Price, Scarcity, and Consumer Willingness to - DataPro

Price, Scarcity, and Consumer Willingness to
Purchase Pirated Media Products
Anthony D. Miyazaki, Alexandra Aguirre Rodriguez, and
Jeff Langenderfer
Worldwide purchases of pirated media products continue to rise despite various industry and
government efforts to quell their growth. Academic research examining consumer decisions underlying
the purchase of pirated media has been limited in its approach by focusing almost exclusively on
main-effects relationships and by using noncausal research designs. This article addresses these
shortcomings by examining how various factors that consumers may perceive as constraining their
ability to purchase genuine products (e.g., high price, stockouts, low income, lack of channel access,
government restrictions) lead them to acquire pirated products and to condone such behavior in
others. The authors report the results of three studies (two of which are experimental) that test three
moderators of the consumption constraint effects using various settings, stimuli, and consumer types.
The findings support the hypotheses that factors that may be perceived as limiting consumption can
lead to higher piracy-related activity and are moderated by ethical beliefs, interpersonal social
influence, and trait psychological reactance. The authors discuss the results in terms of implications
for policy makers, managers, and future research opportunities.
Keywords: pricing, scarcity, piracy, intellectual property, consumer behavior
ounterfeit and pirated products are a substantial and
growing problem for many industries (Siwek 2006),
including luxury goods, automobile parts, consumer
electronics, DVDs, CDs, software, and pharmaceuticals.
Specific industry examples are revealing: Worldwide losses
from counterfeit clothing and shoes are estimated to exceed
$12 billion annually (Blakeney 2004); approximately 35%
of global software is pirated, reaching almost $40 billion per
year; and the software piracy rate in some countries exceeds
90% (Business Software Alliance 2006). The number of
illegally downloaded music files is estimated at approximately 2 billion per month (International Federation of the
Phonographic Industry [IFPI] 2008) and the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) estimates piracy losses at
more than $6 billion each year (McBride 2006; MPAA
2005). Although most estimates of counterfeiting and
piracy rates come from trade organizations with perhaps
some incentive to overestimate losses, even after adjusting
for bias, the volume of counterfeiting activities is still large.
Indeed, as many as 9% of the world’s branded products are
fakes (The Economist 2003), and in some industries the
pirate and counterfeit markets are much larger.
Attempts to combat piracy are typically aimed at both the
supply of and the demand for such products. With respect
to the supply side, efforts are made to locate, apprehend,
and prosecute pirated-product manufacturers and distributors (Jacobs, Samli, and Jedlik 2001; McDonald and
Roberts 1994; Wang and Zhu 2003). On the demand side,
attempts are made to educate the buying public that acquiring pirated products is illegal, unethical, and socially unacceptable (Childnet International 2005; IFPI 2008; MPAA
2005) and to prosecute those willing to acquire such materials (No Electronic Theft Act 1997; Smith 2004; Universal
City Studios v. Corley 2001).
However, relatively little effort has been made to understand the consumer psychology underlying why people are
willing to purchase goods known to be pirated and of an
illegal nature. The few studies that have examined consumer purchases of pirated goods typically have done so
from a consumer characteristics perspective, using focus
groups or survey research to gain descriptive insights into
who these consumers are instead of causal research to gain
predictive insights into what drives these consumers to
engage in piracy (Albers-Miller 1999; Cheung and Prendergast 2006; Chiou, Huang, and Lee 2005; Kwong et al.
2003; Prendergast, Chuen, and Phau 2002). Although such
studies have helped create an initial impression of the
demographics and some basic characteristics of consumers
who purchase pirated goods, they fail to examine the interplay among consumer traits, perceptions of market conditions, and intended and actual behavior. Moreover, prior
work has not directly tested how consumer perceptions of
market conditions can interact with individual characteris-
C
Anthony D. Miyazaki is Knight Ridder Research Professor and Associate Professor of Marketing (e-mail: [email protected]), and Alexandra Aguirre Rodriguez is Assistant Professor of Marketing (e-mail:
[email protected]), College of Business Administration, Florida International University. Jeff Langenderfer is an associate professor,
School of Business, Meredith College (e-mail: jefflang@meredith.
edu).
© 2009, American Marketing Association
ISSN: 0743-9156 (print), 1547-7207 (electronic)
71
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
Vol. 28 (1) Spring 2009, 71–84
72
Consumer Willingness to Purchase Pirated Media Products
tics to influence consumer willingness to engage in and/or
condone the purchase of pirated products.
This article begins to fill the knowledge gap by exploring
how various market conditions that consumers may perceive as consumption constraints can interact with individual characteristics to affect consumers’ support of, intention
to participate in, and actual participation in piracy activities.
We examine these relationships with three studies that use
samples of both general consumers and those who are
known purchasers of pirated goods. Our focus is on pirated
media products because they represent an infringement on
intellectual property that often has no other genuine substitute. Thus, when faced with factors that may limit the perceived ability to obtain genuine media products, consumers
may believe that acquiring a pirated version of the intellectual property is the only viable alternative to purchasing the
desired good.
Before presenting the empirical studies, we first discuss
the roles of psychological reactance and perceptions of
scarcity in consumer responses to perceived consumption
limitations. We follow this with a presentation of the three
empirical studies, after which we discuss the implications
of our findings for public policy and public education.
Consumer Responses to Perceived
Consumption Constraints
Perceived constraints of a person’s freedom to carry out a
particular behavior often can increase that person’s desire to
carry out the behavior. Psychological reactance theory
offers a motivation-based account for why such an effect
occurs. The reactance explanation attributes the increased
motivation to pursue a forbidden alternative to “reactance
arousal,” which is a response of increased attraction to an
alternative to which the person’s access is threatened with
elimination or is blocked by a barrier (Brehm and Brehm
1981).
A recent example of reactance theory is NBC’s attempt
to broadcast the August 2008 Olympic Games opening ceremony on a tape-delayed basis because the live event
occurred in the sparsely viewed early morning hours for the
U.S. market. Internet broadcasts were widely available
throughout Europe but were blocked in the United States.
During the ceremonies, NBC tried fervently to block live
international broadcasts and also sent requests to videosharing Web sites demanding that infringing video of the
opening ceremonies be removed, all in an effort to preserve
its evening U.S. television audience. However, as censorship efforts increased, Internet users became even more
determined to view the ceremonies live, engaging in an
escalating tug-of-war with NBC (Stetler 2008). In the end,
it appears that NBC’s act of censorship actually increased
interest in live viewing for many Web users, consistent with
reactance theory.
In the current context, psychological reactance may
explain why some consumers, when presented with marketplace conditions that are perceived to constrain the purchase
of a desired product, may be willing to risk the legal consequences associated with acquiring a pirated product as a
way of circumventing the perceived barrier. In the case of
pirated media products, this is particularly a concern
because the only real substitute for a genuine intellectual
property product is an unauthorized or pirated version of
that product.
There are several marketplace conditions that various
groups of consumers can perceive as consumption constraints. These can be related to supply, channel access,
buyer circumstances, and regulatory restrictions. Supplybased constraints are those that make the product scarce
(e.g., limited-volume runs, limited time only, limited geographic distribution), unavailable (e.g., out of stock, out of
production, out of print), or difficult to obtain (e.g., available to members only, offered only at higher prices) as a
result of seller actions. Channel constraints consist of the
inability to access distribution channels to acquire the product due to location, a lack of technology, restricted access,
and so on. Buyer-based constraints are those pertaining to a
lack of resources (e.g., money, time, transportation), knowledge, or the ability to acquire the product. Finally, regulatory restrictions can be those imposed by a government
(e.g., bans, quotas, tariffs) or industry (e.g., self-imposed
limitations).
The presence of one or more consumption constraints
can lead to the perceived scarcity of a particular product,
which in turn can increase the desire for that product (Smith
1937). The increased desire for the product and the presence of a barrier to acquisition may give rise to psychological reactance and an even greater motivation to acquire the
product. Scarcity barriers are sometimes intentionally put in
place to increase sales of desirable products (Stock and Balachander 2005) and, particularly in the case of intellectual
property products, can increase the amount of revenue that
can be extracted (Langenderfer and Cook 2001). Such barriers can be created in various ways, such as product
unavailability, high prices, censorship, and repressive government regulations (Clee and Wicklund 1980).
