Russian civilians look at the destroyed remains of their home following the Battle of Rzhev.
Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat?
By John M. Barr
A
t 7:50 a.m. on 25 November
1942, approximately 10,000
guns and mortars unleashed
a massive opening barrage heralding
the onset of Operation Mars against
the German Rzhev salient. For the
next 26 days, seven Soviet armies
comprised of seven tank corps and 37
rifle divisions hurled themselves at the
German Ninth Army. In the end, little
ground was taken in exchange apparently for massive Soviet casualties.
Earlier Fighting in
the Rzhev Salient
A relatively small city of 60,000
people on the northern end of the
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Volga River, Rzhev was the focus of
intense military operations from
October 1941 through January
1943. The bitter nature of fighting
on this front was captured by A.
Tvardovsky who started his poem,
“I was killed near Rzhev” with:
I was killed near Rzhev
In a nameless bog
In Fifth company,
On the Left flank
In a cruel air raid
I didn’t hear explosions
And did not see the flash
Down to an abyss from a cliff
No start, no end
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The fighting began in October 1941,
as the Germans pushed on with their
final assault on Moscow. There was no
pause in military operations around
Rzhev, as a salient was formed in the
German lines by the Soviet winter
offensive of 1941-42. On 7 January
1942, after the initial success of Russian
attacks on Army Group Center, Stalin
ordered the Kalinin Front to attack the
juncture between Army Group North
and Army Group Center with an eye
towards capturing Rzhev and pushing
on to cut the Minsk-Moscow highway,
severing Nazi rail communications.
Meeting an initial success, Lt. Gen.
Yeremenko’s forces seized the large
German supply depot at Toropets,
capturing 450,000 shells, millions of
rounds of small arms ammunition,
several food dumps, nearly 1,000
trucks, and six tanks. This early
success tore a nine-mile gap in the
German lines. Rzhev, however, did
not fall and as the Soviets regrouped
to launch a fresh assault on the city.
The newly appointed commander of
the Ninth Army, Panzer Gen. Model,
launched a counter attack that helped
to encircle the Soviet 20th Army. By
the middle of February, 6,000 men
were left in the 20th army when it
began to attempt its breakout.
The net result of the first Russian
winter offensive in the Rzhev region
was a large salient in the Russian line
that gave the Germans their closest
positions to Moscow. While Hitler’s
offensive power was directed to the
south in the summer of 1942, Stalin did
not let matters rest at the Rzhev salient.
As the Germans broke through on their
way to Stalingrad and the Caucasus
Mountains, Stalin ordered a series
of attacks on the Rzhev salient and
near Leningrad to tie down German
reserves. In August 1942, four Soviet
Armies, under the direction of Zhukov
and Konev, launched a fresh series
of attacks in the Rzhev region. While
there were no decisive breakthroughs,
the Soviets did push the Germans back
at least 20 miles in some locations.
More importantly, from a Soviet
point of view, the Germans had to
move 25 divisions to this front to
contain Russian efforts, including at
least nine divisions from the south. The
bitter fighting in these battles led Chief
of the OKW Col. Gen. Halder, to note
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in his diary on 16 August 1942, “tense
situation in Rzhev.” Gen. Halder’s notations were in direct response to Gen.
Model’s communication that same day,
informing the high command that the
Ninth Army was nearly finished and
that if he did not receive three more
divisions he would not be responsible
for the results. The divisions were supplied and the crises passed. However, a
precedent had been set, using attacks
on the Rzhev salient as a way to divert
German attention from the south.
Operation Mars Preparations
Given the repeated Soviet
offensives in the Rzhev area from late
1941 through the summer of 1942, it is
perhaps no surprise the area figured as
a significant objective in Russian plans
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for counter attacks in late 1942. In
addition, the fact Rzhev was a salient
appealed to the Soviets as a potential
target in which to trap German troops
much as the subsequent Kursk salient
was to lure in the Germans in July 1943.
In September 1942, while street
fighting raged in Stalingrad, Stavka
(Soviet High Command) approved
two operations. The more famous
Operation Uranus, aimed at
encircling the German Sixth Army
at Stalingrad, and Operation Mars,
which had the aim of encircling the
German Ninth Army at Rzhev.
For Operation Mars, the Russians
allocated about 2,300 tanks, 10,000
artillery pieces, and two fronts comprised of seven armies. The basic plan
of attack was to launch simultaneous
assaults on each side of the salient and
pinch it off in the middle. In the meantime, German troops on the salient’s
northern edge would be attacked with
the aim of tying down the troops up
there and preventing their escape from
any pocket that would be formed.
