Fair Play
REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA, ÉTICA Y DERECHO DEL DEPORTE
www.upf.edu/revistafairplay
In defense of the philosophy of the
railway
Filip Kobiela
The University of Physical Education in Krakow (Poland)
Citar este artículo como: Filip Kobiela (2016): In defense of the philosophy of the railway,
Fair Play. Revista de Filosofía, Ética y Derecho del Deporte, vol. 8, 1-9.
FECHA DE RECEPCIÓN: 12 de Septiembre de 2016
FECHA DE ACEPTAPCIÓN: 5 de Octubre de 2016
In defense of the philosophy of the railway.
Filip Kobiela
The University of Physical Education in Krakow
Abstract
Henning Eichberg's paper Do we need an Existential Philosophy of the Railway? Why then a
Philosophy of Sport? containing provocative denial of its title question, has a potential to
restart an important discussion concerning the identity and condition of the philosophy of
sport. But because Eichberg presented some important theses – as I will try to show – without
a proper justification, this potential is at risk to be wasted. The goal of this paper is to
critically analyze one of his crucial presuppositions and on the ground of this analysis offer
another view on the philosophy of sport. The view is thus in one aspect convergent with
Eichbergs' perspective, but in another aspect is opposite to it.
Key Words: Sport, railway, philosophy of, ideology, Eichberg.
Resumen
En su artículo “Do we need an Existential Philosophy of the Railway? Why then a Philosophy
of Sport”, Henning Eichberg lleva a cabo una polémica negación de la pregunta en el título.
Este artículo tiene el potencial de resucitar una importante discusión relativa a la identidad y
condición de la filosofía del deporte. Sin embargo, como Eichberg presenta algunas tesis
importantes – como trataré de mostrar – sin justificación adecuada, este potencial queda en
riesgo de ser malgastado. El objetivo de este artículo es analizar críticamente uno de sus
presupuestos esenciales, y en base a dicho análisis, ofrecer otra visión de la filosofía del
deporte. Ésta es en un sentido convergente con la propuesta de Eichberg, y opuesto en otro
sentido.
Palabras Clave: deporte, ferrocarril, filosofia, ideologia, Eichberg.
To avoid possible misunderstanding, a disclaimer is necessary: I am going to present a view
on philosophy of sport inspired by Eichberg’s remarks that were published as a part of a
polemics concerning a book on phenomenology of sport, but my view is not a part of this
polemics and should not be taken as a part of it. The polemical context of Eichberg’s remarks
explains the determining adjective ‘existential’, which might be interpreted as an allusion to
‘phenomenological’. But since I am not going to participate in this polemics, I am omitting
this determining adjective in further discussion and I am focusing exclusively on the
apparently exotic comparison between the philosophy of sport and the philosophy of the
railway.
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1. Introduction
For the philosophy of sport, a relatively young branch of philosophy, the questions of its
identity as well as its relations to the other branches of philosophy and its place in culture in
general belong to its very core. However, there is no agreement concerning these problems
both inside and outside the philosophy of sport. The discipline is far from being perceived as
a natural, well-grounded or necessary branch of philosophy. According to Graham McFee,
there is no philosophical issues in respect of sport other than ethical ones. Consequently, there
is no place for such sub-discipline of philosophy as the philosophy of sport:
"so-called ‘issues’ in the philosophy of sport are of three kinds: first, and legitimately,
they may be ethical problems inherent in sport; second, and legitimate philosophy
though not ‘philosophy of sport’, they may be problems for other areas of philosophy;
and third, they may be pseudo-problems. (…)“ [McFee, 2002, pp. 16-17].
According to McFee, none of the issues in respect of sport (concerning ethics, aesthetic,
physical education) constitute a ‘philosophy of sport’. A similar view might be find in Jerzy
Kosiewicz who claims that at the current stage of development of this discipline we are facing
‘philosophical reflections on sport rather than the philosophy of sport’ [Kosiewicz 2006, p.
53]. But the strongest criticism of the philosophy of sport comes from Henning Eichberg, who
claims that although there are genuine philosophical questions to sport, ‘sport philosophy’ or
‘philosophy of sport’ should not be taken for granted. In contrary, according to his view,
philosophy of sport is a too narrow, too particular or accidental to constitute a proper part of
philosophy:
"philosophy has its focus on general and fundamental problems not on relatively shorttermed phenomena like the car, the airplane, the telephone, or the toilet – but
irrespectively, on their importance for human life“ [Eichberg 2014, 79].
According to Eichberg whereas there are some genuine philosophical questions to sport (as
well as some genuine philosophical questions to the railway) both sport philosophy and
railway philosophy sounds strange. Eichberg concludes that
"Sport philosophy should not, as is frequently the case, be taken as natural selfevident“ [Eichberg 2014, 79].
