The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald
Reagan
Author(s): David Carleton and Michael Stohl
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May, 1985), pp. 205-229
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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HUMAN RIGHTSQUARTERLY
The ForeignPolicy of Human Rights:
Rhetoricand Realityfrom JimmyCarter
to Ronald Reagan
David Carletonand MichaelStohl
Throughoutthe 1980 presidentialcampaign,candidateReaganclearlyand
sharplycriticizedthe Carterhumanrightspolicy, arguingthat it was morally
unsound,ineffective,andthreateningto UnitedStates'securityinterests.'According to the Reaganview, the policy was morallytenuous because it
createda double standard,condemningminorhumanrightsviolatorswhile
overlookingmajoroffenders.Itwas consideredineffectivebecause it actually reduced United States influence in the targeted nations. Moreover,
Carter'spolicywas saidto threatenUnitedStatessecurityinterestsbecause it
seriouslyunderminedregimeswhich, while imperfect,were at least proWestern. In contrastto Carter,Reaganpromisedthat he would initiatea
more realistichuman rightsprogram.By avoidingthe pitfallsof the Carter
policy and properlyunderstandingthe moralquestionsinvolved,he would
enact a policy that was both ethicallysound and politicallyeffective.
Thispaperwill firstexaminethe enunciatedprinciplesand rationalefor
the Reaganhuman rightspolicy. Thiswill be followed by a comparisonof
the Reaganand Carterpolicies as reflectedby their distributionsof United
Statesforeignassistance.Specifically,we will examinewhetherthe two adfollowedcongressionalguidelinesthatmandatea linkbetween
ministrations
United Statesforeignassistanceand the human rightsrecordsof recipient
1. Thiscritiquemaybe bestexploredin the writingsof JeaneKirkpatrick.
See, e.g., "Dictatorships and Double Standards,"
Commentary68 (November1979): 34-45. While Kirkpatrickwas not actually responsiblefor the Reaganposition, the Commentaryarticle
broughther to his attentionand is recognizedas an accuratereflectionof Reagan'sattitudes.
205
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206
andSTOHL
CARLETON
nations.2Our choice to focus on the distributionof foreignassistanceis due
to the factthatthe manipulationof foreignassistancewas a preferredinstrument of the Carterhuman rightspolicy while it has not been promotedby
the Reagan administration,which has expressed a preference for the
methodsof traditionalor "quiet"diplomacy.Thisfocus on the distributionof
foreignIassistanceis not, however,an attemptto evaluatethe Reaganpolicy
on the basisof his predecessor'scriteria.It is, rather,based on the fact that
Congresshas expressedits intentin law that foreignaid distributionshould
commitmentto human
be an importantexpressionof the administration's
so
is
an
area
where
much
in
uncertain,the distributionof aid
rights.Further,
of
a
evidence
concrete
policyoutputreflectingbudgetaryconsiderprovides
ations.
2. Congressionalinterestin humanrightswas originallyspurredby the Americancivil rights
movement,the backlashagainstAmericaninvolvementin Vietnam,and disenchantment
with the amoral character of the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford
foreign policy. See Sandy
Vogelgesang, "Domestic Politics Behind Human Rights Diplomacy,"in Toward a
Humanitarian
Diplomacy:A PrimerforPolicy,ed. TomJ. Farer(New York:New YorkUniversityPress,1980), 49-92. These events and processesshook the entrenchednational
myththatthe UnitedStateshada uniqueheritageof moralityand respectforhumanrights
worldwide.Troubledby this,a Congresscontrolledby the Democratstooks its firstprovisionalstepsto tie aid to humanrightsby passing? 32 of the 1973 ForeignAssistanceAct,
Pub.L.No. 93-189, 87 Stat.714, 733 (1973)andadding? 502Bto 22 U.S.C.? 2304 in the
1974 ForeignAssistanceAct, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat.1795, 1815 (1974) (amended
1976). Section 32 recommendedthat the President"deny any economic or military
assistanceto the governmentof any foreigncountrywhich practicesthe internmentor imprisonmentof thatcountry'scitizens for politicalpurposes,"87 Stat.733 (1973).Section
502B expanded this to "substantiallyreduce or terminatesecurity assistance to any
governmentwhich engages in a consistentpatternof grossviolationsof internationally
recognizedhumanrights"(see textaccompanyingnote 4 below forthe fulldefinition),88
Stat. 1815 (1974). Both enactmentswere only statementsof the "senseof Congress,"
ighowever,and thereforenot bindingon the president.When the Nixon administration
noredthis congressionalguidance,Congresstook steps to makehumanrightsconsiderationslegallybinding.Congressincludedlanguagein boththe 1975 International
Developmentand FoodAssistanceAct, Pub.L.No. 94-161, ? 310, 89 Stat.849, 860 (1975),and a
SecurityAssistanceandArmsExportControl
? 5028 amendmentin the 1976 International
Act, S. 2662, 94th Cong.,2d Sess., 122 Cong.Rec.9581, 9587-88 (1976),requiringaid to
be withheldif a nationhad a recordof grossviolationsof humanrights.PresidentFord
vetoed the original,bindingversion of ? 502B of the 1975 ForeignAssistanceAct, in
which Congresssimplydeleted the "senseof the Congress"language.In early 1976 he
signeda compromisebillwhich replacedthe "senseof the Congress"languagewithan introductionstatingthatthis rights-aidlinkagewas"thepolicyof the UnitedStates."International SecurityAssistanceand Arms ExportControlAct of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329,
? 301(a),90 Stat.729, 748 (1976).Eventhisqualifyingphrasewas deletedin 1978, so that
to any govcircumstances,"
securityassistanceis now prohibited,absent"extraordinary
ernmentwith a patternof grosshumanrightsviolations.22 U.S.C.? 2304(a)(2)(1982).In
economic assistanceas well. Inter1977 Congressrequiredsuch a linkageformultilateral
nationalFinancialInstitutions
Act, Pub.L.No. 95-118, ? 701, 91 Stat.1067, 1069 (1977)
(currentversion at 22 U.S.C. ? 262d (1982)). These events are discussed in Roberta
Cohen, "HumanRightsDecision-Makingin the ExecutiveBranch:Some Proposalsfor a
CoordinatedStrategy,"in Human Rightsand AmericanForeignPoliky,ed. Donald P.
Kommersand GilbertD. Loescher(NotreDame:Universityof Notre Dame Press,1979),
U.S. SecurityAssistanceon HumanRights
216-46 and StephenB. Cohen,"Conditioning
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ForeignPolicyof HumanRights
207
There is littlequestionthat the intentof Congresswas fairlywell established duringthe mid 1970s.3Both Carterand Reaganhave been charged
with implementinglawsthatcall for considerationof the humanrightspractices of recipientgovernmentswhen determiningthe amountof militaryand
economic assistancethey will receive. Congressdeclined to tie the president'shandscompletely,however,by includingescape clausesin individual
pieces of legislationthatallow aid to continuein the event of undefined"exAs we shall see, these clauses have been used
traordinarycircumstances."
to introducea varietyof concerns other
liberallyby both administrations
than humanrightsinto the foreignaid distributiondecision makingprocess.
The operationaldefinitionof humanrightsusedforthisanalysisis based
on thatfound in legislationsuch as the ForeignAssistanceActof 1974 which
singles out "consisterntpattern[s]of gross violations of internationally
recognizedhumanrights"foraction,identifyingsuch violationsas "tortureor
cruel, inhuman,or degradingtreatmentor punishment;prolongeddetention withoutcharges;or otherflagrantdenialsof the rightto life, liberty,and
the securityof the person."4 Followingthe congressionallead, we focus our
attentionon threatsto the person, particularlyextralegalexecution, disappearance,torture,and politicalimprisonment.These abuses are of an exAmericanJournalof InternationalLaw76 (April1982):246-79. Congresshad
Practices,"
also passed a varietyof country-specificprovisionsmakingaid contingentupon human
rightspractices.Such legislationhas singled out variousnations, includingArgentina,
Brazil,Chile, ElSalvador,Guatemala,Paraguay,the Philippines,SouthKorea,Uruguay,
and Zaire. For example, in fiscal 1975 militaryaid to Chile was prohibited,Foreign
AssistanceAct of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, ? 25, 88 Stat. 1795, 1802 (1974), and the
amount requestedfor South Koreasubstantiallyreduced, ibid. ? 26(a). Militaryaid to
Uruguaywas eliminatedin the ForeignAssistanceand RelatedProgramsAppropriations
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-441, ? 505, 90 Stat. 1465, 1473 (1976). The Foreign
Assistanceand RelatedProgramsAppropriations
Act of 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-148, ? 503,
91 Stat. 1230, 1239 (1977) prohibitedsuch assistanceto Argentina,Brazil,ElSalvador,
Guatemala, and Uruguay. The same Act reduced the amount requested for the
Phillipines,? 503C, 91 Stat. 1239; and eliminatedfunds for Nicaraguaand Paraguay
althoughthese countries'nameswere not specified,H.R.Rep.No. 1546, 95th Cong.,2d
Sess. 27, 31, reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &Ad. News 1878. In fiscal 1979, an indefinite ban was placed on both militaryaid and armssales to Argentina,International
SecurityAssistanceAct of 1977, Pub. L.No. 95-92, ? 11, 91 Stat.614, 619-20 (1977),as
amended by the InternationalSecurityAssistanceAct of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384,
? 12(c)(1),92 Stat.730, 737 (1978).At the end of 1981 the embargoson securityaid to
Chile and Argentinawere modifiedto requirethat the presidentcertify,among other
things, that the governmenthas made "significantprogressin complyingwith internationallyrecognizedprinciplesof humanrights"beforeassistancecould be provided.International Securityand Development CooperationAct of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113,
?? 725, 726, 95 Stat. 1519, 1553-54 (1981). See S. Cohen, this note above, at 254-56.
