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Volume 1, Issue 1 (2002) 145–170
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Ten truths of the Hungarian revolution of 1956
BÉLA K. KIRÁLY
Ministry of Defence, Budapest, Hungary
Almost half a century after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 there are still a lot of
controversial issues to be clarified. The aim of this study is to separate truth from its
opposite, utilizing research materials and personal experiences collected during and
after the events.
Introduction
Half a century has passed since 1956. That represents a considerable period of time
for researchers to clarify the fundamental issues of a commonplace occurrence. It might
not be enough, however, if the events are controversial.
1956 was not controversial in its goals, participants or events. It was purposefully
made controversial by the politics of both sides engaged in the Cold War, which peaked
at that particular point of time.
1956 attracted the attention of the whole world: politicians, scholars and the man in
the street; therefore the propaganda machinery of both the East and the West used it to
the fullest extent of the prevailing technical possibilities to propagate their policies. But
propaganda does not respect the truth.
Almost half a century later, it is time to separate truth from its opposite. It is the aim
of this study to do that, utilizing research materials and personal experiences collected
during and after the events.1
The ten truths
The first truth is that no rational Hungarian citizen wished to change the hated
situation by force. But the majority of thinking citizens wished to see fundamental
changes in the political, economic, social and cultural order imposed upon the
Hungarians by the occupation forces of the USSR and its local puppets. Hungarians
looked with conviction on the ideas and events of the Great Hungarian Reform Era (the
two decades after 1825), and on its fruit, the Revolution of 1848, as patterns to be
followed. There was another historic period in Hungary’s recent history looked upon as
another example of what was to be done: Imre Nagy’s first government of 1953–1955.
Received: May 31, 2002
Address for correspondence:
BÉLA K. KIRÁLY
Irisz utca 3, H–1165, Budapest, Hungary
E-mail:[email protected]
B. K. KIRÁLY: Ten truths of the hungarian revolution of 1956
1848 represented the realization of the ideas of the French Enlightenment; Imre Nagy’s
efforts gave communism a human face, called ‘reform communism.’ The former was
taken as the end goal, Imre Nagy’s program as an interim one.
In 1848 the goal was universal: the whole of Europe hoped for it. In 1956 the Imre
Nagy-type reforms were due only in Soviet-occupied East Central Europe. In both cases
the movement in Hungary started peacefully and was dragged into a bloody
confrontation by those who were determined not to let the change happen. In 1848–
1849 the enemy was the Habsburg and the Tsarist tyrants; in 1956 it was the Soviet
Union alone. In 1848 the counter-revolution commenced with the invasion of Hungary
by General -RVLS-HOODqL under the Habsburg flag; in 1956 it was started by the Sovietcontrolled secret police, which started shooting at the demonstrators who were trying to
enter the Budapest Radio Building to air their reform program. In this clash the
reformers were turned into revolutionary freedom fighters.
There were insinuations that the speedy expansion of the scope and intensity of the
armed conflict was proof that the events were pre-arranged, probably by foreign agents.
How else could the combat have intensified so fast?
But if anyone secured the weapons for the battle and the skill to use them, then it
was the Bolshevik system itself. The masters of Hungary misled the world and
themselves by believing and propagating the falsehoods that their system was the best
on earth, and that the Hungarian people would be ready and willing to protect it in the
event of hostile attack. They coined a slogan to spread this falsehood: “Our country is
not a gap but a bastion in the wall of communism.” Truly believing this, the Bolshevik
leaders trained the Hungarian youth in handling the ‘victorious Soviet arms’ to be able
to defend the system. Small arms were stored in police stations, party H.Q’s and many
other places easily attainable in time of trouble. The knowledge and the means to
respond to the secret police, to meet force with force, were thus at the reformers’
disposal.
The second truth is that the aims of the reformers were precisely defined and
proclaimed in the ‘l6 Point Program of the University Students.’2 This program was so
perfect that it became the bible of the revolution. Even this clear and perfect document
has been misrepresented and falsely criticized by foes of the revolution. What did the
program contain?
The overwhelming demand was national independence; to achieve that, the
withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forces was demanded. For domestic change, it was
demanded that democracy be established by general and equal voting rights for all, and
elections by secret ballot, and freedom of conscience, of the press, of speech, of
assembly and of association.
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For the elimination of the Bolshevik terror regime, the supervision of political and
economic trials was demanded, as were the rehabilitation of the innocent and the return
of those prisoners of war who had not yet been released by the USSR. The trial of the
two principal Bolshevik chiefs, Mátyás Rákosi and Mihály Farkas, was also demanded.
Further demands included the abolition of the Soviet-type state coat of arms and its
replacement with the ‘Kossuth coat of arms’ used in 1848–1849 and again in 1918 and
in 1945, along with the replacement of Soviet uniforms of the armed forces by
Hungarian ones. It was also demanded that March 15 – the anniversary of the
Revolution of l848 – once again become a national holiday.
To end colonial exploitation, the Soviet–Hungarian and Yugoslav–Hungarian
political, cultural and economic treaties were to be revised, international equality had to
be reestablished, and non-interference in Hungary’s domestic affairs was demanded.
A new government was to be formed with the participation of Imre Nagy and the
removal of the Stalinists.
What did the 16 Points Program not demand? This must be clarified, because here
were most of the falsifications committed.
The Program did not demand the abolition of the Workers’ (Communist) Party or
the banning of communism as an ideology. In other words, the Program was not ipso
facto anti-communist. After all, Imre Nagy, the popular leader, was and remained a
communist, and many other ‘reform communists’ played leading roles in the events.
But the Program demanded the re-election of the entire leadership of the Workers’
Party from top to bottom, by secret ballot, to answer the demands of democracy and to
make it fit into the new democratic political system.
The Program did not demand the abolition of socialism either. Instead, a number of
reforms were demanded, which would have made the socialist type of economy more
just, such as the supervision and correction of industrial plans, work norms and salaries,
the system of compulsory delivery of agricultural produce, the introduction of a
minimum wage system and support for the private farmers.
While they had the intention of reforming rather than abolishing communism and
socialism, the authors of the 16 Point Program did not profess a communist or socialist
orientation. There were two reasons why they handled these issues so delicately. Firstly,
there were many ‘reform communists’ among them, and there was no intention of
alienating them. Secondly, most of the reformers were true believers in democracy.
They thought that the general and equal voting rights and elections by secret ballot
would bring about a new democratic government representing the people’s will.
Whatever this was to decide about communism and socialism the reformers were ready
to accept.
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The 16 Point Program welcomed the simultaneous Polish reform activities.
