14
SOME MISTAKES IN THINKING ABOUT
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION*
Donna H. Kerr*
Educational Policy Studies
University of Washington
Once I was a member of a university council that, among other things,
played "watchdog" when decisions were being made regarding whom to appoint
to high places in the univeristy administration. One of my colleague's
favorite points was that if a candidate hedged with a "yes and no" or a "yes,
but..." to the query, "Would you support affirmative action?", such a response should be taken as prima facie evidence that the candidate didn't
really support affirmative action and so should not be hired. It is difficult not to empathize with the "yes, but" response. Most anyone who works
in educational institutions can cite cases in which it seems that affirmative
action worked—that it encouraged just decisions. As illustration, there is
the case of the brilliant young minority professor who would likely have been
passed over for lesser applicants had it not been for affirmative action.
But also it is disappointingly easy to recall cases in which injustice has
reigned in the name of affirmative action, e.g., the woman who, with minimal
qualifications, was appointed project director, in consequence of which both
the project and the woman suffered. Indeed, it is with such cases in mind
that many of us (whether of the minority or majority, whether female or
male) reply with a "yes and no."
How are we to understand the inconsistent results of affirmative
action policies? That is, why is it that affirmative action seems to promote both just and unjust decisions?
Is it that affirmative action policies,
by their very nature, encourage arbitrary decisions?
*My thanks to Robert E. Tostberg for his helpful criticisms.
15
Or does the seeming inconsistency derive not from the affirmative action
policies themselves, but from failures to implement properly the policies?
Or perhaps is it differences in understandings of what constitutes affirmativeaction policy that accounts for the sometimes just and sometimes unjust
decisions made in the name of affirmative action? My hunch is with the latter;
there is more than one type of affirmative action policy and not all types
are just.
In order to distinguish just from unjust affirmative action, some
analysis of the notion of affirmative action policy is required. Professor
Maccia's paper, "Affirmative Action Plans: A. Policy Analysis" serves well
in that it nudges us into attempting to refine our thinking on affirmative
action. Only with some such analysis can our apparent hedgings be shown to
be not hedgings at all, but rather qualifications warranted by their capacity
to pinpoint our moral commitments.
In her paper, Professor Maccia undertakes to pursue a "logical and
1
moral illumination" of affirmative action plans in universities and colleges.
With the aim of logical illumination, she first says some things about the
nature of policy, policy analysis, and affirmative action plans. Then, in
pursuit of moral illumination, she attempts to use Rawlsfs principles of
justice to show that affirmative action plans are moral. In order to indicate where Professor Maccia'.s argument in support of affirmative action goes
awry, I propose to identify (1) her brand of affirmative action and (2) some
mistakes in the logical-illumination section. Then, in a critique of her
moral illumination of affirmative action plans, I will attempt to show how
these mistakes and other foibles contribute to the failure of her argument
in support of affinitive action. Finally, I will suggest what forms of
affirmative action in education appear to be defensible as just programs.
16
What Counts as Affirmative Action?
In order to identify Professor Maccia's argument in support of affirmative action, it should help at the outset to locate the brand of affirmative
action that she considers. Let us begin with the distinction whe draws between affirmative action and a passive stance of non-discrimination.
"(Affirmative action) requires deeds that rectify inequality of opportunity
due to discrimination," whereas non-discrimination requires only that"no
person... be denied employment or related benefits on grounds of his or her
2
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," except where such grounds
3
are relevant.
If my plan goes as intended, it will be helpful to extend
the distinction with further refinements. There are, it seems to me, four
basic types of affirmative action, two that logically require reverse discrimination and two that entail non-discrimination. Pfere I take "reverse
discrimination" to mean that the job-irrelevant criteria of minority status
and womanhood are given positive weight when screening applications. "Nondiscrimination" requires that applications be discriminated on job-relevant
criteria only.
Practice suggest the usefulness of analyzing reverse-discriminatory
affirmative action into two types — one that in some specified percentage
of cases makes the job-irrelevant criteria of minority status or being
female crucial and another that in all cases assigns some positive weight
to the same job-irrelevant criteria. The former constitutes the quota
system and the latter what Professor Maccia would, as I understand her paper,
call the "honest try" (the handicapping form), which is the form of affirmative action that she attempts to defend as a moral policy and for which she
thinks the Higher Education Guidelines—Executive Order 112U6 calls.
