Woodro w Wilson and the U.S. Ratification o f the Treaty of Versailles
Ou tsid e In for ma tion for Uni t 06 D BQ
The question:
It wa s the s tre ng th of the opp os titi on for ces , both libe ral an d conse rv ati ve , r athe r th an
the ine pti tude and s tu bb or nne ss of Pr esid ent Wil s on tha t l ed to the Sen ate de fe at of the
Tr ea ty of V er saille s.
Using the documents and your knowledge of the period 1917 – 1921, assess the validity of this statement.
Liberal
Conservative
Internationalists – Wilsonians
Reservationists – Henry Cabot Lodge
Irreconcilables – Robert Lafollette, William Borah,
Hiram Johnson, George Norris
Wilson’s health as an issue
Herbert Hoover
Bolshevism
League of Nations
Article X of the League of Nations
Treaty with “reservations”
14 Points
Make up of American commission to Versailles Peace
Conference
Wilson’s 1919 speaking tour
1920 election
“Solemn Referendum”
Return to “Normalcy
Questions to consider:
1)
Can you be “progressive” (i.e. liberal) on domestic policy, yet “isolationist” (i.e. conservative) on foreign policy?
2) What sentiments President Wilson and Senator Lodge hold for each other?
3) What group of senators – Internationalists, reservationists, or irreconcilables – were the largest group in the US
Senate?
4) What changes in the Treaty of Versailles were sought by the reservationists?
5) What “mistakes” did Wilson make prior to the senate vote on the Treaty of Versailles?
SIGNIFICANT INDIVIDUALS
William E. Borah (1865-1940) first gained fame as the unsuccessful prosecutor in a 1905 case involving William
D. Haywood, the Western Federation of Miners, and the assassination of Governor Frank Steunenberg. Despite this,
he consistently favored labor against business as he represented Idaho in the U.S. Senate between 1906 and 1940. He
was known as a great orator and progressive, often allying himself with Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow
Wilson to secure progressive domestic legislation. During World War I, however, he opposed both United States
involvement in world affairs and Wilson's widespread repression of civil liberties.
Henry Cabot Lodge (1850-1924) came from one of New England's most influential families and received a
bachelor's degree from Harvard in 1871 and a Ph.D. in political science from the same institution in 1876. He served in
United States House of Representatives (1887-1893) and the Senate (1893-1924). As a somewhat progressive
Republican, Lodge supported both tariffs and anti-trust laws. Lodge was especially fascinated with foreign policy and
considered himself an expert on the subject. He is best remembered for his fight against Wilson in 1919, and most
acknowledged him as Wilson's leading opponent and neutrality's strongest advocate. After Harding's election to the
presidency in 1920, Lodge became the de facto leader of American foreign policy until his death four years later.
Woodrow Wilson was born in 1856 in Staunton, Virginia. Before entering politics, Wilson taught political
science and history at Princeton University between 1890 and 1902. Between 1902 and 1910, Wilson served as
president of Princeton, where he befriended Grover Cleveland (please see second lesson plan in this issue). Wilson
entered politics in 1910 and won the governor's office of New Jersey. At that position he gained fame for opposing
political machines and being an honest politician. After 45 ballots at the 1912 Democratic National Convention, Wilson
secured his party's nomination and challenged incumbent Republican William Howard Taft and former president
Theodore Roosevelt, now running on the Bull Moose Progressive Party ticket. With the Republicans divided between
Taft and Roosevelt, Wilson easily won. As president he advocated and successfully enticed Congress to pass
progressive laws concerning trusts, tariffs, and labor. In 1916, the American people reelected Wilson as a promisor of
peace and isolation. In 1917, however, Wilson took the nation to war--America's first in Europe. After the war, Wilson
advocated continued U.S. involvement in world affairs and won the 1919 Nobel peace prize for his efforts. That year
also witnessed the physical decline of Wilson; he had a severe stroke and remained paralyzed for the rest of his
second term. Wilson died in 1924.
