China’s Economy
China’s Economic Policy Operation Becoming More
Difficult: Can China Promote “Supply-side Structural
Reform?”
Yoshino Tamai, Economist
China Unit,
Research Department – Asia
Mizuho Research Institute Ltd.
([email protected])
1. Introduction
(1) Concern over the outlook for the Chinese economy being reignited
The Chinese financial markets got off to a rocky start in 2016. The Chinese yuan has continued to slide against the
U.S. dollar since December 2015, due to U.S. interest rate hikes and other reasons, while the pace of depreciation
accelerated after the turn of the year (see Fig. 1). This is mainly due to the prevailing view in the markets that the
Chinese authorities showed a willingness to tolerate a weaker yuan.
In December 2015, the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) announced a new yuan index that
measures the currency’s value against a basket of 13 major currencies, and said that it would put more emphasis
on the index than the yuan’s movements against a single currency,1 which led to the growing speculation that the
Chinese authorities would tolerate the depreciation of the yuan against the U.S. dollar. Furthermore, on Jan. 6 and
7, the People’s Bank of China set the reference rate for the yuan against the U.S. dollar slightly weaker than the
previous day’s prevailing closing price at 4:30 pm, which heightened the speculation mentioned above and
resulted in a sharp drop in the yuan. As both the Caixin manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMI indicators
declined in December (see Fig. 2), there was a widespread view in the markets that the Chinese economy might be
slowing down at such a fast pace that the Chinese government needs to allow the yuan to weaken in order to boost
exports, as was the case in August 2015, when the yuan weakened due to adjustments of the reference rate for the
yuan.
The depreciation of the yuan puts downward pressure on stock prices. The Shanghai Composite Index dropped to
a low level equivalent to that marked after a plunge in share prices in late August 2015, and the index fell below
the milestone 3,000 level in mid-January. That triggered a sharp drop in share prices in major countries and
regions from the beginning of the year. The latest slump in Shanghai stock prices was also influenced by
individual systemic reasons, such as that the circuit-breaker system introduced on Jan. 4 to stabilize share prices
resulted in causing investors to sell stocks, and that a ban on stock sales by large shareholders, which was
introduced upon a sharp drop in share prices last summer, was scheduled to be lifted on Jan. 8. However, even
after the circuit-breaker system was suspended and after the Chinese government decided to extend the ban on
stock sales, there has been no strong rally in share prices. This is apparently because the continued depreciation of
the yuan re-ignited concern over the outlook for the Chinese economy.
1
China Foreign Exchange Trade System, "The Launch of RMB Index Helps to Guide Public View of RMB Exchange Rate", Dec.11, 2015.
1
China’s Economy
Fig. 2: Caixin PMI
Fig. 1: Foreign exchange/Shanghai Composite Index
RMB/USD rate (left axis)
RMB
appreciation
(RMB/USD)
6.10
Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (right axis)
6.20
6.30
(Points)
5,500
60
Manufacturing
Non-manufacturing
58
5,000
56
4,500
54
Economic
expansion
52
4,000
50
6.40
3,500
RMB
depreciation
6.50
48
46
3,000
6.60
Economic
depression
44
2,500
42
6.70
2,000
15/01
15/03
15/05
15/07
15/09
15/11
40
10/01
16/01
(Year/month)
11/01
12/01
13/01
14/01
15/01
(Year/month)
Note: Number of sample: 420 manufacturing companies and
Note: Most recent day: January 20
more than 400 non-manufacturing companies
Source: Compiled by Mizuho Research Institute based on data from
Source: Compiled by Mizuho Research Institute based on data from
Bloomberg
the Caixin and the Wind.
(2) Chinese leadership’s policy operation capability: Drawing attention
As the concern over the outlook for the Chinese economy is not dispelled, it is still possible that the markets will
become volatile again. For that, market players are looking at the Chinese leadership’s policy operation capability
regarding whether it can help the Chinese economy make a soft landing.
China’s real gross domestic product grew by 6.9% year-on-year in 2015. While the growth pace slowed down
compared to 7.3% in 2014, the government goal of around a 7% growth rate was achieved. The Chinese
government claims that the country could realize a “medium- and high-speed” growth rate, the stabilization of
consumer prices, and job security amid a weak recovery of the global economy, thanks to macro control. However,
investments in infrastructures have been delayed due to local government bureaucrats, who are being taken to task
by widespread movements to eliminate corruption and other reasons, while the implementation of policies (the
purposes of which are not clear) caused the financial markets to become volatile. It is true that these facts
heightened distrust toward China’s capabilities to make policy responses and communicate with markets.
