Psychology and Aging
2012, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1191–1203
© 2011 American Psychological Association
0882-7974/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0022031
Reducing Misinformation Effects in Older Adults With
Cognitive Interview Mnemonics
Robyn E. Holliday and Joyce E. Humphries
Rebecca Milne
University of Leicester
University of Portsmouth
Amina Memon
Lucy Houlder, Amy Lyons, and Ray Bull
Royal Holloway, University of London
University of Leicester
We examined the effect of a prior Modified Cognitive Interview on young and older adults’ recall of a
short film of a staged crime and subsequent reporting of misinformation. Participants viewed the film
followed the next day by misinformation presented in a postevent summary. They were then interviewed
with either a Modified Cognitive Interview or a control interview followed by a recognition memory test.
A Modified Cognitive Interview elicited more correct details and improved overall accuracy compared
to a control interview in both age groups, although the young adults recollected three times more correct
information in a Modified Cognitive Interview than the older adults. In both age groups, correct
recollections of person and action details were higher in a Modified Cognitive Interview than a control
interview. Importantly, older adults who were interviewed with a Modified Cognitive Interview were not
susceptible to misinformation effects.
Keywords: aging, Cognitive Interview, misinformation effect, eyewitness, suggestibility
tend to perform worse than young adults when recalling statements
(Nyberg, Baekman, Erngrund, Olofsson, & Nilsson, 1996), prose
(Carlesimo et al., 1998), and long word lists (Cohen, Sandler, &
Schroeder, 1987). Although only a handful of studies have compared young and older adults’ memories in an eyewitness context,
for the most part the results of this research mirror the findings
from conventional memory tests. Older adults are less accurate and
less complete in their recollections of simulated crimes whether
questioned immediately or up to 1 week later (Aizpurua, GarciaBajos, & Migueles, 2009; Brimacombe, Quinton, Nance, & Garrioch, 1997; Craik, Byrd, & Swanson, 1987; List, 1986; Yarmey &
Kent, 1980).1 Why is this so?
A number of theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain
these ubiquitous findings (for a review, see Luo & Craik, 2008).
Typically, such accounts have focused on cognitive deficits in
terms of speed of processing (e.g., Salthouse, 1985), available
processing resources (e.g., Hastroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak,
1990), reduced cognitive control (e.g., Park & Hedden, 2001),
semantic knowledge (e.g., Wegesin, Jacobs, Zubin, Ventura, &
Stern, 2000), associate deficits (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000), feature
binding (e.g., Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996), effortful self-initiated
processing (e.g., Craik, 1994), and environmental support (e.g.,
Craik, 1986, 1994). The environmental support account of memory
recall proposes that older adults’ memories will be enhanced if
contextual cues are available at the time of recall. If this theory is
correct, it is expected that the context reinstatement instruction of
Obtaining reliable eyewitness testimony from older witnesses
has become a key concern to policy makers and professionals in
recent years. Clearly, there is a need for a set of protocols that is
specifically designed to maximize accurate testimony from older
individuals. Such protocols should be theoretically based and be
subject to rigorous empirical testing. Given the difficulties surrounding interviewing older witnesses (rapid forgetting, attention
problems), shortened, developmentally appropriate interview protocols would be extremely useful. We examined whether a Modified Cognitive Interview modeled on Holliday’s (2003b) protocol
was effective in increasing older witness’s memories of a simulated robbery. We also examined whether this interview protocol
reduced older adults’ subsequent acceptance of misinformation as
has been reported with other vulnerable witness groups such as
young children (Holliday, 2003b; Holliday & Albon, 2004).
What Is Known About Older Adults’ Memories?
In general, research reports that memory accuracy declines with
advancing age in a number of contexts. For example, older adults
This article was published Online First March 28, 2011.
Robyn E. Holliday and Joyce E. Humphries, School of Psychology,
School of Psychology, University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom;
Rebecca Milne, Institute of Criminal justice Studies, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom; Amina Memon, Department of
Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, London, United
Kingdom; Lucy Houlder, Amy Lyons and Ray Bull, School of Psychology,
University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom.
This research was funded by The Leverhulme Trust.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Robyn E.
Holliday, School of Psychology, University of Leicester, Leicester, United
Kingdom. E-mail: [email protected]
1
For a discussion of face identification research with older adults (which
is beyond the scope of this paper), see Bartlett and Memon (2007) and
Memon, Gabbert, and Hope (2004).
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HOLLIDAY ET AL.
1192
the Cognitive Interview should increase recall in the older participants during this interview.
The Cognitive Interview
The original Cognitive Interview was developed to improve
eyewitness testimony of adults (Geiselman et al., 1984). The four
cognitive components are based on two memory principles, encoding specificity (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) and varied retrieval
(Tulving, 1974). Retrieval of a particular memory is more effective
if there is an overlap in specific features from the encoding and
retrieval contexts (Flexser & Tulving, 1978). This overlap is
facilitated by two of the components: (1) context reinstatement:
Mental reconstruction of the physical and personal contexts surrounding the event to be recalled, and (2) report all: Relate all
details regardless of their perceived relevance. Distinct memory
traces can also be accessed via retrieval methods that minimize
reliance on expectations and prior knowledge (Bower, 1967; Tulving, 1974). Varied retrieval is facilitated by a further two components: (3) change perspective: Recall the event from the perspective of another participant or location in the same event, and (4)
change order: For example, recall the event in reverse order, from
the last temporal detail recalled to the first detail recalled.
The Enhanced Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992)
retains these four cognitive instructions. The Enhanced Cognitive
Interview also underlines the importance of social dynamics and
communication principles such as building rapport, witness compatible questioning, focused retrieval, and Transfer of Control of
the interview to the interviewee (Wright & Holliday, 2003). Social
factors such as negative stereotypes about memory in older age can
make older adults overly cautious about reporting information
(Hess & Hinton, 2006). The Enhanced Cognitive Interview may
ameliorate this because the importance of reporting all remembered details regardless of their perceived relevance (Report all
instruction) is emphasized to the interviewee, and because the
Transfer of Control instruction stresses that the witness is the
expert about the to-be-remembered event. What is known about
older adults’ memories when they are interviewed with an Enhanced Cognitive Interview?
