Canadian Amphibious Capabilities:
Been there, Done it, Got the T-shirt!
Peter Haydon
Recent Department of National Defence (DND) proposals to restructure the Canadian Forces for the 21st
century are built around a strategic concept for a rapid reaction force. Under this strategy, the Forces are
to “provide Canada with modern, task-tailored, and globally deployable combat capable forces that can
respond quickly to crises at home and abroad, in joint or combined operations.”1
Although some might see, or want to see, this as new and original thinking, the idea is far from new
in the annuls of Canadian defence policy. For instance, the Canadian military was taken through a
remarkably similar exercise in the mid-1960s at the hand of a vigorous and brash new defence minister,
Paul Hellyer. This particular exercise lasted for most of Hellyer’s controversial tenure as Minister before
finally fizzling out in 1967. In the end it failed because Cabinet would not support either the radical shift
in policy or related costs, which were considerable. Perhaps there is something to learn from this
particular piece of history that may help guide the latest attempt to develop a credible Canadian rapid
reaction force.
Hellyer’s Defence Policy Changes
In April 1963, the Liberal Party—led by Lester B. Pearson—defeated John Diefenbaker’s Tories in a
federal election. As the new Defence Minister, Paul Hellyer wasted no time in challenging the traditional
course of Canadian defence policy. The new government had already committed itself to a defence review
under a parliamentary committee headed by Maurice Sauve. Hellyer’s task was to oversee a parallel
internal review and produce a new defence white paper. He set about this task with a zeal unmatched in
recent history. His intent was to have things done differently. As he explained in his somewhat selfserving biography, Damn the Torpedoes, 2 “each service was preparing for a different kind of war.” His
plan, about which he made no secret, was to bring the three services together.
Sutherland’s First Study
Hellyer’s internal review was carried by an ad hoc committee of senior military officers and civilians
under the leadership of Dr. R.J. Sutherland, a brilliant defence scientist, who had been told to look at
alternative defence policies. Sutherland did as he had been asked and produced a highly innovative report
which he presented at the end of September 1963.3 Much of the underlying strategic rationale of this
study reflected Sutherland’s earlier, and masterful, analysis of Canada’s strategic situation published in
the summer of 1962 in the International Journal.4
Despite the fact that the Sutherland’s new study travelled through previously uncharted waters, it did
not provide Hellyer with the option that alone would solve all the problems he saw in the defence
structure. To do so was asking the impossible, especially as some of the new minister’s perceptions of
disorganization and lack of cohesion were functions of his own lack of knowledge and naivety.
Significantly, the report stated that creating a defence policy uniquely Canadian in character was an
impossibility; Canada’s policies would always have to reflect not only the proximity of the United States
but also the very nature of the international system and Canada’s traditional commitment to maintaining
order in that system. As Sutherland pointed out so rightly, defence policy has always been a function of
political choices and cannot be crafted in isolation, especially without direct reference to foreign policy.
Nevertheless, the report offered new policy options. One of these centred around the idea of
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withdrawing Canada’s NATO contribution from Europe and basing rapid reaction forces in Canada.
Instead of having army and air force units stationed in Europe, Canada would make available a
“Triphibious” force (also referred to in the report as the Canadian Marine Corps) comprising:
$ an army brigade group with medium tanks and self-propelled artillery;
$ a tactical air wing of 30 VSTOL aircraft operating from two light aircraft carriers; and
$ a naval task group capable of anti-submarine (ASW) and local area anti-aircraft defence as well as a
limited anti-surface capability.
The force would be self-sufficient for 60 days and would be able to deploy quickly so as to be in an
objective area within 10 to 28 days depending on the distance from Canada. Obviously, some limitations
had to be imposed: the force would not be able to operate independently in the face of a major threat but it
would be able to carry out an opposed landing against minor opposition within 6 to 48 hours of arriving in
the area. Faced with a major threat, the idea was that the force would work within a major US Navy fleet.
The cost of acquiring all the necessary capabilities was estimated as $1 billion (in 1963 dollars).
A cheaper variant, always of interest to politicians, was proposed. This required the navy to have
several light ASW carriers each capable of also carrying a battalion of army troops and their vehicles. The
major tactical difference was that instead of a mechanized brigade group the land force would be a light
brigade group without tanks and self-propelled artillery.
Both options required a “fleet train” of cargo ships to keep the force sustained. Although the actual
fighting force would be tactically loaded and landed from navy vessels, the logistic support and
subsequent reinforcement would be provided using commercial vessels. The lack, even then, of suitable
Canadian-flagged merchant ships and the uncertainty of getting the necessary ships on charter led to the
conclusion that for the force to be credible it had to have its own sea lift.