Will the Chinese leadership be able to dispel distrust towards its policy implementation capability and curb
widespread concern over the future of the Chinese economy by steadily implementing policies necessary to
realize a soft landing of the economy this year? In the following article, I would like to organize the direction and
priority issues in this year’s economic policies based on the Central Economic Work Conference and on the
statements of important figures. Then, I will examine problems in policy operation faced by the Chinese
leadership and show where risks lie.
2
China’s Economy
2. China: Planning to promote “supply-side structural reform” along with the enhancement of measures to
support the economy in 2016
(1) Support for the economy through fiscal and monetary policies: To be strengthened.
According to the brief summary of the minutes of the Central Economic Work Conference (held from Dec.
18–21, 2015), in which the direction of the economic policies for 2016 was decided, 2016 is positioned as the
“first year of the decisive stage for comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society” (which refers to a
basically “well-off society”). This corresponds to the fact that, when the draft of the 13th Five-Year Plan, a
mid-term policy outline for the 2016–2020 period, was adopted at the 5th plenary session of the 18th Communist
Party of China (CPC), held at the end of October 2015, the five-year period was described as “a decisive stage for
comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society.” As concrete numerical targets, the plan stipulates that
China will aim to double the 2010 GDP and per capita income of both urban and rural residents by 2020, and in
order to achieve the targets, Chinese President Xi Jinping said in a statement that “The annual growth for the
2016–2020 period must be at least 6.5%.”2 Based on the mid-term growth targets, China is highly likely to aim for
an annual growth rate of from 6.5% to 6.9% in 2016. Therefore, the growth target for 2016 will be lowered from
around the 7% set for 2015.
However, even though the annual growth target is lowered, it is necessary to support the economy through fiscal
and monetary policies in order to lower the pace of economic slowdown in the face of numerous structural
problems, such as adjustments of excess production capacity. A statement released after the Central Economic
Work Conference said that fiscal policy must be more forceful and monetary policy more flexible, suggesting that
China would strengthen measures to support the economy. In addition, it also said that the fiscal deficit ratio
should be expanded as needed, an expression that was not used in the conference held at the end of 2014,
prompting the view that China will likely conduct policy operation, putting more emphasis on fiscal policies.
(2) Emphasizing the promotion of “supply-side structural reform”
What should be noted in the latest Central Economic Work Conference is that China was aware of the negative
effects of excessive dependence on economic pump-priming measures, and emphasizes that the country aims to
achieve sustainable growth by promoting “supply-side structural reform.” This “supply-side structural reform” is a
key phrase that has been often used by Chinese leaders such as President Xi and Premier Li Keqiang since around
November 2015. The term means to adjust excess capital stock while expanding the supply of new goods and
services to meet and stimulate people’s demand. In detail, China aims to work on the following “five tasks”: (1)
cutting excess production capacity, (2) reducing corporate costs, (3) eliminating housing stocks, (4) expanding
effective supply, and (5) preventing and resolving financial risks (see Fig. 3).
2
三浦祐介（2015）
「中国・新五カ年計画の骨格と特徴～小康社会の全面的完成にむけた習政権の政策課題～」
（みずほ総合研究所『みず
ほインサイト』11 月 13 日）。
3
China’s Economy
Fig. 3: “Five Tasks” listed by the Central Economic Work Conference
Task
Major measures
1
Cutting excess
production
capacity
• Marketization of bankruptcy procedures, acceleration of bankruptcy examination
• Financial support and preferential tax measures for the disposal of non-performing
loans and support for the re-employment of unemployed people, etc.
• Dealing with corporate mergers and realignments as much as possible and reducing
bankruptcies and liquidation
2
Reducing
corporate costs
• Lowering costs for administrative procedures, burden of tax and social insurance
premiums, fiscal costs, electricity rates, logistic costs, etc.
