anagement
M
igher Education:
}
r eht Practices and
z.Conversations
,1 s
ca A. Hubbard, Editor
in association,With
fic En tity t i k Institute
Rartda
Rnad; , u
1
2 0
a
ionprofit whose
?rofit organizations as
rise risk management.
anization's website:
Contents
Preface ...................................................................5
1 Emergency Management: Definition, Vision, Mission, Principles
Princi lesof Emergency
p
: Institute.
in any form without
ner.
Management Working Group ..................................7
2 Lessons from the Earthquake Lab: An Experimental Analysis of Learning
from Experience about Natural-Hazards
RobertMeyer ..................................................................19
3 Ensuring Effective Risk Communication Before and During a Disaster
Theodore J.
Hogan ..............................................................35
4 Emergency Management and Homeland Security: Exploring the Gray Area
Glen Woodbury ................................................................41
,
ides these materials
iurposes only, and
my of any kind,
• relating to the
' or usefulness of
I distribution of this
officers, directors
or recommendations
any claims for
:fissions or other
contained on these
^fessional services
iaterials should
ers bear complete
vial, and should
rith their particular
iced.
5 The Importance of International Disaster Management Studies in the
Field of Emergency Management
DamonP. Coppola ....................................
.......................57
6 The War on Terror: When the Response Is the Catastrophe
Ian
S. Lustick ..................................................................73
7 A Review of the U.S. Disaster Assistance Framework: Planning for Recovery
Gavin
P. Smith ................................................................99
8 The Disastrous Response to Hurricane Katrina: Blame It on the Bureaucracy?
Saundra
K.Schneider ..........................................................113
9 Educating Emergency Managers: Accreditation of Collegiate Emergency
Management Programs
Kay C. Goss, Valerie Lucus, Dorothy L. Miller, Daryl Lee Spiewak, Micheal A. Kemp ...... 133
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONVERSATIONS
F4
10 Emergency Management Higher Education: Demographics, Projections,
and Challenges
CarolL. Cwiak ............................................................... 139
11 Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs
LucienG. Canton ............................................................ 155
12 Emergency Planning for Foster Children Displaced by Disaster
MeghanButasek ............................................................. 165
13 The Paradigm Shift in Planning for Special-Needs Populations
BrianS. Parsons and Debra Fulmer .............................................. 183
Leadership
14 Community
Engagement: Leadershi
Tool for Catastrophic
P Health Events
ty
Monica Schoch-Spana, Crystal Franco, Jennifer B. Nuzzo, and Christiana Usenza on behalf
of the Working Group on Community Engagement in Health Emergency Planning ........ 197
15 The Routine and the Catastrophic: Emergency Management After
Hurricane Katrina
R. Steven Daniels ............................................................ 229
16 Delivery of Benefits in an Emergency: Lessons From Katrina
ThomasH. Stanton ........................................................... 249
•
17 From Lessons Learned to Lessons Taught: Implications of Katrina on
the Ground and in Higher Education
.
Jo hn J Kiefer and Lindsey 0. McCormick ......................................... 267
18 Making "Risk-Based" a Reality: Constructing a National Hazards
Risk Assessment
PatrickS. Roberts ............................................................. 277
19 The Use of Hazus-MH and GIS for Emergency Management
Jamie D. Mitchem, Thomas R. Mueller, Kevin J. Mickey .............................. 297
20 Using Information Technologies in Emergency Response Operations
John C. Pine ................................................................. 309
Aboutthe Authors ......................................................325
SelectedBibliography ...................................................337
L
,ES AND CONVERSATIONS
229
Df Pandemic Influenza,"
ecurity.org/website/
ncontrol pand emicfl u.html
rorism in the United States:
uences," Journal of the
717; Clete DiGiovanni et
the 2003 SARS Outbreak,"
endon et al., "Attitudes
untries," Health Affairs 25,
es (see note 74).
Don't Have Paid Sick Leave
www.iwpr.org/pdf/B242.Pdf
:mic Flu, Large Majority of
, 26 October 2006,
March 13, 2008).
15
The Routine and the Catastrophic:
Emergency Management After
Hurricane Katrina
vww.fns. usda.gov/pd/
R. Steven Daniels
al., "Hospital Preparedness
'.07-217.
ibinson et al., "Augmentation
;s: Recommendations of
Rdicine 33, no. 10 (2005):
s/2005_orig-art icles/
URRICANE KATRINA REVEALED MAJOR WEAKNESSES in the structure
and operations of federal emergency management. Victims, the media, the pubHlic, and the U.S. Congress generally believed the response of the local, state,
and federal executives and emergency management agencies to be slow, inadequate,
:hs Says She's Innocent,"
;/ap/2006/09/21 /america/
m; personal communication,
and ineffective.' The operational and structural failures catalogued in the aftermath of
Katrina reflect policy dilemmas that go to the heart of emergency management theory
and practice.
This chapter focuses on the impact that five of these core dilemmas—routine ver-
d ed. (Tucson, Ariz.: Galen
cultural Beliefs, Ceremonies,
no. 1 (2006): 44-50, findar-ch 13, 2008); Pan American
Situations ( Washington, D.C.:
;cessed March 13, 2008).
,l es of the Medical Examiner's
ent of Justice, Office for
sus catastrophic disasters, reaction versus anticipation, decentralization versus centralization, political responsiveness versus comprehensive vulnerability management,
and national security versus domestic disaster management—have had on the evolution of federal disaster policy. Underscoring these dilemmas are the responses of local,
state, federal, and private emergency managers to a 2006 post-Katrina survey. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of federal actions related to the issues raised in
the survey.
THE ROUTINE AND THE CATASTROPHIC
Crises or routine emergencies generally involve situations that affect a limited
geographical area and require the resources of one or two organizations. Disasters
typically disrupt entire political jurisdictions and require intervention from regional or
230
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONVERSATIONS
state governments as well as from multiple local organizations. Catastrophes tend to
disrupt local response and recovery completely, and require intervention at the regional and national levels.
Routine and catastrophic disasters generate different political and administrative
stresses on the emergency management system. Naim Kapucu and Montgomery Van
Wart suggest that catastrophic, major, or extreme disasters require more flexible and
innovative administrative strategies than the standard bureaucratic practices associated with routine emergencies.2
Routine emergencies encompass both emergencies affecting one or two agencies
in a local jurisdiction, and routine disasters affecting localities and regions but requiring state or occasionally national assistance.' In routine situations, effective response
and recovery reflects established emergency response plans, good communication and
information technology, agreed-upon decision protocols, and formal systems of cooperation with boundary-spanning organizations. 4 These procedures increase the likelihood that public expectations (emergent norms) and bureaucratic response will mesh
to produce good outcomes for the affected population.'
