Commissioner‟s report
Commissioner's Report
Investigation into the police management
of reports of domestic abuse made by/in
relation to Casey Brittle
Table of contents
IPCC Commissioner’s Report Casey Brittle
Introduction ......................................................................................................................3
Background ......................................................................................................................3
Referral..............................................................................................................................4
Chronological summary of events..................................................................................4
Misconduct Outcomes...................................................................................................12
Findings ..........................................................................................................................13
Review of Nottinghamshire Police‟s Revised Domestic Abuse Policy and its
Implementation...............................................................................................................17
Commissioner‟s Conclusions.......................................................................................22
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Introduction
1. This report sets out the IPCC independent investigation‟s findings into
Nottinghamshire Police‟s handling of domestic incidents involving Miss Casey
Louise Brittle prior to her murder in October 2010, as well as Commissioner
Amerdeep Somal‟s response to those findings.
2. In addition to considering the policies and guidelines the force had in place relating
to the policing of domestic incidents, the investigation also examined the way in
which Nottinghamshire Police had responded to previous recommendations for
improving their performance in this area of policing. These recommendations were
derived from the IPCC independent investigation into the serious assault of Gail
Hdili by a former partner (See appendix A for a copy of the relevant IPCC press
release)
Background
3. Casey Brittle, 21, was murdered on Sunday 3 October 2010 at her home on
Springfield Street, New Basford, Nottingham.
4. As a result of the Nottinghamshire Police investigation into the murder, Sanchez
Williams, Miss Brittle‟s estranged partner and the father of her daughter, was
charged with murder on the 6 October 2010. He was subsequently convicted of
murder in March 2011 and sentenced to life imprisonment.
5. Sanchez Williams, 27, had an extensive criminal record and warnings on the Police
National Computer for violence. He did not have any previous convictions for
domestic abuse related offences.
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Referral
6. The murder investigation established that there was a history of domestic abuse
between Miss Brittle and Mr Williams. Between September 2008 and October 2010 a
number of incidents were reported to Nottinghamshire Police by both Miss Brittle and
third parties, none of which resulted in criminal charges.
7. Following concerns raised by an internal review by the force about how these
incidents were handled a referral was made to the IPCC on 12 October 2010. On
13 October 2010 this became the subject of an independent investigation.
8. The IPCC reviewed the circumstances of each incident and identified ten officers
whose actions would potentially justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. The
six Police Constables (PC), three Police Sergeants (PS) and one Acting Police
Sergeant (A/PS), all based within the force‟s City Division, were therefore served
with misconduct notices.
Chronological summary of events
9. This investigation identified 11 separate incidents involving Miss Brittle and Mr
Williams. The incidents, which occurred between September 2008 and August
2010, including two incidents on the 18 March 2009, are detailed below.
10. While reading details of the incidents it is important to be aware of the process
Nottinghamshire Police used to assess and respond to risk following domestic
incidents during the relevant period.
11. Following a domestic abuse incident officers should have completed a domestic
abuse form and sent it to the City Division domestic abuse unit. Once submitted to
the unit an assessment would be made of the risk posed to the victim, with the unit
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then providing the officers with a standard set of suggestions for further actions
they could undertake, dependent on the level of risk identified. If no risk
assessment form was submitted, the domestic abuse unit would not be aware of
the incident and would therefore take no action.
6 September 2008
12. At 11.47am police received a call from a woman to say that her cousin was beating
his girlfriend up. The caller did not give, nor was she asked for, her name or the
name of those involved in the incident, meaning checks could not be carried out
police databases. The call handler also failed to establish if children were at the address
despite them being audible in the background, and repeated incorrect
details back to the caller.
13. When an officer arrived Mr Williams answered the door and told the officer he had
been arguing with a friend, not his girlfriend, and there had not been any violence.
A woman appeared at the door and confirmed Mr Williams‟s story. After the
attending officer spoke to the dispatcher via his radio the log was closed and the
officer left the address.
14. The officer accepted the word of Mr Williams even though it was contrary to what
had been reported in the initial phone call. The officer did not any conduct house to
house enquiries, or contact the caller at a later date to establish what had really
happened.
15. As the officer did not believe a domestic incident had taken place neither a
domestic abuse or a child protection form was submitted to the City division‟s
domestic abuse unit.