3
Eliminating
housing stocks
• Expanding the housing demand of mainly rural farmers working in cities through
urbanization and household registration system reforms
• Developing a housing rental market
4
Expanding
effective supply
• Developing new industries, technologies, products, and business models to meet
and stimulate demand
• Supporting the improvement of technologies of firms and replacement of facilities
5
Preventing and
resolving financial
risks
• Dealing with defaults according to law
• Resolving local government debt risks
Source: Compiled by Mizuho Research Institute based on data from 中央经济工作会议在北京举行 习近平李克强作重要讲话
(『中国政府网』2015 年 12 月 21 日)
3. “Five tasks” for 2016
(1) Cutting excess production capacity
Then, what situations and problems lie behind the setting of the above-mentioned “five tasks,” and what policies
will the Chinese government launch?
First, regarding “cutting excess production capacity,” which is listed at the top of the five tasks, Premier Li made
his first visit of 2016 to Taiyuan, Shanxi Province, and held a conference on the reduction of excess production
capacity, inviting representatives from local governments in Shanxi Province, Shaanxi Province, the Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Shandong Province, where the steel and coal industries are the main
industries, along with representatives from 24 major companies in these industries. This suggests that the issue is
of fairly high importance.3
The issue of excess production capacity in China became serious following large-scale economic stimulus
measures taken after the 2008 economic crisis. According to a survey on Chinese domestic companies, the ratio of
companies saying that their excess production capacity is “very serious” or “slightly serious” has been increasing
every year. As of 2015, more than 70% of the surveyed companies (number of samples: about 2,500) believed
their excess production capacity to be a serious problem, according to the survey (see Fig. 4). By industry, the
level of seriousness is high in the basic materials industries, such as mining, non-metallic mineral products,
non-ferrous metal, and steel, as well as in the machinery industries, such as transport machinery and general
machinery.
3
「李克强：综合施策 标本兼治 以结构性改革促进困难行业脱困发展」（『中国政府网』2015 年 1 月 7 日）。
4
China’s Economy
In addition, according to the same survey, as excess production capacity became serious, the capacity utilization
rate fell for the entire manufacturing sector, and the rate remained at a low level of 66.6% in 2015 (see Fig. 5).
Cutting excess production capacity requires corporate merger/realignment or corporate bankruptcy/liquidation in
addition to the reduction of new production capacity, while the Central Economic Work Conference announced
that China would deal with the issue by corporate merger and realignment as much as possible and reduce
corporate bankruptcies and liquidation. Then, the statement issued by the conference stipulates that China will
work on speeding up bankruptcy procedures, disposing of unprofitable assets, and providing financial support and
preferential tax measures for support for the re-employment of unemployed people, etc., which suggests an
intention to minimize negative effects of adjustments. Especially, if negative effects on employment become
obvious, public support for the Chinese leadership is expected to decline. Therefore, China will put extra emphasis
on the reallocation of human resources and the creation of jobs.
Fig. 4: Questionnaire survey on excess production capacity
Unit: %
Very serious
All industrie s
Slightly
serious
No problem
Very serious
and slightly
serious
16.1
58.6
25.3
74.7
2014
15.5
58.5
26.0
74.0
2013
12.8
58.3
28.9
71.1
2012
12.8
54.3
32.9
67.1
Mining industry
33.3
52.4
14.3
85.7
Manufacturing industry
19.8
60.3
19.9
80.1
Non-metallic mineral products
31.1
63.1
5.8
94.2
Non-ferrous metals metallurgy/rolling processing
30.8
50.0
19.2
80.8
Iron steel metallurgy/rolling processing
28.6
64.3
7.1
92.9
Railway/ships/aerospace/other transport machinery
25.0
41.7
33.3
66.7
Chemical fiber
25.0
62.5
12.5
87.5
Automobiles
23.0
68.8
8.2
91.8
Industrial machinery
22.7
54.6
22.7
77.3
General machinery
22.4
65.1
12.5
87.5
Computer/communications/other electronic devices
21.6
58.8
19.6
80.4
Apparel/clothing
20.5
61.3
18.2
81.8
Paper manufacturing/paper products
19.0
66.7
14.3
85.7
Electric machine/electric appliance
18.8
61.2
20.0
80.0
Chemical raw material/chemical material products
18.8
62.4
18.8
81.2
Metallic products
18.3
63.4
18.3
81.7
T extile
18.1
69.5
12.4
87.6
Rubber/plastic products
17.1
62.2
20.7
79.3
Food/alcohol/beverages
16.0
53.4
30.6
69.4
Precision apparatus/measuring gauges
8.8
44.1
47.1
52.9
Medicine
5.4
62.2
32.4
67.6
Note 1: Questionnaire survey covering managers of Chinese companies; the survey was separately conducted from August to
September in 2014 and from August to October in 2015.