Catastrophic, major, or extreme disasters, on the other hand, disrupt the normal
processes of disaster management. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) has described a catastrophic disaster as "an event having unprecedented levels
of damage, casualties, dislocation, and disruption that would have nationwide consequences and jeopardize national security." 6 Although they have many of the characteristics of emergencies, catastrophic disasters overwhelm "the ability of state, local,
and volunteer agencies to adequately provide victims with such life-sustaining mass
care services as food, shelter, and medical assistance within the first 12 to 24 hours.
"7
Kapucu and Van Wart indicate that the differences between routine emergencies and
catastrophic disasters arise because catastrophes are unpredictable and unexpected,
interrupt normal communications, disrupt and complicate decision making, and block
the coordination of multiple organizations required for effective response. $ The disrupi
tions increase the probability that a significant gap will occur between public expectations and bureaucratic performance.' Thus, effective response to and recovery from
catastrophic disasters require more than standard emergency management procedures
can provide—notably, the ability to adapt and expand capacity, restore communications, provide flexible decision making, and expand coordination and goodwill."
ANTICIPATION VERSUS REACTION
For much of its history, the federal government has generally reacted to natural and
man-made disasters, focusing on the response and recovery components of the corn-
ES AND CONVERSATIONS
s. Catastrophes tend to
ervention at the regionical and administrative
i and Montgomery Van
quire more flexible and
icratic practices associng one or two agencies
and regions but requir:ions, effective response
)od communication and
formal systems of cooplures increase the likeliratic response will mesh
and, disrupt the normal
y Management Agency
ng unprecedented levels
h wp „ntionwide conseave many of the charache ability of state, local,
;uch life-sustaining mass
:he first 12 to 24 hours. "7
routine emergencies and
lictable and unexpected
cision making, and block
ve response.' The disrup-..
between public expecta-,
se to and recovery from
management procedures,
icity, restore communicd
ition and goodwill.'°
ally reacted to natural
- components of the c
J
15 THE ROUTINE AND THE CATASTROPHIC: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA
prehensive emergency management model, rather than on mitigation and preparedness. Between 1803, with the granting of special federal assistance to Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, following a major fire, and 1947, the federal government provided direct
assistance on 128 occasions." This assistance largely took the forms of direct aid to
victims and funds for recovery and reconstruction. Since then, even with the passage
of the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950 12 and its many subsequent amendments,13
the unexpected nature of most disasters, added to the political pressures and public
expectations for government response, still leaves governments at all levels reacting to
rather than anticipating emergencies.
Despite their natural tendencies toward reactive policy making in emergencies,
substantial evidence shows that governments do learn from catastrophic events. One
of the basic tenets of the organizational learning literature is that dissatisfaction with
program performance serves as a stimulus to search for alternative ways of doing
business. According to Peter May, after major policy failures, governments often demonstrate that they can develop more effective policy instruments or better implementation plans (instrumental learning), or that they can change the definition of problems,
the scope of policy, or policy goals (social learning). 14 This suggests that the failure of
policy ideas, like an organization's effort to close performance gaps, fosters instrumental learning; it can also stimulate a reconsideration of the rationales underlying
current policy ideas and thereby promote social learning.ls
Thomas Birkland argues that the movement from crises (or routine emergencies)
to disasters to catastrophes increases the likelihood that organizations and political
actors will learn from their mistakes and make better plans or more effective , problem definitions, policies, or goals. 16 On the other hand, such movement also tends to
destroy those policy and political processes that facilitate learning. In short, the occurrence of a catastrophe can promote learning but does not guarantee it.
DECENTRALIZATION VERSUS CENTRALIZATION
The traditional model of disaster management is a bottom-up, decentralized model designed to respond to routine emergencies and disasters, and it does so very effectively. 17 When an incident or disaster occurs, state and local governments assess the
damage and determine the capability of the local jurisdiction and the state to respond.
If the disaster exceeds those capabilities, the governor formally requests assistance
from the president through the FEMA regional office, having first certified that the
disaster is beyond the state's capability to respond, and that the state has provided all
required assistance and followed all necessary procedures. On the basis of the summary material received from the regional office, the FEMA administrator forwards a
231
232
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONVERSATIONS
disaster packet to the president, combining the governor's request, relevant political information about congressional and gubernatorial representation, and the agency
recommendation for action. The final decision to grant or deny aid rests with the president.The effectiveness of the system rests on the preparation, planning, and training
of the local and state emergency management agencies and first responders.
Because catastrophic disasters disrupt local and state infrastructure for response
and recovery, they may well destroy the capacity of local and state governments to
respond, which thereby increases pressure on the national government to centralize
response and recovery operations." However, given that the national government
must marshal personnel and resources to replace those disrupted or destroyed during the catastrophic event, the response is generally slower, less effective, and more
likely to receive public criticism. 19 The government responses to Hurricanes Andrew
and Katrina typify the difficulties associated with centralization during a catastrophic
event that destroys the local infrastructure for response.
L
In addition, centralization serves the political needs of local and state jurisdictions. For most local jurisdictions, the economic benefits of emergency planning are
not immediately apparent because the risk of suffering a disaster or catastrophe in any
budget year is very small and the political benefits of long-term planning are limited.
With the passage of the Federal Disaster Relief Act in 1950, local jurisdictions recognized that they could transfer some of the risks and costs of emergency planning to
the federal government, and at least partially indemnify themselves against their own
lack of planning.^° As a result, the federal government has imposed mitigation and
preparedness requirements on state and local jurisdictions in most of the amendments
to the act. However, the political realities of the system have gradually increased the
=
amount of centralization in the disaster management system.
COMPREHENSIVE VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT VERSUS
POLITICAL RESPONSIVENESS
Throughout the period of formal federal disaster assistance (1950-2007), presidents
weighing the factors involved in issuing a disaster declaration have had to confront
the inherent conflict between professional emergency management standards and the
pressure exerted on elected officials for political responsiveness. Emergency managers
and academics have approached disaster management through various models—comprehensive emergency management, integrated emergency management, sustainable
hazards mitigation, or comprehensive vulnerability management 21 —but the ultimate
±' x
goal has been the same: to develop "holistic and integrated activities directed toward
IL
p.-{
ES AND CONVERSATIONS
1
15 THE ROUTINE AND THE CATASTROPHIC: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA
equest, relevant politi-
the reduction of emergencies and disasters by diminishing risk and susceptibility and
ztation, and the agency
building of resistance and resilience."'2
aid rests with the presi-
However, disasters have political characteristics that make them ideal arenas for
planning, and training
political intervention and the selective application of emergency management prin-
st responders.
astructure for response
ciples. First, disasters are focusing events: They combine objective criteria (scope,
1 state governments to
unpredictability, and victim vulnerability), and widespread secondary consequeces.'1
>vernment to centralize
This combination of impact, media attractiveness, symbolism, and significant spillover
e national government
effects generates an expectation of presidential action. Second, both the president and
•pted or destroyed dur-
Congress frequently treat disaster policy as distributive. 24 In other words, presidents
Less effective, and more
can treat disaster relief as a preferment dispensed for political motives that may bear
to Hurricanes Andrew
little direct linkage to risk or susceptibility, whereas members of Congress can treat
)n during a catastrophic
severity, and visibility), extensive media coverage, symbolic characteristics (rarity,
disaster declarations as pork—benefits for their districts.