Perceptions of consumption constraints and perceptions
of product scarcity represent barriers to the obtainment of
products and thus set the stage for psychological reactance
effects that may result in extreme measures to obtain the
focal product. For example, manufacturer limitations on the
production and/or distribution of a legitimate (nonpirated)
good make it more difficult to obtain the good, which may
result in scarcity perceptions. Similarly, a channel access
constraint, such as distribution limited to the Internet (e.g.,
iTunes, Rhapsody), also limits a person’s access to the
good, resulting in scarcity perceptions. Finally, buyer condition constraints, such as limited disposable income, also
limit a consumer’s access to certain goods, particularly if a
legitimate (nonpirated) good is priced at a level that consumers consider prohibitively high, making the product
seem out of reach for certain segments. The popularity of
pirated media products demonstrates that when consumption constraints (whether created intentionally or not) are
perceived by consumers, some will seek illegal routes to
overcome this barrier to product acquisition.
Regulatory restrictions are a special case; not only are
legitimate products limited in availability as a result of
regulations (e.g., by government censorship), but their
pirated-product substitutes are also restricted by legislative
mandate. This often will result in psychological reactance
effects because consumers believe that their freedom is
being limited by some outside source. For example,
because downloading pirated music from the Internet is
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
73
prohibited by law, this potentially fuels the desire of certain
consumers (particularly those susceptible to reactance
effects) to download such music.
Reactance theory predicts that barriers will increase the
focal product’s attractiveness and increase motivation to
obtain it at a rate congruent with the magnitude of the barrier, but only up to the point at which the barrier is perceived as insurmountable (Brehm 1972). Thus, a barrier
such as a monetary fine or imprisonment can be overcome
essentially by not being caught, whereas a greater barrier,
such as elimination of the outlets a consumer turns to for
pirated goods (e.g., flea markets, Internet sites), would be
insurmountable and thus would not be expected to increase
motivation to obtain the desired good. In addition, government restrictions on genuine products may create black
markets that may be less accessible than legitimate outlets,
further accentuating reactance effects due to perceived
scarcity of the pirated goods.
This leads to our first research question: Can consumer
perceptions of consumption constraints lead to the participation in or the condoning of the purchase of pirated media
products? As we discussed previously, a perceived consumption constraint acts as a barrier to a particular consumption activity—in this case, to the purchase of a genuine (nonpirated) product. As such, the consumer’s choice is
either not to acquire the product (as long as the consumption constraint is present) or to find an alternative acquisition method (in this case, acquire a pirated version instead).
This may occur as a result of higher valuation of the desired
product due to evoked product scarcity perceptions or to
higher motivation to acquire the product due to psychological reactance. In either case, we propose that the perceived
consumption constraints decrease beliefs that alternative
paths to product acquisition, such as purchasing a pirated
version of the product, are as extreme (or abnormal) as they
might be if the consumption constraints were not present.
As a result, such behavior is less likely to be considered
negatively and more likely to be supported or condoned.
Thus, perceived consumption constraints should lead to
decreased opposition toward others purchasing pirated
products, increased intention to purchase pirated products,
and increased probability of actual purchases. Formally,
additional constraints are likely to have little or no effect
because consumption is already constrained. Thus, the addition of more than one consumption constraint should not
have significant effects on the decision to acquire a pirated
version of the desired product. Conversely, with regard to
the removal of consumption constraints, all relevant (i.e.,
perceived and pertinent) consumption constraints would
need to be removed to reduce consumer participation in the
illicit behavior—in this case, acquiring the pirated product.
Methodologically, this suggests a multiplicative (i.e., interaction) effect of multiple consumption constraints rather
than an additive effect, such that the effects of any one relevant consumption constraint will be reduced in the presence
of another (and thus enhanced in the absence of any others).
Thus:
H1: The presence (versus absence) of a perceived consumption
constraint to obtaining a genuine (nonpirated) product (a)
decreases disapproval of others purchasing pirated products, (b) increases consumer intentions to purchase a
pirated product, and (c) increases the probability of the
actual purchase of a pirated product.
The purchase of pirated products has often been approached
from an ethics or morality perspective, often in an attempt
to explain why consumers would deviate from acceptable
behavior (Hill 2007; Kwong et al. 2003). These approaches
have examined the ethics of purchasing pirated products
from deontological (concerned with right versus wrong)
and teleological (considering consequences of the act) perspectives (Gupta, Gould, and Pola 2004), as well as considered a multidimensional concept of moral intensity surrounding the purchase of pirated products (Chiou, Huang,
and Lee 2005; Cronan and Al-Rafee 2007). For example,
Cronan and Al-Rafee (2007) find that intention to pirate
digital materials is positively influenced by favorable attitudes toward piracy and negatively influenced by a consumer’s moral obligation (a feeling of guilt or a personal
obligation to behave or not behave in a certain way).
Indeed, most researchers investigating ethical beliefs
toward piracy and the purchase of pirated products have
found evidence that more strongly held beliefs that piracy is
Marketplace conditions rarely present consumers with
only one potentially determining factor when it comes to
decision making. Thus, it is important to consider how multiple factors combine to influence consumer choice (Meyer
1981; Miyazaki, Grewal, and Goodstein 2005). In the case
of piracy-related decision making, there may be times when
multiple consumption constraints may be perceived as
being present in particular situations.
When consumers perceive a constraint that functions as a
barrier to consumption of a legitimate product, they can
either do without the product or overcome the constraint,
perhaps by acquiring a pirated version of the product. However, if one perceived consumption constraint is present,
H2: The effects of a perceived consumption constraint to
obtaining a genuine (nonpirated) product on consumer attitudes and intentions toward purchasing pirated products are
moderated by the presence (versus absence) of other perceived consumption constraints, such that the presence of
one perceived constraint reduces or negates the effects of
the other.
Ethical Beliefs, Social Influence, and
Trait Psychological Reactance as
Moderators
Although H1 proposes that perceived consumption constraints can lead to increased purchasing of pirated products, it is likely that this will not be the case for all consumers and under all conditions. This leads us to our second
research question: When do consumer perceptions of consumption constraints increase the participation in or the
condoning of the purchase of pirated media products? That
is, what are the moderating factors? Here, we propose three
moderating factors that either limit or enhance the effects of
perceived consumption constraints on the attitudes and
behaviors surrounding the purchase of pirated products.
Moderator 1: Ethical Beliefs Toward Purchasing
Pirated Products
74
Consumer Willingness to Purchase Pirated Media Products
wrong, unethical, or immoral lead to a lower likelihood of
intended piracy behavior. Nevertheless, the dearth of
experimental work in this area has led researchers to disregard the potential for ethical beliefs toward piracy to act as
a moderator of market condition variables. To remedy this
shortcoming, we examine how ethical beliefs pertaining
specifically to the purchasing of pirated products can moderate the relationship between perceived consumption constraints and piracy-related attitudes and behavior.
Prior research has shown that attitudes against a particular activity can be more predictive of intended behavior
than attitudes for that activity (e.g., Miyazaki, Langenderfer, and Sprott 1999). Ethical beliefs toward the practice of
particular illegal activities often dominate predictive models, which suggests that the presence of strong beliefs
against a particular activity relegate other predictive factors
to a minor or nonexistent role. As such, we expect that consumers with relatively strong beliefs against purchasing
pirated products are less likely to overcome perceived consumption constraints by engaging in this illegal behavior.
Conversely, consumers without strong beliefs against purchasing pirated products are more likely to overcome perceived consumption constraints by buying a pirated product
rather than doing without. Thus:
H3: The effects of perceived genuine-product consumption constraints on consumer attitudes and intentions toward purchasing pirated products are moderated by ethical beliefs
against purchasing pirated products, such that stronger
beliefs that such purchases are unethical weaken the consumption constraint effects.
