“Just War, National Interest, and the Iraq War”
Analyzing the Strategic Rhetoric used to mobilize the American Public for War.
by
Chris Costenbader
Curtis Donahoe
David Dry
Stephen Harvey
Joshua Miller
Dr. Tom Knecht
POL-040
Westmont College
November 29, 2012
Do presidents use more national interest rhetoric or just war theory rhetoric when
mobilizing the public for military intervention? Specifically, what type of rhetoric did President
George W. Bush use when speaking to the American public and international community prior to
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003?
In this paper, we find that the specific strategic rhetoric used by President George W.
Bush varied depending on the audience he was speaking to. While President Bush was speaking
to the American public, he used more national interest rhetoric than just war rhetoric.
Conversely, while President Bush was speaking to a primarily international audience, he used
more just war rhetoric than national interest rhetoric. This is due to our assumption that the
American public will be more likely to be attentive to domestic issues. On the other hand, we
assume that the international community is more likely to be persuaded by just war rationale.
Should these hypotheses be supported through our research, it may shed light on the types of
strategic rhetoric our presidents, and President George W. Bush in particular, use when trying to
mobilize the American public and international community for war. Our research does not allow
us to answer the important question of what strategic rhetoric is more effective; it simply enables
us to analyze what types of strategic rhetoric President George W. Bush used.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we will provide a brief history of relevant literature
on the topic. We will show where there are gaps in the literature and how our study provides a
unique perspective on the issue. Second we will include a description of our theory when
approaching our research question. Then we will explain the methods used to explore which
rhetorical strategy President Bush used in mobilizing the American public and international
community for war in Iraq. We will display the results of our research and how they interact with
our stated hypotheses. Lastly, we will discuss the positive and normative implications of the
research in our conclusion.
Review of Relevant Literature:
In order to properly identify what type of strategic rhetoric President Bush used, we must
define what is commonly understood as national interest and just war theory. We turn first to
national interest. National interest is a highly politicized and cryptic notion that is often subject
to interpretation (Weldes 1996). Some scholars argue that national interest solely consists of the
interests of the state as a whole, while others argue that national interests should take into
account various domestic groups and minorities (Acharya 2003). However for this study, we will
use a definition of national interest articulated by Condoleezza Rice who later became an
Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs and then Secretary of State. In an article
in Foreign Affairs during the 2000 campaign, Condoleezza Rice described their understanding of
national interest in a post-Cold War world as being five-fold:
“(1) to ensure that America’s military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense
of its interests if deterrence fails; (2) to promote economic growth and political openness
by extending free trade and a stable international monetary system to all committed to
these principles, including in the western hemisphere, which has too often been neglected
as a vital area of U.S. national interest; (3) to renew strong and intimate relationships
with allies who share American values and can thus share the burden of promoting peace,
prosperity, and freedom; (4) to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with
the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the
international political system; (5) and to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes
and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism
and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” (Rice 2000: 46-47).
After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, these priorities were not discarded.
They were simply reorganized. The fifth prong of Rice’s definition of national security became a
top priority for the Bush Administration, while other prongs, notably the third, became less of a
priority. It is interesting to note that dealing “decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and
hostile powers” was still a priority for the administration before the terrorist attacks. Despite the
order being rearranged, these five objectives for the Bush administration are still important for
our research when we try to separate national interest rhetoric and just war rhetoric.
In contrast to a definition of national interest, a definition of just war theory must be
synthesized from multiple sources and from multiple time periods. Within just war theory, there
are three sub-categories: Jus Ad Bellum (regarding pre-war actions), Jus In Bello (regarding
actions within war), and Jus Post Bellum (regarding post-war actions). In this study we will
focus our attention on and define just war theory along the lines of the first sub-category, jus ad
bellum, which outlines the necessary justifications needed to go to war. Jus ad bellum is the
essence of our definition of just war in this paper because our study focuses on the time prior to
the invasion of Iraq by U.S. forces. Jus ad bellum contains six benchmarks that must be met in
order for war to be justifiable: having a just cause, being a last resort, being declared by a proper
authority, possessing right intention, having a reasonable chance of success, and the ends being
proportional to the means (Moseley 2009). In our content analysis, references to these six
principles of jus ad bellum will be classified as just war rhetoric. Just war rhetoric in this study is
understood as anything referring to just war principles as reasons why military action is
necessary (Walzer 1977). Any strategic rhetoric used by President Bush referencing the killing of
innocent people, anything concerning non-compliance of a leader, anything concerning justice,
and anything concerning the protection of civilian lives falls under the modern theory of just war
as articulated by Walzer and will be considered just war in this study (Walzer 1977).
