ANGLO-FRENCH.RELATIONS IN 1940
Janet Proulx
Thesis submitted to the Faculty
of Graduate Studies, McGill
University in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts.
Department of History
McGill University
11ontreal
April 1966
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
PREFACE
ii
INTRODUCTION
iii
CHAPTER I
UNFRIENDLY ALLIES
1
CHAPTER II
ARMISTICE
31
CHAPTER III
THE PROBLEM OF
FLEET
FRENCH
CHAPTER IV
GAULLIST ACTIVITIES
117
CHAPTER V
SECRET NEGOTIATIONS
141~
81
CONCLUSION
199
APPEI'-JviCES
206
OGRAPHY
236
{i)
PREFACE
I wish to acknowledge the generous assistance of
the Canada Council which made it possible for me to
undertake this research.
I
am also grateful to Dr.
Robert Vogel for his constructive criticism. fertile
suggestions and unstinting willingness to discuss
problems.
{ii)
INTRODUCTION
1'11len did you refrain from us or we refrain
from you?
Ask the wave that bas not watched war between
11
'!.-te two t
Rudyard Kipling
tt 1
Friendly relations between Britain and France are,
historically speaking, an innovation of the twentieth century.
Even if we ignore the Hundred Years 'l'far and Joan of Arc, the
modern history of Anglo-French relations in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries is of a struggle for power which
culminated in the Napoleonic Wars, and a bitter colonial
rivalry cliroaxed at Fashoda.
The alliance of 1914 failed
to reconcile deep diplomatie differences: the French felt the
British betrayed them at Versailles and deeply resented
Britain's negative attitude towards the French invasion of
the Ruhr, and the Angle-German Naval Agreement of 1935 which,
they felt, facilitated Germany's remilitarization.
Britain's
appeasement policy at Munich was criticized by sorne Frenchmen while others blamed the British for forcing France into
World War II.
Thus it can be seen that Anglo-French friend-
ship was a fragile thing indeed and ill-prepared to withstand
the pressures of Arras, Dunkirk, Mers-el-Kebir and Montoire.
(iii)
Strategie exigencies demanded that Britain make sure that
neither the French Fleet nor Empire fell into Axis hands where
they could be used to eut vital supply lines and as bases for
attacks on British colonies.
The control of her waters was
Britain's greatest assat in her struggle with Hitler•s continental 'New Order•, and hence the importance of British
concern over the fate of the French Fleet and Empire.
When
it became clear that Vichy could not be expected to resist
German pressure Britain officially recognized de daulle, supported his efforts to win over the French colonies, and launched
attacks on the French Fleet.
Nevertheless Britain was still
anxious to prevent metropolitan France from being led by Laval
into a reversal of alliances, so there developed a certain
"duality" of purpose in British policy.
Until 1942 Britain had good reason to fear French re-entry
into the war at Germany's side.
This was especially sc after
the British had fired upon the French fleet and the French had
fired back, and the French colonies had clearly demonstrated
their determination to resist invasion.
I hope to prove that
thereafter British fears of French re-entry into the war,
whether justified or not, were very real.
Thus for the
l~st
six months of 1940 the Vichy Government tried desperately to
pacify Berlin and alleviate suffering as much as possible,
while at the same time trying to conciliate the British and
prevent hostile action.
The British, uncertain of French in-
tentions, but anxious to prevent a reversal of alliances,
negotiated with Pétain but gave material aid to the
•
(iv)
Gaul:~~;ts •
Neither aide was certain of the future and both were trying
to insure themselves against all possible exigencies.
This complex problem may be regarded by some as too
recent to be examined objectively but there is now sufficient
documentation in the form of official reports and correspondence,
as well as a profusion of memoirs by participants to achieve by
cross checking a cohesive picture of the subject.
Although
some of the works used are polemical and very biased they do
reflec~
their authors' outlook.
There is, moreover, much more
primary French material available than British.
Many of my
primary sources illustrate the difficulty of writing about
contemporary events without becoming involved in the moral
judgments and ethical problems which often motivated the
diplomats and military leaders.
Charles-Roux 1 s Cinq Mois Tragiques aux Affaira Etrangère
is the most reliable French source, and as a professional
diplomat he presents a more balanced viewpoint than most.
The
works of Baudouin, Weygand, Reynaud and de Gaulle are very
valuable in presenting the many facets of French opinion, but
these men were so deeply personally involved in the events
they describe that they are unable to produce objective accounts.
This is doubly true in the case of Rougier.
If bis negotiations
with Churchill are still a matter of disagreement his most
unreliable books do nothing to increase confidence in him.
are a profusion of secondary works in French among which one
of the best known is Benoist-Méchin 1 s encyclopedie Soixante
{v)
There
Jours qui Ebranlérent l'Occident.
Kammerer has also done a
detailed study of Mers-el-Kebir and of the armistice.
Although
less objective his work is more provocative than BenoistM6chin's.
The British have not felt the need to defend their position.
They were not faced with invasion and political disunity, and
their repercussions.
Like all things in war everything was
justifiable because in the end they won.
The most touchy
problem for Britain was the secret negotiations with Rougier
and a Command Paper has been published on this.
Otherwise
there are a number of books by participants of which Churchill's
monumental works are the best known but far from the most
reliable.
The works of Duff Cooper, Spears, and Hoare are
generally reliable but tend to present very narrow viewpoints.
They are extremely valuable however as cross checks.
Finally,
the standard works of Medlicott and Woodward are well documentad and invaluable sources of factual material.
The early sections of this thesis are largely chronologically
arranged, but the Anglo-French negotiations in the autumn of 1940
overlapped and were so interrelated that they oould not be
treated in this manner.
The French still regard this period with a good deal of
emotionalism and shame.
The statesmen of the third republic
had been disowned by politiciens of all parties in the frantic
effort of 1940 to find scapegoats.
When the Germans demanded
condamnation of •warmongering' pre-war French politiciens, in
•
order to fix the blame for the war on France, Pétain obliged
(vi}
with the absortive war guilt trials at Riom.
The Germans
were not fully satisfied however# for although Pétain
obligingly condemned the defenda.nts before the verdict was
annobnced# the charges laid were lack of preparation for
the war and not responsibility for its initiation.
Certain-
ly with the amount of time the Allies had to prepare for the
Ge~uan
attack they should have been much better prepared and
co-ordinated.
Their failure to take advantage of the 'phony
war 1 was in part responsible for the rapid deterioration in
Anglo-French relations in early 1940 •
•
(vii)
CHAPTER I
UNFRIENDLY ALLIES
"In no country in the world 't-rould people
not have been critical of an ally bearing
so small a part of the common suffering
and loss •••• "l
General Sir Edward Spears
In World War I it was 1917 before interallied co-operation
in the higher direction of the war was effective, so in 1939
serious consideration was given to the problems of Angle-French
co-operation.
The staff conversations which began in March
1939 were comparatively later than those of 1906, before
tvorld lrlar I.
Also they reflect a radical change in British
strate gy as prior to 1939 Bri tain was determined not to becœ;.0
involved in a Continental war.
However, at the staff meetings
it was decided that allied strategy should be in preparation
for a long war.
Germany was expected to attack France over-
land through the Lm.; Countries and three stages were envisaged:
1.
Preserving allied territorial integrity.
2.
Holding and blockading Germany while destroying Italypossibly via North Africa.
3.
The defeat of Germany.2
Actually this forecast proved remarkably accurate, but
hardly in the manner expected by the strategists.
In conformity
1E. Spears, Assignment to Catastrophe:The Fall of France:
June 1940,II, (hereafter referred to as Catastrophe, II), London,
HeiUL1ann, 1954, p. 105.
and the Middle East: The
2
with their expectation of superior Axis military and economie
power during the early stages of the war it was decided that
" ••• during this time our major strategy would be defensive.u3
By lata smmaer 1939 Italy 1 s ambiviant attitude resulted in a
consideration or the strategical affects of Italian neutrality.
Because of removal of the threat to the Mediterranean Italian
neutrality was felt to be desirable, but optimism over Italy
was soon outweighed by the Russo-German non-aggression pact.
In September 1939 the Supreme War Council was created, and
it
beca~e
a channel for the regular exchange of views.
(It had
no actual authority as final decisions were reserved for the
governments.)
It should not be thought that disagreements wera
almost solely inter-allied; in England, for
ex~~ple,
there was
considerable conflict over the nature of the B.E.F. because of
costs, the staggering losses in France during World War I and
udissatisfaction with French foreign policyn.
As a result
" ••• no approval had bean given for plans or preparations to
be made specifically for sending an army to France 11 until a
few month.s before the war.4
Hm-rever, once the Supreme War
Council was established the co-ordination of Anglo-French
policy was remarkably smooth.
The defence plans for North
Africa were co-ordinated and it was decided that there should
be a French Commander-in-Chief in Western Europe and a British
one in the Middle East.
The invasion of Poland did not provide
a real test of the alliance as neither Britain nor France were
3J .R.M. Butler, His tor of the Second vlorld T:!::.-:::-: Grand
Strategy, II, Se tember 19 9-June 19 1, London, H.M.s.o., 957,
p.
io.
4Ibid., p. 15.
3.
willing to commit themselves to war, and even air attacks were
rejected ~or ~ear they would result in German retaliation.5
A~ter
six months
o~
1
phony war' there was a growing
that a realistic and more intensive
eut German supply routes.
e~fort
~eeling
should be made to
Scandinavian iron and Balkan oil
were considered to be Hitler's 1 Achilles' heel.'
The French in
particular felt that less sensitivity should be exhibited for
neutrals and a German invasion of Norway should be fo~estalled
by an Anglo-French seizure of Narvik. 6 General Ironside
agreed and declared that such a "side show" with an AngleFrench force of three or four thousand men would be justified,
but in general British opinion favoured mining of Norwegian
territorial waters and a naval blockade.
The French were
persuaded to approve this course but i..rhen Oslo and Stockholm
were advised accordingly they protested so strongly that the
plan -vras dropped. 7
The French were dissatis~ied and suggested
once again that Narvik should be occupied.
Growing sympathy
for the Finns resulted in the plan to combine this operation
with the movement of a multi-national force of •volunteers'
to Finland.
It is obvious that the difficulties of such a
campaign were underestimated, and when the Finns sued for
peace on March 9 there was no longer a suitable pretext for the
operation so yet another plan was abandoned.
5Ibid.
6Narvik has an important strategie location with reference
to the Gallivare oro fields. It is the only year-round icefree port ~or No~degian and Swedish iron ore.
7Ibid. pp. 103 and 106.
4.
Attention was then focussed on the plan to mine Norwegian
waters on April
5,
but, once again, France was fearful or re-
taliation and the operation was delayed.
The Chiefs of Staff
felt the chances of a German invasion of the Norwegian west
coast were negligible.
This critical miscalculation resulted
in the allies losing the initiative, and the landings were
thus opposed by enemy not neutral forces.8
The disasterous Norwegian campaign should have been an
excellent object lesson to the allies.
Operations of 1938 states that
n ••• one
The Manual of Combined
of the earliest decisions
to be made on a declaration of war is the system of command in
each theatre of war. 11 9
Not only was the chain of command not
clearly established, resulting in considerable disagreements,
but the orders given to the commandera were inadequate.
This
resulted in administrative confusion and a bewildering and
rapid succession of plans.
These changes of plan were so frequent
that there was not enough time to make changes in preparations
at a lower level, and this, combined with lack of inter service
co-operation, severe cold and difficult terrain resulted in
chaos.
Unfortunately, by the time this operation had been
concluded, the military aspects tended to blind the allies
to the basic difficulties of co-ordination, and in any case
there was not enough time to reassess strategy and co-ordination
8Ibid., pp. 122-123.
9Ibid., p. 129.
5
in Western Europe where the situation was complicated by
diplomatie entanglements.
Meanwhile, during the earl y stages of the wal"', the re. was
a remarkable lack of concern about general preparations for
the forth-coming struggle.
The French was themselves allied
to the only other great empire of the world and expected the
combined populations of over five hundred million to be a
guarantee of victory by virtue of military and economie
strength. 10 Imperial liaisons were stressed as was the fact
that far larger numbers of men bad been mobilized in eight
months of war than during the whole of 1.'/orld \•Jar I; 11 the
pitifully antiquated equipment of many of these forces tended
to be ignored. 12
Anglo-French relations seem to have been breached with the
northern defences of France and just as easily.
"The speed and
force and width and depth of the German offensive was sometting
new in war.nl3
11any military strategists could not understand
why the Germans could not be out flanked, but the speed of the
German mechanised forces resulted in plans for counter-attacks
being obsolete while they were being considered.
The British
l~mile Schreiber, "L'Empire Français dans la Guerre,"
ILLUSTRATION, CCVI, May 11, 1940, 41-42.
11 11 La Puissance Nilitaire de L'Empire," ILLUSTRATION, CCVI,
!1ay 11, 1940, no pagination.
12 11 Les Troupes Coloniales," ILLUSTRATION, CCVI, Hay 11,
1940, no pagination.
13Butler, Oo.cit., p. 186.
6
were shocked by the success of the German a.tta.ck and the
colla.pse of the French defences.
"Within a week the front in France, behind
which we had been a.ccustomed to dwell through
the long yea.rs of the former war and the
opening phase pf this ••• was to be irretrievable broken. 11 ly.
The French, on the other band, although equally shocked, resented the British criticism of a defence system upon which
they had relied but to which they had made negligible contributions.
n ••• La
Grande-Bretagne avait trop compté sur
la. France pour lui servir de rampa.rt ••• Nous
avons certés nos responsabilités dans notre
désastre ••• ma.is nos allies~ actuel ou futurs,
avaient aussi les leurs."l~
The speed of the German advance
iw~ersed
France in deep
pessimism and the Battle of France had only been in progress
ten days {May 10-19) when armistice was considered.
The
colla.pse of Belgium and the rapid British retreat in Flanders,
and their move towards the coast aggravated the already
critical situation of the French army and helped precipitate
the appea.l for an armistice, but it is obvious tha.t neither
Britain nor France was prepared properly to meet as efficient
a machine as the Wehrmacht.
The recall of Marshal Pétain and
General Weygand on May 18 improved French morale but had little
effect on the outcome of the battle.
14wtnston Churchill, The Second \iorld 1tlar: Their Finest
referred to as Their Finest Hour), Boston,
Houghton Mifflin, 1949, p.4.
Hour,(he~eafter
15F. Charles-Roux, Cin Mois Tra i ues Aux Affaires
Etrangères: 21 Mai - 1 Novembre 19~0, Paris, Plon, 19 9, p.27.
7.
Pétain approved General Gamelin's metbods in a congratulatory latter written on February 5, 1940, 1 6but be later declared
that Gamelin was imcompetent. 1 7 Pétain was a known pessimist;
on March
25, 1918 he told Clemenceau that Germany
~;ould
defea.t
England and France, and Marshal Joffre described him as a
poor leader who would have readily given up the struggle at
Verdun.l8
He was rernembered, however, by the troops as a
military leader who believed in defensive warfare and knew
how to spare his men.l9
Since be was a popular hero Reynaud
felt that, despite his defeatism, he would be easier to control
if he was in the goverr~ent. 20
17 11 Gamelin is incapable of conducting this war.n nHave you
said this to Daladier? 11 "No, let him get out of his own difficulties.n l1:?1S!•' p. 19.
18see J. J .c. Joffre, 11 i-1emoires du r'!aréchal Jo_'fre, 1910
1917 Cited in ~v. Root, The Secret History of the \far, New York,_.
Scribners, 1945, p. 188.
1 9Paul Reynaud, In the Thick of the Fight: 1930-1945,
London, Cassell, 1955, p. 340. In this effort to preserve
the army his thougbts were in full agreement with Gamelin.
See J. Romaines. "Th~ I-1ystery of Gam.elin, 11 THE SATURDAY
EVENIUG POST, CCXIII, September 28, 1940, 46.
11
20Rather ironically Pétain expressed the same sentiments
about Laval in July 1940. See C. de Gaule, r:lar Hemoirs, I, The
Gall to Honour, (hereafter referred to as Memoirs, I), London,
Collins, 1955, p. 59.
8.
Pétain claimed to be surprised by his recall, yet on March
30 he had remarked that he was sure that 11 • • • ils auront besoin
de moi dans le second quinzaine de mai. 1121 His .forecast proved
correct but he then claimed that he had been recalled too late 22
and in this view he is supported by 'tleygand who earlier had
declared the French army was more powertul than ever betore,
and under a uremarkable high command, 11 so that in the event of
war he felt victory to be assured. 2 3
Weygand was almost as negative in outlook as Pétain.
had a sort ot mystic beliet that France had
be cleansed by suf.fering.24
sir~ed
He
and had to
Politically a royalist, he was also
pro-clerical and a military conservative who discounted the
value of tanks and planes.
His rather archaic ideas of honour,
and his pride in the military and glories of the past permeated
his avery thought, resulting in his preference .for a political
armistice and his indignation with Reynaud who he te1t was
trying to shi.ft the b1ame for France's defeat to the army,
2lp. Tissier, Le Gouvernement de Vichv, London, Harrap,
1942, p. 14.
22sis1ey Huddleston, France: The Tragic Years; 19391947, An Eye1r1i tness Account of Ha..!J Occupation and Liberation,
New York, Devin-Adair, 1955, p. 207.
23Root, OD. cit., p. 166.
24-vr.
Somerset Maugham, nThe Inside Story of the French
Co1lapse," Redbook, ci ted, Ibid., 193, M. ~veygand, Reca11ed
to Service, London, Heinemann, 1952, p. 208.
9.
and whom he accused of bringing him back from Syria to carry
the burden of surrender. 25 In practice however Weygand maintained that the French and British were still allies and thus 1
even after the armistice, he carried out the terms but went
no further than absolutely necessary, and it was at his instigation that: considerable quantities of arros were concealed
both in l1etropoli tan France and in North Africa, arms manufacture
was continued in secret on a limited scale, and 60,000 men were
kept as
1
police 1 and •labour gangs.r26
The military situation was aggravated by the entry of
Italy into the war, which both France and Britain had hoped
to prevent.
Mussolini was set on war as early as February 1,
1940, and he consequently rejected British efforts to negotiate
a trade agreement, 2 7 and personally directed propaganda attacks
on France in the Popolo d 1 Italia. 28 By March 10 Mussolini had
been convinced by von Ribbentrop that a German victory was
inevitable 2 9 and the course of the dictator who was greedy
2 5Private conversation on July 3, 1944 with ~·lm. Langer,
cited in his book, Our Vichy Ga~ble, New York, Knopf, 1947 1
p. 10. Weygand 1 s impression is supported by Alexis Leger,
Secretary General of the French Foreign Office in 1940 1 see
Charles-Roux, Op.eit., p. 40.
26Aron, The Vichy Regime, pp. 183-185.
2 7This resulted in Britain blockading German shipments of
coal to Italy.
•
28H. Gibson, (ed.), The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943, New York,
Doubleday, 1946, pp. 203, 205 & 208.
2 9Ibid., p. 219 •
10
for land and glory was fixed, as he declared:
"Pour rendre un peuple grand, il faut
l'envoyer au combat, même à coups de
pied dans le derriêre ••• "30
British and French appeals for conciliatory talks were brusquely
rejected31 so when Reynaud suggested in London on May 26 that
a joint effort be made to buy Mussolini off he met with a cold
reception.
Although Lord Halifax was favourable both Attlee
and Churchill felt the effort would be futile.
In an earlier
letter to Churchill, Mussolini had complained of the
11
•••
servi-
tude in which Italy finds herself in her own sea, 11 and it was
therefore assumed Italy would demand concessions which would
affect Suez, Gibraltar and Tunisia.
The French seem prepared
to make these concessions but Churchill declared that if Mussolini
felt Hitler could win he could hope to take what he wanted.
The
British therefore felt an immediate attack on northern Italian
ports and cities when war was declared would be more effective
and Reynaud " ••• seemed convinced or at least content,n32 but
at his insistance Britain and France jointly requested Roosevelt to offer immediate consideration of Italian grievances
and recognition as an equal at the Peace Conference, with Roosevelt acting as an itermediary.
As expected the offer was
abruptly rejected.33
30Quoted in M. Hourin, Les Tentatives de Paix dans la.
seconde Guerre Hondia.le, 1939-1945, Paris, Payot, 1949, p.72.
•
31Gibson, Op.cit., pp.238 and 240.
32churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 121-122 •
33Ibid., p.l23. For other America.n efforts see c. Hull,
The Hemoirs of Cordell Hull, I, New York, r1acMillan, 1948,
pp,777-786.
11.
On Hay 28 the French 1vere considering making specifie and
concrete offers to Italy and were warned by Charles-Roux that
taking the diplomatie initiative in the Italian negotiations,
without not only informing, but consulting with the Foreign
office would alienate the British who were involved in Gibraltar,
Suez and Malta.34
vlhen the Foreign Office was consulted Lord
Halifax, in a comrau.."lication dated r1ay 28.., proposed to H. Reynaud
that if Mussolini would co-operate in the settlement of European
questions his Mediterranean claims would be considered.., but he
rejected Reynaud's idea of specifie offers as these could not
be withdrawn, and in view of Hitler's victorias it was felt
the time was not propitious.35
It was, of course, these very
victorias which made the French so willing to make immediate
concessions, and they therefore approached Italy but were
informed by Ciano that war had already been decided.
It is
clear that Italy had merely been waiting until German success
seemed guaranteed.
As Ciano remarked to the British ambassador..,
Sir Percy Lorraine:
"Quand même la France nous offrirait Nice, la
Corse et la Tunisie, nous lui declarerions
la guerret"36
34charles-Roux, Op. cit., p. 13. The French territory
involved would have included land adjacent to the AngloEgyptian Sudan. See also A. Kammerer, La Verité sur L'Armistice,
(hereafter referred to as L'Armistice), Paris, Medicis, !945,
pp. 76-78.
•
35Reynaud, Op. cit., pp. 412-413.
36charles-Roux, Op. cit., p. 180 •
12.
On June 11 at 1:00 a.m. Italy declared war on Britain and
France.
The French were mistakenly convinced that there was
a dichotomy of view within the British Cabinet and the Imperial
General Staff and that by May 16 Churchill and General Ironside
want0d to fight on in France but Lord Gort and Sir John Dill
felt that Britain should concentrate on her own defences.
Anthony Eden, who was Secretary of State for War, and Lord
Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, were believed to support
Lord Gort and when on May
24
Sir John Dill replaceü General
Ironside, the French felt their suspicions confirmed.37 Lord
Gort had already decided, (May 19) that the B.E.F. should be
withdrawn towards the Channel ports and ordered all but one
Royal Air Force airfield to be abandoned.
These orders were
implemented from May 20 without notifying the French.
When the French High Command heard rumeurs of the projected
evacuation of the B.E.F. from Dunkirk, should it fail to make
juncture with troops to the south, they remonstrated with
London.
Churchill instructed Dill to order Lord Gort to
" ••• move southwards upon A.'niens,n and he was dissatisfied with
the sroall sortie made towards Arras.
It was as a result of
these difficulties that General Spears was sent to
Churchill 1 s representative.38
•
Fr~~ce
as
Shortly after his arrival
37J. Benoist-Méchin, Soixante Jours oui Ebranlerent
l•Occident. 10 Mai-10 Juillet 19 0, I, Paris, Albin, pp. 116123, Passim and p. 1 • See also R.Macleod and D. Kelley,
The Ironside Diaries, London, Constable, 1962, pp.335,346
l
and·-3+3•
38Butler, On.cit., pp. 187-190.
13
Spears was informed by \rJeygand that the British were showing
lack of good will by their secrecy and were fighting indifferently, as i11ustrated by their retreat from Rouen without a stand.39
Furthermore Weygand bad a1ready warned Reynaud that if the
French lines were broken co-ordinated resistance could not be
continued and with the deterioration of the situation subsequent to " ••• the defection of the Be1gian Armyn the British
should be requested to send two or three more divisions, tank,
anti-tank, and anti-aircraft units as we11 as aerial support.4°
No such reinforcements were sent to France despite Reynaud's
request and, in tact, they were simply not availab1e.41
The Angle-French military dissension in the spring of
1940 was not confined to the land forces, nor was it pure1y
between the two nations.
Force and Army High
Relations between the British Air
Conh~ands
were strained because of con-
troversy over the role of the R.A.F.; the Army telt it should
be able to use the R.A.F. as an adjunct to the B.E.F. w'bereas
"'
the R.A.F. maintained that its first duty was to protect the
39Paul Baudouin, The Private Diaries Harch 19·0-Ja.nuar
1941, ~f Paul Baudouin, London. Eyre and Spottiswoode, 194 ,
pp. Ô2-CJ$.
40Reynaud, Oo.cit., pp.l+42-444.
41A srnal1 force was sent out later under the cœnmand of
Sir Alan Brookes. This was however far from the scale of
reinforcements the French hoped to obtain. Weygand, Op.cit.,
p. 167.
14
United Kingdom from air attack.4 2 In January 1940 there were
thirteen R.A.F. squadrons under Lord Gort 1 s command and ten
under direct control of Bomber Command in London and independant of both Gort and the
French~ (to the annoyance of the latter)~)
General Spears wrote privately to Reynaud and explained that
the R.A.F. operated independently of the Army and bence the
difficulty of placing squadrons under Weygand's
control~
they would be regarded as a mere adjunct to the army.
where
He~
however, suggested that through good liaison it could be
arranged for the R.A.F. to attack targets specified by General
Weygand.44 Unfortunately neither the R.A.F. nor the French
bad dive-bombers or planes capable of duplicating the devastating effect on the morale of the infantry which the Germans
were producing with their Stukas.
The number of aircraft available for service also caused
considerable friction.
Although aircraft orders to the United
States were increased the R.A.F. relied mainly on British
production which was soon exceeding expectations.45
42E.J. Kingston-McCloughry, The Direction of War: A Critique
of the Political Direction and High Command in War, New York,
Praegar, 1955, pp. lOl & 102.
43Butler, Op.cit., pp. 153 & 154.
44spears, Catastrophe, II, p. 80.
•
45B. Collier, History of the Second World War: The
Defence of the United Kingdom, London, H.M.s.o., 1957, p. 121.
See also Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 115 •
15
Fighter Production
Expected
Gross Production
Delivered
May
261
325
1279
June
292
446
1591
July
329
496
166.5
August
282
476
1601
Despite British efforts the situation became critical
during the Battle of France.
In May the R.A.F. bad 96
fighters, 160 1ight bombera and 160 other aircraft in France.
When the invasion began another 64 fighters were sent over.
These aircraft were a1most entirely wiped out in five weeks
and the R.A.F. losses during the Battle of France totalled
9.59 aircraft, (of which 477 were fighters,) and 1192 men.4 6
During the evacuation of Dunkirk the R.A.F. 1ost an average
of 2.5 fighters a day and Britain was producing lesa than ha1f
that number.47
Nevertheless the French were not satisfied that they were
getting all possible assistance from the R.A.F.
They were
particularly chagrined when, with the fall of Paris imminent,
Churchill's promise of additional serial support was revoked
by the War Cabinet.48 They pointed out that Britain bad
46spears, Catastrophe, I, pp. 306-307.
47churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 71.5 and Collier,
Op.cit., p. 121.
48Langer, Op.cit., p. 4.
16
enough planes to bomb Turin and Milan but not enough to help
protect Paris or prevent Italian reprisals against French citiea.
French civilians obviously shared this vtew for they prevented
further bombing from Marseilles by covering the airfield
with lorries and carts and thus making take-off impossible.49
By May Sir Hugh Dowding, the Commander-in-Chief of
Fighter Command, was immovably determined that due to the
danger of invasion, no further fighters should leave Britain.
Churchill described Fighter Command to Reynaud as " ••• in
effect our Maginot Line," and although France had only 150
of the 650 fighters she had at the beginning of the war
left, all but three squadrons of the Advanced Striking Force
were withdrawn.
Lack of airfields was the official pretext,
but fear of invasion seems to have been the basic factor.
On
May 29 the Chiers of Staff officially notified the Cabinet
that they felt a full-scale invasion of Britain should be
imminently expected.5°
It was largely because of this fear
of invasion that the British refused to send to France the
anti-aircraft guns they had managed to salvage from Norwa7,
and maintained that in any case they could not spare the
ships to carry them, as they were required to protect British
49churchill, Their Finest Hour,pp.l30-156. General
Spears maintains this was not the spontaneous act of peasants
who would be ignorant of policy, but instigated by General
Vuillemin, the c. in c. of the French air force. See Spears,
Catastrophe, II, pp. 162-3.
5°Butler, Op.cit., pp. 184 & 193.
17
territorial waters.5 1
The effort to safe-guard the R.A.F.
seems to have been successful for Churchill made a statement
on June 16, 1940, to the Commonwealth prime ministers to the
effeot that:
" ••• we have managed to husband our airfighter strength in spite of poignant
appeals from France to throw it improvidently into the great land battle, which
it could not have turned decisively. I
am happy to tell you that it is now as
strong as it has every been ••• "52
Reynaud, who opposed the French request for armistice,
nonetheless on April
5,
1941, expressed the view that sub-
sequent events had justified the conservation of the R.A.F.
n ••• sur laquelle repose aujourd'hui notre seule chance de
victoire.n53
The signifioance of the R.A.F. is further
underlined by Hitler's statement on July 2 that " ••• landing
in England is possible, provided that air superiority oan be
obtained ••• n54
The Americans also seem to have recognized the British
position, although not unanimously, as Cordell Hull explains:
51Benoist-Méchin, ~., p. 204.
52churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 195~ See also statement
to General Smuts on June 9, 1940, Ibid., p. 146.
53Kammerer, Armistice, p. 80.
54F.H. Hinsley, Command of the Sea: The Naval Side of
History from 1918 to the End of the Second World War, London,
Christophers, 1950, p. 40.
18
"In response to Reynaud's almost pitiful
pleas for backing, the President urged
Mr. Churchill to send planes to France
but the Prime Minister refused. Bullitt
(the United States Ambassador in Paris)
outraged by this decision, communicated
to the President and roe on June 5 his fear
that the British roight be conserving their
Air Force and Fleet so as to use them as
bargaining points in negotiations with
Hitler. The President and I, however,
thought differently. France was finished
but we were convinced that Britain, under
Churchill 1 s indomitable leadership, intended to fight on."55
The Angle-French alliance was now reeling under the strain of
military defeat, diplomatie disagreeroents and strategical
conflicts.
The tactical difficulties which arose were, under
the circumstances, almost to be expected, but they tended to
increase Angle-French tension, and so the vicious cycle
continued.
Another difficulty was that the political leaders
were often out of touch with the situation on the front lines,
resulting in recriminations between the allies and confusion
at military headquarters.
For example, the evacuation plans
of the B.E.F. caused great consternation in France.
Reynaud
advised Churchill of Weygand's report that the evacuation of
heavy units of the British army from Le Havre was having
" ••• a serious effect on the morale" of the French troops, he
also felt that this withdrawal indicated that Gort was
receiving different orders from London than those agreed upon,
i.e., the "'weygand Plan.n56 The British roaintained that only
55Hull, Op.cit., pp. 774-775.
56p. Tissier, Le Gouvernement de Vichz, London, Harrap,
1942, p. 371. See Kammerer, Armistice, Appendix V, p. 392,
for text of letter.
19
shells were being removed from Le Havre,57 and in fact Gort
ha.d been instructed to carry out the "Weygand Plan" unless
the situation necessitated evacuation.58
Churchill was
therefore under the impression that Gort was pressing south,
whereas Gort, who was struggling to keep his supply line to
Dunkirk open,5 9 had withdrawn 40 km. and obliged Weygand to
modify his plan.
It should however be recalled that on May
23 Churchill had complained that Gort had received no communications for several days and had no details of the projected operation.60
Gort later confirmed this in a report
published on October 17, 1941, by the London Gazette in which
he maintained that the basic problem was total lack of coordination aggravated by broken communications and the death
of General Billette in a car accident; Bilotte's successor,
General Blanchard, was never confir.med as responsible for
co-ordination. 61
57Benoist-Méchin, Op. cit., I, pp. 248 and 237.
58Kammerer, Armistice, p.
44.
59Benoist-Méchin, Op.cit., I, p. 248, Butler, Op.cit.,
pp. 187-188.
60Reynaud, Op.cit., p. 369.
61Kammerer, Armistice, p. 461 •
••
20
To illustrate the chaotic condition or Anglo-French
liaison and the breakdown or communications between military
and political leaders we need only consider the Arras incident.
Weygand accused the British of perfidy in ordering Gort's
withdrawal rrom Arras, contrary to his plan which bad been
approved by Churchill on May 22. 62 Churchill claimed ignorance or any withdrawal from Arras which he said would be
against his wishes.63
However, the retreat rrom Arras was
conrirmed on May 25, and the British maintained that because
or German pressure they were rorced to attack on the date
rirst agreed upon (May 21), whereas the French, who were not
ready, waited another 24 hours by which time the British rorces
bad been obliged to withdraw.64 Some British witnesses however
support the pocket idea and claim the withdrawal was arter
only moderate righting and carried out to keep in line with
other allied forces. 6 5 Whether Gort ever received orders to
hold Arras is doubtful; it does seem likely however that he
was falsely advised by the French that Pérone, Albert and
Amiens had been recaptured, in a vain attempt to get him to
attack.66
Weygand denied that there was a break down in
62Reynaud, Op.cit., p. 38O.
I, p. 248 •
•
ed
p.
See also incident report1939-1940, London, H.M.s.o.,
21
communications and as proof of his contention cites the
relief of one of Gort 1 s divisions by General Blanchard, howevever,
at a meeting of the War Committee on May
25, at which General
Spears was present, Weygand was informed by Commandant Fauvelle
that no orders had been sent to Gort for three days.67 The
difficulties of communication were intensified two days
later when, by their destruction of the Lille telephone
e~
change, British troops completely disrupted inter-allied
communications.68
Thus although the French accused the
British of playing a double game, and not warning them of the
withdrawal from Arras to the north-west by five British divisions which prevented "the pocket" from being closed, the
British seem to have been forced to act independently due to
faulty liaison and consequently Gort followed his inclination
for withdrawal towards the Channel ports.
The British decided on May 28 to withdraw from the Lys.
General Blanchard informed Gort that this move would leave
seven exhausted French divisions off but Gort refused to
reconsider claiming, " ••• he had categorical orders from his
government to subordinate everything to the safety of the
B.E.F."
When asked by Blanchard, "Will the British forces
pull back tonight whatever the position of the French First
Army along the Lys?" General Pownall, Gort's Chief of Staff
•
67spears, Catastrophe, I, pp. 169 & 193.
6 8Bardies "La Campagne de 1939-1940", pp. 233-234, cited
in Benoist-Méchin, Op.cit., II, p. 315.
22
rep1ied, "Yes." 6 9
The British subsequent1y maintained that
the French cou1d have pulled back despite their 1ack of
mechanized transport, but Spears himself adroits that the
French First and Seventh Armies were exhausted because they
had walked back from Belgium whereas the British were carried
by truck.70
The French First Army was surrounded and captured.
Although the British seem almost to regard the evacuation
from Dunkirk as a victory7 1 the French are lesa enthusiastic.
It is c1aimed that Reynaud subscribed to the evacuation yet
his amazement when he was informed of the operation is a1so
acknowledged.
Furthermore, the French received evacuation
orders so 1ate that many arrived on the beaches too late.7 1
The actual process of evacuation could hard1y be regarded
as an example of military collaboration.
The British had
already worked out detailed evacuation plans7 2 and there
was considerable confusion when French troops refused to
" ••• conform to British orders.n73
Beaches south of Dunkirk
69Ibid., pp. 174 & 175. Pownall claims he merely translated Gort's reply. See Lyet, P., La Bataille de France,
Paris, Payot, 1947, p. 109.
70spears, Catastrophe, I, p. 225. See also Churchill,
Finest Hour, p. 93.
71 General Guderian was ordered to ha1t on the Aa;
Dunkirk was to be left to the Luftwaffe. He felt that this
mistaken confidence of Hitler and Goering and the escape of
the B.E.F. reduced the chances of Britain suing for peace.
See H. Guderian, Panzer Leader, London, Michael Joseph,
1952, pp. 117 & 120.
72F"a.bre ... Luce, "Une Tragedie Royale", p. 98, cited in
Benoist-Méchin, Op.cit., II, p. 314.
73El1is, Op.cit., pp. 240-241.
23
had been allocated to the French and Belgians but when French
and Belgian troops began putting their transport out of
order and trying to embark from areas being used by the British
a cordon of Walsh Guards with fixed bayonets was set up.74
Gort refu$ed to embark French troops on May 29 and British
troops threw recalcitrant French soldiers back into the
sea.75
This process continued until counter-orders were
receivad from London, and this despite the fact that 300
French warships and marchant ships wera participating in the
evacuation.76
On May 22, and with Churchill 1 s concurrence, General
Alexander was placed under Admirai Abrial's command but he
refused to obey orders concerning the defence of Dunkirk as
this would delay embarkation.
When he later received orders
from London to embark equal numbers of French troops and
organize the rear-guard he commented:
74Extract from the diary of Major Miles Reid cited in
Spears, Catastrophe, II, p. 7.
75Gort and the French were mutually distrustful but at
this point those French trying to embark were doing so
without orders. Ellis, Op. cit., pp. 142 and 219. The
French contributed far fewer vessels for use in the evacuation t~an the British. See Lyet, Op.cit., p. 111.
76Benoist-Méchin, Op.cit., II, pp. 348 and 349 •
•
24
"Had my Prime Minister been here instead of
in Paris he would never have subscribed to
these conditions. I have been in touch with
Mr. Anthony Eden. He bas ordered me to cooperate with the French forces in the fullest measure compatible with the security of
British troops. I consider their existence
seriously threatened and am sticking to my
decision to embark tomorrow, June lst." 77
The contention that the ground disposition of the troops was
responsible for the disparity in numbers of French and British
troops evacuated does not seem completely valid.
On May 31
Reynaud protested at a meeting of the Supreme
Council that
~ar
only 15,000 of 200,000 French troops in the Dunkirk area bad
been evacuated as against 150,000 of 220,000 British troops.
78
By June 2 all British troops had been evacuated and both the
Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy had withdrawn.
Between
79
30,000 and 40,000 French troops remained in Dunkirk.
That
day General Weygand sent a telegram to General Lelong, the
French military attaché in London, requesting the evacuation
of these defenders of Dunkirk.80The ships sent in response to
this request stood offshore, witbin sight but out of reach
77Ibid., pp. 201 and 208. Before Gort left Dunkirk he
told Alexander that if Abrial's orders "imperilled" his force
he should immediately appeal to London. See Ellis, Op.cit.,
p. 234.
78Reynaud, Op.cit., pp. 449-450.
79Benoist-Méchin, Op.cit., p. 214, II, 402.
•
80Telegram No. 1328/3FT, June 2, 1940, cited in Kammerer,
Armistice, p. 400 •
25
of the furious and frustrated French who lacked small craft;
when the British ships returned to port they protested that
81
they had been endangered for nothing.
Fortunately this
performance was not repeated on the night of June 3 and
50,000 men were embarked. 82 However, if figures are significant in such an operation there was still a tremendous
disparity in the number of troops embarded, some of this
was, as General Swayne avows, due to General Blanchard 1 s
delay in considering the idea of evacuation and abandoning
France until his late withdrawal was responsible for heavy
French casualties and losses.83
The fact remains, however,
that after the evacuation had been completed thousands remained
on the beaches and they were all Frenchmen. 84
After their losses at Dunkirk Reynaud repeatedly appealed
for further British assistance, but on June 5 Weygand informed
him that neither troops nor aircraft had been forthcoming, and
General Spears explained that the B.E.F. would have to be
re-equipped before it could be returned to France.
The British
promise of one division and to bring up the three R.A.F.
squadrons remaining in France to full strength was regarded
by the French as too little and too late to prevent their
81Ellis, O~.cit., p. 245, remarks that the ships returned
empty as fewerrench troops came to embard than expected.