Moderator 2: Social/Interpersonal Influence
Consumers often learn about acceptable consumer practices
through the behavior and attitudes of others in their social
networks (Bearden, Netemeyer, and Teel 1989). Indeed,
there is evidence that social factors sometimes underlie reasons for illegal consumer behavior (Cox, Cox, and Moschis
1990). With respect to purchasing pirated products, several
studies have linked attitudes and behaviors of significant
players in a social network to attitudes and behaviors
related to the purchase of pirated products. For example,
Cheung and Prendergast (2006) find that social conformity
is positively related to the purchase of pirated VCDs (video
compact discs) when the consumers’ social network
included others who also made such purchases. Moreover,
there is also evidence that consumers’ beliefs regarding the
opinions of others in social networks can influence their
attitudes toward purchasing pirated products (Chiou,
Huang, and Lee 2005). Indeed, Limayem, Khalifa, and
Chin (2004) find that social factors in the form of encouragement from friends, relatives, or colleagues positively
influence intentions to pirate software, though external
facilitating conditions were more highly related to actual
piracy behavior. These findings suggest that social or interpersonal influence can act as a moderator to consumption
constraints. Following these findings, we expect that when
consumers have members of a social network (i.e., family
and/or friends) who encourage or support piracy-related
behavior, the effects of perceived consumption constraints
will be weaker than when the social network does not offer
such encouragement or support. Specifically,
H4: The effects of perceived genuine-product consumption constraints on consumer attitudes and intentions toward purchasing pirated products are moderated by interpersonal
influences, such that having close friends or family who
approve of and/or encourage such purchases weakens consumption constraint effects.
Moderator 3: Trait Psychological Reactance
As we explained previously, reactance theory can form the
basis of a motivational explanation for the influence of consumption constraint perceptions on deviant consumer
behavior. Psychological reactance also has been conceptualized as an individual difference variable. Although in general consumers can be motivated to pursue an object associated with access constraints, studies have shown that some
consumers are more prone than others to experiencing the
boomerang effect attributed to psychological reactance.
This behavioral inclination is due to higher levels of trait
psychological reactance (TPR), which is an individual
motivational state aroused when real or perceived barriers
are encountered (Hong and Page 1989; Woller, Buboltz,
and Loveland 2007). Thus, psychological reactance is the
motivational process that drives the behavior, whereas TPR
is the individual difference characteristic. People with high
TPR are more likely to react to and attempt to counteract
barriers, particularly when such barriers are the result of
authoritative control, such as a government restriction (Clee
and Wicklund 1980; Cox, Cox, and Moschis 1990). Considering the previously mentioned example of the 2008
Olympic Games opening ceremony, it is likely that the
Internet users who fought hardest against NBC’s attempt to
censor the live broadcasts were relatively high in TPR.
In terms of the current research, we expect that consumers who score high on a TPR scale will react more
strongly to consumption constraints than those who score
low, particularly for legal or regulatory constraints. Thus:
H5: The effects of perceived genuine-product consumption constraints on consumer attitudes and intentions toward purchasing pirated products are moderated by TPR, such that
high TPR strengthens consumption constraint effects, particularly constraints that are perceived as being caused by
authoritative rule.
Experimental Studies Overview
To test the hypotheses, we conducted three studies that
examine selected marketplace conditions that consumers
could perceive as consumption constraints and how those
perceived constraints affect piracy-related approval, intentions, and behavior. As we explain subsequently, the studies
used a variety of sample sets: shoppers from an online auction Web site (Study 1), consumers at an outdoor flea market that had two known vendors selling pirated DVD
recordings (Study 2), and concertgoers at a free outdoor
concert (Study 3).
The studies collectively examine several marketplace
conditions that consumers might perceive as consumption
constraints to the purchase of a genuine media product. We
chose appropriate conditions by considering the characteristics of each sample studied, the experimental scenarios, and
data collection restrictions. We purposely chose a variety of
marketplace conditions to act as perceived consumption
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
constraints to construct a broader test of the hypotheses.
The perceived constraints we test originate from supplier
conditions (temporary stockout and high price in Study 1,
high price in Study 3), distribution channel conditions (lack
of home Internet access in Study 2), consumer conditions
(low income in Study 2), and government conditions (temporary government restriction in Study 3). Note that any
marketplace condition a consumer perceives as prohibiting
the purchase of a genuine media product is a consumption
constraint for that consumer. Because the only real substitute for genuine media products (whether obtained as purchased, rented, or borrowed physical DVDs, streaming
video, or broadcast receptions) is pirated versions of the
same product, consumers who are unable to eliminate perceived consumption constraints realistically have only two
choices: acquire a pirated version or do without.
In addition, we explore the interactive effect of multiple
perceived consumption constraints, particularly with
respect to how the presence of one consumption constraint
may or may not mitigate the effects of another. Finally, we
examine three moderators (ethical views of piracy, social/
interpersonal influence, and TPR).
Study 1: Temporary Stockout, High Price,
and Ethical Views
We designed Study 1 as a behavioral experiment using fictitious scenarios to examine how two supplier-based perceived consumption constraints—temporary stockouts and
high price—affect consumer attitudes and intentions toward
purchasing pirated products and how consumers’ ethical
views of piracy moderate the effects of those consumption
constraints. In terms of the hypothesized relationships discussed previously, we expect that the presence of a temporary stockout (as opposed to having the product in stock) of
a genuine (nonpirated) product will decrease consumers’
disapproval of someone buying a pirated copy under such
conditions and increase the likelihood that the consumer
will make a similar purchase. We expect that the effects of
price as a consumption constraint will be similar, in that a
higher genuine-product price will result in less disapproval
and higher purchase intention for a pirated copy (Cox, Cox,
and Moschis 1990). (The positioning of price as a consumption constraint is dependent on consumer perceptions of
how a particular price level may or may not prohibit the
consumer’s ability to acquire the genuine product.) These
main-effects expectations are congruent with H1. As H2
predicts, we also expect the two consumption constraints to
interact such that when one constraint is present (i.e., the
price is high or the item is out of stock), the effect of the
other constraint on the dependent variables will be attenuated or absent. Finally, as H3 predicts, we expect that consumers who view piracy as being relatively unethical will
be less affected by perceived consumption constraints than
those who do not consider it unethical. In other words, consumption constraint effects should be weaker or absent for
consumers with stronger views of piracy as unethical.
Methods
We constructed Study 1 as a 2 (genuine-item availability: in
stock versus temporarily out of stock) × 2 (genuine-item
price: low versus high) between-subjects experimental
75
design. The setting was the online purchase of a DVD box
set of a television series, and the sample consisted of online
shoppers who were interested in purchasing such a product.
Sample
To find a sample of people to whom the setting would be
relevant, we began by identifying participants in an online
auction Web site who had bid in the previous month on at
least one DVD box set of a noncurrent television series.
Approximately half of those contacted bid on items that
appeared to be pirated goods (as indicated by the efforts of
the seller to emphasize the video and sound quality of the
recordings). We then sent e-mails (with multiple attempts)
to people from another auction account (a feature no longer
available at this particular auction Web site) asking about
the quality of any purchase they made from the seller. Of
1813 e-mails sent, 391 replied directly back from their auction site e-mail, and 526 replied from a nonauction e-mail
address (896 did not reply at all). We contacted those replying from a nonauction e-mail address (N = 526) one month
later from a university e-mail account and presented them
with the opportunity to participate in an academic research
study (conducted online) and to be entered into a drawing
for one of ten $25 gift cards from their choice of two major
national DVD rental companies. Of those contacted, 206
completed the study. Six responses were not usable, leaving
a final sample of 200 (and an effective response rate of
38%). Average age was 29.8 years (ages ranged from 18 to
62 years), and 56% of the sample were male.
Scenario and Manipulations
The research instrument involved the presentation of a scenario involving the purchase of a DVD boxed set. The highprice, in-stock scenario read as follows:
John has spent the last few months searching stores for a boxed
set DVD recording of one of his favorite television series from
when he was a child. At a friend’s suggestion, he began to look
online and finally found the recording he was looking for being
sold by two potential sources.
The first was a national distributor that priced the genuine,
original recording at $89, and had the product currently in
stock.
The second was through a private seller who was obviously
selling a pirated copy, that is, one that was recorded from the
original DVD. The pirated copy was being sold for $26. John
decided to purchase the pirated copy.
The low-price, out-of-stock scenario was identical, except
for the following line:
The first was a national distributor that priced the genuine,
original recording at $29, but did not have the product in stock
and did not expect it to be in stock for the next several months.