Older Adults and the Enhanced Cognitive Interview
A handful of studies have assessed the effectiveness of the
Cognitive Interview techniques (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) with
older adults and some of these have limitations (for reviews, see
Holliday, Brainerd, Reyna, & Humphries, 2009; Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, in press). In an early study, young (18 –35 years) and
older (65– 80 years) adults viewed a film of a simulated robbery
(Mello & Fisher, 1996). Thirty minutes later, they were given a
standard police interview, a full Cognitive Interview comprising
all four cognitive instructions, or the shorter Cognitive Interview in
which the change perspective instruction was omitted. Older adults
recalled more correct information than young adults when given
Cognitive Interviews. However, these findings should be interpreted cautiously because the young and older groups were given
different types of Cognitive Interview instructions; the older adults
were given the shorter Cognitive Interview whereas young adults
were given the full Cognitive Interview. In addition, the interviewers of the older adults slowed the pace of the interview and used
simple vocabulary, both of which could be taken as condescending
and, potentially harmful to the establishment of good rapport (e.g.,
La Tourette & Meeks, 2000).
Dornburg and McDaniel (2006) reported increased recall of
correct details with Cognitive Interview instructions when young
and older adults were tested repeatedly on their memories for a
story. There are a number of methodological differences between
this research and others discussed in this paper. Participants were
not interviewed using the phased approach characteristic of Cognitive Interview protocols and there was no question phase. Moreover, they were given one Cognitive Interview instruction per
retrieval attempt over some weeks. We know that much new
information is recollected in the question phase of Cognitive
Interviews (Holliday, 2003b). In the current study, interviewers
asked open-ended and specific closed questions (cf. Achieving
Best Evidence, 2001) about details recollected in the free recall
phase.
Two studies by Wright and Holliday (2007a, 2007b) provided
further evidence that a revised Cognitive Interview can increase
correct remembering in older witnesses. In the first, very older
adults’ (75–95 years) memories of a filmed car theft were increased by 30% with Cognitive Interview instructions (Wright and
Holliday, 2007a). In a second study, Wright and Holliday (2007b)
compared the recollections of very older adults (75–96 years) who
had cognitive impairments detected on the Mini-Mental State
Examination (MMSE) (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) with
very older adults without cognitive impairments on this test. Those
with low MMSE scores (under 27) recalled fewer correct details
and were less accurate than those with high (normal) scores
(between 27 and 30). Importantly, however, both high and low
MMSE older adults reported substantially more correct information about action, person, object, and location details when given
revised a Cognitive Interview.
Two studies have reported no improvements in remembering
with Cognitive Interviews (McMahon, 2000; Searcy, Bartlett,
Memon, & Swanson, 2001). In the first, McMahon (2000) compared the amount of correct, incorrect, and confabulated details
reported by young (18 –50 years) and older adults (60 – 88 years)
when each was given a full Cognitive Interview (using all four
cognitive instructions) or a control interview 30 min after viewing
a simulated crime film. Young adults reported more correct details
than older adults in a control interview, but no advantage of a full
Cognitive Interview was found. It is possible that the small numbers of participants in each experimental condition (n ⫽ 10) were
not sufficient to detect an effect. Furthermore, the age range in
McMahon’s “young” group was quite different from other studies,
and included middle-aged participants. In the second study, Searcy
et al. examined whether the context reinstatement instruction facilitated young (18 –30 years) and older (62–79 years) adults’
correct identifications of a confederate in a line-up, 1 month after
they had met this person. It did not. Wright and Holliday (2007a)
suggested that the context reinstatement instruction may be useful
only after short delays when meaningful associations between the
event and the context are strong.
The current study addressed some of the limitations of the
studies discussed above. First, sample size was increased. Second,
older participants were recruited from the community rather than
from a university course, and hence were representative of the
older adult population in general. Third, young and older partici-
REDUCING MISINFORMATION IN OLDER ADULTS
pants were given the exact same interview protocols. Fourth, in
addition to obtaining measures of the total correct, incorrect, and
confabulated details, recollected information was classified according to whether it was provided during the free recall or
question phases of the interview, and in the categories of action,
person, object, or the location. Such information provides a more
precise evaluation of recall (Holliday, 2003b; Stein & Memon,
2006; Wright & Holliday, 2007a, 2007b). Fifth, because cognitive
decline could lead to an overestimation of age-related effects, all
participants completed the MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975) (cf.
Mueller-Johnson & Ceci, 2004; Wright & Holliday, 2007a, 2007b)
that evaluates cognitive status; the picture scale from the Pyramids
and Palm Trees test (PPT; Howard & Paterson, 1992) that tests
understanding of meaning, and the Beck Depression Inventory–
Short form (BDI-SF; Beck & Beck, 1972) between the presentation of the postevent summary and the interview phase.
The Misinformation Effect
The current research adopted a broad definition of the misinformation effect, which states that memories of a witnessed event
can be influenced by cognitive factors such as memory and attention and social factors such as social pressure, compliance with
authority figures, and acquiescence (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Holliday, 2003a, 2003b; Reysen, 2007). Much of the evidence concerning the mechanisms underlying the misinformation effect has been
collected using an adaptation of the standard three-stage paradigm
introduced by Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978). In this paradigm,
participants witness an event (e.g., film, slides) followed by misinformation about that event in a postevent summary before they
take a memory test on their memories for the originally witnessed
event. When asked to choose between the original event and the
postevent misleading details, research with adults (e.g., Loftus,
Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989; Loftus et al., 1978) and
children (e.g., Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987; Holliday, 2003a,
2007b; Holliday & Albon, 2004; Holliday, Douglas, & Hayes,
1999; Holliday & Hayes, 2000; Lampinen & Smith, 1995; Odegard, Cooper, Holliday, & Ceci, 2010) has consistently found that
misled participants are significantly more likely than controls who
have not been misled to report the misinformation as having been
part of the original event (for a review, see Reyna, Holliday, &
Marche, 2002). In the current study, the standard three-stage
paradigm was adopted.
Why do people report the misinformation rather than the original details? There is still no clear consensus in the literature to
answer this question. Candidate theoretical explanations can be
broadly classified as memory interference or response bias/social
demand accounts. For example, the memory trace-alteration account proposes that the original event memories are altered, updated, or replaced by the postevent misinformation (e.g., Loftus et
al., 1978). Retrieval interference accounts, on the other hand, argue
that access to the original event memories is blocked by (e.g.,
Morton et al., 1985) or co-exist with (e.g., Christianson & Ochalek, 1993; Reder & Schunn, 1996) the postevent misinformation
memory trace. Memory trace-strength accounts hold that postevent
misinformation degrades memory by either altering the original
trace or by preventing its retrieval or both, with the amount of
degradation dependent upon the strength of the original event
memory (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; Holliday et al., 1999;
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Marche, 1999). Both the co-existence and trace-strength accounts
assume dual memory traces (original and postevent misinformation) at the point of retrieval. According to the source-monitoring
framework, the misinformation effect occurs when people claim to
have seen information in the original event that was suggested
afterwards (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Source misattributions can occur if there is no memory for the original event
because it was not encoded, or it has been forgotten (Lindsay &
Johnson, 1989; for recent reviews, see Lindsay, 2008; Mitchell &
Johnson, 2009). Other theorists propose that the misinformation is
reported for social demand reasons such as social pressure (Reysen, 2007), social influence (e.g., Hoffman, 2001), conformity
(Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2006; Wright & Klumpp, 2004),
compliance and/or response biases inherent in the standard (Loftus) test paradigm (e.g., McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; see Ayers
& Reder, 1998; Holliday, Reyna, & Hayes, 2002, for reviews).