82Kammer, Armistice, pp. 217 & 218.
•
83spears, Catastrophe, I, p. 264, See also Ellis, Op.cit.,
pp. 246 and 247 •
84A.H. Smith, The Fleet that Faced Beth Ways, London,
Blond, 1963, p. 9.
26
lines from being irreparably breached. 8 5
There were continued instances of lack of co-operation
and confidence between British and French military leaders,
and there was no effective communication between the~.8 6
After the fall of Dunkirk General Brooke was left in command
of British troops in France.
He felt that the idea of a
Brittany redoubt was impractical 8 7 and the Cabinet which bad
never agreed to the schema, tberefore, ordered him to act
independently of the French and instructed Air Marshall
Barratt to co-operate with Brooke and not with General
George.
The British then seemed surprised that the French
" ••• in spite of the admitted disintigration of their army •••
were deeply chagrined.n88
is also a debatable point.
This " ••• admitted disintigration ••• "
On June 16 a telegram from the
Foreign Office notified Reynaud that:
"General Brooke has informed the C.I.G.s.
thàt General Weygand had told him that
French organized resistance bad ceased."
Weygand, in a telegram dated June 18 to the c.r.a.s. and
addressed to Sir John Dill, flatly denied having made any
auch statement.
85Reynaud,
Op.cit., pp. 464-466.
86Ellis, Op, oit., p. 231.
87weyand himself bad told Brooke he regarded the scheme
as nromantic". Ellis, Op.cit., p. 298.
88Butler, Op. oit., p. 201.
27
"General Weygand cannet understand how it can have
been written on the same date (June 14 when
Weygand met with Brooke) by General Brooke that
the French resistance bad ceased. It was made
clear, on the contrary, to General Brooke that
resistance was continuing (and is still continuing
today, June 18th) ••• ~89
General Brooke was subsequently removed from Weygand's
command.
Although the observation that organized French re-
sistance was ceasing was doubtless true it seems unlikely,
despite his efforts to get the politicians to negotiate an
armistice, that a man of Weygand's character would have made
such an admission, particularly when he was still trying to
get additional British assistance.
Thus it can be seen that within a few weeks of the beginning
of the Battle of France, and under the stress of defeat, AngleFrench relations bad deteriorated gravely.
The strong feeling
of Anglophobia which developed in France in the spring of 1940
was rooted partly in the bitterness of defeat, but also in the
conviction that lack of British good-will, their refusal to
send adequate numbers of men, and their conservation of their
military supplies for their own defence, contributed to the
disaster.
Pétain obviously shared this feeling for when
Churchill, during the discussion at Tours, pointed to the hard
times shared by the allies in 1918 Pêtain replied, "In
1
18 I
89
M. Weygand. Recalled to Service, London, Heinemann,
1952, pp. 172-173. See also Woodward, Op.cit., p.63.
28
gave you fourty divisions to save the British Army.
Where are
your fourty divisions that we need to save us now?" 90 The
British regarded Weygand and Pétain as defeatist, and Bullitt
91
confirms this view,
but similarly the French maintain that
Churchill inquired about " ••• defeatist tendencies" in Lord Gort•s
staff.9 2 Churchill agreed the British military contributions
may have been inadequate but in an official declaration he
maintained that Britain had fulfilled all her earlier promises
to the detriment of her own defence.93
Although he admitted
in the House of Commons on June 18 that Britain had a million
and a quarter men under arms these men were not properly equipped
and could not be sent to France immediately. 94 Daladier, on the
ether hand, denies that Britain fulfilled her pledge to France.
90ne Gaulle's account published by A.P., "Washington Post,n
June 22, 1945, cited in Langer, Op.cit., p.23.
91 Ibid., p.lo.
92Pierre Varillon, Mers-el-Kebir, avec nombreaux documents
inédits, Paris, Amict-Dumont, 1949, p.2 •
93Kammerer, Armistice, pp. 207-8
94w.s. Churchill, Blood Sweat and Tears, Toronto, McClelland
and Stewart, 1941, pp.359-366. See also Kammerer, Armistice,
pp. 307-308 & 413.
29
"L'armée britannique n'a pas apportés en France
le concour des divisions qu'elle nous avait
promises." 95
It is indubitably true that despite the number of men who
were nominally part of the British armed forces, the British,
after 10 months of war, were still not prepared to fight.
Sir
Edward Grigg, the Under Secretary of State at the War Office,
told M. Maurois when the armistice was announced:
"I simply want to tell you that we understand and
that we do not blame you. We have not been able
to help you in time; you could not act otherwise.u96
This type of sympathetic expression tended to weigh very lightly
as compared with the damage done, for example, by Churchill•s
orders to the First Lord of the Admiralty on June 27 concerning
the repatriation of French troops who were to be allowed to:
" ••• carry their personal arms, but as little ammunition as possible ••• the French material on board
ships from Narvik will be taken over by us with
the ammunition from the 1 Lombardy' and oth~r ships
as against expanses to which we are put.n9(
It is true that the British were short of war materials but
this type of act greatly increased Anglophobia, which was
already rampant after the military disaster, and it also
greatly facilitated the chore of the German propaganda machine
95A. Fabre-Luce, Le Màstere du Marèchal: Le Procès de
Pétain, (hereafter reterre to as Procès~), Geneva, Cheval
Ailé, 1945, p.67.
96A. Maurois, Tragedz in France, New York, Harper, 1940,
pp. 147 & 150.
97churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.169
30
which had been very active since the declaration of war.98
Consequently by the time French diplomats were considering
suing for peace many Frenchmen felt little obligation to
their former ally while others felt that it was to France 1 s
best interest to co-operate with the German victors.
98German propaganda was efficient and progressed through
effective stages. Hence, during the 1 phony war' placards at
the frontiers read, "Don't begin the war. We won't fire first ..
Why be killed for England?" When the war began the radio claimed,
"Les Anglais fournissent les machines, les Français fournissent
les poitrines." When Paris was threatened the Germans cried,
"Soldats français qui souffrez dans les casements, les officiers
anglais debauchent vos femmes dans vos propres maisons .. 11
As the armistice was resisted by Britain the radio commentators
remarked, ttLes Anglais combattrant jusqu'au dernier Français .. "
See Huddleston, Op.cit., p.22 and Baudouin, Op.cit., p.135.
CHAPTER II
THE AIDUSTICE
"There is not, there cannot be a theoretical
and chimerical liberty as against general
welfare and the independance of the nation •••• "
Marshal Pétain
Faced with overwhelming defeat in the field the French
government was confronted with the problem of how to end the
fighting in the most advantageous way possible for France.
There were three alternatives: armistice, cease-fire or military
convention.
In order to understand the controversy which shook
the French Government when it was faced with this dilemma these
terms must be defined.
An armistice is a government convention
which engages both the military and the government.
A military
convention is an unconditional military capitulation, and
although carried out in the name of the state it is negotiated
by the military, (this was the method adopted by Belgium).
A
cease-fire is a purely military order given independently of
the government, (this method was used by the Netherlands, and
it was in this way that Reynaud hoped to stop hostilities).
~~eygand
was determined that there should be an armistice to avold
dishonouring the army, and it certainly seems true that, "La
31
32
:D'rance a été victime d'une fausse conception de l'honneur,
gée par l 1 e
a gre
t de corps. nl
hri th Re·ynaud, Pétain, Hho tvas sent to talk to
the military clique. 2
'.leygand, Has soon support
11
• • • l'accord complet Pétain - 'deygand sur
ce point. C 1 était b
le conflit entre
Gouvernement et pouvoir militaire, se
griffand sur un conflit entre membres
du Gouvernement. 11 3
the point
view of military law the objections of
gand t.vere well-founded.
in articles 233 and 234
· t 1 t ~on,
·
espec i a 11y
~ua
Al tho:.Igh originally in
11
~fey-
The French Code of Hili tary Justice
cribes the
ath penalty
.
u4
••• en rase campagne.
cap-
This is a fairly
standard military law; what is significant is the reactionary
at ti tude of the mi li tary commanders tvho seem to bave
en
prepared to dishonour the country in arder to save the honour
lcr
~I
1 -L.eo~r,
Y , •
.c':..ammerer, .._:ers.,..e
p. 2 3 •
2weygand,Recalled to Service, p.211. See also Baudouin,
Op.cit.,
.57 and 110 1 Kammerer, Hers-el-Kebir, p. ,
Re-;:rnaud, .9P. ci t., pp. 532 - 533, Aron, The Vichy Regime,
p.23, de la Gorce, Op.cit.,
• 299 - 301, and A. Vagts, History
Of Militarismz in nassim.
3Louis l'"larin, tt Gouvernement et Comrnandement, Conflits,
Differends, Imraixitions qui ont pése sur l'armistice de Juin
DE LA
G
IALE, 8, October 1952,
1940 11
p.·3. See
o Ibid, p.lO.
4J.Isorni and J.Lemaire,
le proc~s du Maréchal Pétain,
33
c:
of the army and refused to break with their military traditions./
"Honour was invoked to condenm obedience". 6
unanimity among the military.
Nor was there
Darlan, for example, attacked
both the army and the politicians.
"The entire system of parliamentary government in
France had been rotten and the high command of
arrny had proved to be equally rotten. 11 7
The controversy was climaxed by a violent scene between
Reynaud and Weygand on June 15 over the responsibility for the
cessation of hostilities.
Weygand claimed that like declaration of
war the responsibility rested with the government, whereas
Reynaud maintained that a cease-fire was preferable to an
armistice, which he feared would involve the surrender of the
fleet.
The argument ended with Weygand 1 s declaration, in front
of President Lebrun, that he would refuse to order a cease-fire,
especially since France's situation was due to the government 1 s
neglect of national defence.s
5P.W.Whitcomb, (trans.), France during the German Occupation: 19 0-19 : A Collection of 292 Statements on the
Government of Maréchal Petain and Pierre Laval, II, hereafter
referred to as Occupation), pp. 740- 744, Document 262,
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957. See also Weygand,
Recalled to Service, p.211
6P.-M. de la Gorce, The French Army, New York, Geo.
Braziller, 1963, p.310
7Langer, Op.cit., p.70.
8Reynaud, Op.cit., pp.526-528.
Rather interestingly the
Pétain-Weygand government later initiated the Riom trials of
those who were 1 responsible' for the war.
34
Reynaud offered to gi ve ·;J'eygand wri tten orders to cease-fire,
but, backed by Pétain, Weygand rejected the offer.
Weygand
has since denied that such an offer was ever made, but Lebrun
supported Reynaud in testimony given at Marshal Pétain 1 s
trial. 9
Churchill claims that Weygand 1 s hatred of the Third Republic and his religious conviction that the French defeat
was divine punishment led hlm to using:
the power of his supreme military position
far beyond the limits, which his professional
responsibilities, great as they were, justified or required."lû
n •••
The British felt that Weygand made a decision which was rightfully Reynaud 1 s, but it
~vas
admitted that the occupation of
the whole of France and the detention of millions of prisoners
was
n ••• a
substantial argu.rnent .nll
Baudouin and ·,veygand beth
speak of the sickening massacre of the French Army while this
struggle for honour between military and political leaders
continued,l2 but this sentiment does not seem to have lessened
their ardour for shifting responslbility.
Another facet of the political-military conflict was the
question of evacuating the government.
The idea of a Breton
9Ibid., pp. 532-533.
lOchurchill, Their Finest Hour, p.201.
llibid., p.202.
•
12weygand, Recalled to Service, p.211 and Baudouin, Op.cit.,
p. 110 •
35
redoubt was abandoned when Weygand advised the cabinet that it
could only be held for a few days. 13 It would just have been
another Maginot Line, and less effective because there would be
no time to build or supply it and there are no natural barriers.
Such an improvised fortress would have to be supplied by the
British Fleet and would not be able to withstand concerted
artillery and aerial attacks.
Weygand also ridiculed Reynaud's
plan for continued resistance from North Africa.
Churchill bad
hoped that the French government would follow the Dutch lead
and carry on the struggle from their empire, 1 4 but the idea that
a government which flees the country is no longer a government,
was commonly held.
Weygand's argument was that once out of
France the government could be replaced and forgotten.
11
I have
bad enough of these fire-eaters who want to go on fighting and
dash off abroad. n 15
Reynaud finally sent de Gaulle, on June 14, to London to
arrange for help in moving the government to Algeria, and he
told de Gaulle that they would next meet in Algiers. 16 The
plan however was abortive, largely because of the inflexibility
of Pétain and the aggressiveness and determination of Laval who
took a delegation to Lebrun's office where he stormed at the
President:
13Ibid., p.213.
•
See also Langer, Op.cit., p.27.
14churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp.200-201.
1 5Aron, The Vichy Regime, pp. 10-11 & 25 •
16de Gaulle, Memoirs, I, p.77.
36
11
• • • you must not le ave.
:'le will not accept
that the Government should continue from
Africa ••• a vTar which is admi ttedly hopeles s. Are you going to pursue a policy
which has already been condemned, the policy
of Reynaud and Churchill which favours a
departure for Africa?
If you leave the soil of France, you
will never set foot on it again ••• there
will be but one word on every lip: desertion ••• perhaps an even graver word: treason ••• "l7
Reynaud was not able to provide France with the resolute
leadership she so badly needed; although represented as the
leader of the resistance group, his strong-willed mistress,
Mme. Hélène de Portes, was a leader of an influential defeatist
group.
"This woman was far from being a person
of no consequence. Her rule over Reynaud
did not stop at public affairs, and,
strangely enough, it had kept on increasing ••• Thus, as time went on, her influence
did not wane; it gretv. 11 18
•
Consequently, when on June 6 he took de Gaulle into his Cabinet
as Under-Secretary of War, he also appointed Paul Baudouin, a
member of Mme. de Portes' circle, as Under-Secretary of Foreign
Affairs.
"Bouthillier, Leca, Devaux., Villelume,
Baudouin, JlL"lle. de Portes ••• such was the
cabal which governed France at the most
terrible turning point in her history."l9
~~e. de Portes boasted the ministry of her own choosing. 20
17Aron, The Vichy Regime, pp. 49-51.
•
18Pertinax, Op.cit., I, p.235.
19rbid., p.237 •
20Langer, Op.cit., p.21.
37
Although her claim is exaggerated as Narin, Campinchi and
Mandel were still cabinet members, 11me. de Portes' influence
should not be underestimated and she was audacious enough to
approach the First Secretary of the American Embassy in an
effort to get him to persuade Reynaud to treat with the Germans,
even though the American government had been encouraging him
to resist. 21 Reynaud was also faced with the military clique
led by 1tleygand and Pétain, who insisted that further resistance
was futile and it was the govern..11ent 1 s duty to negotiate an
armistice.
Pétain in a speech to the cabinet on June 13 put
his case very clearly.
"\'le all recognise th at toda y the mil i tary
situation is very grave. It is such that
if the French government does not ask for
an armistice, it is to be feared that the
troops, no longer heeding the voice of their
chiefs, will sink into astate of panic •••
Assuming that we could resist if we formed
a national redoubt, it is clear that the
defense of this redoubt could not be organized by French troops, but only by fresh
British divisions,
Even ir such a redoubt, established in a
maritime province (i.e. Brittany) could be
organized, it would not, in my opinion,
constituto a guarantee of security but
would expose the government to the temptation
fleeing •••
It is the duty of the government, 1.rhatever may happen, to remain in the country,
on pain of no longer being recognized as the
govern.tnent. To deprive France of her natural
defenders during a period of general confusion means to deliver her to the enemy means
to kill the soul of France, which means
further to render her revival impossible.
.. . . .. . ... . . . . ... ......... .. . ... . ....... . . . . ..
•
The renewal of France must be expected from
the soul of the country i tself, which "L'fe shall
preserve by staying where we are, rather
than from a reconquest of our territory
by allied guns •••
An armistice is, in my view, the necessary condition for the survival of eternal
France 1!22
Finally there was the pro-German group typified by Laval,23 Hho
seems to have been utterly convinced of Germany's glorious
future:
11
I hope for a German vic tory wi thout ~vhich
Bolshevism will shortly be dominant everywhere.1124
Although anti-armistice meetings were held by Mandel who
argued tha t:
"It is mere folly to declare ourselves beaten
when we may be able to win by continuing
the war with our allies."25
his efforts seem to have been fruitless.
Thus after his tem-
porary arrest on June 17, he warned Pétain that he was being
misled and then sailed to Casablanca, where he made an abortive
effort to form a provisional government.
In the midst of his diffic11lties Reynaud seems to bave
been preoccupied with honour which Baudouin claims was more
22 J.Loure, "Pétain,n pp. 432-433, cited in Langer,
Op.cit., pp. 26-27.
•
23see Ibid., p.56 and 223 for Laval 1 s speeches of July 5
when he suggested to Parlia~ent that France aligne herself
with Germany, and of Oct. 26 to the council of Hinisters suggesting closer Franco-German co-operation. See also CharlesRoux, Op.cit., p.lOO and Kammerer, Armistice, p.310. Furthermore Laval belonged to the French Right which was generally
sympathetic to the Germans. See Hichaud, c., The French Right
and Nazi German;z:, New York, Octagon Books, 1964, p.228 •
21tAron, The Vichy Regime, p. 38.
25Aron, The Vichy Regime,
p.25.
:.
important to him than public arder. 26
It Has h!.s belief that
France could no more rely upon the honourable retention of
armistice terms by Elitler than by Ghene;is :\:han 2 7 1--rhich resu.lted in his preference for the idea of carrying on the goverr.cw1ent
in Africa.
However, he was clearly shaken by the Pétain-Weygand
alliance and it was fear not conviction whlch made him delay,
for on May 25 he declared that advantageous conditions for a
separate peace should be examined with a cool he
•
28
He was
therefore not so strongly against an armistice as he claimed,
and his ideas of honour did not prevent hlm from later consi
ing the proposal that he represent the Pétain government
in ':1ashington.
From the British point of
vie~-r
it was most desirable to
persuade the French government to leave France and take as
large a military force with them as possible.
Sir Ronald Campbell, the
earl y
a·~;areness
The reports
tish ambasoador, indicate an
of the di visions v-;i thin the French government
as represented by three main groups:
1.
Pétain and Weygand who were anxious to save
France from further suffering and would therefore negotiate with Germany.
2.
Laval and Flandin 1--rho vrere willine; to collabora te with the Germans and would also want to
negotiate.
26Reynaud, In the Thick of the Fight, pp.489 & 491-493.
•
27Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.? •
28nDocuments secrets de l 1 etat-:major français,n Ecrits
de Parts, cited in Isorni and Lemaire, Oo.cit., p.Jl~.
40
3.
Reynaud and Mandel who were against armistice although the former limited this to " ••• as long as
I am in control. 11 29
Although he felt the chances of getting the French government
to leave metropolitan France were slight Campbell also suggested that sanctuary in London should be offered.
The
British tried to exploit the differences between the French
ministers but met with little success due to the strength
of the pro-armistice faction.
The British also had legal, if somewhat technical and
completely unenforceable, grounds for objecting to a FrancoGerman armistice.
•
On October 23, 1939, the French Government
suggested a study of guarantees which ultimately led to the
signing of an Angle-French agreement on March 28, 1940,3° in
which the parties pledged not to negotiate a separate peace.
The French enthusiasm was based on their hope for material
guarantees against future German aggression.
Although the
British felt this was a premature move the Foreign Office
drafted the treaty31 and it was adopted by the Supreme War
29Pétain was pressing Reynaud and on June 5 told him
flatly that there was " ••• nothing left but to make peace. If
you do not want to do it, you can hand over to me." Reynaud
can therefore have bad no delusions as to the resulta when he
later suggested that Pétain be asked to form a government. See
E.L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War,
London, H.M.s.o., 1962, p.56.
3~Noodward, Op.cit., p.6o.
•
31Ibid •
Council.3 2
Reynaud never discussed this agreement with his
Cabinet, he presented them with a fait accomnli.
The signing of this treaty bad little effect on the French
when they felt obliged to request an armistice.
Quite a few
members of the French government regarded the agreement as
" ••• a personal pledge,'' (possibly analogous to that given
later by Churchill at
Tour~)
because it was never ratified by
Parliament, although the Cabinet bad been consulted before
Reynaud went to London, and gave him a vote of confidence on
his return.33
Othér members of the government, like President
Lebrun, declared that " ••• each nation had obligations to the
aid which the other has supplied. 11 34
Lebrun maintained this
view to the end and at Pétain's trial explained himself thus:
" ••• from the moment that one of the two signatories of a convention like the one of March
28 withholds a part of its forces for its
own defence instead of risking them in the
co~~on struggle, as the British Empire did,
it can still outwardly show a paper to recall
to us the obligation written on it, it no
longer has the necessary moral authority to
say: I cannot free you from your pledge. 11 35
32see Appendix I.
33Assemblée Nationale, "Les Envénements Survenus en France
de 1933 à 1945, Annexes, VII, 2044, cited in Hytier, Op.cit.,
p. 19.
34Langer, Op.cit., p.l7.
35'1Le process du Marshal Pétain," I, p.l81, cited in
Hytier, Oo.cit., p.33.
42
There were
Eew
Frenchmen who Eelt honour-bound by the treaty
and the idea oE ruining France Eor the sake oE honour and
ideology was ridiculed.
It was pointed out that many Empires
who struggled to the bitter end had been totally destroyed.36
Thus it was that Campinchi remarked at a meeting oE the War
Committee on May
25
that if the present government had signed
a no separate peace agreement, all it need do was resign.
No
shock was expressed by anybody.37
The British were not unaware oE the French attitude and as
early as May 17 Churchill instructed Chamberlain to study the
consequences oE evacuating the French government and the problem
of evacuating the B.E.F.
His greatest fear was that very advan-
tageous terms would be offered to the French who would therefore
leave Britain shouldering the whole burden of the war.3 8
There is considerable dispute over who first mentioned the
word armistice but Reynaud, who declared, "There is no light
at the end of the tunnel,n deleted a phrase from the draft of
the minutes of the War Committee meeting of May
25 which he
denied having said and in which the word armistice was
mentioned.3 9
36Isorni and Lemaire, Op.cit., pp. 41-44.
37weygand, Recalled to Service, p.l04.
38Butler, Op.cit., p.l93 and Varillon, Op.cit., p.27.
39Reynaud, Op.cit., pp. 391-3.
43
~eygand
attributed the remark to 'someone' but later declared
that Reynaud speke of the enemy's willingness to grant " ••• an
immediate armistice."40
On June 12 Reynaud was urged to broach
the subject of an armistice with Churchill and he does not
seem to have been adverse to the idea.
"Chautemps wants me to examine with Churchill
what would happen between England and France
if we were compelled to sue for an armistice •••
It will do our British friends sorne good.
Perhaps I shall wrest from them the planes
they so steadfastly refused to send. 11 41
Thus it was on June 12 at the Council of Ministers meeting at
Cangé that the question of an armistice was first officially
raised.
Reynaud, seeking the British reaction, asked Churchill
at Tours:
tt-V'!ill you acknowledge that France bas given
her best, her youth and life-blood; that she
can do no more; and that she is entitled,
having nothing further to contribute to the
cotnmon cause, to enter into a separatè peace
while maintaining the solidarity implicit
in the solid agreement entered into three
months previously?"42
At the meeting in Briares Churchill had made a remark which has
resulted in considerable disagreement.
He told Weygand that:
"If it is thought best for France in her
agony that her Army should capitulate, l~t
there be no hesitation on our account •• 1!43
4°weygand, Recalled to Service, p.l03.
4 1 André Géraud, (Pertinax), The Gravediggers of France,
Garden City, New York, Doubleday Doran, 1944, p.266.
42churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.l8l.
43rbid., p.l55.
44
This is not assent to armistice.
been
n ••• undermined
However he admits to having
by grief ••• " that, with a population of
48 million, Britain had been able to provide her ally with sc
little assistance and he promised that, although, in continuing
the war Britain would be obliged to attack objectives in France,
there would be no " ••• vain recriminations ••• " and that France
would be restored tc her full glory and power.44
It was later
claimed that Churchill was unaware of the strength of the proarmistice group, particularly of the clique of Mme. de Portes,45
and that he made this statement, " ••• en spécifiant que c 1 etait
à. titre personnel. 11 4 6
In fact, Churchill admits that he only
made this statement after consulting with the official British
party which retired tc the garden to consider their reply,47
and in any case one does not make personal promises at international meetings where the representatives of each state are
supposedly empowered to speak for their country.
44charles-Roux, Op.cit., p.29.
45Geraud, Op.cit., p.281.
46A.Kammere, La Tragédie de Mers-el-Kebir: L'Angleterre et
la Flotte Française, (hereafter referred tc as Mers-el-Kebir),
Paris, Meaicis, 1945, p.15. See also Langer, Op.cit., p.2$.
Neither of these writers were present at the conference and no
eye witness acco~t contains reference tc such a remark.
47churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.182.
45
The French chose to understand Churchill•s remarks as
consent and that day Reynaud told Baudouin that:
"Whether he recognizes the fact or not, Mr.
Churchill ••• morally authorized us to ask for
an armistice."4tJ
Churchill wa.s later furious when he heard that Baudouin, whom he
disliked thoroughly, had " ••• spread it about ••• " that he had
authorized armistice negotiations.49
His anger at the mis-
interpretation was largely justified as Baudouin 1 s claim that
he understood the repeatedly muttered
11
Je comprends" from
Churchill during the meeting as comprehension of and agreement
with the French attitude in wanting to request an armistice is
unwarranted.5°
It is clear that the British delegation had no intentions
of releasing France from the no separate peace treaty and in
addressing the meeting Churchill clearly told the French that
Britain could not " ••• consent to action contrary to the recent
agreement,n51 he even added, to Reynaud's horror, that France
would probably be blockaded which might cause Anglo-French
hostility.
Defence of the British cornes unexpectedly from
Charles-Roux who felt the assurances to the French government
48Baudou1n, Op.cit., p.ll6.
49church111, Their Finest Hour, p.l79.
50spears, Catastophe, II, pp. 218-220.
5lchurch111, Their Finest Hour, p.l82.
46
were only in the name of the three representatives, {Churchill,
the Prime Minister; Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary; and
Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Aircraft Production) but if
these men could not be regarded as speaking officially for
Great Britain it is doubtful that any meeting of this type was
of rouch practical value.
Charles-Roux also felt that the British
did not realize that France was considering an armistice and he
bases this claim on the failure of Churchill to discuss the
problem of the Fleet.52
How anybody visiting France in June 1940
and hearing the reports of Weygand and the remarks of Reynaud
could fail to be aware that an armistice request would soon be
made is difficult to understand, or believe.
If Churchill was
as blind as we are expected to believe, why was Campbell instructed to approach Reynaud in an effort to squash rumeurs of
Britain's agreement to release France from the no separate peace
agreement?53
It was during this period the British received
considerable, and perhaps what might be considered extraordinary,
assistance from the anti-armistice French minister M. Mandel.
Having arranged for Campbell to be moved from
50
km. outside the
city to a Bordeaux hotel, Mandel kept the British informed of
Cabinet discussions on such subjects as the disposition of the
fleet.
He also pointed out the necessity of documenting Britain's
52Charles-Roux,
•
Op.cit., p.30.
S>doodward, Op.cit., p.62 •
47
refusal to release France from the Treaty of March 28.
This
advice probably was responsible for the telegrams later delivered
to Reynaud by Campbell.
On June 16 Handel still
n ••• strongly
advised the British Government not to condone a request for an
armistice,u54 and his arrest on the next day is not surprising • .55
Mandel's case clearly illustrates the depths of division within
the French government.
It is not clear why the idea of French continuation of the
war through the fleet and empire was not broached by Churchill
at Tours.
Kammerer claims that Baudouin 1 s record of the Tours
meeting must be incomplete.
He bases this presumption on the
British pre-occupation with the fleet since June 10 and Baudouin 1 s
failure to record any discussion on this subject.
However, with
the exception of an aside remark which Churchill made to Admiral
Darlan at Briars there is no record of any discussion of the
French fleet.5 6
54Ibid., p.6.5. The efforts of Mandel and de Gaulle resulted
in a hardening of the British attitude. See Maurois, Op.cit.,
pp. 361-2 •
.55Although released, with an official apology from Pétain
within 24 hours, he was later re-arrested by arder of Laval for
having negotiated with the British and plotted against the
safety of the state. See Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.62.
5 6Kammerer, Mers-el-Kebir, pp. 13 & 17. See a1so Var11lon,
Op.cit., p.38 and L.Marin, "contribution l l'etude des prodomes
de l'armistice," REVUE HISTORIQUE DE LA DEUXIEHE GUERRE
MONDIALE, I, 3, June 19$1, 9 •
•
48
Churchill, however, did try to get the French to carry on by
stressing the solidarity of " ••• our two peoples and the Empires, 11
and by interpreting, to the French.
Roosevelt 1 s encouragement
as a sign that the United States was about to enter the war.
Any illusion the French may have had on this subject was dispelled by Roosevelt 1 s refusal to allow them to publish his
encouraging communication, and by his refutation of the British
interpretation in a telegram to Churchill on June 15.57
Immediately after meeting with the British at Tours the French
Cabinet met at Cangé, several cabinet members (and Chautemps in
particular) seem to have been annoyed that Churchill did not
come to Cangé.
Churchill claims he was never invited to the
Cangé meeting, and in this, is supported by Mandel,5B whereas
Reynaud claims that Churchill refused on the grounds that he
" ••• did not think it proper for the minister of a foreign
country to take part in a meeting of a Council of Hinisters ••• n59
The absence of Churchill was unfortunate for it was at this
meeting that
Chautemps suggested that armistice terms should be
requested to break the deadlock between those who wished to carry
on the war from Africa and the pro-armistice faction.
57woodward, Op.cit., pp. 61-62.
58spears, Catastrophe, II, p.226.
•
59Aron, The Vichy Regime, pp. 8-9 •
Although
49
it was known that Chautemps belonged to the latter group60
Reynaud concurred because bath he and most of the Cabinet
members expected preposterous terms from the Germans.
Reynaud
told Biddle, the American representative, "I only hope they
won't be too moderate,tt but the general expectation was for
61
very harsh terms.
The military situation at that time indicated quite clearly
that the Wehrmacht could have been at the Pyrenees within two
weeks.
In view of subsequent statements the Germans seem to
have been motivated by the desire to avoid the establishment of
a French government abroad.
•
Reynaud's collapse was nearing when on June 15 Marshal
Pétain threatened to resign unless the fighting was stopped,62
and the British informed him that disembarkation of British
troops in France was being halted until the situation had been
60 on June 8 he declared, "It is useless and we ought to
stop before the whole country is destroyed. Marshal Pétain sees
the position clearest." See P. Baudouin, "Reflexions sur
l'Armistice," p.88, cited in Reynaud, Op.cit., p.523.
6lsee telegrams from Biddle dated June 16, and note of
June 17 from the French ambassador to the Department of State,
cited in Langer, Op.cit., pp.35, 41 & 45. The British motivation
seems to have been to gain time, and Reynaud's to shift
responsibility. See Hull, Op.cit., p.767.
62see Appendix II •
•
50
clarified. 6 3
Although he managed to avert Pétain's resigna-
tian Reynaud did not receive the hoped for assurances from
Roosevelt.
Baudouin was visited by Campbell who according to
instructions from London, bad stressed " ••• the absolute necessity of refusing to take any action by way of negotiating with
Hitler for a separate peace," and invited the French government to London with as much of their fleet and airforce as
possible. 64 Reynaud seemed to be facing a hopeless dilemma:
the Cabinet refused to leave France unless the German terms
were unacceptable, the British refused to release him from the
'no separate peace agreement' and also were withholding further
assistance, the Americans were only verbally encouraging and
•
offered nothing but advice to carry on fighting.
Pétain
threatened to resign unless the fighting ceased immediately,
and ::veygand refused a cease-fire and demanded an armistice.
By the 16th it was clear that if Britain did not acquiesce
to enquiries about armistice conditions Reynaud would resign
and a successor might be installed who would be prepared to
surrender the fleet.
The British therefore gave the proposal
a conditional approval.
6>.Woodward, Op.cit., p. 6 3.
This action was based on
General Brooke's aforementioned report that organized French
military resistance bad ceased.
•
64Ibid., p.64 •
51
"Telegram 368. Viscount Halifax to Sir
Ronald Campbell, 16 June, 12:30 hours.
Please gi ve N. Paul Reynaud the follmving
message 1..;hich has been approved by the
Cab
t: Mr. Churchill to M. Reynaud,
16 June, 19L~O 1 12:35 p .n!. Our agreement
forbiddi~g separate negotiations whether
for arnistice op separate peace, was made
with the F'rench Eepublic and not with any
particular French administration or statesman. It therefore involves the honour of
France. Nevertheless, provided, but only
provided, the French Fleet is sailed forthwith for British harbours pending negotiations.
s I,Iajesty's Govermnent give, tbeir
full consent to an enquiry by the French
Government to ascertain the terms of an
armisttce for Fr-ance. His Hajesty's
Governrnent, being resolved to continue the
war, wholly excludes themselves from all
part in the above mentioned enquiry concerning an armistice."6.5
Chautemps testifies that Reynaud did
comrr~nicate
telegraq 368
to the Council of Ivrinisters :;::reeting on Thursday, but he stopped
before he reached the section dealing with the fleet.
This " •••
mutilation volontaire du texte ••• 11 resulted in tbere be
no
discussion of the fleet at the meeting. 66 It also makes it
appear as if the Bri
tians.
sh had flatly refused to condone negotia-
In view of the difficulties of Reynaud's situation it
is not easy to understand Hhy he Hithheld the British demands,
unless he felt hhis colleagues i.Vould be infuriated
this
suggestion that they should thrmv away their most pm.,;erful
6.5Aron, rrhe Vichy Regime, p. 28.
66Louis Rougier, Les Accords Pétain - Churchill: Histoire
d'une His sion Secr-ète, ~'lon treal, Beauchemin, 1945, p .42. !Ie is
supported in this by Auphan who, denies all knovTledge of tele gram
368 in his "Histoire de mes Trahisons," p.lO, cited in Isorni and
Lemaire, Op.cit., p.57. See also Varillon, Op.cit.,
.4.5-6.
52
weapon in the forthcoming negotiations, and their only defence
against Italian attacks in the Mediterranean.
The British
preoccupation with the fate of the French Fleet can be seen
in telegram 369 which was sent to Campbell a few hours later.
"Telegram 369, from Viscount Halifax to
Sir Ronald Campbell, 16th June, 3:45 p.m.
You should inforrn H. Renaud as follows:
We expect to be consulted as soon as any
armistice terms are received. This is
necessary not merely in virtue of treaty
forbidding separate peace or armistice,
but also in view of vital consequences
of any armistice to ourselves, having
regard especially to the fact that British
troops are fighting with the French Army.
You should impress on the French Government that in stipulating for the removal
of the French Fleet to British ports we
have in mind French interests as well as
our own, and are convinced that it will
strengthen the hands of the French Government in any armistice discussion if they
can show that the French Uavy is out of
reach of German forces. As regards the
French Air Force, we assume that every
effort will be made to fly it to North
Africa, unless indeed the French Government would grefer to send it to this
country ••• n 7
It also seems that the British realized that their demanda might
appear to be as unacceptable to the French as the expected German
terms and, thus it was at this critical moment, that the AngleFrench Union Plan was introduced and
Ca~pbell
was instructed to
suspend telegrams 368 and 369.
Unfortunately Campbell informed
Reynaud that the telegrams were
11
pended.11
cancelledn instead of
11
sus-
It is not known if this was an error in translation
or cypher, but it does !'lot reflect the situation wherein "The
':Jar Cabinet had not altered its position, tt68 and thus if the
67Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.29.
68churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.210.
53
French accepted Union her rleet and rorces would carry on, and
ir not, British demands as set out in telegrams 368 and 369
remained unchanged.
Not only the French were confused but
both Campbell and Spears told Reynaud that the Union errer
supplanted the telegrams.69
The Angle-French Union Plan sprang from a meeting on June
14
of Sir Robert Vansittart and Desmond Morton with two members of
the French Economie Mission, M. Monnet and M. P. Pleven, and
with General de Gaulle, who had been sent to London on June
14
by Reynaud to get Churchill to take a harsher stand against the
proposed armistice.
Reynaud claims that:
n ••• being
opposed to an armistice, I campaigned for
the authorization given by Britain to be withdrawn."70
No actual authorization had been given and he obviously refers
here to Churchill's
1
no recriminations' remark.
Churchill was
evidently unconvinced of the feasibility of the Anglo-French
Union Plan but when a number of Cabinet members expressed their
approval he offered no opposition.
He was then approached by
de Gaulle who felt that the plan would give the French Government
the will to carry on the war.
When the British War Cabinet
discovered that the French Council of Ministers was meeting at
5:00 p.m. that night (June 16) to decide if continued resistance
69P.H.M.Bell, "Prologue de Hers-el-Kebir," REVUE HISTORIQUE
DE LA DEUX.IEME GUERRE H01TDIALE, IX, 33, January 1959, 19.
7°Reynaud to a committee of the National Assembly, cited
in Benoist-Michin, Op.cit., p.328.
54
was possible, it was decided to send, immediately, a draft
proclamation to Reynaud and the French Council via de Gaulle.
They also proposed an early meeting of the French Council with
Churchill, Atlee and Sir A. Sinclair.
The propos al was th us
first communicated by phone to Reynaud by de Gaulle and th en
officially transmitted by Campbell.7l
It seems to haVIe
revitalized Reynaud, who rushed to the President 1 s office and
declared that with this new British offer he was sure he could
carry the Council in a decision to fight on.
The idea of Anglo-F'rench unity was not novel.
Almost
immediately after the outbreak of war the Supreme l-/ar Council
was created to co-ordinate military operations.
One December
12, 1939 it was announced in the House of Gommons that a
financial agreement had been concluded with France whereby both
states would have access to the currency of the other without
the use of gold.
This was followed by an agreement to co-
ordinate trade on February 17 and the "no separate peace"
agreement of March 28th.7 2 These progressive ties were not
haphazard but part of a deliberate plan.
Thus Reynaud spoke
of the " ••• one soul, one will" of Britain and France73 and
Lord Halifax explained that:
71 churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp.20.5-207.
72G.Glasgow, "Rupture Cordiale," CONTD'lPORARY REVIEW,
CLVIII, August 1940, pp.219-221.
73rbid., p.22o.
55
"The financial and economie agreements we have made
with France are unprecedented, and open up a new
chapter in the relations between our two countries.n74
He added that he hoped this new relationship would lead to broad
European collaboration and reconstruction.
The proposal that
Chamberlain brought to the attention of the British War Cabinet
for joint-parliaments and joint-cabinets was, therefore, not
quite as startling as it may seem.
It was however, as Charles-
Roux ren1arks, an innovation without precedent in diplomatie
history75 and as such faced great practical difficulties. 76
When the Council of Ministers met that evening they were
expecting to be informed of the British response to their request
to be released from the March 28 agreement, instead they were
presented with the text of the Anglo-~rench Union proposal.7?
The reaction of the Council was immediate.
incredible and unworkable.
They felt the plan
Some regarded the plan with sus-
picion as a British " ••• scheme to put France in tutelage, orto
carry off her empire," leaving her not as an independant state
74speech by
quoted in H.H.E.
Halifax, London, Oxford Un versity Press,
7Scharles-Roux, Op.cit., p.46.
76The French empire is much more dependent on the metropolis
than the British empire. See "Angle-French Union," THE SPECTATOR,
CLXV, July 15, 1940, 12.
77see Appendix III.
56
but in the position of a Dominion.
that he
Pétain declared flatly
t the British cause was lost and union with ber was
'' ••• fusion with a corpse."?S
Thus, despite Reynaud's enthus-
iasm and ·Handel' s scornful enquiry as tc "tvhetber they would
rather be " ••• a German district than a Briti
the motion not only fai
upon.