Woodro w Wilson and the U.S. Ratification o f the Treaty of Versailles
TIMELINE OF EVENTS
1918:
Wilson's Peace Proposal, Fourteen Points.
Novem ber 1918:
Midterm Elections. Wilson makes a partisan appeal for a Democratic congress to ensure
support for his foreign policies.
5 Novembe r 1918:
December 1918:
Wilson arrives in Paris without a single prominent Republican in the delegations.
14 Fe bruary 1919:
April 1919:
Democrats lose control of both houses of congress.
Lincoln reports to the plenary session with the finished draft of the League Covenant.
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and thirty-nine senators declare that the covenant of the League is
unacceptable.
8 July 1919:
Wilson returns home with the Versailles Treaty and calls on the Senate to accept "This Great Duty."
August 1919:
Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, resorts to delay tactics
and lengthy hearings. He personally dislikes Wilson.
September 1919:
Wilson, to garner support for his foreign policies, embarks on a nation-wide speaking tour.
25 Septem ber 1919:
2 October 1919:
Wilson's doctor cancels Wilson's tour and Wilson is hurried back to Washington.
Wilson suffers a severe stroke and paralysis.
7-19 Novembe r 1919:
The Senate adopts fourteen of Lodge's reservations concerning the Treaty of
Versailles, most having to do with the League.
December 1919:
The Senate votes to reconsider.
January, Febru ary 1920:
March 1920:
Twenty-one Democrats abandon Wilson's ship and join the reservationists. Treaty still not ratified.
20 May 1920:
2 July 1921:
German over.
Wilson remains adamant that there are to be no reservations.
Congress ends the war by joint resolution.
Harding is now president. Another joint resolution declares the state of war with Austria and
Woodro w Wilson and the U.S. Ratification o f the Treaty of Versailles
Document
"The President's State of Health," Memorandum by Secretary of State Robert
Lansing, 5 November 1919
Yesterday I sent over to the White House a Thanksgiving Proclamation which I had drafted on the evening of the 3rd. Today it
was returned to me signed by the President and also his signed authorization to affix to it the Great Seal of the United States.
The Proclamation, as drafted, was not changed in a single word. This fact caused me much concern as to the physical condition
of the President, since it showed either that he was not permitted to read the document or that, if he did read it, he was not in a
mental state to do so critically. In either case decided weakness was shown, because I cannot conceive of the President, if he was
able to review a proclamation of this sort, permitting it being issued to the people without putting into it some of his own phrases
and so impressing it with his personality.
But even more than this failure to pass upon the wording of the Proclamation his signatures were shocking manifestations of
his serious physical state. Instead of his firm and plain writing the signature attached to the Proclamation was almost illegible.
Without knowing the name intended to be written "Woodrow" could not have been deciphered. "Wilson" was better written, but
was very shaky and uneven, while the flourish at the end looked quite unnatural. The signature on the authorization was better,
but that too was evidently written by a man whose nerves or muscles were with difficulty controlled. Both signatures were written
with a lead pencil and did not appear to be done hastily.
I was surprised and distressed by these proofs of the President's condition, because though I knew that he had been threatened
with, if he had not actually suffered, a slight stroke, I had assumed from the repeated assurances of the physicians that he was
almost normal. I know now that he is still a very sick man, and that his convalescence will take much time. If he is really better
than he was, and I am sure that he is, he must have been critically ill, if not very near death.
After seeing this Proclamation with its pitiful signature I feel more alarmed as to the outcome of the President's illness than I
have at any time except on the Wednesday [1 October 1919] after his return to Washington when Tumulty by motions indicated
partial paralysis of the left side. If he has only progressed thus far toward recovery during the last month I cannot see how he can
really conduct the Government for months to come.
Source: A rthur S. Link, ed. The P apers of W ood row Wilson (Prin ceton, N.J.: P rinceton Univ ers ity P re ss, 1 99 0),
63: 61 8- 9.