The extant research concerning older adults’ acceptance of
misinformation is small in comparison to the large body of child
research. Nonetheless, the picture that emerges is one of greater
susceptibility to misinformation in older age (Cohen & Faulkner,
1989; Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004; Karpel, Hoyer, &
Toglia, 2001; Loftus, Levidow, & Duensing, 1992; Marche, Jordan, & Owre, 2002; Mitchell, Johnson, & Mather, 2003; MuellerJohnson & Ceci, 2004; Roediger & Geraci, 2007), which is confidently held (Dodson & Krueger, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2003).
Only two studies have reported no misinformation effects in older
adults (Bornstein, Cherry, Witt, & Greene, 2000; Coxon & Valentine, 1997). It should be noted that older adults’ memories for
original (control) details on which no misinformation was given
was near floor in these studies. To detect an effect of misinformation, control item accuracy needs to be higher than accuracy on
misled items (Mueller-Johnson & Ceci, 2004; see Payne, Toglia, &
Anastasi, 1994, for a review).
The Current Study
A major aim was to test a developmentally Modified Cognitive
Interview protocol adapted from Holliday (2003b) on a group of
older participants to see whether a shorter but effective interview
protocol, in terms of correct recollections, accuracy, and completeness than is currently available to interview older adults, was
viable. This Modified Cognitive Interview omitted the change
perspective instruction (Holliday, 2003b; Mello & Fisher, 1996;
Searcy et al., 2001; Wright & Holliday, 2007a) because of the
concern that it may promote fabrication in adult witnesses (Boon
& Noon, 1994). A second aim was to categorize the reported
details in terms of action, object, person, and location (Holliday,
2003a, 2003b). We expected that the young adults would provide
more correct details than the older adults (Wright & Holliday,
2007a). Third, we wanted to test whether a Modified Cognitive
Interview would reduce misinformation acceptance in adults as has
been found with children (Holliday, 2003b).
Method
Participants
Thirty-one young males and females (M age ⫽ 22 years; age
range: 19 –24 years) and 28 old males and females (M age ⫽ 66
1194
HOLLIDAY ET AL.
years; age range: 60 –73 years) took part in this study. The young
adults were college students who participated for course credits.
The older adults resided in the community of a large city and were
recruited in response to leaflets, newspaper advertisements, and
radio broadcasts. Groups were matched on years of education
(between 15 and 16 years) and ethnicity (95% White, 5% other).
All participants achieved normal scores on tests of cognitive
functioning (see below). All participants were tested individually
in a quiet room at the college.
Design
The design was a 2 (age group: young adults, older adults) ⫻ 2
(interview: modified Cognitive, Structured) ⫻ 2 (recognition test
item type: control, misled) with the first two factors betweensubjects and the last factor within-subjects.
Materials
A 2-min, 36-sec film of a purse-snatch robbery, which contained
a large number of quantifiable details, was chosen as the stimulus
event. Adults were administered one of two interview protocols: a
Structured Interview as a control interview modified from that of
Kḧnken (1993), or a Modified Cognitive Interview containing the
Context Reinstatement, Report All, Change Order instructions (see
Appendix for interview protocols).2 For counterbalancing purposes, there were two versions of the postevent narrative each of
which were a summary of the film (presented in the same temporal
order) and contained six misleading details about previously seen
details from the film (misled items), and neutral information about
the other six details (control items). The misled items were consistent with the syntactic and semantic context of the film (see
Appendix, for postevent narratives and recognition test questions).
Three tests to assess cognitive impairment were given to all
participants in Phase 3 (in the same order). The MMSE (Folstein
et al., 1975) consists of 21 items that assess memory recall, the
ability to follow verbal commands, and the ability to orientate
oneself in one’s environment. A person who scores 26 or lower
(out of 30) is considered to have a significant cognitive impairment
(Whitlatch, Feinberg, & Tucke, 2005). All our participants scored
above 26. The Pyramids and Palm Trees test (PPT: Howard &
Paterson, 1992) is a nonverbal scale that assesses the ability to
extract semantic meaning from pictures and words. We used the
picture subscale in which three cards are given for each test item;
a target picture and two pictures from which the testee is asked to
select the picture that goes with the target picture. For example, the
target picture “waistcoat” is placed above a picture of a “necklace”
and a picture of a “bow tie”; the testee chooses which item goes
with the waistcoat. Scores of 46 or below (out of 52) are indicative
of significant cognitive impairment (Hodges & Patterson, 1995).
All our participants scored above 46. Depression has been linked
to memory deficits (e.g., Burt, Zember, & Niedereche, 1995).
Hence, all our participants completed the 13-item Beck Depression
Inventory–Short Form (BDI-SF: Beck & Beck, 1972). The
BDI-SF is a self-report scale in which respondents rate the severity
of symptoms on a four-point scale ranging from: “I do not feel I
am a complete failure” (score 0) to “I feel I am a complete failure
as a person” (score 3). A score higher than 10 points is viewed as
indicative of depression. All our participants scored below 10.
Importantly, scores on these three tests did not vary by age group
or interview condition.
Procedure
The study was conducted by two female researchers (aged 22
years) in five phases over 2 days. These researchers were trained
in all aspects of the experimental procedure by a senior researcher,
and they received 20 hr of training in each interview technique by
a trained interviewer. Participants were tested individually. In
Phase 1, a researcher showed the short film that depicted a simulated robbery. Participants were told to pay attention to the film
because they would be asked questions about it at a later stage. In
Phase 2, the next day, a different researcher read the participant a
postevent summary of the film they had seen the previous day. In
Phase 3, this researcher administered the three screening instruments that are documented above. After ⬃40 min, the researcher
who showed the film in Phase 1 interviewed the participant with
either the Modified Cognitive or Structured (control) Interview
(Phase 4). Interviews were audio-taped and began with 5 min of
rapport-building. Next, in the Structured Interview, participants
were asked to report the film content without making up anything
up. In the free recall phase, participants were asked: “Tell me
about the film in your own words,” which was followed by a
second request for more information (remember more?). In the
question phase that followed, participants were asked open-ended,
specific, and closed questions only about the details they had
reported in the free recall phase. In the closure phase, the interviewer summarized the remembered details and invited questions.