Amy Donahue and Philip Joyce distinguish between the effects of functional fed-
local and state jurisdic-
eralism (each level of government has emergency management competencies that
emergency planning are
it should emphasize) and legislative theory (each level of government has political
ter or catastrophe in any
incentives that may or may not relate to their competencies). Comparing the expecta-
cm planning are limited.
.ocal jurisdictions recog-
tions from the two models to the reality of federal emergency management functions
emergency planning to
and funding, the authors conclude that political incentives significantly shape modem
emergency management.25
selves against their own
imposed mitigation and
most of the amendments
gradually increased the
DISASTER MANAGEMENT VERSUS NATIONAL SECURITY
Just as political incentives conflict with the exercise of comprehensive vulnerability management, national security concerns often dominate disaster management
functions. In its search for a proper balance, the federal government has combined,
separated, and recombined several critical functions in its various federal disaster
.NT VERSUS
assistance agencies between 1950 and 2007:
:e (1950-2007), presidents
• Coordination of emergency military, civilian, and industrial mobilization; and
ion have had to confront
;ement standards and the
ass. Emergency managers
general preparedness planning
• Development, operation, and maintenance of emergency telecommunications
systems (e.g., the Emergency Broadcast System)
gh various models—com-
• Administration of civil defense programs
management, sustainable
• Administration of disaster assistance and insurance programs
?ment21 but the ultimate
activities directed toward
• Administration of fire prevention and training programs."
[233]
234
f
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONVERSATIONS
Although the comprehensive emergency management model clearly suggests that
the emergency management function concentrate on all disasters and emphasize d ualuse strategies, national security concerns have almost always dominated or superseded disaster management functions. The dominance appears to arise from three
sources: the primary role of the federal government in national security, the tendency
of state and local jurisdictions to shift the political risks of disaster management to the
federal government, and the greater prominence of national security compared with
disaster relief in the public's list of most important problems facing the country.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the focus was on civil defense. During the 1970s and
1980s, the focus shifted to continuity of government following a nuclear attack. In the
aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, the National Academy of Public Administration noted
that stovepiping hampered FEMA's two main directorates: its larger-budget and topsecret National Preparedness Directorate, which administered the continuity-of-gu°vernment function, and the State and Local Programs and Support Directorate, whose more
limited funding clearly impeded FEMA's ability to respond effectively to the hurricane.27
Since September 11, 2001, terrorism and homeland security have largely overshadowed
disaster assistance in federal emergency management because of the public's concerns
over ,terrorism, the Bush administration's policy focus on national security, and the
placement of FEMA under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
DISCUSSION
The preceding discussion suggests that the five dilemmas have reinforcing influences on each other. Most disasters are routine. In the case of a routine emergency,
the decentralized system of emergency management provides both standard response
and recovery functions (reaction) and requirements for mitigation and preparedness
(anticipation) that build on the model of comprehensive vulnerability management.
However, as the scope of disaster increases, the likelihood of significant disruption of
local and state capabilities also increases, making the political benefits and risks to the
president and Congress more visible, and the pressure on the president to act overwhelming. As Saundra Schneider notes, the more disruptive the disaster, the greater
the probability and necessity of federal intervention. But federal intervention necessarily slows response. Thus, the more disruptive the disaster and the greater the federal
responsibility, the more widespread will be the belief that the federal response was a
failure, regardless of the actual success or failure of federal intervention.28
Both real and perceived, policy failures often trigger policy learning. 29 The passage
of most of the significant amendments to the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950 followed large-scale or catastrophic disasters. In the aftermath of most disasters, the rou-
IS THE ROUTINE AND THE CATASTROPHIC: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA
:E5 AND CONVERSATIONS
lel clearly suggests that
tine procedures reasserted themselves for routine emergencies; however, the residual
rs and emphasize
policy change gradually brought about greater centralization and federalization.
dual-
s dominated or super-
SURVEY: THE FIVE DILEMMAS AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA
ors to arise from three
tendency
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, it is useful to examine catastrophic disasters
;ter management to the
from the perspective of local and state emergency managers, and to find out how those
ecurity compared
managers view the dilemmas outlined above. With the approval and assistance of the
1 security, the
with
icing the country.
During the 1970s and
`';
International Association of Emergency Management (IAEM), I administered a sur-
1
vey to the members of the association and to fifty-four state and territorial emergency
a nuclear attack. In the
management directors (members of the National Emergency Management Association
c Administration noted
larger-budget an d top-
[ NEMA]) from May to July 2006. Despite a low response rate (3.0 percent, or 111 valid
responses from a total of 3,654 potential respondents), the surveys I received back
.e continuity-of-govern-
came from all ten FEMA regions, thirty-five states and territories, eighty-five counties,
)irectorate, whose more
four Canadian provinces, and one Australian state. The political jurisdictions (states
lively to the hurricane.
and counties) in the survey responses represented 26 percent of the U.S. population.
27
largely overshadowed
)f the public's concerns
ional security, and the
Figure 15-1. Most likely sources of catastrophic disasters in localities and states, IAEMNEMA survey, 2006.
!curity (DHS).
have reinforcing influf a routine emergency,
)oth standard response
tion an d preparedness
erability management.
gnificant disruption of
enefits and risks to the
president to act over-
C 60%
N_
•
O O
a^ E
T o
O
C) E
Y
40%
L_
c L()
m t
a^ a)
of m 20%
ai r
a-
Ze disaster, the greater
intervention necessar-
0%
the greater the federal
ederal response was a
rvention.28
29
earning. The passage
^\^e °^^• J^c^ e go Ja
^^ °ice \^A5 ``y^ ^Qyz P\°^5 \`ae5 `\y^C ^
rec ``yam
•
F °\^ayam°`te
ty
'° ca
r°'
^^^ c^° tto
O Rio
Q
a5 ^^°
e
°i\ao ^^ `°^ a mac`°e
°^^
°
,
CNO
eC
a
C`P'S
JC
000 +J°
5` Ja5`a
Relief Act of 1950 folnost disasters, the rou-
Type of catastrophic disaster
\°o
235
236
L
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONVERSATIONS
Dilemma 1: Routine versus Catastrophic Disasters
Using FEMA's definition of a catastrophic disaster—an "event having
un
precedented levels of damage, casualties, dislocation, and disruption that would have
nationwide consequences and jeopardize national security"—the survey asked local
and state emergency managers to identify the five most likely types of disaster to produce catastrophic results in their jurisdictions. As shown in Figure 15-1, the five most
likely types of disasters identified by more than 50 percent of respondents are flooding, tornadoes and associated storms, chemical accidents, fires, and winter storms. Of
those five types, four are natural and only one is human caused.