There were also low-price, in-stock and high-price, outof-stock conditions. After viewing this scenario, respondents went on to complete a series of measures that
assessed the dependent variables, manipulation checks,
moderator variable, and demographic items.
Measures
We measured disapproval of others purchasing pirated
products with a three-item scale that began with the state-
76
Consumer Willingness to Purchase Pirated Media Products
ment, “Please answer the following items regarding your
opinion of John’s purchase of the pirated DVD recording.”
This was followed by three bipolar seven-point scale items
anchored by “I approve/disapprove of John’s purchase,” “I
support/oppose John’s purchase,” and “I think John’s purchase was the right/wrong thing to do.” Responses to the
three items had a coefficient alpha of .93, and we averaged
these for the analyses. We assessed the other dependent
measure, consumer intention to purchase a pirated product,
with a one-item measure stating, “If I were in a similar situation, the likelihood that I would buy the pirated DVD set
is …,” followed by a seven-point scale anchored by “low”
and “high.” We did not measure actual purchase in this
study.
The following page contained the two manipulation
check measures. Both had seven-point response scales. For
price, the item read, “The price of the original recording
(compared to the pirated recording) is low/high,” and for
availability, the item read, “The likelihood that the original
recording is currently in stock is low/high.” An item assessing the realistic nature of the scenario was then presented,
which read, “The scenario described at the beginning of this
study is a realistic one,” followed by a seven-point response
scale anchored by “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree.”
The next two pages contained a series of questions unrelated to the study, which served as a filler task. Finally, the
last page contained a measure assessing whether the respondent found purchasing pirated products to be an (un)ethical
practice. It stated, “In general, I feel that purchasing pirated
products is …,” followed by three bipolar seven-point
scales anchored by “ethical/unethical,” “fair/unfair,” and
“right/wrong” (Chung and Monroe 2003; Freestone and
Mitchell 2004; Valentine and Rittenburg 2004). The scale
had a coefficient alpha of .88, and we averaged the
responses for the analyses. We then requested demographic
information.
Results
For simplicity in presenting the analyses, we performed a
median split (at 4.60) of the piracy ethics measure. Respondents who believed that the purchase of pirated products
was relatively unethical had a higher score (M = 4.84) than
those in the more ethical group (M = 4.13; t198 = 3.18, p <
.01, η = .22), as we expected. We conducted the remaining
analyses using analysis of variance in which we examined
the consumption constraint interaction effects within each
ethical beliefs group (belief of pirated-product purchase as
ethical versus belief of pirated-product purchase as unethical). For each analysis, we initially performed a three-factor
analysis of variance, with the relevant two-factor and maineffects analyses reported as appropriate.
Manipulation and Scenario Checks
The manipulation checks provided evidence that the
manipulations were perceived as intended. Specifically,
respondents perceived the high-price condition as higher
(M = 6.09) than the low-price condition (M = 3.42; F1, 192 =
125.94, p < .01, η = .63), and they perceived the stockout
condition as lower availability (M = 2.29) than the in-stock
condition (M = 5.24; F1, 192 = 156.07, p < .01, η = .67). For
each manipulation check, no other main-effect, two-way, or
three-way interaction effects were statistically significant
(all ps > .15). The scenario check was favorable, with the
average response being 6.27 (of 7.00).
Hypothesis Testing
Although we predicted interaction effects, we also conducted main-effects tests to examine the strength of the two
consumption constraints on a general basis and across a
comprehensive population. Main effects for original product availability were significant for both dependent measures. Specifically, consumers were less disapproving of the
purchase of the pirated product under stockout conditions
(M = 3.71) than when the original product was in stock
(M = 4.34; F1, 192 = 8.30, p < .01, η = .20). If confronted
with a similar situation, respondents reported that they were
more likely to make a similar pirated-product purchase
when the original product was temporarily out of stock
(M = 4.39) than when it was in stock (M = 3.68; F1, 192 =
8.33, p < .01, η = .20). Main effects for price were also statistically significant for both dependent measures. Specifically, respondents disapproved less of the piracy when the
original product price was high (M = 3.71) than when it was
low (M = 4.36; F1, 192 = 7.17, p < .01, η = .19) and were
more likely to buy the pirated copy under high-price conditions (M = 4.46) than under low-price conditions (M = 3.59;
F1, 192 = 10.61, p < .01, η = .23). These results support H1.
H2 proposed an interaction between genuine-product
consumption constraints such that the presence of one constraint (in this case, a high original price or a temporary
stockout) would reduce the effect of the other constraint on
the dependent variables. Moreover, both consumption constraints must be removed for consumers either to express
disapproval of someone buying the pirated good or to
refrain from intending to buy it themselves. However, H3
proposed that these effects would be reduced or eliminated
for consumers who believe strongly that purchasing pirated
products is an unethical practice. This suggests little or no
perceived consumption constraint effects for consumers
who strongly believe that piracy is unethical but a consumption constraint interaction effect for consumers without such beliefs. To evaluate these hypotheses, we examine
the analysis of variance results and the mean values for the
dependent measures in each condition (see Figure 1). There
was an expected three-way interaction for purchase intention (p < .05) but not for disapproval (p = .12); however, the
more specific two-way analyses showed support for the
hypotheses. Specifically, when respondents viewed the purchase of pirated products as relatively unethical, price and
availability had no significant effects on either of the
dependent measures (all ps > .25; see Figure 1, Panels B
and D). However, when the respondents did not view purchasing pirated products as unethical, price and availability
interacted in the expected direction for both disapproval
of someone else’s pirated-product purchase (interaction
F1, 102 = 4.99, p = .03, η = .23) and the respondent’s own
intended purchase under similar conditions (interaction
F1, 102 = 6.93, p = .01, η = .26). As Panels A–C of Figure 1
show, these respondents tended to disapprove of the pirated
purchase and to reduce their own purchase intentions only
when both consumption constraints were absent.
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
Figure 1.
Study 1 Results
5.50
5.00
4.50
4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
B: Piracy Viewed as Unethical
Disapproval of
PMP Purchase
Disapproval of
PMP Purchase
A: Piracy Not Viewed as Unethical
Low
5.50
5.00
4.50
4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
High
Low
Genuine Product Price
Stockout
In stock
Stockout
Low
High
Genuine Product Price
Stockout
In stock
In stock
D: Piracy Viewed as Unethical
PMP Purchase
Intention
6
5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
High
Genuine Product Price
C: Piracy Not Viewed as Unethical
PMP Purchase
Intention
77
6
5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
Low
High
Genuine Product Price
Stockout
In stock
Notes: PMP = pirated media products.
Discussion
The findings from Study 1 provide evidence that a high
price and temporary lack of availability (in the form of a
stockout) can be perceived as consumption constraints to
purchasing a genuine media product and thus can create an
environment in which consumers are less likely to be critical of the purchase of a pirated good and are more likely to
purchase a pirated good under similar circumstances. This
result supports the presence of a psychological reactance
mechanism that acts to motivate consumers to overcome
challenges to obtaining an object to which their access is
constrained. For example, in the current context, consumers
who did not perceive the purchase of pirated products as
unethical were susceptible to the psychological reactance
effect, given that they were willing to choose this route to
overcome the consumption constraint barrier (the stockout
and/or high price). Conversely, consumers who viewed
pirated-product purchase as unethical did not consider this a
viable means of overcoming the consumption constraint.
Thus, this group perceived the consumption constraints as
insurmountable barriers, resulting in a decreased motivation
to pursue the desired product.
The results also show that the removal of only one consumption constraint was not enough to change attitudes and
intentions. Only when both constraints were removed were
consumers willing to show disapproval and not consider
purchasing the pirated good. Granted, these effects were
absent for consumers who strongly believed that purchasing
a pirated product in general is unethical. However, current
marketplace conditions suggest that there are tens or hundreds of millions of consumers worldwide who do not consider such purchases unethical. For these consumers, consumption constraints appear to play a role in the purchase of
illegal pirated goods. We discuss the findings in greater
detail in the “Discussion and Implications” section.