Document
Excerpt from the Diary of Ray Stan nard B aker, 5 Novem ber 1919
I lunched at the White House with Mrs. Wilson at 1:30. I had a hard time getting through the gates, for the President has been
ill and has had no visitors. Mrs. [Eleanor] McAdoo, Mrs. [Jessie] Sayre, and Miss Margaret Wilson, the President's daughters were
there: and Admiral and Mrs. Grayson. . . . Mrs. Wilson looks worn and tired after her long vigil, but remains irrepressibly cheerful.
Grayson told me he did not see how they could have gotten along without her. She has been up all hours of the night with the
President and has never faltered in her attention.
The western trip must have been a terrible affair, as she and Admiral Grayson told me about it. The President was ill when he
started and went against the express and urgent advice of his physician. The President felt that he must do all he could to inform
the American people of the League of Nations and try to the limit of his ability to get it adopted by public opinion. From the first
he had no appetite and could not digest what he did eat because he was under such nervous strain. The Doctor had to feed him
liquid and pre-digested foods during the day and night. Soon he could not sleep. The western altitudes affected him: but he would
not give up. In Montana the hot dry weather and the dust caused an affection [infection] of the throat & he developed a kind of
asthma. The Doctor repeatedly sprayed out his nose and throat: often having to do it in the middle of the night. In Washington he
began to have terrible headaches--so blinding, that when he got up to speak he would see double. Yet he would not give in. At
several functions in California--one a dinner in which those present smoked inordinately, he suffered frightfully--but made a
wonderful speech. He never complained, he never scorned his condition--and he refused the beseeching requests of Dr. Grayson to
stop and rest. Coming east one day the doctor saw a curious drag or looseness at the left side of his mouth--a sign of danger that
could no longer be obscured and he and Mrs. Wilson took things into their own hands and called off the trip. No one knows yet
how serious the attack was or what the President has been through. I spent the entire afternoon talking with Grayson and he went
into every phase of the case and read me his secret report--the substance of which I will not even put down here. He asked my
judgment as to what he had done and I told him I thought he was absolutely right in doing what he did. It was a stupendous
responsibility he had to assume, but he has both wisdom and courage--a fine, brave, simple man if ever there was one. He has
never lost his head and his struggle with the other doctors when they were all for operation in the prostrate difficulty was a
notable affair. In this he was supported by Mrs. Wilson.
The President will be much longer in getting up and about than anyone knows--and he may never get up. The Doctor has
invented and had built a kind of chair back, with arms, for use by the President in his bed. He has also a new wheel-chair in which,
presently, he hopes the President may be able to get about. The President is undeniably better, but the doctor is guarding him
closely, keeping everyone away--and preventing, as much as possible, any business coming to his attention. This is hard to do
because the President's mind is exceedingly acute, as good as ever it was, and he chafes at the inactivity. I did not see him myself. I
am sure I could have seen him if I had asked--but, of course, would not. Not even the secretaries and others in the White House
know what the real trouble is.
Source: A rthur S. Link, ed. The P aper s of W ood row Wilson (Prin ceton, N.J.: P rinceton Univ ers ity P re ss, 1 99 0),
63: 61 9-2 0.
Woodro w Wilson and the U.S. Ratification o f the Treaty of Versailles
Document
Memorandum by Dr. Cary T. Grayson on Senator Hitchcock's Interview with the
President on the Peace Treaty, 17 November 1919
Senator Hitchcock called at the White House today at 10:30 for a conference with the President concerning the recent
developments in connection with the ratification of the Peace Treaty. The Senator had sent me a copy of the Lodge resolutions,
which I read to the President.