On the basis of the first option, the mechanized brigade, the study estimated that the following sea lift
would be needed to support the initial deployment:
$ one fast troopship (20,000 tons) with a capacity of 6,000 troops and 6,000 tons of cargo;
$ one fast freighter able to carry 8,000 tons of stores; and
$ two roll-on/roll-off (Ro/Ro) transports each capable of embarking 300-400 vehicles including 30
tanks.
Follow-on forces and resupply to a European theatre of operations would arrive every 18-20 days. This
was an ambitious but realistic concept under the circumstances. The naval forces needed to protect the
fleet train were not mentioned.
This “Triphibious” force was seen to have a wide range of potential uses. It would be available to the
NATO flanks in Northern Norway and the Eastern Mediterranean. Alternatively, it could be used to let
Canada support UN operations in ways not previously possible and with a great deal of operational
flexibility. It also had potential for use in various parts of the world should Canada wish to join a non-UN
multinational force under strategic circumstances similar to those in Korea in the early 1950s. Finally, the
force would permit a more effective defence of Canada, particularly against hostile intrusions in remote
areas.
The report did not make specific recommendations; rather, it posed a series of policy choices:
$ status quo with respect to existing defence priorities and capabilities, modernizing as necessary,
which was the one thing Hellyer wanted to avoid;
$ withdraw from the defence of Europe, which had huge diplomatic implications;
$ build the Canadian Forces on a concept of rapid response including the admittedly very expensive
“Triphibious” force with its inherent versatility; or
$ change the NATO commitment to one of making a useful contribution to SACEUR’s mobile forces.
With the exception of the second option, each policy option was dependent in one way or another upon
sea lift, and this, the report pointed out, was an area where capability improvements could be made
relatively cheaply.
2
The 1964 Defence White Paper
According to his account of the process, Hellyer was not very impressed with the report, referring to
it as “pretty bland stuff” yet by his own admission he used much of it in writing the 1964 Defence White
Paper.5 Despite all his earlier enthusiasm for change, Hellyer’s White Paper was largely a status quo
policy. Some promises of change were offered, but not nearly to the extent of the innovative thinking in
Sutherland’s report. The section on NATO strategy stated:
In the belief that adequate force through a wide spectrum is essential to the deterrence of war, it is the policy of
the government, in determining Canada’s force structure for the balance of the decade, to build in maximum
flexibility. This will permit the disposition of the majority of our forces in Canada where they will be available
for deployment in a variety of peacekeeping activities.6
The final statement of intent regarding the future structure and capabilities of the Canadian Forces was a
little closer to the original concept of “doing things differently” in saying that the army would be reequipped as a mobile force and that the CF would provide an adequate air and sea lift for its immediate
deployment in an emergency.7
The “Burchell” Study
The Canadian Navy meanwhile had embraced Sutherland’s concepts of mobility and what we now
know as joint operations. An ad hoc working group was formed in September 1963 (the third within the
navy in almost as many years) to look into the “size and shape of the navy over the next five to ten
years.”8 The study was based on a series of strategic assumptions including the continuing need for a
naval contribution to the mobile force concept by providing sea lift, support, and protection for army
formations up to brigade group size.9 As an aside, the RCN had studied the sea lift requirements for UN
“police operations” in mid-1961 on the basis of using the carrier, Bonaventure, as the primary support
ship.10 It was also assumed that RCN forces would be largely independent for self-defence and logistic
support.
Working under newly imposed budget ceilings—one of Hellyer’s initial acts in bringing the three
services to heel11—the working group came up with a new force structure based on the primacy of the
NATO and continental ASW missions but with the flexibility to meet the mobile force sea lift and support
requirements. The proposed force structure was centred around three task groups, two on the East Coast
and one on the West. To arrive at this structure, the RCN would have to undertake a number of new
initiatives, including:
acquire two helicopter carriers (LPH) of the American Iwo Jima-class type;
equip the carrier Bonaventure with fighters, the US A4E was the main contender;
increase Sea King ASW helicopter holdings, they could also be used to provide air lift and tactical
mobility for the army;
$ acquire air defence missiles and systems;
$ build a new class of air defence destroyers;
$ create a mobile logistic force of an oiler and stores ship; and
$ continue with planned ASW modernization.
The plan did not survive politically; like the preceding Brock Report, it was far too ambitious and was
not in lock-step with Hellyer’s plans.
$
$
$
Sutherland’s Second Study
By the summer of 1964 yet another fleet study was underway. This one, also conducted by Dr.