Study 2: Channel Access, Low Income,
and Interpersonal Influence
Study 2 consisted of a field study using survey methods; we
conducted this study to examine how two factors—low
income and a lack of distribution channel access—could be
perceived as consumption constraints to obtaining a genuine media product and thus affect the propensity to purchase a low-cost pirated alternative. We also examined the
moderating effects of interpersonal influence. To complement the behavioral intention data collected in Study 1, we
examined actual purchase behavior in Study 2.
In terms of our hypotheses, we expect that the presence
of perceived consumption constraints will result in a higher
likelihood that a consumer will purchase a pirated media
78
Consumer Willingness to Purchase Pirated Media Products
product than when such constraints are not present (H1).
We also expect that interpersonal influence will moderate
the consumption constraint effects (Cox, Cox, and Moschis
1990). Specifically, when key members of a consumer’s
social network strongly encourage or accept the purchasing
of pirated products, we expect that the lack of consumption
constraints will have little effect on decreasing the propensity to purchase a pirated product (H4).
The environment in which we examined these relationships was an outdoor flea market in a major U.S. city (metropolitan population of more than one million) that had two
known vendors of pirated DVD recordings. Although the
recordings were likely of reasonable quality, the packaging
for the recordings (most with a jewel case instead of the
usual DVD case and with a low-quality printed insert) was
clearly substandard, and thus it would be apparent to buyers
and their friends and family that the DVDs were not authentic. Therefore, this situation was an ideal opportunity to
examine how the opinions of key members of consumer
social networks might moderate the proposed effects of the
consumption constraints.
Low income and a lack of home Internet access were the
two consumption constraints we selected for this study
because they appeared to be most germane to this particular
setting. Informal interviews we conducted with both buyers
and nonbuyers of the pirated DVDs suggested a wide range
of income groups present, and lower-income consumers
complained that they did not have the funds to purchase
new, genuine DVDs. Another commonly stated reason for
purchasing the pirated DVDs was respondents’ lack of
Internet access to find other affordable alternatives.
Methods
We disguised Study 2 as a survey assessing how people
perceive the opinions of their friends and family so as not to
draw attention to the questions regarding pirated products.
Thus, we measured the independent variables of income
and home Internet access and the moderating variable of
interpersonal influence with the questionnaire. One of the
research assistants observed actual pirated DVD purchase
behavior.
Procedure
The procedure began by inconspicuously observing flea
market visitors near the larger of the two vendors known to
sell pirated DVD products. As consumers passed by (and
often examined) the displays, a research assistant noted
whether a particular consumer purchased a pirated DVD at
that time. This information, along with a detailed description of the consumer, was relayed to another research assistant who was stationed approximately 150 feet down the
same aisle of vendors. When a selected consumer reached
the survey location, the second research assistant then
approached and asked for his or her participation in a brief
study of opinions, offering a modest monetary incentive.
Thus, each survey participant who purchased a pirated
DVD was marked as such. Note that some participants who
were not marked as having purchased a pirated DVD could
have already done so or could do so in the future; thus, the
number of known pirated DVD purchasers represents a conservative estimate.
Sample
The observers relayed information to the data collectors
regarding 234 purchasing and 211 nonpurchasing consumers (445). Of these, 108 and 85, respectively, agreed to
participate in the study, for a collective response rate of
43%. Respondents had a mean age of 31.2 years (age range
of 21–55), had a median household income range of
$45,000–$49,999, and were about evenly split across sex
(50.3% were female).
Measures
We measured interpersonal influence with three items
(standardized α = .84) that each had seven-point Likerttype response scales anchored by “strongly disagree” (1)
and “strongly agree” (7). The three items started with
“Some of my close friends and/or family might ...” and
ended with “support my decision to purchase pirated products,” “encourage me to purchase pirated products,” and
“persuade me to purchase pirated products.” (We included a
brief description of pirated goods as well.) To take the
focus away from the pirated products, we included them
among other measures that assessed the degree to which
close friends or family would support the consumer’s decision to smoke cigarettes, vote in every election, and recycle
plastic containers. In addition, a measure similar to that in
Study 1 assessed the reported likelihood that the respondent
would buy a pirated product in the near future (as well as
likelihood measures for the three distracter activities). We
measured access to the Internet at home with a yes/no question that asked whether respondents had Internet access that
they could personally use at their place of residence. We
measured income with a 19-category scale ranging from
“$0–$4,999” to “$95,000 or over.”
Results
Similar to Study 1, we performed a median split (at 3.33) of
the moderator variable—in this case, interpersonal influence—to simplify the analyses. To examine how the perceived consumption constraints operate in predicting the
actual pirated-product purchase behavior, we ran discriminant analyses to distinguish between purchasers and nonpurchasers for both the high-social-support group (i.e., consumers with friends or family who would support or
encourage piracy) and the low-social-support group. Predictor variables included the two potential consumption constraints—home Internet access and household income—as
well as age and sex. We added the latter two variables
because prior research has shown that older consumers and
women are less likely to participate in behavior that society
typically views as unethical (Cox, Cox, and Moschis 1990;
Gupta, Gould, and Pola 2004; Prendergast, Chuen, and
Phau 2002).
As we hypothesized, both consumption constraint
variables were significant predictors of purchase of a
pirated DVD for consumers with a low degree of interpersonal influence to buy pirated products, whereas for the
high group, the consumption constraints were not predictive. Specifically, for the low group, the discriminant function was statistically significant (Wilks’ λ = .771; χ2 = 25.3,
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
d.f. = 4; p < .01), with lack of home Internet access and
lower income being predictive of a higher probability of
piracy (both ps < .01). Younger age was also predictive of a
higher probability of piracy (p = .01). For the highinfluence group, only age was predictive (p = .05), whereas
Internet access and income were not. Sex of the respondents
was not predictive for either group.
Finally, we examined the behavioral intention item,
which measured consumers’ likelihood of a future purchase
of a pirated product with respect to its association with
actual behavior. A simple comparison of means showed
that known purchasers of the pirated DVDs indeed scored
higher on the behavioral intention measure (M = 5.27) than
those who were not observed making a pirated DVD purchase (M = 3.45; t = 6.12, p < .01).
Discussion
The results of Study 2 were key in establishing that actual
behavior can be predicted on the basis of factors that may
be perceived as consumption constraints, that interpersonal
influence to purchase pirated products can moderate the
consumption constraint effects, and that behavioral intention measures can be valid substitutes for behavioral observations for this deviant consumer behavior. Of concern,
though not surprising, is that several respondents were witnessed purchasing the pirated DVDs who did not admit any
future intention to participate in this activity.
Study 3: Government Restriction, High
Price, and TPR
We designed Study 3 as a fictitious scenario-based experiment carried out in the field; we return to an examination of
price as a factor that may be perceived as a potential consumption constraint, along with a government restriction on
the sale of a product. To test H5, we examined TPR as a
moderator of the consumption constraint effects. If government restriction and high price are indeed perceived as consumption constraints, we expect that they will result in less
disapproval of piracy behavior and higher anticipated future
piracy behavior (H1). We expect the two consumption constraints to interact with the dependent variables in that the
presence of one should reduce or eliminate the effects of the
other (H2). Moreover, TPR should moderate the consumption constraint effects, in that consumers with high TPR
should show stronger effects, particularly for government
restrictions (H5).
Methods
We conducted Study 3 as a 2 (low versus high price) × 2
(government ban present versus absent) between-subjects
experimental design. We measured TPR as an individual
difference variable and then performed a median split for
simplicity in presenting the results. All analyses involved
three-way (price, ban, TPR) analysis of variance, with relevant two-way interaction and main effects reported as
appropriate. The scenario involved purchasing a DVD of
one of a music fan’s favorite bands.
79
Sample and Procedure
Participants were concertgoers recruited from a free outdoor concert in a major U.S. city (metropolitan area population of more than one million). The bands playing were
local and attracted primarily a younger (ages 20–30 years)
audience. Participants were approached by data collectors
to participate in a “short academic study” and were compensated with a monetary incentive. Of 269 people
approached, 196 agreed to complete the survey. Four surveys were not completed correctly, leaving a final sample
of 192 and an effective response rate of 71%.