Note 2: The shaded area refers to industries in which the ratio of respondents saying their excess production capacity is “very serious”
in the 2015 survey increased from that in the 2014 survey.
Source: Compiled by Mizuho Research Institute based on data from 中国企业家调查系统 (2014，2015)
5
China’s Economy
Fig. 5: Capacity utilization rate in the manufacturing sector
85
（％）
80
75
70
65
60
2006 07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
（年）
(Year)
Note: As data for 2010 does not exist, it was interpolated using average values between the figures for 2009 and 2011.
Source: Compiled by Mizuho Research Institute based on data from 中国企业家调查系统 (Each year’s version)
(2) Reducing corporate costs
The second task is “reducing corporate costs.” Concerning the questionnaire survey mentioned in Chapter 3
Section (1), in a question that asked what major management problems companies face, answers related to
financial burdens such as “increase in labor costs” and “excessive burden of social insurance premiums and tax”
ranked high. Especially, the ratio of respondents saying “excessive burden of social insurance premiums and tax”
has been increasing year-by-year (see Fig. 6). Meanwhile, according to a report issued by the China Center for
Promotion of SME Development, 66% of the total (number of samples: about 4,000 companies) said that they
faced rising funding costs.4
The Central Economic Work Conference says that China will deal with the reduction of corporate costs by
combining several policies. In detail, China will: (1) cut costs for administrative procedures through
administrative reforms, (2) review the unreasonable collection of costs and reduce tax and various costs by
considering cutting the value-added tax rate on the manufacturing sector and other measures, (3) lower social
insurance premiums through the detailed examination of the social security system, (4) reduce fiscal costs through
financial reforms, (5) cut electricity rates through price liberalization, and (6) reduce logistics costs through
distribution system reforms, etc.
These measures are not temporary economic measures to reduce costs, but are aimed at preventing the generation
of unnecessary costs through administrative, fiscal, tax system, and financial reforms, etc. Meanwhile, the Chinese
government has already started working on measure (5), lowering retail prices for electricity for general industry
and commerce on Jan. 1, 2016.5
4
5
中国工业和信息化部「《2015 年全国企业负担调查评价报告》发布」2015 年 10 月 20 日。
国家发展和改革委员会「国家发展改革委关于降低燃煤发电上网电价和一般工商业用电价格的通知」2015 年 12 月 28 日。
6
China’s Economy
Fig. 6: Questionnaire survey concerning major problems faced by companies
90
(%)
80
70
60
50
40
30
Increase in labor costs
Excessive burden of social insurance premiums and tax
Excessive production capacity problems
Declining corporate earnings
Tight finances
20
10
0
2011
12
13
14
15 (Year)
Note: Ratio of companies answering “It is a major management problem” to each issue
Source: Compiled by Mizuho Research Institute based on data from 中国企业家调查系统 (2015)
(3) Eliminating housing stocks
The third task is to eliminate housing stocks, and this is a necessary measure to adjust capital stock along with the
first task of cutting excess production capacity. The Central Urban Work Conference, at which urban planning is
discussed, was held at the end of 2015 for the first time in 37 years since 1978, which indicates that the third task
has a high level of importance.
Among housing stocks in China, the floor area of large housing stock compared to the sold floor area of
residential buildings has been increasing since 2010. While this figure slightly declined in 2015 from the previous
year, it still remains at a high level (see Fig. 7). The apparent reason behind this is that local governments
increased the supply of residential land for the purpose of increasing income from selling the right to use land6
and other reasons. Especially, local cities that have little population influx tend to have a high level of housing
stocks. Such an accumulation of housing stocks puts pressure on the real estate market, and has negative effects
on real economies, local government finances, and financial soundness. As a measure to eliminate housing stocks,
the Central Economic Work Conference decided to aim to expand housing demand by admitting urban residents
having rural residency status and others to settle in the cities where they are working through urbanization and
household registration system reforms. In addition, the conference also decided to aim to develop the housing
rental market and promote the realignment and merger of real estate companies. While China has already
implemented measures to eliminate housing stocks such as easing regulations on home purchases and converting
residential buildings for sale into policy-support-type buildings for low- and middle-income earners,7 the country
6
三浦祐介（2014）
「中国不動産市場の底入れはいつか～住宅市場の循環に基づく考察と今後の展望～」
（みずほ総合研究所『みずほイン
サイト』10 月 23 日）
。
7
三浦祐介（2015）
「調整局面を脱する中国不動産市場～ただし回復のペースは緩慢となる見込み」
（みずほ総合研究所『みずほインサイ
ト』6 月 9 日）。
7
China’s Economy
aims to take a further step to fully work on the reduction of housing stocks through reforms.
