form during the 1920s for as little as $2, but their sales declined sharply with the arrival of valve sets. These offered great advantages, including the power to run
loudspeakers, which made group listening possible. With the crystal set also
disappeared many small manufacturers who had neither the plant nor the
patents to keep up with the large firms. In 1922 RCA sold a range of radio
sets that cost from $18 to $350. Valves usually cost extra, at about $5 each.
Prices continued to fall; in 1925 the cheapest valve set was the Crosley Pup,
The Radio Age, 1895–1940 | 11
which could be had for about $10, plus valves. In 1927 the first AC power sets
came on to the market, relieving customers of the need to store and recharge
batteries. By the end of the 1920s wealthy customers could pay up to $2,000
for the very best radios, elegantly housed in fine wooden cabinets and providing excellent output through advanced loudspeakers. Less privileged buyers could spend $150 for a set that provided performance and sound quality
far superior to sets manufactured only three years earlier.18
Although the purchase of a radio represented a significant financial outlay for most urban workers, installment purchase plans lessened the immediate burden. Dealers began to offer installment plans in 1925, and by 1929
80 percent of radio sales were on credit. Car sets appeared in 1928, but their
diffusion was initially slow because of the downturn in the automobile industry after 1930. Only 108,000 car radios were sold in 1930, and a mere
34,000 in 1931. By 1940, however, more than a quarter of America’s cars were
equipped with radios.19
The Formation of a Mass Radio Audience
“Let the day’s troubles sink with the sun,” ran a radio manufacturer’s advertisement in 1923, “then turn on your Tuska Radio, and be whisked around
the world. In those precious hours between work and sleep, you live in Radio
Fairyland, where you are master of distance and ruler of a host of entertain-
Image not available.
Figure 1. Radio Households and Set Production, 1922–1940.
Source: Graph constructed from data in Historical Statistics of the United States, 2:796.
12 | making the medium
Image not available.
Figure 2. Radio Families, 1922–1940.
Source: Graph constructed from data in Historical Statistics of the United States, 2:796, and
Roosevelt Papers, PPF 853.
ers.” In 1922 only 0.2 percent of American households contained a radio; five
years later nearly a quarter did. By 1930, 45.8 percent of American homes
were equipped with radio, and by 1940 that figure had risen to more than 80
percent.20
In 1926 Senator Clarence Dill of Washington State noted that the United
States, with just 6 percent of the world’s population, owned 80 percent of the
world’s radios. In 1934 the United States’ 147.9 radios per 1,000 persons were
well ahead of Britain’s 133.4, Sweden’s 108.1, Australia’s 78.1, Germany’s 77.4,
and Canada’s 73.5. By 1938 the United States had displaced Denmark at the
top of the radio per capita ownership lists, with 204 radios per 1,000 persons.
These comparisons show that the United States was not alone in its enthusiasm for radio during the 1920s. In Britain the number of listening licenses grew by more than 3,000 percent between 1922 and 1924, and rates of
growth in Australia were even more explosive. Their licensing systems, however, made it more expensive to operate radios. In Britain listeners paid ten
shillings per year for a license, and the average price for medium-quality sets
between the wars ranged between £15 and £30. During this period most semiskilled English workers earned between £2 and £4 per week, making the purchase of a radio set a significant financial outlay. Although radio diffused more
quickly in Britain than in the United States in the early 1920s, American radio
households grew more rapidly after 1926. By 1937, 82 percent of American
homes had radios, compared to 69 percent of British households. Three fac-
The Radio Age, 1895–1940 | 13
tors promoted faster growth of radio ownership in the United States: installation of electricity in homes was more rapid, installment plans for radio buyers came earlier, and Americans enjoyed higher levels of disposable income
during the 1920s.21
Radio’s progress in the United States, however, was not as all-conquering
as its enthusiasts suggested. When diffusion figures are examined on a geographical basis, it is clear that radio ownership was closely correlated to both
wealth and geography. In 1930, for example, the four wealthiest areas of the
nation—the Middle Atlantic, the Pacific, New England, and the East North
Central—were also the top four radio-owning areas. Nine of the richest ten
states in the nation had the highest percentage of radio families, while eight
of the poorest ten states occupied the bottom of the rankings. In 1930 the preponderance of radio families lived in the Northeast and East North Central,
with the Pacific Coast also well represented. The old Confederacy, and in particular the Deep South—the poorest part of the country—languished well behind the rest of the nation. Nationally, 45.8 percent of all households owned
a radio, but the average ownership rate in the 11 Confederate states was 11.9
percent, and that of the Deep South was only 9.7 percent. The New York Times
concluded in 1932 that northern farmers, “followed at a decent interval” by
urban professionals and “skilled mechanics,” were the nation’s foremost radio
owners; radio’s “favorite habitat seems to be with the average four-member
family in middle-class homes in middle-size cities.”22
By 1936, despite the Depression, all areas of the United States had made
great strides in radio ownership. By then 74 percent of the nation’s homes
contained a radio, and all areas of the country had seen their rates grow by at
least 10 percent per year since 1930. In 1936 radio ownership had grown to
87.5 percent in New England, 88.2 percent in the Middle Atlantic states, 84.5
percent on the Pacific Coast, and 80.9 percent in the East North Central
states. Growth in radio ownership between 1930 and 1936 was highest in the
South, with rises of 223 percent in the South Atlantic, 283 percent in the East
South Central, and 248 percent in the West South Central states. Yet the
southern third of the nation still lagged behind the rest of the country. The
average across the old Confederacy was 48 percent of households in 1936,
while in the Deep South it was 44.5 percent, far behind the national average.23
Across the nation radio ownership correlated to household income levels
throughout the interwar period. Predictably, the poorest households were
least likely to contain radios, although even they had a radio ownership rate
of more than 50 percent in 1935. Figure 3 shows radio ownership by household income in 1935, plotted against a national average of 74 percent.