Finally, MEFESZ, the Hungarian University and College Students’ Association of
the inter-war years, was resurrected to replace the Bolshevik-type compulsory and
totalitarian organization with a voluntary and self-governing one.
The third truth is that when the reform movement was forced by its foes to become a
revolution, it was victorious. In other words, calling 1956 a fiasco is distortion of the
truth. I stated that in 1957, when I held my first press conference in Washington DC. A
journalist asked me, without any hostile tone, “Sir, what is then the reason why you are
here?”
I explained that a revolution is a series of forceful actions in which the masses of
progressive ideas defeat and remove a system of government which is regressive in
political, social and economic terms, replacing them with one corresponding to their
own ideas.
This process was completed to the letter in 1956 in Hungary. On October 28, at
13.20, Kossuth Radio Budapest broadcast the following proclamation:
“13:20 Attention, attention! An important announcement follows.
In order to put an end to further bloodshed and to ensure a peaceful settlement, the
government of the Hungarian People’s Republic orders a general and immediate ceasefire. The government orders the armed forces to open fire only when attacked.
Imre Nagy, President of the Council of Ministers.”3
The cease-fire was proclaimed by the government for several reasons. Above all, the
armed forces were unable to defeat the freedom fighter forces. The youth, outraged by
the unnecessary application of force against their peaceful actions, formed resistance
groups all around Budapest, as well as gradually in the countryside also. These freedom
fighter units were extremely flexible.4 If necessary they fought to the finish; at other
times and places, when facing overwhelming enemy firepower, they simply disappeared,
and mingled with the men in the street, to reunite the following day in another place and
continue the combat. These tactics confused their enemy.
The army recruits, like their civilian age group, were eager to see the fall of the
Bolsheviks and the dawn of a more human society. Some of them left the rank-and-file
and either joined the freedom fighters or surrendered their arms and ammunition to them
and went home. The Peoples’ Army as a force could not be counted on by the foes of
change.
Above all other considerations, the principal cause of the cease-fire was Imre Nagy’s
character. At the beginning he thought that the armed forces would be able to reestablish
‘law and order.’ In that case he might have been ready to continue the limited reforms of
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his first government he himself called ‘the New Course’. In that case the changes would
have remained within the premises of ‘reform communism’. That is what basically
happened in Gomulka’s Poland.
But during the period of October 23–28, the ferocity of the fight and the
determination of the reformers not to give up were combined with the advice of Nagy’s
friends to lead the nation into democracy. Nagy, the honest individual, accepted the
view of the nation when he clearly understood what it was. The question was whether
the army leadership would comply or whether it would disregard Nagy’s order and
continue the slaughter. The army leadership cooperated. At 15:03 the same day Radio
Kossuth reported:
“The Ministers of Defense and the Interior… call attention to the order on the
cease-fire. It must be obeyed in a disciplined and responsible fashion. It must be carried
out… ”5
Imre Nagy then changed his H.Q. from the party’s central office to the Parliament
Building. There an avalanche of delegations visited him, reinforcing in Nagy the belief
that he was acting properly.
Even the official daily of the Workers’ Party, Szabad Nép, wrote the following in its
October 28 issue: “During these days Budapest was the scene not of an uprising of a
counter-revolutionary clique, was not an effort to restore the power of the bourgeoisie,
but of an immensely powerful, determined and just national democratic action.”
The victory of the revolution was demonstrated at the grassroots of society by the
creation of ‘councils’ at all level of society to take over the leadership of the citizens’
everyday life from the institutions of the Bolsheviks. Workers’ councils, school councils
and city councils spread as a movement already on that day. They became the
characteristic institutions of the victorious revolution. The victory was proclaimed by
Imre Nagy’s address to the nation, broadcast live at 17.25 by Radio Kossuth Budapest:
“People of Hungary,
Last week, bloody events followed one another with tragic speed. It is the fatal
consequences of the gruesome mistakes and sins of the past decade that are manifesting
themselves in the painful events of which we are eyewitnesses and participants.
During the millennium of Hungarian history, fate has not spared our people and
nation adversities, but has perhaps never inflicted on them a shock such as they are now
experiencing.
The government condemns the view according to which the present huge popular
movement is a counter-revolution… in the demonstrations a great national and
democratic movement has evolved with elementary force, uniting the whole nation.
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This movement aims at securing our national independence and sovereignty, and at
developing the democratic nature of our social, economic, and political life, the only
true bases of socialism in this country…
From the battles, there has emerged a government of democratic national unity,
independence, and socialism, one which will be a true embodiment of the people’s will.
This is the firm resolution of the government…
Our reviving people’s republic counts on the strength and self-sacrifice shown by
you in your creative activities; they are major guarantees of a better future in this
country.
The new government depends on the power and control of the people, hoping to
acquire their trust; the realization of the people’s rightful expectations will be started
instantly… ”6
The most important action of the victorious revolution was the removal of two
foundations of totalitarian rule. First came the abolition of the secret police, the
institution of terror, by a decree of the Minister of the Interior, Ferenc Münnich. Second
came the reform of the Workers’ (Communist) Party in order that it could take its place
in a democratic society.
The reform of the party started on the same day, by the appointment of a six-member
presidium chaired by János Kádár.
By November 1 the work was completed. Instead of reform, a new organization, the
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, was formed under János Kádár’s leadership. Kádár
on that day made a historic statement, broadcast live by Radio Kossuth Budapest at
21.40. He said the following:
“The glorious uprising of our people has shaken off the Rákosi regime, achieved
freedom for the people and independence for the country, without which socialism
cannot exist… The new party for all time to come will distance itself from the crimes of
the past. It will defend against everybody our nation’s honor and independence… ”
Kádár declared loyalty to all fundamental elements of freedom and democracy to
make the new party fit into the political milieu of the victorious revolution.7
The new government of Imre Nagy already included members of the rapidly
reviewed traditional democratic parties. The consolidation started. There were no
persons, parties or groups in Hungary who would have wished or would have dared to
challenge the authority of Imre Nagy or of the victorious revolution.
The revolution was a domestic affair. The Soviet aggression was an international
affair. The latter was so incomparably superior in force that Hungary could not resist it,
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but that does not invalidate the truth that the revolution as a domestic affair was
victorious. The American journalist at that news conference in 1957 understood the
explanation.
Alas, there are still persons who do not wish to accept the truth, and who speak
about the failed revolution.
The fourth truth is that the youth of Budapest, and partially of the countryside, were
those who achieved the victory of the revolution. It has already been clarified above
how the Bolsheviks themselves had trained them how to lead tactical units, to fight and
to handle small arms. The availability of weapons was also clarified. The similarity of
events of 1848 and 1956 remains to be clarified here.