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13 October 2008
16. At 12:01pm Miss Brittle called 999 reporting that she had been assaulted in the
street by her live-in boyfriend. Miss Brittle said she was very frightened, it was not
the first time it had happened and that they had a child together. She said her
partner had driven off and she was on her way to a friend‟s address.
17. Despite her reluctance to deal with the police the handler encouraged her to speak
to officers about what had happened. PC A attended and Miss Brittle said that she
did not want to pursue the assault and refused to name her boyfriend. After half an
hour PC A left and informed the control room that Miss Brittle was unwilling to
cooperate.
18. PC A told the IPCC investigation that she checked the force‟s intelligence system
and that showed there was no other domestic incident involving Miss Brittle.
19. PS A, PC A‟s supervisor, reviewed the crime management system entry and called
Miss Brittle, who repeated what she had said to PC A about not wanting to assist
an investigation.
20. No domestic abuse forms were submitted to the domestic abuse unit as the officer
believed that as Miss Brittle did not wish to proceed with an investigation there was
no need to.
30 October and 4 November 2008
21. Miss Brittle made a 999 call to Nottinghamshire Police at 5.32pm, reporting that her
ex-partner had just assaulted her in front of her 11 month old child. Miss Brittle said
he had assaulted her in the past but that she had not reported it.
22. As Mr Williams had left the scene the call was downgraded so an appointment
could be made for an officer to see Miss Brittle at a later time. When officers later
attempted to visit her she was not available.
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23. In the early hours of 4 November officers stopped Mr Williams for a traffic offence
and arrested him for the alleged assault. Several hours later he was bailed until
early December, at which point he went to Springfield Street, where he spoke to a
neighbour who persuaded him not to confront Miss Brittle.
24. Later on the morning of 4 November Miss Brittle contacted the police. She told
A/PS A that Mr Williams had attended at her address at 5am and spoken to a
neighbour blaming her [Miss Brittle] for his arrest. She was upset Mr Williams had
been arrested without her „say so‟.
25. That afternoon Miss Brittle attended a police station and retracted her original
assault allegation. A different officer dealt with her and filled in both the domestic
abuse and child protection referral forms and sent them to the division‟s domestic
abuse unit, despite her being unwilling to assist the police investigation. This was
in accordance with the force‟s domestic abuse policy.
26. The domestic abuse unit risk assessed the incident on 29 January 2009 - a delay
of three months.
27. Mr Williams did not answer his bail and there is no indication that any effort was
made to trace him. No restrictions were put on his bail e.g. prohibiting contact with
Miss Brittle. In late December his bail was cancelled after the CPS advised no
charges should be brought.
18 March 2009
28. At 1.07pm a resident of Springfield Street reported an incident in which a man was
hitting a woman with a broom in Springfield Street. Police attended quickly and
arrested Mr Williams for assaulting a neighbour of Miss Brittle. He was bailed
without conditions. Attempts to progress the investigation by obtaining statements
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from other witnesses were frustrated and following a review of the case it was
closed. Mr Williams' bail was therefore cancelled.
29. Several hours later, while Mr Williams was in custody, Miss Brittle called police and
told them she did not feel secure in her own home; that Mr Williams was
repeatedly turning up; their daughter was scared of him; that domestic violence
had been going on „for ages‟ and that she wanted to get out of it. She asked for a
crime number so the council would change the locks on her door.
30. An appointment was made and PC B went to Miss Brittle‟s home on 20 March.
Miss Brittle downplayed the incident and said Mr Williams had now taken his
belongings and returned his keys. She said there had not been any violence at this
time.
4 August 2009
31. At 11.08am a 999 call to Nottinghamshire Police reported a violent domestic
incident taking place at Miss Brittle‟s home. PS B and PC C attended and spoke to
Miss Brittle. She acknowledged she had been arguing with someone, but would not
say with whom or about what, only that the matter was „sorted‟.
32. The officers did not speak to the original caller or other neighbours, despite Miss
Brittle‟s acknowledgement that something had actually happened at the address.
33. Their response was also hampered by the call handler noting the wrong house
number for Miss Brittle‟s address. This meant the officers were denied information
relating to previous incidents at the address
34. PC C did not fill in a domestic abuse form as he believed risk assessments were
only required for cooperative victims, nor was an incident created on the force‟s
crime recording system as he did not believe it was suitable for incidents reported
by a third party.