Although these voices are in the minority inside the community of the philosophers of
sport, they indicate still unsolved problem and Eichberg’s diagnosis seems to be the most
destructive for the uncritical notion of the philosophy of sport. Now I would like to focus on
this diagnosis by means of the analysis of Eichberg’s sport-railway analogy.
2. The problem of the importance of the philosophy of the railway
Eichberg's argument is based on the presupposition that there is an equivalence between
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the lack of the need of the (existential) philosophy of the railway and the lack of the need of
the (phenomenological) philosophy of sport. The acceptance of this assumption puts the
defender of the philosophy of sport in a very difficult position. This acceptance leads to the
following dilemma: the defender of the philosophy of sport will have either to admit a
marginal position of the philosophy of sport (equal to the significance of the exotic
philosophy of the railway) or (trying to defend the philosophy of sport as a serious endeavor)
have to prove a special importance of the philosophy of the railway. In these circumstances
for a defender of the philosophy of sport it is better to look for a different strategy, that is
based on undermining of this equivalence. I will follow this path, however, I owe the reader
the reservation that the final result of my analysis might be seen as not less damaging for the
current form of the philosophy of sport than the Eichberg's view is.
So, do we really need a philosophy of the railway? Eichberg claims we do not. For the sake
of the argument, I take it, perhaps in agreement with the common sense, that philosophy of
the railway, in our real world Anno Domini 2016, is not a necessary (or even important) part
of our intellectual activity. Now, the crucial problem is to determine if this is a necessary
truth? The problem is if in any circumstances, in any possible world it is the case that
philosophy of the railway is not an important part of human intellectual activity? I believe this
stronger claim is false. This now revealed distinction between the two claims concerning
importance of the philosophy of the railway enables us to show a gap in Eichberg’s argument.
To prove this, I am going to present a terminological clarification and a brief description of a
possible world in which there is an urgent need for the philosophy of the railway.
3. What is philosophy of X?
To begin with the terminology, there is a narrow (one might say: ‘metaphysical’ or
‘integral’) view of philosophy, which defines this discipline as a unified study of the most
fundamental features of reality. On the ground of this view, although there might exist
different accounts of reality (hence the philosophical polemics) each of these accounts
constitute in fact single philosophical system, which divisions, at least on a certain level of
speculation, are superficial and artificial. This view excludes all sub-disciplines of philosophy,
eliminating (among others) the problem of the philosophy of sport.
In opposition to this narrow view, the broad or ‘fragmentary’ view allows for far reaching
partitions of philosophyi. The ‘philosophical reflection upon X’, means that certain standards
of using of philosophical tools in the course of this reflection is implied as well as some
special importance of X. If ‘philosophical reflection upon X’ would be synonymous to
‘philosophy of X’, we would obtain the broad view of philosophy, in which philosophy is
divided into its sub-disciplines by almost all its topics. Whereas the narrow view eliminates
the problem of existence of the philosophy of sport, the broad view makes it trivialii. All
above-mentioned authors implicitly deny both the broad and the narrow view.
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Perhaps the most popular meta-philosophical account follows the middle path between the
narrow and the broad views of philosophy. The crucial question within this moderate view is:
what does it mean to be a philosophy of X? what means here being something more than just
a philosophical reflection on X. Which X’s counts as a serious candidate to constitute a
particular discipline of philosophy? I doubt if it is possible to formulate a non-controversial,
complete list of relevant necessary and sufficient conditions. There is a margin of arbitrarity
here, certain irregularities are inevitable, as well as an influence of some external factors.
Perhaps on the ground of the moderate view a phenomenon X might constitute philosophy of
X, if the three following criteria are fulfilled:
1. Substantive: X generates some philosophical problems and questions requiring the use
of philosophical tools to be answered and the scope of these problems is broad enough
to create a set of interrelated issues (field). Perhaps typical for philosophies of X’s is
their interdisciplinarity: solving X-generated philosophical problems requires also
some special competencies in X. Perhaps young, aspiring philosophy of X will be
lending some techniques from other fields of philosophy, whilst its mature form
should reciprocate (import and export of philosophical tools, terminology etc.).
2. Institutional: the evolution of the philosophical study of these problems has generated
a special society of researchers, professional journals, conferences etc. Existence of a
well-established institution devoted to supporting growth of the philosophy of X is the
most visible evidence of its maturity. However, it cannot be taken for granted, i.e.
accepted without careful examination of its basis - substantive, philosophical matter.
Institutional aspects might be generated as a part of “celebration” typical to
philosophy understood as an “abstract or poetic texts and postulates, which affirm
Corporate Identity” [Eichberg, 79].