Dominion,n79
d to be carried but was not even voted
It may be that Churchill is correct in feelinc; that there
would have been a more favourable reaction to the harsher British demanda contained in telegra.11s 368 and 369. 00
The union plan would have done nothing to solve France's
irr..rn.ediate military problems and, in view of statements made
later in the war, many Frenchmen must have felt confirmed in
their ideas of British motivation.
11
The bombs dropped on this island by aeroplanes
operating from bases in France have surely been
the most conclusive evidence that our frontier
ought to be at least on the Rhine, if not,
indeed, a good deal further east. 11 81
It has been claimed that if Reynaud had called for a vote
on the armistice he -v;ould have been supported by lLt- of the 23
ministers 9resent, 82 but he never called for a vote. Instead he
?BAron, The Vichy Regime, p.29 and Churchill, Their
Finest Hour, p.213.
79Ibid.
Borbid.
8lnGaullisme, 11 THE SPEC
OR, CLXVIII, Nay 22, 1942, 483.
82Kammerer, Armistice, pp .209-210, and l1ers-el-Kebir, p. 38.
57
resigned, and although on the previous day he had said that it
was useless to expect reasonalbe terms from the Germans and
France therefore bad no alternative but to fight on to the end,83
he designated Pétain as his successor, knowing full well that
this would mean an immediate request for armistice.
surprising to learn that Biddle reported to
It is not
-~fashington
that
night that Reynaud bad completely lost his nerve.84
tlhen Pétain was called to form a government the mi li tary
1
situation was desperate with the Germans already on the Saône
and in Dijon.
or intentions.
The British had no illustions about his powers
Sir Samuel Hoare later described Pétain as:
n ••• a
very old man, whose mind is only lucid
for a few hours in the day and he is obsessed
with certain overruling ideas, one of them
being to get the two million prisoners freed,
the other being his almost medieval dislike
of anything to do with democracy."85
There was no surprise, therefore, when Pétain 1 s first act as
Premier was to request armistice terms through M. de Lequerica,
the Spanish ambassador.
Campbell was informed immediately and
assured by both Baudouin and Darlan that Britain would be consulted and that in any case no dishonourable terms or naval
clauses prejudiciel to the United Kingdom would be accepted. 86
83Baudouin, Op.cit., p.ll2.
84Langer, Op.cit., p.39.
8.5samuel Hoare, Ambassador on Special Hission, London,
Collins, 1946, p.90.
86 churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.68, and Charles-Roux,
Oo.cit., p.53.
58
Both Britain and France expected Germany would demand the
handing over of the French fleet.
Thus, when on June 17
Marshal Pétain announced on the radio that France had requested
armistice terms, Campbell was instructed to renew telegrams
368 and 369 and to inform Pétain that surrender of the fleet:
n ••• would
compromise the successful continuance of
the struggle here-which we are determined to continue
in any case, at any oost, and on which 1gow depend
the salvation and liberation of France ; 7
It seems reasonable to assume that Pétain agreed with this
argument for General Huntziger1s final instructions, when he left
to negotiate the armistice, were that if the enemy demanded
either the fleet or the colonies the negotiations were to be
88
broken off.
The French were confused about the British position and on
the 18th they asked Campbell why telegrams 368 and 369 had been
withdrawn, and if their being shown to Charles-Roux on the 17th
meant they had been re-instated.
It is obvious that Campbell
was himself uncertain for he returned to his office before
telling Baudouin:
to consider these documents only as the principal
elements of a negotiation which led Sunday (June 16),
n •••
~!ft~r~1~;~·M;~ ~~~r~~ii1~~i~~~~rP~~p~s~1~~7~g9
18
871Woodward, Op.cit., p.69.
•
88weygand, Recalled to Service, p.l85 •
89P.Baudouin, "Neuf Mois Au Gouvernement," p.l84, cited in
Hytier, Op.cit., p.25.
59
Baudouin therefore did not present the telegrams to the Council
and it appeared as if Britain was not protesting against the
armistice.
The messages sent later to Pétain and Weygand did
nothing to disperse this misapprehension because France had no
intention of delivering up her fleet.
Furthermore, on their
June 19 visit, the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound; the First
Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. A. Alexander; and Lord Lloyd, the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, seemed to be satisfied with
the assurances they received.90
Actually Britain's Union proposition was made with the
Reynaud Government in mind, and in view of Pétain's attitude,
and due to Campbell 1 s report that the telegrams had not been
read to the Council, Lord Halifax made a public statement reiterating the British position as laid down in telegrams 368
and 369.
Charles-Roux claims the effect of the telegrams was
enfeebled by their delivery, retraction and representation,
and certainly they had less effect when Campbell showed them to
Baudouin on the day after armistice terms had been requested.
Britain has never explained why identical new official messages
were not sent to the new French Government.
Charles-Roux con-
jectures that it may have been that the British expected unacceptable armistice terms to cause the fall of Pétain and the
91
return to power of Reynaud.
Reynaud certainly attached more
90ibid., p.26. See also Varillon, Op.cit., p.61, Noodward,
Op.cit., p.?O, and Langer, Op.cit., p.47.
91charles-Roux, Op.cit., pp.$9-60.
60
significance to the telegrams than Pétain, and he maintained
that in ignoring British conditions the Pétain govern.l'Jlent
n ••• committed
a crime" which resulted in France being excluded
from the meetings of the Big Four. 92
It was generally accepted that the key to British survival
was command of the sea, and the French Fleet was therefore of
great significance to Britain.
For centuries naval control of
the f.1editerranean has been a fundamental tenet of British policy;
without control of the Hediterranean the Empire could not be
maintained and thus Gibraltar, Malta and Suez bad to be protected
at all costs.
Up until June 1940 the French were responsible
for patrolling the Mediterranean while the Royal Navy protected
the Atlantic coastline.
It should be noted that the French
Mediterranean Fleet was made up of many new and efficient vessels
and, although outnumbered by the Italians, they were regarded
as the real masters of the Mediterranean, 9 3 so the ides of their
vessels falling into Axis bands was completely unacceptable to
the British Chiefs of Staff.
92Reynaud, Op.cit., p.559.
93rn late May the British, French and Italians bad the
following ships in the Mediterranean:
•
Battleships
Cruisers
Fleet Destroyers
Aircraft Carriers
Submarines
Ital:I
France
4
19
16
50
0
108
5
Britain
5
38
9
29
46
1
12
1 (sea planes)
The Italians would have two more battleships completed by July, so
while combined with France, Britain had naval superiority - wi thout the French Fleet - she was at a serious disadvantage. See
Playfair, Op.cit., p.90.
61
"It seems to us thererore that we have only
two alternatives: (a) to attempt to persuade
as many French ships as possible to join our
own Fleet, and (b), if (a) fails, to press
the French to sink the whole or their Fleet.n94
There was grave concern over the fats of the French Fleet
for despite Darlan's assertions that he would never surrender
the Fleet it was relt that due to the French belier that the
Allied cause was lost they would be susceptible to German
threats and give less consideration to the value of the fleet
to the allied cause.
Ultimately the politicians might over-
rule Darlan and surrender the fleet.
It was with this .in
mind that Britain encouraged the French Government to seek
refuge abroad and remove the fleet beyond the reach or the
Axis.95
The French realized that the removal of their fleet
would have placed them in a rouch weakened position in their
negotiations with Germany; Britain was not unaware of this
aspect of the affair eitber, for Churchill told Hackenzie King
on June
5
that:
" ••• if America continued neutral and we
were overpowered, I cannat tell what
policy might be adopted by a pro-German
administration such as would undoubtedly
be set up."96
94Butler, Oo.cit., p.218.
9Swoodward, Op.cit., p.59.
96churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.145. The Americans were
aware or this British attitude as Lord Lothian made a similar
remark to Hull. See Hull, Op.cit., pp. 772 & 796-797.
62
Although the French believed that Pound and Alexander left
France "satisfiedn the claim that they returned home " .... beset
with doubtsn despite French assurances is sustained by the fact
that they both sent telegrams to Darlan asking him to join his
fleet with the Royal Navy as per telegrams 368 and 369..
Seemingly
the Admiralty did not know that 368 and 369 had never been agreed
upon..
Darlan was aware of the existence of the telegrams but
he felt, due to Campbell's explanation, that they only had
documentary value, and in any case they bad not been mentioned
by either Pound or Alexander during their visit.
The result
was that Darlan was very annoyed.
" ••• lui ont fait l 1 éffet d 1 etre des héritiers qui
viennent voir si le moribund a bien testé en l~ur
faveur et ne s'inquiètent guère de sa santé."9(
Just what
Po~d
and Alexander expected Darlan to do is not clear.
He obviously would not sail in the middle of the armistice
negotiations; he knew how valuable the possession of the fleet
would be to the French negotiators.9 8 Nevertheless it cannot be
claimed that at this juncture Darlan was acting in a manner
detrimental to British interests.
On June 18 his order of the
97Note of July 9, 1940, "Section d'Etudes de l'Amirauté
française,n cited in Kammerer, Mers-el-Kebir, p.63.
98Langer, Op.cit., p .. 43. Darlan described the British
demands that the fleet leave France as nune jésuit erie. 11
P .T>1.H. Bell, "Prologue to Mers-el-Kebir," REVUE HISTORIQUE DE
LA DEUXIEME GUERRE MONDALE, IX, 33, January 1959, 19.
63
day re ad: "The llar continues relentlessly 11 and i t was on his
orders that the 'Richelieu' sailed from Saint-Nazaire.
The
telegram transmitted that day telling the French Fleet not to
go to British ports, and bearing Darlan 1 s name is of doubtful
origin.
It was in rather peculiar cypher, did not bear Darlan 1 s
usual signature of 'Xavier 377' and was probably sent by the
Germans. 99
The British bad early recruited American aid in their
struggle to keep the French Fleet out of Axis bands.
As early
as Hay 26 Roosevelt informed Reynaud that:
n ••• if
the Germans hold out alluring offers
to France based on the surrender of the
Fleet it should be remembered that these
offers are of no ultimate value, and that
the condition of France could be no worse,
but in fact would be far stronger, if the
fleet were removed as a whole to safe
places."l00
When Reynaud appealed for American assistance be received praise,
promises of military supplies and the warning that:
"It is important to remember that the French
and British Fleets continue (their) mastery
of the Atlantic and other oceans; ••• Naval
pmver in world affairs still carries the
lessons of history as Admiral Darlan well
knows. 11 101
99Kammerer, Hers-el-Kebir, p.61.
lOOTelegram, 11ay 26, 1940, from F.D. Roosevelt to Ambassador
Bullitt to be conveyed to Premier Reynaud, cited in Langer,
Op.cit., pp. 13-14. See also Hull, Op.cit., p. 792.
lOlchurchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 183-184.
64
Churchill interpreted this message to Reynaud to mean that
the United States was committed:
" ••• beyond recall to take the only remaining step,
namely, becoming a belligerant in form as she
already bas constituted herself in fact."l02
Roosevelt refused to allow publication and denied Churchill's
interpretation, fearing the accusation of exceeding his constitutional authority.
Reynaud not to
11
•••
He clarified the situation by telling
interpret this declaration as implying
military intervention. Only Congress can enter into such
engagements." 10 3 However, American sympathies were never in
doubt during the armistice negotia.tions.
Lord Lothian persuaded
Roosevelt to send a message to Bordeaux on June 18 to the effect
that France would lose American friendship if ber fleet did not
sail before the negotiations began.
as
11
•••
The French regarded this
intolerable interference" by a neutral and ignored it. 104
The Americans were singularly blunt and undiplomatic with the
French in this respect, for example after the armistice was
signed Cordell Hull told the French Amba.ssador, Henry Haye,
that the United States felt France bad given Hitler " ••• a. loaded
gun with which to shoot a.t their best friends," and n ••• virtua.lly
signed away their navy to Germany.nl05
102Ibid., p.l85.
l03Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.27.
10
~doodward, Op.cit., p.70.
105Hu11, Op.cit., pp. 847-848
65
In view of the chaotic background it is not surprising that
when the German terms were received in Bordeaux mutual tension
resulted in distrust and dissension between Campbell and Baudouin.
Baudouin claims he told Charles-Roux to inform Campbell of the
German terms before the meeting of the Council which was held
immediately after these terms were received by telephone from
General Huntziger at 10:30 p.m. on June 21.
He saw Charles-Roux
in conversation with Campbell after this meeting, and Campbell
must have been informed as he sent a note to the Council referring
to the
n ••• insidious
fleet. 11106
character of the conditions concerning the
After the meeting, which ended at 3:00 a.m. Campbell
complained about his treatment and Baudouin says he gave him a
copy of the text of the armistice conditions.
said he felt the British
Gover~~ent
Campbell then
should be represented at
meetings where France decided policy.
He was told that this was
impossible, and unless the Germens granted a time extension there
would not even be the opportunity to consult with Britain.
Campbell claims that Baudouin was rude to him, 10 7 the e.:::::tent of
this rudeness seems to have been the remark by the harassed
minister that he bad n ••• no time for a long discussion with you.ul08
106Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.58. See also the letter to
Varillon from Baudouin, cited in Varillon, Op.cit., p.210.
•
10 7charles-Roux, Op.cit., p.87.
108Baudouin, Op.cit., p.134 •
66
He then offered to see the ambassador at 7:30 the next morning
but claims that Campbell mistook the meeting place and proceeded to complain to Pétain. 10 9
On the ether band Charles-Roux supports Campbell's contention that he only was given a copy of the text on the afternoon of the 22nd and not on the night of the 2lst.
He further
maintains that it was only at 9:15 a.m. on the 22nd that
Baudouin instructed him to explain the amendments France was
requesting.
Although Baudouin told him Campbell had been
informed of the terms it became obvious that Campbell did not
know what the amendments referr.ed to, and at this point
Charles-Roux showed him a copy of the text. 110
After the Council meeting on June 22 Campbell insisted on
seeing Baudouin immediately and told him that the French proposals
would lead to a breach of faith.
Baudouin denied this and said
that the scuttling order was the key to the problem.
Charles-
Roux bad assured Campbell the night before that Darlan did not
intend to allow the fleet to fall into German bands and would
sooner destroy it.
The French felt the British should be
satisfied but Campbell denied this and declared he would leave
France as saon as the armistice was signed.
similar interview with General Weygand. 111
•
109Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.58.
llOcharles-Roux, Op.cit., p.88 •
111Woodward, Op.cit., p.73.
He later had a
67
The basic disagreements between the account or Campbell and
or Baudouin concern the time when the text was shown to Campbell,
and the place where their morning meeting was scheduled.
The
difficulty is compounded by the dating of Campbell 1 s not n23rd
June, l:JO.n Campbell left Bordeaux on June 22. 112 It is clear
that Campbell distrusted the French, but how he could send a
note to the Council protesting terms of which he was supposedly
in ignorance is not clear.
Charles-Roux adroits he did not agree
with Baudouin that an armistice was either a necessity or even
the best solution to France's problems, but in view of his professional record it is most unlikely that he would have revealed
information about the armistice to the Ambassador without
Baudouin's directive.
The armistice was signed at 6:46 p.m. German summer time.
Campbell had orders to avoid capture but his precipitate departure on June 22 was well in advance of any danger and constituted a uni-lateral rupture of Angle-French diplomatie
relations.
It is interesting to speculate whether a more
sympathetic British representative in Bordeaux might have prevented the Mers-el-Kebir catastrophe.
In ract the idea or
offensive action against the French Fleet seems to have germinated
soon after the return to London of Campbell, who was until then
regarded as " ••• un ami fidele et loyal de la France.nl13
•
11 2Aron, The Vichy Regime, pp. 61 & 57 •
l13Kammerer, Mers-el-Kebir, p.45.
68
Baudouin, who blames Campbell's nervousness for the break in
diplomatie relations, and who summarily retired the French
ambassador to London, 1-vho had resigned because of the British
attitude, says of Campbell:
11
• • • 1 have never on any day or at any moment
felt that behind the icy manner of Sir
Ronald Campbell there beat the heart of a
friend. I have always had before me the
faultless representative of England, the
very aloof high official who was opposed
to any real initiative. The stiffness of
our nocturnal conversation was terrible,
and his reserve was not to be explained
by the normal British rigidity, for his
cold looks hardly concealed his extreme
caution. Hhat hope is there that in the
days to come this ambassador i-lill help
me to save what is left of Franco-British
friendship."ll4
/lb at hope indeed l
The Americans felt that Pétain was trustworthy and had
accepted harsher terms to avold the surrender of the fleet.
The armistice -v,ras felt to be militarily inevitable and Pbtaints
gover~~ent was regarded as legal. 11 5 Throughout the early
stages of the war the Americans regarded de Gaulle with the
same suspicions with which the British viewed Pétain.
Churchill told Roosevelt that he feared Germany would threaten
to destroy French cities or annex Alsace and Lorraine unless
the fleet was delivered to them and Pétain would be unable to
resist. 116
•
114Baudouin, Oo.cit., p.ll9.
11 5J • L ••
11 Th
A 1"erc1.er,
M
•
e l.T,.,ew F rene h Reg 1me, !t co1\lf1\'o1\nTT;<AL
L'll'l n:~.t..r. ,
XXXIII, Harch 7, 1941, 486-489.
ll6p .H .H. Bell, nPrologue to Hers-el-Kebir, 11 REVUE iE3'rORIQUE
LA DEUXIEl;IE GUERRE HONDIALE, IX, 23 January 1959, 18.
69
·:.Jhen,
on June 22, Churc:1ill told the Comrnons that the
armistice terms placed not only France but her Fleet and Zmpire
in Axis hands 11 7 the French naval mission in London became
alarmed and vrarned Paris that the British, having only the
original terms, 1.-vere very uneasy.
They recei ved the follm-ving
reply at 13:50 on June 23:
"Mission navale Londres de Amiraute française,
5147. Votre 1321. Toutes dispositions
acceptées sont condi tionées pal' le fait que
la flotte française reste française, sous
pavillion français, et ceci définitivement.
Stop. Ces conditions ne lèsent pas intérêts
britannique. Stop. Par contre, attitude des
autorités britannique que vous me signalez
ne peut être considérée par nous comme amicale.
Stop. Insistez pour que mesures envisagées
soient rapidment rapportées. 11 118
•
These measures were the seizures of marchant ships destined for
French ports, even if still in French bands.
Despite French
efforts the blockade of France was formally decreed on June 26,
and the French Admiralty 1 s appeal to Britain to refrain from
judgement until the negotiations were completed and to treat
unoccupied ports as neutral went unheeded. 11 9
Thus uhen the
negotiations \vi th Italy were completed on June 30 the French
naval mission in London was immediately informed;
117Rougier, Op.cit., pp. 49-50.
118varillon, Op.cit., p.84.
~.
119Telegram from the French Admiralty to French Naval
Hission in London, 5185-86, June 27, Ibid., p.35. Sorne French
munitions ships coming from the U.S.A:-wère re-routed to
London after June 16 by Honnet, and de Gaulle had already redirected the 1 Pasteur 1 from Bordeux to London. See Churchill,
Their Finest Hour, pp. 2l!t--215.
70
"Gouvernement italien autorise stationnement
de la flotte à demi-éffectif à Toulon et
Afrique du Nord.-Stop.-J'ai ferme espoir
qu 1 il en sera de même du Gouvernement
allemand dont réponse est attendue.-Stop.Dans ces conditions, tous les prétextes
anglais pour bloquer nos forces tombent et
je vous prie d'insister pour que nos bâtiments de guerre et de commerce soient
libérés. 11 120
The appeals fell on deaf ears.
The blockade continued, French
ships were interned and worse was to follow.
Pétain remarked
that since the Axis bad not demanded that the fleet be
11
livrée 11
but merely demobilized:
11
L 1 Amirauté française a eu la sensation
penible que les malheurs de la France
laissaient insensible les dirigeants anglais
qui ne songeaient qu'à devenir les maitres
de la flotte française. 11 121
The terms expected and those received wore quite different.
The French and British both expected Germany to demand that the
French Fleet be surrendered and interned in the same way as the
Allies bad demanded al.most the entire High Seas Fleet of the
Germans in the naval clauses of the 1918 armistice.
The French
were therefore pleasantly surprised and actually amazed by the
moderation of Article VIII. 122 After reading the terms H. Leon
Noel turned to Admirai Le Luc and enquired, 11 Amiral, que leur
avez-vous donc fait? 1112 3 the terms were so moderate that the
1 2 ûtes événements survenus en France de 1933 à 1945,
Rapport, Annexes, Documents," p.L~73, cited in P.l''1.H. Bell,
"Prologue de Hers-el-Kebir," REVUE HISTORIQUE DE LA DEUXIEllE
GUERRE MONDIALE, IX, 33, January 1959, 32.
12lnougier, Oo.cit., pp.
55-56.
122see Appendix IV.
12
~varillon, Op.cit., p.?l.
71
British found them hard to believe and felt they concealed seme
machinations.
Actually the French Fleet was not necessary to
German strategy at the time, but its loss to the Axis would
have jeopardized British control of the Mediterraneen and
Atlantic.
Aware of British suspicions the French asked for
modification of Article VIII to permit the use of North African,
rather than French ports on the grounds that ships in Channel
and Atlantic ports would be open to British attack.
General
Keitel refused, but he suggested that, since the German work
in reference to the ports was soll and not muss, that alternative French ports could perhaps be used. 124 The extent of the
German control of the demobilized French vessels is also
clarified by reference to the original French text.
The French
word contrôler means to supervise or examine and does not
carry the stronger idea of absolute authority implicit in the
English word control.
The Germans may either have guessed at French concern
with the naval terms, or, in the chaos of Bordeaux, they could
easily have learned of it directly.
In any case they were
12.5
determined to keep the French Fleet out of British bands.
In interviews with Ciano (July 7) and Mussolini (October 28)
Hitler stressed the important part moderate terms bad played
in keeping the French Fleet out of Allied bands.
•
l2L~Kammerer, Hers-el-Kebir, pp. 84-8.5
125see Appendix
v.
He added that
72
pressure on the French, such as envisaged by Italy, would
result in the return of the French Fleet to war and the
turning of North Africa to de Gaulle, instead of their defence
126
against the British by the French.
Thus Churchill 1 s
impression that Sitler was trying to avoid forcing the French
127
Government into going to North Africa is well-founded,
but
the idea that is would be easier to invade Britain with the
128
French Fleet out of action,
while it may be true, was not
a significant factor because Hitler still hoped to avert a
full-scale war with Britain.
The British, however, felt there
was a very real danger of invasion and their behaviour must be
•
judged accordingly.
With the French Fleet in German bands not
only would Britain's supply lines be eut, but control of ber own
coastal waters could be challenged and invasion would then be
much more likely.
126
A. Truchet, L'Armistice de 19 0 et l'Afri ue du Nord,
Paris, Presses Universita res de France, 19 , pp. 29 - 99 & 302.
12 7Abetz, "Pétain et les Allemands," p.l5, cited in
c. Schmitt, Les Accords Secrets Franco-Britannique de NovembreDecembre 19 0:1 Histoire ou H stification, Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 19 7, p.33.
l28H. de Kerillis, De Gaulle Dictateur: Une Grande
Mystification de l'Histoire, Montreal, Beauchemin, 1945, p.22.
73
The British had good reason to look askance at Hitler's
promises and appeals for peace.
Churchill remarked that Pétain
should " ••• ask half a dozen countries what is the value of such
solemn assurances." 129 In fact the last phrase of Article VIII
demanding the recall of all warships outside French territorial
waters was never carried out, so the French could be said to
have broken the treaty before the Germans.
Charles-Roux was
largely in agreement with the British and he realized they
would not be content to rely on Hitler's word.
He too felt that
the Axis intended ultimately to dismember both the armed forces
•
and the empire, despite French determination to maintain them
130
independently.
Although, today, British fears may seem somewhat exaggerated at that time they had not been fully informed
of the armistice terms and the situation seemed grave indeed.
It was under these circumstances that Churchill, on June 23,
broadcast the terms of the armistice and declared that the
French Government had been deprived of all real liberty.l3l
He also appealed to the French outside the occupied zone to assist
" ••• the forces of liberation. 111 32 thereby hoping to encourage
men to leave France and carry on the struggle from the colonies.
129Langer, Op.cit., p.57. See also the speech of Lord
Halifax in Leeds on January 20,1940, quoted in Craster,
Op.cit., p.J.50.
130charles-Roux, Op.cit., pp.85 & 144.
131~-Joodward, Oo.cit., p.74.
132Ibid.
74
Pétain was highly incensed and broadcast an indignant rebuttal
decrying the British lack of understanding. 1 33 Baudouin was
also disturbed by the violence of the British reaction and sent
an official mission to clarify the situation; he directed
M. Gambon to advise the Foreigh Office of their arrival.
Charles-Roux had already asked the Canadian and South African
representatives to try to get their governments to moderate the
London attitude.l34
The majority of Frenchmen seem to have felt
that after Britain's poor showing in the fighting she had no
right to cant to France about honour. 1 35 Others were irked by
Churchill 1 s references to "the Pétain Government 11 and "the
•
Government a.t Bordeaux" and Baudouin told his amba.ssador to
advise London accordingly.
The ambassador appealed to Churchill
to recognise the sacrifices France was making to ensure that
there would not be a rupture in harmonious Anglo-French relations.l36
This interview confirmed Ca.mpbell's report that the
l33Kammerer, Op.cit., p.317.
134charles-Roux, Op.cit., p.74.
1
35A. Fabre-Luce, ~J~o~u~r~n~a~l~~~~~~~~~~~~~
after referred to as Journa
pp. 263-295, passim.
136charles-Roux, Op.cit., p.97 •
•
(here-
75
French were anxious to retain their link with Britain and would
make every effort to do so, 137 but the British were obviously
not similarly disposed.
On June
25 Viscount Caldecote declared
that the armistice bad made the severence of relations inevitable.138
This attitude is reflected in the refusal of visas to
Baudouin 1 s agents who were consequently stranded in Lisbon.
This may have been because Baudouin himself was suspect, but his
statements about defending French neutrality against Britain
and Germany alike were surely not only understandable, but more
than offset by declarations of France's intention that AngleFrench friendship should survive their military co-operation. 1 3 9
Actually London showed a more marked reversal of policy in
mid 1940 than France.
Thus, while on June 17 Churchill declared
on the B.B.C.:
" ••• I grieve for the gallant French people who have
fallen into this terrible misfortune. Nothing will
alter our feelings towards them ••• "l40
he allowed de Gaulle to use the B.B.C. facilities a few days
later to condemn the French Government for not interpreting its
l37Assemblée Nationale, "Les Evénements Survenus en France
de 1933 à 1945, 11 Rapport, II, p.435, cited in Hytier, Op.cit., p.44
138 H.L. Debates, Series V,
25
June 1940, CXVI, col. 657.
139p. Baudouin, "Neuf Hois au Gouvernement," p.l38
•
140R.B. r1cCallum, En~land and France 1939-1945, London,
Hamish Hamilton, 1944, p. 6 .
76
duty as Poland, Norway, Belgiu.m, Holland and Luxembourg had,
by continuing the war from exile.
" ••• these men, though they may once have
served the cause of France, are betraying
her today."l41
The attacks of de Gaulle were even more violent after his
Provissional French National
British support.
Co~~ittee
in London had received
He insisted that:
"This capitulation was signed before all
resistance was exhausted. This capitulation delivers into the hands of our
enemies, vrho will use them against our
allies, our arms, our warships, and our
gold ••• There is .no longer on the sail
of France an independant Government
capable of upholding the interests of
France and the French overseas."l42
Although the armistice did restrict Vichy 1 s field of action
and gave her a peculiar character, she retained a degree of
independance which made diplomatie relations possible, even
with enemy countries like Canada and South Africa, for at least
two more years.
Having seen what had happened to Poland and
Czechoslovakia it is not surprising that the French chose a
course which enabled them to retain their fleet and empire, and
thereby a position from which to negotiate.
The French position
should not, however, be regarded as in any way equal to that of
the Germans who had absolute military control of three-fifths of
•
14lspeeches of General de Gaulle on June 22 and August 22
quoted in Charles de Gaulle, The Speeches of General de Gaulle,
(hereafter referred to as Speeches), London, Oxford University
Press, 1944, pp.3 & 26 •
14 2 nLondon V. Bordeaux, 11 TIHE, XXXVI, July 1, 1940, 25.
77
the country and had two million French prisoners.
These
prisoners were an excellent blackmail tool for the Germans and
a constant source of concern to Vichy.
Finally it should be
remembered that the armistice was only valid according to
Article XXIV as long as the French
GoverP~ent
fulfilled its
"obligations. 11
The arrnistice was, however, not an unmitigated blessing for
the Germans either.
General Guderian felt that if the two zones
bad not been created in France, there could have been an
immediate invasion of French North Africa and England would then
have been willing to negotiate a reasonable peace. 1 43 General
Keitel, who represented Germany at the negotiations with
France agreed.
"L'histoire aurait été differente, disait-il melancoliquement, si nous avions pris Gibraltar et si le
Fuhrer n'avait pas laissé à la France sa 1 ~arine,
ses troupes coloniale et ses colonies."l44
Even the British, who immediately after the armistice was
signed were so bitter, seem to later have appreciated its value
to them.
General Georges says in January 1943 in Casablanca,
t'corocco, Churchill, in a toast, declared that:
"Après tout l'armistice nous a rendu service,
l'Afrique du Nord a été sauvée ••• "l45
143auderian, Op.cit., pp. 136-137.
144Rayrnond Cartier, "Les Secrets de la Guerre Dévoilés
par Nuremberg,n p.l80.
145neposition by General Georges before the High Court,
J.o., p.l67, cited in Schmitt, Op.cit., p.l7. (Churchill and
Brooke place this incident in Marrakesh.)
78
The Times on May 19, 1945, editorially stated that the French
decision, although deplored at the time, was in the end responsible for preventing the Germans from capturing Gibraltar
1
1
and moving into North Africa, '+
6 and it gradually became
accepted that France bad no alternative but to seek an armistice.147
Thus, eventually, Britain and France drew together
on their views of the armistice.
As Pétain said:
"ce ne sont pas les Allies qui pourraient
me le reprocher. Je leur donne la libre
Mediterranée. Je leur ai assurés la base
du départ en Afrique du Nord; quand ils
ont débarqués en novembre 1942, ils n'etaient
pas encore bien préparés. Alors, vous voyez,
ce que cela avait donné en 1940, au moment
où les Allemands étaient en pleine force,
si on l'avait écouté, l 1 Algerie aurait été
occupée, et l 1 Egypte avec, Suez et Gibraltar
avec.
Les Anglais le savent bien."l48
It can be argued that in negotiating an armistice France
induced Hitler to corrunit his greatest blunder. 149 In retrospect this seems true.
The Germans actually
a~~itted
to Huntziger
l4 6Ibid., p.74.
1940, cited in
Editions de la Maison
ll+8Private conversation, IVI.t1. du Gard, La Chronique de
Vichy, 1940-1944, Paris, Flarrunarion, 1948, p.95. See also
Letter of K. de Courcy, Sec.-Gen. British Conservative Party,
to M. Lemery, raad at Pétain 1 s trial and supporting the above
view, cited in Isorni and Lemaire, Op.cit., pp. 171-172.
1 49narlan, "Message to America, 11 COS:P10POLITAN, January
1943, cited in Langer, Op.cit., pp.60-61.
79
on July 16 that they bad been guilty of a
11
bêtise 11 which they
wished to rectify by demanding French bases and use of French
merchant ships, railroads, airfields and radio stations in
North Africa.
The French maintained this controvened the armis-
tice and for reasons which are far from clear the Germans did
not press the matter.
It should, however, be borne in mind that the views of the
armistice quoted above are all retrospective.
At the time of the
armistice negotiations the attitude of all concerned would
probably have been quite different.
The Germans were not pre-
pared for the speed of their success and were not yet fully
decided on their next move.
"Hitler, thinking within the
limited framework of continental ideas, failed properly to grasp
the decisive importance of the Mediterraneen to the British,"lSO
but in any case he hoped to create a New European Order and
perhaps to avert a full saale war with Britain.
Nobody doubted
that should the Germans change their minds they would renounce
the armistice and easily take the unoccupied sector of France.
To the French the defeat of the French Army meant that the
war was lost.
In such a case seeking the most advantageous
terms possible from the victor and preventing the total subjugation of the country was the most practical decision.
Pétain
could not possibly have foreseen that the armistice might later
ISOGuderian, Op.cit., p.l37.
80
be useful to the Allied cause; had he really been
concerned
about an Allied victory he would have led his government into
exile and encouraged the Fleet and Empire to fight on.
To the British, now faced with the prospect of standing
alone, the armistice was a disaster, especially since the French
Fleet was expected to be turned against its former ally.
It was
British concern about the French Fleet and Empire, and the
possibility of a reversal of alliances, which was responsible
for the attacks on Vichy and the subsequent deterioration of
Angle-French relations.
CHAPTER III
THE PROBLEH
TH3
FRENCH F'LEET
"If only the people at home had listened to
chaps like A.B.C. (Andrew Cunningham) and old
Dudley (North), who really knew what they
were talking about, we would have left the
French alone and got on with the real job
of fightine; the enemy. 11
Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Cunningham
1
Both England and France were ai'll'are of the value of their
fleets as tools for negotiation.
As a French diplomat remarked
on June 14:
•
nHe still possess 'potentials' in the gold
reserve, in the Navy, in the Empire. It
remains to be seen vthether we shall have
the courage to tear them from England's
tentacles, and, by using them to (sic)
obtain good terms from Germany. 11 2
Just as the loss of the French Fleet was a threat to Britain,
so Churchill tried to impel the Americans to action with
warnings that:
"If members of the present ad.rninistration
were finished and ethers came in to parley
~~id the ruins, you must not be blind to
the fact that the sole remaining bargaining
counter with Germany would be the Fleet,
and, if this country was left by the United
States to its fate, no one would have the
right to blame those then responsible if
they made the best terms they could for the
lsmith, Op.cit., p.225.
2~era''r., Op c~t
'""
\A-
•
....
•
,
p 273
•
•
81
82
•
surviving inhabitants •••• I could not answer
for my successors, who in utter despair and
helplessness might well have to accommodate
themselve3 to the German will.t!3
These warnings to America were reiterated by Lord Lothian who
remarked that negotiations between Britain and Germany could
result in
11
•••
feeling in England against the United States •••
similar to French bi tterness towards us now. u4
'1\Then in July,
at the height of the invasion threat, Roosevelt suggested that
the Royal Navy shelter in Amerioan ports, Lord Lothian was
horrified, and Churchill refused to even discuss the matter.
The bitterness which the French Navy felt towards the
British was based on aggressive acts which began as early as
June 18.
11
As the storm gathered, in an effort to save
ourselves, we threw diplomacy and discretion
overboard. Without reference to the French
He sent Rear-Adrniral Burges-';vatson to Bordeux
in the destroyer •Beagle' to sabotage the
huge oil stocks in that port and blow up the
harbour installations.
. .On...June
.....18,
....on
...the
. . ..... ..... . .. .... ....... .
very day tvhen the ships
1
companies of the Jean Bart,' Riohelieu,'
and 'Surcouf' were doin~ their damnedest to
put to sea, our Admiralty issued an order that
all French merohant ships bound for France in
convoy were to be brought to British ports.
Since all convoys at that time were escorted
by ships of the Royal Navy, this order
virtually amounted to the seizure of the P.rench
merchant:men by force.
1
1
3Telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt, May 20, 1940,
quoted in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.57.
•
4Ibid., pp. 229-230 •
83
On that same day too de Gaulle broadcasting from
the BBC, with the British Government's blessing,
denounced the new French Government in which Darlan
held high office as a "makeshift government and called
upon all F~ench warships to join the Liberation
r.~ovement. n ;;;i
The French were clearly determined to keep their fleet out
of German hands.
On June 18 and 19 a number of vessels were
sunk br destroyed in Brest and Cherbourg, 6 and a substantial
n~mber
left for Casablanca and Plymouth, having destroyed the
port facilities.
Even though not completed the
1
Jean Bart'
sailed out of the Loire estuary, under heavy bombardment, with
only twenty centimetres of hull clearance.
With the exception
of vessels scattered along the shores of Provence, (l+ cruisers,
•
14 torpedo boats,
4
destroyers and 18 submarines,) all other
French warships were in ports in Africa, the Far East, the West
Indies, the Levant, or on the high seas.
have been difficult to seize.7
They would therefore
Furthermore the Toulon squadron
received a secret memorandum containing inforr11ation on hm.v best
to employ explosives, " ••• l'explosion d'une grenade de
35
kilos
placée contre le bordé peut faire une brèche de deux à trois
metres de diametre ••• "; the necessary explosives could be obtained
from the Toulon arsenal " ••• sans formalité." 8
>smith, On.cit., p.37.
6A total of over lOO vessels were destroyed.
•
7varillon, Op.cit., pp.79-80 & 86-87 •
8Ibid., p.81.
•
84
On the diplomatie front Reynaud tried to reassure the
British (perhaps being more aware that the British felt their
conditions had been ignored).
He reported a conversation with
Darlan and Pétain wherein the former pledged never to allow the
French Fleet to fall into enemy hands.
"This should set your
mind at rest on the point" he concluded.9
The British were
obviously not reassured for the next day in a speech to the
Gommons Churchill attacked Article VIII, and the French Government for not continuing the war. 10 The British attitude was
reinforced by the remarks of de Gaulle:
•
" ••• notre flotte, nos avions, nos chars (étaient) à
livrer intacts pour que 1 1 adversaire puisse s 1 en
servir contres nos propres alliés ••• nll
Consequently as late as the end of 1941 the British were still
concerned about the remaining French warships. 12
The key to this situation was, of course, the position of
Admiral Darlan.
He has been labelled an Anglophobe yet early
in the war he made every effort to co-operate with the British
and was firmly opposed to the armistice.
In a personal letter
to Admiral Le Luc, dated May 28, he said that if there was an
9Telegram, Reynaud to Churchill, June 24, 1940, cited in
Reynaud, Op.cit., p.563.
lOsee Appendix VI
llc. de Gaulle, "Discours aux Français," pp. 18-19, cited in
Varillon, Op.cit., p.83.
•
12 11 Pawns in the German Game; Silhouettes of the Vichy Fleet,n
'rHE ILLUSTRATED LONDON NElvS, CLXLIX, November 29, 1941, p.696.
•
85
armistice and terms demanded the surrender or the rleet " ••• Je
n'ai pas l'intention d'exécuter cet ordre."
original.)
(Underlined in the
Under the above circumstances he proposed to seek
harbour in British ports, or in Halirax, and to continue the war
at the side of the Royal Navy. 13 When the situation deteriorated
Darlan sent secret orders to the commanders in all the major
theatres of operation giving the order of succession of command
and declaring that these officers would conform to general orders
to fight to the end against the enemy unless ordered to ceasefire by a regular and independant French Government ("Désobéir
à tout autre gouvernement ••• "), and under no circumstances to
•
hand over warships to the enemy. 14
By June 24 Darlan had had
time to formulate definite plans and to examine the armistice
terms; he then
issued his famous Secret Orders to the Fleet. 1 5
From the last paragraph of these orders it is obvious Darlan
had growing doubts about British intentions, but at the same time
the fourth paragraph is clearly aimed at preventing the Germans
from reneging on the armistice terms on the grounds of France
having not fulfilled her obligations.
To most Frenchmen the
13varillon, Op.cit., pp. 31-32.
14Darlan, telegram
cited Ibid., p.61.
15see Appendix VII •
•
5057-58-59,
Secret, June 20, 13:30,
86
existence of these orders make the Mers-el-Kebir attack entirely
unjustifiable; they are in agreement with the French Admiralty 1 s
decision to keep their fleet independant of both Britain and
Germany because they were aware that:
navires ••• constituent toujours un des él~ments
essentiels de notre situation internationale."lb
n ••• nos
There can be little doubt that the British were aware of
Darlan's orders, in essence if not in detail, (Odendhal in
London was not able to show the orders to Pound.)