In addition, different FEMA regions ranked disasters very differently. Flooding
influenced every region. Winter storms rated highly in New England and the midAtlantic; tornadoes were most prevalent in four midwestern and southern regions;
hurricanes figured prominently in the Southeast; terrorism and riots/civil disturbances were among the most likely disasters to affect in the Washington, D.C., region; an d
wildfires and earthquakes were most common in the West.
Figure 15-2. Anticipation and reaction in Hurricane Katrina, closed-ended responses to
IAEM-NEMA survey, 2006.
Statements
1. Flawed mitigation and economic
development procedures (Mean 1 a &1 b)
1 a. Flawed local, state, and federal r—
mitigation procedures
1 b. Poor economic development decisions by
all levels of government
2. Inadequate state and local leadership
and response (Mean 2a through 2d)
2a. Inadequate state leadership and management
2b. Inadequate local leadership and
management of the crisis
2c. Poor Louisiana and Mississippi
emergency plans
2d. Poor local emergency plans
3. Inadequate FEMA leadership and
response (Mean 3a &3b)
3a. Inadequate FEMA leadership
and management
3b. Poor FEMA emergency plans 1
4. Response effective or beyond government
control (Mean 4a &4b)
4a. The strength of the hur ri cane
68
73
-^
4b. Hurricane Katrina repsonse was effective -{
0
1
76
73
1
`O
57
33
1
42
24
18
23
1 14
20
40
Percentage agreeing
60
80
15 THE ROUTINE AND THE CATASTROPHIC: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA
AND CONVERSATIONS
In general, most emergency managers believe that natural disasters would genervent having unprec-
ate catastrophic outcomes more often than human-caused accidents, and that acci-
on that would have
dents would occur more frequently than terrorism.
e survey asked local
Dilemma 2: Anticipation versus Reaction
)es of disaster to pro-e 15-1, the five most
Survey respondents also evaluated the anticipation and reaction to Hurricane
spondents are flood-
Katrina. They were asked to respond to ten statements on a five-point scale ranging
ad winter storms. Of from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." The ten statements shared four common
dimensions:
differently. Flooding
igland and the mid-
• Flawed mitigation procedures and economic development decisions (two items)
td southern regions;
• Inadequate state and local leadership and response (four items)
Dts/civil disturbanc-
• Inadequate FEMA leadership and response (two items)
)n, D.C., region; and
• Response was effective/scope of disaster beyond government control (two items).
With the ten closed-ended statements, emergency managers largely focused on
two themes noted in Figure 15-2: flawed mitigation procedures and economic development decisions by all levels of government (68 percent), and inadequate state and
nded responses to
r5
local leadership and response (66 percent). Only half as many respondents believe that
inadequate FEMA leadership and response was the problem (33 percent), and considFigure 15-3. Anticipation and reaction in Hurricane Katrina, open-ended responses to
IAEM-NEMA survey, 2006.
68
73
Source of poor government response
64
66
76
;: 73
Inadequate planning, mitigation,
and preparedness
Poor leadership
Inadequate response, recove ry ,
execution, and communication
25
`^17
17
Poor intergovernmental coordination
Some aspects of
response adequate
Marginalization of FEMA,
excessive focus on terrorism
Excessive bureaucracy
58
57
1 10
9
7
5
3
Inadequate data for comment
Insufficient personnel and funding
2
Scope of disaster exceeded capacity
2
Other
60
1
80
0.0
10.0
20.0
Percent responding
30.0
zs^
238 1 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONVERSATIONS
erably fewer believe that the response was effective or that the disaster was beyond
government control (18 percent).
The survey also allowed respondents to provide open-ended responses (see Figure
15-3) to the question of anticipation and reaction. The most commonly cited reasons
for the belief that government response was ineffective were inadequate planning
mitigation, and preparedness (25 percent); poor leadership (at all levels of government) (17 percent); inadequate response, recovery, execution, and communication (17
percent); and poor intergovernmental coordination (10 percent).
Several state, local, and private emergency management professionals identified
one or more of these factors in their open-ended responses. William Cover, director of
the Cass County, Nebraska, emergency management agency, suggested that the primary causes were "failure of coordination between levels of government, failure to
exercise plans ahead of the disaster, and failure to use available plans during the disaster." Another senior government official noted, "The major flaw appeared to be the
coordination between the levels of government and an understanding of the federal
response system." One anonymous official argued, "The single most important reason
for local government inadequacy was a failure to respond quickly in requesting fedFigure 15-4. Decentralization and centralization: Appropriate level of control, IAEMNEMA survey, 2006.
Level of control
61
Local governments
^l.
Federal Emergency
5
7
Management Agency
55
State governments
35
No level effective
Department of Homeland Security
1
The White House
8
Presidentially-appointed,
independent task force
7
A specially trained
U.S. milita ry force
0
20
40
Percentage agreeing
60
15 THE ROUTINE AND THE CATASTROPHIC: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AFTER HURRICANE KATAINA
PICES AND CONVERSATIONS
eral aid while the federal government (FEMA) did not have experienced emergency
the disaster was beyond
management personnel in key positions due to political appointments and stripping
led responses (see Figure
of needed funding." At least one official in the survey placed the blame directly on a
commonly cited reasons
failure to educate the public about the responsibilities of emergency management:
ire inadequate planning,
(at all levels of govern-
Communication, communication, communication. I spent a great deal of
and communication (17
time yelling at the television during this event because of the lack of educa-
nt).
tion and ignorance by the public, some government officials, and, in par-
t professionals identified
ticular, the media, regarding emergency management responsibilities at the
Villiam Cover, director of
local, state, and federal levels. Emergency manager' s strive to keep relation-
r, suggested that the pri-
ships with all involved entities, but the combination of politics and the blame
)f government, failure to
game takes the focus off the real issue: serving and protecting the public!