Over the past few decades there has been an abundance of literature on the concept of
framing as it pertains to political decision making. The concept of framing can be defined in
many different ways. Two divergent definitions of framing can be found in Chong & Druckman
(2004) and Riker (1986). Chong and Druckman define framing as “the process by which people
develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue”
(Chong & Druckman 2004, 104). Alternatively, Riker defines framing as “the central process by
which government officials and journalists exercise political influence over each other and over
the public” (Riker 1986). The differences in the two definitions highlight an important
characteristic of framing. Chong and Druckman argue that framing is a way in which the public
takes a position on an issue. Riker, on the other hand, identifies framing as a tool employed by
political elites to influence or sway the public and other political elites in order to garner more
support for a specific policy position. Our study accepts and is conducted under the definition of
framing as put forth by Riker (1986).
A major factor in estimating how effective a frame will be in influencing the opinions of
the public is how popular or effective the person using the frame is perceived to be (Edwards
1990; Entman 1989). Political elites, such as U.S. presidents, can make more effective use of a
desired frame if they have a high public approval rating, or if they are seen as effective leaders.
(Edwards 1990; Entman 1989) In crisis situations, the president is looked to for leadership and is
able to use the informal power of influence to persuade the American public of a right course of
action through a specific frame (Kernell 2007). In addition to a president’s popularity and
perceived effectiveness, the public’s trust in the president also plays heavily into the
effectiveness of a frame. If the public trusts that the president has knowledge of the most relevant
issues at hand and can be trusted to tell what they actually know, then the use of a specific frame
will be more effective (Lodge and Taber 2000).
Not all citizens accept a frame based upon the popularity or perceived effectiveness of the
elite providing it. Many other theories exist concerning the acceptance of a frame by the public.
There is evidence that citizens judge the merits of a frame and the frame’s architect on something
as simple as the heuristic of party identification (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Another
theory of how citizens receive frames is that they do so communally, intelligibly, and change
their opinions in response to changing conditions (Page and Shapiro 1982).
There is a competing view along the same lines when it comes to the impact of elite cues
on the decision-making of the public. Scholars holding this view argue that if the public is
attentive to alternate sources of information, such as news media, then the impact of elite cues
and elite opinion is limited. (Popkin 1991; Huckfeldt et al. 1999; Huckfeldt et al. 2005).
However, others disagree and argue that the public relies on elite cues and cues from informed
sources in order to make educated choices that reflect their interests. Even without previous
knowledge of the issue, the public is able to form policy opinions based on cues from more
informed sources, namely policy elites (Mondak 1993; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998;
Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Boudreau 2006a, 2006b; Miller and Krosnick 2000).
Similarly, some scholars contend that the public is completely reliant on elite cues when
forming the opinions, and not reliant on news events (Zaller and Feldman 1992; Bartels 2002).
This research leads to the implication that elite framing is very important and can change the
public’s views on different conflicts. According to Zaller, “Evidence from half a century of
polling in the United States supports the proposition that the more citizens know about politics
and public affairs, the more they are wedded to elite and media perspectives on foreign policy
issues” (Zaller 1992, 190).
The study of the effects of framing on the American public goes far beyond political
science research. Researchers across many disciplines have sought to explain the psychological
mechanisms behind framing effects (Iyengar 1991; Zaller 1992; Cappella and Jamieson 1997;
Nelson et al. 1997a,b; Price and Tewksbury 1997; Gross 2000; Brewer 2001). According to
Chong and Druckman (2007), “Either the public has no attitudes on many political issues, or it
holds so many fragmentary and conflicting attitudes that it cannot reconcile or resolve them.” If
opinions are at the mercy of how issues are framed, there can be no legitimate representation of
public interests (Riker 1986; Zaller 1992; Entman 1993; Bartels 2003). In addition to the effects
of framing, studies of priming effects have shown that elites can significantly influence
individual citizens by predisposing them to favor one policy or another (Iyengar and Kinder
1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Mendelberg 2001; Druckman and Holmes 2004).