Charles-
Roux had told Campbell there was no danger of the fleet falling
into German hands, even if in French ports, because Darlan had
already taken the necessary preventative measures.
Although he
did not actually mention scuttling, Charles-Roux asserts that he
made his meaning perfectly clear.
Campbell must have understood
because his objection was that the French could be foiled in
their efforts if the German attack was sufficiently swift. 1 7
Furthermore, despite the British Admiralty's claim that Darlan's
orders of June 24 were never seen by them, it is admitted that
Admiral Odend'hal '' ••• gave the gist" of them to naval officers
in London, but " ••• he certainly did not impress its importance
on th em. 11 18 Surely this was obvious. What seems more likely is
that the communication was ignored because the plans for
11
Catapult"
16Telegram 1805, June 25, 1940, Admiralty to Fleet, cited
in Kammerer, Mers-el-Kebir, p.8o.
17Char 1 es-Roux, Op.cit., p. 8 9.
18 Butler, Oo.cit., pp.219-220.
ady being laid.
way of excuse it 1s claimed
that:
11
•••
Cabinet did not consider· the instructions, and probably would not have considered
the orders, of a single Frenchman, even v1ere
he Commander-in-Chief and a Hinister, sufficient insurance against so great a risk:.nl9
Thus Admiral North visited Admiral Gensoul on June 23 and then,
in an effort to prevent an attack on the French Fleet, he
advised the Admiralty by radio the next day tbat Gensoul:
" ••• stated cate
cally tbat his orders from
Admiral Darlan were that under no (R) no
circumstances vrould the fleet be handed over
intact. 11
and that organization exis ted for scuttling and 't·rrecking
lit-
ary installa ti ons, 20 his ccrruilt.mication 1.1as ignored.
foregoins may seem to cast considerable doubt on the
genuineness of 3ri tish fears, but in fact i t ivas the blindness
of
ar Hhich resulted in the Admiralty's ill-conceived p<!!licy.
The liaison between French and
largely broken dawn and the Briti
itish naval authorities had
were often poorly informed;
for example, after the conclusion of armistice negotiations
with Italy the French Admiralty sent a message to London, via
Madrid, to the effect that the Fleet was to be helf-manned and
harboured in Toulon and
the Germans 1>Tould
th Africa, and they bad every hope
e.
The message was so badly garbled in
19Ibid.
20s.mith, Qry.cit.,
pp.5J-54.
88
transmission tha.t Odend 1 hal was unable to shm-1 it to the
British and only gave a verbal report, which was much less
effective. 21 The British felt they could not rely on German
promises, especially when these could be denounced if France
did not fulfill all ber obligations (such as the staggering
fina.ncial demands), and as Churchill puts it they felt " ••• the
life of the State and the salvation of our cause were at stake.n 22
In this atmosphere of fear, ignorance and distrust "Catapult"
was conceived.
Its aim was the seizure, control, or disablement
of all accessible French warships.
Initiated by Churchill, it
received the unanimous support of the Cabinet, in what Halifax
described as " ••• a hideous dilemma." 2 3
British liaison officers in Casablanca informed London on
June 23 that a small display of force would suffice to get
French ships to surrender.
1•lhen the Admiral ty checked wi th
Admirals Cunningham and North, and liaison officers in North
Africa they all disagreed with this report.
Cunningham, in his
reply, said he was sure Darlan would never meekly hand over
his fleet.
The Admiralty's communique of June
25
seems to
discount the new advice they had received because it maintains
21 rbid., pp. 62-63.
22churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.232.
23tanger, Op.cit., p.56.
89
that regardless of the French interpretation their Fleet was
" ••• in astate of readiness for action against us when they
wish." 24 Just why any such action should be conten:plated by
the French is not explained.
Actually the French had no such
intentions, but by July 3 the Germans were becoming very annoyed
and were threatening to reconsider the armistice unless French
ships held in British ports were returned to France.
French were caught between the two irate powers.
The
Most of the
ships in British ports were old and of little military value
and France felt they were insignificant if she could keep her
main fleet in unoccupied or colonial ports.
Unfortunately the
French were unable to fully reassure the British because of
communications difficulties, for
exa~mple
the bearer of a note,
to the French Admiralty fron: their London representative, about
British fears concerning Metropolitan French ports, was held
from June 29 to July 8 due to " ••• the stupidity of our (British)
2
Intelligence Service." 5
Operation "Catapultn or "Boomerang" as Admiral North called
1t 2 6 was scheduled for July 3 and consisted of three areas of
operation: British ports, Mers-el-Kebir and Alexandria.
~his was not the first time Churchill had ignored the
unanimous advice of the Admiralty, in 1915 he engaged British
forces on the Dardanelles venture despite Admiralty objections.
2
2 5smith, Op.cit., pp.
26rbid., p.64.
55-58.
90
The reasons for the seizure of French sbips in British
harbours is usually declared to be as a precaution to prevent
their falling into enemy hands. 2 7 Just how this could bave
come about is not specified.
However, the idea tbat it was a
move to demonstrate how easily Germany could seize French sbips
is supported by Churchill's July 4 speech in the House of Gommons
when he declared that the French Fleet was as much in German
bands as ships in Portsmouth and Plymouth were witbin British
power, and France bad tberefore exposed ber ally to needless
danger. 2 8 Another interesting statement on this subject was
made by the First Sea Lord to Ad.l"!liral Huselier on July
5 wben
he declared tbat subordinating all to the war effort, and in
view of a drastic shortage of destroyers it bad been decided
to requisition twelve of the French ships for active service in
the British navy. 2 9 The situation was quite differnet from
Mers-el-Kebir and Alexandria where the risk of the French sbips
falling into Axis bands was mucb greater and once in German
bands these vessels would have made the blockade and invasion
of Britain feasible.
The fate of the country tberefore seemed
to rest on immobilizing the French Mediterranean Fleet.3°
27Letter to Admiral Nasmith, July 2, 1940, quoted in
Varillon, Op.cit., p.l64.
28L. Rougier, Les Accords Pétain - Churchill: Histoire
d'une Mission Secrète, Montreal, Editions Beauchemin, 1945,
pp. 305-306.
29varillon, Op.cit., p.l64.
30rilhose Navy Now?n THŒ, X:XXV, June 24, 1940, 24-25
91
British officers and ratings in Plymouth and Portsmouth
were ordered to deliberately cultivate friendships with their
French opposite numbers, and to get to know the layout of the
French vessels. 31 This greatly facilitated the sudden night
raid and reduced casualties.32 The ships seized were, however,
of doubtful value.
ships ('Paris' and
Many were old ships and only used as depot
1
Courbet 1 ) , while the old
1
a British crew aboard broke in two in a storm.
Branlebas,' with
The two most
valuable ships taken were fleet destroyers but because of
humiliation and detention under squalid conditions the crews of
the 'Triomphant' and 'Leopard' refused to serve and bad to be
replaced with Dutch and Polish crews.
Afternews of Mers-el-
Kebir reached the detained French sailors there was deep resentment and even fewer sailors were willing to join the Free
French Naval Force.33
The situation in the Mediterranean was significantly different.
With the French Fleet out of action the only bases left
to the British were Gibraltar (threatened by Spain), Malta
(threatened by Italy), Alexandrie and Haifa.
British fears in
this area were therefore much more justifiable, and during a
visit to Admiral Gensoul, less than a week before the Mers-elKebir attack, Admiral North expressed fears that Britain lacked
3lsmith, Op.cit., p.78.
32churchil1 claims only one French sailor was killed.
Smith is able to name two. The number is uncertain but was
definitely low. Ibid., pp. 11 & 82.
33~., pp. 82-83.
92
sufficient strength in the Mediterraneen theatre to prevent an
Italian attack on Gibraltar.3Lt.
The disposition o:f British,
French and Italian Fleets in the l"1editerranean in June, 1940,
clearly shous a prepondei'ance of I talian ships, which, if combined with the French vessels would have meant absolute control
of the Mediterraneen by the Axis.J5
On June 30 Admiral Cunningham protested to the Admiralty
about his
1
Catapult 1 orders.
He maintained that the situation
in Alexandrie. was different from elsewhere and demanded to know
the object of the attack when the French ships had already been
moved beyond German threat.
He predicted that any aggressive
act against the French ships would result in strong resistance
and cause Anglophobie. in North Africa and the Near
concluded his message with the statement that
11
•••
t.
He
owing to
critical ammunition situation I am anwilling to engage my
cruisers in any actions except against the enemy."36 Cunningham
bad very strong feelings abeut the whole operation.
11
•
That I bad s trong viet.;s on the 't-lhole operation goes without saying. To me the idea was
utterly repugnant. The officers and men in
the French squadron were our friends ••• and
they bad fought alongside us. Vice-Admiral
Godfrey, moreover, was a man of honour in
whom we could place implicit faith. Suddenly
and without warning to attack and board his
ships, and in the course of it probably to
inflict many casualties on his sailors, appeared to me to be an act of sheer treachery
Hhich was as injudicious as it was unnecessary.n37
34varillon, Op.cit., p.97. See also Butler, Op.cit.,
p.230 and a letter of Sir Samuel Hoare in the uNew York Times 11
April 22, 1946, cited in ~eygand, Recalled to Service, p.217 •
35see Appendix VIII.
36A.B. Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, London,Hutchison,l957,
p.246.
37 Ibid., p.244 •
93
On June
24 the French Admiralty ordered Godfoy to sail to
Beirut, but Cunningham advised him that his instructions were
to prevent the French Fleet from leaving port.
further orders.
Beth awaited
Even when he received orders to execute 'Catapult 1
Cunningham waited because he felt the authorities had not had
sufficient time to consider the particular situation in Alexandria, but he was then ordered to present three alternatives
to Godroy:
1)
Turn over his ships with a skeleton crew to the British.
2)
Disarm his ships.
3)
Sink his ships.
After consideration Godfrey said No. 1 was dishonourable and
contrary to his duty, No. 2 was not possible without permission
and he was not allowed to consult his Admiralty, so he would
sink his vessels.
He asked for 48 hours to remove his crews.
Cunningham was appalled by his friend's decision and granted
the extra time requested even though this was contrary to his
38
instructions.
He then privately suggested to Godfrey that
if the French discharged their fuel oil and removed their torpedo
heads he would be able to approach the British Admiralty again.
This was done.
The Admiralty was not pleased and ordered
Cunningham to see to the immediate reduction of the French crews.
Feeling that his orders showed a lack of understanding of the
explosive situation Cunningham ignored them.
•
Similarly when
Godfrey was ordered to use force if necessary to leave port
38rbid., p.246.
See also Varillon, Op.cit., pp. 165-166.
94
he merely stopped discharging fuel oil.39
This gentlemen's
agreement, and disobeying of orders prevented Alexandrie from
becoming another Ners-el-Kebir.
~men
Godfrey got net.vs of Hers-el-Kebir he decided that he
would have to fight his was out, and " ••• il reprenait son entière
liberté d'action."
Cunningham was determined to avoid a battle.
"Nos regrets de ce que s'est passé sont aussi vifs que le votre •••
(mais) c 1 est fou de se battre entre nous-même."
He therefore
went over Godfroy 1 s head and sent teams to appeal to the French
officers and men.
Every French ship was visited.4°
The result
of this maneuver was that meetings were held aboard the French
ships and all the captains were called to a conference with
Godfrey who then informed Cunningham that he agreed to:
1)
Discharge the remaining fuel ail.
2)
Demilitarize his vessels.
3)
Reduce crews.
The Admiralty which had in no way co-operated before now offered
Cunningham hearty congratulations )t-1
It has been suggested that Cunningham was censured for not
sinking the French ships at Alexandrie but there seems to be no
basis for this, although Churchill gives little space to the
Alexandrie incident in his tvorks.
The Germans \>Vere very annoyed
that the French did not fight at Alexandria and to appease them
Huntziger got his government to protest, and a telegram was sent
•
39smith, Op.cit., pp.86-87.
p.250.
See also Cunningham, Op.cit.,
40Varillon, On.cit., pp. 1 6 7-1 68 •
41Ibid., pp.252-253 & 255.
95
to London stating that as long as her ships were tetained
France " ••• reserved full liberty of action."42
The British attack on Mers-el-Kebir was foreseen by several
French officiels but their warnings were ignored.
act by Britain seemed inconceivable.
seem clear enough.
An aggressive
In retrospect the omens
The British began by detaining French ships
and Oden 1 hal warned Darlan that the British feared the French
Fleet would be used against them.4 3 Oden'hal's fears were
repeated by the French Embassy in Nashington and by •Pertinax' who
wrote an article in the Baltimore Sun predicting a violent act
by the Royal Navy.
Lord Halifax was very reticent with the re-
tiring French ambassador who expressed the hope that nothing
•
would be done to envenom Anglo-French relations.44
Finally the
R.A.F. was making daily flights over Mers-el-Kebir.45
Never-
theless it is obvious that 'Catapult' took the French entirely
by surprise.
Vice-Admiral Semerville was charged with the
operation at Mers-el-Kebir.
Catapult 1
His "Force H" was considerably
42Baudouin, Op.cit., pp.l74-175.
43Aron, The Vichy Regime, pp.?J-74.
44charles-Roux, Op.cit., p.92.
45varillon, Op.cit., p.97 •
•
1
96
smaller than the French Fleet harboured at Mers-el-Kebir46 but
the latter had no room to maneuver and were partly demobilized.47
Captain Rolland who had recently been the Naval Attaché in Paris
was attached to Somerville's force and on July 1 the Admiralty
received the following communication:
nAfter talk with Rolland and others, Vice-Admiral
'Force R 1 is impressed with their view that the use
of force should be avoided at all costs. Rolland
considera offensive action on our ~art would alienate
all Frenchmen wherever they are."4ô
Semerville received an uncompromising reply from the Admiralty.
"Firm intention H.M.G. that if French will not accep t
any of your alternatives they are to be destroyed. 11 49
The Admiralty then forwarded their alternatives.50
munique is very interesting.
This com-
It contains untrue clauses which
infer that the French Government agreed to send the fleet to
Britain before the armistice whereas the French had merely
promised that if Germany demanded the fleet there would be no
armistice.
Since Gensoul was poorly informed due to interrupted
communications the charge that " ••• they hoped to pull a fast
46Force 'H' was made up of one battle cruiser ( 'Rood'), t\...ro
battle ships ('Valiant 1 and 1 Resolution 1 ) , one aircraft carrier
('Ark Royal'), two cruisers and eleven destroyers. The French
Fleet was made up of two battle cruisers ('Dunkerque' and
'Strasbourg' - which the Admiralty was most anxious to see out
of commission), two battle ships ('Provence' and 1 Bretagne 1 ) ,
one sea-plane carrier ('Commandant Teste•), six fleet destroyers,
four submarines and a number of torpedo boats. See Churchill,
Their Finest Hour, p.233 and Playfair, Op.cit., pp.l30 & 132.
•
47see Appendix IX.
48~,.roodward, Op.cit., p.234 •
49rbid.
50see Appendix
x.
97
one on Gensoul".5 1 seems plausible.
Churchill says the com-
munique was a " ••• carefully conceived" text, yet he leaves the
three opening paragraphs out of his account • .5 2
When Gensoul received the text of the
co~~unique
he sent
the following signal to the French Admiralty:
"A British force composed of three battleships, one
aircraft carrier, cruisers and destroyers, before
Oran, have sent me an ultimatum: 1 Sink your ships
within six hours or we shall use force.' My reply
has been: 'French ships will reply to force with
force. ' 11 .53
He thus ignored the offer to sail to the United States or French
~est
Indian colonial ports, and grossly misinterpreted the whole
situation.
Vichy never blamed Gensoul for his truncated version
as it was felt he had transmitted the essentials.
This was also
Semerville' s opinion for he told Admiral North, ";ve are going
to Oran to ask them to surrender or scuttle - or be sunk.n.54
Churchill also omitted the alternatives in his Gommons speech
so the French Government was not aware of the third until
.51smith, Op.cit., p.?l •
.52compare Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.23.5, with Varillon,
Op.cit., p.212 and Kammerer, Mers-el-Kebir, p.104. This omission
conveniently permits Churchill to ignore the fact that 24 hours
earlier London had been advised that the French Fleet could anohor
in Toulon and North Africa. The French knew about this before
the negotiations, as did Semerville and Rolland. See Varillon,
Dp.cit., pp. 105, 116 & 86.
53Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.77.
•
54N. Monks, "That Day at Gibraltar," p.22, cited in Hytier,
Op.cit., p.55 •
98
July
5.55
This so-called 'Martinque clause' was in any case
not very realistic: it would have been a breach of the armistice,
there was not sufficient time allowed to reduce crews but a
delay would have given Darlan a chance to attack, and the British
could not have spared ships to act as an escort.
The abject of
the clause may well have been to try and pacify Gensoul.
Rolland,
aware that the Admiralty bad decided to accept demilitarization
as another alternative, hinted to Gensoul that this combined tvi th
50~
reduced crews might be acceptable.
Gensoul accordingly no-
tified the French Admiralty at 1:20p.m.56
The conditions of
demilitarization were that under Somerville 1 s supervision and
within six hours the ships were to be demilitarized to the extent
that it would take a year in port to return them to battle condition.57
This was obviously impossible, especially since Gensoul
would have to consult his government.
The French Government was moving to Vichy and Darlan could
not be found when Gensoul 1 s message arrived, therefore, Admiral
Le Luc, the next in command ordered reinforcements to Oran from
Toulon and Algeria, and initiated plans for a reprisai on
55Charles-Roux, Op.cit., pp.136-137.
56smith, Op.cit., p.95.
57s.w. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945, I, London,
1954, p.243.
H.H.s.o.,
99
Gibraltar.
He notified Gensoul in clear:
"Faites savoir à 1 1 intermédiaire britannique que
l 1 amiral de la Flotte à donne ordre à toutes les
forces françaises en Mediterranée de vous rallier
immédiatement. Vous aurez donc à donner vos
ordres à ces forces. Appelez les sous marins et
avions si necessair~S Commission Armistice par
ailleurs prévenue.";,
Just why Gensoul did not call in aerial and submarine assistance
is not clear.
Gensoul refused to receive Holland on the morning of July 3
and sent Lieutenant Dufay, a friend of Holland 1 s.
During their
conversation Holland admitted British knowledge of Darlan's
orders 5057-59 of June 20 but seemed to know nothing of any
further orders.59
Gensoul received Holland at 3:05 p.m. and
showed him a copy of Darlan's secret orders, declaring his
intention to obey them.
Holland remarked, nif only we had known
this before it might have made all the difference.u60
Darlan 1 s
orders were, in fact, very close to the •Martinique clause' and
of course, the British Admiralty was aware of these orders.
After negotiating all day Solland desperately informed
Semerville:
Op.cit., p.l24. "In clear" accepted military
terminology for plain language.
58Varillon,
59rbid., p.ll4.
60smith, Op.cit., p.97.
100
"Admiral Gensoul says crew being reduced and
if threatened by enemy would go to Martinique or u.s.A. but this not quite our proposition can get no nearer.n61
London, however, l...ras adament and Semerville had just received
the final Admiralty signal:
"?rer:ch ships must comply wi th terms or sinl_c
thernselves or be sunk by yeu before dark.n62
The discussion therefore ended at 4:30 p.m.63 when Gensoul
shovreél Tiolland a signal from Sor:1erville:
nunless one of my proposais is accepted 'by
5:30 I shall be compelled to sink your ships." 61~
Althcuch Lord Halifax bas since claimed that a delay would have
been granted to enable the French to fulfill the demands 6 5 this
is obviously not so because the British Admiralty picked up
Admiral Le Luc t s signel, en clair, that reinforcements 1-1ere on
the way, and warned Semerville to deal with
e situation quickly,?6
6lvarillon, Op.cit., p.l35.
62churchill,
eir Finest
~our,
p.236.
63There are discrepancies in the times, probably due to
use of local and British S1J.:;nmeP time.
64Aron, The Vicby Hegi:me, p.78.
I·Iers-el-Kebir,
6f...e<
• th
~0m1.
·-~~
0 D.Cl.v.,
• -!p. 97 •
101
The next signals sent for Mers-el-Kebir perhaps reflect
the difference of attitude.
Semerville signalled, "I am
engaging the enemy, 11 whereas Gensoul 1 s message was, "Combat
engagé contre forces britannique. 11 67
The British Fleet positioned itself behind a roc1{y outcrap
and used, besides its batteries, a smoke screen and planes from
the 'Ark Royal.'
The bombarQment lasted ten minutes.
French lost 1297 dead and 351 wounded.
the 'Dunkerque' ran aground, the
1
The 'Bretagne' blel>f up,
Provence 1 was beached, the
'Commandant-Teste' was unscathed, and the
with three destroyers to Toulon.
The
1
3trasbourg 1 escaped
The British aQmit to one
dead and a sea plane crew missing, but the Spanish at Algeciras
report that 30 corpses were taken ashore from the
1
Hood 1 two
days later.68
The attack of Mers-el-Kebir was not over.
Admiral Esteva's
signal, en clair, that the 'Dunkerque' was only slightly damaged
provoked an attack by torpedo carrying planes which resulted in
the sinking of four small ships and 150 deaths on the 'Dunkerque'.
It was doubtless from these attacks that the
started by an official
co~munique
11
oersistent leaend"
-
0
on July 8 began, to the affect
67varillon, Op.cit., p.l35.
68 11 Friend against Friend, 11 TDIE, XXXVI, July 15, 1946, 29.
102
that during three British raids the decks and lifeboats of the
'Dunkerque' were straffed with machine gun fire. 6 9
The French had warned Britain that:
" ••• le premier coup de canon tiré sur nous
aurait pour résultat pratique de mettre
immédiatement toute la Flotte française
contre la Grand-Brétagne, résultat qui
serait diamétralement opposé à celui
que recherche le Gouvernement britannique.n70
This prediction proved very true.
On the day after the attack
Baudouin publically declared:
"The ties of comradship and excessive
fidelity are completely broken now •••
Yesterday's French dead at Oran have
rendered us the service of liberating us
from England's domination, allowing us
to be politically free to follow a
purely French policy."7l
Even de Gaulle seems to have been upset by
1
Catapult' but he
increased French bitterness by saying in a B.B.C. broadcast on
July 8 that the Bordeaux Government was to
bla~e
as it had
consented:
" ••• à livrer nos navirs à la discretion
de l'enemie. Il n'y a pas le moindre
doute que, par principe et par nécessité,
l'eneni les aurait employés, soit contre
l'Angleterre, soit contre notre propre
Empire. Eh bien 1 je dis sans ambages qu 1 il
vaut mieux qu'ils aient été détruits. 11 72
69Baudouin, Op.cit., p.l61, and Hytier, Ou.cit., p.63.
70nufay to Holland, Official Report of Admira1 Gensoul,
July 9, 1940, cited in Vari1lon, Op.cit., p.llB.
71"End of an Entente," TII1E, XXXVI, Ju1y 15, 1940, 17.
72c. de Gaulle, "Discours aux Français," p.25, cited in
Vari1lon, Op.cit., p.76.
103
Cambon protested to Lord Halifax without awaiting orders
from France and was told, rather more diplomatically, the same
thing.73
The French rejected this and other explanations
vigorously.
They felt bitter that Britain had not respected
her ally's misfortune but had increased her suffering and losses.
Churchill claims that, "the genius of France enabled her people
to comprehend the whole significance of Oran.n74
An article in
Le Figaro75 which blames Churchill for the massacre seems to
reflect the French 'comprehension' of Oran quite accurately as
does their decision not to wear British decorations.76
In fact,
from the viewpoint of Anglo-French relations, Mers-el-Kebir
could be regarded as a German victory.
The official French protest stated:
"It is with stupefaction that we have learned of this
act of aggression which would be unjustified in any
circumstances, but which is the more so because
North Africa will not be subject to occupation."77
73Charles-Roux, Op.cit., p.l2 5•
74churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.238.
75see Appendix XI.
76Kammerer, Mers-el-Kebir, p.ll6.
77Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.79.
Op.cit., pp.l24-125.
See also Charles-Roux,
104
This may be considered quite strongly worded for a diplomatie
communication, but it in no way reflects the violence of
feeling which Mers-el-Kebir engendered in many quartera.
In
the French Empire there was a stiffening of anti-British feeling
and a determination to remain totally independent.78
In England
French sailors who had volunteered to serve with the British
changed their minds and no naval officers amongst those seized
in the British segment of
Gensoul
1
Catapult' remained on British soil.7 9
declared that the whole French Navy might bave
gone over to Britain had it not been for Mers-el-Kebir. 80
hi~self
Admiral Darlan 1 s attitude underwent a remarkable change
after l'1ers-el-Kebir.
On June 3 he told Colonel de Villelume:
"Les generaux ne veulent plus se battre, les soldats
fichent le camp; si l'on demand un jour l'armistice,
je finirai ma carrière par une acte de splendide
indiscipline, je partirai avec la Flotte."Ul
It has been suggested that he did not carry out this threat
because Pétain suggested to hlm that he become first consul in
a proposed consulate.
Actually he bec ame I'1inister of l1larine and
had to stay, and although a desire for personal power may have
had a part in his decision, it was also influenced by his
78statern.ent by Leon Cayla, ex-Governor-General of French
rPlest Africa, \~hitcorn.b, Occuoation, II, Document 206, p. 727.
79Truchet, Oo.cit., p.J27.
80Ibid., p.32 5•
81Karn.111erer, Hers-el-Kebir, p. 25.
105
indie;na ti on wi th the British lvho doubted his word.
Lord
Alexander went so far as to tell him, "We have no use for
words. 1182
One of the most serious consequences of Mers-el-Kebir was
that the French regarded it as freeing them from any obligations
to England, and many, like Baudouin, felt that France should
become part of the Nazi New Order in Europe.
"What happened at Hers-el-Kebir enables us,
at last, to turn public opinion against
England, uproot all pro-British prejudices.
Thus we shall be in a position to co-operate
with Italy and Spain, to create within the
New Order a Latin bloc, strong enough in
the long rQ~ to put some curb on German
pm·rer. But be re is wh at I fe ar. As long as
Churchill, that raving maniac, that alcoholic,
remains in office, war will continue, and
therefore, with plenty of time before us we
shall have a good chance to succeed in all
our planning with Italy and Spain. But were
the British to throw Churchill overboard,
our prospects would be darkened. Halifax
could hardly fail to become Premier. A
peace compromise would soon be in the making
between England and Germany. Then great
schemes of territorial dismemberment might
be considered and France's hour of most
deadly danger would strike."83
French feelings were further embittered by the Americans.
Having been consulted by Britain, and given tacit approval to
Mers-el-Kebir, Roosevelt told Saint-Quentin, that in view of
the circQ~stances the British action was justified.84
82A. de Montmorency, "The Enigma of Admiral Darlan,"
cited in Rougier, Op.cit., p.59.
•
83aèraud, Op.cit., p.492 •
84charles-Roux, Op.cit., pp.124, 130-131, & 152.
106
To the French
~ers-el-Kebir
was a turning point.
was now the accuser instead of the accused.
phobes it produced valuable arguments.
France
For the Anglo-
Even Baudouin asked:
"Does England know how much grist all this
brings to the mill of Pierre Laval, and
those who want a change of alliance? 11 85
Al~ost
i~~ediately
after the attack on Gensoul 1 s ships the
French Admiralty issued orders to attack British warships and
seize merchant ships.86
At a 6:30 a.m. meeting on July
4,
Darlan informed Laval, Pétain and Baudouin that he had ordered
the 'Strasbourg' to join the squadron from Algiers and attack
the British fleet returning to Gibraltar.
Laval agreed with
Darlan's decision, but Pétain and Baudouin were horrified at
the prospect of war with Britain, and it was decided instead
to make official the breaking off of diplomatie relations,
which had existed in fact since the departure of Sir Ronald
Campbell and his staff.
Laval was disappointed and told the
Brazilian Ambassador that a "hostile act 11 would be committed
against England.
His statement circulated so widely that
Baudouin felt obliged to refute it at a 9:30 p.m. press conference that evening.87
S5Baudouin, Op.cit., p.l61.
86see Appendix XII.
•
B7Aron, The Vichy Regime, pp. 79-81 •
107
Although Darlan was forced to rescind his earlier orders 88
before they could be acted upon, and the Council refused to
approve a Franco-Italian expedition in Alexandria, he did get
Council approval to:
1.
Use warships to search British merchant ships.
2.
Escort French
3.
Carry out bambine raids on Gibraltar.89
~erchant
ships and fire if threateneà.
The extent of the raids on Gibraltar is not clear.
Churchill
speaks of a few bombs being dropped in the harbour on July
5
and 6, during two raid~with only three planes being involved. 90
Hoare denies any such raids took place until after the attack
on Dakar,9 1 but admits that in 1942 an American visiter was
shawn damage which it was claimed was sustained during these
raids. 92 Furthermore, there was little harassment of British
shipping because it was feared that repercussions would include
an intensification of the blockade of France.93
The
was cultivated by Vichy that Mers-el-Kebir
i~pression
illustrated France's willingness to defend her possessions.
88 see French Admiralty's telegr~~ 3385, July 5, 1940,
7:15, cited in Varillon, Oo.cit., p.l78.
89varillon, On.cit., p.81.
9°rbid.
See also Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.238.
91Hoare, On.cit., pp.85-86.
•
9 2H. Butcher,
cited Ibid., p.64.
11
!1y Three Years wi th Eisenhoi1er, 11 p .162,
93charles-Roux, Op.cit., pp.l33-13L~.
108
Vice-Admiral Tclichelier, president of the French Naval Com.rnission at the armistice negotiations proposed at 4:00 a.m. on
July 4, to General Huntziger that France should profit from
German sympathy to Gain concessions in the naval clauses.
They therefore requested:
1.
Suspension of conditions in Article VIII.
2.
Unimpeded passage of war ships through the Straits
of Gibraltar.
3.
Release of all Naval Ministry personnel.
All these demands were accorded.94
The Germans permitted some
rearming of French units and as of July 5 demilitarization of
the fleet was stopped. 9 5 Because of this Dakar was better defended, and in 1942 the Americans had to fight the •Jean-Bart'
and other French units.
Also many Frenchmen became convinced
that scrupulous observation of the armistice conditions by
France would be reflected by Germany.
Paradoxically, Laval
found it easier to destroy the Republic which had allied itself
with a state which destroyed the helpless fleet at Mers-el-Kebir,
and was able to get a bill passed
a dictator.
11
Boomerangl 11 indeed.
~·lhich
virtually made Pétain
The British seem to have
felt the change in the French attitude was the result of propaganda and was, in any case, inevitable.
•
94varillon, Op.cit., pp.127-128. Kammerer refers to this
as " ••• having taken instructions from the Germans.n Ibid.,
pp. 114-115.
95Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.Sl •
109
Since July 3, 1940, there have been repeated efforts to
justify the attack at Mers-el-Kebir.
The main reason offered
is the danger of the ships falling into enemy hands.
That
itish fears were not totally groundless is illustrated by
the surrender on December 8, 1942, at Biarritz, of three destroyers, nine submarines and two planes.
AQ~iral
Derrien
had to surrender them under threat of massacre of the population
and garrison.
Although the fleet in Toulon was scuttled the
same threat might also have proved useful there.96
The claim
of ignorance of the armistice terms, uncertainty about secret
clauses, and lack of information about Darlan 1 s orders97 does
•
not seem sufficient justification for such drastic action .
Fear of invasion is another
1
reason 1 cited, but Churchill him-
self admits that in the summer of 1940 this was unlikely be98
cause Britain had naval superiority.
Admittedly, if the
whole French Fleet had been turned over to Germany, this would
no longer have been true; in other words,
tain need not
fear invasion only as long as Germany did not control the French
Fleet, and no longer.
Finally, probably the most fantastic
theory is that of Professer Rougier who claims that during a
conversation in October 1940, Churchill told him:
96schmitt, Oo.cit., pp.30-31.
97Butler, Oo.cit., p.226 and Morize, Oo.cit., p.82.
•
9Bchurchill, "Memoirs,'' III, cited in Varillon, Op.cit.,p.26
110
"Hers-el-Kebir fut une nécessité de ma
politique intérieure. C'est Hers-elKébir qui a fait comprendre au peuple
britannique ••• que je voulais le transformer en une énorme machine de guerre
et mener la lutte jusqu'au bout. 11 99
This seems a very singular statement for an astute statesman
to make to a foreign representative, particularly at a time
when he was trying to conciliate Vichy.
No such remark is
found in Churchill's works, but the idea should not be cornpletely rejected for Churchill did tell Cordell Hull that Mersel-Kebir was to show British readiness to fight, 100 and this
is surely no more justifiable a reason than that cited by
Rougier.
ttThis event intensified French anger at
Great Britain, and the more so because
the French Gover~ment put out an untrue
version of the facts. It is, however,
doubtful whether, if the engagement at
Oran had been avoided, the policy of
JYiarsnal Pétain 1 s Government tm-lard Great
Britain would have been any less hostile.
Darlan's anglophobia was increased by the
French lasses at Oran, but Laval was not
an admiral and his policy of FrancoGerman collaboration was not based on
sent1ment."l01
Immediately after )'Iers-el-X:ebir, the British Parliament was
unanimous in its approval, it was only later when the effect
991. Rougier,
cited Ibid., p.88.
11
l'1ission Secrète a Londrès," pp .. 68-69,
lOOHull, Op.cit., p.799. See also Churchill, Their Finest
Hour, p.256. Charles-Roux, Oo.cit., p.l44, declares that
1 Catapult 1 kept Spain out of the Har by showing
itish f
ting spirit.
101Butler, Op.cit., p.X~XI.
111
on French opinion was realized, that sorne members referred to
it as a "b1under. 11 102
Both at Mers-el-Kebir in Ho1land 1 s distress, and at Alexandria in Cunningham's determined re-interpretation of orders,
we see the British naval officers' reluctance to turn upon a
helpless former ally.
This impression is confirmed by a latter
to The Times by Admiral North after the French bad destroyed
their Toulon fleet and arsenal rather than permit them to fall
into German bands.
"So the French Fleet has never been turned
over to the enemy after all. As one who
bad French units serving efficiently and
loyally under his command in the early
parts of this war I never thought that it
would be.
Our government's action wbich led to
our fleet having, with uttar repugnance,
to fire on their late comrades in Oran
Harbour (Mers-el-Kebir) resulted in sorne
2,000 French officers and men becoming
the innocent victims of their politicians 1
duplicity. Had it not been for this the
whole French Fleet might have been fighting alongside us today. The French
admirals gave their word of honour that
in no curcumstances would~heir ships be
turned over intact to the enemy. They
have kept their word."103
l02H.C. Debates, Series V, 6 August 1941, CCCLXXIII,
col. 2017, Speech by Sir A. Southby.
103Rougier, Op.cit., p.58.
112
It is well known that the officers in "Force H" were shocked
v.rhen they beard their orders. Several protested and one refused duty. 104 Admiral Semerville wrote to his wife:
" ••• it was an absolutely bloody business
to shoot up those Frenchmen who showed
the greatest gallantry eThe truth is my
heart wasn 1 t in it ••• 11 1O;;J
Sorne officers went even further.
Captain Pleydell-Bouverie,
late chief of the British Naval Mission in France, actually
wrote personally to Darlan, who ans-v.rered througb his Chief
of Staff that he could not retain personal relationship with
British Naval officers after British attacks on the French
forces, arrest of French personnel and blockade of French
ports.106
That the Royal Navy took no pride in 'Catapult 1 is
reflected :i.n Lord Strobolgi 1 s book Sea Power in the Second
',eJ'orld :.:J'ar which not only fails to describe the actions at
Alexandrie, Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar, but even depreciates
efforts made to blockade France.
From a purely military point of view
very successful.
1
Catapult 1 was not
In British waters eight destroyers, four
cruisers, along with a nurnber of miscellaneous vessels, and
the three
~orld ~ar
I battleships •Courbet' 'Paris' and
'Lorraine' were seized.
At Vers-el-Kebir:
104smith, Op.cit., p.65.
105rbid., p.1o4.
106varlllon, Op.cit., pp.l88-189.
the battlesbip
113
1
Breta.gne 1 was sunk, the
1
Dunkerque 1 'Mogador' and •Provence'
were all repaired and joined the •strasbourg' 'Commandant
Teste' and
1
Jean Bart' and five super destroyers; most of these
returned to Toulon where there was a mucb greater danger of
German capture.107
Huch of the fleet was therefore still in
Vichy 1 s control, but wbile Churchill's claim. that " ••• a large
proportion of the French Fleet bas, therefore, passed into our
bands or bas been put out of action or otherwise withheld from
Germany 11 108 is rather exaggerated, it is nevertbeless true that
the French Fleet was sufficiently damaged to prevent it from
being operational for 18 months.
These 18 months were a crucial
period in the war for the British, and although Hitler bad more
or less abandoned the idea of invasion by late July the British
bad no way of knowing this.
ships did not end with
1
Consequently attacks on French
Catapult.•
On the same day the 'Dorset-
sbire' was ordered to shadow the 'Richelieu.'
She was allowed
to go north but:
"If she is about to proceed towards West
Indies you are to make every endeavour
to destroy her by torpedo attack and if
this fails by ramming (R) ramming.nl09
107smith, on.cit., pp.lll-112.
108n.c. Debates, Series V,
109smith, Op.cit., p.ll4.
4
July 1940, CCCLXII, col.l049.
114
The blocking of a passage to the West Indies puts the 'Martinique clause' offered to Gensoul in a very dubious light.
On
July 8, while berthed in Dakar, an unsuccessful raid by bombers
and torpedo boats was made on the 'Richelieu,' but protests
from the U.S.A. and Dominions restrained the British from
further action. 110 The British Admiralty also considered an
attack on the 'Jean Bart' which was docked in Casablanca, but
since violent protests were received from Admirals North and
Semerville, especially because there were 13,000 women and
children in Casablanca awaiting embarkation of
15
marchant
ships, the operation was abandoned and orders were issued not
to fire the first shots at French ships. 111 On July 14 Churchill
promised, in a speech to the Gommons, that unless they moved
to German or Italian controlled ports, French ships would not
be molested. 112 Darlan does not seem to have been impressed.
Having foreseen the British attack he bad recalled his ships
from British ports on June 18, and warned his admirals to
''Beware of British attacks," but he was still deeply shocked
by the actual attacks.
"It was as if the heart could not believe
llOcharles-Roux, Op.cit., p.l49.
lllsmith, Oo.cit., p.l20.
ll2churchill, Blood, Sweat and Tears, p.389.
115
what the reason knew. 11 113
In a letter to Churchi
after the
destruction of the Toulon fleet he explained, very logically,
the folly of the British naval attacks. 114
Lord Halifax deplored the French decision to break off
diplomatie relations, and declared British t-lillingness to exchange representatives with Vichy.
Feeling in Vichy was still
too strong to permit this but it was decided to leave, as a
representative in London,
~.
Chartier, who had not been part
of the withdrawn embassy, but who could maintain more or less
official contact with the British Government. 115
faced a very difficult situation.
Halifax
He denied that the withdrawal
of Campbell and his staff signified a rupture in diplomatie relations and insisted that Britain was anxious to resu.,."Ue "normal"
. contacts. 116 On July 12 Halifax received a telegram from Vichy
refuting their responsibility for the diplomatie rupture and
setting out five conditions for its resumption.
These were:
1.
2.
Restoration of warships held in Alexandrie and
Britain, with their officers and crews.
Restoration of all merchant ships.
113Assemblée Nationale, "Les Evénements Survenus en France
de 1933-1945," Rapport, II, p.46S, cited in Hytier, Op.cit.,p.50.