The Modified Cognitive Interview and the Structured Interview
protocols were the same with the exception that in the former the
three Cognitive Interview instructions were implemented in the
free recall phase of the interview, and the instruction to form a
mental image before questions about specific details recalled in the
question phase. After rapport was established, the Report All
instruction was given: “I want you to tell me everything you can
remember, every detail you can remember even if you think it may
be irrelevant.” The Report All instruction was immediately followed by the Context Reinstatement instruction in which the
participant was asked to mentally reinstate the personal and physical context in which the film was shown, as follows, “Close your
eyes. Picture yourself back in the room where you watched the
film. How were you feeling? What could you see in the room?
What could you hear in the room?” The participant then recalled
all they could remember. Next, the Change Order instruction was
given to recall the film details in reverse order beginning from the
last temporal detail reported: “Now I want you to tell me the very
last thing you remember in the film” (recall), then “What happened
just before that?” This latter prompt was continued until no further
details could be recollected or the beginning of the film was
reached. The question phase began with the instruction to form a
mental image before questions about specific details recalled in the
free recall phase. An important point to note about information
recalled in the question phase of both interviews is that such
information is new and is based on information reported in the free
2
For a discussion of control interviews in this literature, see Fisher
(1996) and Memon and Stevenage (1996).
REDUCING MISINFORMATION IN OLDER ADULTS
recall phase (cf. Holliday, 2003a, 2003b; Holliday & Albon, 2004;
Wright & Holliday, 2007a, 2007b). For example, if the participant
reported seeing a woman who was robbed in the free recall phase,
the interviewer asked the participant to form an image in their
mind of this woman: “Close your eyes. Get a picture in your mind
of this woman.” When they indicated they had done this the
interviewer asked a series of questions about this woman to obtain
new information, for example: “you said the woman was carrying
a bag. Tell me more about this bag?” The closure phase followed
the same procedure as for the Structured Interview. After the
interview, the participant completed a recognition memory test to
assess acceptance of original event details and postevent misinformation (Phase 5). This test contained 12 questions about 12 items:
6 original (control) from the film clip viewed in Phase 1, and 6
items on which misinformation was given in the postevent narrative in Phase 2 (see Appendix). Participants were told that they
would be asked questions about the film some of which were old
and some new; they should respond “yes” if they remembered the
detail (old) and “no” if they did not (new).
Coding and Scoring of the Interviews
Film details reported during interviews were coded as correct,
incorrect, and confabulated in the categories of person, action,
object, and location, with one point given for each unit of information reported in the free recall and question phases (cf. Holliday, 2003a, 2007b). Every piece of information was scored the
first time it was mentioned whether it was correct or not. For
example, the statement, “a woman stood at a cash machine at a
supermarket” was coded as - “woman” (1-person), “stood” (1action) “cash machine” (1-object) “at the supermarket” (1location). This coding system produced a total of 647 details in the
film: 249 person, 117 action, 166 object, and 115 location. A detail
was coded as correct if it corresponded with the film (e.g., “red
bag” when this was shown), as incorrect if it was discrepant from
the film (e.g., “green bag” instead of “red bag”), and confabulated
if it did not appear in the film (e.g., “a cat”). Interviews were
transcribed, coded, and scored by three independent coders who
were blind to the experimental hypotheses about the interview
protocols. Inter-coder reliabilities were calculated for total correct,
total incorrect, and total confabulations and were all around 95%
agreement. Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of agreement was moderate, 0.577, and above chance levels. The duration of each interview
(in minutes) and the number of questions asked were noted. The
recognition test data were scored by a new researcher who was
blind to the interview condition in which participants were placed.
Results
Interview Analyses
Initially, three separate 2 (age group) ⫻ 2 (interview)
ANCOVAs with duration, number of questions asked, and interviewer as covariates were performed on the total numbers of
correct, incorrect, and confabulated details. For total correct and
total confabulated details, no main effects were found hence all
subsequent analyses of these details omitted the three covariates.
Similarly, for total incorrect details, no main effect of number of
questions or interviewer was found. However, a main effect was
1195
found for duration; Modified Cognitive Interviews were significantly longer (M ⫽ 22.44 min) than Structured (control) interviews
(M ⫽ 14.20 min). Hence, all subsequent analyses of incorrect
details included duration as a covariate. Tukey’s (HSD) post hoc
tests were performed on all significant interactions (p ⬍ .05). The
mean numbers of correct, incorrect and confabulated details in the
categories of person, action, object, and location recalled in
the free recall and question phases of the interviews are presented
in Table 1.
Accuracy
Accuracy rates were calculated by dividing the proportion of
total correct details recalled in each age group, interview phase,
and interview type by the proportion of total details recalled (see
Table 1)., Two separate 2 (age group) ⫻ 2 (interview) ANOVAs
on accuracy rates in the two interview phases were performed.
Main effects of interview were found in the free recall phase, F(1,
55) ⫽ 4.54, MSE ⫽ .002, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .076, and in the question
phase, F(1, 55) ⫽ 4.74, MSE ⫽ .006, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .079.
Accuracy rates were higher in both phases of Modified Cognitive
Interviews (MMCI FR ⫽ .93, MMCI QP ⫽ .86) than in Structured
(control) Interviews (MSI FR ⫽ .91, MSI QP ⫽ .82). No age differences were found.
Completeness
The total number of correct details recalled was divided by the
total number of possible correct details to give a proportion completeness score for each participant (cf. Holliday, 2003b) (see
Table 1). A 2 (age group) ⫻ 2 (interview) ANOVA on these scores
revealed main effects for age group and for interview, and an Age
Group X Interview interaction, F(1, 55) ⫽ 8.64, p ⬍ .01, ␩2p ⫽
.136. For young adults, correct recollections in Modified Cognitive
Interviews were more complete than in Structured Interviews
(MMCI ⫽ .21, MSI ⫽ .14). This effect was not found for the older
adults (MMCI ⫽ .16, MSI ⫽ .15).