Fig. 7: Floor area of in-process housing inventory (compared to the sold floor area of residential buildings)
(Times)
6
Tier-1 cities
Tier 3 cities
5
Tier 2 cities
4
3
2
Nationwide
average
1
0
2006 07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
(Year)
Note 1: Floor area of in-process inventory = Construction area – Completed area
Note 2: Tier-1 cities are the four cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. Tier-2 cities are the 20 cities of Nanjing, Hangzhou, Hefei,
Ningbo, and Xiamen, etc. Tier-3 cities are the five cities of Haikou, Guiyang, Kunming, Yinchuan, and Urumqi.
Source: Compiled by Mizuho Research Institute based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China
(4) Expanding effective supply
The first and third tasks are aimed at reducing excess supply of production capacity and real estate, etc., while the
direction of the fourth task, “expanding effective supply” is different from the first and third. The fourth task is
intended to expand the supply of new goods and services to meet and stimulate demand.
At the Central Economic Work Conference, the following issues were listed: (1) resolution of the poverty issue,
(2) support for the improvement of technologies and the replacement of facilities, (3) introduction of soft and hard
infrastructure, and (4) supply of high-quality agricultural products, etc. At first glance, these issues appear to vary
from each other, but they all require a supply of goods and services in order to respond to currently unmet demand
or to create new demand.
A good example to explain the necessity of “expanding effective supply” is bulk purchases by Chinese tourists,
which has been seen in Japan and other countries in recent years.8 This phenomenon apparently highlights the
potential consumption needs for high-quality products and fine services like those offered in Japan and other
countries. In other words, products and services offered in China fail to sufficiently meet the needs of people. It
can be said that China aims to realize a high-quality economy by encouraging the expansion of supply appropriate
for needs and consumption capacities in the future.
(5) Preventing and resolving financial risks
In the course of adjusting excess capital stock, there will be increased financial risks such as an increase in bad
8
Xu Shaoshi, chairperson of the National Development and Reform Commission, pointed out the shortage of the effective supply of products and
services in China, citing that many Chinese tourists buy cold medicines and cosmetic items in foreign countries.（「国新办就贯彻落实党的十八届五
中全会精神，编制好国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要有关情况举行发布会」（『中国网』2015 年 11 月 3 日）
。
8
China’s Economy
loans and the defaults of corporate bonds, etc. With that in mind, “preventing and resolving financial risks” is
listed as the fifth task.
The ratio of non-performing loans in China is low, at 1.59%, as of September 2015, while the ratio would increase
to 5.36% if special mention loans are included, and the pace of increase has been accelerating recently. The ratio
of non-performing loans has appeared to be growing in industries facing excess production capacity and real
estate-related industries, etc. In addition, there is a report that the actual ratio of non-performing loans may be
higher than the above-mentioned figure,9 so uncertainty regarding financial risks is high.
In the brief summary of the minutes of the Central Economic Work Conference, the handling of credit defaults
according to law is first mentioned as a measure contributing to the prevention and resolution of financial risks.
This is intended to again emphasize that the Chinese government will aim to transgress the unwritten rule existing
in China that bonds will be definitely redeemed and will admit individual defaults. In March 2014, the Chinese
bond market suffered its first default, and Premier Li showed a willingness to accept individual defaults as far as
they do not develop into a systemic risk. However, even at the end of 2015, People’s Bank of China Deputy
Governor Pan Gongsheng said the country would transgress the unwritten rule that bonds would be definitely
redeemed in a well-ordered manner,10 which implies the possibility that relief measures were taken even though
defaults took place. However, if such conditions continue, investor moral hazard will prevail, causing capital to
flow into high-risk products disproportionately, and also, there will be negative effects on appropriate price
formation in the bond market. Amid expectations that more defaults will take place in the future along with
economic slowdown, if the government forcibly contains defaults as it did in the past, this will further increase
financial risks. Therefore, China apparently emphasized the necessity to handle defaults based on rules from the
latest Central Economic Work Conference.