17
In x% of job openings of a
given category, job-irrelevant
criteria of minority status and
being female are made criteria
that must be met to be considered for the job
In all cases of job openings, the
job-irrelevant criteria of minority
status and being female are given
positive weight in review of job
applications.
Note: While these two types of reverse-discriminatory affirmative
action are logically distinct, they can, of course, be combined in
various ways in practice.
Figure 1
Perhaps because Professor Maccia treats non-discrimination and affirmative action as dichotomous, she overlooks the two basic types of affirmative
action of the non-discriminatory category. The first of these types, active
non-discrimination, should not be confounded with the "passive stance of
non-discrimination," even though it is a type of non-discrimination. Active
non-discrimination consists in taking steps to overcome blocks to nondiscrimination in the objective sense — blocks such as prejudices or prejudicial habits and practice, the existence of which or the discriminatory
nature of which persons may be unaware. To see just how active non-discrimination differs from non-discrimination simpliciter, it is important to underscore "in the objective sense." One might honestly believe that he or she
has not discriminated on the basis of race, sex, national origin, etc., and
yet have unknowingly so discriminated. That is, one might not discriminate
in the subjective sense against women and minorities and yet be so discriminating in the objective sense. Deeds undertaken to block discrimination in
the objective sense or unintended de facto discrimination, so as to avoid
discriminating directly or in effect against minorities and women, would
5
count as examples of non-discriminatory affirmative action.
18
The second type of non-discriminatory affirmative action would consist in
defensibly treating minority status and womanhood as job-relevant criteria.
For example, the producers of Sesame Street might defensibly treat being a
Chicano as a job-relevant criterion if, say, the job consists in serving as
an adult model (educationally speaking) for those viewers who are Chicano
children. Here note that although it is required that Chicanos be chosen
rather than non-Chicanos, this still counts as a case of non-discrimination
in that Chicano status is job-relevant. The sense in which this type of
non-discrimination qualifies as affirmative action is that it serves to
6
counter "underutilization" of minorities and females.
Action is taken to remove
blocks to non-discrimination
in the objective sense.
Where educationally defensible, the
criteria of minority status and being
female are made job-relevant and
crucial, so that only a minority or
woman may be considered for the job.
Figure 2
Given four logically distinct forms of affirmative action, to obtain
the answer that along with Professor Maccia we seek, we cannot simply ask
whether affirmative action is moral. Instead, we must put the question to
each form and at least be open to the possibility that we will find them to be
neither all morally defensible nor all morally indefensible.
Three Mistakes in Thinking About
Affirmative Action in Higher Education
Mistake #1: Failure to see that some might be more qualified than others.
The Higher Education Guidelines—Executive Order 11246 is written in
language that suggests that any given person either is or is not qualified
for any specified position.
19
As far as I can determine, Professor Maccia accepts the point in the sense
she employs the same qualified/unqualified distinction. Further, as the
distinction is used, if more than one person is "qualified" for a given
position, then an affirmative-action choice would be made on the basis of the
job-irrelevant criteria of minority status and being female.
Now there is no doubt about the fact that if I wish to go sailing, I'll
need a sailboat, rather than a speedboat, a tug, a steamship, or a freighter.
But if I wish to sail as precisely and efficiently as possible, then I would
be a fool to say that just any boat that qualifies as a sailboat will suffice.
Clearly some would be better for my purposes than others. Likewise, if a
faculty wishes to fill a vacancy, not just anyone who satisfies the minimal
requirements for the position may qualify in the stronger sense. That is,
being qualified admits of degree. While a group of candidates m y all in
some minimal sense be "qualified" for some position in an educational institution, it is, I think, most commonly the case that some are more qualified
than others. Strength of graduate degrees, quality of publications, depth
of teaching experience and expertise, significance of contributions to the
academic community and the like all suggest a variation in the quality of
"qualified" candidates. I offer this point not as a fresh insight, but as
a commonplace. My reason for underscoring the fact that qualifications Cat
least in educational institutions and likely in many other places) admit of
degree is this: if anyone but the most qualified applicant is offered the
position first, then the decision has been m d e on the basis of job-irrelevant
criteria and, like it or not, where the job-irrelevant criteria are minority
status and being female, that constitutes reverse discrimination. Moreover,
it the two irost qualified candidates are judged to be equally qualified, then
to choose outright the woman or minority candidate over the equally-asqualified non-minority m l e rather than to toss a coin, would constitute reverse discrimination.