The youth of 1956, just like the ‘Youth of March’ in 1848, were the heroes and the
victors. But in 1848 the youth had time to prepare, while in 1956 the youth had none. In
1848 the Habsburg tyrant could not afford to smash the victory of the Hungarian
revolution immediately after the progressive laws had been passed by the last feudal
diet. The contrary happened: the Emperor-king even ratified those laws in April. So the
1848 revolution could be called, as Professor István Deák of Columbia University has
called it, a ‘lawful revolution,’ which is a fundamental change achieved with no
violence. It was so because a major part of the Habsburg Army was tied down in
Lombardy fighting against the Italian risorgimento. The dynasty dared not wage a twofront war. Only on September 11 did they unleash -HOODqL against Hungary, since on
August 9 the armistice of Vigevano was concluded in Italy and thus troops could be
transferred to Hungary. The youth of 1948 had half a year to prepare. The reformers of
l956 were facing force on the very first day of their peaceful demonstrations.
The victory was achieved in 1956 by independently fighting small units at Széna
Square, Móricz Zsigmond Square, Corvin Cinema, Tompa Street and other strongholds.
What adds to the prestige of these freedom fighters is their wisdom in recognizing that
the victory of small units might not be enough to secure final victory and such power
that could secure the consolidation efforts of the Nagy government. That was the reason
why from the very start the local units demanded their amalgamation into a new armed
force, the National Guard, again taking 1848 as a shining example to be followed. They
also desired that a central high command should take over the task of organizing and
leading this new armed force.
The fifth truth is that until victory, October 28, that is, the freedom fighters were
commanded not by a high command but by an ideal. But as the fighting grew more and
more intense the need of unity was more and more forcefully acknowledged by the
freedom fighters themselves. Their representatives started to look for a solution. Soon
they recognized that Police Colonel Sándor Kopácsi had become a supporter of the
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freedom fighters. The news spread fast, and representatives of fighting groups sent
delegations to the Police H.Q at Deák Square. On October 28, the day of victory, many
fighting groups of Budapest, and even some from the countryside, were officially
represented at Deák Square Police H.Q. So complete was the representation of all
significant freedom fighter groups that it could be considered an official congress of the
freedom fighter forces.
On October 29, a delegation visited me at the Central Military Hospital at Robert
Károly avenue and presented an invitation from the presidency of the Deák Square
congress to join them. I was still not fully recovered from minor surgery, but I did not
turn down the invitation. With my daily visitor, Mrs. Márta Sárközi, the daughter of the
playwright Ferenc Molnár, we drove in a military jeep to Deák Square.
I was introduced to the congress, and at the initiative of one of the members was
elected chairman of the congress. I was convinced that the intention of those present to
establish a central leadership for the revolutionary forces was necessary. They
demanded that the freedom fighter units should be united into the new National Guard
and that all the armed forces should come under the supervision of a revolutionary
organization to direct and supervise the armed protection of the consolidation efforts of
the Nagy Government. To make this organ effective, it must originate in the initiative of
the freedom fighters and be recognized by the government.
I myself drafted a resolution, which should after endorsement by the congress be
shown to Prime Minister Imre Nagy for his endorsement. Only after acquiring both
endorsements should it be declared to the freedom fighters and the general public. In the
late afternoon of October 30, with a small delegation, I took the draft to Imre Nagy.
He received us instantly, with two of his inseparable companions, former President
of the Republic Zoltán Tildy, who was already a member of the cabinet, and Zoltán Vas,
the most human communist I have ever known. I presented the following draft for the
signature of the Prime Minister:
“In the name of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People’s Republic, I
hereby acknowledge and confirm the setting up of a preparatory committee charged with
forming a Revolutionary Committee of National Defense composed of delegates of units
fighting in the revolution, representatives of the army and police, and representatives of
workers and youth. The Revolutionary Committee of National Defense shall organize
the new armed forces, composed of units that participated in the revolutionary fighting,
of the army, of the police, and of workers and youth. Relying on their support, it will
restore peace in the country, and create conditions leading to the execution of the
government’s programs announced on October 28 and 30.
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The Revolutionary Committee of National Defense will remain active until the entry
into office of a new government, to be formed as a result of free general elections.
Budapest, October 30, 1956
Imre Nagy
President of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People’s Republic.”8
After this draft was read by all three statesmen, Zoltán Vas was the first to make
comments. He said that if that new organization were to bear in its name the term
‘National Defense,’ the intention would be interpreted as if our main concern were
defense against foreign attack. The Soviet Union might interpret that as a preparation
against them. But the most important mission of this new committee should not be
preparation for war but for the protection of domestic stability. Vas recommended
changing the words ‘National Defense’ [honvédelmi] to ‘Public Safety’ [karhatalmi].
We agreed with Mr. Vas; that is how in the final text bearing Imre Nagy’s signature the
term ‘Public Safety’ appeared.
The establishment of the Revolutionary Council for Public Safety thus originated in
the initiative of the freedom fighters and was endorsed by the head of government. On
October 31, a conference held in the Kilian Barracks gave publicity to these
developments.
The Committee received numerous reports from various parts of the country about
the formation of National Guard units. All of them voluntarily subordinated themselves
to the Committee. Similar reports about subordination were received from units at
Budapest. In the Council we concentrated on the Budapest units, since the fate of the
government and of the consolidation depended on how these goals were to succeed in
the capital city. In fact, the effort succeeded. Day by day the use of arms declined. The
night of November 1–2 was still; no shooting occurred. Without foreign interference,
the final victory of the revolution seemed secure.
After the meeting with the Prime Minister on October 30, the establishment of the
Supreme Command of the National Guard commenced within the Revolutionary
Council of Public Safety. I invited professors as well as students from the Zrínyi Miklós
Military Academy, of which I was the founding commander in 1950–1951. There were
still there officers whom I knew well. When my election on November 3, to be the
Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard, took place, the staff had already been
operational for days. The freedom fighter units formerly fighting independently from
each other now had a professional military leadership.
The sixth truth is that during the night of October 30–31 a massive Soviet invasion
of Hungary commenced. It was decided upon after the Chinese government changed its
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attitude to the events. Up to that time they had been raising objections against massive
Soviet retaliation against the Hungarians. But on October 30 they informed the Soviet
leadership that they no longer had any objection against any Soviet action in Hungary.
The Soviet war against Hungary in fact started during that fateful night of October
30–31. It was combined with the most vicious campaign of the Soviet diplomacy,
Ambassador Yuri Andropov in particular, to mislead the Hungarians about Soviet
intentions.
The first such action I myself was involved in occurred at noon on November 2.