Congresshas also interveneddirectlyin the foreignassistanceprocess by occasionally
blockingaid requests.Forexample, in 1983 it refusedto grantGuatemalaten million
dollarsin assistancedespite Reaganadministrationinsistenceon the aid.
3. See DavidP. Forsythe,HumanRightsand WorldPolitics(Lincoln:Universityof Nebraska
Press,1983).
4. ForeignAssistanceAct of 1974, Pub.L.No. 93-559, ? 46, 88 Stat.1795, 1815 (1974)(currentversionat 22 U.S.C.? 2304(a)(2)(1982)).
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208
CARLETONand STOHL
traordinarilygross character,exact a frighteninglyhigh human cost, and
tend to be relativelyflagrant,therebymakingthem visibleand likelytargets
for concerted UnitedStatesaction. In doing so, however, we do not deny
the importanceof other abuses, such as the denialof fundamentalpolitical,
social, and economic rightsor necessities.
I. THE REAGANCRITIQUEAND REFORMULATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTSPOLICY
The Reagancritiqueand reformulationof UnitedStateshumanrightspolicy
has had two principlecurrents.First,internationalterrorismhas been introduced as a key humanrightsconcern. Second, the moralissuesinvolvedin
judgingthe relative"goodness"of regimeshave been clarified.Bothcurrents
operate to redirectattentiontowardsthe Soviet Union and its allies.
Fromthe startof their administrationof United Statesforeign policy,
Reaganand his advisorswere particularlyinterestedin internationalterrorism, which they definedas anti-stateattacks,and in identifyinginternational
terrorismas a human rights concern. In his first news conference as
terrorism
Secretaryof State,AlexanderHaig declared that, "[i]nternational
willtake the place of humanrightsin our concern, because it is the ultimate
abuse of humanrights."
5 Haigalso repeatedlycondemnedthe SovietUnion
and
for"training,
terrorists,therebydemonfunding equipping"international
and
the Soviet Union.6 By
terrorism
a
link
between
international
strating
the
terrorism
as
most
international
significantthreatto human
identifying
as the chief source of inSoviet
Union
and
further
the
identifying
rights,
by
ternationalterrorism,it was possibleto bundle humanrights,nationalsecurity, and internationalterrorisminto a single package that fit neatly (and
subtly)into the broaderUnited Statesfightagainstglobalcommunism.
also attemptedto clarifythe moralissuesinvolvedin
The administration
the
human
rightspracticesof variousregimes.Thisserved,on the
evaluating
one hand, as the basisfor criticizingthe Carterpolicy, and, on the other, as
human rightspolicy. The Reagancrithe foundationfor a more "realistic"
tique was enunciated most consistentlyand clearly by Jeane Kirkpatrick
when she was UnitedStatesAmbassadorto the UnitedNations.7Kirkpatrick
5. "TheTalkof the Town,"The New Yorker,16 February1981, 31.
6. AlexanderHaig, News Conference,28 January1981, U.S. Departmentof StateCurrent
PolicyNo. 258, 5.
7. Kirkpatrick
is not, however, the only administrationspokespersonto enunciate the
criticismsdiscussed. She has simply provided the most comprehensiveanalyses. For
discussionsby other aministrationofficials,see ElliottAbrams,"HumanRightsand the
RefugeeCrisis,"Departmentof State Bulletin82 (September1982): 43-45; WilliamP.
Clark, "PersonalLibertiesand National Security,"Departmentof State Bulletin 82
(December1982):35-38; and MichaelNovak,"HumanRightsand WhitedSepulchres,"
in Human Rightsand U.S. Human RightsPolicy, ed. HowardJ. Wiarda(Washington,
D.C.:AmericanEnterpriseInstitute,1982).
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ForeignPolicyof HumanRights
209
or
arguedthatthe Carterpolicywas flawedfromthe startdue to its "purist"
she criticizedthe
"utopian"conception of humanrights.More particularly,
policyas it was practicedfora lackof effectivenessand forfocusingsolelyon
United Statesallies. Publiclycriticizingand denyingaid to "friendly"
human
rightsviolatorswas not effective,she argued,because it delegitimizedthem,
thereby making these allies more susceptible to unfriendlyopposition
groups. Moreover,public criticismand denial of aid made these allies less
susceptibleto United States influence and pressure.Makingthe situation
worse still in her eyes, the policy was "almostinvariablyanti-Westernin its
application."8It was arguedthat the Carterhuman rightspolicyworkedto
destabilizeand undermineAmericanalliesaroundthe world. Insum, therefore, the Reagancritiqueconcluded that the Carterpolicy effectivelypromoted neitherhuman rightsnor United Statessecurityinterests.
At the heart of the Reagancritique is an entire reformulationof the
moralissuessurroundingthe human rightsissue.The Carterpolicywas funof its "purist"
condamentallymisdirectedbecause of the inappropriateness
ception of human rights.Michael Novak, the Reaganadministration's
appointee to the United NationsCommissionon Human Rights,has argued
thatthe fundamentalproblemwas thatthe Carteradministration
"pretended
that all nationserredagainsthuman rightsmore or less equally.No distinction was made between totalitariannationsand authoritarian
nations."9 It is
this, identified-byNovakas the "mostimportantdistinctionof the twentieth
considersthe basis
century,"that provideswhat the Reaganadministration
for a properconceptionof humanrightsand lies at the heartof any realistic
human rightspolicy.10
The theoreticalbackdropforthe administration's
positionon the distinction between totalitarianismand authoritarianism
is an article written by
for Commentarymagazinein 1979. At the heartof the argument
Kirkpatrick
is a trulyextraordinary
statement,as follows:
Traditional
autocrats
leavein placeexistingallocations
of wealth,power,status
andotherresources
whichin mosttraditional
societiesfavoranaffluent
fewand
maintain
massesin poverty.Buttheyworshiptraditional
godsandobservetraditionaltaboos.Theydo not disturbthe habitualrhythms
of workand leisure,
habitualplacesof residence,habitual
of familyandpersonalrelations.
patterns
Becausethemiseries
of traditional
lifearefamiliar,
to ordinary
theyarebearable
peoplewho,growingup in the society,learnto cope,as childrenbornto untouchablesin Indiaacquirethe skillsandattitudes
forsurvival
in the
necessary
miserable
rolestheyaredestinedto fill.Suchsocietiescreatdno refugees.
a ViableHumanRightsPolicy,"WorldAffairs143 (Spring
8. JeaneKirkpatrick,
"Establishing
TheReaganPhenomenon-and OtherSpeeches
1981):327. See also JeaneJ. Kirkpatrick,
on ForeignPolicy(Washington,D.C.:AmericanEnterpriseInstitute,1983).
9. Novak, note 7 above, at 82.
10. A Conversationwith MichaelNovakand RichardSchifter:HumanRightsand the United
Nations(Washington,D.C.:AmericanEnterpriseInstitute,1981), 17.
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210
CARLETON
andSTOHL
Communist
Preciselythe oppositeis trueof revolutionary
regimes.They
createrefugeesbythemillionbecausetheyclaimjurisdiction
overthewholelife
of the society....
the historyof thiscenturyprovidesno groundsforexpectingthat
Moreover,
willtransform
radical
totalitarian
themselves.
Atthemomentthereisa far
regimes
and democratization
in the
greaterlikelihoodof progressiveliberalization
of
and
Chile
than
in
the
in
of
Cuba;
Brazil,
Argentina,
governments
government
Taiwanthanin the People'sRepublic
of China;in SouthKoreathanin North
Korea;in Zairethan in Angola;and so forth.11
Leavingasidethe accuracyof this view forthe moment,the argumentis
that non-democraticgovernmentsare not all the same because of the distinctionbetweentotalitarianand authoritarian
regimes.Whilethe lattermay
be responsiblefor seriousviolationsof human rights,they are nonetheless
preferableto totalitarianregimes.When one couples this with a "realistic"
understandingthat not all regimescan be perfect,one's policy choices are
clarified.It is thus argued that a true human rightspolicy is one which
chooses the lesserover the greaterevil; it is a policywhich lendssupportto
authoritarian
regimes(howevergrudgingly)in orderto minimizethe greater
evil of totalitarianism.