20
The Higher Education Guideline—Executive Order 112U6 explicitly denounces any reverse discrimination "which leads to the seclection of unquali7
fied persons over qualified ones."
By failing to recognize the fact that
"qualified" persons' qualifications typically vary in degree, neither the
Guidelines nor Professor Maccia has acknowledged that in cases in which a
qualified candidate, who happens to be a non-minority male, appears to be
more qualified than another"qualified" candidate, who is a minority or a
woman, reverse discrimination would consist in the less qualified (not unqualified) person's being selected over the more qualified one.
(This point
seriously damages Professor Maccia's argument for the justness of the honesttry or handicapping form of affirmative action, as will be discussed later on.)
Mistake #2: Misunderstanding education as analogous to chess-playing.
Professor Maccia offers the university as an example of a formal social
organization that is instituted for the promotion of learning. Further, she
states, "a university is constituted by rules which are essential for the
promotion of learning." At first blush, these two points m y appear to be
harmless generalizations that are likely true. Closer scrutiny reveals a
misunderstanding that bodes logical trouble when mounting arguments regarding
affirmative action in universities and colleges.
Let us take that closer look. Professor Maccia observes that chess is
constituted by rules that must be followed if one player is either to capture
or to check another player's king. Likewise, she continues, if one wishes to
promote learning, then one must follow the rules that constitute the university.
The rub appears to come from treating educating as analogous to chess-playing.
Surely one can promote learning without following the rules of any university.
Indeed, one need not even be aware of such things called rules of the university
and yet promote learning within that university, though surely one must be
aware of the rules of chess in order to capture another's king.
21
That is, if one fails to follow the rules of chess, it logically follows that
one is not playing chess. But if one fails to follow the rules of a university
(e.g., rules for hiring faculty), it does not necessarily follow that one is
not promoting learning.
(A professor's dream?: Follow my rules and it logi-
cally follows that you will learn.)
The analogy misleads insofar as it misses the point of constitutive
rules: descriptive definition. The rules of chess constitute the game of
chess. Likewise, the rules of a particular university define that university
as an institution. But the rules of the university themselves are not
essential to the achievement of the goals of the university. Clearly, the
promotion of learning could always be accomplished otherwise. Any sound
defense of any kind of affirmative action must at least not be based on an
assumption to the contrary. Put otherwise, any argument for any form of
affirmative action necessarily fails if it hinges on the claim that the
essential learning goals of universities cannot be promoted if affirmative
action guidelines are not followed in the hiring of faculty.
Mistake #3: Failure to distinguish the university's goal of the promotion of
learning from just any promotion of just any learning.
Throughout her paper, Professor Maccia refers to the goal of universities as the promotion of learning. To be sure she has company. Commonly we
talk loosely about universities being places of learning, and usually such
talk does no harm. But when the topic regards the rules under which universities are to be staffed, the time has come to be more precise. Universities
are neither the place for just any kind of promotion of learning nor the place
for the promotion of just any learning. The first point first. Learning can
be promoted in a tremendous number of considerably different ways, ranging
from conditioning to the provision of exemplary models of rational inquiry
across the gamut of disciplines.
I trust that it is clear that not every
way in which learning could be promoted is appropriate in a university.
Second, of the myriad things that can be learned and the numerous levels on
which they can be learned, not all learnings are appropriate goals for
university endeavors. Not even all laudable learnings are appropriate. For
example, the learning of rudimentary reading skills is surely a worthwhile
activity, yet the university hardly seems to be the appropriate place to make
direct attempts at the eradication of illiteracy. A defense of affirmative
action procedures in higher education that is grounded on the assumption that
just any promotion of just any learning will do denies, among other things,
the univeristy its identity. Surely, no matter how well-intended, proposals
for hiring procedures within universities that disregard the nature of the
university should not be j edged solely on the power of the proposed procedures
to diminish "underutilization" of women and minorities.
What's Wrong with Professor Maccia's Argument?