Imre Nagy called me by phone:
“I have just received a verbal ultimatum from the Soviet ambassador. He claims that
the embassy is under siege by ‘hooligans’. In the event that the Hungarian government is
not in a position to guarantee the peaceful work of the embassy he [Andropov] will ask
for the protection of Soviet troops. Do you understand the problem?” concluded the
Prime Minister.
“Yes. I understand,” I replied. “Andropov is looking for an excuse to bring the
Soviet troops back to Budapest. I shall settle the problem.”
“When you are there please call me and inform me.”
As always when reestablishment of order – the main mission of the National Guard –
was necessary, I alerted the freedom fighters, who were in readiness at our H.Q. at Deák
Square, and combined them with army and police sub-units.
Since on November 2 the situation seemed more serious than in other cases, I also
alerted a tank sub-unit, ordering them to wait for me in the Róbert Károly Avenue
barracks. There the tanks were ready when I arrived. Jointly with the other sub-unit,
they followed me to Heroes’ Square.
I was prepared to put an end to the siege of the embassy, for the new government’s
reputation depended on how it could secure law and order. Furthermore, the protection
of foreign diplomats is a must for all civilized regimes.
I left the bulk of the troops at Heroes’ Square and proceeded with two escorts in a
car on Andrássy Street to the Bajza Street corner. Peeping into the block where the
Soviet embassy was located, I did not see any disorder. The block was almost empty.
I was admitted into the embassy with my interpreter.
Andropov received me with strange cordiality. He escorted me upstairs into his
study. Walking up the elegant curving stairs, the ambassador looked at me with
inquisitive eyes like an anaconda, and did not stop talking politely. It seemed that he
was measuring me up as a potential collaborator, like Kádár, who the previous day had
professed loyalty to the ideals of the revolution, and then flown to Moscow to betray the
same.
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Andropov explained that Imre Nagy had misunderstood him. He was not talking
about a siege but about the visit of some old ladies who were looking for a place to stay
because their lodging had been bombed and had become uninhabitable. Vicious lies, of
course.
Andropov suddenly stopped, looked in my eyes and said, “You know, General, the
Soviet Union is the best friend of the Hungarian people.”
I was not a diplomat to reply to this lie politely, nor was I in a charitable mood, so I
said, with no polite emphasis, “Yes Sir. I know that very well.”
Andropov must have understood that he was speaking to no potential collaborator.
No more word left his lips; he sped upstairs. Arriving in his study, he offered me a seat
and said, “Please call up the Prime Minister, by dialing No. 1 on this phone [the
government secret so-called ‘K’ telephone system had a branch in the ambassador’s
study], and ask him if he has received my letter recommending Soviet–Hungarian
negotiations at a ministerial level to meet as soon as possible to discuss the withdrawal
of Soviet troops from Hungary. Please ask what the Prime Minister’s reply is.”
“That I shall do with pleasure,” was my reply.
I reported to Imre Nagy the total absence of ‘hooligans’ and the non-existent siege,
and transmitted the ambassador’s inquiry. Imre Nagy said that the letter had arrived.
The Hungarian delegation was going to be ready and waiting for the Soviet counterparts
in the Parliament that afternoon. He instructed me to hurry to his office, since I was to
be a member of the Hungarian delegation.
Andropov escorted me to the gates of the Embassy, and still pretending good will we
took leave of each other.
Arriving at the Prime Minister’s office, the members of the delegation were already
assembled there. Nagy said: “We have decided not to include you in the delegation, for
two reasons. We wish to be as polite to the USSR delegation as possible, and your
inclusion, after being released from prison only a few weeks ago, might be considered
by them as an insult. That is the view of several members of the delegation, which I
respect. Secondly, and more importantly, while the delegation is engaged in negotiation
I wish you to be at my disposal to give advice whenever I need it.”
Returning to the H.Q. at Deák Square, the head of intelligence reported the details of
the massive Soviet troop deployments around the country. We routinely reported it to
the Prime Minister’s office. The Soviet reply at all times was that the troop movements
were previously ordered, and only after their completion could the withdrawal start.
Another vicious lie, of course.
The seventh truth is that the proclamation of neutrality of Hungary was a
consequence rather than the cause of the Soviet aggression, in contrast to what was
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propagated then and what some think even today. The misunderstanding originates in
the fact that the declaration of neutrality occurred on November 1, and the fighting stage
of the war against Hungary started only on November 4. Logically minded persons,
even friends of Hungary who were not privy to all the facts, might draw the conclusion
that the Hungarians were hot-headed with their neutrality. How could the Soviet Union,
one of the two superpowers, tolerate such a provocative act from one of its allies?
Partly due to our H.Q.’s continuous reports, the Prime Minister was fully aware of
the details of the massive invasion of Soviet troops from the night of October 30–31. He
launched protest after protest to the Soviet Embassy and to the Kremlin via the
Hungarian Embassy in Moscow. The replies were the obvious lies already quoted
above. Thereupon the Hungarian government sent urgent reports to the SecretaryGeneral of the UN and to the permanent members of the Security Council of the UN.
Only when from nowhere did the Prime Mister receive any reply did he proclaim
neutrality and the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. It was thought that if Hungary
were still to be a member of the Warsaw Pact when the offensive started then the world
might look at it as a family row; however, if the USSR were to attack a neutral country
then it might be considered the aggression it really was, and then Hungary might receive
help. It was like a drowning man clutching at straws.
That, however, is only an interpretation. There are hard facts on the proclamation
having been an effect, not the cause, of the aggression. The proof of that resides in the
behavior of the Soviet government. Following the Chinese statement on their lack of
objection, the Soviet leaders, headed by Nikita Khrushchev, hurried to Brest, Poland,9
where the Polish Communist Party leaders, including W. Gomulka, were on October 31
informed about the start of Soviet military action, The Poles did not express support for
the action, but the Soviet leaders did not ask for it. Their intention was only to give the
information to the Poles. On the following day the Soviet leaders were in Bucharest,
where the Romanian, Czechoslovak and Bulgarian leaders were informed about what
was in the making. Bulgaria did not express support; however, the Romanian and
Czechoslovak leaders asked for permission to participate in the suppression of the
revolution, but did not receive permission to do so. On November 2, a day after the
declaration of neutrality, the Soviet delegation was on the island of Brioni – Josip Broz
Tito’s summer resort – where Tito, like the Chinese, declared no objection. Tito’s
advice, however, was heeded, and the intention to make Münnich – the arch-Muscovite,
and a Jew – President of the Ministerial Council was dropped, and there and then was
the decision made on Kádár’s promotion to chief Soviet agent in Hungary.
The truth, then, is that the declaration of neutrality was an effect, not the cause, of
the Soviet aggression. The rush visits of the Soviet leaders around their empire added
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but one additional shame to the atrocious aggression: the Romanians and the
Czechoslovaks fully supported the aggression and only because their request was denied
were they not partners in the killing of Hungarians.