I
le plans during the disas-
Dilemma 3: Decentralization versus Centralization
flaw appeared to be the
?rstanding of the federal
The survey also asked respondents to identify the appropriate level of government
le most important reason
to control mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities in the case of a
uickly in requesting fed-
catastrophic disaster. Five statements focused on federal mechanisms, two focused on
local and state governments, and one stated that no level was effective (see Figure 154). State and local emergency managers rejected centralization in the White House, an
independent task force, DHS, and the military out of hand. More th an one-third be li eve
iel of control, IAEM-
Figure 15-5. The adequacy of state and local emergency plans.
Evaluation of adequacy
Plan contains revision and circulation provisions
Plan prepared by a qualified emergency planner
Plan has clear, simple, unambiguous language
"" 78
75
73
Plan is compatible with other plans and jurisdictions
72
Plan specifies roles of all pariticipants for all activities
69
Plan based on a full risk and vulnerability assessment
69
Plan is a single, integrated plan
s
67
Plan discusses process and quantities
_
65
Plan contains provisions for non-public organizations
--^ 30
60
Plan covers mitigation and preparedness
Plan is adequate for a catastrophic disaster
_____________158
Emergency operations center vulnerable to catastrophe
51
Plan relfects a full audit of available resources
43
Jurisdiction has an effective mass evacuation plan
39
Sufficient state emergency management personnel
27
Sufficient local emergency management personnel
20
0
20
40
60
Percent agreeing
ng
—^
L
60
80
239
240
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONVERSATIONS
that no level would produce effec tive results. However, the majority of respondents
agreed that the appropriate locus of control is the local government (61 percent), FEJ,L
(57 percent), or the state government (55 percent), with no clear preference indicated.
The responses reflect the belief that the effectiveness of the system rests on the prepara ti on, planning, and training of the local and state emergency m an agement agencies
and first responders. When respondents were asked to evaluate the adequacy of their
jurisdiction's emergency operations plan on sixteen dimensions developed by David
3
Alexander' ° their answers indicated that some significant gaps exist that may increase
the likelihood that catastrophic disasters would disrupt their local and state response
an d recovery (see Figure 15-5). Their greatest concerns—indicated by the lowest percentages agreeing with the statements that articulated the dimensions—involve ha y `
Figure 15-6. The evolution of presidential disaster declarations, 1953-2005. The
vertical line indicates passage of the Stafford Act.
100
Disaster requests
— — Major disaster declarations
— Turndowns and other responses
—
-°
° 80
II
I:
o
20
z
I
i
I
\
I(
\ \IIII1
AI
:
^
\
/ri I\,t\I,\ II
\^ ^^^'
,^I
\I I \i
,/
1
\
I
\\Ii
0
1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005
1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003
Calendar year
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency. Available th ro ugh the Freedom of Information Act, FEMA FOIA
Helpdesk, E-mail: [email protected], Telephone: (202) 646-3323
ICES AND CONVERSATIONS
x
15 THE ROUTINE AND THE CATASTROPHIC: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA
majority of respondents
ing sufficient local and state emergency management personnel (nearly 80 percent
rnent (61 percent), FEMA
believe that their local and state agencies are understaffed), having an adequate mass
it preference indicated.
evacuation plan, and using a full resource audit to prepare the plan. More than half
system rests on the prep-
believe that their emergency operations center is vulnerable to catastrophic disaster.
=y management agencies
Dilemma 4: Vulnerability versus Responsiveness
ate the adequacy of their
)ns developed by David
The IAEM-NEMA survey did not directly assess the need to achieve a balance
,s exist that may increase
between vulnerability management and political responsiveness; however, an exami-
local and state response
nation of presidential disaster declaration activity between 1953 and 2005 clearly sug-
.cated by the lowest per-
gests a broadening definition of the federal role and the increasing political visibility
mensions—involve hav-
of the disaster management process (see Figure 15-6).
Disaster requests, major disaster declarations, and turndowns all increased from
1953-2005. The
1953 to 1973, and then, despite some spurts, generally decreased until 1988. Throughout
1.
the period, the number of turndowns averaged 12.7 per year with the number exceeding twenty in only five years (1973,1974,1977,1978, and 1980). By contrast, the number
of requests and major disaster declarations increased significantly after the passage of
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) in
.r µ^
1988. Given that the number of turndowns remained relatively constant, this meant
a significant increase in the approval rate for major disasters (from 65 percent before
1989 to 79 percent after).31
'.1
Using the percentage of major disaster requests approved as the dependent variable, I used dummy variable regression to test the impact of political responsiveness
on the presidential disaster declaration process. Two variables seemed particularly
relevant: the passage of the Stafford Act, which expanded the definition of major
r
I
,' I
Table 15-1. The Impact of Presidential Elections and the Stafford Act on Major Disaster
Declarations, 1953-2005
Percentage of major disaster requests granted
Variables
Constant
Carter dummy
Presidential election year
1993199720012005
391 1995 1999 2003
Passage of Stafford Act
R-Squared
Number of cases
)rmation Act, FEMA FOIA
B
64.8%
-14.6%
7.6%
Sig. (one-tailed)
0.000
0.021
12.0%
0.038
0.002
0.287
Sig. (two-tailed)
0.001
53
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, available through the Freedom of Information Act, FEMA FOIA
Helpdesk, at [email protected], telephone: (202) 646-3323
241
[2:4 2]
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONVERSATIONS
disasters to include human-caused disasters and signaled a significant change in the
federal role in disasters; and presidential election-year politics, which put increased
pressure on presidents to grant assistance in marginal cases. I also controlled for the
Carter administration because presidential documents from the Carter Library clearly
indicated that President Jimmy Carter was unusually reluctant to grant major disaster
assistance. 32 The results of the regression appear in Table 15-1.
Adjusting for other factors, President Carter granted 15 percent fewer major disaster declarations than other presidents prior to the Stafford Act; all presidents granted 8
percent more major disaster declarations during presidential election years than during other years; and Presidents George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush,
whose administrations followed the passage of the Stafford Act, granted 12 percent
more major disaster declarations than their predecessors. These results suggest that
political responsiveness has played an increasing role in the disaster declaration process. Both the increases during election years and the expansion of presidential declaration activity after the Stafford Act broadened the federal role in disaster assistance
imply that presidents have become increasingly sensitive to the political effects of the
disaster declaration process.