114see Appendix XIII.
ll5simultaneously Vichy asked Ottawa and Pretoria to return
their representatives, and it was through these representatives
that considerable communications were retained with London.
ll6The French seem ta have been disturbed by his use of
'normal' rather than tofficial' in referring to the basis of
relations. See Charles-Roux, Op.cit., p.l57.
116
3.
Payment of an indemnity for death and destruction
caused at Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar.
4.
Lifting of b1ockade on Nartinique.
5.
Freedom of the saas without British interference. 11 7
Later a demand for the return of all French servicemen in England was added, aimed at de Gaulle 1 s organization.
In return
Vichy promised to release British marchant ships held in French
ports.118
Unt11 these conditions were met no resumption of
diplomatie relations wou1d be possible.
The negotiations for the resumption of diplomatie relations
were dropped when Bri tain dropped 1eaflets on r-'iorocco attacking
Marsha1 Pétain.
Therefore on July 28 Baudouin informed London
that Sir Neville Bland would not be permitted to enter Vichy
until the new incident was sett1ed, and the fifty French officers being he1d in Eng1and were released.
At this point
Chartier was refused permission to use
code and he returned to Vichy. 11 9 The rupture was complete.
~.
117Ibid., pp.159-160.
•
118on August 9 France returned 150,000 tons of British
shipping which had been trapped in her ports, but Britain still
he1d 400,000 tons of French shipping. Later, in desperation,
the French made use of the 1)0,000 tons of British shipping
left in ber ports. See M. Auphan, La Marine au Services des
Français: La Lutte Pour La Vie, (hereafter referred to as
La Lutte Pour La Vie), Paris, Les Isles D'or, 1947, pp.24-25.
119cbar1es-Roux, Op.cit., pp.161-162.
c
IV
GAULLIST ACTIVITIES
"De Gaulle et Pétain pouvaient collaborer
en s'opposant, à condition de ne jamais
perdre de vue les intérêts supérieurs de
le France, dont ils n'étaient l 1 un et
l'autre que les serviteurs."
A. Fabre-Luce
Reynaud fully intended to continue the war by following the
Dutch example and taking the government into exile in London
wh ile the army would fight on from the empire • 1 itlhen Pétain
came to power he was determined to remain in France, but he
was originally planning to send Vice-President Chautemps and
part of the government to ?Jorth Africa.
opposed to any such move.
~veygand
and Laval were
'/J'eygand, on the grounds that i t was
dishonourable in view of the armistice, and Laval, because he
feared it would frustrate his plans for a junior partnership
in Hazi Europe.
Darlan arranged for tho se who \vere most anxious
to continue the struggle from North Africa to sail on the f!vlassilia 1 on June 21; when the armistice was announced on June 23
the captain refused to sail to Britain.
They arrived in Casa-
blanca on June 24 and Handel proclaimed a dissident government:
1 Geraud, Op.cit., p.292 and Truchet, Op.cit.,
•
117
.14-lS •
118
"En accord avec les Allies britanniques
et dans cette heure de détresse nationale,
j 1 ai p1•is le pouvoir. L 1 armée coloniale
et le flotte française poursuivront le
guerre jusqu'à la victoire."2
Although the British immediately sent Duff Cooper and Lord
~andel,
Gort to Casablanca, General Noguês had already arrested
and placed him under guard aboard the
1
}1assilia.'
General Noguês originally felt that the war could be
carried on from North Africa as he had 250,000 men and
the
f~lt
itish fleet would provide sufficient protection against
Spanish or Italian attack,3 he changed his rnind, according to
Commandant LaRoch, 1-vhen Spain declared nonbelligerency. 4
':Jhen
of fic lally asked for his opinion Noguès informed ':leygand on
June 22 that, although
would need reinforcements, he had
sufficient resources in North Africa to make a prolonged stand
against the enemy, if he received naval and aerial
r:
assistance._.,~
From evidence presented to the Parliamentary Enquiry held
in June 1949 it seems unlikely, despite ·:leygand's statement,
that Noguès 1 telegrams were ever presented to the Council of
Iviinisters. 6 This impression is strongly supported by the
2 '"
1\
'
'-i
r\.ammerer, ürlUlS
v ce 1 p • 3'4 3 •
3rnterview in Algiers, La Groudiere, 11 ?1es Carnets," p.96,
cited in Truchet, Op.cit., pp.323-324. See also Rej~aud,
Op. ci t., p .J+46.
4Fabre-Luce, Procès, p.62.
•
5T.O.A.F.N., Iro.372-3, June
Oo.cit., pp.94-95.
, 1940, cited in Truchet,
6r1. Lebrun denies th at they were presented.
Ibid., p. 36G.
119
records of the Council meetings kept by Baudouin, who records
that General Koeltz, who was explaining Noguès views at this
meeting declared that no real resistance could be expected
from North Africa. 7
Similarly Bouthillier sumrnarizes Noguès r
message as pessimistic.
e
There are marked differences between
the accounts of what was presented to the Council and Noguès'
message which began:
"L'A.P.N., avec ses resources actuelles,
est en mesure de resister longtemps de
1 1 enemi."
In comparing Noguès 1 telegram with Bouthillier 1 s record we find
Noguès referring to the Sebou and Querra as '' ••• constituent de
bonnes lignes de defense," while Bouthillier says Hoguès reported he was " ••• incapable de constituer une ligne de resistance."
Further, with 268 modern tanks in North Africa Baudouin records
" ••• pas de chars d'un modèle postérieur a 1918, 11 and while
Noguès says,
n ••• les
stocks de carburants et de munitions
correspondant à deux mois d'operation" were available, Bouthillier records that it was reported that they were " ••• nuis
pas, même (pour) un plein jour de combat. 11 9
It is clear that
Baudouin and Bouthillier did not just imagine what they heard.
What seems more likely is that
~eygand
tampered with the
7on the other hand in a deposition made April 17, 1951,
swears he did not attend the Council meeting of June 23
and merely took a list of the supplies that Noguès required to
1 67 .
'T
-rb''
.. eygan d !' ~.,
p._.~
~oeltz
Sy. Bouthillier, "Le Drame de Vichy Face à 1 1 enemi, face
a l'aillie," pp.lOJ-107, cited Ibid.
9Ibid., pp.J66-367.
120
information in Noguès' telegrams.
His motive is not .far to
seek, he had just finished fighting to get support for the
armistice, and wanted no further doubts to arise.
','fey gand
has admitted that since he could not provide Noguès with the
support he required he presented the Council with an unfavourable report,lO which supports the contention that his ideas
and not Noguès' were presented.
Noguès' attitude was, however, obviously rather ambivalent as on June 27 he declared he no longer believed that the
war could be continued from North Africa as he could hope for
no real help from Britain nor from Bordeaux. 11 This may seem
like a very sudden about-face but Noguès' explains his position.
"Le Gouvernement se trouvant dans une
atmosphere de panique, n'a pu se rendre
compte de l'élément de moral et de force
que représentait l'Afrique du Nord, qui,
avec la Marine et l'Aviation, pouvait
tenir jusqu'à l'usure de nos adversaires.
Il le regrettera runèrement •••
Je reste à mon poste ••• pour remplir une
mission de sacrifice, qui couvre mon front
de honte, pour ne pas couper la France en
deux.nl2
It is very doubtful whether continuation of the war from
North Africa was militarily feasible. 1 3 To begin with the bulk
lO.,[eygand, Recalled to Service, pp.215-218 & 251-252.
llsee Appendix XIV.
12Truchet, Op.cit., p.71.
13Truchet, Oo.cit., was written to demonstrate the feasibility of such a move but is most unconvincing.
121
of the French Army would have had to have been withdrawn from
the Battle of France, under which circumstances the Germans
would probably have refused an armistice.
The French Admiralty
had declared itself u..YJ.able to handle any such evacuation and in
any case organized transportation for troops from the front
lines to the
diterranean ports was non-existent.
F'urthermore
the Royal Navy was not prepared to remove ships from regular
service to assist with the transport of 900,000 men.
Hence
Spear 1 s efforts to induce Pétain to take the French Arrny to
North Africa were doomed; when he protested;
"Vous ne pouvez pourtant pas nous laisser
combattre seul, répond Spears avec
obstination, dans ce qui reste, malgré
tout notre lutte comrnune 111
11
Et vous? Vous nous avez pas laissés combattre seuls!" reulique le Maréchal d'un
ton acebretl4
•
In a letter to the New York Times of April 22, 1946, Sir Samuel
Hoare admits that the British expected Hitler to move through
Spain to Africa and felt incapable of protecting Gibraltar,l5
yet the British were urging the French to move to North Africa
where, not only would Britain be unable to supply them
i~~ed-
iately, but, as Darlan declared, by the time
tain could help
there would be no ports left to receive supplies. 16
14Benoist-Hechin, Op.cit., II, p.l52.
is not recorded by Spears.
This conversation
1 >deygand, Recalled to Service, p.217.
l6:Note from Darlan to ';leygand, June 24, 1940, Ibid.
122
The Americans felt Pétain had prevented chaos and was
supported by the majority of the people, 1 7 the British however
took an entirely different view.
They regarded Pétain as a
facade, and declared the French leaders " ••• are in no sense
free agents,nl3 and the Brodeau.x Government had
n ••• delivered
themselves over to the enemy, and lie wholly within his
pm.,rer.nl9
The rather uncooperative attitude of sorne French
leaders caused some of the Britisü to question the value of
negotiating with a
gover~~ent
whose existence was dependent on
Hitler's goodwill.20
The British attitude was hardened by General de Gaulle,
who, although he was not a cabinet minister, and therefore bad
no right to speak for France, made a broadcast from London on
June 18 blaming the government for the disaster and calling the
French to rally to him. 21 His interpretation of France 1 s duty
was to follow the paths of other refugee governments, and he
condemned the armistice as delivering the helpless country into
1 7 11 Langer, Op.cit., pp.295 and 369. See also Hull, Op.cit.,
pp.805 and 806, 11 The French Crises,n COHHON'vJEAL, XXXIII, December
7, 1940, 244-245, and J.L.A. Hercier, "The UeH" French Reeime, 11
Ibid., XXXIV, April 25, 1941, ll+-15.
18 11 Hitlerts France,n THE :NATION, CLI, July 20,1940, 44-45.
1 9churchil1 in a speech to the Co~~ons, 25 June, 1940,
cited in Churchill, B1ood, Sweat and Tears, p.371.
20char1es Petrie, "British Diplomacy During the First Years
of the -,var," THE QUARTERLY REVIE'd, CCLX...XV, No.546, October 1940,
158.
21Huddleston, Op.cit., p.45.
123
enemy hands. 22
The Foreign Office rejected de Gaulle's sug-
gestion that he establish a French Government in London; they
were being " ••• careful not to ride two herses at the same
time, 11 beeause they did not want to aggrava te hTeygand whom they
still hoped to persuade to go to North Africa. 2 3 In fact, despite his pretensions, the British never did recognize de Gaulle
as the sole political power representing France, but only as
the leader of the Pree French. 24
With the approval of the War Cabinet de Gaulle broadcast
an appeal to all Frenchmen and announced his intention to set
up a National Committee in London which would give an account
of itself to the legal and free French Government, as soon as
such a government existed.
co~~unique
After this broadcast an official
declared that the Bordeaux Government could not be
regarded as independent and the British Government was therefore recognizing the National
as representing all
Frenchmen who wished to continue the war. 2 5 The Churchill-de
Co~mittee
Gaulle Agreement was signed on August 7, 1940, but made retroactive to July 1, and promised military assistance to restore
France.
It is unusual to find a Great Power signing an agree-
22speeches of General de Gaulle, June 22 & 24, 1940, quoted
in de Gaulle, SEeeches, p.Jl.
23woodward, OE,cit., p.75.
•
24see Appendix XV •
25~voodward, OE.cit., p.76 and 11 Keesings' ',Teekly Archives,
1937-1940," p.4112, cited in Flory, Op.cit,, p.58.
124
ment with an individua1. 26
A few days later de Gaulle announced
the Agreement thus:
nr
recently signed a most important agreement
By virtue
of this agreement I, who am now the leader
of the Free French, undertake to organize an
army, a navy and an air force to fight at the
side of our Allies. His I ajesty's Government, for their part, agree to restore the
full independance and greatness of France
after victory."27
wi th His Hajes ty' s Gov·ernment.
It was an integral part of this agreement that the Free French
should never " ••• bear arms against France,H but a very fine
distinction was later made differentiating between 'France'
and Vichy, or individual Frenchmen.28
However, by November,
de Gaulle bad 35,000 men (including a thousand airmen), 20
warships, 60 merchant ships, plus technicians, newspapers,
radio stations and growing financial resources. 2 9 His movement was well-established.
Early in 1940 the B.B.C. had begun broadcasting for France
as agreed
betwee~1
the French ambassador, H. Corbin, and the
I-linistry of Information, but after Hers-el-Xebir the French
speakers read news provided by B.B.C. officials.3°
"
s
Français parlent aux Français" bad a vast audience and, there26For text of the Agreement see Karnmerer, Armistice,
Appendix XLVIII, pp. 486-488.
27de Gaulle, Speeches, p.21.
28de Gaulle, Memoirs, I, p.lOO.
29de Gaulle, Speeches, pp.36-37.
30prance was already receiving twice as much B.B.C. air
time as any ether occupied country and on August 11 the
Ministry of Information was ordered to " ••• make the B.B.C.
obey" and carry de Gaulle' s ne1oTs from Africa. See Churchill,
Their Finest Hour, p.6,56.
125
fore, considerable political influence.
the unknm"l'n Free Frene h
It began by making
ader's role understood but soon
began controlled, but increasingly virulent, attacks on Pêtain.3 1
Vichy became very incensed and blamed the B.R.C. and British
agents for the dissidence of Chad and the Cameroons; the B.R.C.
may have played a role but the records indicate the agents were
Gaullists.3 2
successful.
There can be no doubt that British propaganda Has
Mussolini in the Popolo d'Italia maintained Churc-
hill's broadcasts had preserved the moral alliance between
Britain and France,33 but many B.B.C. broadcasts doubtless increased the anxiety of many Frenchmen who felt furtter resistance impossible and therefore resented attac
Govern."llent.34
on the
Bordea~~
Jean Prouvost, the Hinister of Information,
pointed out that Britain bad not provided the 26 divisions she
promised and
~n1ile
France kept men of
48
under arms the 28 year
olds in Bri tain !,mre not mobilized; under the se circurns tances
dernanded by "tvba t right
tain tried to dictate French
policy or increase friction by supporting
11
separatists. 11 3)
31J.L. Cremieux-Brilbac, uLes Emissions
B.B.C. Pendant la Guerre,"
HISTORIQUE DE
GUERRE HU:NDIALE, I, No. 1, November 1950, 74-80,
la
32Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.l7.
33"Evening News," 17 April 1941, cited in Tissier, On.cit.,
p. 47.
•
34·:r~eygand, Recalled to Service, p .25'3 and ~l[oodward,
Oo.cit., p. 76 •
35 11 London V.
aux,n
, XXXVI, July 1, 1940,
25.
126
Actually many Frenchmen, even in Vichy, supported de Gaulle's
military position but found his attacks on the French Government repugnant and felt he had increased Angle-French tension.36
The French authorities lost no time in condemning de Gaulle.
Ee tJas disovmed after his June 18 broadcast and ordered to return
to France.
Although he was prepared to go the British refused to
provide transportation and he was consequently struck from the
army list on June 23.37
He was ultimately condemned to death,38
and having foreseen this, de Gaulle ironically remarked:
ncette fois "ils" condamneront un général
qui n'a pas voulu ••• quitté."39
Britain made every effort to encourage the French colonies
to continue the ir resistance.
The Chiefs of Staff recormnended
all possible military assistance to the colonies and British
consuls 'ltiere accordingly ordereà to
cornr~:unicate
British 1'1Till-
ingness to assist the French colonial authorities to carry on
the struggle.4°
The French authorities complained repeatedly,
but to no avail because:
36Baudouin
1
Op.cit., pp.206-207.
37Haurois, Op.cit., pp.~.04, 422 & 457.
38Pétain later declared this 11 • • • a formality, it has never
entered my rnind to gi ve effec t to i t." See :'leygand, Recalled
to Service, p.258.
39H. de Kerillis, Voici la Vérité, (hereafter referred to
as Vérité) New York, Editions de la Haison Francaise,l942,p.307.
401doodward, Op. ci t., pp. 74-75 and de Gaulle, Hemoirs, I,
pp.ll5-116. See Appendix XVI for a typical British appeal.
127
"At this time His Najesty's Government
attached great importance to aiding
General de Gaulle and the Free French
to rally the African possessions and
colonies of France ••• being still free
from Hitler 1 s force and Pétain's fraud
they were in no mood to surrender. To
them General de Gaulle shope as a star
in the pitch-black night."41
Despite this 'star' Indo-China was the only large colony which
seemed prepared to disavow Pétain at this time and Anglo-French
relations had deteriorated rapidly, as illustrated by the
French statement to '.fashington that Britain found it easier to
blockade France than give her military assistance.4 2
After the Franco-Italian armistice the North African colonies were sure they \vere not to be occupied and would have enough
troops left to maintain order, so they were not sa susceptible
to British propaganda.
The records of this period indicate that
the French colonists were not fully aHare of Hussolini's aspirations with reference to French colonial territories.
The
British therefore were disappointed by the reaction of the
colonists tc their appeals.
41churchill,
Their Finest Hour, p.473.
42/loodward, Op. ci t., p. 77 •
•
•
128
"Our first aim on the collapse of France
was to induce the French colonies ta
fight on as our allies. ife established
close contact with the local French
aQ~inistrations and offered substantial
financial inducement. The reaction
leaves no doubt that there are French
elements ready to rally ta our side.
But the Vichy government is in a position to exercise strong pressure on the
local officials who have been in a
defeatist and wavering frame of mind;
and there is no doubt that the offici.al
policy of the local administrators is
now one of obedience to Vichy and refusal to co-operate with us."43
1
Marshal Pétain was never as popular in North Africa as in
France and his request for armistice was not well received in
the Empire.44
•
There exists almost unlimited proof of the desire
of the French population in North Africa to carry on the war •
The government and the French adn1inistrators were flooded with
communications begging them to carry on from Uorth Africa.
J\Iany of these date from the period prier to the armistice and
the con~uncement of British propaganda.45
The colonists beld
meetings, passed motions in favour of war, expressed their
admiration for• de Gaul1e 1 s stand, and sent delegations ta tbeir
military leaders.46
The Resident-General at Tunisia declared
43colonial Office Report on '"Jest Africa, August 3, 1940,
cited in Butler, Oo.cit., p.312.
44A. Truchet, "L'Armistice de juin 1940 et l'Afrique du
Nord," REVUE HISTORIQUE DE LA DEUXIEI·IE GUERRE l·IOHDIAL, I, Uo.J,
June 1951, 29.
•
45see Truchet, Op.cit., pp.36-37 & 41 •
46Ibid., pp.37-48.
129
that France could only retain her selr-respect, and that or
ethers, by carrying on with the war.
His reaction was typical
or colonial administrators, many of t-rhom were replaced.47
During the armistice negotiations there was a combined
appeal to Pétain rrom: the Tunisian Resident-General, the
Syrian High Commissioner, the Governor-General of I"Iadagascar,
the French Co:rn.rnissioner in the Cameroons, and the GovernorGeneral of French
~est
Africa, tbrough General Noguês,(the
Resident-General in Tunisia and
c.
in
c.
in North
Afric~)
to the errect that armistice would mean the loss of the
Empire. 48 Noguês also reported that he was having great difficulty in maintaining public order and keeping the population
behind the government.49
telegram from General
At this point, through an intercepted
~1i ttelhauser
to General Noguês, the
government became aware that Noguês was considering allying
his 60,000 troops with the British army in Egypt.
'tleygand
irnmediately telegra.mmed Noguês to remind him that duty demanded loyalty to the
gover~rnent.SO The soul-searching dile~na
which faced many colonial adminstrators and military leaders
is well su.nL.rned up by the High CortL.'11issioner to Beirut' s letter
47charles-Rowc, Op.cit., pp.66-67.
48Benoist-Mechin, OD.cit., II, pp.474-47S.
49T.O.A.F.N. ta General ~eygand, llo.674, Cab./c., June
21, 1940, and T.O.A.F'.N. to General >.feygand, No.696, Cab./c.,
June 25, 194.0, cited in Truchet, Op.cit.., pp.93 & 98.
Socharles-Row{ says that left to himself Noguês would
have ignored the armistice. See Charles-Roux., Op. ci t., pp. 65-66.
130
to Baudouin:
ttJe ne peux cacher à Votre Excellence, que
ma déception de patriote a été profonde
••• Contrairement à ce que pense Votre
Excellence, il n'était pas facile pour
moi d 1 ap~rcevoir clairment quel était mon
devoir.";::;l
The metropolitan
goverr~ent
maintained that had the Empire
carried on the struggle the Germans -v;ou1d have immediately continued the Har into Africa, and it was later c1aimed that French
acceptance of the armistice great
ings in Irovember
19L~2.
facilitated the Allied land-
It is impossible to determine the va1id-
ity of such an hypothesis, but it seems that an attack by Hitler
on North Africa late in 1940 v-rould have left the German eastern
and western flanks dangerously exposed.
Furthermore Hitler was
preoccupied wi th Russia and too coiT'...'îÜtted
else~-1here
ing to divert men and materials to North Africa.
to be 1-vill-
Ee recognized
the danger of Allied invasion was very real but fe1t it was not
immediate;5 2 even afte::> the fall of Chad the Germans Here still
determined to use Frenclh~en to defend the French Empire.53
Perhaps the surprise of the Germa.n
gh Command 1r1hen
Rom.~e1
advanced in 1941 and their reminder to him that he was supposed
to be working in a pure1y defensive capacity at Cyrenaicia best
51Ibid., Dp.68-6~.
--
-
5 2:iins1ey, F.~~., Hit1er 1 s Stratef;y, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1951, pp.1$0-1$1.
1918-19·5, The
D, XI, London,
131
i11ustrates the German attitude to North Africa in 1940 and
1941.54
A1tbougb the British contention that a German invasion
of North Africa, even via Spain, ;,ras impossible due to Allied
naval power seems over-optimistic, it does seem probable that
the vichy e;overnment 1vas motivated, at least in part, by the
desire to preserve sorne measure of independance.
By mid-July the Germans had had second thoughts about the
armistice and on July 16 German demanda for use of
:~orth
African air bases, ports, railroads and merchant shipping were
presented at
The French resisted and demanded
~iesbaden.
that Germany stick to the armistice terms.
General Koe1tz
has suggested that Sitler did not press his demands because
an aversion to combined operations such as would be
to attack either Britain or North Africa.
r>eq'~ired
There was also fear
that use of force would cause a rising in North Africa led by
•,~r
eygan d .....~6
It 11as because of the German ·:.:mvlillingness to use
force on Vichy that, in
co~~entinE
on British
co~~unications
to the effect that Axis occupation of neither Syria nor Lebanon
-------- --··------·--------- --------5ltHinsley, Ei tl er' s Strate cry, p .lLj.6.
55r sornJ.· ana~ ·~t,emalre,
·
on.cl· t .,
Gernan demanda.
On.cit., p.232.
See also
Eaudo~in,
·
t e~;::;i 01....
::.q4
, gJ.ves
On.cit., p.l72 and Butler,
A
..
pp.~
56Letter of Hencke to von Ribbentrop, :liesbaden, July 22,
1940, describes letter sent Hitler protesting incoMpatibility
of Ger:nan requests ~..ri th honour and the armistice. Doc11'11ents
.
in German Foreign Policy,X, Ho.208, p.274. The Germans were
a~are of ~eygand's hostility and distrusted him.
It was
because of this that they were soMewhat restrained in the
132
-v1ould be permi tted, Charles-Roux com.rn.ents.
"Le danger invoqué
par le :J'oreign Office n'était pas donc actuel. 11 .57
Havi:1g failed to c;et ei ther the French Goverœnent to continue the 1,1ar, or the colonists to it;nore the armistice, the
tish turned to de Gaulle.
Despite the
prom~se,
on July 1.5,
that no further attacks would be made on French warships or
colonies in north AfricA, on July 30 a British cruiser disembarked troops at Duala in the Cameroons and an
ultimatQ~
sent to the Governor-General of Madagascar by the British
in
c.
was
c.
Far Eastern Fleet.
The next day all France and North
Africa was included in the blockade zone • .5 8 On August 4 de
Gaulle had
tisb approval to set up his "Conseil du Defense
de la France d' 01J.tre-mer" which, wi th the support of the Royal
Navy, was soon to begin administration of Chad and the Cameroons.
Although the dissidence of Chad was hailed in London as
true patriotism there was a less altruistic aspect.
Felix
oué, the eovernor, was faced with an economie crises.
He
bad 70,000,000 francs Horth of cotton mvaitine shipment and
amount of equipment they allov1ed the To'rench to send to north
Africa for self-defence. Ibid., Helmuth Greiner in 11 T,far Diary
of the ·.rehrmacht Operations Staff, December 1, 1940-J:•Tarch 24,
1941, 11 p.918. See also interview with von Ribbentrop, Vienna,
June 1.5, 194.1, cited in Truchet, Op.cit., p.297 •
.57Charles-Roux, Op.cit., p.ll7 •
.58Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.l97.
133
there was increasing pressure from the unpaid planters and
natives.
~fhen
be sent a representative to Lagos to discuss
British financial assistance it was not difficult to persuade him of the right cou:::--se of action.59
Vichy protested
against London 1 s support of 1 rebels 1 and suggested negotiations through Madria. 60 A wave of Anglophobia was sweeping
France and Laval 1 s proposal to the Cabinet, on August 30,
that France declare war on Britain was rejected but reflected
growing French hostility.
This hostility reached a peak with
the British inspired attack on Dakar.
The strategie value of Dakar is univers
ly recognized.6l
Situated at the narrowest part of the South Atlantic it could
be used to threaten shipping going via the Cape of Good Hope
route, which due to the dangers of the Mediterranean was being
heavily used by the British.
Further it provi
d an excellent
centre for the control of French Equatorial Africa {which
appealed to de Gaulle); there were aerodromes like Fort Lamy
(which would have been useful for refueling R.A.F. flights);
there was a dry dock, and although the facilities were poor
59smith, Op.cit., p.l25.
60see Chapter
See also Appendix XVII.
v.
61Hitler at the German Naval Conference at ~olfsschanze,
July 9, 1941, cited in A. Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals,
New York, Dutton, 1949, p.ll6. See also Hull, Op.cit., p.852,
for American viewpoint.
134
and it took a full year to repair the damage to the 'Richelieu'
from a single torpedo, it was the only dry dock north of Cape
Town.
Finally Belgian, Polish and Banque de France gold were
stored in Dakar.
De Gaulle claims the British planned to use
the gold stored at Bamako to pay for American war materials,
but with Polish and Belgian support it was agreed to turn it
62
over to the refugee gover~~ents and the Free French.
Despite Churchill's claim that, "The seas and oceans are
open. The U-boats are contained,n 6 3 Dakar in German bands
would have been a serious threat to Allied convoys.64
Co~~ission
•
An Axis
to Dakar in July felt the port was poorly defended
but feared French reaction to a German take over might be a
rising all over French Africa.
The first commission left
August 10 and the second on September 23, 6 5 thus both the
British claim that there were Germans in Dakar, and the French
contention that there were none, at the time of the attack,
were true, but Dakar was clearly still in French hands.66
6 2 de Gaulle, Memoirs, I, p.l24.
63speech to the Co1nmons, August 20, 1940, cited in
Churchill, Blood, Sweat and Tears, p.403.
64P.K. Kemp, Victorg at Sea, 1939-1945, London, Frederick Miller, 1957, p.lO •
65schmitt, Op.cit., pp.26 & 28.
•
66see Appendix XVIII. See also "Un Document aocamblant
les Agents Nazi a Dakar,'' FRANCE, October 5, 1940, 1 & 4•
135
Churchill realized that an attack on Dakar could provolre a
declaration of war by Vichy, but felt the risks warranted
because of the value of Dakar's port facilities and its usefulness to de Gaulle's m0v3ment. 67 It is perhaps significant
that Admirals North and Semerville were left out of the planning of 'Menace,' and even though Dakar was within North 1 s
command he never received ordel's for 'Henace.'
North was under
the impression that Anglo-French naval relations were improving
due to reports he received about the attitude of the French
68
naval attache in Madrid.
The operation was planned by Generals Spears and de Gaulle
in consultation with the Chiefs of Staff, and under Churchill 1 s
supervision.
It was decided that except for naval personnel
only French forces should be used to lessen the chances of
The original plan called for 2,500 French troops
opposition.
with
tan~s,
artillery and air support, but at de Gaulle 1 s re-
quest additional Polish and British forces were sent.
Churchill
concedes that the Cabinet was fearful of a declaration of war
by Vichy, but says, "(I} ••• felt in my fingertips 11 that there
would be no war and in any case he " ••• had now become set on
the venture."
He admits responsibility for the ultimate ap-
proval of 'Menace.r69
67see Appendix XIX.
•
68smith, Op.cit., p.lJ2 •
69churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp.471-478.
136
The whole operation was dogged with misfortune and doomed
to failure.
Even before the expedition got underway the list
of difficulties and mistakes is substantial.7°
There was dis-
agreement over disposai of the gold and a major delay occurred
when it was decided to augment the French forces with the lOlst
and 102nd Royal Marine brigades.
This change in plans meant
reloading of ships and a last minute five day training course
in boat work for the marines.
Tbere was difficulty with the
ships' crews who demanded luxury foods and back pay.
One cap-
tain was missing at sailing time, another captain refused to
sail because of the weight of deck cargo, and two ships collided
in the harbour.
It was also discovered that the frelghters were
so slow they had to leave several days early.
In addition it
se ems qui te defini te th at the re Iv as a securi ty leak. 7l
troops escort
equipment 1-1ore tropical ge ar.
11
The
A DalŒr 11 was
chalked on the troop trains and Gaullist officers at the Adelphi
Hotel in Liverpool loudly toasted "Dakar."
Finally the plane
bringing British liaison officers with intelligence contrary to
de Gaulle's broke down.
They arrived in London on August 29
and their advice was ignored.
Ac tually the error 1-vhich bas caused the grea test sc and al
~vas
the total
breakdo~om
in communications which permi tted three
70smith, Oo.cit., pp.l27 & 130.
•
71Lequerica, the Spanish ambassador, told Baudouin that
the Spanish embassy in London had beard de Gaulle i·las leaving
for North Africa. Noguês was accordingly warned. See
Appendix xx:.
137
cruisers and three destroyers from Toulon to pass throü.gh the
Straits, with British permission, and steam for Dakar.
This
despite: the warnings of a British agent in Toulon, the advice
of ambassador Hoare, and Darlan 1 s official request for passage.72
The passage of nForce Y11 resulted in the dis~issal of
Admiral North,73 but whether it made a significant difference
at Dakat· is doubtful.
Sorne shells and propellors for the
'Richelieu' were left at Dakar but " ••• we nmv- knm-.r that the
French ships did not ••• carry reinforcements for Dakar- they
'V·Tere, in fact, bound for Libreville. 11 74
Churchill has con-
sistently maintained that the Dakar garrison was reinforced by
"Force Y" but neither this nor the idea that it was sent to
retake the Cameroons and French
~quatorial
Africa from de Gaulle
can be substantiated.75
The above illustrates the
system.
~-.rea}mess
of the intelligence
De Gaulle was nunbelievably ill-informedn76 yet the
72 smith, Op.cit., p.l34 and Hoare, Op.cit., p.85. "Time"
magazine speculated that ships may have been allowed to leave
the Mediterraneen to put them beyond German control. See
nF1yine Frenchmen,n TH'Œ, XXX:VI, September 23, 1940, 30.
73For a discussion of the 'North Affair' see Smith,
Op.cit., pp. 164-174 and Roskill, Oo.cit., pp. 311-314.
74Butler, Oo.cit., p.317.
See also Roskill, Op.cit., p.315.
75ohurchill, Their F'inest Hour, p.486 and de Gaulle Hemoirs
The French however did tell the German armistice
co~~ission that six ships were going to prevent the spread of
Gaullism in French Nest Africa. See Roskill, On.cit., p.311 •
I, pp.l2,5-126.
•
76Juan S. Vidarte, "De Gaulle at Dakar, 11
February 22, 1941, 205 & 207.
NATION, CLII,
138
copy of the French West African Defence Schema sent to the
Office, by Captain Poulter of the
~ar
itish Army, was never passed
on the the leaders of 1Menace.'77
rThen Churchill suggested that the expedition should be di-
1
verted to Duala to consolidate Gaullist territories there were
vehement protests from de Gaulle and the British officers with
him, so the ":far Cabinet decided
11
•••
to let things rip.n7S
This
may seem an irresponsible attitude but Churchill wrote to Smuts
on September 22 that resistance was not expected to be strong.
s tiff fight 11 can be n ttributeà to his habitual effort to engender American sympathy.7 9
Bis remar·l<: to Roosevelt predic ting a
11
The new Governor-General of French West Africa, Pierre
Boisson, unlike most Frencb officers south of the Sahara, declared himself against de Gaulle.
!ie felt the loss of Dakar
would result in a German take-over of the territory.
His
attitude resulted in many Gaullists leaving to join the British,
thus reducing the nu.'11ber of de Gaulle sympathizers in Dalcar. 80
The operation therefore met more opposition than expected.
The
shore batteries} ships and subrnarines in the harbour successfully held off the British and Free French forces for three days.
The heavy fog shrouded the harbour and caused loss of contact
77Butler, Oo.cit., p.316.
7Schurc~ill, Their Finest Hour, pp.LJ.83-486.
79rbid.,
.487-488.
80Juan Vidarte, "De Gaulle at Dakar, 11 THE NATION, CLII,
February 22, 1941, 205, and Huddleston, Op.cit., pp.78-79.
139
with the Free French forces landing in the Bay of Rufisque.
Gl
Just when Boisson was considering surrender the operation was
abandoned ..
As a military operation
'I·~enace'
was a failure.
Although
Dakar was never used as a base by enemy submarines or surface
vessels, and in the fighting at Dakar the 'Richelieu' was hit
and a French submarine sunk, this is counterbalanced by the
severe damage suffered by a British battleship, a cruiser and
t~fo
destroyers.
32
Furt11ermore Dakar was more firmly than ever
in Vichy hands, but, remarked Churchill,
11
Errors tm-;ards the
enemy must be lightly judged: we cannot foresee everything."
\lhat might have been foreseen were the bomber attacks on
Gibraltar, which were evidently quite successful, and the
French warning that further attacks or continuation of the
blockade of France would result in France making the Mediterranean untenable to the British Fleet, and possibly in attacks
on British colonies.
to send a control
The German Navy had been urging Hitler
co~~ission
to Dakar and after the attack von
Stulpnagel told the French delegation that France would be
allowed to send three cruisers, three destroyers, and two
"groups" of planes, as well as six battalions of Singhalese
•
Olcontrary to de Gaulle's claim that he landed with the
assistance of local inhabitants it seems that his forces 1-re re
held 7ili· miles off-shore by fire from two old 9)mm. guns. See
S~ith, On.cit., pp.l47-148.
82Roskill, On.cit., pp.Jl6-317 •
troops to reinforce Dakar's defence system.
The Germans seem
to have been so impressed by French determination to defend
their territory tbat by the end of the yeer Ritter was suggesting that " ••• the entire French naval force be released to fisht
agains t de Gaulle and the Uni te à Kingdo:rn. "83
Despite the effect on Angle-French negotiations then in
progress Britain continued to support de Gaulle, and attacks
on French colonies.
There was a r,rowing feeling in France
that these attacks Here a British attempt to des troy the l.,rench
Empire for ber m..rn benefi t.
11
Vichyssois" and
11
Gaullis t 11 were,
tberefore, both synonymous with traiter or puppet according to
French"llen
.
of differing
vie~.rs.
The s trength of this feeling is
illustrated by the execution of the first sabateurs in France,
not as anti-German partisans, but as French dissidents. 84
When the Gaullists attacked Gabon, which bad little strategic value but could have provided a submarine base, and gave
the Allies access to cocoa and vegetable oils from French
Equatorial Africa,85 the
11
Vichyssoisn were quick to point out
that this "criminelle enterprise" was supported by the Royal
Navy.
The bombing of Gabon, dropping of propaganda leaflets
8.J:voodt-vard, Op.cit., p.85 and Documents in German Foreign
Policy, XI, p.7, No.S, Hench to Foreign Ministry, Telegram 1 6,
',,Teisbaè.en, September 2, 1940 and p.61, No.46 and p. 759, No.432.
84Rougier, Op.cit., pp.72-77, passim.
85nne Gaulle in Gabon," CURRENT HISTORY, LII, December 10,
1940, 9.
on Lambarene, de Gaulle's taking hostages for Gaullists before
Frenct courts, and the blockade were responsible for even
greater distrust of British motives. 86 Weygand was, therefore,
sent to Algeria to organize defence of French African colonies
from aggression from any quarter, and to prevent the further
spread of dissidence.87
The Germens were somewhat uncertain
about this move and planned operation 'Attila' should the
French colonies rise.
88
In Inde-China General Catroux felt that his only hope was
to remain allied to the British and when advised by Bordeaux
that no foreign troops should be allowed to operate in IndoChina he replied that expediency necessitated British assistance and:
"Je ne demande pas que ma politique, avec
l'angleterre soit apprQuvée: il ~e suffit
qu'elle soit ignorée."09
He ignored instructions to negotiate with Japan because he had
been promised substantial aid by the British Navy, but on July
23 he was replaced by Admiral Decoux and a treaty was signed
Hith Japan.
This treaty Has renounced by de Gaulle's Committee
06Robert de Beauplun, "La defense de l'Zmpire Français,"
ILLUSTRA'riON, December 21, 1940, 425, and Rougier, Op.cit.,p.l6L~.
87Langer, Op.cit., p.104.
08 See Appendix XXI.
0
•
89:::\am.lllerer, Armistice, pp .458-459..
pp.418 & 421.
See also Ibid.,
142
of National Liberation ivhich declared war on Japan on December
8, l~l~l. 90
Therea.fter there \vas a chaotic situation in Indo-
China with not only Chinese fi
French fighting Gaullists.9 1
ting Japenese, but
Vichy
wit~
The British supported de Gaulle, but he was never
pop~lar
with them as he seemed to feel that he could only prove his
independance by being rude to them.
The British, on the other
band, accepted hi:n only as the sole high-ran:dng French office.r
who came to them, but regarded him as " ••• a danr:;erous reactionary, a Fascist, and a c,.rould-be dictator.n
v-rere members of the rightist
'Front Populaire.
France. 92
Gaulle's
t
1
Hany of his officers
Action Française' and also
His only clai.m t o sympathy ·,v-as his love of
By July 1943 Churchill hL1self 11as attacki
dictat~rial
the
de
tendencies in the French colonies, and his
efforts to undermine Anglo-American unity.93
~ost Americans
felt de Gaulle had no rir;ht to claim to be the legal government
in French colonies94 and although his military acbievements ~ere
sli
t, and consisted larEely of following the fighting and
90Ibid., pp.360-364, oasstm.
9lr.de la Gorce, The French Army: A ~ilitary Political
History, New York, Geo. 3razillier, 1963, p.379.
NEiv
92"London Diary - The Truth About General de Gaulle,"
AND rTATION, XX, December 7, 19~.0, 558.
STATES~·1AN
93nGiraud'S Non Political Visit Stirs Political Implications, 11 "NE~·JmvEEK, XXII, 3, 19 July 1943, 38.
94"General de Gaulle and the Colonies, n CŒ''C·10lï'.V'EAL, XXXII,
September 13, 1940, 32.
clai~ing the glory95 he was very unpopular in France for, as
Hajor-General Irwin said,
n ••• he
has not shirked the re
bility of fightine; bet1,1een Frenchr1en. 11 9 6
95Kerillis, Verité, p.251.