14 | making the medium
Image not available.
Figure 3. Household Radio Ownership by Income Levels, 1935.
Source: Graph constructed from data in Herman S. Hettinger and Walter J. Neff, Practical Radio
Advertising, p. 41.
Radio ownership during the interwar period was not exclusively a product of income levels. The attractiveness of radio ownership also depended
upon availability of good reception, AC power, and stations. The South lacked
all these factors, but in the West North Central states farmers who enjoyed
good reception bought more radios than their income levels might otherwise
have suggested. Ownership rates in the West North Central thus were higher
than in the Mountain states, where reception was poorer and stations fewer,
despite the average higher per capita income of the latter region.24
Radio as a Consumer Durable, 1920–1940
Although radio was thought of as a fad during the early 1920s, it quickly
proved to be a durable part of the consumer economy. During the interwar
years Americans placed a high priority upon the purchase of a radio. They
also showed their attachment to their radios by holding on to them during
the hard times of the Depression.
The radio boom occurred in the context of a wider communications revolution after 1900. The total number of items per capita of first class mail rose
by 70 percent between 1900 and 1930, and per capita use of telegraph facilities jumped more than 60 percent during the same period. In 1900 there were
The Radio Age, 1895–1940 | 15
more than 1.3 million telephones, or 18 per thousand people. That proportion grew to 163.6 in 1930, and total phone calls per capita per year also
jumped, from 64 in 1902 to 246 in 1927.25
Impressive as these figures were, telephone diffusion rates after 1920 still
lagged behind radio. Despite the telephone’s 44-year head start, radio took
only ten years to overtake it within American homes (see fig. 4). The gap between the number of radio homes and telephone homes increased during the
Depression. Telephone subscriptions dropped markedly, from 42 percent of
homes in 1929 to 31 percent in 1933. Thereafter telephone penetration increased, but even in 1940 it was well below the 1929 figure. Radio diffusion
proved much less sensitive to the Depression, although its rate of increase did
lessen.
Many factors contributed to radio’s higher diffusion rate. Telephone service remained expensive through the 1920s, although costs declined significantly in real terms after 1900. Consequently telephone subscription rates
were closely related to economic status during the 1920s. In Robert and
Helen Lynd’s study of Muncie, Indiana, in 1924, for instance, they found that
all 40 of the town’s “business class” families had phones, compared with only
55 percent of workers’ houses.26 Radio ownership was more appealing to
many poorer Americans because it required only one outlay for the purchase
of a set, and then minimal ongoing costs for electrical power or battery charging. The low running costs of a radio set probably encouraged families to hold
Image not available.
Figure 4. Radio and Telephone Homes, 1920–1940.
Source: Graph constructed from data in Historical Statistics of the United States, 1:43, and 2:783, 796.
16 | making the medium
Image not available.
Figure 5. Rates of Growth of Selected Consumer Goods and Disposable Personal
Income, 1920–1940.
Source: Graph constructed from data in Historical Statistics of the United States, 1:242, 2:783,796.
on to them even as they ceased to subscribe to their phone system during the
Depression. There was little point in selling an almost worthless used radio
set, and radio listening may well have been seen as a cheap alternative to a
family outing to the movies. Average weekly movie attendance dropped by a
third between 1930 and 1932, while the proportion of radio homes jumped
from 45 percent to 60 percent in the same period.27
Figure 5 compares radio’s growth rate in comparison with those of other
communication and leisure goods and changes in disposable income. It shows
that radio far outpaced any other rival for consumers’ discretionary spending.
Radio’s growth rate after 1928 fell back to levels closer to those of other
leisure and communication goods, although it still remained above those for
automobile registrations and telephone households for the whole interwar pe-
The Radio Age, 1895–1940 | 17
riod. In 1932, for example, the number of radio homes grew by 10 percent,
while car registrations dropped by 6.7 percent, movie attendance by 20 percent, and telephone households by 5.7 percent.
Many families joined the radio audience at the same time that car registrations and the number of telephone households were shrinking. It is not
possible to tell whether the same families bought a radio set as they divested
themselves of cars and phones. What is clear, however, is that many Americans placed a very high priority upon entering the radio age, and that a large
number of them were prepared to sacrifice other material aspirations in order
to do so. Radio growth was fastest in the poorer southern sections of the nation during the Depression. Across the nation as a whole, the radio industry
could point to the simple fact that radio households grew by more than 14
percent between 1930 and 1933 while disposable personal income fell by
nearly 43 percent.28 Radio was as close to Depression-proof as any industry
in the economy.
By 1940 radio broadcasting had established itself as the preeminent communication medium in the United States. It had transformed itself from a fad
of the Jazz Age into a household necessity that held attraction for increasing
numbers of Americans even when incomes plummeted and jobs evaporated
in the 1930s. As more and more Americans bought radios, questions about
radio programming, and in particular the means by which the industry could
sustain itself, became increasingly pressing. The young industry was forced
to address fundamental questions about what it broadcast and, even more importantly, who was to pay for those programs.