The policy implicationsof this approachare broughtto lightwhen one
understandsthatthe Reaganadministration
regimes,
regardedauthoritarian
the
as
those
to
UnitedStates,while totalitarian
by definition,
regimesfriendly
regimeswere, by definition,those friendlyto the SovietUnion.12As a result,
the Reagan administrationcould assert that human rights interestsand
UnitedStatessecurityinterestswere parallel.WilliamClark,formerAssistant
to the Presidentfor NationalSecurityAffairs,highlightedthis linkagewhen
he argued that, "[t]headministrationbelieves that a strong America-an
Americawhose nationalsecurityis assured-is good for personalliberties
throughoutthe world."13In practice,this requiresthe UnitedStatesto supportpro-Westernnon-democraticregimesactively,howeverrepressivethey
may be. As explainedby formerSecretaryof StateAlexanderHaig,the "first
imperative"of a humanrightspolicy"isto strengthenthe UnitedStates,its
allies and friends,the main safeguardagainsttotalitarianaggression.14
reformulationof humanrightspolicy thus
The Reaganadministration's
includeda broadcritiqueof its perceptionof the Carterpolicy,and an expo11. Kirkpatrick,
note 1 above, at 44.
discussionand use of the concept
12. Itis thispointthatseparatesthe Reaganadministration's
of totalitarianism
from the far less polemicallygroundedwork on the subject by Carl.
Friedrich,ZibgniewBrzezinski,HannahArendt,LeonardShapiro,and others.See, e.g.,
HannahArendt,The Originsof Totalitarianism
(San Diego: HarcourtBraceJovanovich,
1968). Carl J. Friedrichand Zbigniew K. Brzezinski,TotalitarianDictatorshipand
Autocracy(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1956).
13. Clark,note 7 above, at 36.
14. "Excerpts
FromHaig'sSpeechon HumanRightsand ForeignPolicy,"New YorkTimes,21
April1981, A6.
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Policyof HumanRights
Foreign
211
sition of a complex moral argumentmeant to justify-on human rights
grounds- the unabashedpursuitof UnitedStatesnationalsecurityinterests.
The reformulation,as discussed,had two main tenets. The firstintroduced
terrorismas the principlehumanrightsconcerndirectingatteninternational
tion towardsthe SovietUnionwhichwas regardedas the sourceof such terrorism.The second emphasizedthe relativemoralsuperiorityof authoritarian United Statesfriendsas opposed to the totalitarianallies of the Soviet
Union. The resultingrhetorichas thus been primarilyconcerned with the
abuses of the Soviet Union and its allies and with preventingany further
Soviet expansion.s1
II. THE REALITYBEHIND THE RHETORIC:A COMPARISON
OF THE CARTERAND REAGANHUMAN RIGHTSPOLICIES
A. Measuring Human Rights Violations
The most significantproblem faced by all analystsof human rightsis the
developmentof a validmeans of measuringviolations.Evenwhen one has
clearlydelineatedwhat is meant by human rightsviolations,reliableinformationis often hardto come by. Thereis no adequatedatasourceavailable
and gatheringinformationis necessarilyproblematic.16
Moreover,what informationis publicly,availableis unsystematic.This is due in part to the
unevenness of global news coverage, resultingin less publicityfor human
rightsviolationsin some partsof the worldthanthose in otherregions.17Far
more important,however,is the abilityof moststatessignificantlyto control
informationconcerningtheirrightsviolations.Moststatesare not interested
in informinglargeaudiencesof such activities,and as a result,manyevents
are exposed only long afterthe fact, or are suppressedaltogether.18
Giventhese problems,we are hesitantto employ any singlemeasureof
15. Attimesthe Reaganadministration's
connectionof the humanrightsissue to the broader
United Statesfight againstthe Soviets and internationalcommunismis made explicit.
ElliottAbrams,forinstance,has statedthat"resisting
the expansionof communismis a key
humanrightsgoal."Abrams,note 7 above, at 44.
16. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt and James McCarthy,"Fact-Findingby International
Law22
Journalof International
NongovernmentalHumanRightsOrganizations,"
Virginia
(Fall1981): 1-89.
17. Foranalysesof the politicalimplicationsof this uneven coverage,see Ted RobertGurr,
Politimetrics(EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1972); EdwardS. Herman,The Real
TerrorNetwork (Boston:South End Press, 1982); Alex Schmid and Janny De Graaf,
Violenceas Communication:InsurgentTerrorism
and the WesternNews Media,(Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications,1982); and Philip Eliot et al., TelevisingTerrorism:Political
Violencein PopularCulture(New York:CharlesScribner'sSons, 1984).
18. See the discussionin RaymondD. Duvalland MichaelStohl,"Governanceby Terror,"
in
The Politicsof Terrorism,2d ed., ed. MichaelStohl (New York:Marcel Dekker, Inc.,
1983), 187-88.
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212
CARLETON
andSTOHL
human rights.Instead,we have chosen to employ three differentscales.
Takenindividually,none of the three are entirelysuitable.Eachsuffersfrom
particularweaknessesand biases. Yet, the three are derivedfrom information providedby organizationsof distinctlydifferentpoliticalorientations.
Thus,the biases builtinto the scales are not consistent.Takencollectively,
then, they provide a varied and interestingdata set. If the three parallel
analysesconducted below generatesimilarfindings,we may feel confident
that the variedpoliticalconcerns built into the scales are not skewingthe
overallanalysis.
The firstscale we have employed is taken directlyfrom the Freedom
House organization."9
Eachyear FreedomHouse rankseverycountryin the
world on a "civilrights"scale. Thisscale examinesa host of traditionalcivil
libertiesas well as the securityof the person. Thus,this scale includesfor
considerationseveralaspects of human rightsbeyond the concerns identified in the humanrightslegislativepackage.Furthermore,
veryseriousquestions have been raisedconcerningthe mannerin which FreedomHouse
constructsits scales.20The scale is includedfor considerationnonetheless,
despiteitsquestionablesuccesss, because it is the only significantattemptto
date to measure comprehensivelythe rightsin which we are interested.
Beyondthis, it seemed worthwhileto includethe scale in the analysisdue to
the respectthatthe FreedomHouse organizationcontinuesto enjoywithin
UnitedStatespoliticalinstitutions.Overall,however,we do realizethatthe
civil rightsscale is methodologicallythe weakest and least desirableof our
measures.
Oursecond andthirdindices,in which we arefarmoreinterested,were
constructedfromexistingrawdata.We took as our startingpointa "political
terror"scale publishedby FreedomHouse in its 1980 yearbook.Thisscale
distinguishesfive levels of politicalviolence and terror,as follows:
LevelA: "Countries...undera secureruleof law,peoplearenotimprisoned
fortheirviews,andtortureis rareorexceptional.
murders
.... Political
rare... ."
areextremely
LevelB: "Thereis a limitedamountof imprisonment
for nonviolentpolitical
activity.However,few personsare affected,tortureand beatingare
murderis rare...."
exceptional.... Political
is extensivepoliticalimprisonment,
LevelC: "There
or a recenthistoryof such
andbrutality
Execution
or
other
murders
may
imprisonment.
political
19. RaymondD. Gastil, Freedomin the World:PoliticalRightsand Civil Liberties1982
(Westport,Conn.:GreenwoodPress,1982).
20. Fora detailedcritiqueof the FreedomHousescales,see JohnF.McCamant,"ACritiqueof
PresentMeasuresof 'HumanRightsDevelopment'and an Alternative,"
and HarryM.
in
Scobleand LaurieS. Wiseberg,"Problemsof ComparativeResearchon HumanRights,"
Global HumanRights:PublicPolicies,ComparativeMeasures,and NGO Strategies,ed.
Ved P. Nanda,JamesR.Scarritt,and GeorgeW. Shepherd,Jr.(Boulder,Colo.:Westview
Press,1981), 123-46, 147-72.
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Policyof HumanRights
Foreign
213
be common.Unlimited
detention,withor withouttrial,for political
viewsis accepted...."
LevelD: "Thepracticesof LevelC areexpandedto largernumbers.Murders,
area commonpartof life.... Inspiteofits
andtorture
disappearances,
themthosewhointerest
level
terror
affectsprimarily
on
this
generality,
selvesin politicsor ideas."