96rbid., p.l73.
onsi-
CHAPTER V
SECRET lTEGOTIATIOHS
11
'/le can hardly e:::pect to receive binding
assurances in v.rri tins from them Hhich
would not be approved by the Germans,
and they have so far given us little
ground for confidence in any oral assurances they may give us. But there is no
other bas is on i-.rhich t..re can proceed •••
The only safeguard we have is that if
they go back on their understandings . .;e
can regard any arrangement we make with
them as void and withdraw any advantages
we have accorded them."l
Lord Halifax
Tbere was a peak of anti-French feeling in England during
the
autu~~
of 1940.
This was induced, at least in part, by a
German campaign aimed at creating mutual distrust.
of German propaganda is seen in articles dec1aring
The success
~rance
had
sudden1y becorne the enemy instead of the friend of Britain, the
friend instead of the enemy of Germany.2
The magnanimity of
the armistice terms offered ta France, although aimed at preventing the French government from leaving the country, increased
the British feeling of isolation.3
Hitler actually hoped to
1
Telegram from Lord I~alifax to Hoare, October 19, 1940,
cited in H.C.Cmd. 6662 of 1945, XXV, 17.
2 G.Glasgow, "Rupture Cordiale, u CONTEHPORARY HEVIE1,J,
CLVIII, August 1940, 213.
3E.Wiskemann, L 1 Axe Rome-Berlin, Fayot, Paris, 1950, pp.
235-236.
144
145
avert war with Britain.
He regarded the British Empire as a
s tabilizing influence and ~·Jas relue tant to des troy i t, 4 but
the British were not convinced of this.
The French became uneasy Hhen there Here persistent
rumeurs of an Anelo-German peace tFeaty.
Although French
policy was predicated on the fact that the war was lost and
th at the British would, therefore, also have to make an ar:aistice, they were concerned over who would pay for the Allied
defea t.
An unoccupied United IUngdom could make much !nore
advantageous terms and any hope of being recompensed for
colonial lasses with British territory would be gone.
:F'rench were clearly
11
•••
afraid a German-English understanding
would be too much at the expanse of :D'rance. n5
beginning of July
The
As early as the
:r·:. dt Ormesson, the French ambassador to the
Vatican reported tbat Cardinal Maglione, Pope Pius XII's
Secretary of State, bad informed bim that official contact
bad already been made between Britain and the Axis powers
with a view to negotiating an armistice.
received from London, and Hitler's s
Similar reports were
ech to the Reichstag on
July 19 calling upon the English to make peace, in no
~.:ray
4rnterview of von Ribbentrop with Ciano, cited in D.
Hue;geridge, Ciano's Diplomatie Papers, London, Odbams, 1948,
p.373 •
.5Letter of Prince Hax Hohenlohe to Hewel, 18 July, 1940,
Documents on German Foreign Policy, XI, p.24.5.
mollified French fears. 6
German efforts to conciliate the
British increased Hhen war with Russia seemed inevitable.
Accordingly Hitler told von Ribbentrop that if peace could
be negotiated Ger•many <-vould recognize the British Empire in
return for British recognition of Germany as the principal
continental European pov1er and the return of German colonies. 7
The French had no illusions about the effect of such an agreement on their interests.
Von Ribbentrop declared at the time
of the Hontoire negotiations, "The French side was quite clear
about the fact that if En[Sland sbould offer the Axis Pm-1ers
a compromise peaee France alone might have to bear the burden
of the los t lvar. uS
ca-:.1se of
tler's attitude the possibility of invasion
in 1940 was considerably less than most Britons realized, and
in fact the invasion plans never seem to have been pursued
seriously.
ossal bluff.
"In his mind
1
Sea Lion' was never more than a col-
Anything less ••• was ruled out by his anxiety to
end the war with Great Britain. 11
He felt that preparations for
invasion would have a serious effect on
itish morale. 9
6German Library of Information, 11 Facts in Review, 11 New
York, 1940, II, 32, pp.362-375, cited in Doc~~ents in German
Forei~n Policy, X, pp.250-251.
See also Charles-Roux, Oo.cit.,
pp.lS -184.
7Hinsley, Hitler 1 s Strategy, pp.79-81.
Oo.cit., pp.S0-86, oassim.
See also Hourin,
Bvon Ribbentrop, Telegram 1500, October 25, 1940, to the
German ambassador in Italy, Docw~ents in German Foreign Policy,
p.393.
9rrinsley, Hitler 1 s Strategy, pp.83-85.
Churchill was regarded as a major stQmbling block, but it was
hoped he could be forced to step down in favour of Ealifax; 10
however, on July 22 the latter mede a totally uncompromising
reply to Hitler's appeal, which Hewel declared '' ••• destroyed
our belief in a conciliation party over there." 11
Since the Americans refused to mediate the next approaches
-...;ere throue;h the lUne; of Sweden 12 on August 2, and later throue;h
13
Prince Hax Hohenlohe; both were su..'Tiffiarily rejected.
The terms
of these offers seem to have included the offer of French colonies as bait, 14 and a threat that if Britain refused her colonies
would be given to France as a reward, and she, instead of France,
le;
would be saddled with the cost of the war. "' Althou,::h General
10Prince Fiax Hohenlohe to Ee.,'lel, lB July 1940, "JocllJ.'TI.ents
in German Foreic:n Policv, X, p.2J!.7·
llHewel to Prince
Hohenlohe, 24 July, Ibid., p.287.
12According to Telee;ram 553 from the German Kinister in
Stockholm to the Foreie;n I,linis try, on 23 December 1940, a
British representative, r-1allet, approached a hie;h 3wedish
official with a request to arrange talks about the '' ••• possibility of a German-English settlement." See Hinsley, Hitler's
Strategy, p.931.
13rritler's reoeated efforts leave room for soeculation as
to 1-1hether Rudolf fiess 1 flit:;ht in 1'-lay 19L~l may not have had his
tacit consent.
14churchill must have felt the French were concerned about
this as he officially denied tbat Britain intended to take over
any French colonies. See Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.Sll.
15 11 Archives Secrètes de Comte Ciano," p.407, cited Ibid.,
p.92, Gibson, Oo.cit., p.281, and H.L.D. Girard, "~:ontoire;­
Verdun Diplomatique," pp.245 & 345, cited in Truchet, Oo.cit.,
pp.302-303.
','leygand regarded rumours of the above as a hoax and an Axis
effort to disrupt Anglo-French relations, the majority of
D
~rene
h men were no t so sangu1ne.
,
16
About the same time there were rumoars in Hoscow that
France would declare war on Britain, 1 7 and the British could
not have been very reassured by Laval 1 s efforts to negotiate
military collaboration Hith Abetz, the German ambasss.dor in
Paris.
Laval declared that France had been drs.gged into the
war by Britain and that the time had come for a reversal of
alliances.
The German controlled Parisian press supported
him and claimed that the declaration of war was the result of
British manipulation of French patriotism aimed at preventing
lq
any possibility of an understanding with Germany. u Pétain 1 s
rer.1arks la. te in October about freedom from tradi tional alliances Here natura1ly connected to Lavaltz efforts and cast doubts
19
on hovr sel"iously he took the negotiations t{ith Britain.
However the majori ty of Frenchmen t'lere indignant about this effort
to 11 • • • reverser notre poli tique exterieure, 1120 and supported
lb,:!eygand, Recalled to Service,
.358-359.
17charles-Roux, Op.cit., p.l20.
18Jacques de Lesdain, 11 3 septembre 1939- 3 septembre 1940, 11
ILLUSTRATION, CCVI~, September 7, 1940, 10.
19scbmitt, On.cit., p.J~l.
20Letter from Reynaud to Pétain, Nay 18, 1941, cited in
Armistice, pp.216- 7.
the
government' s r·efusr-ü to allm-1 the Germans use of North
African military and transport facilities. 21
Laval first approached Abetz through a Germanophile journalist, Fernand de Brinon, early in July 1940.
Abetz had a
French wife and was a well-known Francophile, but he never
forgot to put German interests first.
Since be was promoted
to ambassador because of his negotiations 'V'lith Laval he i-ras
c'!oubly anx.ious tha t they should succeed.
It is maintained
that bis goal was a relaxation of the armistice terms, and
that he never woulà have actually agreed to military co-operation, but in order to obtain concessions he had to make them. 22
Laval 1-ras singularly uncommunicative about his conversations
with Abetz, and it is difficult to judge whether this was to
prevent interference, whicl·! is the popular vie;...-, or because
little Has actually accomplisbed.
:Uoubts about Laval 1 s unHill-
ingness to join in the war seem well founded if we judge by his
offer of July 22 of wide, but undefined collaboration, 2 3 and
by Ciano's statement tc Mussolini in October, shortly after
Laval replaced Baudouin in the Foreign I1inis try, 2 1~ tha t Hitler
21J\l though the Prench docu.111ents of refusal have not been
found in the German archives - perhaps having never been delivered by Huntziger to General von Stulpnagel - the refusal
is implicit in French behaviour.
22 J. Nontigny, "De L'Armistice a l'Assemblee nationale,"
p.63, cited l"Iytier, Op.cit.,
.135 & 146.
•
23Baudouin, Op.cit., p.177 •
2Lmaudouin seems to have kept control of Angle-French
relations, so Laval faced the same difficulty as his predecessor,
Eytier, Oo.cit., p.70.
150
hoped to draw France into an anti-British coalition.25
Laval
evidently hoped to arrange a reshuffling of the Cabinet and to
provoke an actual war (not mere skirmishing), when England
resisted Vichy's recapturing of Gaullist colonies. 2 6
The
i tish were alarrn.ed by Laval' s growing influence and
on October 21 Churchill broadcast an appeal for closer understanding, and a warning that Hitler was trying to obliterate
France. 2 7
It was in view of growing Anglophobie, and in an
effort to prevent the French Fleet from falling into German
bands that Britain made repeated efforts in the autumn of 1940
to negotiate a mùdus vivendi with Vichy.28
Since the British
were desperately trying to play every possible angle these
negotiations took place during the Dakar operation and the
build-up and use of de Gaulle.
The British found the blockade was a very effective tool
in these negotiations, and since they wei'e prepared for any
bargain which would help the Har, they bargained economie concessions for increased resistance to Germany by Vichy.
The
blockade was decreed on July 30 but not announceà to the Cornmons by Churchill until August 20.
25,..u J.. o <>on,
1 "'
He then explained that the
0 p.c...~ t • , 9. 2°8
/ J.
26ninsley, Eitler 1 s Strategy, pp.401-402.
27churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.SlO.
•
28Letter from Churchill to the British Ambassador in Paris,
July 13, 1945, quoted in H.C.Gmd. 6662 of 19 ~,XXV, 3-4. The
very existence of the Tou on Fleet crea d a threat which resulted in the over extension of the British naval forces.
1.51
Axis would pillage food shipments to conquered lands, and in
any case, since it would relieve them of the responsibility of
feeding the population, food shipments would help the German
Hor effort.
He stressed that most of the conquered countries
were agricultural and therefore there should be no shortage of
food unless the German armies were using it. 2 9 Furthermore
foods could be converted into war material.
make explosives.
Potatoes
~ade
"Fats are used to
the alcohol for motor spirit.
The plastic materials ••• are made of milk.n30
It Has later
claimed that foodstuffs reaching France were indeed divided
11
very unequally 11 with 60-80% going to Germany and Italy, but
this \-ras flatly denied by AdJniral Auphan \vho was responsible
for French marchant shipping,3l and it is known that the Germans had agreed to uFrench control of exporta and importa on
2
the outer borders of France in the occupied area as well."3
29·.v. N. Me dl icott, The Economie Blockade, I, London,
1957, pp.551 & 666. This ignores the destruction
of farms in the fighting and the shortage of farm workers.
H.M.s.o.,
30Rougier, Op.cit., pp.330-331.
3lr"'iendlicott, O~.cit., pp.564 & .579 and Auphan, La Lutte
Pour la Vie, pp.27-2 & 36. It is obvious that Auphan could
not possibly know how the food was distributed after it reached
the urban areas. The German Army of Occupation was not being
fed from food supplies shipped frorn. Germany.
32nirector of the German Director of Econo!llic Policy to
the Chairman on Economie Questions at the Armistice Comr::ission,
Berlin, October 5, 1940, Docwnents on Ger~an Foreir,n Policy,
XI, p.264.
1.52
The blockade of France was not severe.
The official
figures for the port of Marseille for the third week of August
1940 show that 49 ships docked carrying 2.5,935 tons of food
and 7,560 passengers.33
It bas been suggested that, apart from
political considerations, the British lacked the naval strength
~1
to blockade France effectively,~~ and fearing that an effort at
more stringent regulation ".--tould draH the F'rench Fleet into conflict with the Royal Navy the British made '' ••• a virtue of
necessity 11 and allowed trade between North Africa and France.35
blockade of Germany was more efficient; her imports in 1939
fell by
50~~
seized.3 6
11
•••
and a million and a rtalf tons of contraband tvere
Obviously the British did not wish to force France
to choose between starvation and forcing the blockade 1..,rhich
necessarily would end in open hostilities with England.n37
Neither North Africa nor Metropolitan France are self-supporting and in a situation aggravated by the Germans, Pétain found
hiroself trapped between two antagonists and forced to play
11
• • • double
jeu. 11 3 8
33schmitt, Op.cit., p.37. See also :,Iendlicott, Oo.cit.,
p._561, which gives 172,000 tons of foodstuffs as the October
1940 total.
34'KemJorthy, Op. c 1 t., p. 22.
35Nedlicott, Oo.cit., pp.558 & 581.
36speech by Lord Halifax, Leeds, Jan:...tary 20, 1940, quoted
in Craster, Op.cit., p.355.
37Hytier, Oo.cit., p.SS.
38The French food situation was becoming desperate.
Medlicott, Oo.cit., p.566.
153
Although a useful tool the blockade naturally caused some
bad feeling.
Baudouin declared the blockade to be an " ••• acte
d'hostilité pire que le douloureux attenat de Hers-el-Kebir.n39
There were complaints that French merchant shipping was treateà
as enemy shipping, ever. though i t Has admi tted that Prance bad
treated Danisb shipping in a similar manner.4°
For the British,
fear of reducing Vichy's resistance to Germany, and a desire
to see the United States send supplies to Spain, further complicated the blockade problem.
"It 1...ras, therefore, British
policy to attract Spain into the allied sphere of interest by
enabling her to import, with reasonable limits, all the wheat
she needed.n4l
The Americans were encouraged to co-operate
and when Roosevelt made food shipmer.ts, cond1tional on Spain's
promise to stay out of the war, the British urged him to take
advantage of the situation.
Hoare felt that with the
rmans
at the Pyrenees the Spanish could not be expected to take a
pro-Allied stance and if they did not get food from the Allies
they i'J'Ould be fore ed into the Axis bloc.
advised 11 • • • don 1 t bogsle, but feed. 11 4 2
Churct.ill suce inc tl y
39speech of Baudouin, August 22, 1940, cited in R
00.cit.,
.71-72.
40Auphan, La Lutte Pour
Vie, p.29.
4lrredlicott, On.cit., pp.539
L~ 2 Ibid., pp.540-543.
&
.S45.
er,
154
The Spanish situatior. weighed
negotiations in the
aut~~
avily on Anglo-French
of 1940.
Hitler felt " ••• Spanish
adhesion ••• and her intervention in the war to be a factor of
fundamental in;port'-l:'l.ce. "L;3
interests of Vichy and
He therefore tried to juggle the
~adrid.
Serrano Suner hated •• ••• dis-
honest and dishonourable F'rance"; not only had the Frenc"!:l
lled his two brothers but like most Spaniards he
France as Spain 1 s eternal enemy.
re~arded
However he felt Spain need-
ed two or three years to prepare for war and his demands were
1rmnted IIorocco and Gibral tari+4 plus food and
su.bstantial.
agricultural supplies to combat famine.
Hoare confirms famine
in Spain and the political situation 'dbereby Suner was umlilling to ob tain necessary cornr:wdi ti es from Al lied areas.
This
situation persisted until Decernber 1940 when the neH Spanish
=Hnister of Comr:1erce and :Lndus try, Dimi trio Carceller, be came
convinced of British economie stability and was
negotiate .formal economie
In
willin~
to
e meantime Bri. tain,
not Hishins Spain to rely economically on G;::rmany, bad
r-
suaded America to ship food to Spain, despite the latter 1 s refusal to give any assurances that she would not join the
The Spanish vrere obviously pro-Axis from the be?;inni
~)Conversation bet•1een
January 19,
19)~0,
tler and J;J:ussolini, Berghal,
eitecl in l'Tuggerià , Oo.cit., p.419.
4l~Gibson, Oo.cit., p.94 and du Gard, Oo.cit., p.l0.5.
e also the record of von Ribbentrop and Suner 1 s conference,
Septem.ber 16, 191.{.0, Hinsley, Hitler 1 s Strate gy, pp. 8.5 & 89.
45Eoare, Op.cit., pp.37 & 96-99.
46Hull, Op.cit., pp.87.5-886, passi~.
,
155
but they waited to see how the war would progress. 1 ~7
To insure
Spanish interests Franco proclaimed Spanish neQtrality in
September 1939, but tHo days
ter I1usso1ini 1 s attack on France
ll<l
he
te red this to non-belligerency. '.-u
Al though this ma~,. bave
boen encouraging for the Axis, by August 8 3aron von Stohrer
reported to Berlin that unless Spain's demanda were met she
would not enter the war.
The main point of Franco-Spanish friction was Tangiers
Hhich, accorùing to the Convention of Paris of December 18,
1923, was nominally governed by the Sultan of Morocco with
an international territorial regime H'hich was in fact predominantly French.
On June 14, 1940, Tangiers was occü9ied by
Spain, ostensibly to prevent an Italian takeover and, as the
Comte de la 3au..rne was assureà, " ••• for the temporary purpose
of maintaininc; arder."
Any pretence of being an interim regime
vanished with the repudiation of international control on
November
4. 1~9
tler kept Nussolini out of Tangiers and French
Morocco so as not to antagonize Spain, but at the same time
refused to recognj_ze Franco' s conf1icting clait11s.
courased a Spani
also dls-
move against French colonies because he
hoped for further French co-operation.
It was because of this
4 7Throughout 1940 they turned refugees over to the GerTnans.
See X:arr. .merer, Ar:nistica, p.261.
48Hoare, Oo.cit.,
p.41.
156
dile:m.::1a that his meetine; Hith Franco on the
Frene~
border at
Hendaye on October 23 wes a failure;50 from this time on 3itler
tended to favour France and regard
anish demands as excess-
ive.5 1
Spanish demands increased steadily.
She now tvanted:
Gibraltar, French Morocco, a large section of Algeria, including Oran, the enlargement of Rio d'Oro, colonies on the gulf
of Guinea, plus substantiel economie aid in the form of wheat
and petroleum, as well as military assistance and 380 m:a. guns
to use against Gibraltar.5 2
Mussolini tried to persuade
Franco to reduce his demands, but the longer the Ivar continued
the less probability there seemed of a British defeat, and the
more cautious Franco
beca~e.
For a brief period in September von Ribbentrop claims
Hitler considered giving in to Spain in order to neutralize
de Gaulle's efforts, and it was at this tine that rwnours
about a tripartite agreement were rife.53
However, Franco
still 1vould not commit himself to a date upon
~'fhich
S:pain
would enter the war,54 and he only made a few minor con-
50rbid., pp.93-94.
pp.371-'!)"{b;
See also ~Iinsley, Hitler's Strategy,
51Admiral raeder, "Archives Confidentielles du Grandamiral RaedEœ, 11 FRANCE SOIR, November 19, 1947, ci ted in
Isorni and Lemaire, On.cit., pp.ll4-115. See also: Conversation of Tiitler and Mussolini, Brenner Pass, October 4, 1940,
cited in Muggeridge, On.cit., p.397, and Archives Secretes
de la ~ilhelmstrasse, pp~l-19.
52craster, On.cit., p.388.
5~1uggeridge, On.cit., pp.391-394, Gibson, Op.cit., p.304.
54conversation of Hitler and r;;ussolini, Florence, October
28, cited in Muggerid , On.cit., p.401.
157
cessions related to supplying German submarines.
The proto-
col signed by Hitler and Franco promised vague co-operation
and was purely a face-saving cesture.
Axis pressure on Franco indicated to him their anxiety
and he becrune increasingly reticent.
In December he informed
Admiral Canaris that the Spanish people would not allow Germen troops to pass through Spain to attack Gibraltar.
Admiral
Leahy feels this may have indicated a pro-Allied tendency,5 6
but accumulating Allied successes H·ere doubtless a very strong
argument.57
Both Britain and France were thus concerned about each
other 1 s policy.
The French were feeling pressure from the
blockade, but also fearful of German intervention if they
could not stop the spread of dissidence in their colonies.
The British, on the ether band, were disturbed by Vichy's cooperative attitude towards the Nazis and the possibility of
a reversal of alliances.
It was under these circmnstances
that a series of secret negotiations were begun aimed at
creating a satisfactory modus vivendi.
The Hoare-Baume,
Rougier and Dupuy-Chevalier negotiations therefore all overlap, not only chronologically, but in their very essence.
•
55rbid., p.417, and Hemorandum by Kramarz, Berlin, 31
OctoberlC)40, Hinsley, Hitler 1 s StrateÎy' p.445. Tankers
and destroyers were also involved. Te egram from Stohrer
to the Foreign I'-Tinistry, Hadrid, 5 December 19L~O, Ibid.,
pp.787-788 •
.56rbid., pp.417-~18 and :J.D.Leahy, I '..Jas There, p.l9.
57see Conversation of Franco and Mussolini, February 12,
1941, cited in :-Tuge;e dge, Op.cit., p.L12i.:..
The
Anglo-~rench
negotiations at Madrid were initiated
officially on Aucust 29 by Baudouin, without the knowledce
of Pétain.
Although irritated by the refusal of London to
allow Chartier to use code, and by the British blockade and
support of de Gaulle, which he regarded as sewing seeds of
discord between two countries which had long been united by
close bonds, Baudouin was anxious that " ••• un effort devrait
être tenté pour les
r~~ener
à une meilleure comprehension de
leurs positions respective. 11 58
Accordingly
advised London
that ?rance 1v-as willing to negotiate t·li th Sir Samuel lioare,
the British am'bassador in Iiadrid.
Churchill seems to have
been baffled by his failure to get French leaders to carry on
the war from Africa,59 and in view of Jritain's isolated
position and ùoubts about French policy he was
negotiate.
As a result
~..rillinc
to
the conversations between Sir
Sa:::nuel Hoare and the Comte de la Baume, although the British
refused to stop su?porting de Gaulle and giving naval protection to Gaullist colonies, they were willing to discuss
relaxation of the blockade in return for a French pledge not
to attack dissident colonies or British ships and po?ts, and
to prevent German infiltration of her E:::npire.
The British
t:g
and 186.
,., P .Baudouin, "Heur ;-lois au Gouvernement, n pp. 326, 221
59The fact that none went reflects a certain solidarity
of viet·T. De Gaulle N"as unknown before tbe war and only achieved his position through unremitted British support.
1
159
proposal endeà with the
that France would be restored to her rightful place in Europe. 60
assu~ance
Baudouin reacted favourable to the British offer but
Pétain was annoyed by the requ.est of a pledge not to attack
itish ships and ports when in fact only French ships and
ports bad been attacked.
British support of
He also took strong exception to
Gaulle.
Pétain was thus in favour of
a nee;ative reply Hhich Hould nonethe
of food ships through the blockade.
3riti
of~er
s demand free passage
Ynen the
arrived it proved to be even more
te:;:t of the
gid and
began by laying bla:r1e on France for firing on de Gaulle at
Dakar and for bambine; Gibraltar.
There Has nm-r no hope of
winnine; Pétain over, and Baudouin had to be satisfied wi
couching the French reply in the most diplomatie terms possible.61
The ne
tive tone of the French reply and its nre-
occupation with refutation rather limited the scope for Hoare
and de la Baume's negotiations.
De la Baume stressed that
France would not seize Gaullist colonies if Britain took no
fur
action against loyal colonies and permittec1 tbe re-
SQ~ption
France.
of trade be
en these colonies and.mstropolitsn
3ritish, however, were reluctant to
co-ope~ate
because they felt imported food would be used to provision
60 charles-Houx., Op.cit., p.3L~2.
6lsee Appendix XXII.
160
the occupied zone which the Germans would then strip to feed
their arnies.
British rnisgi vinc;s about
l'PeLe~'
in tegri ty and the pos-
sibility of a reversal cf alliances reached a peak with the
Franco-German 1-Iontoire meetings in Oc tober.
The
itish
anxiety is reflected in IIalifax 1 s warning to de Gaulle to
avoid provocation of Vichy and by George VI's personal message
to Pbtain which contrasta
er.rlier cor.1J."mnications.
~arkedly
with the tone of Churchill's
De la BauJne wa.c not kept inforraed on
the Franco-German talks and was thus not able to reassure
Hoare, further he seerns to have been affected by British fears
and conjectured that Laval reight sign a peace with Hitler and
h '~l
. t th
' . . ' t co_onles.
l
.
62
~rene
~
ee-t aga1ns
. e alSSlaen
use t 'ne ,_,
The
British therefore demanded that France undertake not tc become
involved in hostile operations,63 and felt their fears were
justified when Laval,
{~v-ho
had repl::1ced Baudouin in the I'oreit:n
:'Tinis tr~~>) had de la Dawne transferred to Berne. bL~
62 Telegran:
are to IIali.fP:::., l'Jovember
H.C.Cmd. 6662 of 1945, XXV, 20.
4, 19~0,
Noth
of
ci ted in
63Ibid., 23.
64obviously the Free French were kept in ignorance of the
IIoare-BaLL'Tie negotiations as they attributed de ln Jau:r:e' s re~oval to the anti-German attitude of M. Coulondre, the French
ambas sador• to Swi tzerland. See "H. Pie tri devient A:nbassadeur
•· ".,.,"''··c--·
'1 tb
1
a T.•
~- . . a d rlu,
l'h~;.r.' .t, 1
t.,c
o er 7 , 19LC
~,p ••
161
significance was concluded at the Hitler-Pêtain meeting at
Xontoire on October 24.
However, Pétain 1 s verbal acceptance
of the principle of "collaboration, 11 and the German assurance
that after the war the French Empire would be '' ••• essentially
equivalent to
~vbat
she possessed at the manent," resulted in
London being long in doubt as to exactly Hhat concessions
6
France had made. 5 Hoare was therefore ordered to advise the
French chargé d'affaira that there would be no further attacks
on French colonies if France could satisfy Britain that she
could defend these territorles, and promlsed not to attack
those helà by àe Gaulle, to Hhom Britain had contracted obligati ons 1-1hen the
Vic~1y
Government had be en unable to defend i ts
Empire.
On the French side doubts about
arrange a modus vivendi
~vere
itish willingness to
based on the continued support of
de Gaulle and of his attack on Dakar.
In September Hoare had
assured de la Bau.."Ue that Britain appreciated the French positlon and
11
does not wi
to take any s tep l-thich migh t er:1broil
the tHo coun tries. n 66 The Frencb who :vere fear::'ul th at even
•••
Gaullist propaganda might result in German, Italia:r: and Spanish
intervention Here later to discover that 1vhile they
65churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.525.
•
66Langer, Op.cit., p.238 •
~1ere
being
162
reassured the British and Gaullists Here plannine; an attack
on Dakar.
The
nch anger is seen in the message Darlan
sent to the :Sritisl:J naval attaché in Hadrid ·announcing that
French merchant ships would hereafter be escorted and that
Vichy planned to retake the dissident colonies.
Although
this comraunication t'las later retracted by the Vichy Government
it illustrates not only French anger but a certain duality of
thought Hithin their government.
obvious on the 3ritish side.
This duality is even rnore
Hoare himself declared that he
was:
n ••• baffled
as to what London wants. Do
we wish to keeu Pétain or do we with to
destroy him and his government?"67
It is probable that only the failure of the Dakar attack, and
the Vichy Government's hope that de Gaulle Hould noH be discredited, prevented the operation from having even more serious
effects on the negotiations.
'Jhen fighting broke out in Gabon in Oc tober between de
Ga~lle's
forces and Vichy supporters the French denied German
infiltration and claimed this Has an e:::cuse for an unprovoked
attack by de Gaulle.
They also denied that the Hontoire con-
versations bad in any way modified their liberty.
The
tish
1:.rere not fully convinced but Hoare was ordered to continue the
•
67Letter from Hoare to Beaverbrook, October
cited in Hoare, Oo.cit., p.87 •
7, 1940,
163
negotiations.
68
By this
ti~e
the French fear of German inter-
vention in their c onies, if they could not stop Gaullist
attacks, 6 9 seems to have co~ili1Unicated itself to the British,
Hho began demandine reassurance that the
1
Jean Bart' and 'Ric:1e-
lieu' would not be moved from Casablanca to Toulon, but would
be kept in readiness to protect the Empire.
Pétain tterefore
declared:
lt
Aga in I reitera te ••• the se ships Hill be
used to defend the territories of France.
Gnless we are attacked by the British,
they will never be used against England.n70
Taken as a whole the Hoar'e-de la Bau..'Ue negotiations have
to be regarded as abortive.
Despite Baudouin's thanks to Hoare
for arra.neine; for the relaxation of the blockade, 7l Aci.'Tiiral
Auphan who was responsible for French merchant shipping describes the talks as unsuccessful. 7 2
There 1-1as no agreement
between France and England, and to regard these talks as a confirmation of the Rougier Protocol, as ·,Jeygand did, 73 seems farfetched indeed.
68Telegrams from Hoare to Halifax, November 10 and 11, 19L~O,
and from Halifax to Hoare, November 12, 1940, cited Ibid.,pp.22-25.
69Baudouin, Oo.cit., pp.228 & 198.
70churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.517. The British obviously realized that the addition of these two units to the Toulon
Fleet would make German seizure rauch more likely.
7 1Baudouin, Op.cit., p.243.
•
72Auphan, La Lutte Pour La Vie, p.36 •
73-,-;eyganà, !•1emoirs, p.605.
161.~
The most controversial Angle-French negotiations of this
period were those
tween Rougier and London.
Professer
Louis Rougier was generally regarded as totally lacking in the
quali ti es required by a diplœna t undertaking a diffucul t
ter-
national mission, but it should not be forgotten tbat he had
in fact been previously used on a mission in 1932 (this mission
\vas however economie in sc ope).
He did not have the confidence
of Pétain who said, "On le considère ici cortJ..'1le un agent anglais,n74 nor of Churchill who hardly mentions him and remarks
that he saw Rougier " ••• not because I or my colleagues had any
respect for
Vichy.75
l~arshal
Pétain" but to keep channels open to
Peeling that he lacked sufficient stature as an emis-
sary to secret negotiations the British seem to have used
Rougier mainly as a source of information.
little doubt that Rougier 1 s
ssion
trtB.s
say supported by the '/ichy government. 7 6
There can, however,
official, that is to
Rougier carrieà a
note on Pbtain's official stationery:
74Letter of Pétain to :'Jeygand, 9 November 194.0, cited in
Schmitt, Oo.cit., p.üo.
75churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.509. Rougier certainly
did not behave like a professional diplomat. He gave an account
of
mission to the U .s. Government through ':J"al ter Lippman,
(much to the annoyance of the British). See Rougier, Oo.cit.,
pp.213 & 215.
•
76Letter from Admiral Pernet, November lL+, 1940, requesting
an account of Rougi er 1 s expanses. Ibid., p .LJ.l9, photostat VII.
Also
tter of ?ranch Consul Generarin Algiers, November 2,
1940, inntructing officials to co-operate with Rougier, Ibid.,
p.1J.l3, photostat VI.
--
165
Recomrr:;.ende
Nonsieur le Professeu.r Hougier à la
bienveillante attention des nos représentants diplomatique et consulaire.
11
Ph.Pétain
20-7-1940. Il 77
This vague note has two interesting aspects.
There were no
diplomatie and consular officials in Britain at the time, and
although Rougier claims he got this note on September 20 it is
dated July 2o,7 8 which is a peculiar sort of error even for
Pétain to have made, and one upon which Rougier makes no comment.
Rougier 1 s official status, Vichy's abject in assisting him,
and the intended scope of the negotiations he was to carry out
are not clear.
3ougier afu.1its that he was under the illusion
at the time that de Gaulle and Pétain 1·1ere co-operat
behind
a façade of quarrels, and he evidently felt that having one
government to preserve the ho:-;leland and another to protee t the
L:;mpire was a good thing.
arrived in Vichy, but
was rapidly disillusioned vJhen
continued ta support both men; he
represented Pétain, and later encouraged young men to join de
Gaulle.7 9
As saon as he arrived in London Rougier told Churchill
about the divisions in the French government between the neutralists, the belligerant resistance group and the collaboration-
77rbid., p.413, photost
•
II.
75rbid., p.ll3 •
70rbid., pp.lOl-102, 105, 165 & 357.
•
166
ists.
He strongly recow.raended that de Gaulle should be made
to respect the clause of the Anglo-Gaullist Agreement which
forbade the use of
I~ree
French forces agains t France, as he
felt this would wreck any chance of Anglo-Frencb co-operation.
80
Rougier claims that the basis of the trouble betHeen Vichy
and London t·ras the " ••• nalentendu sur 1 1 armistice 11 i·Thich centred
Ql
on the naval clauses.~
Although he maintains he was sent to
ssipate these misunderstandings the docur1ents and letters he
received were about economie negotiations.
Rougier broadened the vistas of his mission.
It seems as if g.
Had his miss•on
had greater significance surely Baudouin would have told him
about the Hoare - de la Baume negotiations, about which he Has
obviously in total ignorance.
Rougier
te~egra9hed
a colleague, Professer Lionel Rabbins
of the London School of Economies, tha t the blockade tvas a
psychological error because it would result in Brit
of Germany, being blamed for s tarva ti on in .France.
, ins
ad
r,Jhen he 1-vas
invited to London, M. Coulondre arranged for him to see Baudouin
to discuss, not any diplomatie misunderstEmdings, but a much
G?
more practical problem: the relaxation of the blockade. -
80rtid., pp.llB-119, & 1)2.
Dlrbià.,
pp.J7-3S.
3 2He '\.·ras gi ven a le tt er s igned Belmont, from the Com:r.1erc ial
•
?:elations section of the Foreign {:inistry on October 10, 1040,
tvhich
clareà that 2,)3), 000 tons of fuel oil p.a. 1·Tas an indispens ible !Ünimum. Ibid., p .lOG.
l~''7
-Ol
Rougier was granted an interview with Pêt8in at which he
he was told that,
altho~gh
accordingly.
fo~aed
Rousier
11as
Pétain despised Laval he needed him,
later anil t
but would set rid of
clai~s
3ritish were to be in-
Conveniently after the
~ontoire
talks
able to reassure Churchill, and he claims only his
presence :Ln London
ented
stilities!u"3
Certainly the :rontoire talks must t:.ave made I\ougier 1 s
position in London very d
icult.
T~e
i tish lmc:·r :rit
was strlving for a reversal of alliances but the vague reports
,0.4
they received and the alm.,:-üst Reuters communique'"'
resulted
in Churchill 1 s furlou. s threat to denounce Pétain as a traiter
and bomb Vichy. 8 5 Rougier tried to calm Churchill and told
him not to be duped by Goebbels t propagande, but just hmv his
presence should have, as Pétain claimed, made the meaning of
;-Iontoire clear to the 3riti , is inexplicable. 86
The Rougier Protocol itself is a very dubious document. 87
Rougier was asked to prepare a protocol showing the British
and Prench viet-Jpoi.nts -vrhich Churchill i:.rould then carree t
admits that
n ••• ce
protocole servirait de base à un
~
tle-
man'3 agreement provisoire, en attendant un modus vivendi
3 3Ibid., pp.ll2-113, 153-15L~ & 38.
S4see A;.Jpendi.x. X.:X.:III.
(;,-'
0
~Rougier,
Op.cit., pp.l26-127.
86Isorni and Lemaire, Oo.cit., p.99.
87s e..., Rppen
n
d1_x
t:>
'Y'[T'1/
A"d
•
he
168
definitif, 1188 yet this document is later given the stature of
an international treaty.
T~ere
are also considerable differ-
encas between the French and English versions.
The British
version omits the paragraphs dealing with the raising of the
blockade, the cessation of B.B.C. attacks on Pétain,J9 and
a later
the entrance of the French colonies into the war
date,90 and includes a section, not found ln Rougier's version,
which proclaims the right of 3ritain to support the French
colonies which have rallied to de Gaulle.
The
tish con-
tention that Rougier' s version may be an early draft ,.vhich
was never endorsed seems quite feasible.
91
The whole crux of the controversy over this
docQ~ent,
ever, lies in the identification of the reci9ient.
how-
The photo-
stat of the first page shows the recipient's name was blocked
out.9 2 Rougier explains he did this when returning to Vichy
to protect Pétain.
The British claim the note was headed
"Entretien avec v!eygand 11 and that the first page otherHise
corresponds with a duplicata in the Foreign Office archives. 9 3
88nougier, Op.cit., p.lJO.
89Elowever, the Gaullists were ordered to cease radio
attacks on Pétain. See de Gaulle, Memoirs, I, p.J08.
90Rougier had not been authorized to negotiate an agree;:nent pledging the Empire to return to the war.
9lu
~l. C Cmd • 6662 of 1942, XXV, 6-7.
•
•
92nougier, Op.cit., p.J39.
93~r.G.Cmd. 6662 of 19l}5, XX:V, 6-7.
169
The blocked out area only covers enough space for seven letters
so Hhile i t could not be 'Churchill t i t could be 'Premier, '
but in such a document 'le Premier' Hould be more usual.
Pur-
thermore in sorne copies a 'Y' seems visible which supports the
idea that this docmnent was not an agreement wi th Pétain but
a call to ~eygand to join the dissid
s. 9ll In view of British
po licy at the t ime, and her preoccupation
t-li th
the French Emp-
ire such an appeal seems very probable.
Rougier got his SHiss visa through
~veygand 1 s
intervention
and as a result was able to contact Robbins before any Vichy
q:)
officials knevl about his plans.'
He also carried a message
from Weygand to warn London that after
~ers-el-Kebir
the
French had experienced difficulty keeping the Germans out of
North Africa, which was not only essential to the Briti
as
a springboard to Europe, but as a defence for Egypt and the
1'7"ear ?:astern oil su:pplies. 9 6 Churchill had been trying to get
Weygand to lead a rising in North Africa for some tine, and
if he regarded Rougier as a courrier from ':Jeygand this may
e::::plain the immediate invitation to vjsit London.
94schmitt, Op.cit., pp.57-58.
95Rougier, Op.cit., p.lo6.
96Ibid., p.lll.
170
Ueygand 1 s attitude towards Rougier was also rather odd.
Rougier returned to Vichy via North Africa to see Weygand and
tell him tha t the Foreign Office I-ras anxious to me et 1-ri th his
representatives. Weygand refused to have any contact with the
tish, 9 7 and actually denied that he saw Rougier or the Protocol in North Africa,98 yet he speaks of an interview with
Rougier in his Hemoirs.
Although he admits he regarded Church-
ill's offers of help as a bluff because he knew Britain bad no
supplies to spare, and he was annoyed by Churchill's suggestion
of "rebellion" to an old soldier, Weygand firmly maintained his
ignorance of the Rougier nego
ations, and claimed he only
learned of them after Rougier published his book. 99
There are, however, two incidental but persuasive pieces
evidence to
contrary.
Halifax promising Hoare
n •••
The first is a telegram from
an account of the line which H.
Rougier told us he proposes to take wi th General .ieygand. nlOO
1
It could be argued that Rougier's intervie1rr with vieygand 1rras
incidental to his mission, but when explaining his missioYJ. to
an American journalist Rougier said he had been urged to go to
London by H.
st Mercier, Chief of the
ctricity Trust in
971:leygand, Recalled to Service, pp. 3.57-358 & 360.