In addition to the literature on framing, there has been significant work on how the public
views military intervention. Early research shows that the attitude of the public with regards to
the use of military force tends to be idiosyncratic and unstructured (Almond 1950; Lippman
1955; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964). Mueller brought a fresh look on the subject with his
seminal work on casualties and support for the Vietnam and Korean Wars (see also Milstein and
Mitchell 1968; Milstein 1973; Mueller 1971, 1973, 2005). Mueller found that the public was able
to and did form coherent and systematic opinions about foreign policy.
Much of the growing literature on military intervention has adopted the view that the
public engages in a cost-benefit analysis. The public weighs the benefits of intervening with the
expected costs (E. Larson 2000; Gartner 2008; Mueller 1971, 1973, 2005; Gartner and Segura
1998). One example is American attentiveness to information concerning casualties (Mueller
1971, 1973, 2005; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gartner 2008). Another example exhibiting how
the public engages in a surface level cost-benefit analysis for intervention is how the public
responds to information about mission objectives (the public is very often displeased) (Jentleson
1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Eichenberg 2005). Other scholars focus on incoming
information about the success of the mission and how this affects public approval or disapproval
for intervention (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005/2006, 2009; Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007).
There is broad research suggesting that the public responds to information about foreign affairs
in systematic ways and as a result, is consistent in it’s application of a cost-benefit analysis to
determine its opinion of military intervention (Nincic 1988, 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992;
Peffley and Hurwitz 1992; Aldrich et al. 2006).
While the above theories are important, what is more informative for our paper are the
theories focusing on policy objective frames. Policy objective theories argue that public approval
of military action is highest when the action is framed through specific policy objectives that the
public views as legitimate (Jentleson and Britton 1998; Perla 2011). When studying the rhetoric
used by President George W. Bush to mobilize the American public for war, it is beneficial to
look at his use of just war and national interest rhetoric as a reflection of the implied policy
objective. Just war rhetoric is commonly interpreted as reflecting a policy objective of human
rights and international peace. National interest rhetoric on the other hand, is often interpreted as
reflecting a policy objective of national security and preservation of American freedoms.
However, strategic rhetoric can also be used to disguise a policy objective. A president may
disguise a national interest objective in just war rhetoric in order to persuade the public.
Kull and Destler (1999) show that the public responds to the participation of allied states
and international organizations as if to weigh multilateral action as less costly than unilateral
action. These findings fit well with our hypothesis that President Bush uses both national interest
rhetoric and just war rhetoric when speaking to the American public. If Kull and Destler are
correct, then it would be wise for a president to use just war rhetoric and not just national interest
when attempting to mobilize the American public to support military intervention.
Numerous studies on framing effects indicate that individual attitudes toward the use of
military force can be altered through the use of narrative frames (Iyengar and Simon 1993; Allen,
O’Laughlin, and Sullivan 1994; Aday, Cluverius, and Livingston 2005; Boettcher and Cobb
2006). Framing a crisis as a story affects what people remember, how they remember it, and
what opinions they hold about the justification for military action (Herrmann, Tetlock, and
Visser 1999; Berinsky and Kinder 2006). This is important to our research because we focus on
the elite cues and frames used by President Bush in the run up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq on
March 20th, 2003. If narrative frames can sway the belief of the public, then it is very important
to discover if and how elites use narrative frames. Our study, in one way or another, seeks to
determine how President Bush used the narrative frames of national interest and just war before
March 20th, 2003.
In addition to research about the effect of framing on public perceptions, the research of
the effects of public opinion on a president’s use of framing is also important. It has been argued
that the effect of public opinion on American foreign policy varies by president (Foyle 1999).