LevelE: "The terrorsof Level D have been extended to the whole
population....The leadersof thesesocietiesplaceno limitson the
orideological
withwhichtheypursuepersonal
meansorthoroughness
goals."21
Itshouldbe clearthatthe levelsof the scale are distinguishedaccording
to the use of political killings,torture, and imprisonment.In short, the
FreedomHouse "politicalterror"scale groupsand ranksthose violationsof
humanrightsin which we are most interested.We havethereforetakenthis
scale as the basisfor constructingtwo indices,one fromthe data presented
in the annualhumanrightsreportsof the UnitedStatesDepartmentof State
and the other fromthe data presentedin the annualreportsof AmnestyInternational.Usingthe FreedomHouse scale as a guide, we used the data in
each of the annual reportsto rankthe fifty-ninecountriesincluded in the
analysisfor each year the reportshave been availablefrom 1977 to the
present. (See Appendix1.)22 In the constructionof each index, we scaled
the data presented in the reportsas if they were accurateand complete.
Thus, any biases exhibitedin the annual reportsof the two organizations
should be evidentin the indices.Giventheirparticularfocus on the rightsof
the person,these two indices more accuratelyreflectour interests,and the
analysesusingthese measureswill thereforebe our principleconcern. We
are reasonablycomfortablewith the resultsbecause of the high level of
intercoderreliabilityin constructingthese indices. While they provide us
withordinalmeasuresonly, we areconfidentthatthe nationsthatarescored
as havingthe highestrankingsare those nationswhich in the reportsof our
two sources are responsbilefor higher numbersof deaths, torture, and
politicalimprisonmentthan those below them, and that the study can be
replicated.
Insum, the three scales we employ have been developed fromsources
with differentpoliticalmotivesand assumptions.While none of the scales
would (orshould)satisfyall readers,takencollectivelythey providean interestingand very usefuldata set. Since our purposeis to test if evaluationsof
21. RaymondD. Gastil, Freedomin the World:PoliticalRightsand Civil Liberties1980,
(Westport,Conn.:GreenwoodPress,1980), 37.
22. TheAmnestyInternational
Reportsareavailablefrom1976 to 1983 (London:AmnestyInternationalPublications),while the StateDepartmentCountryReportson HumanRights
Practices,submittedto U.S. Congress,House Committeeon ForeignAffairsand Senate
Committeeon ForeignRelations,cover 1977 to 1983.
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214
and STOHL
CARLETON
countries'humanrightsrecordsarecorrelatedwiththe level of foreignassistance they receive,it will be intriguingto find if one of these "realities"
better
accordswith the rhetoricand realityof policythan do the others.Further,if
the parallelanalysesgeneratesimilarfindingsregardlessof politicalassumptions, we feel justifiedin a reasonabledegree of confidence that political
concerns have not skewed our analysis.
B. The Carter"Initiative"
In orderto determinethe accuracyof Reagan'scharacterization
of Carter's
humanrightspolicy,as well as the degreeto whichthe Reaganhumanrights
of Carter's
policydiffers,it is necessaryto examinethe actualcharacteristics
After
the
at
stated
of
the
Carter
administrapolicy.
looking
publicly
policy
tion, we will then examinethe empiricalevidence.
Carterspoke frequentlyand forceFromthe startof his administration
of
human
in
and
their
central role in the formationof
fully support
rights
United Statesforeignpolicy. He was also generallysupportiveof Congressionaleffortsto codifyhumanrightsconcerns.23Inhis inauguraladdress,the
Presidentemphasizedhis commitmentsaying,"Ourcommitmentto human
rightsmust be absolute .... Because we are free, we can never be indifferentto the fate of freedom-elsewhere.Our moralsense dictatesa clearcut
preferencefor those societieswhich sharewith us an abidingrespectfor individualhumanrights."24
Therecan be littledoubt that Mr. Carterwas both politicallyand personally committedto human rights.Accordingto the Reagancritique,in
fact, the Carteradministrationwas so strongly,indeed "single-mindedly"
committedto human rights,that it doggedlycriticizedUnited Statesallies
and denied them needed assistance.Increasingly,however, analystshave
questioned whether the Carterhuman rightspolicy actuallywas implementedwith consistencyand that,in practice,the Carterpolicywas remarkably similarto the Nixon-Fordpolicy.25In short, some contend that the
Carterpolicy was long on rhetoricand shorton action.
23. Carter'ssupportforcongressionalhumanrightsinitiativeswas not absolute,however.On
severaloccasions the Carteradministration
fought againstthe passageof humanrights
FinancialInlegislation,notablyagainstlanguagein what became the 1977 International
stitutionsAct, Pub.L.No. 95-118, ? 701, 91 Stat.1069 (1977);see note 2 above. Inmost
of these cases Carterwas apparentlyconcernedwith maintainingexecutivebranch"flexibility"in foreignpolicy. Fora discussionof these cases, see Vogelgesang,note 2 above,at
70-71.
24. "Inaugural
Addressof PresidentJimmyCarter,"20 January1977, in Publi( Papersof the
Presidentsof the UnitedStates1977, BookI (Washington,D.C.:U.S. GovernmentPrinting
Office, 1977), 2-3.
25. See, e.g., Noam Chomsky,"HumanRights"and AmericanForeignPolicy (Nottingham,
England:SpokesmanBooks,1978). Forotheranalysesof the Carterpolicy,see S. Cohen,
note 2 above; RichardFalk,HumanRightsandStateSovereignty(New York:Holmesand
MeierPublishers,Inc., 1981).
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Foreign
Policyof HumanRights
215
Ina previousanalysis,we foundthatthere was not a significantrelationship between humanrightsand UnitedStatesforeignpolicyassistanceat any
For the present
time duringthe Nixon, Ford,or Carteradministrations.26
in
we
have
data
an
order
additional
cases
to replicate
on
forty-six
analysis
and extend the earlieranalysis.To analyzethe relationshipbetween aid and
rights,we computedSpearmanrankordercorrelationsbetween the human
rightsindices and per capita militaryand economic aid for each year in
which the Carteradministrationsubmitteda budget to Congress.27(See
Table 1.)
Despite our earlieranalysis,the resultsin Table 1 remainsurprising.28
Regardlessof how one measureshuman rights,the correlationswith both
militaryand economic aid are, at best, very small.None of the correlations
are significantat the .05 level and none are meaningful.Furthermore,
the relationshipsare not consistentlynegative,as an active human rightspolicy
would require.In many cases there is a positive relationshipbetween aid
and human rightsviolations:the more abusivea state was, the more aid it
received.Clearlythe Carterpolicyand existinglegislationrequirea negative
relationshipwhich is not evidenced in these data regardlessof which scale is
employed in the analysis.
It appears that the Carterhuman rights policy was far less "singlehas portrayedit. WhileCarterand
minded"than the Reaganadministration
other administration
spokespersonsrepeatedlyraisedthe spectorof aid terthe
stick
was
mination,
actuallyused very sparingly.Over the course of the
four years Carterwas in office, securityassistancewas cut off in only eight
cases: Argentina,Bolivia,El Salvador,Guatemala,Haiti, Nicaragua,Para26. MichaelStohl, DavidCarleton,and Steven E.Johnson,"HumanRightsand U.S. Foreign
Assistance:FromNixon to Carter,"
Journalof Peace Research21 (No. 3, 1984):215-26.
27. Since we are focusing on executive decisions concerningforeignaid distribution,it is
is in
more reasonableto considerbudgetyearsthanthe actualyearseach administration
is largelythe resultof the
office. The budgetduringthe firstyear of each administration
andthusitwould not be fairto holdthemaccountableforthose
precedingadministration,
budgets.Therefore,we will considerthe fouryearsin which PresidentCartersubmitteda
budget (1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981), and the firsttwo yearsin which PresidentReagan
has submitteda budget(1982 and 1983). The assistancefigures,drawnfromthe annual
Senate Hearings on Foreign Assistance and Related ProgramsAppropriations,are
calculatedon a per capita basis.An analysisof absolutelevels of aid would be skewed
because some of the worst humanrightsviolatorsduringthis period,such as Argentina
and Indonesia,are among the most populous states as well. Evenif aid to these states
were sharplycut back, the figurewould likelyremainlargerthan that receivedby small
non-abusivestates,such as Jamaicaand CostaRica.A statisticalanalysisof absolutelevels
of aid, then, could easilyoverlookeven a veryactiveand purposefulhumanrightspolicy.
All populationstatisticsare from the WorldBankAtlas (Washington,D.C.: The World
Bank,1981).
28. Due to the moraland politicalcommitmentsresultingfromthe CampDavidtalks,Egypt
and Israelhave receivedthe lion'sshareof the UnitedStatesaid packageover the period
examined. Their position is so dominant,in fact, that when left in the analysisthey
significantlyskew the results.Therefore,Egyptand Israelhave been excludedfrom the
statisticalanalysis.
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216
CARLETONand STOHL
TABLE1
CARTER
ADMINISTRATION
RankOrderCorrelationsBetween Human Rights
and Per CapitaMilitaryand EconomicAssistance
1978: mil.