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10 November 2009
35. Miss Brittle made a 999 call at 10.22pm to report that her front door had been
kicked in and that someone may have been trying to break in. She explained her
partner had given chase and the suspect had not entered her property because a
neighbour had startled them. She advised that her daughter, aged nearly two, was
at the property.
36. Officers arrived quickly, during which time the call handler had established there
was a history of domestic violence at the property. Neighbours also told them they
thought Mr Williams had damaged the door, but they did not want to get involved.
37. When officers returned the next day Miss Brittle gave a different account, saying
that she and Mr Williams had caused the damage themselves as they had locked
themselves out and wanted to get in.
38. No risk assessment forms were sent to the domestic abuse unit, which the IPCC
investigation found justifiable in this incident.
4 June 2010
39. A colleague of Miss Brittle at the West One store in the Victoria Centre, Nottingham
made a 999 call to report that Miss Brittle had been assaulted by her boyfriend,
40. Before police arrived Miss Brittle told a security guard that her ex boyfriend, Mr
Williams, had entered the store and thrown her into a changing room. The security
guard recalled that she had red marks round her neck and was clearly shaken, but
she was also trying to play the incident down.
41. When PC D arrived Miss Brittle refused to provide details of the offender or her
child. Miss Brittle‟s colleague similarly refused to talk to PC D, although the
colleague was told a third party complaint could lead to a prosecution. A check with
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the shopping centre revealed there was no CCTV of the incident. The incident was
closed without a crime number being requested or domestic abuse forms being
submitted.
25 July 2010
42. At 5.21pm Miss Brittle made a non-emergency call to Nottinghamshire Police to
report that Mr Williams had been to her house about an hour ago, threatened her
and taken her mobile phone. She told the call handler that they had a 30 month old
daughter together.
43. When an officer arrived Miss Brittle explained what had happened and asked for
advice on how to seek a civil injunction against Mr Williams. She also said she did
not want to make a complaint regarding the theft of her phone, nor did she want
the officer to attend Mr Williams‟ home to warn him. An entry to this effect was
signed by Miss Brittle in the officer‟s pocket notebook.
44. The officer spoke to Miss Brittle about her relationship with Mr Williams and filled in
domestic abuse and child protection forms, which were sent to the domestic abuse
team. They gave Miss Brittle a medium risk level.
45. The officer returned to Miss Brittle‟s home in early August and advised her of the
outcome of her risk assessment. He also spoke to the local beat manager to let
him know of the incident.
10 August 2010
46. Security staff at the Victoria Centre, Nottingham, called police at 4.07pm and told
them a man had head butted a woman and thrown her into a photo booth. The
man was still at the scene, in company of other men. Police assistance was
requested, as it was anticipated that the man would “kick off”.
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47. PC E, an officer of less than two years‟ service at the time of the incident, and PC
F attended. PC E dealt with Miss Brittle. His pocket notebook records the following
signed entry:
„My name is Casey Brittle 11/4/1989 and I live at Springfield Street An incident
occurred today at Next in the Victoria Centre involving my ex-boyfriend Sanchez
Williams. He assaulted me in the Victoria Centre but I do not wish to give a
statement or make any complaint as I‟m unwilling. I‟m happy for the incident to be
dealt with by police informally.‟
48. Despite Miss Brittle admitting she had been the victim of an assault, PC E decided
it was not appropriate to arrest Mr Williams as he felt there was no realistic chance
of prosecution. This was not a decision for the officer to make.
49. Instead PC E decided the matter could be dealt with by way of a harassment
warning, but subsequently decided that this was not appropriate given Miss Brittle
was willing to have contact with the offender.
50. PC F spoke to Miss Brittle‟s friends, who were shopping with her at the time of the
incident and obtained Mr Williams‟ name from them.
51. Neither officer was able to provide a detailed description of their actions that day,
only vaguely recalling that they had spoken to a security guard briefly and that the
incident was not covered by CCTV.
52. Following Miss Brittle‟s murder it was established security guards at the centre had
retained CCTV of Mr Williams in the centre, the names and dates of birth of Miss
Brittle and Mr Williams, as well as contact details for her friends. They also made
contemporaneous notes about the incident.