Foyle also argues that the decisions made in foreign policy are more a result of the individual
than the public. In the specific instance of a terrorist attack, when the American public feels
threatened by an outside force (terrorist threat), they are more inclined to follow the plan laid out
before them by the president (Davis and Silver 2004). After an attack on their own country, the
public is much more receptive of their leader’s decisions because they look to the president as a
figure to rally around. Rising approval ratings often grant the president more leverage to initiate
military action (Stimson 2004). After the attack on September 11, 2001, President Bush was seen
to have a clear opportunity to mobilize the public for a retaliatory strike against al-Qaeda.
However, in his initiative for Iraq, President Bush did not have the luxury of a “clear and present
danger” like he did immediately after September 11th, 2001. Because he lacked this luxury,
President Bush had to convince the American public that military intervention in Iraq was
necessary and prudent.
Theory
Just war rhetoric and national interest rhetoric are two commonly used strategies for
encouraging the public and the international community to support the use of military force. We
refer to just war rhetoric and national interest rhetoric both as being “strategic rhetoric.” Our
research is focused on these two strategies and how President George W. Bush may or may not
have implemented them in the months leading up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. It is plausible
that President Bush used both just war rhetoric and national interest rhetoric when approaching
entry into a conflict with Iraq. It appears highly unlikely that President Bush would use only one
of the two types of strategic rhetoric mentioned above when mobilizing the public and
international audiences for armed conflict in Iraq. While the American public is concerned with
the interests for America in going to war, the international community focuses on the
justification of a sovereign nation making war on another sovereign nation. Our first hypothesis
is as follows:
H1: President George W. Bush used both national interest and just war rhetoric when
mobilizing the American public for military intervention in Iraq.
The second hypothesis poses the possibility that President Bush may have used specific
types of rhetoric when addressing either national or international audiences. Using national
interest rhetoric while speaking to the American people may allow President Bush to garner
more support for military action in Iraq. The American people may feel more inclined to lend
their support if the war had a direct link to the future and interests of the United States. Just war
theory might be more advantageous in the eye of the international audience because they may be
more affected by the statistical reasons for going to war rather than being swayed by pandering
to their emotions. However, it is also true that Americans respond well to just war theory
conditions. Americans, for example, are more willing to engage in military conflict if the
aggressor has nuclear capabilities than if it does not (Herrman, Tetlock, and Visser 1999).
Therefore, Americans respond well to portions of both types of rhetoric. It seems apparent that
President Bush needed to make a distinct difference in the ways he appealed to his own people
and in the ways he needed to justify, to the international community, the war in Iraq. For this
reason our second hypothesis explains a connection between audience and rhetoric used:
H2: President George W. Bush used national interest rhetoric when addressing a
domestic audience and just war rhetoric when addressing an international audience.
Our third hypothesis suggests that in order to gain the support of the American public,
President Bush needed to focus on national interests to appeal to the people of the United States.
The domestic audience may have been more approving of national interest rhetoric and President
Bush would have known that. The presence of United States interests is strongly and consistently
related to support for military intervention (Herrman, Tetlock, and Visser 1999). The resulting
possibility is that rather than relying only on just cause, the president more frequently used
national interest rhetoric while addressing the public to encourage support for military
intervention in Iraq.
H3: President George W. Bush used more national interest rhetoric than just war rhetoric
when mobilizing the American public for war in Iraq.
We assume that the international community is concerned with norms and Just War
Theory concepts such as right intention, proper authority, proportionality, and just cause
(Moseley 2009). If President Bush was trying to garner support from the international
community before entering the conflict, then he most likely used Just War Theory to appeal to
them. The international community needed to know that President Bush was entering into this
conflict because it was a just cause. Our fourth hypothesis explains a connection between an
international audience and the use of just war theory rhetoric by the president:
H4: President George W. Bush used more just war than national interest rhetoric when
mobilizing the international community to support American intervention in Iraq.
Methodology
We used content analysis to determine the specific rhetoric used by President George W.
Bush when mobilizing the American Public and international community for war in Iraq.
Looking at the actual words President Bush used provides the substantive material needed to
analyze the president’s rhetoric. Each of our hypotheses put forth a claim concerning the
president’s choice of frame, national interest or just war, when addressing the American public
or when addressing an international audience.