What I have to say in this section is addressed to Professor Maccia's
argument in favor of honest-try or handicapping affirmative action. While
I have seen no other argument in support of affirmative action that is exactly
the same as Professor Maccia's, her argument seems to be of the same form as
8
arguments in support of reverse discrimination in general.
So I think that
my remarks will have applications that go beyond the criticism of the Maccia
argument and extend even beyond a refutation of handicapping to a criticism
of the quota form of affirmative action.
In my interpretation, Professor Maccia's argument in support of handicapping constitutes an argument in support of a revolutionary tactic and,
as such, suffers a moral malaise that is common in the justification of
revolutions.
In an attempt to clarify and back up this interpretation, I
will (1) distinguish two kinds of revolutions, (2) call on a distinction
between the Good Life and right action, (3) show that Professor Maccia's
argument calls for a revolutionary "great leap forward" and, in so doing,
does not satisfy Rawls's principles of justice. At this point I can only
23
beg the reader's indulgence while I take this "revolutionary" detour and hope
that it will have been worth the efforts.
There are two kinds of revolutions, one that changes the political order
(the "overthrow" revolution) and another that consists in a "great leap forward" (the great-leap revolution).
Both overthrow and great-leap revolutionaries
have a vision of the Good Life, a Utopia in which to believe. Realization of
the Good Life as they envision it serves as the focus of the efforts of both
types of revolutionaries, though the two types perceive themselves as being
at different stages in their strivings. In the Overthrow, the revolutionaries
conceive themselves to be laying the foundation for the political order or
power structure that undergirds the Good Life they envision. On the other
hand, the revolutionaries who press forward with the Great Leap believe that
the basic political order for the Good Life has already been established and
that they, instead, are taking a short cut in the establishment of the soical
relations, culture and technology that, atop the political foundation, constitute the conditions for the Good Life. Here care needs to be taken to
distinguish revolutions — both Overthrows and Great Leaps — from just any
change in the political order, social relations, etc. The revolutionary,
as opposed to other agents of change, believes that pursuit of the Good Life
is itself sufficient justification for the suspension of individual rights,
though just which rights are deemed suspensible varies from revolutionary
to revolutionary.
The proponents of affirmative action as reverse discrimination, if
ascribed patriotic purposes, are great-leap revolutionaries. They believe •
that the basic political foundation for the Good Life in the United States
has already been laid, but that other conditions of the American dream of a
thoroughly democratic society have yet to be established. For example,
evidence remains that discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, etc.
still largely determines who enjoys what social and economic benefits. As
a great-leap revolutionary, the proponent of reverse discrimination is both
24
committed to the realization of the American dream as a goal and impatient.
"We have waited long enough!" or "It is past time that we make amends for
the injustices of discrimination!" is the clarion call. The rationale for
revolutionary tactics is this:
(1) an essential feature of the dream rea-
lized is that there be no significant correlation between race, color, sex,
etc. and position in the society; (2) whatever can be done should be done —
and done as soon as possible — to destroy the imbalances that the present
correlations indicate. The dream first; fairness to individuals second.
I propose that the difference between making the great leap via quotas and
"leaping" via handicapping rests with the extent to which individual rights
(in particular, the right to fair treatment) are considered suspensible.
With the quota system, the right to" an equal chance at jobs is, in some
percentage of cases, flatly denied the non-minority male. With the handicapping method of leaping forward, the non-minority male's chances are
systematically reduced, though not denied outright. That is, the nonminority male is docked relative points for his status as non-minority
male, though he would not be denied the job if, in spite of his handicap,
he were still to acquire the greatest number of points. The non-discriminationist (i.e., the person who believes that decisions should be made
only on job-relevant grounds), on the other hand, does not believe that
the individual's right to fair treatment is suspensible, even if without
its suspension the dream (as a goal rather than as an aim) takes longer to
realize.
Herein lies the crucial difference between non-discriminatory affirmative action and reverse-discriminatory affirmative action. Under nondiscrimination, fair treatment is not believed to be morally suspensible under
any condition, while under reverse discrimination, fair treatment is believed to be morally suspensible for purposes of expediency and welfare, i.e.,
if its suspension promises to contribute to the realization of the Good Life.
