The Paradoxes of Omnipotence The attribute of omnipotence, coupled with the role normally ascribed to God as the creator of everything else that exists, gives rise to some interesting puzzles, two of which we will explore. The (First) Paradox of Omnipotence The first paradox, proposed and defended by Antony Flew and J. L. Mackie, is an argument for the conclusion that if God is omnipotent, he cannot create anything that he does not control absolutely; as a consequence, it is impossible for God to create a genuinely free creature. Here is Antony Flew’s statement of the argument, from God and Philosophy (1966), pp. 47‐48: As Creator he could not decide simply to leave to their own devices creatures already autonomously existing. He both designs and makes them in full knowledge and determination of all that they will ever do or fail to do. As Creator he must be first cause, prime mover, supporter, and controller of every thought and action throughout his utterly dependent universe. In short: if creation is in, autonomy is out. Why then is this vital conclusion so often ignored or even denied? Partly, no doubt, because the idea of creation is misunderstood; thought of perhaps as, like begetting, a matter of performing one action and then leaving nature to take its course. Mainly, surely, because theologians are no more than other men exempt from conflicts of desire. . . . These common tendencies are reinforced by the conviction, which is for most of us for most of the time quite inescapable, that we are on occasion free agents: as indeed we are. It is, apparently, easy to mistake the implication. If in fact we ever are free agents, and if this is in a sense which is incompatible with being completely the creatures of a Creator, then what follows is: not that there may be a Creator liberally–albeit mysteriously–granting some degree of emancipation; but that there cannot be any Creator at all. There is, however, a way to give meaning to the notion of disobedience to God’s will (as much, that is, as can be given to any human notion applied in this context). But it is a maneuver for which there is a price to be paid when we come to consider the next question. In the human context we give sense to talk about what people want primarily by reference to what they do or would do in appropriate circumstances. . . . We decide what a man–any man, including ourselves–really wants by determining what he would do if all obstacles were removed. But to creative omnipotence there are no obstacles. So what he really wants must be whatever actually comes about; and that goes for everything that is happening, including whatever we are doing. If, therefore, anyone wants to insist that some of these happenings, in particular some actions, are against God’s will; then this has, presumably, got to be done by reference to the consequences which he arranges, or would arrange, for different sorts of actions. All actions must, in the primary sense, be according to God’s will. It follows, Flew argues, that an omnipotent creator must be a “Supreme Puppet‐master of creatures whose every thought and move he arranges.” (p. 44) In response to this challenge, a theist might make the distinction between allowing something to happen and causing it to happen. God may, for his own reasons, allow free creatures to do things that he does not cause them to do. But in The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), J. L. Mackie replies that this distinction, though it makes sense in the Copyright © Tim McGrew 2013 case of beings of finite power, does not make sense in the case of an omnipotent being. Allowing but not causing something to happen is, Mackie argues, typically based on some failure either of power or of knowledge, a lack of effort or simple inadvertence. But the more completely the matter is within our power, the less clear does the first ground of the distinction become. If it is something that we can either bring about or prevent with negligible effort, allowing it to happen is less completely differentiated from bringing it about. And similarly the more completely the matter is within our knowledge, the less clear does the second ground of the distinction become; if it is something we cannot help attending to, allowing it to happen cannot be marked off by the criterion of inadvertence. It seems, then, that as power and knowledge increase, this everyday distinction fades out, and for a being with unlimited power and unlimited vision it would not hold at all. (The Miracle of Theism, p. 161) Assignment #1: Assess this objection, laying it out clearly in premise‐ conclusion form and then doing your best to evaluate its force. The Paradox of the Stone (Second Paradox of Omnipotence) A very old challenge to the notion of an omnipotent being can be posed in a brief sentence: Can God make a stone bigger than he can lift? We can lay out the challenge in the following fashion: 1. Either God can create a stone that he cannot lift, or he cannot. 2. If he can, then, necessarily, there is at least one task that God cannot perform (namely, lifting the stone in question). 3. If he cannot, then, necessarily, there is at least one act that God cannot perform (namely, creating the stone in question). Therefore, 4. There is at least one task or act that God cannot perform. 5. If God is omnipootent, then he can perform any task or act. Therefore, 6. God is not omnipotent. Assignment #2: Assess this argument. Copyright © Tim McGrew 2013