Scenario and Manipulations
The scenario presented to participants involved a music fan
desiring a new DVD of a band’s concert. The pricing
manipulation was similar to that in Study 1. The government restriction manipulation was presented as a temporary
ban on the import of the DVD. Specifically, the scenario
(with high price and government restriction) was as
follows:
One of J.T.’s favorite bands recently played a celebration concert in its home country and created a DVD of the concert for
sale around the world. J.T. wants to buy the DVD as soon as
possible. The band has noted that the DVD will be for sale
exclusively on its Web site for a price of $89. Unfortunately,
the federal government has decided to issue a temporary ban on
importing the DVD into the country until a series of regulatory
documents have been approved, a process that reportedly may
last several months. In the meantime, J.T. has found a way to
buy an unauthorized, pirated copy of the DVD, which can be
purchased for $26. J.T. has decided to buy the pirated copy.
The no-ban conditions were identical, except for the following two sentences:
Fortunately, the federal government is currently allowing the
import of the DVD into the country even though the band still
has to have some regulatory documents approved. Nevertheless, J.T. has found a way to buy an unauthorized, pirated copy
of the DVD, which can be purchased for $26.
The low-price conditions listed a genuine product price of
$29.
Measures
The two dependent variable measures—disapproval of others purchasing pirated products and consumer piracy intentions—were identical (except for the name change) to those
used in Study 1, as was the price manipulation check measure. A manipulation check for product availability read,
“The likelihood that J.T. can purchase the original recording during the next few months is ...”; this was followed by
a seven-point response scale anchored by “low” and “high.”
As with Study 1, we presented an item assessing the realistic nature of the scenario as well. We measured the moderating variable using Hong and Faedda’s (1996) 11-point
TPR scale and seven-point “disagree/agree” response scales
(coefficient α = .82). We averaged the scale items and performed a median split at 4.05.
80
Consumer Willingness to Purchase Pirated Media Products
Results
Manipulation and Scenario Checks
Analysis of the manipulation checks provided evidence that
participants perceived the manipulations as we intended.
Specifically, they perceived the high-price condition as
higher (M = 5.57) than the low-price condition (M = 2.74;
F1, 191 = 214.0, p < .01, η = .73), and they perceived the
government ban condition as lower availability (M = 2.10)
than the no-ban condition (M = 4.77; F1, 191 = 260.9, p <
.01, η = .77). In addition, no other main or interaction (twoway or three-way) effects were significant (all ps > .20).
The scenario check was favorable as well in that the average response was 5.79 (of 7.00).
Hypothesis Testing
As in Study 1, we assessed main-effects tests to examine
the strength of the two perceived consumption constraints
on a general basis. The main-effects test for original product availability was significant for the disapproval dependent measure. Specifically, consumers were less disapproving of the purchase of the pirated product under government
restriction conditions (M = 4.33) than when there was no
government ban on the original product (M = 4.77; F1, 191 =
5.09, p < .05, η = .16). The main effect for the behavioral
Figure 2.
intention measure (that respondents would make a similar
pirated-product purchase) was not significant (Mban = 4.19,
Mno_ban = 3.77; F1, 191 = 3.22, p = .07). Main effects for
price were statistically significant for both dependent measures. Respondents were less disapproving of the piracy
when the original product price was high (M = 4.22) than
when it was low (M = 4.89; F1, 191 = 11.39, p < .01, η = .24)
and reported higher pirated-product purchase intentions
under high-price conditions (M = 4.57) than under lowprice conditions (M = 3.38; F1, 191 = 24.92, p < .01, η =
.34). These results support H1.
As with Study 1, H2 proposed an interaction effect
between perceived consumption constraints, such that the
presence of one constraint (either the high genuine-product
price or the temporary ban) would reduce the effect of the
other constraint on the dependent variables. In addition, H5
proposed that when TPR is relatively high, consumption
constraint effects, particularly that of the government ban,
should be stronger. As in Study 1, there was an expected
three-way interaction for purchase intention (p < .05) but
not for disapproval; however, the more specific two-way
analyses for the high- and low-TPR groups showed support
for the hypotheses (see Figure 2).
For consumers with relatively high TPR, both price and
availability had main effects on both dependent measures.
Study 3 Results
B: High TPR
5.50
Disapproval of
PMP Purchase
Disapproval of
PMP Purchase
A: Low TPR
5.00
4.00
3.50
3.00
Low
5.50
5.00
4.00
3.50
3.00
Low
High
Genuine Product Price
Genuine Product Price
Ban
Ban
No ban
No ban
D: High TPR
5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
5
PMP Purchase
Intention
PMP Purchase
Intention
C: Low TPR
Low
High
High
5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
5
Low
High
Genuine Product Price
Genuine Product Price
Ban
Ban
Notes: PMP = pirated media products.
No ban
No ban
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
Specifically, high-TPR consumers encountering a high
price were less likely to disapprove of a pirated purchase
(M = 3.78) than those with a low price (M = 4.56; F1, 94 =
7.24, p < .01, η = .27) and had higher intentions of making
a pirated purchase under high-price conditions (M = 4.94)
than under low-price conditions (M = 3.89; F1, 94 = 10.14,
p < .01, η = .32). Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between the two consumption constraints for both
the disapproval (F1, 94 = 7.95, p < .01, η = .29) and purchase
intention (F1, 94 = 6.72, p < .01, η = .26) measures. The
interactions revealed that both consumption constraints
must be eliminated to raise piracy disapproval rates and
lower intended piracy behavior (see Figure 2, Panels B and
D), in support of H2. For consumers with relatively low
TPR, the government ban had no effect on piracy disapproval (F1, 96 = .86, not significant [n.s.]) or on intended
piracy behavior (F1, 96 = .56, n.s.). The interaction effects
were also not significant for both dependent measures (both
ps > .25; see Figure 2, Panels A and C). However, the lowTPR consumers offered less disapproval under high-price
conditions (M = 4.66) than under low-price conditions (M =
5.21; F1, 96 = 4.21, p < .05, η = .21) and higher intended
piracy under high-price conditions (M = 4.18) than under
low-price conditions (M = 2.90; F1, 96 = 15.04, p < .01, η =
.37). Overall, these findings offer support for H5.
Discussion
The results from Study 3 support the hypotheses and add
evidence of more specific moderating effects. Specifically,
high-TPR consumers were more likely to respond to a government restriction type of consumption constraint than
low-TPR consumers. However, for the low-TPR consumers, the high-price factor dominated attitudes and intentions, and there were no effects for government restrictions.
Discussion and Implications
The findings from the three studies support the hypothesized relationships regarding consumer attitudes and behavioral inclinations toward purchasing pirated products. In
particular, we found that across three varied sets of consumers in different marketplace settings (online shoppers,
flea market visitors, and concertgoers) and five market conditions (high price, stockouts, low income, lack of channel
access, and government restrictions), factors that can limit
consumption (i.e., factors that may be perceived as consumption constraints) can lead to (1) decreased disapproval
of other consumers’ pirated-product purchase behavior, (2)
greater personal pirated-product purchase intentions, and
(3) higher probability of actual pirated-product purchase.
Furthermore, the examination of three moderating variables
(ethical views of piracy, interpersonal influence, and TPR)
demonstrated that the focal effects differ across various
consumer types and situations.
The results are important in several respects. First, they
show that consumers can potentially perceive various factors related to supply, buyer conditions, channel accessibility, and regulatory restrictions as consumption constraints,
and given the psychological reactance–triggering effects of
such constraints, under certain circumstances these con-
81
straints influence the degree to which consumers are willing
to condone and/or participate in the purchase of pirated
products as a means to overcome the perceived barriers to
purchase. This broadens prior views of consumption constraints and provides a basis for the study of pirated products and deviant consumer behavior. Second, the findings
indicate that managing harmful reactions to perceived consumption constraints may be better effectuated by focusing
on moderating variables rather than on the perceived consumption constraints themselves. The implications of these
findings are germane to academic researchers, marketing
managers, and public policy makers.