3. Social: X (and X-generated problems) have a special social importance (this point will
be discussed below).
I believe this simple view is sufficient to account the meaning of such expressions as
‘philosophy of science’, ‘philosophy of law’ or even ‘philosophy of music’iii. In the light of
these criteria sport seems to be a not so bad candidate for constituting separate branch of
philosophy (perhaps much better candidate than the railway), but all criteria and its
application might raise controversies and thus require detailed discussion.
At this stage I will narrow down the discussion only to the point three – social importance.
Let us now go back to the point suggested by abovementioned distinction between the two
claims concerning the importance of the philosophy of the railway. Social approach to the
problem of philosophy of X is based not only on the concept of theory of X (theoretical
problems generated by X) but also on the concept of ideology connected with X. A way of the
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emergence of philosophy of X might lead through a critical analysis of an ideology of X (if
such an ideology exists). If this critical discussion of X reaches certain standard of
philosophical analysis, it might be counted at least as a serious candidate to become a
philosophy of X. Perhaps ‘philosophy of religion’ might serve as a typical example here.
The analysis of the net of inter-relations between these three criteria (and especially
substantive and social) lies beyond the scope of this paper. My current goal is to test if we can
construct a plausible description of the philosophy of the railway understood as a
philosophically elaborated critique of an ideology. One might point out that this is only one
understanding of philosophy of X, however, this is sufficient for my further purposes to
indicate at least one form of the philosophy of the railway which is needed in a certain
possible world, or rather certain possible society. The passage could be understood as a partial
answer to the Eichberg’s important question:
"Why is the existence of a philosophy of sport taken for granted and self-evident while
a philosphy of the railway waould rather be a weird or even ridiculed
project?“ [Eichberg, 79].
4. Living in the Railway Obsessed Society
Let us imagine now a world in which ‘international railway society’ has so a strong
position, that schools on all levels, universities teaching and research, media coverage and
leisure pursuits are essentially concerned with the railway-related issues. Imagine (it's easy if
you try) that in this weird society railway-spokespersons have so a strong prestige that they
occupy TV shows and has influence on school curricula, fashion, politics or even religion. In
almost every country ‘railway observation’ is a national hobby, and it has many long-life
devotees. You will not find a pub without a big TV screen covering trains crossing important
routes. The pope is praising railway goodness, and notable politicians are trying to improve
their images using connections with well-known train drivers. Some train-celebrities are
highly estimated authorities in many fields of life. There is a lot of published materials
concerning railway-studies, railway-leisure etc. More intellectual part of these vast production
is called the philosophy of the railway (and a branch of it might be even specified as
existential), but the label is not important here. What matters is the real function of this
literature in this railway obsessed society (ROS). The function of many of these publications
is subordinated to the interest of the railway-connected societies, so it might be rather called
the official philosophy of the railway. Due to this interest, more important than purely
theoretical research, it should be rather called the ideology of the railway.
Now, this ideology might raise (among critically thinking part of the population) some
criticism. This criticism, after reaching certain level of sophistication – in contrast to the
railway ideology – might be called the real philosophy of the railway, not official one, but
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genuine one. It has a special place in this culture, perhaps not central, but still important, as a
kind of intellectual inquiry that has special practical importance. It raises a lot of serious
issues, and one of them is the desired limits of the impact of the railway ideology on the
society. A critic claims that selective, biased railway observation might lead to permanent
habit of non-objective thinking. Constant watching of very fast trains is also a kind of
addiction which consumes a lot of energy that could be devoted to the more valuable and
important matters than relatively fiddling transport. Narrow-mindedness of some dedicated
steam locomotives is legendary, and it is difficult to have a conversation with them that is not
exclusively focused on their mania. Different forms of atavism and tribalism are reported,
including barbarian attacks of fans of one company on trains belonging to other companies. It
has also been pointed out that a kind of admiration of the fastest train motormans or the most
effective ticket inspectors might be fascist-like: the cult of power of railway passengers and
the condemnation of weakness of the rest of the population. The biggest railway events are
often organized in non-democratic countries that are not respecting human rights what raises
especially vivid controversies of moral and political nature. For many critics, hypocrisy is
perhaps the most adequate description of this contradiction of the noble railway ideals and sad
practice of railway committees. There are even railway haters (brave enough to spread their
shocking ideas despite the social taboo) who dare to claim that obligatory railway education
lessons and trips should be limited or even eliminated in schools. And this is just the tip of the
iceberg. The discussions might be perceived as a kind of self-defense mechanism of the
railway obsessed society. Even if it starts with just a commonsensical reflection and
journalist’s criticism, during the course of the social debate it might constitute a serious
opposition to the official, well-funded railway propaganda. It is well known that International
Railway Committee did not only need ideological idealization, but went about developing
rich financial means to sponsor philosophical engagement [Eichberg, 80]. But there is no
reason why philosophers (worth their name) should join, as a volunteers, this corporate
“philosophy”; on the contrary, it is more justified to expect that they will elaborate the
bottom-up anti-railway protest.