Recall Across Interview Phases
Three separate 2 (age group) ⫻ 2 (interview) ANOVAs examined recollection of the numbers of correct, incorrect, and confabulated details collapsed across interview phases (free recall,
question). Main effects were found for (1) age group, F(1, 55) ⫽
6.63, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .108; overall, young adults remembered more
correct details (M ⫽ 114.19) than older adults (M ⫽ 99.43), and
(2) interview, F(1, 55) ⫽ 19.70, p ⬍ .001, ␩2p ⫽ .264, more correct
details were reported in Modified Cognitive Interviews (M ⫽
121.54) than in Structured Interviews (M ⫽ 94.23). These main
effects interacted significantly, Age Group ⫻ Interview, F(1,
55) ⫽ 8.64, p ⬍ .01, ␩2p ⫽ .136. Young adults remembered more
correct details in Modified Cognitive Interviews (M ⫽ 136.60)
than older adults (M ⫽ 104.15), but not in Structured Interviews
(Myoung ⫽ 93.19, Molder ⫽ 95.33). No significant effects were
found for incorrect or confabulated details.
Recall in the Free Recall and Question Phases
A series of 2 (age group) ⫻ 2 (interview) ANOVAs examined
recall of the numbers of correct, incorrect, and confabulated
HOLLIDAY ET AL.
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Table 1
Mean Numbers of Correct, Incorrect, and Confabulated Details Recalled by Interview Condition
(SDs Are in Parentheses)
Structured (control) Interview
Correct free recall phase
Action
Person
Object
Location
Correct question phase
Action
Person
Object
Location
Incorrect free recall phase
Action
Person
Object
Location
Incorrect question phase
Action
Person
Object
Location
Confabulated free recall phase
Action
Person
Object
Location
Confabulated question phase
Action
Person
Object
Location
Accuracy
Completeness
Misinformation intrusions
Modified Cognitive Interview
Young
Old
Young
Old
16.44 (5.54)
16.06 (7.57)
7.50 (3.85)
10.50 (3.93)
18.87 (4.81)
18.20 (5.12)
8.07 (3.54)
13.40 (4.05)
24.13 (5.88)
24.00 (12.67)
10.93 (7.08)
15.53 (6.30)
22.38 (5.19)
20.85 (9.46)
7.23 (3.44)
13.00 (5.24)
5.44 (3.61)
22.56 (7.72)
6.44 (4.24)
8.25 (4.06)
4.47 (3.23)
20.73 (9.63)
4.53 (3.96)
7.07 (3.56)
7.40 (3.66)
33.33 (16.19)
8.80 (4.75)
11.80 (5.80)
5.62 (3.40)
23.23 (8.11)
5.46 (3.55)
6.46 (3.07)
2.19 (1.72)
1.62 (1.59)
0.38 (0.62)
0.50 (0.73)
1.67 (0.72)
2.47 (1.73)
0.87 (1.41)
0.67 (0.98)
2.67 (2.09)
1.87 (1.87)
0.47 (1.30)
0.53 (0.92)
1.92 (1.32)
2.08 (2.10)
0.46 (0.88)
0.31 (0.75)
0.94 (1.34)
5.88 (4.02)
0.56 (1.09)
1.00 (0.97)
1.00 (1.07)
5.93 (4.51)
0.87 (0.99)
0.67 (1.80)
0.80 (1.15)
8.07 (5.98)
2.20 (1.70)
0.80 (1.15)
0.46 (0.52)
4.46 (3.55)
0.62 (1.12)
0.38 (0.65)
0.06 (0.25)
0.06 (0.25)
0.06 (0.25)
0.00 (0.00)
0.20 (0.56)
0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
0.07 (0.26)
0.07 (0.26)
0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
0.08 (0.28)
0.08 (0.28)
0.08 (0.28)
0.31 (0.60)
0.19 (0.75)
0.38 (0.62)
0.12 (0.34)
0.87 (0.04)
0.14 (0.03)
0.38 (0.62)
0.07 (0.26)
0.13 (0.35)
0.27 (0.46)
0.00 (0.00)
0.87 (0.04)
0.15 (0.04)
1.33 (1.72)
0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
0.07 (0.26)
0.89 (0.05)
0.21 (0.04)
0.87 (1.19)
0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
0.31 (0.75)
0.00 (0.00)
0.90 (0.04)
0.16 (0.04)
0.46 (0.66)
details in the free recall and question phases of both the interviews.3 In the free recall phase, more correct details were recalled
in Modified Cognitive Interviews (M ⫽ 69.39) than in Structured
Interviews (M ⫽ 54.39), F(1, 55) ⫽ 7.76, p ⬍ .01, ␩2p ⫽ .124. No
effects were found for incorrect or confabulated details.
In the question phase, main effects were found for (1) age group,
young adults recalled more correct details (M ⫽ 52.03) than older
adults (M ⫽ 38.64), F(1, 55) ⫽ 9.01, p ⬍ .01, ␩2p ⫽ .141, and (2)
interview, more correct details were recalled in Modified Cognitive Interviews (M ⫽ 52.14) than in Structured Interviews (M ⫽
39.84), F(1, 55) ⫽ 6.64, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .108. A main effect of age
group was found for recall of incorrect details; young adults
recalled more incorrect details (M ⫽ 10.03) than older adults (M ⫽
7.29), F(1, 54) ⫽ 5.42, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .091. Note that no evidence
of age differences in accuracy was found in this phase (see above).
No effects were found for confabulated details.
Recall of Specific Types of Information
The numbers of correct, incorrect, and confabulated details in
the free recall and question phases of both interviews were further
classified according to the categories of person, action, object, and
location details. A series of 2 (age group) ⫻ 2 (interview)
ANOVAs were performed on these variables.3
In the free recall phase, main effects of interview were found for
correct person, F(1, 55) ⫽ 4.97, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .083, and correct
action details, F(1, 55) ⫽ 15.94, MSE ⫽ 28.92, p ⬍ .001, ␩2p ⫽
.225. More correct person (M ⫽ 22.54) and action (M ⫽ 23.32),
details were recalled in Modified Cognitive Interviews than in
Structured Interviews (Mperson ⫽ 17.10, Maction ⫽ 17.61). An Age
Group X Interview interaction was found for location details, F(1,
55) ⫽ 15.94, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .074. For young adults only, more
correct location details were recalled in Modified Cognitive Interviews (M ⫽ 15.53) than in Structured Interviews (M ⫽ 10.50). No
other significant effects were found.
In the question phase, main effects of age group were found for
correct person, F(1, 55) ⫽ 4.32, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .073, object, F(1,
55) ⫽ 5.79, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .095, and location, F(1, 55) ⫽ 8.51, p ⬍
.01, ␩2p ⫽ .134, details. Young adults recalled more correct person
(M ⫽ 27.77), object (M ⫽ 7.58), and location (M ⫽ 9.97) details
than older adults (Mperson ⫽ 21.89, Mobject ⫽ 4.96, Mlocation ⫽
6.79). A main effect of interview for correct person details was
found, F(1, 55) ⫽ 5.34, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .088; more correct person
details were reported in Modified Cognitive Interviews (M ⫽
3
Separate analyses were performed for the two interview phases because the information recalled in each phase is not independent. Details
recalled in the Free Recall phase are the sources for questions in the
Question phase (cf. Holliday, 2003a, 2003b; Holliday & Albon, 2004;
Memon, Wark, Holley, Bull, & Kḧnken, 1997; Wright & Holliday, 2007a,
2007b).