The Senator, after exchanging good-morning greetings with the President, asked him if he had read the Lodge resolution, and
whether he had anything to suggest concerning it. The President immediately replied: "I consider it a nullification of the Treaty and
utterly impossible." He then drew an analogy between this and South Carolina's threat to nullify the Constitution. Senator
Hitchcock then called the President's attention to the changes the Senate had made in Article X, to which the President replied:
"That cuts the very heart out of the Treaty; I could not stand for those changes for a moment because it would humiliate the
United States before all of the Allied countries." Senator Hitchcock said: "What would be the effect of the defeat of the Treaty by
the Lodge resolution?" The President's answer was: "The United States would suffer the contempt of the world. We will be playing
into Germany's hands. Think of the humiliation we would suffer in having to ask Germany whether she would accept such and
such reservation!" The President said: "If the Republicans are bent on defeating this Treaty, I want the vote of each, Republican
and Democrat, recorded, because they will have to answer to the country in the future for their acts. They must answer to the
people. I am a sick man, lying in this bed, but I am going to debate this issue with these gentlemen in their respective states
whenever they come up for re-election if I have breadth enough in my body to carry on the fight. I shall do this even if I have to
give my life to it. And I will get their political scalps when the truth is known to the people. They have got to account to their
constituents for their actions in this matter. I have no doubt as to what the verdict of the people will be when they know the facts.
Mind you, Senator, I have no hostility towards these gentlemen but an utter contempt."
Senator Hitchcock favored certain compromises with the Republicans. The President said: "With the exception of
interpretations, which I would not alter the substance, I am not willing to make any compromise other than what we agreed upon
at our meeting on [blank]. The President's position was that he would not oppose reservations which were merely interpretations
of the Treaty, but that he was irreconcilably opposed to any alteration of the Treaty which would cause a recommitment to council
with other nations.
The Senator told the President that he had had a conference with Lord [Edward] Grey, the British Ambassador, and with Mr.
[Jean] Jusserand, the French Ambassador. They told the Senator that they considered--that Senator Lodge and the Republican
party had killed the Peace Treaty and the League of Nations. They also commented on the fact that this view had been published in
both English and French papers. They also expressed the belief that their countries would reject a Treaty amended in accordance
with the Lodge resolution.
The President interrogated Senator Hitchcock as to what had occurred in the Senate concerning the Treaty in the last month.
He said: "I have been lying on my back and have been very weak, and it has fatigued me to read and to discuss matters in my mind,
so to speak. I have been kept in the dark to a certain extent except what Mrs. Wilson and Doctor Grayson have told me, and they
have purposely kept a good deal from me. I want you to tell me now just everything that has taken place, so I may pick up the
threads that were left when I was put to bed." These interrogations were at considerable length, the interview lasting one hour and
five minutes. Whenever Senator Hitchcock would bring forth some argument why so and so was done, the President would
combat him and ask to be advised why it was done and for what purpose. He said repeatedly: "Senator, I think you have acted very
wisely and used good judgment in the circumstances, but why did you do so and so. I am not criticising you but I am asking you for
information" . . . .
After the Senator and I had left the room, the Senator turned to me and said: "The President is looking remarkably well. He
has strengthened so much more physically and mentally since I saw him last. He is very combative today as he sits up there in that
bed. On certain compromises he is as immovable as the Rock of Gibraltar." The Senator also said to me: "I would give anything if
the Democrats, in fact, all the Senate, could see the attitude that man took this morning. Think how effective it would be if they
could see the picture as you and I saw it this morning!"
Source: A rthur S. Link, ed., The Pap er s of W ood row Wils on (P rincet on, N.J.: Princ eton Unive rsity P res s , 19 9 1),
64:4 3-5.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Woodro w Wilson and the U.S. Ratification o f the Treaty of Versailles
Document
Letter from Robert Lansing to Frank L. Polk, 19 November 1919
By the time this letter reaches you the fate of the Treaty in the Senate will have been decided and so my comments as to the. .
.[probabilities] of its ratification in any form at all acceptable would be of doubtful value. However you may find some interest in
the views I hold at the present time.
The treaty when laid before the Senate was tremendously handicapped by two things: first, the Covenant as drafted which
certainly from the legal standpoint was open to valid criticism because it apparently was in defiance of certain constitutional
provisions; and second, the insensate animosity of a considerable group of Republican Senators to the President personally. This
latter feeling enhanced the objections to the League because he with the aid of Colonel House was looked upon as the author of
the Covenant or at least its chief sponsor and advocate. If his enemies could practically destroy the League or render it worthless,
they were particularly desirous of doing so because they felt that it would humble his pride of authorship and prove to the world
that he was by no means so great and powerful as had been supposed. With this end in view the Senate majority began its
campaign apparently against the Covenant but really against the President.