98schmi tt, On. ci t., pp. 68, and
Vol. VI, p.l62), Ibid., p.64.
11
Cormnission d'Enquete,"
99Pétain 1 s Trial, J.O., July 31, 194.5, p.l4.5, cited Ibid.,
p.l3.
lOOTelegrarn Halifax to Hoare, November 1, 1940, cited in
H.C.Cmd. 6662 of 194.5, LXV, 19.
171
the hopes of improving Angle-French relations and of persuad101
ine; ~:reygand to ri se •
Hm-rever U..."ltil the British archives are
open
is problem cannat be resolved with any degree of certain-
ty.
Even Rougier complains about the degree of secrecy which
surrounded his talks in London.
He says that secrecy from the
Gaullists was a sine qua non v-rith the British, 102 and that this
condition restricted him and prevented a more binding agreement.
It is not surprising that Baudouin felt it necessary to keep
negotiations H·ith London a secret from Laval, but Charles-Roux' s
claim tha t he kne1tl nothinz of the Roue;ier miss ion un til four
years later is interesting. 10 3 It infers that either Baudouin
did not Hish his aide to knm,;, although he had every reason to
trust him and his pro-British sympathies Here Hell 1-:noHn, or
Rougi er 1 s miss ion
f
"t-l as
cons idered to be outs ide Charles-Roux' s
ld of interest, that is a purely
diplomatie mission.
econo~ic
and in no way
Other than Baudouin and Pétain the only
Vichy official \·rho seems to have se en the Rougi er Protocol 1.-ras
Admiral Flandin, and his notes indicate that Pétain told him
he regarded the document as a. firm com."Ylitment.
101Trial of I-1arshal Pétain, J. 0., July
cited in Sch~itt, Ou.cit., p.42.
102
T:"le suge;estion
' 1945, p.l06,
~1hether the British were trying to negotiate a rising
in North Africa to be led by ·.'leygand, or a modus vivendi t-li th
Vichy they would not have wanted de Ga~lle to know about it.
103charles-RoQ~, OD.cit., p.356.
172
that even Pétain only becarne familiar with the Protocol at
Flandin's trial and therefore could not remember details seems
far-fetched; 104 for although, at his trial, Pétain admitted he
could not remember if the treaty Has actually signed, it lvas
~orell-knotv-n,
and even he agreed that he had u ••• des trous de
mémoire et ses idées ne se suiver1t pas." 105 Furthermore Pétain
insisted that, 11
"Il est exact que ~~
fait négocier un traité
devant demeurer secrè t avec :1. ',J. Churchill.
Ce traité dont la négo~iation a cowaencé le
même jour que r·Iontoire - ce rapprochement
donne a i'Iontoire son véritable caractère - a
inspiré ma politique, même +orsque les Anglais
semblaient s'en écarter.nlOo
concluded by remarking that he refused to reveal det
the negotiations
ls
cause of the 3ritish insistance on secrecy,
and this is the tvay gentlemen behave 1
Tl1ere can be no doubt
that Pétain had a copy of the Protocol, his peculiar behaviour
is surely attributable to senility.
Baudouin maintains that Pbtain 1 s acceptance of " ••• ce que
vient de rapporter
• Rougier" was without reservation and that
l04sch:ni tt, Op. ci t., pp. 7 & 10. See also P .:D'ladin, "Le
Procès Flandin,n p.l73, cited in Isorni and Lemaire, Cp.cit.,
p.l07, and Flandin's testimony at Pétain 1 s trial, August 7,
1945, cited in ':lhitcomb, Occupation, II, pp.933-934,
DocLUIWnt 274.
105J. Isorni, "Souffrances et Bort du IIaréchal, 11
cited in Schrdtt, Op.cit • ., l).lf3.
p.44,
1061. Noguères, President of the court at Pétain's trial,
Verbal process, June 0, 19L~5, 11 Le Veritable Froc ès du Haréchal
?étain," p.370, cited Ibid., pp.7-8.
173
he im.'Tiediately aslœd
Ga"l12, Ocboa, the ?ortugese anbassador,
to convey his acceptance to London. 10 7 British ratification
J:I.
is more difficult to confirm.
Rougier claims that Sir Alex-
ander Cadozan promised to notify hlm of ratifica.tion through
the British Consul General in Geneva, 10 8 and he produces a
photostat of the said telecram which confirrns the French agreement not to attack Britain or allmv the Empire to fall into
allen bands, and promises not to attack the colonies loyal to
Vic~y
as long as these do not become Axis bases, but refuses
to suspend support of the Gaullist colonies.
"The conditions outlined above would constitute a provisional arrangement in case
situation might be changed Hhile means are
sought of reachinz a :nodus vivendi."
The telegram concludes Hi th an of' fer to send a British economic expert to negoti
:Nadrid. 10 9
e with a representat
from Vichy in
The British acknowledge this tele gram but declare
that its aim was:
10 7,:(l~au d ou1.n,
·
n.'n.c it ., Pr'•u
,.., "7 -v~J.
QQ
On.cit., p.275.
See also
Sch~litt,
108nougier, On.clt., pp.l37-138.
l09rbid., pp.420-421, p~otostat VIII. See also z.c.C~d.
6662 of TII'i3', JCKV, 20.
the telef::::>2:n, as ir:. the
i tlsh
version nf the Protocol,
ere is no mentio~ o~ the blockade,
3.3.C. or t~e length of the ~ar •
•
" ••• to comply \'1"itl1 :1. Rour;ier 1 s request that
he shou1d be informed of the outcome of the
negotiations at ~adrid ••• this telegram contains, ho1rJ'ever, notlling more than a su!llillary
of the ~adrid negotiations ••• (and) had no
connection Hith ::. Rougier's conversation in
London 2nd bears no relation to the "Gentleman's Ar;reer:1ent 11 H"hich accorcHng to :L Rougier
H"as conc1uded through his intermediary."110
It becomes apparent that to London Rougier's mission was
merely an exchange of ideas wllereas to sorne Vichy officials
it had much greater sizni:ficance.
Battdo11.in fe1t that the
"Rougier memoJ•andu..vn puts the finishing touches on what I -v.ras
trying to bui1d up by \'lay of Hadrid. " 111
Pétain, held
Rougier in considerab1y 1ess esteem and deliberately kept him
wai ting rrJ'hen he returned from London. 112 Rougi er, meamv-hile,
credits his negotiation Hi th preventing further attacks on the
French Fleet and laying the foundation for the Madrid talks. 11 3
By the time Rougier bad finished his London talks the French
Fleet 1N"as already impotent and al thou[;h Churchill admi tted in
the Gommons on April 9, 191-J-1, that the economie negotiations
1vere a re sul t of Pétain' s promise never t o a ttack :Sri tain., he
in no way connected this with Rougier.
110 rbid., po.?-8. Since the negotiations are so similar
in scope either interpretation is feasible.
lllBaudouin, Oo.cit., p.274.
ll2schmitt, On.cit., p.So.
•
ll3nougier, Op.cit., pp.l68-169 •
175
After his return to Vichy Rougier continued to communicate
~-:ith
the
i t ish.
assurances from
icate to you." 114
In particular he sent London
Pétain \·.rhich
11
•••
tllrec
asked me to cor.1rrrun-
These assurances are that there would
no separate Franco-German peace, that the Fleet and Empire
would remain French and that Gaullist c
onies would not be
attacked if the British and de Gaulle refrained from attac
North Africa, French
~r!est
Africa and :'Torocco.
Just why Rougier
felt it necessary to send such a communication, if he regarded
his "Gentleman's Agreement" as binding, is not c1ear.
·:!hile
in Lisbon )(on his way to a teaching post in the I'·IeH
School of Soci
search) Rougier wrote four letters to Lon-
don recapitulating the Protocol and suggesting a secret agreement t-rhich included a propos al for the ris ing of the French
Empire accord
to a plan Hhich 1-vould guarantee thern
ar~ns.
In view of the attitude of Weygand and other French milit
leaders this proposal seems pure Rougier.
however, that a
tish attack on
in further German pressure and that
meet four
arms.
He did exp1ain,
colonies would result
~eygand
therefore would
tish divisions with force but twenty with open
repeated Pétain 1 s promise to get rid of Laval and
underlined the part p1ayed by France so far in striving for
•
1
114H.C.Cmd.
662 of
1945,
XX.V, 28-29 •
176
an Allied victory, resisting
enouc;h for the 13 .~-~ .F. to
evacuate, in accepting two zones to prevent the loss of the
, 1_5
fleet, and in refusins North African bases to the Germans.L-
Once ac;ain these letters cast doubt on whether Roueier himself
regarded hls agreement as binding.
The
tish have consistently refused to acknowledge
Rougier's Protocol as anytbing more than the basis of further
. t•1on. 116 In 1942 Rougier asked the Foreign Office to
nego t la
reveal the negotiations to reduce American antagonism tm·mrds
117
Vichy.
The Foreign Office sent a flat refusal to reveal
llR
the discussion.
The post-war French courts do not seem to
J
have ace
ted Rougier's idea of the significance of his nego-
tiations either.
He sent documents to de Gaulle in 1945 in an
effort to protect Pétain, but both the doc1.:1.ments and a long
119
covering
tter 1t1ere ienored.
Sirni1ar1y he offered bis
Accords to the T1inistry of Justice in defence of Flandin and
120
Dentz
and they were ineffectua1. It cannet be denied that
115Rougier, Op. ci t.., pp. 32t-5- 348, Documents, XIII-XVI.
116"No agreement was in fact ever concluded with Vichy,"
Churchill, House of Cow...mons, June 12, 1945, cited H.C.Cmd.
6662 of 191+5, Xt'\.V, 5.
117Letter from Rougier to Halifax, December 11, 1942,
Ibid., p.220.
•
118Letter from ~Ialifax to Rougier, December 29, 19)~2,
Ibid., p.431, photostat XVII.
119Ibid., pp.283 & 293 •
120Ibid., pp.J99-400, Docu.'llent
xxx.
177
:nuch o.f the cri tic ism of Rot.te;ier' s Protocol is justifiable.
He only photostated the first page Hhile the most controversi
sections were in later sections, and Britain's willingness to
ratify an agreement with " ••• ses alliés eventuels," is doubtful to day the least.
The Rougier negotiations cannat be isolated from the simultaneous Montoire talks, and apart from Pétain's claim that
Rougier 1 s agreement should have made Hontoire 1 s significance
clear, it is obvious that to both the English and the French
the meetings of !Ii tler Hi th Laval and Pétain had much more
:pr•ofound implications for
•
meeting with Churchill.
possibility of a revcrsal
An;::;lo-Frenc~:
The
relations than Rougier 1 s
itish were
~~easy
about the
alliances and Pétain 1 s speech of
October 11 suggesting France liberate herself from old alliances
vras
so full of vague and disturbing statements that even the
A.r1ericans 1.-ranted to knoH just Hhat relations would be repudiated.121
The British seem to have felt that this speech was even
more significant after they heard of the Hontoire meetings.
Laval hated the British.
121charles-Roax, On.cit., pp.358-359 •
•
178
"France bas never had and never will have a
itain. All
more bitter enemy than Great
our history proves it. We have bee~ but a
plaything in British bands and have been
used to assure ber own protection. Today
we are at the bottom of the abyss to which
Britain has led us."l22
;,'[ben Hitler promised to safeguard French
terests and com-
pensate ber for loss of colonies with British territories
declared, "As a Frenchman, I can only say that I
sire with
all my heart a British defeat. 1112 3 Although Laval was anxious
that France become an integral part of Hitler 1 s 1 New Europe'
and held secret talks Hith Abetz, 124 it should be remembered
that it Has Pétain "v-ho requested a meeting '.·J'ith Hitler through
•
the French air-ace Colonel Fonck, a friand of Goering •
tler was willing to hold such a meeting as he Has doub
ful about crossing the Channel.
hoped to
t S}!ain' s per-
mission to cross to North Africa via Gibraltar and French
approval of the passage of the Wehrmacht through North Africa
to Suez.
He wanted,
all cos
, to avoid the lvhole French
ire going over to de Gaulle, and with it the French
If France defended her own colonies,
et.
tler hoped hostilities
122Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.86. Even before his meetings
Hi th Abetz
H·as violently Anglophobe. He encouraged Darlan
to at tack the
tish after lier·s-el-Kebir. Ibid., P. 80.
-
~
123Ibid., P.215.
--
•
~
12~~"H. Laval a-t-il Suggere 1 r Occupation Totale de la
France ? 11
, Septernbex• 4, 19!.!~0, 1, and
Quoi Donc Laval
Parla-t-il a Abetz?n Ibid., SepternbeP 3, 1940, l~ •
179
could be provoked with the British.
12
5
It would have been at
this point that the Germans would have been interested in Dakar
as a base from which to attack British shipping Hhich would
nm-r be forced t o go a round the Cape.
In view of Laval 1 s well-established relations with Abetz,
and doubtless
th a view to preparing himself for Pétain,
Hitler held his first meeting at Montoire with Laval on October
22.
This meetinc was very successful as Laval declared that
a majority of Frenchmen were in favour of oollaboration.126
The meeting of Laval and
~Ii
er is insignificant lrlhen oompared
with the October 24 meeting of Pétain and Tiitler.
In the
interval bebveen these hw meetings Hitler bad held unsuccessful talks wi th Fra-::1co at Hendaye • 12 7 Th~1s 1-rhen Hitler declared,
"Je suis sûr de gagner la guerre; aidez-moi a l'écourter,"l23
and suggested that France snould not only defend her empire but
125Laval told Abetz about the Hoare - de la Baume negotiations and urged an attack on British colonies to provoke hostilit s. See Telegram 977, Abetz to the Foreign Ministry,
October 26, 1940, and Telegram 1349, Foreign Ministry to Abetz,
Hovember 30, 1940, !iinsley, Eitler 1 s Strategy, pp.401-402 (,; 588.
126In Laval's mind collaboration was not only political
and economie but military and
had made commitments in August
to F'ield :Iarshal von Braucl'li tscll tha t France would su1:;port tl:e
Gerr.um VJar effort. Baudouin, Op.cit., p.261. See also Ilinsl ,
Eitler's Strategy, pp.354-361 for an official ~Iemor•andu.'TI of
the German Foreign :Iinistr:r describing Laval T s Anglophobie.
12 étain bad beard of the German plans for an attack on
Gibraltar ancl ~-J'arne cl Franco through
Japanesc am.bassador in
Vichy,
• Sawada, and had been reassured that German demanda
would not be met, so he would have been able to surmise the
result of the Franco-Hitler :n.eeting. See Aron, 11 The Vichy
Regime," p.21J.
128charles-Roux, On.cit., p.375.
180
try to reconquer dissident colonies, Pétain was evasive and
pressed his
ot·m
ai!:lls, declarine; that
11
v;ras :i.n
•••
no position
at this time to define the exact limits of French co-operation
faveur of collaboration
al thouglJ
no binding
ement was possible without the agreement
Frencb Gcvernrn.ent. In vieH of his dictatorial pmvers this l'las
. .
a rather unconvlnclns
statement. 12°/
Pétain bad ve
Hanted from
1.
2.
tler.
definite i
as about the concessions
These were:
The release of a million prisoners.
duction of occu9ation costs (then $9,200,000 daily).
3.
Relocation of the demarcation line north
1~.
Assistance to French industry.
lease
Actually he met wi
sorne ports, e.c., Bordeaux.
lit
prisoners' condition was sl
~:ontoire
nore success than
tly improved, but
affected their morele.
The demarcation 1ine and
occupation costs t·Jere uncbanged and,
tests, tl1e
1ater. 1 3°
Oct
None
the Loire.
itc Abetz 1 s
iOtlS
Lorrainers tecan a few deys
ss Pétain's motivation
se
a
rr~eetinc
129Hemor,andu.'n, Official of the German Fore
Hinis try,
r 7, 1940, cited in Einsley, Hitler''s Strate&, p.389.
130 11 BetHeen the Lines,u
, XXVI, Uovember 11, 1940,
32 and O.Abetz, ttHistoire d 1 une P itique," p.177, citec1 in
ier, OD.cit., p.182.
lÜl
l·!i th Hitler Nns almos t certainly an effort to improve the lot
of France and not a move towards a reversal of alliances.
ex.plained
~-Ion toi re
a
fe~·!
da ys la ter to an old friend, General
La'J.re:
"'.-!ben one is at
head of a country
occupied by the enel11y, one must have
conversations with him in order to try
to attenuate his harshness, and to
a"t-raken in hirn,
possible, unc1erstanding if not generosity. That is what
tho se l·il:o have e;ot ten the 1rrors t of
military encounters have always done,
amonB others the Prussians af!er
and the Russians at Tilsit."lJl
Pétain declares that
made no actuel engagements
.
i·Iontoire 1 32 "and never even ..-"ulSCUssea'
litary co-
The S1t1iss ambassador in Vichy was also convincec1 cf
ration;t133
P~tain
1
s
hatred of the Ger:nans and fel t he Has determined never to er: ter
into any true form of collabora ti on 1-.ri th them.l3LJ.
band
~:t
German document c
On the other
tured in 19!!-.5 by the Americans de-
clared:
131J. Lauer, "Pétain," p.?5, cited in Hytier, Op.cit.,
p.l63.
132rnterview with Pétain, cited in H.
thète, Les Tem s
s Illusions: Souvenirs
1942, Geneva, Les Editions du Cheval Ailé,
133Telegram from Hatthet·rs, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Vichy
to the State Department, Hovember 16, 1940, cited in Langer,
Op.cit., p.lOl.
134Letter of ~Ir. 'J. Stuki, SHiss ambassador to Vichy to
::. Payen, President of the Court at ?éteints tri , cited in
Isorni and Lemaire, On.cit., pp.l76-177.
182
"The
s Powers and France have an
identical interest in seeing the defeat
of England accomplished as saon as possible. Consequently, the French Government ,,Till support, Hithin the limits of
its ability, the measures
ich the Axis
PoHers mas t
to this end. 11 135
Rumeurs of this type of vague general agreement, combined Hith
German radio propaganda Hhich announced th at li'rance, led by
Pbtain, had decided to co-operate with Germany and " ••• the
basis for Franco-German collaboration is established,nl36 led
to
2t anxiety both arnong F'renchmen and in ::;nelanél.
;,r..r'len,
on October 30, Pétain made a speech explaining that in arder
to protect French interests and maintain national unity
working
~-Ji thin
was
" ••• the nmv European Order - that I am today
pursuing a path of collaborationn and that France must
soil and reduce the nu."!lber of disside
fend
s, he closed 1-fi th
the prophetie words:
"This policy is :r.ine. It is I 1
alone Hhom bistor·y ~<Till judge." 37
Hany French patriots did not wait for history's judgment, they
felt Pétain could no longer be trusted and turned to the Brit:i.sh.
tish anxiety is reflected in the conciliatory personal appeal
of George VI to Pétain and by Roosevelt 1 s stern declaration that
Franco-German co-operation was unjustifiable
would result,
--------------------------------------------------------------------1
35Hull, On.cit., p.SL~9.
See also Langer, On.cit., p.95.
136L. Harchal, Vichy, T·Ho Years of Deception, lTeioJ" York,
Arco, 1944, p.94. A protocol ~v-as prepareà b'.lt never :::>resented.
It called for French co-operation with
Axis
Europe and
recapture of Gaullist colonies. Declaration of war acainst
Bri tain .-las referred to but not openly s tated al though Bri ti
colonies were held out as a reward. See 3insley, Hitler 1 s
'"ir '
C: 0 •
uc: t r·· "' +- "" by
l-n • 3,/
1
0.. l,J
\.J
137Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.225.
133
not only in a termination of all American aid to l"rance, but
indifference to the fate of the French
ire.
138
Pétain was
evidently annoyed by British fears and American threats and
protested that up until then Britain had had less to fear from
France than vice versa, 1 39 but botb the Ame
cans and British
found it increasingly difficult to distinguish between the
policies of Laval and Pétain.
Most Vichy officiais did not sbare Lav
1
s view of himself
as the saviour of France negotiating for a place for France in
the
lTel,l
:Surope.
=re cor:11ni tted PrA.nce to collaboration 1vi tb the
Nazis, albeit in vague and wide
ter~s,
to an extent to which
the Vichy Governmen t l:·ras not prepare à t o agree.
to the Council of
~inisters
In a speech
on October 26 Laval demanded
P~anco-
German collaboration and sugcested attac1cs on Gaullist colon
This broadened the rift between h
became even more s
and Pétain.
s.
The situation
ous or: Oc tober 30 1r1hen, after a lunch eon
at the German embassy, Laval suge;ested a coalition against
:Snr,land.
This discussion \V'as continued la ter 11i th Goerinc and
the Germans actually began military preparations for FrancoGerman attacks on Gaullist colonies.
lJ8Telegram from 3ull to
in Lanc;er, Op.cit., p.97.
139Eull, On.cit., IJ.850.
At a military conference
tthews, October 25, 1940, cited
184
on November 29 the Germans tried to get a derinite commitment
and when Darlan did not reply Huntziger suggested a delay on
the pretext that is was the rainy season. 1 4° A showdown was
averted, but the Germans were not deceived.
Montoire, in fact, seems to have led to misunderstandings with Britain and America, and to confusion in France but not in Germany.
Nany Germans were opposed to the Hontoire
negotiations from the outset and were vocally critical.
Von
Renthe-Fink, Hitler's special diplomatie representative attached to Pétain regarded Montoire as the greatest German diplomatie defeat in relations with France beeause nothing was
gained by it and espeeially beeause Germany did not get control
of North Africa rrom where he relt Allied landings could have
been prevented. 1 41 This view is very slanted, ir only in the
increased tension it created between France and Britain, Montoire would seem to have been diplomatically significant.
Anglo-French relations had deteriorated abruptly because the
British were ignorant or the conclusions of the Montoire talks
and on October 30 in order to prevent further misunderstandings
Baudouin secretly brought the Portugese representative to
Pétain who rormally informed hlm, in an engagement to be transmitted to Churchill, that there would be no military eollabor-
140Aron, The Vichy Regime, pp.226-227 & 232.
•
14lrsorni and Lemaire, Op.cit., pp.ll3-114 •
185
ation as a result of Montoire, and no hostile acts against
Great Brita1n. 1 4 2
Montoire would seem to be a good example of a 'double
jeu' which disappointed all those involved.
London feared
that Germany had offered France peace terms and fretted about
the concessions France might have made.
Vichy assured the
unconvinced British that:
" ••• il n'a jamais été question d'une négociation de paix et il n'en sera pas question
aussi longtemps que durera la guerre entre
l'Allemagne et l'Angleterre."l43
but at the same time had to persuade Hitler that total
occupation of France would result in Weygand 1eading a rebellion in North Africa and the Vichy Government moving to
A1geria;l44 in the meantime Pétain had not managed to get any
substantial concessions from Hitler.
Fina11y the Germans had
failed to get any definite commitments from Pétain.
The last of the series of secret Anglo-French negotiations
of 1940 actual1y extended into 1941 and are known as the
Halifax-Chevalier negotiations.
The "Gentleman's Agreement''
negotiated by Rougier has been regarded as the forerunner of
142Baudouin, oo.cit., p.226.
143Havas communique, November 11, 1940, cited in Rougier,
Op.cit., p.l59.
144Muggeridge, Op.cit., p.429 and Root, Oo.cit., p.574.
186
the definitive modus vivendi realized in December by Halifax
1
and Chevalier. 45 Pétain also remarked to Baudouin on December 6 that the terms of the Halifax-Chevalier agreement
were the same as those of the Rougier Protocol,l46 and indeed
there does seem to be a marked similarity.
This may be ex-
plained by the fact that the aspirations of Britain and France
had changed very little.
The British were still anxious to
get the French colonies to rise, and determined to continue
supporting the dissident colonies, and the relaxation of the
blockade was still of primary concern to Vichy.
After consultation with Eden, General Catroux sent a
letter on November 2 to
~:leygand
stressing the importance of a
French move, however feeble, in North Africa.
As surely must
have been expected Weyeand rejected the suggestion and pointed
out that any such action would require Pétain's authorization.l47
Churchill may have been partly influenced by this reply to make
more precise offers of six fully equipped divisions and consideration of other requirements for North Africa.l48
~ihile
it may be true that just as Laval was of secondary importance
to Pétain soto the British " ••• l'affaire de Gaulle est une
145x. de Bourbon, Les Accords Secrets Franco-Anglais de
Decembre 1940, Paris, Plon, 1949.
146Baudouin, Op.cit., p.282.
See Appendices XXIV & XXV.
147Truchet, Op.cit., p.206.
148rn 1941 Eden added to these offers Tripolitania in
return for the participation of French North Africa in the
struggle against Italy. Ibid., p.207.
187
affaire secondaire,nl49 they both caused a great deal or
tension.
It may well be that Britain decided to reopen nego-
tiations with Vichy because she heard about the German plans
to retake Chad and wanted to avert hostilities.
The British
attitude towards de Gaulle was an obstacle to more cordial
Anglo-French relations as, although France had no intentions
or surrendering her colonies to the Germans, even Pétain admitted that France might have to cede certain bases for satisfactory compensation,l50 and the British therefore relt the
more French territory under de Gaulle's control the less danger
of a German 'coup.'
The French concern about the blockade makes the initiation
of this new set of negotiations seem unrealistically co-incldental.
On December 3 Chevalier was visited by Admirai Auphan
who told him that the country raced starvation and economie
strangulation unless petroleum products could be obtained within
six weeks, and that transportation of these products would be
impossible without British agreement.
He therefore suggested
that Chevalier should approach his friend Halifax through the
Canadian representative in Vichy, Pierre Dupuy.
On the very
next day Dupuy called on Chevalier with a message from Halifaxt51
149Bourbon, Op.cit., p.42.
150~oodward, Op.cit., p.lOl.
•
15lde Bourbon, Op.cit., pp.30-31 •
188
"Tell our French friends that we are in an
extremely difficult position. We cannot be
openly friendly. ~"le must main tain a state
of artificial tension between us. If
Germany suspects our friendship, Article X
of the Armistice Convention would be immediately applied. But behind a facade of
misunderstanding we must understand each
other."l52
Britain was still very disturbed about Franco-German relations
and this message was a conciliatory effort aimed at opening
negotiations whlch would prevent the Vichy drift towards the
Nazi camp, rather than a true reflection of British feelings.
Dupuy also assured Chevalier that de Gaulle 1 s prestige bad
diminished and that Dakar and Mers-el-Kebir were attacked because of the presence of Germans, a fact which Chevalier hotly
contested.
However, it was decided not to discuss the past
and Chevalier promised to arrange an interview for Dupuy with
Pétain.
Chevalier
cal~ed
in Auphan who was incensed that one of
the primary conditions of the British was continued support of
dissident colonies, and also aggrieved because a troopship and
a ship loaded with corn and cod bad been prevented from returning from the Antilles to France.
Dupuy went as far as he could
in promising that these events would not recur and that every
effort would be made to see that supplies necessary for public
•
152Ibid., pp.34-35 and Aron, Op.cit., pp.234-235 •
•
189
bealtb be allowed through the blockade.
He also promised to
approach Halifax about fuel oils but would have to receive
assurances that they would remain in unoccupied France.
"As
for your Gaullist colonies you must try and get them back on
the quiet.nl.53
Dupuy returned to London on December 6 after a brief
secret meeting with Pétain where one of the main alterations
to the draft was the substitution of •coolness' for 'tension.•
Otherwise the agreement binds the British to stop B.B.C.
attacks on Vichy and to relax the blockade between North Africa
and unoccupied France, while the French promise not to allow
•
their fleet or colonies to fall into German bands.
The last
clause insists on the secrecy of the agreement being main tained.l.54
This secrecy was necessary to prevent German inter-
ven ti on according to Article X of the Armistice, and Pétain,
who was becoming increasingly nervous decided that if Dupuy
returned, Chevalier should act as intermediary so there would
be no witnesses. 1 .5.5 Of the long report which explicitly formulated the agreement with Pétain no trace has been found.
1.53de Bourbon, Op.cit., pp.36-37 and Aron, Op.cit., p.23.5.
1.54see Appendix XXV.
•
1.5.5Testimony of Mr. P. Dupuy at the trial of Pétain,
"Procès," p.2.54, cited in Isorni and Lemaire, Op.cit., p.l09,
and de Bourbon, Op.cit., p.62 •
190
No copy was kept at Vichy.
However, it cannot be said that
no documents exist for Chevalier took manuscripts to the High
Court of Justice in 1942 and 1943; 1 5 6 the absence of the actual
document is not very important.
After receiving the telegram 11 'rout va bien" from Dupuy on
December 71 57 the French ref~arded the agreement as ratified
and since the terms were so similar to the Rougier Protocol
they were not everly perturbed.
Furthermore certain changes
took place after December 7 which confirmed not only to Chevalier, Auphan and Pétain, but to many ether observers that an
agreement had been reached.
From then on French ships bound
for North African ports were allowed to pass Gibraltar and to
return to France, and this continued from mid-December 1940
l
158 A few of these ships were stopped
until November 19L~2.
seemingly to allay German suspicion. 1 5 9 This relaxation of the
blockade made a great difference to the daily lives of millions
of Frenchinen.
'/li thout
Dakar peansuts and North African cereals
the rat ration would have dropped
50%
and even a subsistence
ration of bread could not have been maintained.l60
The attacks
156de Bourbon, Op.cit., p.l.
157Telegram from Dupuy to Chevaller, December 7, 1940,
Aron, On.cit., p.236.
158nupuy reported Vichy's gratitude, but French naval
officers were not deceived; they were amused by the 'relaxation' of the blockade and ran sweepstakes on which ships would
be stopped. See Medlicott, OE.cit., p.562.
159From September 1940- November 1942 Auphan's records
show 540 convoys passed Gibraltar and only a token number
were stopped. See Medlicott, Op.cit., p.562.
160lQiQ., p.l8l.
191
on Vichy by the Gaullist radio station at Brazzaville were also,
temporarily, halted.
The new arrangement should have been mutually satisfactory,
especially after the proposed attack on Chad was averted but it
is clear that the British were not satisfied.
On December 31
Churchill informed Pétain that:
"If at any time in the near future the French
Government decides to cross to North Africa
or resume the war there against Italy and
Germany, we should be willing to send a
strong and well equipped expeditionary force
of up to six divisions to aid the defence of
Morocco, Algiers and Tunis."l61
He went on to stress the improvement in the war situation but
expressed fears that Germany might decide to go to Africa via
Spain.
In view of Hendaye Pétain was probably not very im-
pressed with this argument, but more significant to his reaction
was the simultaneous delivery to Chevalier, by Matthews, the
American Chargé d'Affairs, of two notes which Pétain rightly
attributed to British sources. 162 The first note offered to
ease the blockade and allow petroleum products through, the
second demanded greater Franco-British collaboration.
Pétain
read and burned the notes, and then told Chevalier to tell
Matthews that France was pleased about the easing of the blockade but as far as the second note went " ••• nous n'avons pas
161Ibid., p.l81.
King.
162Britain passed them to the Americans via Mackenzie
See de Bourbon, Op.cit., pp.59-60.
192
reçu le message."
Not only did it contravene the armistice
terms but its tone was unaccepta.ble.
Pétain then proceeded
to reply nega.tively to Churchill's letter, for which he bas
been blamed for a further rupture in Angle-French relations.l63
The rupture cannet have been very serious as Dupuy returned
to France on February 13, 1941.
The fall of Laval may have led
the British to suppose that Pétain might now be convinced to go
to North Africa.
Once again supplies were discussed but on
February 22 Darlan arrived in Vichy with the German demand for
Chevalier 1 s dismissal.
negotiations.
They had obvious1y beard about the
Chevalier was merely transferred from Education
to the new ministerial post of Family and the contact was
maintained.
This second visit in itself seems to indicate
that nothing definite wa.s concluded a.t the earlier negotiation.
Churchill insisted on keeping Dupuy in Vichy and his value is
quite clear.
"I don't rely on all that he says or is said
to him, but it helps me and it is the on1y
contact we have."l64
In ether words M. Dupuy was an unofficial representative in an
enemy-occupied country.
163schmitt, Op.cit., p.ll6. Churchill did appeal direct1y
to ~veygand on January l7, 1941. (See de Bourbon, Op.cit.,
pp.20-22) but Schmitt's contention that the b1ockade was again
enforced from February 17, 1941, cannot be substantiated.
Ibid., p.l89.
164J.W.Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, Vol.I,
1939-1944, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1960, pp.241
& 322.
See also R.I>1.Dawson, Canadien in ~rtforld Aff airs: Ttvo
Years of 'tlar 1939-19 1, II, London, Oxford University Press,
19 • pp.2 3-2
193
There was a direct and definite connection between the
secret negotiations of late 1940 and the fall of Laval.
Pétain
was working for improved relations with Britain in order to
alleviate the blockade, stop propaganda attacks and restrict
the spread of dissidence in the Empire.
Meanwhile Laval was
increasing Anglo-French tension by working for closer FrancoGerman collaboration.
As Pétain told him, "Everytime you went
to Paris I wondered what brick was to fall on our heads next."165
Pétain had seemingly been kept in the dark about Laval-German
military conversations until the proposals for an attack on
Chad were discussed by General von Stulpnagel on November
with General Doyen, Huntziger's successor.
5,
Knowing that this
attack and the proposed attack on Nigeria would provoke hostilities with Britain Pétain allowed the discussions to drag
on, but he obviously bad no intention of allowing Laval to
lead France into war with Britain.
act.
He was finally forced to
On December 13 Laval announced Hitler's intention to
return the ashes of the Duke of Reichstadt from Vienna to
Paris, and he managedpy discussing the tour of the occupied
zone which Pétain could make>to induce the old man to agree
to attend the ceremony.
A number of deputies met immediately
this became known and sent a delegation to the Marshal demand-
165Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.242.
194
ing the dismissa.l of Laval.
'l1hey
convinced him of the nec-
essity of this move and a.lso got him to refuse the invitation
166
to go to Paris.
An impromptu Council Meeting was beld
tha.t evening a.t 8 p.m. and when Pétain a.nnounced the resignation of the government a11 those present signed personal
167
resignations. Only Laval 1 s and Ripert 1 s
were accepted.
That night the furious Laval was put under bouse arrest.
The next day Pétain broa.dcast the following a.nnouncement:
"I have just made a decision I judge to be
in conformity with the best interests of
the country. .H. Pierre Laval no longer
belongs to the government ••• It is for
important ressons of internal policy that
I took it upon myse1f to make this decision which has not the slightest bearing
on our relations with Germa.ny."l 6 tl
169
The Germans were of a different mind.
Hitler was furious,
not out of concern for Laval, but beca.use he wa.s throw·n out of
office " •.• a.t the very moment he was about to conclude an agree-
166 du Moulin de La.barthète, Op.cit., pp.63-67, passJm.
167Ripert wa.s maldng way for Chevalier as Pétain fel t
giving him a ministeriel position would facilitate ne~otia­
tions. Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.241.
168r,1archal, Op. ci t., p .103.
169The Germans were aware that Laval's fal1 was due to
bis interference with the negotiations of de la Baa~e and
Petrie, and his efforts to have Weygand dismissed and more
stringent efforts made against Gau1list forces in the colonies.
See Telegram No. 1.5.56, Abetz to the Foreign Hinistry, cited in
Hinsley, Hitler's Strategx, p.891.
195
ment with Germany.nl70
Abetz went to Pétain and insisted that
Laval returned to conclude the negotiations.
He warned Pétain
that reprisals would be taken against France.
"H. Laval doit repre:adre sa place au pouvoir,
où la .D'rance subira les conséquences d 1 un
geste que vous n'avez sans doute pas voulu,
••• qui vous a été imposé par un clique de
militaires et d 1 anglophiles."l71
Pétain promised an enquiry and then offered Laval Production
or Agriculture.
Having failed Abetz took Laval bacle to Paris.
Pétain, however, was still sticking to a middle-of-theraad policy.
He selected Flandin as Laval's successor, but
Flandin was willing to resist German demands even at the cost
of temporary pressure.
He felt the Chad operation was just a
blind to get French military co-operation. 1 7 2 Pétain, on the
other band, was unwilling to risk further defiance.
Without
the knowledge of the Council Pétain asked Darlan to arrange a
second meeting with Hitler.
This second meeting took place at
Ferté-Hauterive on January 18.
Pétain was disconcerted to
discover that Laval had found out and had told the Germans
about Rougier's mission.
He finally agreed to a joint commun-
ique that Franco-German misapprehensions had been cleared up
170Geraud, Op.cit., p. 7c 04• In view of Hitler's anger the
contention that Laval's fall was engineered by von Ribbentrop
and Abetz, who showed records of Laval's discussions to Flandin,
seems far-fetched. See Root, Op.cit., pp.318-319.
17ldu 1•1oulin de Labarthète, Op. ci t., p. 81.
172Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.255.
196
and then
i~mediately
after the meeting called a press con-
ference to denounce the communique and state that he bad no
intention of recalling Laval.l73
The Germans exerted severe
pressure on Pétain and closed the demarcation line.
'vlhen
Flandin resigned, Darlan, who was to form the next government
announced:
nif we cease collaboratin, we shall lose all
the advantages we may expect from the armistice.
For my part, I have made my choice. I am for
collaboration.n174
This attitude was fairly representative of Vichy opinion as
most of France felt the war was lost and there was no alternative to collaboration with the victors.
five months of
ne~otiations
great diplomatie victory.
shows this was not so.
Thus at the end of
it seemed as if Germany had won a
In fact an examination of the record
Pressure on France was relieved by the
lifting of the blockade, wbich made German economie pressure
less effective.
A German take-over in North Africa was averted
and the Protocols of Paris signed by Darlan on March 28) 1941,
were rejected by Vichy.
Finally the Toulon Fleet was destroyed
on November 27, 1942, when the Germans attempted to capture it.
It can hardly be said that this constitutes a diplomatie defeat
for Britain nor a policy of Franco-German collaboration for
France.
•
173Laval returned to office on April 14, 1941.
174Aron, The Vichy Regime, p.266 •
197
Even when ordered to cease attacks by the Brazzaville
radio on Vichy " ••• under the circumstances," these
11
circum-
stances11 were never expla.ined to de Ga.ulle175 and he rema.ined
1
ada.mantly opposed to any negotiations with Vichy. 7 6 Thus
while the French did not succeed in keeping the Germans in
ignorance of the secret negotiations with Britain, the British
seem to have succeeded very well in concealing them from de
Gaulle.
Since the war the British have been assisted in the
efforts to keep the negotiations secret by Pétain's aversion
to written records; he even refused to sign orders for Darlan
to authorize hlm to go to North Africa and continue the government from there, should the Germans take over Vichy.
"In spi te of our arguments the T1arshal ever
cautious, refused to sign the operational order
I had drafted. 'I have no use for paper but
you must consider my arder as definite. I
shall not reverse my decision. At the sa.me
time it must be understood that it remains a
secret bett>~een the three of us. No one else
ought to knmv. '"177
1
British denial of the existence of any actual agreement, 1 78
despite what seems to be overwhelming evidence cannot be dis-
175Telegram, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to
de Gaulle, October 31, 1940, de Gaulle, "r·1emoirs, Documents,"
cited in Schmitt, Op.cit., p.143.
176churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp.315-317.
de Gaulle, Speeches, p.41.
See also
177Baudouin, Op.cit., pp.l90-191.
•
178churchill in a Speech to the Gommons on June 12, 1945,
declared " ••• no agreement was in fa.ct concluded with the
Vichy administration either through their emissary (Rougier)
or through any other channel." H.C.Cmd. 6662 of 1945, XXV, 5.
198
missed lightly.
Until the opening of the British archives
the problem i-till remain unsolved as the evidence of Vichy
ministers, who had an interest in establishing the existence
of treaties in order to defend their positions, is not very
reliable.