53. In a statement to the murder investigation one of the guards added she saw
injuries on Miss Brittle and that Mr Williams had threatened to kill Miss Brittle. Mr
Williams had also rung her mobile 10-15 times after the assault and on the one
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occasion Miss Brittle answered, the security guard heard Mr Williams shout:
„I‟ve got a gun, I‟m going to do your mum and grandma.‟
54. Miss Brittle told the guard Mr Williams had access to firearms, something that also
featured on Mr Williams‟ police intelligence profile.
55. PC E submitted a domestic abuse form nine days after the incident, instead of
before the end of his tour of duty as the force‟s policy said it should have been. He
had crossed through all the questions, added inaccurate information about the
offender being unknown and that he believed it likely Mr Williams would do it again.
The risk was assessed as standard, but the IPCC investigation felt that the true risk
from this incident was medium - consistent with the previous assessment
conducted by the unit.
56. The incident was reviewed by PS C, who was satisfied there were no further lines
of enquiry. There is no record of statements being taken from the security guards.
57. Following Miss Brittle‟s murder it was also found that PC E did not respond to two
emails from Victim Support. These emails asked whether the officer had informed
Miss Brittle of their service and whether they had permission to contact her. The
link with Victim Support was introduced by the force to try to help the charity
provide victims with support and advice, but the organisation can only contact them
directly if permission has been given.
Misconduct Outcomes
58. The IPCC investigation recommended that six officers should be required to attend
misconduct meetings. All six officers entered guilty pleas. The outcome of the
meetings is as follows:,
• 4 August 2009 - PC C and PS B. No further action
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• 4 June 2010 - PC D received management action.
• 10 August 2010 - PC F and PS C received management action while PC E
received a written warning.
59. The four other officers who were not required to attend misconduct meetings were
subject to unsatisfactory performance procedures.
Findings
60. Aside from the failings of officers the IPCC investigation also found serious
systemic failings by the force. These will be explored in the following section.
61. When the majority of these incidents occurred Nottinghamshire Police did not have
a domestic abuse policy in place. In October 2008 the force, recognising that the
policy was not fit for purpose as it was outdated, removed it from circulation. A
revised version of the policy was made available to officers in March 2010. In the
intervening time period no interim policy was put in place, which is clearly
unacceptable.
62. A lack of knowledge on the part of divisional officers and lack of support from the
force therefore accounts for some, but not all, of the following themes that
characterised many of the responses to incidents involving Miss Brittle.
Failure to Pursue Lines of Enquiry
63. Although there were occasions when officers took positive action and arrested Mr
Williams, all too often the investigation found that officers placed too much
emphasis on Miss Brittle‟s unwillingness to proceed with criminal allegations.
64. Rather than seek independent evidence that may have assisted prosecutions,
officers appear to have been content to take no further action.
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Completion of risk assessment forms
65. Many officers told the IPCC they were not aware of, or were unclear about what to
do when responding to domestic incidents. In Miss Brittle‟s case seven incidents
required the completion of the domestic abuse and child protection forms, but only
three domestic and two child protection forms were submitted. As a consequence
the force and its officers failed to provide adequate support and safeguards to a
vulnerable victim and her child.
66. The need to ensure officers were submitting risk assessment forms was
highlighted to the force in late 2009 following the IPCC‟s investigation into a
serious domestic incident which resulted in Gail Hdili sustaining serious injuries at
the hands of her ex-partner . The repetition of these failures indicates the force‟s
efforts on this front were not sufficiently robust.
67. The investigation also found that in most of the incidents Miss Brittle was not
provided with a leaflet that would have outlined steps she could take to secure
support from other organisations. Some officers were not aware of the leaflet and
one stated that they had to photocopy the original as the force had not provided
any more after the initial print run.
Lack of Proactive work by Domestic Abuse Units
68. During the relevant period the City Division‟s Domestic Abuse Support Unit did not
take any proactive steps to identify and risk assess domestic incidents that may
have occurred in the local area. This is disappointing given that the Hdili
investigation highlighted the limitations of relying on divisional officers submitting
risk assessment forms.
69. The findings of that investigation should have prompted the force to reconsider the
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role of the units, with a view to making them more proactive, as opposed to
reactive, as a matter of urgency.
70. The City Division‟s domestic abuse unit‟s working hours were 0800-1600, Monday
to Friday. There were no contingency arrangements for „out-of-hours‟ incidents.
Therefore a domestic incident reported on a Friday evening would not be risk
assessed until the following Monday morning.