Operationalization of Independent and Dependent Variables
We operationalized the independent and dependent variables by constructing the codes
and codebook used to analyze President Bush’s public statements. Our initial codebook was
constructed by using two speeches with different audiences and different themes. Each speech
was examined sentence by sentence and a code was created so that the content of every sentence
could be coded. The two speeches used in the construction of the codebook were President
Bush’s “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 29,
2002 and his “Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September
12, 2002.
In order to determine whether or not President Bush used national interest rhetoric or Just
War Theory rhetoric, codes were divided into three distinct categories: “National Interest
Rhetoric,” “Just War Theory Rhetoric,” and a “General Foreign Policy”. The “general foreign
policy” category was used for references by the president that did not fit into the two main
categories. As the titles suggest, the categories contained codes that specifically fell in one form
of rhetoric or the other. “National Interest Rhetoric” codes included references to anything
regarding the safety of U.S. citizens, property, freedom, or ideals. A few examples of national
interest codes that we used are “safety of the United States,” “safety of allies,” and “WMD in
relation to national security”. For “Just War Theory Rhetoric” we included any statement that
included any of the six principles concerning Jus ad Bello (just cause, last resort, proper
authority, right of intent, reasonable success, and proportional means). Some of these codes
included “murder” for just cause, “non-compliance with international norms” for last resort,
“congressional action” for proper authority, “liberating the Iraqi people” for right of intent, and
so on. There were also separate codes for each of the Jus ad Bellum principles individually.
We also added an “options” and “actions” category. The purpose of these categories was
to show and differences in what the president was referring to as a possible outcome as opposed
to what was actually taking place. An example of these codes might be the difference between
the president considering taking military action and him taking that action. We also used the
option/action codes while referring to congressional action, United Nations action, and action
regarding foreign aid.
Acquisition of Sources
We used the American Presidency Project (APP) database to find our sources (American
Presidency Project 2012). The APP database is an archive of over one hundred thousand
documents related to the study of the presidency put together by University of California, Santa
Barbara. The date range we set for our data was September 11, 2001 through March 20, 2003.
President Bush began using retaliation rhetoric just a few hours after the attacks on the World
Trade Center and Pentagon. This rhetoric and mobilization tactic continued until March 20, 2003
when the United States led the coalition that invaded Iraq. We narrowed down our data to only
include public remarks of President George W. Bush. Public remarks include official speeches as
well as press conferences and other public statements. We did not need to analyze any remarks
past the March 20, 2003 invasion because the president’s rhetoric for mobilizing the American
public and international community into military conflict had concluded. In this paper, we are
only concerned with Jus Ad Bellum (pre-war) rhetoric and not Jus In Bello (within war) rhetoric.
Our manual coding approach required us to narrow down the amount of speeches to
analyze, and we had to select one or more keywords that would produce an adequate amount of
related remarks without overreaching into the war in Afghanistan or other foreign policy areas.
After trying multiple terms, “Iraq” was chosen as the best keyword for a number of reasons.
First, the term was broad, yet not overreaching like “terrorism.” We correctly assumed that
almost every source with the keyword of “Iraq” would be important for our study. Keywords
such as “terror” would include numerous speeches not important to our research. Second, terms
such as “Saddam Hussein” or “weapons of mass destruction” would have been too narrow and
may have caused us to overlook important statements made by the president. Throughout our
research, we noticed a great deal of repetition in President Bush’s speeches. It is clear to us that
the president had a fixed amount of talking points used to mobilize either the American public or
international community around military intervention in Iraq. Within these talking points, the
president almost always mentioned “weapons of mass destruction” and “Saddam Hussein.” We
are confident that “Iraq” was a broad enough keyword to encompass these and other more
narrow keywords.
Testing the hypotheses
After we settled on our keywords, sources and codebook, we practiced coding as a group
of five researchers together, then apart, to improve our inter-coder reliability. After this practice,
we had an intercoder reliability of over 70%
Threats to Validity
In contrast to computer or machine coding, manual coding is examining each sample in
context instead of exact terminology. This is the approach to content analysis that was utilized in
this study. A manual approach allows for flexibility if new frames are discovered in the midst of
data that were not part of the initial prototype. Manual coding is also beneficial because humans
can read for context, whereas computers have a difficult time coding context. One drawback to
manual coding is the time it takes to read through articles. This drawback limits the sample size
of the study. When multiple coders is being used, intercoder reliability is an obvious concern.