Dilemma 5: Disaster Management versus Homeland Security
The likely causes of catastrophic disasters reported above clearly suggest that emergency management professionals place terrorism relatively low (except in New York and
Washington, D.C.). Yet homeland security has come to dominate disaster management
funding. In fiscal year 2008, FEMA's budget, the State Homeland Security Program,
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, and
Transportation and Infrastructure Protection account for nearly 80 percent of the funding for emergency management performance grants to state and local governments 33
What solutions did emergency managers suggest to redress the balance between
disaster management and homeland security? The survey asked respondents to evaluate six statements concerning the relationship between emergency management and
homeland security. According to their responses, the majorities of respondents believe
that the FEMA administrator should have extensive emergency management experience (92 percent), should report directly to the president (86 percent), and should
separate from DHS (79 percent). Less than a quarter of the respondents believe that
mitigation and preparedness should be separate from response and recovery (23 percent), and far fewer believe that the president should abolish FEMA and replace with
another agency (4 percent), or that homeland security functions should dominate
emergency management functions (3 percent).
;S AND CONVERSATIONS
nificant change in the
, which put increased
1
15 THE ROUTINE AND THE CATASTROPHIC: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA
To gain specific details, the survey asked respondents to place themselves in the
role of the FEMA director and address the following question:
also controlled for the
If you were the director of FEMA, what key changes would you make to improve
Carter Library clearly
agency performance and achieve the agency's goals as listed in the FY 2003-2008
:o grant major disaster
Strategic Plan (1. Reduce loss of life and property; 2. Minimize suffering and disruption caused by disasters; 3. Prepare the nation to address the consequences of ter-
ent fewer major disas-
rorism; 4. Serve as the nation's portal for emergency management information and
ll presidents granted 8
expertise; 5. Create a motivating and challenging work environment for employees;
ection years than dur-
and 6. Make FEMA a world-class enterprise.)
, and George W. Bush,
The EM professionals made six broad recommendations noted by at least 20 percent of respondents:
ct, granted 12 percent
;e results suggest that
;aster declaration pro-
• Separate emergency management and homeland security (33 percent)
i of presidential decla-
• Recruit expertise and experience (32 percent)
in disaster assistance
• Restructure and refund FEMA (27 percent)
political effects of the
• Improve intergovernmental coordination (24 percent)
• Focus on comprehensive emergency management (24 percent)
• Improve preparedness and training (21 percent).
Security
arly suggest that emer-
Discussion
'xcept in New York and
The survey revealed a fundamental discontinuity between the professional con-
disaster management
cerns of local and state emergency managers and the evolving structure of federal
end Security Program,
emergency management within DHS. Most local and state managers emphasized that
^curity Initiative, and
the most likely cause of catastrophic disaster in their jurisdictions is natural in ori-
80 percent of the fund-
gin. They placed primary responsibility for the failures of mitigation, preparedness,
local governments.33
response, and recovery after Katrina on the local and state governments in Louisiana
s the balance between
and Mississippi. They also identified significant shortcomings in emergency manage-
[respondents to evalu-
ment planning that might increase the disruption of local and state response during
!ncy management and
a catastrophic disaster. While they disagreed about the appropriate level for dealing
of respondents believe
with catastrophic disaster, placing nearly equal emphasis on local, state, and FEMA
cy management expe-
responsibility, they strongly argued for the separation of FEMA from DHS and the
percent), and should
placement of greater emphasis on comprehensive emergency management.
,pondents believe that
However, after 9/11 and the passage of the Homeland Security Act, the structures
and recovery (23 per-
and functions of federal emergency management shifted dramatically, and the pri-
EMA and replace with
mary emphasis of DHS (and FEMA) became homeland security, with the bulk of state
ions should dominate
and local grant assistance and program funding directed toward domestic terrorism.
A major restructuring of FEMA in 2003 and 2004 shifted preparedness functions to a
243
244
L
TION: CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONVERSATIONS
ENCYMANA6EMENTINHrnHEREDUCATJON:
separate division within FEMA. In addition, the location of FEMA within the
or
ganizational structure of DHS limited the agency director's direct access to the president:
most communication had to go through the secretary of DHS.
AFTERMATH: THE POST KATRINA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
REFORM ACT OF 2006 AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF FEMA
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, emergency management officials and elected politicians issued many recommendations for the improvement of federal emergency management. Most of these recommendations mirror the recommendations
and policy changes identified by the respondents to the IAEM-NEMA survey. Several
elected politicians, including Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.), Rep. Bob Etheridge
( D-N.C.), Sen. Daniel Akaka (D-Haw.), Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), Sen. Hillary
Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.), and Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.), sponsored or supported legislation to make FEMA independent of DHS, establish a direct reporting line
to the president, or both. IAEM and NEMA lobbied extensively during the period
from September 2005 to October 2006 to strengthen FEMA's emergency management
authority, bring preparedness back into FEMA as part of the comprehensive emergency management model, and increase funding for and maintain the natural disaster
components of Emergency Management Performance Grants.
After considerable debate, President Bush signed the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act 2007 on October 4, 2006. Title VI of the act—the PostKatrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act)—sought
to restructure federal emergency management generally, and FEMA specifically, to
answer the criticisms arising from the failures of governmental performance during
that hurricane. Among other things,3'
• The act transferred preparedness functions back into a restructured FEMA.
• The act requires FEMA"to lead and support efforts to reduce the loss of life and
property and protect the nation from all hazards through a risk-based system
that focuses on the expanded comprehensive emergency management components of preparedness, response, recovery, and hazard mitigation." 35 The expanded concept of comprehensive emergency management includes "protection."
• The act grants FEMA independent status within DHS, similar to the status of the
U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Secret Service.
• The act prohibits the secretary of DHS from separating or transferring FEMA
functions or resources, and requires the secretary to follow statutory appropriations requirements when allocating funding to FEMA.
;ES AND CONVERSATIONS
15 THE ROUTINE AND THE CATASTROPHIC: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA
?MA within the organi-
• The act grants the FEMA administrator (new title) the rank of deputy secretary
access to the president:
of DHS. As such, the FEMA administrator reports directly to the president, the
Homeland Security Council, and the secretary of DHS; may receive cabinet status
during a national emergency; and must have emergency management or home-
MANAGEMENT
JG OF FEMA
ment officials and electement of federal emerthe recommendations
land security experience (although the White House has contested the limitation
on presidential appointment power).
• The act allows FEMA to have up to four deputy administrators appointed by the
president and confirmed by the Senate.
• The act requires FEMA to develop and maintain robust regional operations
-NEMA survey. Several :; w
headed by regional administrators who have extensive emergency management
s.), Rep. Bob Etheridge
and homeland security experience.
(D-Calif.), Sen. Hillary
sponsored or supporti a direct reporting line
• For disaster response, the act provides the administrator greater authority to
preposition resources or unilaterally provide assistance without a state request.