FreedomHouse
Civil Rights
-.05
Amnesty
International
-.15
State
Dept.
.02
eco.
.03
.05
1979: mil.
eco.
.03
.04
-.11
-.03
.01
-.03
1980: mil.
eco.
.08
.03
.04
-.03
-.04
-.10
1981: mil.
eco.
.03
.01
-.06
-.05
-.12
-.11
-.21
None significantat .05 or better.
Of obviousimportanceis the factthatalleightof these
guay,and Uruguay.29
cases were in LatinAmerica.Clearly,if the Carterpolicy had an impact,it
was in LatinAmerica.The extentof thisimpactand the reasonsbehindit will
be discussedin some detailin the conclusionbelow. It is importantto note
here, however, that even in these few cases the Cartercommitmentwas
something less than "absolute."In the cases of Brazil, El Salvador,
Guatemala,Argentina,and Uruguay,PresidentCarterwas sparedthe difficult aid terminationdecision. Reactingto negative Departmentof State
humanrightsreports,these countrieschose to protestwhat they saw as interferencein theirdomesticaffairsby deciding,"ontheirown initiative,that
they would not accept United States militaryassistance."30Furthermore,
economic assistancecontinued to flow to most of these countries,as did
assistancefor militaryspare partsand supportequipment.31
In short,there was a greatdeal of differencebetween the rhetoricand
the realityof the Carterhuman rightspolicy as appliedto aid distribution.
The Carteradministrationdid not significantlywithdrawmaterialsupport
from repressiveUnitedStatesfriends.It made ample use of the "extraordiclauseswritteninto humanrightslegislation.The major
narycircumstances"
emphasisof the Carterpolicywas rhetoricaland its principleimpactwas on
29. S. Cohen, note 2 above, at 270.
30. JohnSalzberg,"TheCarterAdministration-AnAppraisal:A CongressionalPerspective,"
in GlobalHumanRights:PublicPolicies,ComparativeMeasures,and NGOStrategies,ed.
Ved P. Nanda,JamesR. Scarritt,and GeorgeW. Shepherd,Jr.(Boulder,Colo.:Westview
Press,1981), 13. Accordingto Salzberg,these nationsrejectedthe aid because they consideredsuch interferenceto be an insultto their nationaldignity.Ibid.
31. S. Cohen, note 2 above, at 273-75.
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Foreign Policy of Human Rights
217
TABLE2
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
RankOrderCorrelationsBetween Human Rights
and Per CapitaMilitaryand EconomicAid
1982: mil.
eco.
FreedomHouse
Civil Rights
.03
.05
Amnesty
International
-.04
- .03
State
Dept.
-.32*
-.40*
1983: mil.
.02
.20
-.10
eco.
- .03
.03
-.27*
*
Significantat .05 or better.
domestic politics.The Reagancritiquewould thus appearmisdirected.The
Carteradministrationdid not punish United Statesfriendswhile allowing
UnitedStatesenemies to remainunscathed.Thereforethe aid policycould
not have reduced UnitedStatesinfluenceor threatenedUnitedStatessecurityinterests.These Reaganadministrationargumentsare based on the assumptionthataid was frequentlyterminated,but, as we have seen, thiswas
simplynot the case.
C. The ReaganHuman RightsPolicy in Practice
To determinewhetherthere was a significantrelationshipbetween aid and
we have computed the rankorder
rightsduringthe Reaganadministration
correlationsfor the firsttwo budget years of the Reaganadministration.
Becausethere is a two-yearlag in acquiringconfirmedaid figures,however,
the 1983 aidfiguresrepresentonly preliminaryestimatesof the aidflow. The
results,shown in Table2, are similarto those fromthe Carterperiodon the
FreedomHouse and AmnestyInternationalscales but they are notablydifferenton the StateDepartmentscale. Agains,the correlationsare quitesmall
and generallynot significant.Forboth the Carterand the Reaganadministrations there tend to be more negativecorrelationsbetween the aid and the
AmnestyInternationaland StateDepartmenthumanrightsscales than with
the FreedomHouse scale. This is probablydue to the fact that the former
scales moreaccuratelyreflectthe UnitedStatesworkingdefinitionof human
rightsby focusingalmostexclusivelyon threatsto the securityof the person.
Thus,while not a significantcorrelationin most cases, UnitedStatesaid distributiondoes generallyappearto be negativelycorrelatedwith grossviolations of human rights.
The strongerState Departmentforeign assistance correlationsmerit
some discussion because they are the only significant correlations
discovered over the entire six year period. First,the State Department
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218
CARLETON
andSTOHL
reportsare meantsto be the basisupon which executivedecisionsare made
concerningaid distributionquestions.Thus, to the extent that the correlations are negativeand significant,the Reaganadministrationis acting in a
mannerconsistentwiththe reportsand existingstatutes.Inthis regard,then,
the Reaganadministrationhas demonstratedmore consistency than the
Carteradministration.
Althoughthisgreaterapparentconsistencymaybe the resultof bringing
aid distributioninto line with the reports,it could also resultfrom bringing
the reportsinto linewithdesiredaid distributions.Theobjectivityof the State
Departmentcountryreportshas increasinglybeen questionedover the last
severalyears.32Whilewe have no basisforjudgingthe overallobjectivityof
the StateDepartmentreportshere, the factthatthe 1982and 1983 Freedom
House and Amnesty Internationalcorrelationsexhibit little or no change
fromthe 1981figures,while the StateDepartmentcorrelationsalone change
significantly,would seem to raisesome questionsabout the latterfigures'
validity.When threedisparatesourcesexhibitthe same patternforthe initial
fouryearsexamined,and only one scale deviatesin the fifthand sixthyears,
it is likelythat it resultedfromthe preparationand reportingof data rather
than from an actual policy change. As noted earlier,in constructingour
humanrightsscaleswe did not challengethe informationin the reports,but
simplyaccepted or assumedthe validityof the descriptionsand rankedthe
countries accordingly.33Therefore, any biases in the reports are also
reflectedin our scales.
Inpractice,then, the Reaganhumanrightspolicyregardingaid distribution does not appear, overall,to be significantlydifferentfrom the Carter
humanrightspolicy.Thisfactwould, no doubt,surpriserankingmembersof
does it appear
At no pointduringeitheradministration
both administrations.
fromour analysisthathumanrightsconcernssignificantlyinfluencedthe distributionof United Statesforeignassistance,whether it be militaryor economic aid. Thus,it was not surprisingto discoverthatthe best predictorof
the distributionof aid in any given year is the distributionin the previous
year. The autocorrelationfiguresof both militaryand economic assistance
are consistentlyhigh. (See Appendix2.)
32. For instance, Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, in a joint report, have noted that:
... the CountyReportsfor 1983sufferfrompoliticalbias.Thisis evidentin the languagethatis used
to describesourcesof informationabout humanrightsabusesand in the contextthatis set forthe
discussionof abuses.Invariouscountriesthatare alignedwiththe UnitedStates,..., the Country
or "claims".. .even when the
"charges,"
Reportsdiscussabuses largelyin termsof "allegations,"
evidence that has been compiledaboutabusesis overwhelming.
AmericasWatch, HelsinkiWatch, and LawyersCommitteefor InternationalHuman
Rights,Critique:Reviewof the Departmentof State'sCountryReportson HumanRights
Practicesfor 1982 (New York:AmericasWatch, HelsinkiWatch,and LawyersCommittee
for InternationalHumanRights,1983), 1.
33. Fora furtherdiscussion,see Stohl et al. note 26 above.
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ForeignPolicyof HumanRights
219
III. THERELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN
HUMANRIGHTS
RHETORIC
AND ACTION
Perhapsthe point made most clearlyby these resultsis that there is a gulf
between human rightsrhetoricand human rightsaction in United States
we have
politics.In discussingboth the Carterand Reaganadministrations,
been forced to distinguishbetween what has been said and what has actually been done. At this point, then, in assessingthe changes introducedby
in termsof humanrights,it would seem usefulto
the Reaganadministration
deal with each of these aspects in turn.
A. The ReaganAdministraion'sHuman RightsRhetoric
In examiningthe human rightsrhetoricof the Reaganadministration
three
issueswarrantattention,each of which we reviewedearlier.The firstis the
accuracyof the Reaganportrayaland critiqueof his predecessor'shuman
rightspolicy. The second, is the accuracyof the distinctionmade between
and totalitarianregimes.And, finally,there is the issue of the
authoritarian
soundnessof viewing internationalterrorismas a human rightsconcern.
First,our analysisraises serious questions about the accuracy of the
Reagancritiqueof the Carterhuman rightspolicy. The critiqueis strongly
premisedon the beliefthat the Carteradministration
activelyimplemented
its "absolute"
commitmentto humanrightsabroad.Butwe have shown that
this was not the case. Exceptin a very few cases, UnitedStatesforeignaid
distributionpolicy towardsrepressiveyet friendlyregimesdid not change.