REDUCING MISINFORMATION IN OLDER ADULTS
28.64) than in Structured Interviews (M ⫽ 21.68). An Age Group
X Interview interaction was found for incorrect object details, F(1,
54) ⫽ 7.10, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .116; young adults recalled more
incorrect object details in Modified Cognitive Interviews (M ⫽
2.20) than older adults (M ⫽ .62), but not in Structured Interviews
(Myoung ⫽ .56, Molder ⫽ .87). A main effect of interview was found
for recall of confabulated action details, F(1, 55) ⫽ 4.55, p ⬍ .05,
␩2p ⫽ .076; more were recalled in Structured Interviews (M ⫽ .19)
than in Modified Cognitive Interviews (M ⫽ .00), although the
absolute numbers were small or nonexistent.
Misinformation Intrusions: Interviews
The numbers of misinformation intrusions reported in both
interviews were calculated for each participant. Intrusions were
defined as details on which misinformation was presented in the
postevent narrative. A 2 (age group) ⫻ 2 (interview) ANOVA on
these data revealed an Age Group X Interview interaction, F(1,
55) ⫽ 5.20, MSE ⫽ 1.31, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .086. Post hoc tests
demonstrated that for the older adults, fewer details were recalled
in Modified Cognitive Interviews (M ⫽ .46) than in Structured
Interviews (M ⫽ 1.33). No significant differences were found for
the young adults (MMCI ⫽ .87, MSI ⫽ .38).
Recognition Test Analyses: The Misinformation Effect
The proportions correct for control (proportion “old”) and misled items (proportion “new”) were calculated for each participant.
All analyses were performed after collapsing across postevent
narrative version (1 or 2) because preliminary analyses found no
reliable effect of narrative version. Table 2 illustrates the mean
proportions correct in each experimental condition.
A 2 (age group) ⫻ 2 (interview) ⫻ 2 (item type: control, misled)
ANOVA with the item type factor within-participants was performed on the proportions correct. A main effect was found for
control versus misled item types, F(1, 55) ⫽ 5.28, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽
.088; across interview conditions and age groups, correct recognition of control items (M ⫽ .71) was higher than for misled items
(M ⫽ .63), which is evidence of a misinformation effect. A main
effect of age group was also found, F(1, 55) ⫽ 10.03, p ⬍ .01,
␩2p ⫽ .154. These main effects were qualified by an interaction
with interview, Age Group X Item Type X Interview, F(1, 55) ⫽
4.45, p ⬍ .05, ␩2p ⫽ .075). A misinformation effect (i.e., the mean
difference between correct recognition of control and misled items
(Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Holliday et al., 1999) was found for older
adults given a Structured Interview (Mdiff ⫽ .30). For older adults
Table 2
Mean Proportions Correct for Control and Misled Item Types
as a Function of Interview Condition and Age Group (SDs Are
in Parentheses)
Item type
Control
Misled
Structured (control)
Interview
Modified Cognitive
Interview
Young
Old
Young
Old
.73 (.19)
.74 (.25)
.70 (.18)
.40 (.24)
.74 (.08)
.71 (.24)
.69 (.19)
.67 (.12)
1197
given a Modified Cognitive Interview, however, no evidence of a
misinformation effect was found (Mdiff ⫽ .02). No misinformation
effects were found for young adults in either interview condition.
Discussion
The first important finding was that participants who were given
the Modified Cognitive Interview recalled more correct information and their reports were more accurate overall than participants
given the Structured (control) Interview. Significantly, the Modified Cognitive Interview increased older adults’ reporting of correct details in both the free recall and question phases. With regard
to the types of information recalled, the Modified Cognitive Interview increased adults’ memories of person and action details, as
has been reported previously with adults (Wright & Holliday,
2007a) and children (Holliday, 2003b; Milne & Bull, 2003), without a concomitant increase in incorrect or confabulated details
(Wright & Holliday, 2007a). Indeed, both young and older adults
recalled twice as many correct person and action than object
details during the free recall phase (Holliday, 2003a, 2003b; Holliday & Albon, 2004; Memon et al., 1997; Milne et al., 1995), and
25% more correct person details in the question phase (Holliday,
2003b). Practically, interviews with law professionals in real-life
settings necessarily demand that witnesses provide an accurate
description of an alleged offender and his or her actions.
Several other results were found to be age-related. First, the
older adults recalled fewer correct details and were less complete
in their recollections than the young adults, as reported by others
(e.g., Aizpura et al., 2009; Brimacombe et al., 1997; Coxon &
Valentine, 1997; Craik et al., 1987; List, 1986; Wright & Holliday,
2007a; Yarmey & Kent, 1980). Second, the type of interview
influenced correct recollections. Modified Cognitive Interviews
increased correct remembering in both age groups but this increase
was three times larger for the young adults than the older adults
(31 and 10%, respectively). The type of interview also influenced
the kind of information reported. For young adults only, 33% more
correct location information was reported in Modified Cognitive
Interviews. Completeness of recollections was 5% higher in Modified Cognitive Interviews, but only in the young adults. Third, the
type of information recollected differed by age. The older adults
recalled fewer correct location details during free recall, and fewer
correct person, object, and location details during questioning than
the young adults. Yet, memory for action details was stable across
young and older participants. Taken together, these results suggest
that memory for person, object, and location information may
decline earlier in old age than memory for details about actions.
These findings accord with earlier work by Wright and Holliday
(2007a) and are important because there is little evidence about
how memory for different types of details changes with advancing
age. Surprisingly, young adults recollected more incorrect object
details in the question phase of Modified Cognitive Interviews
than older adults, although the absolute numbers were small (2 and
0.6 details, respectively). We can find no other studies that report
such a finding. Importantly, however, there was no evidence that
accuracy was comprised in the young adults.