In addition, resolving local government debt risk is listed as an issue in the conference. Aiming to reduce the
burden of repaying local government loans, China started converting loans into bonds by issuing local government
bonds in 2015. Regarding the issuance of local government bonds, the total amount of local government bond
issuance was about 3.8 trillion yuan in 2015, as planned (of the amount, 3.2 trillion yuan was for the conversion of
loans, and the remaining 0.6 trillion yuan was for the issuance of new bonds). In such a way, the conversion of
loans made progress. According to Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei, debt costs fell to 3.5% from the average
of 10% through the conversion measure, contributing to reducing burden by about 200 billion yuan.11 China will
continue to reduce burden by pursuing the conversion of loans in the future, while the management and
supervision of local government debt risk will be strengthened. According to instructive opinions issued on Jan.
11 by the Chinese Finance Ministry, local governments facing especially high risk are required to draw up a
medium- and long-term plan to resolve debt risk, along with emergency measures, to respond to the emergence of
risk.12
9
「不良贷款腾挪术」（『财新周刊』2015 年第 46 期、2015 年 11 月 30 日）。
「潘功胜：有序打破刚性兑付 消除信用市场定价扭曲」（『新浪财经』2015 年 12 月 22 日）。
11
「楼继伟：地方偿债能力下降」
（『财新』2015 年 12 月 22 日）
。
12
财政部「关于对地方政府债务实行限额管理的实施意见」Completed on Dec. 21, 2015, and announced on Jan. 11, 2016
10
9
China’s Economy
4. Pace of reform implementation and communication with markets: To become an issue
It should be highly evaluated that the Chinese government not only relies on support for the economy through
fiscal and monetary policies, but is also trying to implement supply-side structural reform centering on the
above-mentioned “five tasks” and realize sustainable growth. The issue is that how fast the government will
implement the reform. If the government actively promotes capital stock adjustment at a fast pace, this will lead to
greater negative effects of reform, such as in a sharp rise in non-performing loans and an increase in the number
of unemployed people, which will heighten financial risks. Market players may become more pessimistic about
the Chinese economy, and the risk of financial market turmoil will increase. Meanwhile, if the pace of reform
implementation is slow, and if the government excessively depends on support for the economy through fiscal and
monetary policies as a result, this will result in leaving capital stock accumulation unaddressed or even facilitating
it, which could increase pressure for adjustment in the future.
In addition, as I noted at the beginning of this article, Chinese financial market fluctuations have great impact on
the global financial markets. Therefore, in implementing the reform, it is necessary to pay more attention to
effects on the financial markets than before. Also, from this perspective, the implementation of reform becomes
more difficult. There could be a vicious cycle where concern over the negative effects of reform on the economy
causes a significant depreciation of the yuan again and where the Chinese authorities are forced to conduct
exchange intervention. Then, the intervention will cause the country’s foreign exchange reserves to decline, which
will be regarded as making it more difficult for the Chinese government to make policy response, and as a result,
the yuan will get weaker again. In addition, in case of large market fluctuations, it is more difficult for the Chinese
government to implement reform, and this could possibly delay the progress of such reform. Whether the Chinese
government can promote reform while carefully communicating with market players will become a more
important factor to determine risks, more than before.
References
中国企业家调查系统(2015)「企业经营者对宏观形势及企业经营状况的判断﹑问题和建议」(『管理世界』
2015 年第 12 期)
――――――――― (2014)「企业经营者对宏观形势及企业经营状况的判断、问题和建议」 (『管理世界』
2014 年第 12 期)
10
China’s Economy
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Indemnity: The information included in this material is obtained from various sources that the bank believes are reliable.
However, the bank shall not guarantee its correctness, trustworthiness, or integrity. The bank shall also not be liable for
any damage, whatsoever, arising from this information.
5.
This publication is not deemed to constitute advice, solicitation or recommendation to sell financial assets.
6.
This document is a translation of the Japanese original, and the original will take precedence in the event of any difference
between the two versions.
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