The eighth truth is that regarding its aims and size of forces applied during the
Soviet aggression it was a war, and that this was the first war between socialist states.
It was a war since war means application of massive forces against one state or a
group of states against another state or a group of states, systematically conducted in
order to destroy the will or the means of the opponent too resist. When this latter point
is reached, the attacker imposes its political, economic, ideological or any other goals
upon the opponent.
The Soviet invading forces contained 16 division-size higher land army units and a
tactical air force consisting mostly of fighter bombers. 2,000 tanks were included in this
force, exactly as many as were at Hitler’s disposal in 1940 when he defeated France and
forced the British expeditionary force to evacuate the continent. This was a massive
force. Its systematic application against Hungary to suppress its political system and
impose its own puppet regime upon Hungary satisfies this definition of what war
means.10
It was the first war between socialist states. The USSR, the aggressor, was accepted
by the world as a socialist state, albeit a totalitarian one. The Hungarian victorious
revolution – as was explained in the paragraphs dealing with the ‘second truth’ – did not
wish to abolish socialism; they wanted only to reform it. Thus the government and
society of Hungary fell into the category of systems known as democratic socialist states
and societies. The Soviet Union had wished to wage the first war against a socialist
country – Tito’s Yugoslavia – in the early 1950s, but the war with Yugoslavia was
aborted due to contemporary world events. Thus the dubious and ominous privilege of
being the first war between socialist states belongs to the Soviet aggression against
Hungary in 1956.
Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), the late distinguished scholar of sociology, came to
the following conclusion in this regard:
“The most representative organization with which the Hungarians reorganized their
government and society in 1956 were the ‘councils’ (tanácsok). Every institute where
men lived or worked created their own ‘councils.’ There were ‘Workers Councils,’ ‘City
Councils,’ ‘University Councils’ and so on.” The word ‘council’ is Soviet in Russian.
Thus Arendt concluded that “when Soviet-Russian tanks crushed the revolution in
Hungary, they actually destroyed the only free and acting soviets in existence anywhere
in the world. [As in Germany in 1919] it was not the ‘reaction’ but the Social democrats
who liquidated the Soldiers’ and Workers Councils.”11
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B. K. KIRÁLY: Ten truths of the hungarian revolution of 1956
Ignatio Silone (the pseudonym of Secondo Tranqilli (1900–1976) novelist and
antifascist politician claimed the same in the 21 January, 1957, issue of The New
Leader.
The ninth truth is the Free World’s positive response to what happened in Hungary.
The Western thinkers understood the truths of the Revolution of 1956, and likewise the
UN General Assembly’s Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary in its Report of
September 1957 clearly stated these truths. In the West the street also responded
positively.
Major demonstrations were organized all over the West against the Soviet
aggression. The palace of the French Communist Party at Paris was put to flames. Many
intellectuals quit their membership in the Communist Parties of Europe. The most
effective protest, causing the greatest harm to the Soviet Union’s reputation, was made
by the publications of mostly left-wing intellectuals.
Albert Camus (1913-1960), the existentialist writer, wrote the following: “Hungarian
blood has proved to be so valuable to Europe and to freedom that we must try to spare
every drop of it… The Hungarian workers and intellectuals, beside whom we stand
today with so much impotent grief… their suffering is ours, their hope belongs to us too.
Despite their destitution, their exile, their chains, it took them but a single day to
transmit to us the royal legacy of liberty. May we be worthy of it!”12
He defined the post-1956 Kádár regime thus: “The Hungarian Minister of State
Marosan… declared a few days ago that there would not be further counter-revolution
in Hungary. For once, one of Kádár’s ministers has told the truth. How could there be a
counter-revolution since it has seized power?… I hope that the Hungarian resistance
will continue until the counter-revolutionary state collapses everywhere in the East
under the weight of its lies and its contradictions.”13
Raymond Claude Ferdinand Aron (1905-1983), the eminent philosopher and social
scientist, pointed out the complexity of the nature of those events: “No event has moved
the conscience of the free world as deeply as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. No
other event has assumed such equivocal political significance in the space of ten years.
This historic moment can best be characterized by the psychoanalytical formula of overdetermination, the plurality of meanings inherent in a single act, a single thought…
No one has the right to incite a people to greatness when it costs so many sacrifices
and ends in martyrdom. But when, in a sort of heroic madness, a people chooses a
destiny of greatness, when it sacrifices itself to bear witness, it is the duty of the analyst
to realize the limits of the interpretation to which he has restricted himself.
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The Hungarian revolution, a historic tragedy, a triumph in defeat, will forever
remain one of those rare events that restore man’s faith in himself and remind him,
beyond his proper lot, of the meaning of his destiny: truth.”14
Milovan Djilas (1911-1995), the second man in Tito’s Yugoslavia, who recognized
the fallacy of Bolshevism and turned into a democratic reformer, a poet, writer and
statesman, wrote the following: “The Revolution in Hungary means the beginning of the
end of Communism… The world has rarely witnessed such an unprecedented unity of
the popular masses and such heroism. The unity of the popular masses was so strong
that it appeared as though there had been no civil strife, as though a ruling class had not
been wiped out overnight as if it never existed. And the heroic intoxication was so high
that barehanded boys and girls were stopping the tanks of the interventionists who, like
the Cossacks of Nicholas I. in 1848 [it was in 1849: the editor] tried to suppress their
liberty and enslave their country… The Hungarian revolution blazed a path which
sooner or later other Communist countries must follow. The wound which the
Hungarian Revolution inflicted on Communism can never be completely healed. All its
evils and weaknesses, both as Soviet imperialism and a definite system of suppression,
had collected on the body of Hungary, and there, like festering sores, were cut out by
the hands of the Hungarian people.”15
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) the leftist philosopher and novelist, understood that
unity of Hungarians opposing the Soviets also. He wrote the following: “… The Soviet
newspapers claim that the Red Army intervened against the insurgents, alongside the
[Hungarian] workers. The workers throw a humiliating denial at them: their strike and
the maintenance of their demands prove that they were and they remain with the
insurgents and against the Red Army… ”16
Besides the statements of the intellectuals of the Free World, as well as the street
demonstrations protesting against the Soviet aggression, the greatest and the longestlasting harm to the image of the Soviet Union was done by the resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly, which kept alive the awareness of Soviet aggression
committed in 1956.
Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy sent calls for help to the UN Secretariat as
soon as the massive invasion commencing during the night of October 30–31 became
known. He did not receive any reply. But on November 4, when the shooting phase of
the Soviet aggression commenced, and the Security Council action was prevented by
Soviet veto, the General Assembly of the UN, having been in session to discuss the Suez
crisis, began to discuss the Soviet aggression against Hungary instead.