The Reagancritiquefailed to recognize this and was thus fundamentally
flawed. In the absence of active and consistentimplementation,it is not
cleareitherthatthe Carterpolicywas ineffectivebecause it reducedUnited
Statesinfluenceor that it threatenedUnitedStatessecurityinterests.
In consideringthe distinctiondrawn by the administrationbetween
totalitariansand authoritarians,the principalquestion to be addressed is
whetheror not the distinctionpresentsan accuratepictureof the world.This
question has received considerableattention, most of it derogatoryand
polemical. But polemics aside, there are some serious problemswith the
distinction itself. The basis for the distinction is the argument that
totalitarianism
representsa more evil formof tyrannybecause such regimes
claimjurisdictionover the entiresociety. The regimeenforcescontrolover
all social institutions-politics, kinship,religion,education, and economy.
on the otherhand,are only interestedin politicalinstitutions.
Authoritarians,
They simplywant to stay in power. They do not disturbother social institutions; they maintainthe "habitualrhythmsof work and leisure, habitual
places of residence, habitual patterns of family and personal relations,"and
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220
CARLETON
and STOHL
thus are less repressiveand more acceptable.34While there is a rich
literatureon totalitarianism,
is there anythingto the distinctionas raisedby
the Reaganadministration?
Arethe regimesidentifiedby the Reaganadministrationas totalitarianand authoritarianreallylikethis?The evidence is not
convincing.
When we see an independentreligiousinstitutionplayinga significant
Poland,an extensiveblackmarketoperatingin
politicalrole in "totalitarian"
"totalitarian"
Cuba, and the continuationof significantpoliticaldissent in
"totalitarian"
Nicaragua,what are we to conclude?These regimesdo not
control all social institutions.And, conversely, can it really be said that
authoritarians
do not impingeupon"habitual"
socialpatternsand institutions
when the Guatemalanregime "scorches"whole villages, the Salvadoran
regime assassinates priests and missionaries, the Indonesian regime
eliminatestens of thousandsof Timorese,the SouthAfricanregimerelocates
hundredsof thousandsof nativeblacks,or when torturehas become an institutionalizedgovernmentpolicy throughoutmuch of the SouthernCone?
Thesetraditionalauthoritarians
are not restrictingthemselvessolely to political institutions.Timeand againthey disturbeach of the other social institutions as well.
The real problemwith the distinction,in StanleyHoffmann'swords, is
that it is based "on a confusion between the world of ideal-types ... and the
world of politicalrealities."35
The Reaganadministrationhas chosen to attributeto real governmentsthe capabilitiesof an ideal-type,even if these
capabilitiesfarexceed the government'sactualresources.An examinationof
politicalrealitiesin the countriesidentifiedby the administrationindicates
that these so-calledtotalitariangovernmentsdo not and cannot controlall
social institutions,and thatthe governmentslabeledauthoritarian
frequently
move beyond political institutionsand attack social institutionsas well.
When these realitiesare understood,choosingthe lesserof evilsis no longer
a simplematter.When authoritarianism
the moral
meldsintototalitarianism,
distinctionblursand breaksdown.
Thefinalpointto considerregardingthe Reaganadministration's
human
rightsrhetoricis its attemptto characterizeinternationalterrorismas the
"ultimateabuse of humanrights."The problemwith this argumentis that it
lacks explicit criteriaby which to judge its validity.What exactly are the
criteriato use in judging internationalterrorismto be the chief threatto
human rights?If we look at human costs as the most obvious choice, the
Reaganpositionwould appearweak. Accordingto the CIA,between 1969
and 1981 internationalterroristevents were responsiblefor less than four
thousandfatalitiesworldwide.36By contrast,the repressiveactionsof many
34. Kirkpatrick,note 1 above, at 44.
35. Stanley Hoffmann, "Reaching for the Most Difficult: Human Rights as a Foreign Policy
Goal," Daedalus 112 (Fall 1983): 42.
36. "Patternsof InternationalTerrorism: 1981," Department of State Bulletin 82 (August 1982):
11.
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ForeignPolicyof HumanRights
221
individualstateshave resultedin farmore casualities.In humanterms,then,
internationalterrorismhas been far less costly than state repression.Given
the relativegravityof the two threats,it is difficultto understandhow terrorism could be viewed objectivelyas the more serious violationof human
rights.
Reagan'shuman rights rhetoric has changed over the course of his
tenure in office. Several observers have argued that the authoritariantotalitariandistinctionand the terrorismaspects of the rhetorichave been
dropped by the administration.While it is true that the frequency with
which these elements are discussed has declined over time, it is not at all
clear that they have lost their importancewithin the administration.The
reasons behind the reduced emphasis on these aspects of the rhetorical
package appear two-fold. First,the purpose of the rhetoricwas to justify
changes in policyto both domesticand foreignaudiences.One would then
expect, quite naturally,thatitwould be givengreatestpublicemphasisat the
and would then receiveless attentionin the years
startof the administration,
that followed. Secondly,the rhetoricalargumentsran into politicalopposition that requiredthatthey be playeddown. As noted above, the distinction
and totalitarianregimeswas opposed froma variety
between authoritarian
was countered by its own CIAin its efof quarters,and the administration
forts to identifyterrorismas the most grievousviolationof human rights.
Neither of these developments, however, necessarily mean that these
aspectsof the rhetoricalpackageare no longeracceptedwithinthe administrationas accurateand as a practicalguide in decisionmaking.In fact, one
findsthat both elementsof the rhetoricare stilldiscussedexplicitlyon occasion37and, far more frequently,are implied by administrationspokespersons.38Itappears,simply,thatin responseto politicalpressures,the administrationhas dropped what are now buzzwordsfor the oppositionand explainsthe conceptualoriginsof its policy less frequently.
Overall,then, the rhetoricof the Reaganhuman rightspolicy appears
strained.Our analysishas seriouslyquestioned the Reaganinterpretation
and critiqueof the Carterpolicy, and there are significantlogicalflawswith
distinctionand the argumentthat international
the authoritarian-totalitarian
terrorismrepresentsthe greatestabuse of human rights.But,as was noted
much earlier,the variousaspectsof the rhetoricdo falltogetherquite neatly,
and do directhumanrightsconcernstowardsthe SovietUnionand itsallies.
37. See, e.g., George Schultz, "HumanRightsand the Moral Dimensionof U.S. Foreign
Policy,"Departmentof State Bulletin83 (April1984): 17-18.
The Challengeto the Democracies,"U.S. Departmentof
38. See GeorgeSchultz,'Terrorism:
StateCurrentPolicyNo. 589 (June1984), 3; U.S. Departmentof State,CountryReportson
Human RightsPracticesfor 1981, submittedto U.S. Congress,House Committeeon
ForeignAffairsand Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,97th Cong., 2d sess.,
February1982; U.S. Departmentof State,CountryReportson HumanRightsPracticesfor
1982, submittedto U.S. Congress,HouseCommitteeon ForeignAffairsand SenateCommitteeon ForeignRelations,98th Cong., 1st sess., February1983.
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222
CARLETON
andSTOHL
Foran administrationsincerelycommittedto the reassertionof American
strength,such rhetoricthus has a clear utility.
B. The ReaganAdministration'sHuman RightsPolicyin Action
the evidence indicates
Turningto the actionsof the Reaganadministration,
that very littlewas done in the way of redirectingthe distributionof United
Statesforeignassistance.As in the Carteradministration,
the distributionof
aid has had very littleto do with the level of respect for human rightsin
recipient nations. This apparentcontradictionof the law is generallyexplained in either of two ways. The most common is the invocationof the
circumstances"escape clause. These circumstancesremain
"extraordinary
undefinedin the humanrightslegislativepackage,and thus may be defined
by the executive as broadlyas it wishes, a point to which we will return
shortly. Secondly, the administrationhas justifiedits behaviorthrougha
of the legislativelanguagecallingfor UnitedStatesaccreativeinterpretation
tion in cases exhibitinga "consistentpatternof grossviolations."While acceptingthatthere are grossviolationsof humanrightsin a numberof countrieswhich it activelysupports,the administration
has arguedeitherthatthe
violationsare not consistentor thatthey do not representa pattern,and thus
the law does not apply.39 The upshot of all of this, of course, is that the
has not denied foreign
likethe Carteradministration,
Reaganadministration,
assistancein the mannercalled for by Congressionalstatutes.
The extraordinarycircumstancesclause found in most human rights
to introducea varietyof
legislationhas been used by both administrations
concernsto the foreignaid decision makingprocess.The inclusionof such a
clause representsat least the tacit recognitionon the partof Congressthat
concernsother than humanrightsmay impingeupon foreignaid decisions.