How might the Modified Cognitive Interview used here improve
memories for a simulated crime? Remember that an important
feature of this interview is the context reinstatement instruction,
whereby the witness is asked to close his or her eyes and to
1198
HOLLIDAY ET AL.
mentally reinstate the physical and personal contexts in which the
to-be-remembered event was experienced. There is considerable
evidence that memory is enhanced if the context in which the event
was witnessed/experienced overlaps with the context in which the
event is recalled, a phenomenon known as “encoding specificity”
(Tulving & Thomson, 1973). There is also evidence that if memory retrieval is performed with eyes closed, as in the present study,
this often results in significantly more detailed (correct) information being recalled (Holliday, 2003b; Holliday & Albon, 2004;
Perfect, Wagstaff, Moore, Andrews, Cleveland, Newcombe, Brisbane, & Brown, 2008; Wright & Holliday, 2007a). Can older
adults use contextual cues to improve their recollections?
The effect of context on memory in old age is predicted by
environmental support theory (Craik, 1986, 1994). Specifically,
deficits in available processing resources mean that older adults
are less efficient and less likely than younger adults to use contextual cues (e.g., Burke & Light, 1981) spontaneously at encoding
(e.g., elaboration) and retrieval (e.g., retrieval searches) to aid their
remembering. Yet, we know that if older adults are instructed to
use contextual cues at encoding; for example, in the form of a
question as to whether a presented word matched a presented face,
that accuracy and completeness of recall are increased (Skinner &
Fernandes, 2009). Free recall tests are especially difficult for older
adults because they provide few retrieval cues (Craik, 1994; Luo &
Craik, 2008). In our study, environmental support was given at
retrieval in the form of the context reinstatement instruction in the
free recall phase and the form a mental image instruction in the
question phase, both of which serve to focus the interviewee’s
mind on the details of the original film. To this end, it is likely that
the recall improvements seen in the older adults when interviewed
with a Modified Cognitive Interview were affected in part by the
availability of contextual cues facilitated by the context reinstatement instruction.
Two additional pieces of evidence that favor a contextual account of our findings are to do with the individual Cognitive
Interview instructions. We noted that the absolute numbers of
correct information recollected under the Change order instruction
in the free recall phase was very small (less than 2%). This means
that the locus of the positive effects of Modified Cognitive Interviews on correct recollections in the free recall phase was with the
report all and context reinstatement instructions. Note that these
instructions are given together in that order in the protocol of
Fisher and Geiselman (1992) and that used here. In the question
phase of a Modified Cognitive Interview, an instruction to create
a mental image of the item (e.g., of the woman standing at a cash
machine) was given immediately before questions about this item.
Note that the only difference between the two interviews in this
phase is the form an image instruction in the Modified Cognitive
Interview. Hence, we can see precisely how this instruction facilitated correct recollections. Indeed, more correct information (i.e.,
not produced during free recall) was recollected in the Modified
Cognitive Interview than the Structured (control) Interview.
Misinformation Effects
A major aim of this study was to test whether misinformation
effects could be minimized if participants, particularly the older
adults, were interviewed using a Modified Cognitive Interview. As
has been reported in studies that compared young and older adults,
older adults’ memories were disproportionately affected by postevent misinformation (Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Gabbert et al.,
2004; Karpel et al., 2001; Marche et al., 2002; Mitchell et al.,
2003; Mueller-Johnson & Ceci, 2004; Roediger & Geraci, 2007).
Specifically, acceptance of misinformation on a recognition test
was dependent upon the type of prior interview as well as age; only
older adults given the Structured (control) Interview demonstrated
a misinformation effect on this test, and this effect was substantial
(30%). Older adults were also more likely to incorporate postevent
misinformation (misinformation intrusions) in their free recall
during an interview when they were given the Structured Interview. Importantly, however, misinformation effects were eliminated if older adults were given the Modified Cognitive Interview.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study to show that
instructions at the point of retrieval can reduce misinformation
effects in older adults. No misinformation effects were found for
young adults in either interview condition. Why? It could be that
the retention interval between viewing the film and exposure to
postevent misinformation was not sufficiently long enough (1 day)
to allow for forgetting of the film details for the young adults. If so,
the fact that the older adults were suggestible after the same delay
suggests they may have greater difficulties with memory storage
and/or memory retrieval difficulties in comparison to young adults.
Yet, if this explanation is correct, one would expect that older and
young adults would also differ in correct recognition of control
items for which no misinformation was given, but this was not the
case, both age groups were equally proficient.
We propose that two theoretical accounts of misinformation
effects in old age best explain our findings. One is concerned with
memory for source–the source-monitoring framework (Johnson et
al., 1993), and the other is concerned with memory processes/
memory trace strength–the gist hypothesis (Brainerd & Reyna,
2005; Koustaal & Schacter, 1997).4 It is well-known that older
adults make more source-monitoring errors than young adults
because they misattribute the source of their memories to the
postevent misinformation instead of to the original event (Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1989; Henkel, Johnson, & De
Leonardis, 1998; McIntyre & Craik, 1987; Mitchell et al., 2003;
Multhaup, De Leonardis, & Johnson, 1999; Roediger & Geraci,
2007; Schacter, Kaszniak, Kihlstrom, & Valdiserri, 1991; Searcy
et al., 1999; Wegesin et al., 2000). Moreover, older adults have
difficulties in identifying and using specific details about the
sources of their memories such as the day, time, and place (Dodson
& Krueger, 2006; Ferguson, Hashtroudi, & Johnson, 1992). Some
studies have reported that misinformation effects can be minimized by having participants take source-monitoring tests that
encourage close examination of the source of the memories for the
original and the postevent misinformation (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Multhaup et al. 1999).5 As discussed earlier, we pro4
The two accounts propose similar mechanisms but are theoretically
distinct.
5
Although the present research was not specifically intended as a test
of the source-monitoring account of the misinformation effect it did
incorporate conditions that encouraged a high level of discrimination
between sources; a different experimenter provided the misinformation,
and adults were presented with a postevent summary 1 day after
viewing the film clip.
REDUCING MISINFORMATION IN OLDER ADULTS
pose that the context reinstatement instruction in the free recall
phase and the form an image instruction in the question phase of
the Modified Cognitive Interview improved older adults’ correct
recollections by encouraging them to use memory retrieval strategies (e.g., retrieval searches) that they do not, for the most part,
implement spontaneously. A likely by-product of this is that they
are better able to discriminate the sources of their memories as the
original film rather than the postevent misinformation summary.
The second theoretical account proposes that remembering in
older age is based predominantly on the familiarity or gist or
general meaning of the event to-be-remembered (e.g., Gardner &
Java, 1991; Koustaal & Schacter, 1997) rather than on the exact
surface information (verbatim). This reliance on gist processing is
called “the gist-preference” hypothesis (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005),
a tendency to use gist in remembering. If this hypothesis is correct,
and the specific details were encoded in the first place, it should be
possible to reverse the reliance on gist processing by using a
verbatim-focused manipulation (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). A Cognitive Interview is one such manipulation. As discussed earlier, the
purpose of the context reinstatement instruction in the free recall
phase and the form an image instruction in the question phase in
the Modified Cognitive Interview used here was to facilitate retrieval of the exact details (verbatim) of the filmed crime. There
are two ways in which our findings fit this theoretical account.