71. The IPCC investigation acknowledges that a search tool has been developed that
allows domestic abuse units to review all potential domestic incidents on the crime
management system. The tool was designed on the assumption that domestic
incidents are recorded with „domestic no crime‟ numbers. However, given that
three of the incidents considered by this investigation were not given „domestic no
crime‟ numbers when they should have been [incidents of 6 September 2008, 4
August 2009 and 4 June 2010] this process still has potential loopholes.
Scheduled appointments
72. The force operates a „Managed Incident Car‟ (MIC) service, which is essentially an
officer who attends pre-arranged appointments with members of the public who
have complained regarding matters that do not require an immediate or priority
response. The force‟s MIC policy advises that it is not to be used for domestic
abuse incidents; similarly, these appointments cannot be booked for immediate or
priority incidents due to a command and control block on such action being taken.
Control room staff twice manipulated the system by downgrading incidents to book
appointments for officers to visit Miss Brittle. The investigation was also told that
the practice was common in the force‟s control room.
73. The force‟s Call Grading policy contradicts the MIC policy, as it states that in some
15
circumstances it may be appropriate to use the MIC for domestic incidents. The
investigation therefore suggests the guide is reviewed to remove the inconsistent
advice. It may be that some lower level domestic incidents are suitable for MIC
appointments with the approval of a control room supervisor, but this needs to be
properly considered and documented.
Police bail: lack of conditions
74. The force domestic abuse procedure advises officers that consideration should be
given to imposing bail conditions, yet on both occasions when Mr Williams was
arrested and bailed, no bail conditions were imposed. This meant that officers were
unable to arrest Mr Williams for breaching bail conditions when he was
subsequently involved in incidents involving Miss Brittle.
75. This is particularly concerning as the force had put a marker on Mr Williams‟ profile
to indicate he offended whilst on bail. Neither of the Custody Sergeants who bailed
Mr Williams documented their rationale for failing to impose bail conditions; as a
result there was no clear audit trail.
Recording Incidents and Intelligence
76. When Nottinghamshire Police receive a call the control room create a log on their
Command and Control system, VISION. Domestic incidents should be given a
domestic qualifier in order that they are easily retrieved when the system is
searched for such incidents. In addition, domestic abuse incidents should be given
a „domestic no crime‟ code which essentially means that the incident will be
progressed on the force‟s crime recording system in the same way as a crime. A
sergeant will then review the crime record before it is closed to ensure there are no
outstanding actions.
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77. It was a feature of the incidents involving Miss Brittle that three incidents were not
closed with the correct domestic „no crime‟ code.
78. Control Room supervisors should also quality check three calls a month per call
handler, and one of these calls should be a domestic abuse incident. The
investigation was told this does not always happen.
79. The investigation found that the officers should also have made greater use of the
force‟s intelligence system, MEMEX, to record details of incidents so that future
risk assessments and incidents are better informed.
Review of Nottinghamshire Police‟s Revised Domestic
Abuse Policy and its Implementation
80. In March 2010 Nottinghamshire Police published its revised domestic abuse policy.
In late 2010 they also introduced the Domestic Abuse, Stalking and Harassment
(DASH) model for dealing with domestic incidents.
81. While the introduction of the DASH model will have undoubtedly improved the
handling of domestic abuse incidents in the force, two of the incidents involving
Miss Brittle occurred after the revised policy‟s introduction. As failings were found
in these cases it was felt the force‟s revised policy should be reviewed as part of
the investigation. The following section highlights concerns raised by this review.
82. The IPCC investigation found that despite introducing DASH the force‟s revised
policy had not been further updated to reflect this and therefore reflected old
domestic abuse model and practices. The outdated policy was also overdue for
review by four months when the IPCC began its investigation in October 2010.
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Implementation of Domestic Abuse Stalking and Harassment Model
83. The DASH model is nationally endorsed and requires the attending officer to
identify the level of risk at the time of the incident, using their professional
judgement. The officers are assisted in this regard by the DASH Risk Identification
Form which provides indicators and definitions of the three risk levels (Standard,
Medium and High). Under the previous model risk was assessed if/when the forms
were received by the domestic abuse unit.
84. Having identified a level of risk the officer is responsible for implementing
immediate control measures. Medium risk cases should be referred to supervisors
at an early stage, and high risk cases should be referred to a duty Inspector and
ultimately the Daily Management Meeting.