As in other policyareas,decision makerfrequentlyseek to achieve a variety
of diversegoalswiththe foreignaid policyinstrument.Beyondhumanrights
concerns,decision makersmayalso seek to achieveor improvepoliticalobjectives, militarysecurity, and/or economic management or efficiency.
Thereis also, of course,the problemof bureaucraticand budgetaryinertia.
As we haveseen, this latterpointis highlightedby the consistentlyhighautocorrelationcoefficientsfound among the yearlyforeignaid figures.Policy
makersin any administrationare forced to juggle these often competing
39. See NicolaiN. Petro,ThePredicamentof HumanRights:TheCarterand ReaganPolicies,
Vol. V (New York:UniversityPressof America,1983),58. The creativeuse of the extraordinarycircumstancesclause and strainedinterpretationsof legislativelanguage is not
however. Fora discussionof similaractionson the
uniqueto the Reaganadministration,
partof the Carteradministrationsee S. Cohen, note 2 above, at 264.
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ForeignPolicyof HumanRights
223
pressuresand concerns. It is clearfromthe passageof such a broadhuman
rightslegislativepackage,however,thatthe Congressfeels thatconsiderable
weight should be given to humanrightsconcernsvis-a-visthese other concerns.
What we have found in our analysis,of course, is that in the final inhave either preferredor
stance both the Carterand Reaganadministrations
felt compelled to pursue one or more of these other interestswith the
foreign aid instrument.In the competitionamong these variousinterests,
there are but a few cases in which the human rightsconcern has been
judged compelling.In the vast majorityof instances,some combinationof
"otherinterests"has been judged more importantthan the promotionof
humanrights.Whilethisfindingis the mostcentralto our analysisand points
out an importantsimilaritybetween the two administrations,it is nevertheless true that the manner in which these interestsare juggled point us
towardsa significantdifferencebetween the administrations.
There is no question that PresidentCarterand many of his top appointees were sincerelycommittedto the cause of human rights.Yet, we
have foundthatthis concern was only rarelydeemed compellingin foreign
aid decisions. Stephen Cohen, Deputy AssistantSecretaryof State for
HumanRightsand SecurityAssistanceduringthe Carteradministration,has
explainedhow the administration
weightedthe variousconcerns relevantto
He
notes
aid
distribution.
that the administrationadopted a very
foreign
liberalinterpretationof the extraordinarycircumstancesclause, and thus,
except in regardto a numberof LatinAmericancountries,alwaysfoundthat
extraordinaryinterests existed. Apparently,the administrationrequired
some, though very little,argumentand substantiationto invokethe clause.
As Cohen explains it, "TheAdministrationdid requiresome showing of a
substantialand specific interestbefore the exception for extraordinarycircumstanceswas available.A mere desireforcordialrelations,withoutmore,
was never held sufficient.... However, once a specific interestof some
substantialitywas cited, the exception was usuallyinvoked."40
Examplesof specificinterestscited by Cohen includecountriesclose to
the Soviet Union or Sovietallies,those with U.S. militarybases, those who
were membersin pro-Westernsecurityorganizations,and those with major
resourcesused in the UnitedStates.Obviously,these and similararguments
can be made for virtuallyall United Statesaid recipients.Apparently,the
only region for which such argumentscould not be musteredwas Latin
America.Thispoint is confirmedby Cohen who explainswhy each of those
few countriesin which aid was terminatedwas in LatinAmerica.41
It seems clear that despite its commitmentto human rights,the Carter
40. S. Cohen, note 2 above, at 270.
41. Ibid.at 271.
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224
CARLETON
andSTOHL
administrationwas never actuallywillingto wager a potentialpoliticalor
securityriskin favorof humanrights.Itis importantto considerthe implications of this point. Even an administrationthat made an ideological and
moralcommitmentto humanrightsfound it easy to give consistentlygreater
concerns. Nevertheless,the
priorityto more traditionaland "hard-nosed"
Carterpolicy had a positiveimpactas regardsLatinAmerica.Inthe absence
of any perceivedsecurityrisksto the UnitedStates,the Cateradministration
was willingto emphasizehumanrightsconcernsover what may have been
diplomaticor economic interests.Thus,while an examinationof the weight
given competingclaimsin foreignaid decision makingindicatesthatin most
instancesthe Carterand ReaganAdministrations
acted similarly,one may
find subtle differences.
Whilethe Carteradministration
was willingto pursuehumanrightsconcerns in LatinAmerica,the Reaganadministrationhas apparentlyfound
other interestsmore compelling. Shortlyafter assumingoffice, President
Reaganremovedthe bans on severalformsof aid to Argentina,Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. He more recently lifted the arms embargo against
Guatemala,and he has repeatedlyfloated the idea of resumingforeign
assistanceto Guatemalaas well. Thus, in short, it appearsthat the policy
makersin the Carteradmin'istration
did give greaterweightto humanrights
than to.many other non-securityrelatedconcerns. Inthis, they standapart
fromthe Reaganpolicymakersthatfollowedthem. Butagain,the overriding
fact is thatboth administrations
alwaysfound securityinterestsmore importantthan humanrightsconcernswhen they were seen to be in competition.
Thissimilarityfundamentallyshaped theirforeignassistancedecisions,and
thus one does not find significantoverall differencesin the human rightsforeignassistancerelationshipin the two administrations.
As noted in the introduction,it may not be altogetherfairto judge the
Reaganadministrationaccordingto criteriawhich it disapproves.Despite
the reasonableclarityof Congressionalintent, the administrationhas consistentlystatedthat it did not approveof the use of foreignassistancein the
manner prescribedby human rights legislation.42It has argued that the
instrumentsof a humanrightspolicyshould be chosen accordingto the criterion of effectiveness,and that "inthe majorityof cases this criterionsugThe administrationhas congests an emphasison traditionaldiplomacy."43
sistentlypromotedthe use of traditionalquiet diplomacyor constructive
engagement.Thus,in concluding,it mightbe usefuland interestingto exam42. The administration
has given some groundon its originalpositionconcerningthe use of
foreignaid in promotinghumanrights.Inthe introductionto its 1982 humanrightsreport,
statedthat:"Decisionson foreignassistanceprovidedby
for instance,the administration
the United Statestake humanrightsconditionsinto account.The transferof police and
militaryequipmentis carefullyreviewedin orderto avoid identifyingthe United States
with violatorsof humanrights."CountryReportsfor 1982, note 38 above.
43. CountryReportsfor 1981, note 38 above, at 11.
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Policyof HumanRights
Foreign
225
ine brieflythe questionof effectiveness.By lookingat the questionof effectiveness ratherthan consistency with United States statutes,how do the
Carterand Reaganhuman rightspolicies compare?
C. Effectivenessof the Reaganand CarterHuman RightsPolicies
The Reagancritique has stronglyemphasized the ineffectivenessof the
Carterpolicy.44 It has attributedthe "loss"of Iranand Nicaraguato the
policy, highlightedBrazil'scancellationof its mutualassistancepactwith the
UnitedStates,anc cited the continuingviolationsand reducedUnitedStates
influence in Argentina,Guatemala,South Africa,and other states. Butthe
case is actuallyquite mixed. While the Carterpolicy clearlyhad its limitations, it did achieve severalsuccesses. The continuationof democraticrule
in the DominicanRepublic,the relativelymoderatecourse of the government of Zimbabwein itsfirstyears,and the releaseof significantnumbersof
individualpolitical prisonersmay reasonablybe attributedto the Carter
human rightspolicy.45
The difficultyin evaluatingthe effectivenessof the Reaganpolicy is, as
explained by ElliottAbrams,AssistantSecretaryof Statefor Human Rights
and Humanitarian
Affairs,that"[t]raditional
diplomacyhas the drawbackof
where
it
visible
is
most
least
successful."46In other words,
being
precisely
since traditionaldiplomacyis most effectivewhen it is conducted behind
closed doors, with littleor no publicfanfare,a very effectivepolicy may appearto observerseitheras a policyof apathyor as no policyat all. Giventhe
natureof such a closed-doorprocess,informationis necessarilylimited.We
humanrightsscale, forwhich we have
have used our AmnestyInternational
the most information,to get some feeling- admittedlycrude- forthe aggregate impactof the Reaganpolicy. Over the course of the firsttwo yearsof
the human rightssituationimprovedin seven of
the Reaganadministration,
the fifty-ninecountries in our analysisand worsened in eight others. This
in which five imcomparesto the firsttwo yearsof the Carteradministration
two
and
four
The
for
the
administrations
are not
worsened.
proved
figures
human
at
the
different.
situation,
then,
Looking
rights
aggregate
significantly
we cannot say that the Reaganhuman rightspolicy has been noticeably
more or less effectivethan the Carterpolicy.
It is extremelydifficultto evaluatethe effectivenessof quiet diplomacy
on a case-by-casebasis,but in those stateswhere the Reaganadministration
note 1 above.