It is obvious that in such a society there is an urgent need for philosophically grounded
reflection concerning diverse railway phenomena. Now I believe this is sufficient to show that
the critique of the railway ideology could be a vital part of intellectual life of a certain
fictitious society (ROS). It should be also clear that the lack of the need of philosophy of the
railway in our world is just a contingent truth. But ROS really needs some critical analysis of
the railway ideology (due to its ubiquitness and influence), what means that it needs qualified
philosophical reflection of railway-related issues, what in turn means - as these issues are
genuinely philosophical, dealing with values, attitudes, moral and aesthetic judgements - it
needs the philosophy of the railway. It will not be a ‘timeless’, fundamental philosophical
field equal to metaphysics or epistemology, but it will constitute legitimate in ROS part of
applied philosophical reflection.
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5. Are we living in SOS?
After these preparations we are in the position to attack the main problem: the need for the
philosophy of sport in our society. But by the means of the analogy railway-sport (or rather
transport - sport) the answer should emerge immediately. Thanks to the substitution railway/
sport (although not always one to one) in ROS we get the description of sport obsessed
society (SOS) which needs a philosophy of sport defined in analogy to the philosophy of the
railway in ROS. Such understood sport philosophy would be a critical response to sport
ideology. If this result is relevant to our real world depends on factual question of adequacy of
SOS description to our world. Because in this paper I am concerned rather with logical and
terminological issues than factual issues, I am not going to make any final empirical claim. At
this point I am going only to confine my argument to the following statement: a philosophy of
sport (in a sense) is urgently needed in the world that fits the SOS description. I believe it is
the case that we are not dwelling ROS, but it is possible that we are actually dwelling SOS,
but because we get used to its obsession, it is difficult for us to fully realize and asses it.
Obviously, the diagnosis might differ strongly between respective countries.
For those who agree with the logic of the argument and the adequacy of SOS description to
our world, I am offering an additional comment. To prove that philosophy of sport is really
needed does not mean that we have really fulfilled this need with what is already known as a
‘philosophy of sport’. It is possible that a part of it (or even majority of it) falls in fact into the
category 'ideology of sport'. I am not going to draw a precise demarcation line between the
ideology and the philosophy of sport. But to address Henning Eichberg's analysis: if he is
right in suggesting that so and so is a case of ideology rather than the philosophy of sport, it
does not challenge the conviction that the real philosophy of sport is needed. Thus I believe
his paper might be read as an attack on the ideology of sport under the auspices of the
philosophy of sport, but not as an evidence that the philosophy of sport (in the above defined
sense) is not an important part of the intellectual life. My defense of the possibility of the need
of philosophy of the railway is two-edged: it is meant as an attack on some forms of the
‘philosophy of sport’, but not on the philosophy of sport as such, on the contrary, some forms
of critical philosophy of sport are defended.
6. Closing remarks
After presenting a defense of the possibility of the philosophy of the railway dependent on
certain social conditions (and, ceteris paribus, the possibility of the philosophy of sport) I left
the two following questions open :1) does our society fulfill the criteria of the need of the
philosophy of sport and 2) where exactly lies the demarcation line between ideology of sport
and philosophy of sport. There are many possible combinations of the relevant answers, and
the definite choice of one of them lies beyond the scope of this paper. Henning Eichberg's
position might be interpreted as follows: we do not need the philosophy of sport (although we
have something that is called ‘philosophy of sport’), whereas my argument reveals the
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worrisome possibility that is almost directly opposite to his position. If we are living in SOS,
due to presented arguments we really need a genuine philosophy of sport, but the existing
body of knowledge called ‘philosophy of sport’ does not fully meet above characterized
criterion of critical analysis of the ideology of sport.
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Notes
i
It is interesting to note that whereas the narrow view eliminates sub-disciplines of
philosophy, the broad view might eliminate its mother-discipline, claiming that there are
only philosophies of X, Y, Z… but there is no philosophy simpliciter.
ii
Inflation of this kind has already occurred with the term philosophy referring to different
forms of actions (coach’s philosophy of game, boss’ philosophy of business; philosophy of
cooking etc.).
iii
In The Oxford Companion to Philosophy [Honderich 1995] one might find such
Philosophies of X as philosophy of education, history, language, law, life, mathematics,
mind, religion, science. The Companion does not include philosophy of sport; however, it
includes article ‘sport’ (written by David Best).
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