The earlier hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, among them mine, showed conclusively that it was personal
hostility to the President which was the controlling motive, and that the interests of the United States were really secondary to
them in importance. It is undeniable that the attempts of the Committee to discredit the President in his conduct of the
negotiations at Paris were more or less successful so far as the public were concerned. Unfortunately the President’s record was
vulnerable and nothing was overlooked by the partisans who were testing every joint of his armor.
There is no doubt that at the outset the great majority of the people were back of the President and the League. I felt that if
the President did not assume a defensive attitude he would in large measure retain this popular support, but that, if he began to
explain the Covenant, he would unavoidably become involved in arguments which would be subject to attack arousing doubt as to
their validity in the public mind. For that reason I strongly advised him two days after I landed, not to make a speaking tour for the
League. He yielded very unwillingly agreeing to postpone his trip, though he would not abandon it.
I had hoped that the postponement would result in abandonment, but as the attacks on the weak points in the covenant
increased in virulence the President became incensed and pugnacious with the result that he was inflexible in his determination to
go out and appeal to the people over the heads of the Senators. I attempted again to dissuade him from taking this step, because I
felt sure that it would solidify the opposition in the Senate and that instead of being an offensive, which would only amount to
abuse anyway, it would be a defense of the Covenant.
You know, if you followed the President’s speeches in the West that, while he used some rather undignified expressions about
the opposition in the Senate, he sought to defend the Covenant and its various provisions. I am sure the performance lost rather
than gained support for the Treaty. It came to me from various sources that the public began to consider that the objections had
some merit otherwise the President would not have taken so much trouble to answer them. Prior to his western trip the public
were disposed to brush the objections aside on the supposition that they were only put forward to discredit the President rather
than the Treaty. Thus, the President’s speeches, while they may have won over a few, lost, in my opinion, a great deal of public
support, especially as the whole proceeding took on the character of a party issue.
Then, as you know, came the President’s physical collapse, his return to Washington, and his elimination from the struggle by
reason of his grave illness. While his inability to direct the defense of the Treaty in the Senate may have affected the present
situation unfavorably, I am not at all sure that he could have accomplished more than Hitchcock, who has kept his head and shown
himself capable and adroit.
The President lost the best chance to compromise on moderate reservations last August. I suggested that policy to him and his
jaw shot out and he said that there were going to be no reservations and if the opposition wanted a fight they would “get a
damned good one,” referring of course to his appeal to the people. With a majority against him on some sort of modification of the
Treaty I confess that his course seemed to me a policy which would force the “moderatists” to join the “irreconcilables.” Now that is
just what has happened and the steam-roller is working smoothly and successfully.
Today Hitchcock had a brief talk with the President, which in his state of health is a dangerous thing to do, and the President
said that if the resolution of ratification was passed with the present reservations, he would withdraw the treaty. Both he and
Hitchcock think that this step will create a situation where they can dictate moderate reservations which will be acceptable to
other nations as well as to the President. Now you understand this is the last stand. The President is with his back to the wall and
means to go down rather than surrender. I am not so sanguine of success as he and the Senator seem to be, judging from Tumulty,
who is my informant. Many Senators will rejoice if the Treaty is withdrawn and will use all their influence to prevent its revival.
These enemies of the document have grown stronger than they were last August and I am not certain by any means that they can
be defeated. If this policy succeeds I will certainly have to take off my hat to Hitchcock as a great parliamentary leader. He showed
his adroitness in announcing after he left the President, that the Lodge reservations were unacceptable to the President, who
would, if they were adopted, “pocket” the treaty. At least he has thrown down the gauntlet and it will be interesting to see the
effect.