85. This model was introduced on City Division in December 2010. Of the ten officers
served with notices in the course of this investigation, four stated that they had not
received any domestic abuse training, and a further two officers stated that they
had received very little training.
86. This lack of a thorough corporate approach to domestic abuse continued with the
implementation of the DASH model. The various divisions across Nottinghamshire
implemented DASH training and the research tool (see paragraph 71) at different
times. A more coordinated approach would provide a more consistent level of
service to the public; it was not sensible for different divisions to use different risk
assessment models and risk identification tools, as this could result in a „postcode
lottery‟ in police responses to domestic incidents.
87. DASH training for City Division officers started in June 2010 and was completed in
mid-September; it was implemented on the City Division in December 2010.
However, a number of officers told the investigation they had still not received any
domestic abuse training. IPCC enquiries in early 2011 indicated that two of the
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officers had still not attended DASH training.
88. Despite the domestic abuse form changing as a result of DASH, old forms were
still being submitted to the domestic abuse units. Officers who submit the old forms
are advised they should use the new template. This suggests some officers are not
following the new process.
89. The investigation is encouraged to find that there is a process for informing officers
who submit the old form but we are concerned that the domestic abuse unit does
not ask the investigating officer to resubmit the correct forms on that occasion- the
assessment is conducted using the old assessment process. This is not
appropriate, as these incidents will essentially receive less scrutiny than those
handled in accordance with the DASH model.
Victims who are reluctant to assist the police
90. Neither the original nor the revised version of the force domestic abuse policy give
any guidance whatsoever on the approach officers should take when dealing with
victims of domestic abuse who are reluctant to engage with the police. This
investigation demonstrated that divisional officers need explicit instructions and
insight into the consequences of failure to do so in these circumstances.
91. In the relevant time period the unit was largely dependent on officers submitting the
relevant forms, as no proactive trawl for domestic incidents was conducted. The
duty Inspector‟s briefing book was reviewed, but this would only include reference
to matters sufficiently serious to have been escalated to the duty Inspector.
92. In the event that an officer submits the new form after dealing with an
uncooperative victim the officer‟s sergeant should then review the form with the
officer to ensure all appropriate checks have been conducted.
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Third party reports
93. At present third party reports of domestic abuse not confirmed by the victim are not
given crime numbers (crimes/domestic no crimes) and therefore not recorded on
the crime recording system, which is problematic (see paragraph 71). It is
suggested that in future such reports should at the very least be recorded on the
force‟s intelligence system so the force is able to build up an accurate risk profile
for the victim.
94. In addition, whilst difficult, it is not impossible for a domestic incident to be
prosecuted even without the victim‟s cooperation, provided that sufficient
independent evidence is available.
High risk victims: Access to Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC)
and other support groups
95. Victims who are deemed to be at high risk of significant harm are considered for
inclusion in a MARAC. However, only a small number of high risk cases can
actually proceed to MARAC due to resource constraints.
96. Those high risk victims who are not forwarded to MARAC receive a lower level of
intervention than medium risk victims, who may receive support from the
Community Beat Manager (CBM). High risk cases that do not progress to MARAC
remain with the original investigating officer and do not get CBM support. This is
neither logical nor safe.
97. A minimum of forty cases are discussed at the Nottingham MARAC every month. A
discussion as to which cases will then be taken to MARAC takes place, although
the rationale for these decisions is not documented.
98. The current domestic abuse policy does not contain reference to Victim Support
and how officers can introduce victims to the service. There is a general document
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regarding the information sharing relationship between the force and Victim
Support, but this investigation found it to be an impenetrable document.
Access to the Child Abuse Tracking System
99. Access to the child abuse database would have been of limited use to Control
Room staff in this case, as only 3 of a possible 7 domestic incidents were recorded
on the database due to officers failing to submit forms. Therefore, an interrogation
of the system would not produce an accurate reflection of the frequency and
severity of incidents.
100. However, it is of concern that database access has still not been successfully
rolled out to all control room staff despite concerns being raised by the Gail Hdili
investigation. The IPCC has been told that some but not all control room staff have
access. We acknowledge that the force has encountered a number of problems
that have frustrated the desire to give universal access to the system, but these
appear to be a result of a lack of coordinated work across different business
groups within the force.