In fact most ministers on both sides would not
have even knoiin about the negotiations as secrecy was absolutely necessary.
The "collaboration" of Pétain can be regarded as a facade
("artificial coolness") and a method of concealing his real
aims, which could have included resuming the war at an appropriate time, but this would make Montoire only a cover for
the real agreements to which he felt himself
and
co~~itted
Pétain himself declared that he " ••• n'etait pas engagé avec
personne. 111 79
Admi ttedly Pétain iv as forced to play a
jeu 11 but there are many unanswered questions.
11
double
l!'or example,
why, if he regarded the Rougier Protocol as a treaty did Pétain
bee;in negotiations again with Dupuy?
But then again Dupuy was
in Vichy because of British initiative, and if they were willing to relax the blockade but were very concerned about FrancoGerman negotiations, why did they not make a formal agreement
with Pétain?
Until the British archives are opened one can
only sift the existing evidence and try to make a cohesive
picture out of a mosaic of testimony.
•
179Pétain to Weygand, ~~arch 1942, cited in Weygand,
Memoirs, pp.541-542.
CONCLUSION
A Double tDouble jeu'
"Et maintenant, si l'angleterre n'est pas
vaincue dans quelques semaines nous
aurons été les plus grands criminels de
l'Histoire de France."
General Huntziger
In any war in which one member of an alliance is defeated
there is a strong possibility of bad feeling between the exallies.
This is particularly true in our era of mass media
whereby propaganda machines can instigate doubts about goodwill.
As Churchill himself declareâ:
'hNhen good people get into trouble because
they are attacked ••• they must be very careful not to get at loggerheads with one
another. The common enemy is ah-rays trying
to bring this about, and, in bad luck a lot
of things happen which play into the enemy 1 s
bands. ni
It must certainly be admitted that tta lot of things" made it
much easier for the Germans and Laval 1 s clique to create an
atmosphere of distrust.
Britain's isolation in face of Hitler 1 s
amazing vic tories, the threat of invasion, and the a,.11.bigui ty
of the French position made her particularly susceptible to
the lack of sympathy for France of which Pétain so bitterly
complains.
lspeech, October 21, 1940, Churchill, Their Finest Hour,
p.510.
199
200
nor
course the salvation of' France must
primarily reside in herself. But cooperation with America and England is
indispensible. There have been divergences which have shocked me, but no
profound breach. They are due to misunderstanding ••• I do not think there
has been an adequate appreciation of
our position. He are ùnder duress, we
cannot act as we please, we cannot
express ourselves freely. But we have
behaved with honor (sic) and have done
nothing to jeopardize the position of
our friends. I must think of' France
first, but in doing so I think also of
the allies of' France.
.... . . . . . . . ... . . .. . . . . . . ..... .... ... ..
"I have been saddened by the lack of
comprehension, but recriminations will
not mend matters, and my personal feelings are of no importance. There must
be a wholehearted reconciliation •••
.................... .... .... . .... . .. ..
nHonsieur Churchill promised that, if we
were obli d to make an armistice, he
would do nothing to render our plight
more painful ••• We have tried to fulfil
all our promises fai thf'ully. ·de have
not, for example, even thought for a
moment of surrendering the fleet,
though that would have been a powerful
counter in our dealings with Germany.
Rather than allow our ships to be used
against America and England, we scuttled them in the end ••• I do not see
what greater proof of our loyalty we
could have offered ••• In point of fact
we rendered great service in concluding an armistice. It checked the
élan of Germany, it kept her from the
Mediterranean which she might well
have reached in the first year of the
war. And if the Germans had bolted the
!·1edi terranean, the war 1-:ould have been
lost.n2
2Personal interview with Pétain in 1943, cited in
Huddleston, Oo.cit., pp.206-207.
201
The British attitude is not difficult to understand.
The whole of
onslaught.
~vestern
Europe had collapsed before the Nazi
None of the smaller states had been expected to
be able to resist for very long, but the almost immediate
collapse of France with her fortresses and laree army was
totally unexpected.
Further, instead of following the lead
of the other conquered states and carrying on the war from
abroad the French govermnent chose to remain in the homeland
and nep;otiate with the enemy.
It should be borne in mind that this paper deals with
Anglo-French relations during a period when France was not
her own master and consequently she had much greater latitude
of action with Britain than with Germany.
The possibility of
her relationship with Britain offered a wider choice of events
if not of policy.
Furthermore while maintaining a proper
balance in her relationship with these two warring powers was
of utmost importance to France, it was of no such significance
to either Germany or England.3
Germany, however, was in a
much more advantageous position to exercise pressure on France
than Britain, and the repercussions of possible French acts
were of less significance to Germany than to Britain.
British fears about the fate of the French Fleet and
Empire resulted in attacks on beth.
The Free French and the
efforts to get the French Empire to rise were not successful
3The British were, of course, more concerned than Germany
because of their fears about the French Fleet.
202
enough to be considered of any significance to the course of
the war.
In retrospect the attacks on the French Fleet might
be considered futile, but the British were convinced, not
without considerable justification, that the Vichy
gover~ment
would not be able to keep their fleet out of German control.
The attacks at Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar reduced the potential
threat of the French Fleet so that the British were able to
concentra te their efforts elsewhere.
Av-Tare of the antagonism
which their policy caused the British strove to prevent Anglophobia and emotionalism from being used by Laval as a springboard to power.
Rad Laval succeeded in seizing power not only
would British influence on France have become negligible, but
with France as a German puppet the whole political structure
of Europe could have been affected.
It is doubtful whether
the refugee governments of the other conquered states could
have maintained their claim to legitimacy in the face of a
pro-Nazi government in
Par~s.
In this contingency, and in
view also of the Russo-German pact, Britain could have found
herselt defying the whole of Europe.
It is against this back-
ground that the attacks on the French Empire and Fleet, the
blockade of France, and the secret negotiations of late 1940,
must be judged.
The blockade and the secret negotiations
seem to have been quite successful as France never collaborated
with Germany to the ex.tent envisioned by Laval.
203
Similarly the French, faced with the dilemma of military
defeat and political disunity felt forced to adopt a ndouble
jeu" policy.
Pétain, while disclaiming this, sums up the
French situation thus:
11
Je suis pris entre duex politiques, 1 1 une
celle de la collaboration avec les Anglais,
qui a toutes mes preferences; l'autre, la
loi du vainquer que je suis forcé de subir •••
Je ne pratique pas une politique de double
jeu ••• je suis loyal avec les uns co~~e avec
les autres •
••• j'ai signé l•armistice ••• une rupture de
l'armistice entraînerait l'intervention
immédediate de l'Allemagne en France libre
et en Afrique du Nord.
D'autre part, je suis loyal et runical avec
les Anglais ••• dans la limite du champ qui
m'est laissé libre ••• je fais tout ce qui
est en mon pouvoir pour faciliter leur
tâche •••• "4
There can be little doubt that many anti-Lavalist diplomats at
Vichy felt that the British understood that their dealings with
Germany in 1940 were the result of expediency not choice.
The Germans seem to have understood the French position
very well:
"The French Government is evidently caught
between two lines of fire at the present
time. On the one hand, on the basis of
English and American propagande. reports it
is afraid of German coercive measures
against the unoccupied territory, and on
4conversation of Pétain and Chevalier, February 1, 1941,
cited from Chevalier's diary, in a deposition at Pétain's trial,
p.255, col.2, cited in Bourbon, o~.cit., p.65. See also ~fuit­
comb, Occupation, II, Document 27 , Chevalier 1 s testimony at
Pétain trial on August 7, 1945, pp.935-938.
204
the other it is being subjected to increased pressure from England in order to prevent
it co-operating with Germany. Rumeurs about
the Prench intention to resume the fight
against the Axis in Africa, and to shift
forces and material to North Africa for this
purpose, evidently arise as a reaction to
the fear of German occupation of the unoccupied territory. 11 5
Even today many people feel that Pétain's behaviour stemmed
from a 'secret accord' arrived at between the British and
Vichy Governments in December 1940.
It now seems as if Pétain's
arch enemy, Charles de Gaulle, may be the one who clears his
name.6
The fact that France never did join Germany in a military
sense may seem to indicate a policy of expediency rather than
of collaboration, but it is absurd to claim, as does General
Odic, that:
nil faut que la France, soit en guerre aux
côtés de l'Allemagne afin de prouver la
culpabilité des hommes de Vichy. 11 7
Regardless of questions of guilt, and purely from the viewpoint of the state, the French nation seems to have benefited
from the divergent policies of Pétain and de Gaulle, who despite
5Memorandum by Grote, an official of the Political Division I.M., Berlin, January ?, 1941, cited in Documents in
German Foreign Policy, XI, p.1043.
6B.Kaplan, "Ground Being Spaded for Redemption of Pétain,n
The Montreal Star, February 15, 1964, 9.
7Testimony of General Odic, cited K. Pendar, "Une Aventure
Diplomatiquen and quoted in Isorni and Lemaire, Op.cit., p.l27.
205
their differences put France first.
As de Gaulle himself
remarked:
"France must always have two strings in
ber bow. In June 1940 they were de Gaulle
and Pétain."B
SB. Kaplan, "Ground Being Spaded for Redemption of
Pétain," The Montreal Star, February 15, 1964, 9 •
•
206
APPENDIX I
Anglo-French Treaty of March 28, 1940
nThe Government of the French Republic and the Government
of the United Kingdom enter into mutual engagements not to
negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace during
the present war unless by common consent.
They undertake to discuss peace terms only after a complete agreement bas been reached between them about the necessary conditions to ensure both of them respectively, effective
and lasting guarantees for their security. Finally, they
undertake to maintain, when peace bas been restored, collaboration in their actions within all spheres as long as this will
be necessary to safeguard the security and insure the reconstitution, with the collaboration of other nations, of international order in Europe, which will guarantee the liberty of
Nations, respect for law and maintenance of peace.nl
207
APPEriDIX II
Pétain's letter of Resignation
Bordeaux, le 16 juin, 1940.
Monsieur le Président du Conseil,
(P. Reynaud added by hand)
La gravité, chaque jour croissante, de la situation militaire ma convainct de la nécessité pour le Gouvernement de
mettre immédiatement fin aux hostilités.
Cette mesure est la seule capable de sauver le Pays.
L'avance de 1 1 enemi, si l'on n'y met un terme, conduira
à l'occupation et à la destruction totale du térritoire. Il
en resultera une réduction des resources alimentaires de la
Nation dans des conditions telles que la famine est inévitable
à trés bref délai.
Les déliberations quotidiennes du Gouvernement m'apparaissent comme étant du pures maneuvres dilatoires aboutissant
à l'abdication définitive de la Souveraineté française:
Je ne puis m'y associer.
Je vous remets donc ma démission de fonctions de Ministre
d'Etat et de Vice-Président du Conseil.
(signed)
1
•
Reynaud, OE.cit., p.531 •
Ph. Pétai.n 1
208
APPENDIX III
Declaration of ünion
"At this most fateful moment in the history of the
modern world, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the
French Republic make this declaration of indissoluble union
and unyielding resolution in their common defence of justice
and freedom against subjection to a syst~m which reduces
mankind to a life of robots and slaves.
The two Governments declare that France and Great Britain
shall no longer be t~-ro na ti ons, but one Franco-British Union.
The cons ti tut ion of the Union 1..vill provide for joint organs
of defence, foreign, financial, and economie policies.
Every citizen of France will enjoy immediate citizenship
of Great Britain; every British subject will become a citizen
of France.
Both countries will share responsibility for the repair
of the devastation of war, wherever it occurs in their territories, and the resources of both shall be equally, and as
one, applied to that purpose.
During the war there shall be a single :,!far Cabinet, and
all the forces of Britain and France, whether on land, sea,
or in the air, will be placed under its direction. It will
govern from wherever i t best can. T:Je two Parlia.rnents will
be formally associated. The nations of the British Empire
are already forming new armies. France will keep her available forces in the field, on the sea, and in the air. The
Union appeals to the United States to fortify the economie
resources of the Allies, and to bring her powerful material
aid to the common cause.
The Union will concentrate its whole energy against the
power of the enemy, no matter where the battle may be.
And thus we shall conquer." 1
•
lchurchill, Their Finest Hour, pp.208-209 •
209
APPENDIX IV
Franco-German Armistice
Article VIII
"The French Fleet - with the exception of that part of it
which is to be left at the disposal of the French Government
for safe-guarding its interests in the Colonial Empire - shall
be concentrated in ports of be determined and shall be demobilized and disarmed under the control of Germany, or Italy
respectively.
The nomination of these ports shall be based upon the
home ports of the ships in peace time. The German Government
solemnly declares to the French Government that it has no
intention of using during the war, for its own purposes, the
French Fleet stationed in ports under German control, except
for such ships as may be necessary for surveillance of the
coasts and for mine-sweeping.
Moreover it declares solemnly and formally that it has
no intention of for~ulating claims to the French Fleet on the
conclusion of peace. Except for the part of the French Fleet
to be determined which shall be appropriated to the safeguarding of French interests in the Colonial Empire, all French
warships now outside French territorial waters shall be recalled to France.nl
•
lAron, The Vichy Regime, pp.53-54 •
210
APPENDIX V
Hitler's Ideas on the French Fleet
"~vi th regard to the French fleet the Fuhrer said that
the best thing that could heppen would be to have the French
sink it. The worst thing would be to have the fleet unite
with the British, because in view of the larger number of
light French ships, the united British-French fleets could
organize extensive convoys. That being so, Britain could
supply herself without difficulty and could transport ••• large
forces to all sorts of places ••• (•I prefer for the long run
a compact and collected enemy ••• rather than enemies who are
weaker but are scattered here and there.t) That being so,
it would not be well to demand purely and simply that the
French surrender their fleet. France will not agree to that
and, as against the very slight probability that the French
may sink their
et, there would be the rouch greater probability that they would send it to join the British fleet.
It will be much better, therefore, to demand that they
assemble the fleet in such a way that it cannot be moved or
dispersed ••• "l
•
1 unpublished Graziani Papers, Italien General Staff
Report, June 18, 1940, cited by Langer, Op.cit., pp.48-49 •
211
APPENDIX VI
Churchill on the French Fleet
We hope, hmvever, that the French Empire, stretching all
over the world, and still protected by sea power, will continue the struggle at the side of its Allies, that it may
become the seat of a gover~~ent which will strive steadfastly
for victory, and will organize armies of liberation •
... ..t..our
.. . .rel
. .. . . . .... . . . .... . .. . . . .. . . . . .................... .
a ti ons will be wi th the Bordeaux Government, I
,•
~tJha
cannot tell. They have delivered themselves over to the
enemy and lie wholly in his power. He may do much by blandishments or by severities, by propaganda, and by the choosing
of pro-German Hinisters to make our rel a ti ons difficul t. ·.1e
do not knmv whether we shall be allmved to have any British
representative in the restricted region called "unoccupied
France, 11 because that is entirely surrounded by and under the
control of the enemy; but, relying upon the true genius of
the French people, and their judgment upon wbat has happened
to them when they are allowed to know the facts, we shall
endeavour to keep such contacts as are possible through the
bars of their prison.
..The
.. . .safety
...... .of...Great
.. . . ..Britain
. . .. . .... . .. . ... . .. . .... . . ........... . .
and the British Empire is
powerfully, though not decisively, affected by by what happens
to the French Fleet.
..We...reminded
...... . ..the
.. ..new
. ..... . . . ... . . . ... . . . . . .. . . . .... . .. . . . . . .. .
Government that the condition indis-
pensable to their release had not been complied with, the
condition being that it should be sent to a British port.
There was plenty of time to do it, and it would have made no
difference to the negotiations: the terms could hardly have
been more severe than they were •
..Everything
. . . . .. . .. ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... .... . . .. .
was, of course, fusing into collapse at that
..
time, but many solemn assurances were given that the Fleet
would never be allowed to fall into German bands. It was,
therefore, "with grief and amazement 11 -to quote the words of
the Government statement which we issued on Sunday- that I
read Article 8 of the Armistice terms.
212
This Article, to which the French Government have subscribed, says that the French Fleet, excepting that part left free
for the safeguarding of French interests in the Colonial
Empire, shall be collected in ports to be specified and there
demobilised and disarmed under German or Italian control.
From this text it is clear that the French war vessels under
this Armistice pass into German and Italien control while
fully armed. ~:le note, of course, in the same Article the
solemn declaration of the German Gover~~ent that they have
no intention of using them for their own purposes during the
war. ',fuat is the value of that? Ask half a dozen countries
what is the value of such a solemn assurance. Furthermore,
the s&üe Article 8 of the Armistice excepts from the operation
of such assurances and solemn declarations those units necessary for coast surveillance and mine-sweeping. Under this
provision it would be possible for the German Government to
reserve, ostensibly for coast surveillance, any existing units
of the French Fleet. Finally, the Armistice can at any time
be voided on any pretext of non-observance, and the terms of
Armistice explicitly provide for further German claims when
any peace between Germany and France comes to be signed.l
lH.C. Debates, Series V,
302-30;>.
25
June 1940, CCCLXII, Col.
213
APPENDIX VII
Darlan 1 s Secret Orders of June 24, 1940
n ••• orders remain valid, whatever contradictory orders
you may receive hereafter, even if signed by me.
1.
The ships which have been demobilized must remain
French ••• and they must remain in either Netropolitan or Colonial French ports.
2.
Secret preparations for scuttling must be made so
that if the enemy or an ex-ally seize a ship by
force, they will be unable to make use of it.
3.
If the Armistice Commission, whose duty it is to
interpret the position, should decide otherwise
than in paragraph 1, all warships, upon this
decision being put into effect, will, without
further orders, set sail for the United States
or be scuttled ••• In no circumstances will they
be left intact in enemy hands.
4.
Such ships as take refuge in foreign ports must
not be used in warlike operations against Germany
or Italy without orders from the Commanders-inChief of the French Naval Forces.
In no circumstances will the orders of any foreign
admiralty be obeyed."l
1 Aron, The Vichy Regime, pp. 71.~-7.5.
•
•
...;:
1
1
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i
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1
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1
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1
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pç::. "S>E:...~\.\--.>')<;:,.~';)~-.,
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,_
-
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British
------ French
vvvvvv Italian
Key: -
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t"S
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>
APPENDIX VIII
DISPOSITION OF THE MAIN FLEETS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
JUNE 14, 1940 l
lBased on Churchill, Their Finest Houre 438.
e
215
•
APPENDIX IX
POSITION OF THE FRENCH SHIPS AT THE BEGINNING
OF THE ACTION AT MEHS-EL-KEBIH ON JULY'3,1941. l
Key:
1 - Dunkerque
2 - Provence
3 - Strasbourg
4 - Bretagne
5 - Commandant Teste
•
1
.
Based on Varillon, Op. cit., p. 15, and Playfair, Op. cit.,
pp. 133 & 134.
216
APPENDIX X
British Offer to Admira! Gensoul at f'1ers-el-Kebir,
fi@
19 0
2,
11
His Majesty 1 s Government have commanded me to inform you
as follows:
They agreed to French Government approaching the German
Government only on conditions that, if an armistice was concluded, the French Fleet should be sent to British ports to
prevent its falling into the bands of the enemy. The Council
of Ministers declared on the 18th of June that, before capitulating on land, the French Fleet would join up with the
British force or sink itself.
lfhilst the present French Government may consider that
terms of their armistice with Germany and Italy are reconciliable with these undertakings, His Majesty's Government finds
it impossible from their previous experience to believa Germany and Italy will not at any moment which suits them seize
French warships and use them against Britain and ber allies.
Italian armistice prescribes that French ships should return
to metropolitan ports and under armistice France is required
to yield up units for coastal defence and mine-sweeping.
It is impossible for us, your comrades up to nmv, to
allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German or
Italian enemy. We are determined to fight on to the end, and
if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that
France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers,
and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer, we
solemnly declare tbat we shall restore the greatness and
territory of France. For this purpose, we must make sure that
the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by
the common foe. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government bave instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now
at Hers-el-Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of
the following alternatives:
(a)
Sail with us and continue to fight for victory
against the Germans and Italians.
(b)
Sail with reduced crews under our control to
a British port. The reduced crews will be
repatriated at the earliest moment.
217
If either of these courses is adopted by you, we will
restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or
pay full compensation, if they are damaged meanwhile.
(c)
Alternatively, if you feel bound to stipulate
that your ships should not be used against the
Germans or Italians unless these break the
Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced
crews to sorne French port in the ~est Indies l1artinique, for instance - where they can be
demilitarized to our satisfaction, or perhaps
be entrusted to the United States and remain
safe until the end of the war, the crews being
repatriated.
If you refuse these fair offers, I must, with profound
regret, require you to sink your ships within six hours.
Finally, failing the above, I have the orders of His
Majesty's Government to use whatever force may be necessary
to prevent your ships from falling into German or Italian
bands. "1
•
1 Kammerer, Mers-el-Kebir, pp.l04-l05.
Op.cit., pp.l33-135. ~
See also Butler,
218
APPE1TDIX XI
François Mauriac on Mers-el-Kebir
" ••• Au soir de l'armistice nous ne pensions pas qu'il
pût nous arriver de pire ••• Et puis, tout à coup, ce retournement de l'Angleterre contre nous, ce quet-apens de Mersel-Kebir, et tous ces marins sacrifiés ••• M. Winston Churchill
se souvient-il de ce qu'il a coûté d'efforts aux ouvriers de
l'Entente Cordiale ••• pour vaincre la vieille inimité, pour
conjurer cette haine héréditaire qu'entretenait entre les
deux peuples les souvenirs de la guerre de Cent Ans, une
histoire sombre et cruelle, jalonée par le bûcher de Rouen,
par Sainte-Hélène, par Fachoda? Notre génération avait
remonté ce courant ••• et tout à coup ce suprême malheur, le
seul auquel nous ne nous fussion pas attendu, le corps de
ces marins que chacun de nous veille dans son coeur: M. Winston Churchill a dressé pour combien d 1 années contre l'Angleterre, une France unanime. 11 1
•
lFrançcois Mauriac in 'Le Figaro,' cited in Varillon,
Op.cit., p.l74 •
219
APPENDIX XII
French Admiralty
Tele~ram
33 2 -
11
1
Secret 1
-
Jul
Tous bâtements, toutes autorités de 1 'lu'ilirauté
française.
Primo. Devant attitude hostile prise par Marine Royale
britannique à lY1ers-el-Kebir considérer comme hostile
et attaquer tout bàtiment de guerre britannique rencontré.
·
Secundo. L'ordre ci-dessus s'adresse à tous bâtiment
de surface, sous-marins et aéronefs.
Tertio. Saisir tout bàtiment de commerce britannique
et le conduire dans un port français. 11 1
lvarillon, Oo.cit., p.178 •
•
220
APPENDIX XIII
Letter of Admiral Darlan to Mr. Churchill
(translated)
Algiers, December 4, 1942
Dear Mr. Prime Minister.
On June 12, 1940, at Briare, at the Headquarter of
General :,'/eygand, you took me aside and said to me:
"Darlan, I hope that you will never surrender the
Fleet." I answered you: "There is no question of doing
so; it would be contrary to our naval traditions and
honour." The First Lord of the Admiralty, Alexander,
and the First Sea Lord, Pound, received the same reply
on June 17, 1940, at Bordeaux, as did Lord Lloyd. If
I did not consent to authorize the French Fleet to
proceed to British ports, it was because I knew that
auch a decision would bring about the total occupation
of Metropolitan France as well as North Africa.
I admit having been overcome by a great bitterness
and a great resentment against England as a result of
the painful event-s which touched me as a sailor; furthermore, it seemed to me that you did not belteve my word.
One day Lord Halifax sent me word by H. Dupuy that in
England my word was not doubted, but that it was believed
I should not be able to keep it. The voluntary destruction of the Fleet at Toulon has just proved that I was
right, because even though I no longer commanded, the
Fleet executed the orders which I had given and maintained,
contrary to the wishes of the Laval Government. On the
orders of my Chief, the Marshal, I was obliged from
January, 1941, to April, 1942, to adopt a policy which
would prevent France and its Empire from being occupied
and crushed by the Axis Powers. This policy was by the
force of events opposed to yours. 'ilhat else could I
do? At the time you were not able to help us, and any
221
gesture towards you would have led to the most disasterous consequences for my country. If we had not
assumed the obligation to defend the Empire, by our
m..rn forces (I always refused German aid, even in
Syria), the Axis would have come to Africa and our
own Army would have been discarded; the First British
Army undoubtedly would not be before Tunis today with
the French troops at its side to combat the Germans
and Italians.
..................
.....
Please accept, Mr. Prime Hinister, the assurances
of my highest consideration.
François Darlan, Admiral of the Fleet.ul
lchurchill, Their Finest Hour, pp.239-241.
222
APPENDIX XIV
Gen~ral
Noguès• Attitude on June 27, 1940
"Il nous expliqua qu 1 il été partisan de la résistance
en Afrique du Nord, avec ou sans le Gouvernement de Bordeaux.
Son Gouvernement était prêt •••
nNais ••• l'Afrique du Nord est une ile avec la mer des
trois côtés et le désert au sud. Pour faire quelque chose,
j'avais besoin de la flotte française. Or, l'amiral Gensoul
commandant de la Flotte refuse de marcher et les Anglais
ne peuvent m'aider avant quelques mois. Les Anglais du
reste n'arrivent pas à comprendre la situation ••• je n'ai pas
de munitions, je n'ai pas d'armes, je n'ai pas de matériel.
Il ne faut pas compter sur le Gouvernement de Bordeaux,
composé de vieillards démoralisés. J'avais réussi à faire
charger sur trois navires tout ce que j'avais pu trouver
dans les dépôts comme munitions et matériel, y compris des
chars, et au dernier moment Bordeaux a interdit le départ.
Par conséquent, pour l'instant, rien a faire ••• "l
lneputy Parent, "Resistance au Maroc, 11 VAINCRE, September
30, 1943, cited in Truchet, Op.cit., p.58.
223
APPEriDIX XV
ExerEt from de Gaulle 1 s Brazzaville Manifesto, October 27, 1941.
"Il n'existe plus de gouvernement français. 1 1 organisme sis à Vichy et qui prétend porter ce nom est inconstitutionnel et soumis à l'envahisseur ••• Il faut dont qu'un
POUVOIR NOUVEAU assume la charge de diriger l'éffort français
dans la guerre ••• j'exercerai IvlES POUVOIRS au nom de la France
et UNIQUE~ENT POUR LA DEFENDRE •••
Charles de Gaulle" 1
1 de Kerillis, De Gaulle, pp.41-42.
224
APPENDIX XVI
Appeal of British Consul in Tunisia to Resident General
Peyrou ton
"Le Gouvernement français actuel, en acceptant par contrainte les conditions de l'enemi visant a l'armistice, a
été empêché de faire honneur à l'engagement solennel pris
par la France envers ses alliés britanniques. Il s 1 est
resigné à accepter le fait accompli de l'occupation allemande
de la France métropolitaine; mais cette occupation ne s'étend
pas aux vastes térritoires de l'Empire d 1 0utre-Ner, qui reste
intact •••
. . .Nous
. . faisons
. . . . appel
. . . aux
. ... . .. .. . .. .. . .. ..
autorités civiles et militaires
de tous les térritoires français d'Outre-Mer pour qu'ils se
rangent a nos côtés et se battent avec nous, jusqu'à ce que
la victoire ••• Nous faisons appel a ces autorités pour qu'elles
a~dssent ainsi, même si elles recoivent du Gouvernement
siégeant en France l'ordre de se rendre a l'enemi ••• ce Gouvernement n'a pas reçu de mandat constitutionnel pour la
livraison du térritoire français."l
1 Kammerer, Armistice, pp.339-340.
225
APPENDIX XVII
Exerpt from General de Gaullets Speech, August 27, 1940, on
the Rallying of Chad
"At the instigation of her leaders ••• the Chad has given
striking proof that she is pre-eminently a land of stouthearted Frenchmen.
In spite of the extreme precariousness of her military
and economie situation, Chad territory refused to be party to
a shameful act of surrender and decided to fight on until
victory. By her admirable spirit of resolution, she has
pointed out the path of dutrr and given the signal for recovery
to the whole French Empire. rl
1
•
de Gaulle, Soeeches, p.28 •
226
APPENDIX XVIII
Extract from a Telegram from Baudouin to de la Baume,
September 25, 1940
0
Some days before the attack on Dakar the English
admiral commanding in the Atlantic told the
French admiral not to put in at Dakar as it was
in German hands. This statement was entirely
untrue as there was neither a German at Dakar
nor a German ship anywhere in the colony. No
local disturbance either among the French or the
natives required the presence of the English at
Dakar. The resistance put up proves this •
••• there has been a definite improvement in
Franco-British relations during the past weeks •••
I cannot understand what advantage England hopes
to gain by upsetting this state of affairs. It
can be said of her aggression that is was worse
than a crime - it was a blunder. 11 1
lBaudouin, Op.cit., pp.249-250.
227
APPEHDIX XIX
Churchill to General Ismay, for
"1.
c.o.s.
Committee,
Augus~
9
0
The telegram from the governor of Nigeria shows the
danger of German influence spreading quickly through
the ~est African colonies of France with the connivance or aid of the Vichy Government. Unless we act
with celerity and vigour, we may find effective Uboats bases, supported by German aviation, all down
this coast •••
2.
It is now six weeks since the Cabinet was strongly
disposed to action at Casablanca ••• Nothing, however,
cmae of this. The local French were hostile. The
Chiefs of Staff were not able to make any positive
proposals, and the situation has markedly deteriorated.
3.
It would seem extremely important to British interests
that General de Gaulle should take Dakar at the earliest
moment. If his emissaries report that it can be taken
peaceably so much the better. If their report is adverse, an adequate Polish and British force should be
provided ••• The operation once begun must be carried
through. De Gaulle should impart a French character to
it.
The Chiefs of Staff should make a plan for achieving
the capture of Dakar •••
•
s.
Let a plan be prepared forthwith •••
6.
It is not intended, after Dakar is taken, that we shall
hold i t wi th British forces. General de Gaulle 1 s acirninistration would be set up ••• British assistance being
limited to supplies on a moderate scale, and of course
preventing any sea-bourne expedition from Germanised
?rance •••
7.
••• British ships are to be used as transports whenever
convenient, and merely boist French colours •••
8.
The risk of a French declaration of war and whether it
should be courted is reserved for the Cabinet.nl
lchurchill, Their Finest Hour, pp.475-476.
228
APPENDIX XX
Warning telegram to General Noguès
A Rabat, 8 septembre, No.332.
Dechiffrez vous - même
14 heures
"Je suis informé par une source que je crois
sûre, du départ de Londres du général (last
two words crossed out and replaced by: de
M.) de Gaulle pour l'Afrique Française.
Probablement pour l'Afrique du Nord. Prenez
toutes dispositions pour l'appréhender.
Veuillez considérer 1'1. de Gaulle comme hors
la loi et employer n'importe quel moyen pour
l'empêcher de nuire.
Signe
lKammerer, Armsitice, p.380 •
•
P. Baudouin"l
229
APPENDIX. XXI
Operation Attila
11
The Iï'uehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,
Fuehrer Headquarters,
10/12/40
12 Copies
2nd Copy
Directive No. 19
Operation 1 Attila 1
Should revolts occur in parts of the French Colonial
Empire now under the command of General ',<leygand,
preparations must be made for the speedy occupation
of the territories of the French motherland which
are still unoccupied. (Operation 'Attila')
At the same time, it will be necessary for the French
Home Fleet and that part of the French Air Force
which is on home airfields to be secured, or at least
hindered from going over to the side of the enemy."l
•
lMartienssen, Op.cit., p.97. See also DocQ~ents on
German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, pp.836-B38,
Document No.~88 •
230
APPENDIX XXII
French Reply to British Proposals, Via Madrid,
October~
19
0
"Le gouvernement français accueille avec faveur les
ouvertures du gouvernement anglais tendant à mettre un terme
aux actes hostiles dont l'Empire et la flotte française ont
été l'object ou la victime ••• le gouvernement français appellent de sa part les observations suivantes:
a - Le gouvernement français n'a jamais pris l'initiative d'attaques contres des navires ou des territoires britanniques. Les operations qui ont eu lieu ••• ont toujour procédé d'initiative anglaises, dont le gouvernement français
a toujours cherché à limiter les consequences. Le gouvernement français ••• doit declarer nettement au gouvernement
anglais qu'il n'hésiterait pas à riposter avec tous ses
moyens, si des forces armées britanniques renouvelaient leurs
att'aques •••
. ..... .... ......... .. . ...... . ..
c message de lord Halifax précise que le gouvernement britannique ne peut retirer son appui à M. de Gaulle, si
celui-cé le réclame, pour "maintenir son autorité dans les
colonies française qui se rallient à sa cause." Le gouvernement français ne reconnaît ni la cause, ni l'autorité de
11. de Gaulle. Il n'existe qu'un gouvernement français •••
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .
Enfin, le gouvernement français déclare qu'il a le vif
désir de contribuer à 1 1 establissement d'un modus vivendi
acceptable, par les deux gouvernements, concernant le regime
des échanges commerciaux entre les colonies française et la
me trop ole: •• 11 1
1 charles-Roux, Op.cit., pp.352-353.
6662 of 1945, XXV, 14-16 •
•
See also H.C.Cmd.
231
APPENDIX XXIII
"Les conditions de paix séparée entre
L'Allemagne et la France.
Toujours selon de nouvelles diplomatiques reçues de
Berne, le New York Times indique comme suit, les conditions
de paix: --- ---1 -
Cession de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine a l'Allemagne;
2 -
Cession de la Riviera jusqu'à Nice à l'Italie;
3 -
La France et l'Italie se partagent l'administration de
la Tunisie;
4-
La France et l'Espagne se partagent l'administration
du ~·laroc;
5-
Les armées françaises en Syrie et dans l'Afrique du
Nord ne gêneront pas les armées italiennes dans leur
campagne d 1 Egypt
La France donnerait en outre ses bases aériennes de
l'Afrique du Nord, mais pas son aviation.
Toujours de même source, on prétend, que le maréchal
Pétain avait d 1 abord refusé, mais que Laval a insisté en
brandissant le spéctre de la famine.
Laval aurait été soutenu par Baudouin et
l'P~iral
Darlan.
Si la France acceptait ces conditions on lui accorderait,
parâit-il, un corridor du nord vers Bordeaux à travers le
territoire occupé. Il y aurait immédiate libération des
prisonniers, une modification de la ligne de démarcation entre
les deux zones, l'accès de Paris serait libre.- (D'après
Reuter) • 11 1
1 Reuter 1 s communique, FRANCE, October
•
25,
1940, p.l •
232
APPENDIX XXIV
The Rougier Protocol
XX....\.XXXX
Entretien Avec XXXXXXX
--(Blocked out}
I
Point de Vue de l'Angleterre:
A -
Décision du peuple et du gouvernement Britanniques
de mener la guerre jusqu'à l'effondrement de
l'Hitlérisme.
......... ...................
B -
Capacité du gouvernement britannique de poursuivre
la guerre
1. Appui financier des Etats-Unis.
2. Accroissement de l'appareil militaire: 10,000
avions de première ligne au printemps prochain
(altered in ink to read: 'more than 15,000 new
aeroplanes in the next 9 months 1 ) Bombardiers
avec un rayon d'action permettant de bombarder
toutes les villes d'Italie en partant de
1 1 Egypt. Maitrise de l'air au printemps.
(al te red in ink to re ad: 'in 191~1' }
C -
Durée probable de la guerre
l'Empire français
suivan~~'attitude
de
1. Avec une revolte de l'Afrique du Nord •••
2. Sans bases en Tunisie, mais avec la possibilité
d'arrêter la pénétration allemande en direction
du Canal du Suez et de l'Irak; 2 ou 3 and.
.. . .... ..... . . ... . .... .. ..
(Marp,inal note in ink:
own estimations')
D -
•
1
These are M. Rougier 1 s
Décision de la Grande-Bretagne a l'égarde de la
France
a) La rétablir dans son intégrité et sa souveraineté
si elle ne fait rien pour aider la victoire des
Totalitaires et, a fortiori, si elle contribue à
la victoire britannique. (Marginal note in ink:
1 If General Weygand will raise the standard in
N. Africa, he can count in the renewal of the
whole-hearted collaboration of the governments
and peoples of the British Empire, and of a share
of the assistance afforded by the United States')
233
b) Au cas ou le gouvernement français céderait des
bases aériennes et navales aux totalitaires, la
grande-Bretagne ne réponderait plus du sort
futur de la France et de son Empire.
(Marginal note in ink marked as supplementary
paragraph (c): 1 In such case, Great Britain would
do everything in her power to strike at a government which had been guilty of so base a betrayal 1 )
E -
Atténuation de blocus au cas où la France soit
passivement soit activement aiderait la victoire
britannique
......... ....
F -
. ... .. . . ... . .
Accord sur le statut des colonies françaises
demeurées fidèles à Vichy.
1. Le gouvernement anglais s'engage à ne plus chercher à prendre par la force ou à debaucher par
la propagande les colonies françaises demeurèes
fidèles au vouvernement de Vichy.
2. Le gouvernement anglais est averti que toute
agression contre les colonies françaises sera
repoussée par les armes •••
G -
Accord sur la Radio
La radio britannique s'abstiendra de toute critique a l'égard de ••• le Maréchal Pétain.
II
Point de vue français
A -
Le gouvernement français s'engage à ne pas
chercher à reprendre par la force les colonies
passées à de Gaulle.
2 •••• à ne céder à l'Axe ni les ports de Provence,
ni les bases de l'Afrique du Nord, du Maroc et
de l'Afrique Occidentale.
3. Le gouvernement français remettre l'Empire dans
la guerre la jour où les Anglais et leurs Alliés
éventuels auront fait la preuve de leur force •••
•
234
B -
En~agement
concernant la flotte
Le gouvernement français, conformêment aux
assurances solennelles qu'il a déjà données
••• s'engage à saborder les unités de sa
flotte plutôt que de les laisser tomber aux
mains des Allemands et des Italiens. Des
ordres, annulant tous les ordres ultérieurs,
ont été donnés à tous les Commandants dans
ce sens.
Londres, 28 octobre, 1940.
(Note rédigée dans le Cabinet de N. Strang au Foreign
Office, et soumise aux corrections et à l'approbation
du Premier Xinistre.)"l
1Rougier, Op.cit., pp.l31-136, photostat V. The British
maintain the handwritten corrections were made by Lord
Halifax and Mr. Strang, and not by Churchill. rr.c.Cmd. 6662
of 194,5, X.X.V, 8.
235
APPENDIX XXV
Clauses From the Halifax-Chevalier Agreement
"1.
It is agreed between France and England that a state of
"artificial coolness" rather than "artificial Tension"
should be maintained.
2.
Concerning the colonies which have decided to continue
to fight at the side of England, it was agreed that
the actual situation should be provisionally maintained
••• these colonies should be ultimately returned to the
French Government •••
3.
Concerning the Fleet and the Colonies, Marshal Pétain
renewed his formal assurance not at any priee nor on
any pretext to deliver them to the Axis powers. The
Fleet would scuttle itself rather than fall into the
bands of the Germans or the Italians •••
4.
English broadcasts would abstain from interfering in
the internal affairs of France.
5.
The British Government would treat in the same way as
they did coasting trade the transport by sea of necessary supplies between the French North African ports
and the French Mediterranean coast on the condition
that these products would not be transferred to territory occupied by the Axis powers. On the vital
question of petroleum and lubricating oil ••• technicians would consider the ways and means at Madrid.
French troops stationed in the Colonies and
French possessions would oppose all attempts at invasion by whoever made.
Finally, the contracting parties agreed to hold
the clauses of the Agreement, and the fact of the
Agreement itself, rigorously secret. 11 1
•
lAran, Op.cit., pp.235-236 •
236
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