25
This preoccupation with the dream, even to the detriment of fair treatment
of individuals, constitutes the central moral failing in justifications of
9
revolutions. Demonstration of the priority of individual rights over
establishing Utopias reaches well beyond the bounds of this small paper.
I
refer to John RawlsTs development of "the priority of justice over efficiency
10
and welfare."
Now to Professor Maccia's argument in particular. After her having
noddingly quoted Kant's imperative that persons never merely be treated as
means and rawls's principles of social justice, her argument for denying
fair treatment to non-minority
11males for purposes of achieving social ends
may seem a bit of a surprise.
Let us review, step by step, the Maccia
argument for honest-try affirmative action.
Good-Life Premise: -Persons should "share in the benefits of the distribution of natural talents, whatever that distribution
might be."12
Good-Life-Not-Yet- Discriminatory practices have denied us all benefits
Achieved Premises: of the natural talents of minorities and women.^
Short-Cut Premise:
"By actually hiring women and minorities qualified to
promote learning, (natural) talents formerly unavailable result in benefit for all."14
Conclusion
(Recommendation):
We should hire minorities and women who are qualified,
before hiring non-minority males who are qualified.
Let us examine each premise in turn. First, the Good-Life Premise,
which appears to be based on a misunderstanding of Rawls's second principle
of justice. As I understand the second principle, its point is to define
the conditions under which social and economic inequalities are justifiable.
In the Maccia reading, with which I take issue, Rawls's seocnd principle
does more. Namely, it requires that arrangements be made so that everyone
benefits from the distribution of natural talents. My point is this:
contrary to the Maccia reading, the second principle is in agreement with
extending those persons with greater natural talents greater liberties
26
only if such extentions are of benefit to even the least socially and economically advantaged.
In other words, Professor Maccia appears to mistake
the second principle as a statement that obligates the naturally more
talented to act so as to share whatever the benefits of their talents with
others, when all that can be drawn from the principle about natural talents
is that the naturally more talented should not be extended greater social
and economic liberties unless such inequalities can both (1) "reasonably
(be) expected to be to everyone's advantage and (2) (be) attached to posi16
tions and offices open to all be"
(presumably on a merit basis).
There is surely a grain of truth in the Good-Life-Not-Yet-Achieved
Premise.
It does seem plausible that discriminatory practices have denied
us all a number of things, sane of which may well be benefits that might
derive from natural talents of minorities and women. Rather than to press
for a definition of "natural talents," let us consider the context and what
natural talents likely are not. The context of affirmative action that
Professor Maccia discusses is higher education. If benefits of talents
are at issue, surely it would be benefits of acquired, not natural, talents.
If the statement were rewritten with "acquired talents of minorities and
women," the premise could then serve well as a piece of an argument in
support of non-discrimination, but not as a piece of an argument for handicapping.
It would serve an arguement in support of non-discrimination in
that the relevant acquired talents would count as job-relevant criteria and
those with the highest ranking job-relevant acquired talents would be hired,
without regard to sex, race, etc.
The three mistakes identified earlier permeate the Short-Cut Premise
which, for ease of reference, I repeat here:
By actually hiring women and minorities qualified to promote learning,
talents formerly unavailable result in benefit for all.
27
Perhaps most obviously, the Short-cut Premise suffers from Mistake #1, the
failure to see that some might be more qualified than others. Only if in
fact women and minorities historically have been or perhaps now are more
qualified to promote learning, then it would follow that hiring minorities
and women would avail us of benefits presently denied us by discrimination
against minorities and women. From our armchairs, we cannot say whether
women or minorities as a group have been or are in fact more qualified, but
it seems unlikely. Indeed, part of the discrimination problem has been the
denial, whether outright or indirect, of educational preparation that would
have qualified women and minorities to compete for the most-qualified status.
It perhaps should again be noted that not only does this mistake damage
the internal logic of the premise, but also it serves to camouflage the
fact that handicapping is a form of reverse discrimination.
Additionally (or maybe alternatively), the Short-cut Premise may be
interpreted as ailing from Mistake #2, misunderstanding education as analogous to chess-playing. For the premise to stand up under scrutiny, it
would have to be true that the mere having of rules that require women and
minorities to be given preferential treatment in hiring decisions would
insure that their promotion-of-learning talents would benefit us all. As
discussed in earlier consideration of Mistake #2, educating cannot be done
by definition; instead, it must be done by acting in a world not in which
results are obtained by declaration, but in which action must be assessed
by empirical means. No definition can warrant the claim that preferential
treatment of women or minorities will either promote learning or, in a
more general sense, benefit us all.