Checks of intercoder reliability are crucial when doing manual content analysis. Limiting the
scope of our research to the 205 public statements of the president can be seen as a threat to
internal validity, because significant data could remain unnoticed. However, we were limited by
time restrictions and could not code every speech made by the president between September 11,
2001 and March 20, 2003, which would have been several thousand.
In order to manage the 205 selected speeches that President George W. Bush made
between September 2001 and March 2003, we had to have multiple people work on coding each
of the speeches. This could be viewed as a threat to our internal validity as each of the coders
would have slightly varying interpretations of each of the statements. To address this issue we
had to test what is called our “inter-coder reliability.” We each coded the same speech, “Address
to the nation on Iraq” March 19, 2003. In this first test we fell just short of that mark, so we
consulted with each other, adjusted our codebook accordingly and proceeded to separately code a
second speech, “Radio Address” September 28, 2002. In this test we were well above the
targeted 70% accuracy.
Again due to time and resource constraints, we had to limit our research to the single case
of President George W. Bush’s statements leading up to the beginning of military engagement in
Iraq. As a result, the generalizability of our results is highly suspect. Any study with a sample
size of one cannot legitimately claim to be generalizable, and thus we do not do so here. We
hope that our findings will spur further research in the realm of strategic rhetoric used by other
presidents when mobilizing the public for intervention in other crisis situations, as well as noncrisis situations.
Results
The data, although not always supportive of the hypotheses, revealed several pieces of
surprising information. Our first hypothesis, “President George W. Bush used both national
interest and just war rhetoric when mobilizing the American public for military intervention in
Iraq” was confirmed because both types of rhetoric were present in his statements made to
domestic audiences.
The president used just war rhetoric in his speeches regardless of audience. The president
used both just war rhetoric and national interest rhetoric when addressing the American public.
However, when he addressed international audiences, President George W. Bush
overwhelmingly used just war rhetoric, and for the most part, left out any national interest
rhetoric. The second hypothesis, “President George W. Bush used different types of rhetoric
depending on the audience he was addressing,” was also supported along with H1 since the
president adjusted his statements to the international community so that any national interest
rhetoric would be omitted.
Figure 1. Overall use of Strategic Rhetoric
70.00% 62.03% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 37.97% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00% Strategic Rhetoric used when speaking on Iraq: National Interest Just War In order to test our hypotheses, we combined all of the codes in the codebook
representing just war rhetoric into a single variable. We also combined all of the national interest
codes in the codebook into a single variable. After creating two separate additive variables, one
for just war and one for national interest, we ran a crosstab with the audience President Bush was
addressing. Figure 2 shows the total percentage of national interest and just war rhetoric used
when speaking to domestic audiences. There is an insignificant relationship between domestic
audience and the type of rhetoric used (p > .05). These findings oppose our third hypothesis,
which states that the president used more national interest rhetoric when addressing a domestic
audience.
Figure 2. Strategic Rhetoric towards Domestic Audience
60.00% 55.95% 50.00% 44.05% 40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00% Strategic Rhetoric used when speaking to a Domestic Audience on Iraq p = 0.108 National Interest Just War According to Figure 3, our fourth hypothesis, that George W. Bush used more just war
rhetoric than national interest rhetoric when addressing international audiences, was supported
by our data. A significantly greater percentage of strategic rhetoric used by President Bush was
just war rhetoric. 87.94% of the president’s addresses to an international audience employed just
war rhetoric versus only 12.06% employing national interest rhetoric. The president clearly
preferred just war rhetoric when addressing international audiences.