Implications
Marketing exchange factors, such as low income, high
prices, and purchase/availability restrictions, all contribute
to the illegal acquisition of products through shoplifting
(Cox, Cox, and Moschis 1990) and purchasing known
stolen goods (Albers-Miller 1999). The current research
provides evidence that these factors may be perceived as
consumption constraints that, due to the psychological reactance mechanism, influence a consumer’s willingness to
participate in or condone piracy-related behavior. From a
practical perspective, it benefits both marketers who present
the consumer with perceived constraints, such as high
prices or limited supplies, and governmental regulators who
set restrictions on obtaining pirated versions of products to
consider potential psychological reactance effects that may
be triggered by the consumption constraints placed in the
consumer’s path to obtaining such products. In particular,
greater attention should be directed toward the means of
mitigating the negative outcomes (condoning, intending to
purchase, and/or purchasing pirated products) of psychological reactance effects. Because psychological reactance
leads consumers to try to overcome consumption constraints, the marketer could provide legitimate alternatives
to obtaining the constrained products. For example, if supply of a new product is intentionally limited to create supply shortage, as was the case with the Sony PlayStation 3
during the 2006 holiday season, the manufacturer could
provide alternatives to those for whom the price or supply is
a constraint, such as a lease or rental program through retail
or entertainment outlets. As for government restrictions
against acquiring pirated products, these constraints must
be perceived as insurmountable so that consumer motivation to acquire these types of products subsides. Raising
awareness of the severity of penalties for piracy and of
enforcement of these penalties through credible communication sources, such as news outlets and word of mouth,
would likely help increase the perceived insurmountability
of regulatory constraints against obtaining pirated products.
From a theoretical perspective, the findings add breadth
to the examination of psychological reactance theory and its
usefulness in explaining reactions to potential barriers to
genuine-product purchases. Although much of the prior
work on psychological reactance has been focused on barriers imposed by government or other authoritative figures,
the potential for various types of barriers to be perceived as
consumption constraints and to prompt piracy-related
behavior suggests that psychological reactance is useful in
82
Consumer Willingness to Purchase Pirated Media Products
explaining reactions to nonauthoritative sources as well.
The findings also address the conceptual basis for what
constitutes consumption constraints, including whether they
are mainly physical in nature, the degree to which they are
also psychological in nature, and the degree to which they
are represented by psychological reactions to consumer perceptions of objective conditions.
Furthermore, the interactive effects shown by the three
moderating variables may be useful in examining other
types of deviant consumer behavior—both legal and illegal—such as shoplifting (Cox, Cox, and Moschis 1990),
insurance fraud (Miyazaki 2009), and general dishonesty
(Mazar and Ariely 2006). Marketing managers and policy
makers should also heed the results of these studies as
potential key elements in reducing consumer piracy behavior. Industry and government efforts to confront piracy
directly have had limited effects on the amount or scope of
piracy. Thus, focusing efforts on perceived consumption
constraints or moderating variables may be more successful
in effecting changes in behavior.
To date, copyright holders have typically focused their
efforts on prosecuting producers and suppliers of pirated
products. This is sensible because there is substantial evidence that piracy (for sound recordings at least) is positively related to the size and efficiency of the black-market
distribution channels (Papadopoulos 2004). However, the
current research indicates that education efforts may have
noticeable effects as well. Changing consumer attitudes and
increasing the salience of messages that piracy is theft and,
thus, socially unacceptable or unethical may have substantial effects on legitimate consumption choices.
Consumer advocates and policy makers should consider
other marketplace factors that could be perceived as consumption constraints and thus lead consumers to acquire
pirated products and/or support the piracy behavior of others. Although industry or government may attempt to
remove certain perceived consumption constraints, a more
effective approach may be to target moderating variables,
such as social influence or ethical perceptions, similar to
recent efforts by the MPAA to change attitudes toward
piracy. Indeed, Mazar and Ariely (2006) suggest that education and socialization efforts can increase internal reward
mechanisms by instilling or strengthening internalized
social norms. From a consumer education perspective, it is
not apparent that previous attempts have worked to significantly reduce pirating behavior, though recent efforts have
shown more promise (e.g., Siemens and Kopp 2006). It is
critical for those attempting to change piracy attitudes and
behavior to understand that some remedies may work only
for certain groups but not for others. Again, an investigation
into these and other moderators may help determine which
remedies will work for particular consumer segments.
Potential Limitations and Further Research
Studies 1 and 3 were limited by examining only intended
behavior instead of actual behavior, though the strong relationship between reported intentions and actual behavior
uncovered in Study 2 lends confidence to the findings of the
other two studies. Further research that examines actual
behavior will continue to add to the findings of these studies in better understanding piracy and other deviant con-
sumer behavior. Another limitation could be the use of consumer disapproval of another person’s piracy behavior as a
dependent variable. However, considering the findings of
Study 2 that interpersonal influence plays a role in moderating the consumption constraint effects, such attitudes may
prove to be crucial to consumer reactance to perceived
scarcity, price, lack of resources, and other perceived constraints. Nevertheless, an expansion of dependent measures
would add to the understanding of consumption constraints
regarding piracy behavior. A methodological concern with
Study 2 involves the measurement of social influence after
the purchase of the pirated product. Although the study participants were likely unaware that their purchase of pirated
products had been observed, it is possible that their piracy
actions influenced these measures. Future studies could
work to remedy this concern and could consider the potential for socially desirable response behavior.
A theoretical limitation involves both the assumption that
consumers indeed perceived the limiting factors as consumption constraints and the use of psychological reactance
theory as an explanatory tool. Further research should use
process measures to explore more precisely how consumers
interpret the manipulated factors and whether they consider
each one (under the various conditions) a constraint to their
consumption opportunities. Furthermore, more detailed
measurement of psychological reactance could be conducted to validate when consumers experience it and when
simple cost–benefit analyses might offer a more elegant
theoretical explanation.
Finally, there is a limitation in the type of piracy behavior studied here. We purposefully focused our studies on the
purchase of pirated media products. We understand that
there are many other products that suffer from significant
piracy problems. In addition, as demonstrated by the vast
number of pirated songs that are downloaded, an actual purchase is not always necessary. Indeed, further research
could focus efforts on alternative perspectives of piracy
behavior, how consumption constraints do or do not play a
role, and how consumer involvement and perceptions of
price or cost may help explain reactions to constraints. Such
research could more deeply explore what choices, particularly what distribution choices, a consumer has when he or
she wants a particular product or service. For example, consider some of the ways that a consumer could acquire a
desired recording of a song: (1) purchase at a store, (2) purchase through a mail-order service, (3) purchase online and
have it mailed, (4) purchase online and download it, (5)
purchase an unofficial (pirated) copy online and have it
mailed, (6) purchase an unofficial (pirated) copy in person,
(7) download a free pirated copy from a peer-to-peer service (e.g., LimeWire, Morpheus, BitTorrent), (8) borrow a
CD from a friend and burn it, or (9) record it from the radio,
particularly from high-quality digital/subscription radio.
Conclusions
The three studies presented here demonstrate that various
consumption-limiting factors can have a deleterious effect
on consumer behavior, particularly under the conditions of
various moderating factors. The variety of limiting factors
studied—originating from supplier, channel, consumer, and
government conditions—and the three moderating variables
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
offer a comprehensive look at how price, scarcity, and government restrictions can influence consumers to seek alternative sources for the products they want. Indeed, it is often
the marketplace conditions that influence the piracy-related
consumer attitudes and behaviors to the point of potentially
condoning such behavior and participating in it.
The three studies collectively examine potential consumption constraints that originate from supplier conditions
(temporary stockout and high price in Study 1, high price in
Study 3), distribution channel conditions (lack of home
Internet access in Study 2), consumer conditions (low
income in Study 2), and government conditions (temporary
government restriction in Study 3). In addition, we examine
the interactive effects of various consumption constraints,
showing that resolving one consumption constraint may
have little or no effect on reducing piracy behavior for certain consumer groups unless other consumption constraints
are resolved as well. Thus, further research and future
efforts by government and industry will need to be more
creative in identifying who is prone to consumption constraint effects and how to remedy those effects.
References
Albers-Miller, Nancy D. (1999), “Consumer Misbehavior: Why
People Buy Illicit Goods,” Journal of Consumer Marketing, 16
(3), 273–87.
Bearden, William O., Richard G. Netemeyer, and Jesse E. Teel
(1989), “Measurement of Consumer Susceptibility to Interpersonal Influence,” Journal of Consumer Research, 15 (March),
473–81.
Blakeney, Michael (2004), “Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights: Challenges, Remedies, and Public Awareness,” World
Intellectual Property Organization, (accessed March 29, 2008),
[available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/arab/en/wipo_
ip_uni_dub_04/wipo_ip_uni_dub_04_7.doc].