But let us momentarily forget the first two mistakes in the Shortcut Premise, in order to uncover a third foible. Let us imagine that women
and minorities have special talents (natural or acquired) for promoting
learning — talents that
WDuld
make them qualified to promote learning in
28
in a way that non-minority males could not be qualified or as qualified.
For the premise to stand up, it would have to be true both that the type of
promotion of learning in which minorities and women have speical talents
and that the learnings that they are especially talented in promoting are
appropriate in the university. Though perhaps an interesting logical
possibility, it seems most unlikely that this is in fact so. If, for
example, the type of promotion of learning that is appropriate in universities
is the provision of exemplary models of inquiry in the knowledge disciplines,
then minorites and women, as groups, would not appear to be especially
naturally talented in the requisite way. That one would be a "born" inquirer in sane intellectual discipline — a human artifice — seems clearly
unlikely. And, as noted before, women and minorities have not had opportunities equivalent to those of non-minority males to acquire such talents.
So surely they have not acquired special talents of the same sort. If women and minorities do have special natural talents in the promotion of
learning (Here sexist and racist phrases come to mind:
"a woman's touch,"
"blacks are born musicians," etc.), it seems most unlikely either that
these sorts of "talents" would enable one to promote learning in the manner
or with the content that is appropriate in an institution of higher education.
So even if the Sort-cut Premise were not ridden with Mistake #1 and Mistake
#2, it would still be weakened by Mistake #3, the failure to distinguish
i
the university's goal of the promotion of learning from just any promotion
of learning and the promotion of just any learning.
In Defense of Non-Discriminatory Affirmative Action
Having argued against the quota and handicapping forms of affirmative
action, I feel compelled to draw attention to the alternative, non-discriminatory affirmative action, lest what can and should be done in pursuit of
the Good Life be overlooked. I share the revolutionary's dream that one
day prejudicial practices and attitudes will have disappeared — that
29
positions in OUP social and economic order will be granted and assumed
fairly, which means at least without irrelevant regard to any person's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. Do I support affirmative action?
Yes, but...Yes, I support non-discriminatory affirmative action, but no,
I cannot abide the suspension of fair treatment of some individuals that
reverse-discriminatory affirmative action requires.
The crucial question is this: what justly can be done to bring minority and female participation in our society up to par with that of non-minority males? That is, without treating any persons as means rather than ends,
without violating any person's right to justice as fairness, what can we do
in pursuit of our dream? More particularly, what can and should we do in
the context of education?
Let us begin with the anti-affirmative-action, laissez-faire thesis:
all that is required to bring minority and female participation up to par
with that of non-minority males is that discrimination against minorites
and women in hiring and employment practices be stopped. The validity of
this view rests on the premise that the effects of past discrimination
will disappear at least automatically, if npt immediately. In other words,
if we just stop discriminating against minorities and women, they will
gradually begin to share in the social and economic positions on a par
with non-minority males. It seems to me that the point really cannot be
disputed, especially if no consideration is given to how long that might
take and if it is assumed that raw intelligence is distributed randomly
throughout the population. Over time the statistics would no doubt change.
But must we be content with merely not disallowing their participation?
Short of discriminating against non-minority males (i.e., short of the
reverse-discrimination short cut), are there perhaps ways in which the
fuller participation of minorities and women might be discouraged?
30
What we seek here are employment policies in higher education that (1)
must not deny fair treatment to anyone as an individual and (2) must have
the likely effect of encouraging minorities and women to become prepared to
18
compete and actually to compete for the "most qualified" status.
The
possible means to these ends are infinitely many. What I propose here are
what I take to be the three categories of actions that could and should be
undertaken. Definition of more particular prescriptions that would fall
within these three categories is limited only by criteria 1 and 2 above,
one's imagination, and empirical support regarding "what works."
The first two categories of action I propose aim to counter the longengrained crony system and constitute an affirmative action policy of active
non-discrimination.