Meanwhile the industrial unrest and the outbreaks of Bolshevists in this country together with the serious strike of the coal
miners, the injunction against the leaders and the present miners’ conference here have diverted public attention from the Treaty
in large measure. Three months ago everybody talked of it. Now everybody is weary and only desire to have the matter settled one
way or the other. They do not seem to care how it is settled. Since the grave problems of domestic nature take up the attention of
the people, they have lost interest in the economic condition of the world. The disposition seems to be to attend to our own affairs
and let the rest of the nations go to the devil if they want to.
Altogether the outlook for the President’s world policies is very gloomy. He cannot, I feel sure, carry them through. Why he
cannot seems to me evident. And I think the blame can be placed with almost equal certainty. It causes one, loyal to the President,
a feeling of sorrow and regret to see his great reputation as a leader being thus shattered. He reached the zenith of his greatness in
January of this year, and since that time he has lost in prestige and popularity at home and abroad. I shall not go into the reasons
but leave you to judge them as you can do as well as I.
I have heard nothing from Colonel House directly or indirectly for a month. I cannot find that he is taking any active part in
public affairs. He is sharing the President’s character of a target for senatorial sarcasm and curses. I have wondered sometimes
what he thinks of this awful mess and if he sees any way out. . . .
Source: A rthur S. Link, ed., The Pap er s of W ood row Wils on (P rincet on, N.J.: Princ eton Unive rsity P res s , 19 9 1),
64:54-7.
Woodro w Wilson and the U.S. Ratification o f the Treaty of Versailles
The Opposition
Document
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
"I personally went over this reservation to Article 10 again and again with groups of Senators and with individual members.
Finally, I asked Senator McCumber. . . to come to my house and lunch with me alone. At that time, we took up the reservation
which had been already brought to a point where I thought I could secure all Republican votes for it if I could get the assent of
Senator McCumber. After much discussion, he and I agreed upon the reservation in the form in which it was presented to the
Senate and finally adopted. The reservation was as follows:
'The United States assumed no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any country or to
interfere in controversies between nations--whether members of the league or not--under the provisions of Article 10 or to employ
the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the
Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval
forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.'"
Source: H enry Cabot Lod ge, The Senat e and the Lea gue of Nati ons (Ne w Yo rk: Cha rle s Sc ribne r's Sons, 1925 ).
Document
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
"League of Nations"
I am as anxious as any human being can be to have the United States render every possible service to the civilization and the
peace of mankind. But I am certain that we can do it best by not putting ourselves in leading strings, or subjecting our policies and
our sovereignty to other nations. The independence of the United States is not only more precious to ourselves, but to the world,
than any single possession.
Look at the United States today. We have made mistakes in the past; we have had shortcomings. We shall make mistakes in
the future and fall short of our own best hopes. But nonetheless, is there any country today on the face of the earth which can
compare with this in ordered liberty, in peace, and in the largest freedom? I feel that I can say this without being accused of undue
boastfulness, for it is a simple fact. And in taking on these obligations, all that we do is in the spirit of unselfishness, and it is a
desire for the good of mankind. But it is well to remember that we are dealing with nations, every one of which has a direct
individual interest to serve, and there is grave danger in an unshared idealism. Contrast the United States with any country on the
face of the earth today and ask yourself whether the situation of the United States is not the best to be found.
I will go as far as anyone in world service that the first step to world service is the maintenance of the United States. You may
call me selfish if you will, conservative or reactionary, or use any other harsh adjective you see fit to apply. But an American I was
born, an American I've remained all my life. I can never be anything else but an American, and I must think of the United States
first. And when I think of the United States first in an arrangement like this, I am thinking of what is best for the world. For if the
United States fails, the best hopes of mankind fail with it. I have never had but one allegiance; I cannot divide it now. I have loved
but one flag and I cannot share that devotion and give affection to the mongrel banner invented for a league. Internationalism,
illustrated by the Bolshevik and by the men to whom all countries are alike, provided they can make money out of them, is to me
repulsive. National I must remain and in that way I, like all other Americans, can render the amplest service to the world.