The General Assembly passed a resolution, listing precisely Imre Nagy’s requests,
and inter alia stated the following:
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B. K. KIRÁLY: Ten truths of the hungarian revolution of 1956
“… Convinced that recent events in Hungary manifest clearly the desire of the
Hungarian people to exercise and enjoy fully their fundamental rights, freedom and
independence,
Condemning the use of Soviet military force to suppress the efforts of the Hungarian
people to reassert their rights
Noting moreover the declaration of 30 October 1956 by the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of its avowed policy of non-intervention in the
internal affairs of other States,
Noting the communication of 1 November 1956 (A/3251) of the Government of
Hungary to the Secretary-General regarding demands made by the Government to the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the instant immediate
withdrawal of Soviet forces
Noting further the communication of 2 November 1956 (S/3726) from the
Government of Hungary to the Secretary-General asking the Security Council to instruct
the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of Hungary to
start the negotiations immediately on withdrawal of Soviet forces,
Noting that the intervention of the Soviet military forces in Hungary has resulted in
grave loss of life and widespread bloodshed among the Hungarian people,
Taking note of the radio appeal of Prime Minister Imre Nagy of 4 November
1956… the General Assembly resolved that
1. The Soviet Union should desist from further attacks and intervention in Hungary’s
domestic affairs;
2. The Soviet Union should not send more troops but rather start the immediate
withdrawal of all her troops from Hungary;
that the General Assembly
3. Affirmed Hungary’s right to be free and independent;
4. Requested the Secretary-General to investigate the situation directly or by his
representatives urgently and report to the General Assembly and suggest how to end the
intervention in Hungary in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the UN;
5. Called upon the Hungarian and the Soviet Governments to allow observers to
enter and freely observe the situation and to report on the results of their observation to
the Secretary-General;
6. Called upon the members of the UN to help the Secretary-General to fulfil these
duties;
7. Requested the Secretary-General to arrange humanitarian aid for the Hungarian
people;
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8. Requested the members of the UN and international organizations to help the
effort of giving humanitarian aid to the Hungarians.
564th Plenary Meeting 4. November 1956.”17
Since the Soviet Union and the Kádár government imposed by it on Hungary
disregarded the resolution, the General Assembly discussed the issue once again on
November 9, and declared “… the foreign intervention in Hungary is an intolerable
attempt to deny to the Hungarian people the exercise and the enjoyment of… freedom
and independence, and in particular to deny the Hungarian people the right to a
government freely elected and representing their national aspirations… ” 18
It stated that the Soviet action constituted a violation of the Charter of the UN and
the Peace Treaty between Hungary and the Allied and Associated Powers, and it insisted
that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary was necessary.
The resolution called upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces without delay, to
hold general elections in Hungary as soon as law and order were restored, and urged the
Secretary-General to continue his investigation and present a report to the General
Assembly.19
Since once again the Soviet Union and the Kádár regime disregarded the UN
General Assembly’s resolution on January 10, 1957, the General Assembly resolved to
set up a Five Nation Special Committee on Hungary in order to collect the most complete
and the possible best information on the situation caused by the Soviet Union by interfering
in the internal affairs of Hungary by their armed forces and by other means.20
This Special Committee became known as the Committee of Five. Its members were
delegated by small nations of the five continents: Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia
and Uruguay. Alsing Andersen was made the Chairman of the Special Committee. Its
first session was held on January 17, 1957.
The Special Committee heard 111 witnesses; only such Hungarians were heard who
were participants of the revolution. The hearings were held in New York, Geneva,
Rome, Vienna and London. The first three witnesses were Anna Kéthly, a member of
Imre Nagy’s cabinet, General Béla K. Király, the Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian
1DWLRQDO *XDUG DQG -y]VHI .YiJy 0D\RU RI %XGDSHVW 7KH\ ZHUH KHDUG LQ RSHQ
sessions. All the other witnesses were heard in closed sessions, their names kept secret
to protect their relatives in Hungary against retaliation by the Bolsheviks. The
Committee held its last meeting on June 7, 1957. Thereafter the Report was finalized
and published. That is the most precise, complete and reliable account of the events ever
drafted. A few sentences quoted from its conclusions might reflect that judgement.
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B. K. KIRÁLY: Ten truths of the hungarian revolution of 1956
Whoever is seriously interested in the truths of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956
should consult it. In its Chapter XVII Conclusions, it read thus:
“To the best of the Committee’s belief, these conclusions represent the essential
facts about the Hungarian uprising which are necessary to an understanding of its nature
and outcome. They are as follows:
What took place in Hungary in October and November 1956 was a spontaneous
national uprising, due to long-standing grievances which had caused resentment among
the people. One of these grievances was the inferior status of Hungary with regard to the
USSR; the system of government was in part maintained by the weapon of terror,
wielded by the ÁVH or political police, whose influence was exercised at least until the
end of 1955, through a complex network of agents and informers permeating the whole
of Hungarian society. In other respects also, Soviet pressure was resented. From the
stifling of free speech to the adoption of a Soviet-style uniform for the Hungarian army,
an alien influence existed in all walks of life. Hungarians felt no personal animosity
towards the individual Soviet soldiers on Hungarian soil, but these armed forces were
symbols of something which annoyed a proud people and fed the desire to be free.”21
The report further exposed the following findings:
• Neither reactionary nor ‘Western Imperialist’ influence could be proven;
• The revolutionaries were students, workers, soldiers and intellectuals, many of them
former communists;
• Many reform propositions advocated the protection of the land reform and a socialdemocratic society;
• No fascist kind of changes were proposed;
• The uprising was not planned; it was a spontaneous movement;
• 7KH LPPHGLDWH FDXVHV RI WKH VWDUW RI WKH PRYHPHQW ZHUH WKH QHZV RQ October
DERXWWKHVXFFHVVRIWKH3ROLVKUHIRUPHUVDQGWKHULJLGLW\RIWKH6WDOLQLVW(UQ *HU
towards the reformers;
• There were no preparations for an uprising;
• Due to the Polish events, the Soviet occupation forces made preparations against
the Hungarians as early as 20 October;
• The Warsaw Pact gave no power to the USSR to use its troops in a domestic crisis;
• The student demonstrations on 23 October were peaceful. No evidence could be
found that anyone had tried to apply force for change;
• The secret police fire at the Budapest radio station was the immediate cause of
counter-action by force;
• It was not Imre Nagy who asked for Soviet armed help;
• ‘Councils’ were the characteristic institutions of the revolution;
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B. K. KIRÁLY: Ten truths of the hungarian revolution of 1956
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Imre Nagy was a loyal communist, who, recognizing the people’s wish, joined them
in accepting a multi-party system and the withdrawal of Soviet troops;
During the days after 28 October all prerequisites of freedom prevailed in Hungary.