Sutherland, was to meet the 1964 White Paper’s remit to “conduct a study to determine the best
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combination of weapons systems” for the ASW task.12 Sutherland’s mandate was to seek ways of
maximizing ASW capability, and in this he contrasted the tactical capabilities of nuclear-powered
submarines against those of ASW carriers, with their potential to support mobile land forces. He also
looked at various destroyer options.
Constrained by Hellyer’s rigid budget, the study had little room to manoeuvre. In the end, Sutherland
concluded that an ASW carrier provided the most flexibility but that the budget was insufficient to replace
Bonaventure in the next 5-10 years. Nuclear submarines, while providing the best ASW capability, were
low in flexibility. As a result, he recommended that the navy essentially stay as it was (status quo) but
that a new class of guided-missile destroyers be built in the future and that the navy continue to make
maximum use of helicopters.
The recommendations of this study were not accepted by Hellyer; his dream of providing a uniquely
Canadian defence force was foundering. Clearly, Sutherland and Hellyer had different views on many
aspects of defence policy, and it began to look as if the navy was caught in the middle of the debate
without support for either an ASW role or a leading role in the army’s mobile force.
The “Dyer” Study
It wasn’t very long before another naval force structure study (the sixth since 1959) was undertaken.
Con-ducted hastily in the autumn of 1964 in response to a directive from Hellyer by an ad hoc naval staff
(the Naval Staff was disbanded that July during Hellyer’s reorganization of National Defence
Headquarters) under the Chairmanship of Vice-Admiral K.L. Dyer, the naval program was re-examined
and the recommendations submitted to the Chief of Defence Staff on 15 October and to the Minister on
23 October 1964.13 The recommendations, which reflected the essence of the previous studies, were that:
four new ASW destroyers be built (these eventually became the four Tribal-class DDHs);
the seven Restigouche-class destroyers be modernized (only four were modernized in the end);
Bonaventure be modernized and retained in service until 1975 (she was scrapped in 1970);
an additional fleet support ship, like Provider, be built (two such ships were eventually built with a
modest sea lift capability);
$ eight new Sea King helicopters be acquired (they were not);
$ a dedicated sea lift ship along the lines of an LPH be built (it was not); and, if funding became
available (it did not);
$ 21 A4E fighters be acquired to provide fleet air defence; and
$ two more submarines be acquired for the West Coast.
The study also recommended that in the longer-term consideration be given to replacing the Argus
maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, and building guided-missile
destroyers and hydrofoils. The sea lift argument was simple: enough lift capability to move some 3,000
troops and their vehicles, except tanks, would exist in the carrier and Provider—a return to the
conventional wisdom of 1961. However, the report stated that adding another support ship and a
dedicated sea lift ship (LPH) would increase the capability and add much needed flexibility. The LPH
was seen as being able to lift a complete battalion and its equipment. This study also seems to have fallen
on deaf ears.
But that is not the end of the saga. Yet another study of maritime force structure was directed in
November 1964, almost certainly because of the political rejection of the earlier Dyer Study.
$
$
$
$
The “Falls” Study
The next study was based on a memo from the new CDS, General J.V. Allard, requiring a study of:
$ the nature of the submarine threat;
$ the need for ocean surveillance systems;
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the comparative performance of various ASW platforms;
longer-term maritime aircraft requirements; and
limited war and related sea lift requirements to include the need to replace Bonaventure, the relative
merits of commercial vs military sea lift ships, and the use of ASW helicopters in army support
roles.14
In this, the study was not really asked to look at anything that had not already been extensively studied in
the preceding six years. Naval policy was apparently becoming a very difficult “political” issue.
Under the guidance of Captain R.H. Falls, the “in house” study was completed at the end of January
1967.15 The conclusions came in the form of a comprehensive shopping list of naval equipment needed to
keep the fleet effective. The discussion of sea lift was brief and to the point, but the final conclusion was
that no definitive recommendations could be made without first knowing exactly what had to be lifted and
supported and under what tactical conditions. What the study did say was that the sea lift capability
inherent in the carrier and the fleet support ships was enough to look after a light battalion group—an
airborne battalion group was used as the model. There were limitations to this concept though, not least of
which was that using Bonaventure in a sea lift role would require the removal of her ASW capability.
Also, it was pointed out that the availability of the necessary ships could not be guaranteed because they
had other commitments. Finally, it was explained that such a force would need protection from submarine
and air threats and that this requirement would also be subject to availability problems as a result of other
tasking.