The United States is the world's best hope, but if you fetter her in the interest through quarrels of other nations, if you tangle her
in the intrigues of Europe, you will destroy her powerful good, and endanger her very existence. Leave her to march freely through
the centuries to come, as in the years that have gone. Strong, generous, and confident, she has nobly served mankind. Beware how
you trifle with your marvelous inheritance -- this great land of ordered liberty. For if we stumble and fall, freedom and civilization
everywhere will go down in ruin.
Source: Exc erpts fr o m a rec ordin g by Senat or Hen r y Cabot Lod ge fr o m the A merican Me mory Col lectio n
Woodro w Wilson and the U.S. Ratification o f the Treaty of Versailles
Document
Senator William E. Borah
"'Entertain no compromise; have none of it.' This states the position I occupy at this time and which I have, in a humble way,
occupied from the first contention in regard to this proposal. My objections to the league have not been met by the
reservationists. . . . My friends of reservations, tell me where is the reservation in these articles which protect us against entangling
alliances with Europe?"
Sou rc e: William E . Bor ah, Congress ional Record , 10 No vemb er 1 919 , 6 6th C on gr es s, F ir st S ess ion .
Document
Senator William E. Borah on November 10, 1919.
Mr. President, after Mr. Lincoln had been elected President, before he assumed the duties of the office and at the time when
all indications were to the effect that we would soon be in the midst of civil strife, a friend from the city of Washington wrote him
for instructions. Mr. Lincoln wrote back in a single line, 'Entertain no compromise; have none of it.' That states the position I
occupy at this time and which I have in my humble way occupied from the first contention in regard to this proposal of entering
the League of Nations....
Have we not been told day by day for the last nine months that the Senate of the United States, a coordinate part of the
treaty-making power, should accept this league as it was written because the wise men sitting in Versailles had so written it, and
has not every possible influence and every source of power in public opinion been organized and directed against the Senate to
compel it to do that thing?
What is the result of all this? We are in the midst of all the affairs of Europe. We have joined in alliance with all European
concerns. We have joined in alliance with all the European nations which have thus far joined the league, and all nations which
may be admitted to the league. We are sitting there dabbling in their affairs and intermeddling in their concerns. In other words,
Mr. President–and this comes to the question which is fundamental with me–we have forfeited and surrendered, once and for all,
the great policy of 'no entangling alliances' upon which the strength of this Republic has been founded for 150 years....
There is another and even more commanding reason why I shall record my vote against this treaty. It imperils what I conceive
to be the underlying, the very first principles of this Republic. It is in conflict with the right of our people to govern themselves free
from all restraint, legal or moral, of foreign powers...I will not I can not, give up my belief that America must, not alone for the
happiness of her own people, but for the moral guidance and greater contentment of the world, be permitted to live her own life.
Next to the tie which binds a man to his God is the tie which binds a man to his country, and all schemes, all plans, however
ambitious and fascinating they seem in their proposal, but which embarrass or entangle and impede or shackle her sovereign will,
which would compromise her freedom of action I unhesitatingly put behind me....
Sir, we are told that this treaty means peace. Even so, I would not pay the price. Would you purchase peace at the cost of our
independence?...
Mr. President, to recapitulate, Europe is still Europe, with all her racial antipathies and imperialistic appetites, with the same
standards of government, whatever name Government may bear, and the same strange conceptions of right and justice in
whatever terms she may clothe her schemes of ambition. She is unchanged, and if we assume the task of effectuating a change,
save as in the past by whatever power precept and example may exert, we will end by becoming Europeanized in our standards and
in our conceptions of civilization or we will fall into disintegration and as a Republic die. If we give up our independence and enter
her councils with one vote, if we surrender our seat of authority here upon the Western Continent, this place of command to
which the living God directed our fathers that they, free from all foreign entanglements, might work out a new scheme of
government, if we quit our own stand upon foreign soil, we shall return as our President returned from Versailles, stripped of our
principles and shorn of our ideals. Look upon his experience. The thoughtful will gather from it a lesson of deep and lasting
significance.
Source: Exc erpts fr o m a sp eech b efo re the U.S. Sen ate, pr esented by Sen ato r W illia m E. Bo rah on N ov embe r
10, 19 19.