The 20th Army, under the command
of Gen. Konev of the Western Front,
would strike from the east with the
30th Army on its right flank. In the
west, the 41st and 22nd Armies, under
Gen. Purkaev’s Kalinin Front, would
launch the main attack. The 20th
Army planned to attack the first day
with four infantry divisions, which
would open up the German defenses
and allow the 6th Tank Corps and the
2nd Guards Cavalry Corps to exploit
through and meet up with the Kalinin
Front. The 30th Army would launch
the offensive with three infantry
divisions and two tank brigades.
Meanwhile, the 41st Army would
open operations with an attack by
the 6th Siberian Infantry Corps. This
corps was tasked with opening the
German defenses for exploitation
by the 1st and 2nd Mechanized Corps.
The 22nd Army would attack with two
divisions, whose job it was to clear a
path for the 3rd Mechanized Corps.
The Soviets also planned for the
30th and 39th Armies to attack the
salient from the north. This attack
would not only trap the German
forces, but also prevent their redeployment to aid in the defense of the
salient’s flanks. All three attacks were
slated to start on the same day.
The original assault for Operation
Mars was scheduled for 12 October
1942. However, torrential rains in the
middle of the month reduced roads
to mud and forced a postponement
of the offensive. In the meantime,
the Germans picked up hints of the
impending Soviet attack. In September,
German intelligence noted an increase
in Russian rail traffic near the Rzhev
salient and by mid-October Berlin
began to suspect a Soviet offensive
might be aimed at the Ninth Army
after the ground dried. Facing the
20th Army’s assault on the eastern
face of the salient were three German
infantry divisions with a similar
three divisions on the western face.
The Germans also deployed strong
armored reserves comprised of two
panzer divisions and two motorized
divisions, including the powerful
Grossdeutschland division, inside the
salient. Model could call for immediate
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Russian civilians symbolically hand over new KV-1 tanks to the
Soviet army, after donating to have the tanks built.
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relief upon the army’s reserve of a
panzer division located at the salient’s
base and three additional panzer divisions in Army Group Center’s reserve.
At the end of October 1942, Zhukov
flew to Moscow to discuss both Mars
and Uranus with Stalin. At that time,
the final assault for Uranus was set
for 16 November, and Mars for 25
November. On 6 November 1942, the
Germans issued a new intelligence
estimate based upon their alleged
super spy, code-named Max. According
to Max, attacks were due near
Vorenezh, Grozny, south of Leningrad,
but no mention appears to have been
made of Stalingrad. After meeting with
Stalin, Zhukov spent the middle of
November near Stalingrad inspecting
Soviet preparations for Uranus.
Soviet T-34 tanks, mainstay of the Soviet armored force throughout the war.
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Soviet anti-tank crews preparing to engage German armor.
Defeat on the Salient’s
Eastern Front
The Russian artillery barrage that
heralded the opening of Operation
Mars on the eastern face of the salient
lasted 90 minutes. Unfortunately,
heavy snow and fog limited the
barrage’s effectiveness. The snow also
hindered Soviet efforts to use their air
force for direct support and to interdict
the movement of German reinforcements. The Russians, therefore, had
to rely on their infantry and tanks
to clear a path through the German
front line. The line in this sector was
demarcated by the Vazuza River
which, although frozen, presented
the Germans with clear fields of fire.
The initial Soviet effort did not go
well. By the end of the battle’s first
day, the 31st Army was effectively
wrecked. Its three infantry divisions
had sustained nearly 50 percent
casualties, and two supporting tank
brigades were unable to continue.
The devastation of these units was
so complete the 31st Army played
very little role in the remainder of
Operation Mars. Further south, the
German defenders inflicted a similar
drubbing on the three infantry divisions on the 20th Army’s right flank. In
20th Army’s center, however, the 247th
Division achieved results positive
enough to allow Konev to order the 6th
Tank Corps into battle the next day.
Poor weather and wretched roads
hampered Soviet efforts to reinforce
the 20th army’s limited success.
Furthermore, the Germans clung tenaciously to villages that lay astride Soviet
resupply routes and commenced
counter attacks by the evening of the
second day of the battle. Over the next
few days, additional Soviet troops were
fed into the bridgehead, but these only
succeeded in sustaining heavy losses
with no additional gains in territory.
The one hope of success came on
the night of 28 November 1942 when
the Russians located a weakness in
the German line and managed to
squeeze through elements of the 6th
Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Cavalry
Corps. These units passed through
on a narrow front for a penetration of
about 2-3 miles, but Soviet artillery and
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resupply continued to be hampered
by stubborn German defense, and the
Russians were unable to effectively
exploit this modest success.
Georgy Konstantinovich
Zhukov in 1944
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