First, misinformation effects were eliminated in older adults when
they were interviewed with a Modified Cognitive Interview protocol that focused their retrieval on the surface details of the event
rather than on the general meaning of the event. Second, the fact
that the young adults showed no evidence of a misinformation
effect indicates that their memories were likely to be verbatimbased. A line of research that should be pursued in future studies
with older adults concerns identifying the memory processes underlying acceptance of misinformation effects as has been evaluated with children. Holliday and Hayes (2000) adapted Jacoby’s
process dissociation model of recognition memory to quantify
these processes and established that both conscious recollection
and unconscious familiarity were implicated in children’s reporting of misinformation. Whether these processes are involved in
older adults’ reporting of misinformation is yet to be determined,
but would have important implications for theoretical accounts of
misinformation effects in old age.
To conclude, the Modified Cognitive Interview facilitated remembering of witnessed information by focusing retrieval on the
surface details of the filmed crime and on the sources of those
details (whether the film or postevent summary). This result demonstrates that a Cognitive Interview adapted for older adults can be
an important tool for interviewing them about forensically relevant
information. Furthermore, a Modified Cognitive Interview offered
some protection against the negative effects of misinformation
when administered after the postevent misinformation. The fact
that older adults could reject postevent misinformation demonstrates that both the original and postevent memory traces were
intact, which rules out a strong version of the trace-alteration
hypothesis of the misinformation effect (e.g., Loftus et al., 1978),
but lends support to the co-existence of original and postevent
memory traces (e.g., Christianson & Ochalek, 1993).
For practitioners, shortened modified interview protocols that
facilitate accurate testimony are important given the potential
problems surrounding interviewing these witnesses (limited atten-
1199
tion span, forget faster) and pressures on police and other professionals to obtain maximum information following a crime (Wright
& Holliday, 2005, 2007a). It is acknowledged that these results
were obtained under laboratory conditions but we believe that, it is
important that factors are first tested under controlled experimental
conditions before evaluation in the field (Brainerd & Ornstein,
1991; Holliday, 2003b; Holliday et al., 2009). Testing of an
adapted version of the Modified Cognitive Interview protocol for
young children (Holliday, 2003b) using a live (staged) event has
demonstrated that misinformation effects can minimized in real
life contexts (Holliday, 2010) in the older adult population.
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Appendix
Interview Protocols
Modified Cognitive Interview Structured Interview
1. Rapport building phase
Rules of interview rules of interview
2. Free recall phase
Report everything
Context reinstatement
Recall request recall request
Change order
Recall request remember more?
3. Questioning phase
Information provided in FR
Information provided in FR used as the basis of open-ended used as the basis of open-ended and specific questions
and specific questions
Form image, probe image
4. Closure
Yes/no Recognition memory test question for each postevent narrative
Postevent narrative Version 1
There are two people at the cash machine. The woman is wearing a jacket with a hood. The man is shorter than
the woman. A third man waits in line carrying something. There is a red sign above the cash machine with 50%
off on it. There are four bins nearby. The grey-haired woman opens her brown handbag and puts the money in
her purse. Another woman is wearing a jacket. The grey-haired woman bumped into a trolley. There are cars
parked on each side of the trolley park. A silver Mini passes in front of the grey-haired woman. There is snow
on the ground. The grey-haired woman crosses a busy road. As she walks beside a fence she meets a man. The
man is tall and is wearing a woolly hat. After the man takes her bag, the grey-haired woman drops something.
She rang her friend for help.
Yes/no recognition memory test questions for this narrative version
1. Did the grey-haired woman wear a purple jacket? (Control 1)
2. Was the man at the cash machine shorter than the grey-haired woman? (Misled 1)
3. Was there a third man waiting in line holding plastic carrier bags? (Control 2)
4. Did the red sign above the cash machine say 50% off? (Misled 2)?
5. Did the grey-haired woman have a brown handbag? (Misled 3)
6. Was there another woman shopper wearing a blue jacket? (Control 3)
7. Did the grey-haired woman bump into a trolley? (Misled 4)
8. Were there three cars parked on either side of the trolley park? (Control 4)
9. Did a silver Mini pass in front of the grey-haired woman? (Misled 5)
10. Did the grey-haired woman walk beside a brown fence? (Control 5)
11. Did the robber wear a woolly hat? (Misled 6)
12. Did the grey-haired woman drop her glove? (Control 6)
(Appendix continues)
REDUCING MISINFORMATION IN OLDER ADULTS
1203
Appendix (continued)
Postevent narrative Version 2
There were two people at the cash machine. The woman was wearing a pink jacket with a hood. There was a man
at the other cash machine. A third man waited in line carrying a backpack. There was a red sign above the cash
machine. There were four bins nearby. The grey-haired woman opened her handbag and put the money in her
purse. Another woman was wearing a red jacket. The grey-haired woman walked on. There were four cars
parked on each side of the trolley park. A silver car passed in front of the grey-haired woman. There was snow
on the ground. The grey-haired woman crossed a busy road. As she walked beside a green fence she met a man.
The man was wearing warm clothes. After the man took her bag, the grey-haired woman dropped her keys. She
rang her friend for help.
Yes/no recognition memory test questions for this narrative version
1. Did the grey-haired woman wear a pink jacket? (Misled 1)
2. Was the man at the cash machine taller than the grey-haired woman? (Control 1)
3. Was there a third man waiting in line carrying a backpack? (Misled 2)
4. Did the red sign above the cash machine say “half price”? (Control 2)?
5. Did the grey-haired woman have a black handbag? (Control 3)
6. Was there another woman shopper wearing a red jacket? (Misled 3)
7. Did the grey-haired woman walk past a trolley? (Control 4)
8. Were there 4 cars parked on either side of the trolley park? (Misled 4)
9. Did a silver estate car pass in front of the grey-haired woman? (Control 5)
10. Did the grey-haired woman walk beside a green fence? (Misled 5)
11. Was the robber man tall? (Control 6)
12. Did the grey-haired woman drop her keys? (Misled 6)
Control questions are those for which no misinformation was given and reflect the information that was present in the
original film. In the postevent narrative, only generic information was presented for these details.
Misled questions are those for which misinformation that contradicts information presented in the original film and was
presented in the postevent narrative.
Received January 19, 2010
Revision received August 6, 2010
Accepted August 20, 2010 䡲