The people were united;
The lynchings were restricted to members of the AVH;
Socialism was not attacked; its disadvantages were to be corrected only;
The freedom fighters were voluntarily united into the National Guard;
The liberties of citizens were suppressed prior to the uprising and again from 4
November onwards;
There were deportations to the USSR;
The uprising was revolutionary, the Kádár regime counter-revolutionary;
No evidence was found which would have proved any popular support for the
Kádár regime;
Kádár’s reign started with lawless terror.
Finally the Committee’s report concluded that “Investigation of the Soviet
aggression by the UN was legally proper.” It was even requested by the legal
government of Imre Nagy. Hungary was obliged to protect human rights by the Treaty
of Peace. Otherwise “A massive armed intervention by one Power on the territory of
another, with the avowed intention of interfering with the internal affairs of the country,
must, by the Soviets’ own definition of aggression, be a matter of international
concern.”22
In contrast to the correct understanding of the revolution by Western thinkers and
the UN Special Committee the Kremlin never sided with the truth, never apologized
properly. The nearest to an apology was expressed by Boris Yeltsin, the President of
Russia. He visited Hungary, bringing with him precious documents on the revolution
selected from the archives of the Soviet Union. They were published in Hungarian.23 He
also delivered a speech in the Hungarian Parliament on November 11 1992.
President Boris Yeltsin said the following:
“I feel it a privilege to speak in the Hungarian Parliament in this hall of exceptional
beauty… This is the first time in the history of our countries that a president of a free
and democratic Russia can address the Parliament of a free and democratic Hungary.
Let me convey the best wishes of the Russian people and express their sincere effort to
live in perfect harmony and friendship with the Hungarian people. The people in Russia
have always been sincerely and deeply interested in the life and culture of your country.
There were active political and economic relations between Russia and Hungary even in
the earliest period of their statehood. The most outstanding event in the history of
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Russian–Hungarian relations was the treaty of friendship concluded by Tsar Peter the
Great and Ferenc Rákóczi II in 1707. Unfortunately, as often happens in history,
glorious periods were followed by gloomier ones. We are aware that the people of
Hungary cherish with respect the memory of the revolution of 1848–1849, and
remember the sad role of Tsarist Russia in changing its fate. Hardly more than a
hundred years later something similar happened. I am speaking of the tragedy of 1956,
which will remain an indelible shame of the Soviet regime for good. The trace of the
caterpillar-belts of the tanks in the streets of Budapest, in this beautiful city I have now
had the opportunity to see, will always be there in the souls of those who cherish the
ideals of freedom and democracy. I am convinced that these people form the majority
today both in Hungary and in Russia…
It is painful to acknowledge that Russian soldiers were involved in the tragic events
on order of the then leaders of the Kremlin. All this happened ten years after they had
liberated Hungary from the brown plague of Nazism, at the price of great sacrifices. One
type of ideology and violence was replaced by another. I find it symbolic that the
Hungarian people were the first to rise against oppression. The national uprising was not
a futile attempt. It revealed that not only individuals but whole nations realized that
without getting rid of communist dictatorship they had no hope for a future.
I proclaim with full responsibility before this responsible body that communism in
Russia is over once and for all, and there is no returning to it.”24
The tenth truth is a double-edged one: the Kádár government became the bloodiest
terror regime in modern Hungarian history. But a nation with the heritage of 1956 could
not be controlled by terror alone. Kádár therefore had to turn the country into the most
contented ‘jolly barracks’ of the Soviet Empire, to be able to control it. The regime
lasted for 33 years, the longest tenure of any Hungarian government since World War I.
The terror phase lasted between 1956 and 1963. The response to it was the
suspension of Kádár’s delegation mandate in the UN. The regime became the pariah of
humanity. ‘The jolly barracks’ or ‘Goulash Communism’ phase was the period from
1963 to 1989. It meant ‘soft’ dictatorship, and high living standards for the population.
Even a degree of tolerance for the dissidents existed. Kádár launched the slogan “Who
is not against us is with us.”
The reign of terror was unprecedented in twentieth-century Europe outside the
Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. On December 11 martial law was proclaimed, in
February 1957 the ‘Workers’ Militia,’ the instrument of terror, was established.
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Hungary’s losses caused by the Soviet forces and/or Kádár’s terror organizations
were as follows:25
Combat casualties between October 23 and December 31:
Wounded in Budapest: 16,700;
Wounded in the countryside: 2,526;
Total: 19,226.
Wounded according to their age groups:
under 14 years of age: 5.1 percent;
between 15 and 18: 17.4 percent;
between 19 and 24: 26.4 percent;
between 25 and 30: 20.7 percent;
between 31 and 50: 22.6 percent;
over 51: 7.8 percent.
Violent deaths between October 23 and January 16, 1957: 2,652 persons.
These figures are taken from the records of official registries and cemeteries. The
victims of secret police firing squads were often registered as death due to natural
causes; thus the true figures were higher than those given above.
Court sentences between November 4 1856 and April 1 1958:
total sentenced: 14,378;
executed: 229.
The executed persons by their age groups:
between 15 and 24 years of age: 31.8 percent;
between 25 and 34: 42.8 percent;
between 35 and 44: 16.5 percent;
between 45 and 55: 5.7 percent;
over 55: 2.2 percent.
193,885 persons became refugees in the West.
Some conclusions of the statistics of terror:
• The number of victims was in the extreme.
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• The majority of the victims were under the age of 30 (in the case of the wounded,
89.6 percent, and in the case of those executed under 35, 74.6 percent). That proves the
truth of the claim that the revolution was the action of the enraged youth.
• Youth under the age of 14 were sentenced. This was the violation of the minimal
degree of civilized jurisdiction. There were persons below the age of 18 condemned to
death. The degree of the regime’s brutality was demonstrated by the case of Péter
Mansfeld, a boy of 15 years, who was condemned to death and executed when he
reached his eighteenth birthday.
The UN Special Committee’s Report stated: “Prior to the uprising and since
November 4 1956 the rights of individuals have been violated. The Kádár regime does
not enjoy the support of the people,” the report concluded.26
Despite the terror, mass demonstrations occurred. A nationwide strike commenced
on November 23, a month after the start of the revolution. Budapest protested by
stillness; none entered the streets. On December 4, a month after the second aggression,
the women of Budapest held mass demonstrations dressed in black.