101. The investigation was also advised that it is still not unusual for officers to fail to
submit a child protection form.
Use of the Force Intelligence System
102. The force‟s domestic abuse policy made one reference to MEMEX entries: it states
that reports made by third parties not via the control room should be subject of
MEMEX entries. The document is otherwise silent on the issue of domestic abuse
intelligence despite clear national policies that highlight the benefit of recording
such information on local intelligence databases.
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Commissioner‟s Conclusions
103. Casey Brittle was a young mother who was killed by a man well-known to local
police for his propensity for violence and threatening behaviour. Her death is a
tragedy for her friends and family.
104. It is also tragic that it takes such a death to serve as a poignant reminder to all
police officers and the police service, of the vital need to remain vigilant to the
consequences of not taking positive action when dealing with domestic abuse.
105. When a woman reports violence at the hands of a man who has already abused
her, the police service must take effective and positive action. It is established that
taking such action helps prevent needless deaths of women like Casey.
106. In this case it is clear that a number of officers failed to perform to the level
expected of them. This was borne of a lack of knowledge and a willingness to
accept the word of a woman who had suffered years of abuse when she said she
did not want or need their help. As a result basic actions that may have helped
others see the full picture of her suffering were not completed.
107. No consideration was given as to why Casey was reporting domestic abuse but
then saying that she did not want police help. This was a young mother living in
constant fear of a man for what must have felt like an eternity to her. Little thought
was given finding a way to prosecute Williams without the need to rely upon Casey
as a witness. This is particularly pertinent as there were independent witnesses to
some of the incidents. Not least, security guards who saw visible injuries on Casey,
heard Williams threaten to kill her and were present when he telephoned her and
threatened to shoot her family with a gun. Sadly, this evidence which could and
should have been obtained at the time was not obtained until after she had been
murdered.
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108. It is clear that beside the failings of individual officers, Casey was significantly let
down by systemic failures within Nottinghamshire Police.
109. The facts of this case are particularly distressing as Nottinghamshire Police were
given impetus to improve following the horrific attack on Gail Hdili. As we now
know the changes that were so obviously needed then were not made.
110. The IPCC makes recommendations to police forces, to help improve their
response in dealing with domestic abuse and to ensure that lessons are learnt from
cases we investigate. This is to ensure the same mistakes are not made again.
111. Having been told where to make improvements previously Nottinghamshire Police
failed to put in place the right systems and policies that would have helped their
officers deal with the abuse Casey was suffering. The lack of a corporate approach
first seen in the Hdili investigation are present in Casey‟s case, from the
incremental roll out of training, through to the failure to update the force policy
despite the prompting of a review date and the introduction of the DASH model.
112. Having considered all the information gathered we have been unable to say with
certainty that if officers or the force had served Casey better then she would still be
alive today. Sanchez Williams was a violent offender with scant regard for the law.
It is impossible to judge what impact any positive action taken by the force would
have had on him and his attitude to Casey.
113. Members of the public will no doubt be shocked by the findings of this investigation
and it is of great concern to me that it may mean that victims may hesitate to report
domestic abuse to the police. I would urge those who find themselves suffering at
the hands of an abuser not to take this course of action. Reporting domestic abuse
is an act of enormous personal courage and involving the police is still the main
way victims can break the cycle of abuse.
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114. During the course of these incidents and our investigation Nottinghamshire Police
has been subject to an intense period of change and scrutiny. We have been reassured by the force that lessons will be learned on this occasion and I hope, for
the sake of those who need the police‟s help, this truly is the case this time.
Commissioner Amerdeep Somal
Date 15 September 2011
Appendix A
http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/Pages/pr_281010_hdili.aspx
A Commissioner's report is not an IPCC Investigation report. The purpose of a
Commissioner's report is to share with the public the key findings and summary of the
IPCC investigation, including the Commissioner's own decision making, the outcome of
any legal processes that followed from the investigation, and the learning
recommendations. The report belongs to the IPCC Commissioner who retains oversight
of the investigation. The Investigation report is provided to the family or complainant, the
police force, individual officers, and with a Coroner ahead of any Inquest. The
Investigation report and related evidence is also provided to the Crown Prosecution
Service when the IPCC considers that serious consideration should be given to whether
or not a person should be prosecuted for a criminal offence. Investigation reports are
published only in exceptional circumstances because of data protection or other legal
restrictions.
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