• The act requires the appointment of a national advisory council and ten regional
vely during the period
advisory councils to provide state, local, nonprofit, and private expertise to
mergency management
FEMA and its regional offices. It also creates regional strike teams to provide
e comprehensive emer-
assistance during disasters.
tain the natural disaster
• The act creates a disability coordinator, a chief medical officer, and a small-state
and rural advocate. The administrator appoints the first, the president selects the
partment of Homeland
1I of the act—the Post-
third, and the president with the advice of the Senate chooses the second.
• Finally, the act makes changes to ensure greater flexibility in the delivery of
t-Katrina Act)—sought
services and assistance during the response and recovery phases of a declared
I FEMA specifically, to
disaster.
tal performance during
FEMA has begun to implement these initiatives through the creation of the National
Preparedness Directorate and the development of the Catastrophic Disaster Planning
tructured FEMA.
Initiative 3 6 In addition, in its FY 2008 budget request, FEMA has begun the process of
uce the loss of life and
converting its short-term response employees into permanent employees.37
a risk-based system
A comparison of the policy recommendations of the post-Katrina reports of the
nanagement compo-
White House, the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, and the Government
:igation." 35 The expand-
Accountability Office;38 the respondents to the IAEM-NEMA 2006 survey; and the
ludes "protection."
actions taken by Congress and the president suggests that Congress and the president
filar to the status of the
have listened. The Post-Katrina Act has strengthened FEMA, reestablished the direct
linkage between the FEMA administrator and the president, refocused the agency on
transferring FEMA
comprehensive emergency management, and recognized the importance of regional
v statutory appropria-
differences in catastrophic disasters. The only federal recommendation not implemented is the separation of FEMA from DHS. However, the actions taken to increase
245
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONVERSATIONS
246
L1
the status of FEMA within DHS and reestablish direct reporting lines to the president
have achieved much of the advantages associated with independence.
At the same time, though, the Post-Katrina Act does little to ensure that state and
local jurisdictions make their emergency operations plans more comprehensive, retrofit their emergency operations centers, and make economic development decisions
that promote comprehensive vulnerability management.
39
These actions will require a
greater commitment from state and local elected officials with support from the state
and local emergency management community.
Endnotes
1
Bruce Alpert, "Katrina Taught Us, Emergency Officials Say," New Orleans Times-Picayune
22 September 2005, www.nola.com/newslogs/tporleans/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_tporleans/
archives/2005_09_22.html; Peter Applebome et al., "A Delicate Balance Is Undone in a Flash,
and a Battered City Waits," New York Times, 4 September 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/09/04/
national/nationalspecial/04reconstruct.html; Associated Press, "Successor to Brown is Seen as
Experienced," New York Times, 9 September 2005, www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/
AP-Profile-Allen.html; Associated Press, "Ex-FEMA Chief Defends Role in Katrina Response," Wa/I
Street Journal, 27 September 2005, online.wsj.com/article/0,SB112782581706453200,00.html;
Robert Block and John D. McKinnon, "Panel to Begin Inquiry Into the Katrina Response and the
Military's Role," Wall Street Journal, 27 September 2005, A3, A14; Robert Block et al., "Behind Poor
Katrina Response, a Long Chain of Weak Links," Wall Street Journal, 6 September 2005, Al, online.
wsj.com/article/SB112597239277632387.html; Robert Block, "Brown Portrays FEMA to Panel as
Broken and Resource-Starved," Wall Stre et Journal, 28 September 2005, A3; White House, The
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President,
February 2006), www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/; Matthew Cooper, "Dipping
His Toe in Disaster," Time, 12 September 2005, 51; Peter G. Gosselin and Alan C. Miller, 'Why
FEMA Was Missing in Action," Los Angeles Times, 5 September 2005, www.latimes.com/news/
nationworld/nation/la-na-fema5sep05,0,2650635,full.story; Rebuilding Governor's Commission on
Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal, After Katrina: Building Back Better Than Ever (Jackson, Miss.:
Governor's Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal, December 31, 2005), hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/BBBTE.pdf; Eric Lipton et al., "Breakdowns Marked the Path from Hurricane
to Anarchy," New York Times, 11 September 2005, 1, www.nytimes.com/2005/09/11/national/
nationalspecial/1 1 response.html; Peter Grier, "Where to Find $200 Billion to Pay for Katrina,"
Christian Science Monitor, 30 September 2005, www.csmonitor.com/2005/0930/p01s02-uspo.html;
Norman J. Rabkin, Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation's Preparedness, Response,
and Recovery Activities, GAO-05-1053T (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Accountability Office,
September 28, 2005); U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 15, 2006), katrina.house.gov/
full_katrina_report.htm; U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, S. Rept. 109-322 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, June 22, 2006), www.hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/ExecSum.pdf (all Web sites
above accessed February 17, 2008).
2 Naim Kapucu and Montgomery Van Wart, "The Evolving Role of the Public Sector in Managing
Catastrophic Disasters: Lessons Learned," Administration & Society 38 (July 2006): 279-308; see
also Saundra K. Schneider, Flirting with Disaster: Public Management in Crisis Situations (Armonk,
N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995).
3 Kapucu and Van Wart, "Evolving Role of the Public Sector."
ICES AND CONVERSATIONS
t5 THE ROUTINE AND THE CATASTROPHIC: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AFTER HURRICANE KATAINA
ng lines to the
4 Ibid.; Naim Kapucu, "Building Community Capacity to Respond," The Public Manager 36 (Fall
2007): 21-25.
endence.
5 Schneider, Flirting with Disaster.
to ensure that state and
.ore comprehensive, retdevelopment decisions
?se actions will require a
1
support from the state
247
6 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Combined Catastrophic Plan for Southeast
Louisiana and the New Madrid Seismic Zone: Scope of Work, FY 2004 (Washington, D.C.: FEMA,
2004), 4, hoversight.house.gov/Documents/20050909130029-67700.pdf (accessed February 17,
2008).
7 J. Dexter Peach, Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the
Nation's Response Strategy, GAO/T-RCED-93-46 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting
Office, May 25, 1993), 1, archive.gao.gov/d43t14/149256.pdf (accessed February 17, 2008).