Figure 3. Strategic Rhetoric toward International Audience
100.00% 87.94% 90.00% 80.00% 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 12.06% 10.00% 0.00% Strategic Rhetoric used when speaking to an International Audience on Iraq p < 0.001*** National Interest Just War Next, we are interested in whether President Bush’s mention of specific issues changed
over times. Although the research design did not include a study of specific talking points and
how they were used differently at certain times, the data gleaned from the content analysis was
used to observe several interesting characteristics of President Bush’s rhetoric. The speeches
were divided into six different chronological groups. Crosstabs were performed using the
chronological group variable and variables representing different talking points or themes. Figure
4 and Table 1 show how the number of references to WMDs did not significantly increase as a
percentage of overall strategic rhetoric from late September 2001 to March 20th, 2003 (p > .05).
Even in the few weeks before the United States deployment of troops to Iraq, the president’s use
of WMD references dropped as a percentage of overall strategic rhetoric, but the drop is not
significant.
Figure 4. WMD Rhetoric
30.00% 25.00% 20.00% % of total Strategic Rhetoric 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00% 9/19/2001 -­‐ 5/22/2002 -­‐ 9/24/2002 -­‐ 10/24/2002 -­‐ 11/23/2002 -­‐ 2/10/2003 -­‐ 5/21/2002 9/23/2002 10/23/2002 11/22/2002 2/9/2003 3/20/2003 p = 0.143 In contrast to his use of rhetoric referring to WMDs, President Bush’s use of
humanitarian rhetoric or Iraqi interest reasoning increased significantly from September 2001 to
March 20th, 2003 (p < .001). Use of humanitarian interests in the president’s rhetoric increased
from a mean of 4.6% of total strategic rhetoric in the first five time periods to 19.4% of total
strategic rhetoric in the month before the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Humanitarian interests in Bush’s
public statements are exemplified by specific rhetoric relating to liberating the Iraqi people or
providing the Iraqi people with basic human liberties and representative government. Figure 5
below shows that as the date of invasion came closer and closer, the president began to increase
his use of humanitarian rhetoric when making public statements relating to Iraq. The significant
increase in the president’s use of humanitarian rhetoric possibly indicates that he intended to use
the just cause of humanitarian intervention to justify the invasion of Iraq to the public.
Figure 5. Humanitarian Rhetoric
25.00% 20.00% 15.00% % of total Strategic Rhetoric 10.00% 5.00% 0.00% 9/19/2001 -­‐ 5/22/2002 -­‐ 9/24/2002 -­‐ 10/24/2002 -­‐ 11/23/2002 -­‐ 2/10/2003 -­‐ 5/21/2002 9/23/2002 10/23/2002 11/22/2002 2/9/2003 3/20/2003 p < .001 Conclusion
When we decided to conduct a study determining how a president uses national interest
rhetoric and Just War Theory rhetoric, we chose to focus on only one president and only one
case. It is our hope that our research will stimulate future studies on the topic. There are
opportunities for our research to be expanded to other conflicts to determine if other presidents
behaved in similar ways. The type of conflict - crisis or non-crisis - was not accounted for in our
study, but may have affected the type of rhetoric used. George W. Bush had a large amount of
time to mobilize the public, and arguably only pushed for the invasion of Iraq within a small
window of time just prior to March 20, 2003. It would be expected for the type of rhetoric used
by a president to be stronger or weaker depending on the time frame before conflict. It may be
seen that presidents use stronger rhetoric, more national interest rhetoric, or even more just war
rhetoric if they feel the need for more immediate action. It would also be safe to hypothesize that
presidents may use less national interest rhetoric if they do not feel that the situation is as dire or
if national interests are not explicitly at stake in the conflict. National interest plays a large role
the reasoning of a president, and it would be expected to be a large part of any leaders argument
for action in a conflict situation.
It is our hope that the above research will guide future research on presidents and other
heads of state. We believe that this type of research can lead to interesting realizations of the
mindsets of leaders as they approach the need for military action in any type of conflict. It will
also give good insight as to whether leaders focus more on national interests or on Just War
Theory. We believe this research could stimulate a further analysis about the strategic use of
national interest and just war rhetoric. One possible study would be looking in the past and
analyzing how this strategy has evolved and the origins of national interest and just war rhetoric.
It will be interesting to compare these finding with what was said internally, once those
documents are declassified. A case study would be effective in comparing the rhetoric President
Bush used, as discovered in this paper, with the internal rationale of the Bush administration.
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