44. See Kirkpatrick,
45. See Hoffman,note 35 above, at 44; ElizabethDrew, "A Reporterat Large(Human
The New Yorker,18 July1977, 59; AnthonyLewis,"AQuestionof Humanity,"
Rights),"
New YorkTimes,28 February1977, 27.
46. CountryReportsfor 1981, note 38 above, at 11.
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226
CARLETON
and STOHL
has been particularly
active,such as ElSalvadoror SouthAfrica,the situation
best efdoes not appearencouraging.Despite the Reaganadministration's
forts in El Salvador,there is little reason to believe that the condition of
humanrightshas improvedsubstantially.47
Infact,the only thingthathasappearedto influencethe behaviorof the Salvadoranmilitaryis the proximity
of the next Congressionalreviewof its respectfor humanrights-the threat
of aid termination.48
And in SouthAfrica,where the policy of constructive
has
been
most extensivelypromoted,there is also littlereason
engagement
for optimism.The South Africansremain entrenched in Namibia, many
thousandsof nativeblackscontinueto be relocatedto homelands,and arbitraryarrestsand imprisonmentscontinue unabated.49
Finally,it might also be useful to consider the effectivenessof each
policy in terms of its impact upon the victims of these regimes.Michael
Walzerhas rightlyencouragedall of us to give some thoughtand sympathy
to "the tortureddissidents,the imprisonedoppositionists,the threatened
minorities,all the 'disappeared'and murderedmen and women of all the
tyrannies,old and new."50Thisis of courseprudentadvice;we shouldnever
lose sightof those who suffermost. Itis in thisareathatthe Carterpolicywas
perhapsmost successful.Upon emergingfromthe depths of the repressive
machineryof the formerArgentineregime,Jacobo Timermanpubliclyexpressed his gratitudefor Carterand his humanrightspolicy, saying,"Those
of us who were imprisoned,those who are in prisonstill,will never forget
PresidentCarterand his contributionto the battlefor human rights."-s
Whateverelse maybe saidaboutthe Carterpolicy,the rhetoricpursued
did mitigatea degreeof the lonelinessthatmustbe felt by each humanrights
victim. It also raisedthe world'sconsciousnessof human rights,and thus
provideda measureof hope for the victims.5s2Unfortunately,the rhetoricof
the Reaganapproachoffers the victims of human rightsabuses no such
hope. Thisoften forgottensense of effectivenessis, in Timerman'swords,a
case where "[q]uietdiplomacyis surrender."
53
47. AmnestyInternational,note 33 above, at 132-37.
48. The Reaganadministration
itselfhas apparentlynow realizedthis. Inthe pastyear, both
Vice PresidentBushand Secretaryof StateShultzhave been sent to ElSalvadorto criticize
publiclythe regime'shuman rightsviolationsand threatenthe terminationof United
Statesaid if the situationdoes not improve.
49. Joseph Lelyveld,"ForPretoria,LawsAre Basicto KeepingBlacksin Check,"New York
Times,10 October1983, 1, A6.
The Theory of Tyranny,the
50. Michael Walzer, "Totalitarianism
vs. Authoritarianism:
Tyrannyof Theory,"Dissent28 (Fall1981), 403.
51. "Timerman
CriticizesReaganon HumanRightsPolicy,"New YorkTimes,15 June1981,
A5.
52. Drew, note 45 above.
53. Quoted in JudithMiller,"RightsVictimis a Potent Presenceas SenatorsAssess Reagan
Choice,"New YorkTimes,20 May 1981, A14.
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Policyof HumanRights
Foreign
227
In sum, United Statesforeignpolicy underboth PresidentsCarterand
Reaganhas been characterizedby a sharpdistinctionbetween the rhetoric
and the realityof humanrightspolicy.Moreover,there is a sharpdifference
in the rhetoricof the two administrations.
We have seen that the rhetorical
aspects of the Reagancritiqueand reformulationof human rightspolicy
have demonstratedempiricaland logicalflaws. In contrast,the practiceof
on foreignaid distributionhas been
the Carterand ReaganAdministrations
similar.
Neither
administration
has acted in accordancewith the
remarkably
establishedhumanrightslegislativepackage.Thus,while the Reaganadministrationhas produceda rhetoricon humanrightspolicythatis radicallydifferentfromthatof the Carteradministration,
the policyoutputsin the areaof
not
more
assistance
are
coherent.
Decisionson the distribution
foreign
any
of UnitedStatesforeignassistancecontinueto be made with interestsother
than humanrightsin mind.WhileCarter'spolicymay have failedwhile raising expectations,Reagan'spolicy offersno hope whatsoever.
APPENDIX1
The Human RightsRankings*of 59 CountriesBasedon the Annual Reportsof
Amnesty International(AI)and the United StatesState Department(SD)
1977
Country
Argentina
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Brazil
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran
Israel
1978
1979
1981
1980
1982
1983
AI SD AI SD Al SD AI SD AI SD AI SD AI SD
5
3
3
4
4
4
3
-
2
3
3
3
2
1
5
3
3
4
5
3
-
2
3
2
3
2
1
3
3
4
5
5
4
3
4
4
2
2
2
2
3
4
3
3
1
3
1
2
4
3
2
3
3
3
5
5
3
5
4
3
4
3
3
2
2
2
4
5
2
3
2-2
2
2
2
3
4
2
5
3
3
3
4
5
-
4
2
2
3
2
3
3
3
1
3
4
4
3
5
2
2
2
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
2
3
1
4
2
3
4
2
5
4
-
4
3
1
5
4
-
3
3
1
3
3
3
4
3
3
4
5
-
3
3
5
4
3
5
5
2
3
4
3
2
2
2
1
4
5
1
4
3
3
2
3
3
-
2
2
3
4
4
2
4
3
3
3
3
3
5
2
4
5
3
3
5
3
4
4
4
5
2
5
3
3
3
3
5
3
3
5
2
3
2
2
4
2
-
-
2
3
5
4
5
4
4
4
5
4
2
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
1
3
3
3
4
4
3
4
4
2
3
3
3
2
2
3
3
1
2
2
3
4
4
3
4
3
2
2
3
3
5
2
3
5
4
3
5
3
4
3
4
5
2
1
2
3
4
4
3
4
3
3
2
3
3
5
2
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228
CARLETON
and STOHL
APPENDIX1, Continued
The Human RightsRankings*of 59 CountriesBasedon the Annual Reportsof
AmnestyInternational(AI)and the United StatesState Department(SD)
1977
Country
1978
1979
1981
1980
1982
1983
AI SD AI SD AI SD Al SD AI SD AI SD AI SD
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
2
3
-
1
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
-
-
2
3
4
3
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
4
3
3
4
-
2
2
2
3
2
3
----1
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
4
3
2
2
3
4
4
4
4
3
3
2
3
3
3
2
1
2
3
4
3
4
3
1
3
2
3
2
3
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
3
1
1
2
3
3
2
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
4
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
1
3
3
2
2
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
4
2
1
2
Somalia
-
2
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
3
South Korea
Sudan
Suriname
Taiwan
Tanzania
Thailand
Trinidad &
Tobago
Tunisia
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yemen, N.
Zaire
Zambia
3
3
3
2
3
3
2
3
3
---3
3
3
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3.
2
2
3
2
3
1
2
2
3
3
2
2
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
2
3
2
2
3
4
3
3
3
-
3
2
3
3
3
3
1
1
2
3
2
3
3
3
-
2
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
3
4
4
3
2
2
2
3
2
3
3
3
-
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
-
1
1
4
1
2
2
2
1
3
3
3
2
3
3
2
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Lebanon
Liberia
Malaysia
Mali
Mexico
Morocco
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Singapore
3
3
4
4
3
3
3
3
5
-
5
3
4
-
2
2
2
2
1
3
2
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
5
2
4
3
4
4
-
4
3
5
3
3
-
3
4
3
4
3
3
2
3
4
2
4
3
1
2
2
3
2
1
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
3
3
5
4
4
4
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
2
2
-
2
4
4
4
4
3
2
3
2
3
3
4
2
1
2
3
1
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
2
3
2
3
3
2
2
3
4
1
2
3
3
4
3
4
3
* Eachscale runsfrom1 to 5, where 1 equalsgreatrespectforhumanrightsand5 equalsa low
level of respect.
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229
ForeignPolicyof HumanRights
APPENDIX2
Autocorrelationsof Absoluteand Per CapitaU.S. Military
and EconomicAid, 1977-1983
1977 to '78
1978 to '79
1979 to '80
1980 to '81
1981 to '82
1982 to '83
MilitaryAid
(absolute)
MilitaryAid
(percapita)
EconomicAid
(absolute)
EconomicAid
(percapita)
.94
.97
.90
.95
.89
.71
.98
.87
.60
.94
.95
.99
.92
.97
.95
.92
.92
.96
.82
.83
.78
.69
.81
.98
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