Brehm, Jack W. (1972), Responses to Loss of Freedom: A Theory
of Psychological Reactance. Morristown, NJ: General Learning
Press.
83
Clee, Mona A. and Robert A. Wicklund (1980), “Consumer
Behavior and Psychological Reactance,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 6 (March), 389–405.
Cox, Dena, Anthony D. Cox, and George P. Moschis (1990),
“When Consumer Behavior Goes Bad: An Investigation of
Adolescent Shoplifting,” Journal of Consumer Research, 17
(September), 149–59.
Cronan, Timothy Paul and Sulaiman Al-Rafee (2007), “Factors
that Influence the Intention to Pirate Software and Media,”
Journal of Business Ethics, 78 (April), 527–45.
The Economist (2003), “Stepping Up the War Against Piracy,”
(January 30), (accessed February 20, 2003), [available at
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=
1560936].
Freestone, O. and V. Mitchell (2004), “Generation Y Attitudes
Towards E-ethics and Internet-Related Misbehaviours,” Journal
of Business Ethics, 54 (October), 121–28.
Gupta, Pola B., Stephen J. Gould, and Bharath Pola (2004), “‘To
Pirate or Not to Pirate’: A Comparative Study of the Ethical
Versus Other Influences on the Consumer’s Software
Acquisition-Mode Decision,” Journal of Business Ethics, 55
(December), 255–74.
Hill, Charles W.L. (2007), “Digital Piracy: Causes, Consequences,
and Strategic Responses,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management,
24 (March), 9–25.
Hong, Sung-Mook and Salvatora Faedda (1996), “Refinement of
the Hong Psychological Reactance Scale,” Educational and
Psychological Measurement, 56 (Fall), 173–82.
——— and S. Page (1989), “A Psychological Reactance Scale:
Development, Factor Structure, and Reliability,” Psychological
Reports, 64 (3), 1323–26.
IFPI (2008), “IFPI Digital Music Report: Revolution, Innovation,
Responsibility,” (accessed March 29, 2008), [available at
http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2008.pdf].
Jacobs, Laurence, A. Coskun Samli, and Tom Jedlik (2001), “The
Nightmare of International Product Piracy,” Industrial Marketing Management, 30 (6), 499–509.
Brehm, Sharon Stephens and Jack W. Brehm (1981), Psychological Reactance: A Theory of Freedom and Control. New York:
Academic Press.
Kwong, Kenneth K., Oliver H.M. Yau, Jenny S.Y. Lee, Leo Y.M.
Sin, and Alan C.B. Tse (2003), “The Effects of Attitudinal and
Demographic Factors on Intention to Buy Pirated CDs: The
Case of Chinese Consumers,” Journal of Business Ethics, 47
(3), 223–35.
Business Software Alliance (2006), “Fourth Annual BSA and IDC
Global Software Piracy Study,” (accessed March 29, 2008),
[available at http://w3.bsa.org/globalstudy//upload/2007Global-Piracy-Study-EN.pdf].
Langenderfer, Jeff and Don Lloyd Cook (2001), “Copyright Policies and Issues Raised by A&M Records v. Napster: ‘The Shot
Heard ’Round the World’ or ‘Not with a Bang but a Whimper?’” Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 20 (Fall), 280–88.
Cheung, Wah-Leung and Gerard Prendergast (2006), “Buyers’
Perceptions of Pirated Products in China,” Marketing Intelligence & Planning, 24 (5), 446–62.
Limayem, Moez, Mohamed Khalifa, and Wynne W. Chin (2004),
“Factors Motivating Software Piracy: A Longitudinal Study,”
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 51 (November), 414–25.
Childnet International (2005), “Young People, Music, and the
Internet,” (accessed April 1, 2008), [available at http://76.74.24.
142/A6091D27-6C3B-CA63-0422-7A6EF89A7125.pdf].
Chiou, Jyh-Shen, Chien-yi Huang, and Hsin-hui Lee (2005), “The
Antecedents of Music Piracy Attitudes and Intentions,” Journal
of Business Ethics, 57 (March), 161–74.
Chung, Janne and Gary S. Monroe (2003), “Exploring Social
Desirability Bias,” Journal of Business Ethics, 44 (June),
291–302.
Mazar, Nina and Dan Ariely (2006), “Dishonesty in Everyday
Life and Its Policy Implications,” Journal of Public Policy &
Marketing, 25 (Spring), 117–26.
McBride, Sarah (2006), “Studios See Big Rise in Estimates of
Losses to Movie Piracy,” The Wall Street Journal, (May 3), B1.
McDonald, Gael and Christopher Roberts (1994), “Product Piracy:
The Problem that Will Not Go Away,” Journal of Product &
Brand Management, 3 (4), 55–65.
84
Consumer Willingness to Purchase Pirated Media Products
Meyer, Robert J. (1981), “A Model of Multiattribute Judgments
Under Attribute Uncertainty and Informational Constraint,”
Journal of Marketing Research, 18 (November), 428–41.
Miyazaki, Anthony D. (2009), “Perceived Ethicality of Insurance
Claim Fraud: Do Higher Deductibles Lead to Lower Ethical
Standards?” Journal of Business Ethics, forthcoming.
———, Dhruv Grewal, and Ronald C. Goodstein (2005), “The
Effect of Multiple Extrinsic Cues on Quality Perceptions: A
Matter of Consistency,” Journal of Consumer Research, 32
(June), 146–53.
———, Jeff Langenderfer, and David E. Sprott (1999),
“Government-Sponsored Lotteries: Exploring Purchase and
Nonpurchase Motivations,” Psychology & Marketing, 16 (January), 1–20.
MPAA (2005), “2005 U.S. Piracy Fact Sheet,” (accessed April 1,
2008), [available at http://www.mpaa.org/USPiracyFactSheet.
pdf].
Siwek, Stephen E. (2006), “The True Cost of Motion Picture
Piracy to the US Economy,” Institute for Policy Innovation,
(accessed March 29, 2008), [available at http://www.ipi.org/
ipi%5CIPIPublications.nsf/PublicationLookupFullTextPDF/
293C69E7D5055FA4862571F800168459/$File/CostOfPiracy.
pdf?OpenElement].
Smith, Adam (1937), The Wealth of Nations. New York: Random
House.
Smith, Tom (2004), “RIAA Sues 482 More Unnamed File Sharers,” The Register, (accessed April 1, 2008), [available at http://
www.theregister.co.uk/2004/06/23/riaa_sues_482/].
Stetler, Brian (2008), “Tape Delay by NBC Faces End Run by
Online Fans,” The New York Times, (August 9), A1.
Stock, Axel and Subramanian Balachander (2005), “The Making
of a ‘Hot Product’: A Signaling Explanation of Marketers’
Scarcity Strategy,” Management Science, 51 (8), 1181–92.
No Electronic Theft Act (1997), P.L. 105-147.
Universal City Studios v. Corley (2001), 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Circuit).
Papadopoulos, Theo (2004), “Pricing and Pirate Product Market
Formation,” Journal of Product & Brand Management: Pricing
Strategy and Practice, 13 (1), 56–63.
Valentine, Sean R. and Terri L. Rittenburg (2004), “Spanish and
American Business Professionals’ Ethical Evaluations in Global
Situations,” Journal of Business Ethics, 51 (April), 1–14.
Prendergast, Gerard, Leung Hing Chuen, and Ian Phau (2002),
“Understanding Consumer Demand for Non-Deceptive Pirated
Brands,” Marketing Intelligence & Planning, 20 (7), 405–416.
Wang, Shujen and Jonathan J.H. Zhu (2003), “Mapping Film
Piracy in China,” Theory, Culture & Society, 20 (4), 97–125.
Siemens, Jennifer Christie and Steven W. Kopp (2006), “Teaching
Ethical Copyright Behavior: Assessing the Effects of a
University-Sponsored Computing Ethics Program,” NASPA
Journal, 43 (4), 112–26.
Woller, Kevin M.P., Walter C. Buboltz Jr., and James M. Loveland (2007), “Psychological Reactance: Examination Across
Age, Ethnicity, and Gender,” American Journal of Psychology,
120 (Spring), 15–24.