$
$
$
O’Brien Responds
Allard wisely realized that the Falls Study was deficient because it had not been carried out with the
full involvement of Maritime Command. In March 1967, he wrote to the Maritime Commander, RearAdmiral J.C. O’Brien, asking him to provide his assessment of the overall effectiveness of the navy.16
O’Brien’s letter forwarding his own staff’s study was forthright in stating both the problem and the best
solution.17 The overall intent, he established, was that “Maritime Command will have balanced forces,
which will be able to make an adequate contribution to the Defence of Canada, North American Defence,
to NATO, and in peacekeeping operations to sustain Canada’s credit in the world community.” The force
formed, he continued, “will be responsive to the roles of the Canadian Forces as a whole, able to support
Mobile Command in any overseas endeavour and in the counter-lodgement role.” In this, O’Brien made it
crystal clear that by maintaining a balanced fleet with adequate fighting capabilities, he would be able to
move and support a land force as well as do many other things. In his opinion, the need for dedicated sea
lift was unnecessary provided the fleet was correctly structured. His letter contained one paragraph that
not only supported the earlier findings of the Burchell Study of January 1964 but also the essence of some
eight years of consistent naval advice on the subject:
I have stated the preferred large ship options as the procurement of 2 LHA type ships. I must, however,
state that if local air superiority cannot be guaranteed that my option must be the procurement of two
attack carriers in lieu of the LHA’s. I realize that this is an expensive proposition but I believe that
adequate offensive and defensive air is essential to any military operation.18
While such advice made absolute military sense, it obviously made little political sense and was thus
largely ignored. To Hellyer, the consistency of the naval advice probably seemed like a challenge to his
call for innovative thinking. Moreover, his earlier experiences with Admirals Brock and Landymore, and
with the senior naval community in general, probably clouded the issue. Anyway, little more was said
about dedicated sea lift. The assumption that enough contingency sea lift already existed within the fleet
structure seemed to prevail. To prove the point, several “joint” exercises were carried out under that
premise. However, the focus of those exercises was more on counter-lodgement and small scale
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operations than the grander concept of a self-sufficient Canadian brigade group available for UN
operations first envisaged by Hellyer. Perhaps it was an impossible dream after all. More importantly,
Cabinet were not ready to embrace the concept.
A great deal of effort had been expended in trying to provide Hellyer with a naval policy that
included his vision of a uniquely Canadian rapid reaction force—all to no avail. Yet, in a relatively short
space of time, Canadian naval policy was again under review, with results that put pay to Hellyer’s ideal
of a UN force and which also curbed the navy’s ability to provide support to the army. But this was not
done for Hellyer’s benefit; he was replaced as Minister of National Defence in September 1967. In his
wake he left many problems that the new Minister, Leo Cadieux, and a new administration under Pierre
Elliot Trudeau would have to sort out.
Cadieux Sorts it Out
The government’s 1968 decision to hold the defence budget at $1.72 billion put DND in a very
difficult position—there was not enough money to meet existing commitments. The solution was to close
bases and reduce the activity rates; actions seen as preferable to reducing force commitments to NATO or
to the bilateral continental defence structure. For the navy, the idea of making further cuts in force levels
was an abrogation of defence responsibilities in the Canadian ACLANT sub-area and in the Pacific which
would inevitably require that US forces assume part or all of the responsibility for those waters.19
It soon became quite clear that the government was not about to provide more money and, it later
emerged, the NATO commitment was not sacrosanct. Cuts would be made, and just how they would be
implemented was left to DND to work out. This process hit the navy particularly hard for it resulted in the
loss of the carrier Bonaventure; the core capability that the admirals had strived for so long to retain.
Although the reasons for the decision were largely financial they also reflected NATO realities—five or
six destroyers were of greater operational value than one ASW carrier.
To many, Bonaventure was sacrificed blindly on the altar of fiscal constraint rather than as a result of
any careful review of capability requirements.20 With a whimper rather than a bang, it seemed, a rich part
of Canadian naval history came to an end. More importantly, the keystone of the fleet’s flexibility in
meeting many and diverse taskings had gone. Looking back, with the clarity of perfect hindsight, this
should not really have been a surprise. It was well known that change was in the wind. It was also well
known that the carrier capability, using up almost one-third of the navy’s annual budget, was becoming
unaffordable. Its potential role as the heart and soul of a contingency sea lift capability, that the army
never fully embraced, was not enough to save it.
Conclusion
In conclusion, one has to ask what all this tells us today. Some obvious facts stand out. First, naval
planning throughout the 1963-67 period was consistent and continually recommended that a balanced and
flexible fleet would be able to provide the necessary sea lift and support for a deployed army formation,
other than for any requirement for tanks. The other point made consistently by the admirals and their
staffs was that if a contingency requirement for sea lift arose, no guarantee could be made on the
availability of the necessary ships when other operations were being conducted. The other important
point, and one which was made very clear during the 1982 Falklands’ War, was that if you are going to
send a land force into a potentially hostile environment, air superiority is essential. This was Admiral
O’Brien’s key point.