One can imagine that a selection committee might
honestly believe that it discriminates between candidates only on job relevant criteria and yet always select a non-minority male, especially if
additional criteria were unknowingly applied (e.g., extra points for someone who had been a student of an old friend). A non-minority male would
certainly be selected if no excellently qualified minorities or women were
even to apply for the position. That is, in the selection of persons to
be hired, promoted, or granted merit pay or other such social and economic
benefits of employment, non-discriminatory criteria could honestly be believed to be applied or could actually be applied and yet no change might
occur in the level of participation of women and minorities.
The two categories of action that would seem to be good candidates
for breaking through the crony system are (1) a review of the job to be
done and publication of criteria to be employed and (2) a comprehensive
search for excellently qualified19
candidates, including excellently qualified
minorities and women candidates.
31
A review of each position to be filled, if undertaken with the express
purpose of expunging job-irrelevant hiring and promotion criteria, would
likely have the effect of eliminating the "crony criteria" so long engrained
in the thinking of so many academics.
(By 'review of the job to be done,'
I do not intend a weakening of the job so as to reduce qualifications.)
It is one thing to believe that one is applying strictly job—relevant criteria and yet another actually to apply only job-relevant criteria. The
(
point of a review of the job to be done and publication of the job-relevant
criteria would be to increase the likelihood that no job-irrelevant criteria
would be brought to bear in the employment decisions. An underlying assumption here is that whatever the intent of the crony criteria, one of the
effects has been to discriminate, if directly, against minorities and women
and, to be sure, other groups as well.
The point of the comprehensive search for excellent candidates, including excellently qualified minority and women candidates, is likely
transparent; characteristically the crony system limts advertisement of the
vacant position to passing the word along to a few collegues a worst or to
making announcements in publications and societies "in the field" at best.
Indeed, one point on which the Higher Education Guidelines appear to be
clearly on a just track regards recruitment of candidates in particular,
namely the specification of what might be done to uncover whatever excellently qualified minority and women candidates exist.
While the first two categories of affirmative action I propose likely
ring familiar, the third may sound novel: a policy of allowing educationally
defensible minority and female jobs.
(It should be noted that there is
some evidence to suggest that the kind of action I have in mind 20
m y run
counter to some interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
) In
short, I wish to suggest that for educational purposes some jobs be defined
in such a way that either being a minority or being a woman counts as a
crucial job-relevant criterion.
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Recall that the point of the first category of action is to "clean up" job
criteria so as to make the criteria brought to bear strictly job-relevant;
the aim of the second is to seek applications from all persons who are excellently qualified, including excellently qualified minorities and women.
The purpose of the third category of action is to educationally encourage
women and minorities to prepare for occupations and positions for which
historically only non-minority males have been educationally encouraged.
It will take considerable imagination and empirical work to determine what
specifically could be done that would constitute effective educational encouragement. One possibility comes readily to mind:
from what we presently
know about the effects of role-models on the young, in order to break the
traditional occupational patterns and expectations, it m y well be essential
that some jobs in educational agencies be defined as being strictly for
minorities or women. That is, perhaps we need to define some educational
positions as role-model positions, lest we never succeed in altering the
role expectations for minorities and women in our society. If "educational"
is read broadly, as I think it must be if we are at all serious about the
American dream, then expressly minority and women role-model positions
must be instituted, for example, in advertising in general, TV and radio
programming, service organizations, churches and other agencies with educative potency, as well as within our schools. As illustration, presently
allowing advertising to encourage young females to believe that their
proper domin of concern runs from the selection of detergents to the
polishing of floors bodes a continuation of slim findings in our next
generation's searches for excellently qualified female candidates for
positions in higher education.
To be sure, not just any educational purpose that could be served by
allowing only females and minorities access to particular positions ought
to be served. The basis for establishing such positions should be more
narrowly defined.
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At least we ought to have good reason to believe that the allowance of such
educational positions would alter the established and self-perpetuating
patterns of exclusion of women and minorities from the social and economic
benefits on a part with non-minority males.
I do not mean to suggest that if we design and implement programs that
promote actions of these three categories then we will have achieved the
elusive dream. Many other factors, some of which we somewhat understand,
also block the way. My intent here has been only to suggest what sorts of
affirmative action can and should be undertaken in the context of education
so that the realm of higher education might, by gust means, come closer
sooner to the American dream than it would if we were to reply solely on
non-discrimination to take its course.