Bertrand Russell, "Appearance and Reality"
----------------------------Common Sense Reality vs. Philosophically Defensible Reality
Sense information about objects fails to reflect the "real" object (whether here we speak of color,
texture, shape, hardness, etc.). The latter is an inference we make from what we actually sense.
But what do we actually sense?
Color of a table:
Common Sense Belief: the table has a stable color which my sight reveals to me.
But to grasp what we really see, think like a painter who must reconstruct what is literally
presented to sight:
What looking at what I see like a painter reveals to me:
Some parts are brighter than others (where the light is reflected)
These parts are a different color than the darker parts
If I move, the distribution of hues presented to me will change
If I change the source of light, I change the colors presented to sight
If I look at the table through blue-tinted glasses, the colors presented to sight change
If I look in the direction of the table when it is dark, the I cannot see the table at all…. ‘it’
has no color at all (unless things that cannot be seen have color….this is getting worse and worse!)
Conclusion: the table has no stable color
Conflict: common sense proposes that the table has a stable color, but my more-careful
assessment of the evidence shows this is a mistake. What should I believe about the color of the
table?
Texture of a table:
Common Sense Belief: the tabletop has a stable texture which my sight and touch reveal to
me.
What looking at what I see like a painter reveals to me:
To the eye: surface of the table looks smooth.
To a microscope: the surface of the table is ragged, with hills and valleys.
Interim Conclusion: the texture as presented to the microscope is the real texture of the
tabletop.
To a stronger microscope: the surface looks different (steeper hills, deeper valleys, new
components of each)
Final Conclusion: the table has no stable texture
Locke steps in to save us from ourselves. He points out that color and visible texture are unstable
features of physical objects, but shape is a permanent and stable feature of physical objects. What
we perceive of color and texture is determined by the stable features of objects we don’t perceive
directly.
Ok, then the Shape of a Table should be Stable:
But is it?
Consider: we see nonparallel lines that are really parallel; we see sides that appear of
different lengths but are of equal lengths; rectangles that have nothing but right angles appear to
have two oblique angles and two acute angles, etc.).
Conclusion: even the shape of physical objects is unstable!
Upshot: our idea of the 'real' object is based on an inference, and if we never directly perceive the
real properties of the object, two questions arise:
1. Is there a real object?
2. What sort of object is it?
To solve this problem, we must use Russell’s Toolbox of Useful Terms:
“Sense-data” = what is immediately known in sensation
“Sensation” = the experience of being immediately aware of sense-data
“Physical Object” = the cause of our sensations and of sense-data
“Matter” = the aggregation of all physical objects
How to use these terms: The color, texture, shape of the table are sense-data we know about due to
our sensations of color, texture, shape, and are caused by the properties of the physical object (the
table). Matter is known by means of the aggregation of sense-data generated by the properties of
all physical objects of which we have experience (sensations).
This leads to two new questions that parallel #1 and #2 above:
1a. Is there any such thing as matter?
2a. If so, what is its nature?
Berkeley on the existence of ‘matter’ (as expressed using Russellian Toolbox of Terms):
The idea of a mind-independent material object subsisting in space is self-contradictory for
two reasons:
a) because our evidence for material objects consists entirely of sense-data based on the
sensations we experience, and
b) because our concept of the existence of a material object depends on the existence of
the sensations we experience
Since we never experience the cause of our perceptions, we have no rational basis to assert
that something we have never experienced exists.
Therefore: all that exists are sensations, i.e., experiences of sense-data
Russell thinks this argument is mistaken, but he admits it is very powerful and persuasive.
It is powerful and persuasive because one thing it assumes is true: what we immediately perceive is
neither physical objects nor matter in general, but sense-data by way of our sensations.
In other words, what we perceive is Appearances, which both common sense and deep
philosophical reflection suggest are caused by Real Properties of Mind-Independent Objects (aka
Reality)
Russell’s first task is now to answer the question this picture poses for us: does Matter exist?
This is really just the question: can be justify our belief in the existence of mind-independent
objects?