As O’Brien and his predecessors understood only too well, if you are going to play alone like the big
navies, you have to have the same sort of capabilities. If DND is going to move ahead with the idea of a
new rapid reaction force, the degree of autonomy and the extend of interoperability are important in
developing a useful force. In this, it might make sense to consider the strategic value of the modern
successors to the LPHs and LHAs of the 1960s. These vessels, after all, are the only ones that provide the
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necessary flexibility and can thus go a long way to ensuring operational success. As platforms from which
the full range of helicopter support operations can be conducted (as well VSTOL fighter operations if
necessary) ships of the LHA/LPH type would provide an important part of the necessary fleet balance and
flexibility needed to meet the mandate of Strategy 2020. Such ships would also help ensure that the
proposed “modern, task-tailored, and globally deployable combat capable forces” able to “respond
quickly to crises at home and abroad, in joint or combined operations” are operationally credible and not a
mere token.
If there is a moral to this story that could be applied to the present situation, it is that making radical
changes in defence policy is risky business which sometimes has adverse consequences. Defence
Ministers don’t necessarily make the decisions, Cabinet does. And in that body today, the Foreign
Minister generally holds greater sway. So, before embarking on a major change in the military’s
capabilities it is as well to ensure that it is demonstrably responsive to Canadian foreign policy objectives
and that the politicians are firmly on side.
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Canada, National Defence, Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: Department of National
Defence, June 1999), 6.
Paul Hellyer, Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada’s Armed Forces (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc.,
1990), 33-34.
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Defence Policy, 30 September 1963. Available in the Raymont Collection DHH File
No. 73/1223.
R.J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation”, International Journal, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (Summer 1962), 199223.
Hellyer, Damn the Torpedoes, 34.
Canada, White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, March 1964), 12.
White Paper on Defence, 24.
Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Naval Programmes, 6 January 1964. (Also known as the Burchell Study) DHH
File (Naval Plans) 124.019 (D1), 1. The previous studies were that conducted by Commodore Boulton in March 1959 and
the ill-fated and overinflated Brock Report of 1961.
Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Naval Programmes, Part I, para 3(c). The actual assumption was for a brigade on
the East Coast and a battalion on the West Coast.
The various memos, including one from the Army Staff with personnel, vehicle, and stores requirements, can be found in
RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 3922, File NSS 8260-CVL 22. There is passing reference in the Brock Report to the use of
Bonaventure as a troop transport, but nothing substantive is said about providing comprehensive support.
Letter from MND to the three Service Chiefs of 24 September 1963 “1964/65 Estimates” capped the navy budget at $270
million as opposed to $285 million authorized by the previous government.
1964 White Paper on Defence, 15.
The memo (S 3135-2 of 23 October 1964) forwarding the study to Hellyer was signed by Air Chief Marshall F.R. Miller and
contained the statement “in a memorandum dated 2 September, 1964, you indicated that it is important that the principal
programme elements of the Maritime Forces be considered at an early date and requested specific recommendations and
options.” From DHH file 73/1223 No. 382.
Memo from CDS to VCDS of 17 November 1966.
Study of Maritime System Flexibility (V-3240-6 (DGMF)) of 31 January 1967. From RG 24, Acc 1987-88/200 File SMARC: 3240-1 Pt. 1.
Letter from CDS to Commander, Maritime Command (V 3240-6 (DMFORS)) of 30 March 1967. From RG 24, Acc 198788/200 File S-MARC: 3240-1 Pt. 1.
Letter from Commander Maritime Command to CDS (MARC: 3240-1) of 18 September 1967. From RG 24, Acc 198788/200 File S-MARC: 3240-1 Pt. 1.
Ibid., para 5.
Draft Memorandum to Cabinet “1968/69 Defence Budget” V 7150-1 (DSFP) of 3 November 1967. DHH archives Raymont
Collection (73/1223) File No. 1034.
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20. The CDS’s Planning Guidance Directive (D 36/69 S 3120-10 of 22 September 1969) closes the chapter by simply stating
that Bonaventure would be “withdrawn from operational service 1 Jan 70” and be paid off by 31 March that year.
Peter Haydon is the editor of Maritime Affairs and a senior Research Fellow with the Centre for Foreign Policy
Studies at Dalhousie University. He is also part of the team working on the official history of Canada’s Cold
War navy.
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