8 Kapucu and Van Wart, "Evolving Role of the Public Sector."
9 Schneider, Flirting with Disaster.
10 Kapucu and Van Wart, "Evolving Role of the Public Sector."
ns Times-Picayune
logs/nola_tporleans/
a Is Undone in a Flash,
nytimes.com/2005/09/04/
ssor to Brown is Seen as
'aponline/national/
in Katrina Response," Wall
581706453200, 00. html;
:atrina Response and the
art Block et al., "Behind Poor
September 2005, Al, online.
p
ortrays FEMA to Panel as
1
5, A3; White House, The
D.C.: Office of the President,
Matthew Cooper, "Dipping
rid Alan C. Miller, "Why
Nww.latimes.com/news/
governor's Commission on
Than Ever (Jackson, Miss.:
fiber 31, 2005), hsgac.sen!d the Path from Hurricane
1/2005/09/11 /national/
,n to Pay for Katrina,"
O5/0930/p01s02-uspo.html;
s Preparedness, Response,
ment Accountability Office,
Ive: The Final Report of the
)onse to Hurricane Katrina
, katrina.house.gov/
and Governmental Affairs,
Iton, D.C.: U.S. Government
ecSum.pdf (all Web sites
Sector in Managing
(July 2006): 279-308; see
Crisis Situations (Armonk,
Plic
11 Schneider, Flirting with Disaster.
12 Public Law 81-875, U.S. Statutes at Large 64 (1950): 1109.
13 Disaster Relief Act of 1966, Public Law 89-769, U.S. Statutes at Large 80 (1966): 1316; Disaster
Relief Act of 1969, Public Law 91-79, U.S. Statutes at Large 83 (1969): 79; Disaster Relief Act of
1970, Public Law 91-606, U.S. Statutes at Large 84 (1970): 1744; Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Public
Law 93-288, U.S. Statutes at Large 88 (1974): 143; Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Public Law 106390, U.S. Statutes at Large 114 (2000): 1552.
14 Peter J. May, "Policy Learning and Failure," Journal of Public Policy 12, no. 4 (1992): 331-354.
15 Ibid., 341.
16 Thomas Birkland, Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2006).
17 Schneider, Flirting with Disaster.
18 National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), Coping with Catastrophe: Building an
Emergency Management System to Meet People's Needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters
(Washington, D.C.: NAPA, 1993); Schneider, Flirting with Disaster.
19 White House, Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina; NAPA, Coping with Catastrophe; Richard T.
Sylves, "Ferment at FEMA: Reforming Emergency Management," Public Administration Review 54,
no. 3 (1994): 303-307; U.S. House, Failure of Initiative; U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still
Unprepared.
20 Rutherford H. Platt, Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events (Washington,
D.C.: Island Press, 1999).
21 R. Steven Daniels and Carolyn L. Clark-Daniels, "Vulnerability Reduction and Political
Responsiveness: Explaining Executive Decisions in U.S. Disaster Policy During the Ford and Carter
Administrations," International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 20 (August 2002):
225-253; David A. McEntire et al., "A Comparison of Disaster Paradigms: The Search for a Holistic
Policy Guide," Public Administration Review 62, no. 3 (2002): 267-281; David A. McEntire, "Why
Vulnerability Matters: Exploring the Merit of an Inclusive Disaster Reduction Concept," Disaster
Prevention and Management 14, no. 2 (2005): 206-222; Dennis Mileti, Disaster by Design: A
Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press,
1999); Robert O. Schneider, "Hazard Mitigation and Sustainable Community Development,"
Disaster Prevention and Management 11, no. 2 (2002): 141-147; Peter R. J. Trim, "An Integrative
Approach to Disaster Management and Planning," Disaster Prevention and Management 13, no. 3
(2004): 218-225.
22 McEntire et al., "Comparison of Disaster Paradigms," 273.
23 Thomas Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Washington,
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997); Birkland, Lessons of Disaster, 1-30; Kapucu, "Building
248
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CURRENT PRACTICES AND
CONV
S
ERSATIONS
Community Capacity to Respond"; John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies,
2nd ed. (New York: Longman Classics, 2002); Schneider, Flirting with Disaster, 14-18.
24 Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory," World
Politics 16, no. 4 (1964): 677-715.
25 Amy K. Donahue and Philip G. Joyce, "A Framework for Analyzing Emergency Management with an
Application to Federal Budgeting," Public Administration Review 61, no. 6 (2001): 728-740.
26 National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Records of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/311.html
(accessed February 18, 2008).
27 NAPA, Coping with Catastrophe.
28 Schneider, Flirting with Disaster.
29 May, "Policy Learning and Failure"; Birkland, Lessons of Disaster.
30 David Alexander, "Towards the Development of a Standard in Emergency Planning," Disaster
Prevention and Management 14, no. 2 (2005): 158-175.
31 FEMA, "Declarations and Turndowns (Detail)," DARIS 1.2 Run, (Washington, D.C.: FEMA, July
7, 1999); FEMA, "Federal Emergency Management Agency: Designated Areas," DARIS 1.2 Run,
(Washington, D.C.: FEMA, December 27, 1999); FEMA, Declared Disasters by Year or State,
www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema (accessed April 3, 2008); FEMA, "Declarations
and Turndowns (Detail), Turndowns, Period of Action, 07/15/1999-12/31/2003," FOIA Request
(Washington, D.C.: FEMA, January 13, 2004); and FEMA, "Declarations and Turndowns (Detail),
Turndowns, Period of Action: 01/01/2004-12/31/2005," FOIA Request (Washington, D.C.: FEMA,
February 23, 2007).
32 Stu Eizenstat and Lynn Daft, Carter Presidential Records, White House Central Files, Subject Files:
Disasters, Box DI-1 1, Folder D12/ST 26 1/20/77-1/20/81 Executive, June 13, 1980. Recommended
Turndown for Major Disaster Assistance—Montana, Memorandum for the President, June 13, and
Attachments (handwritten comments), Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Ga.,
33 U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), "Department of Homeland Security," www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/homeland.html (accessed April 8, 2008).
34 Keith Bea et al., Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes after Hurricane Katrina: A
Summary of Statutory Provisions, RL33279 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service,
December 15, 2006), CRS-7, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33729.pdf (accessed April 8, 2008).
35 R. David Paulison, "Reforming FEMA: Are We Making Progress?" statement before the House
Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and
Response and Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight, February 28, 2007,
www.fema.gov/txt/about/paulison/testimony/02-28-07_testimony.txt (accessed April 3, 2008).
36 Eileen Sullivan, "FEMA Reform Prompts Major Departmentwide Restructuring,"CQ Homeland
Security, January 17, 2007, www.homelandsecuritynys.org/news/2007/femarestructure.html
(accessed April 8, 2008); FEMA, "Catastrophic Disaster Planning, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Fiscal Year 2007," PowerPoint Presentation, training.fema.gov/EMlweb/edu/docs/
Pawlowski%20-%20Catastrophic%2ODisaster%20Planning.ppt (accessed April 8, 2008).
37 OMB, "Department of Homeland Security."
38 White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned; Rabkin, Providing
Oversight; U.S. House, A Failure of Initiative; U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still
Unprepared.
39 McEntire et al. "Comparison of Disaster Paradigms."