In the meantime – something which the public did not know then – the Soviet
offered safe conduct for Imre Nagy and friends if they would return to their homes from
the Yugoslav Embassy. A block away from the Embassy, the bus that carried them was
halted by Soviet tanks, and the group was kidnapped and taken to Romania.
In 1962, for reasons too complex to expound here, the USA government conducted a
secret deal with the Kádár regime. The Hungarian delegation was received by the UN
General Assembly fall session in 1962. In return, the regime granted amnesty for
incarcerated freedom fighters. But even that deal was violated by Kádár. Many victims,
mostly those who were arrested while armed, were sentenced as common criminals; they
were not released in 1963.
The period of 1963–1989 was called ‘Goulash Communism.’ The essence of this
term was the increase of standards of living much above what Hungary’s economy
warranted. The deficit was paid for by immense foreign loans. These loans have been
paid back by the post-1990 democratic governments, causing great hardships to the
taxpayers even today (in 2002). The Kádár era population ate up the future of coming
generations.
The political essence of this trickery was Kádár’s ability to secure the stability of
society by purchasing the loyalty of the illiterate and the silence of the literate dissidents
by means of high standards of living. That is why he could afford to soften his
dictatorship. At the same time, the Romanian, Czechoslovak and Bulgarian communist
regimes still secured their countries’ social stability by hard dictatorship.
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Kádár placated old Bolsheviks by reestablishment of the five year plans, in other
words, a centralized Soviet-type economy in industrial production. By 1961 agriculture
was collectivized, a change even Rákosi did not try to effect. The ‘autonomous’ peasant
was wiped out, private property virtually abolished. There was one beneficial effect of
this change, in the form of the new agrarian revolution: the mechanization of agriculture.
The 8th Party Congress of 20-24 November 1962 declared that “laying the
foundation of Socialism was completed… ”
The social stability misled the free world. The regime was admitted into
organizations all other Soviet captive nations desired to enter in vain. The regime
became a member of GATT in 1973, and of the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund. Signs of Western recognition multiplied. In 1963, half a year after the UN deal,
U. Thant, Secretary-General of the UN, visited Kádár. On September 28, 1971, a
bilateral treaty was completed with the Holy See, putting in order both the Vatican–
Hungarian relationship as well as that between the state and church within Hungary.
Also in 1971 Hungary signed the Helsinki Accord. Relations were normalized with
Austria, Finland and West Germany. The USA granted ‘most favored nation’ status for
Hungary in exchange for Kádár’s recognition of Hungary’s obligation to pay war
reparations to the USA. Prominent statesmen visited and or received Kádár, a high
gesture of appreciation. Among the visitors were: Indira Ghandi and Josip Tito (1974),
Chancellor Bruno Kreisky (1976), Margaret Thatcher, Richard Nixon, Francois
Mitterand, George Bush, Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl. Among the leaders of the
Soviet captive countries, Kádár was the first to have an audience with Pope Paul VI, in
1977. He was received by heads of states and governments of France, Italy, the United
Kingdom and West Germany.
The Kádár regime’s most significant success in international relations was probably
the return of the crown of St. Stephen, Hungary’s first king (1001–1038) by the USA on
January 6, 1978. Kádár had ceased to be the pariah of humanity.
All the Western recognition notwithstanding, the domestic situation political and
economic gradually deteriorated. A serious economic crisis commenced; its main cause
was one of the foundations of ‘Goulash Communism’: the principle of no
unemployment. This created masses of non-productive hands on the payroll. This was
bad enough, but in early 1989 14,000 unemployed were already registered, and the
number was growing fast towards becoming a six-figure total.
The system of emphasis on quantity was that quality was totally neglected. That was
tolerated by the Soviet system, but not accepted by Western markets. The decline of the
Soviet market and of cheap Soviet raw materials, and above all the neglect of
modernization of the infrastructure, were all causes of the coming crisis.
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In 1968 the ‘New Economic Mechanism’ was introduced, with the intention of
giving greater leeway to local initiative and the introduction of elements of free market.
Both in industry and agriculture a second economy developed, producing incomparably
more and better goods than the ‘official’ socialist sector did. Western-type banking
systems also flourished. This all received vitriolic attacks from old Bolsheviks in the
party leadership, who wanted no deviation from the Soviet socialist patterns. So the
economic crisis grew into a political one, causing a split in the leadership. On the right
of the party leadership reform communists became active. In the absence of Soviet
direction, the solution of the domestic quarrels of all the Soviet captive nations became
their own problem. A policy of hard dictatorship was out of the question in Hungary.
Democratic movements started, and dissident publications and groups multiplied.
The party leadership was aware of the danger posed by the growing economic crisis
since Kádár was not ready to accept fundamental changes. In June 1988, Károly Grosz
replaced him as Prime Minister; in May Kádár was elected party chairman, a ceremonial
position. But those communists who were aware that fundamental changes could not be
DYRLGHG IHOW .iGiU WR EH D EXUGHQ RQ 0D\ 5H]V 1\HUV UHSODFHG .iGiU DV
chairman of the party.
On June 16, 1989, on the anniversary of his execution, Imre Nagy and his associates
were re-buried. The funeral ceremony commenced at Budapest Heroes’ Square, where
the coffins were displayed. Along the road to the cemetery hundreds of thousands of
Hungarians lined up in a silent demonstration demanding fundamental change. As one
of the speakers at the funeral rites, I was sitting in one of the buses following the
cortege. Looking out of the window I saw the bright eyes of youth and adults waving us
their greetings. The scene was almost sacrilegious, since after all it was a funeral rather
than a celebration. I felt it was 1956 once again: the Hungarian people were united in
condemning the evil past and aspiring for a better future.
On July 16, 1989, the courts rehabilitated Imre Nagy. All these events had intensive
media coverage, and thus Kádár had to witness the glorification of his mortal foe.
Within twenty-four hours he was dead. The Kádár regime was gone, as was the one who
gave it its name; this paramount opportunist was gone amidst the contempt of the
masses, whose adulation he so much desired. It was a drama the like of which probably
even the genius of Shakespeare could not fathom. With the almost simultaneous burials
of Imre Nagy and János Kádár, the main events and the immediate aftermath of the
revolution might be considered closed.
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(1956-1999) [The Ideas of the Hungarian Revolution. Their Suppression and Victory (1956-1999)]
Budapest: ARP Atlanti Kutató és Kiadó Tárasulat-Alapítvány, 200l. Also see appendix 1 in this volume.
A forradalom hangja. Magyarországi rádióadások 1956. október 23-november 9 [The Voice of the
Revolution. Radio Broadcasts in Hungary 1956 October 23-November 9], Budapest: Századvég Kiadó–
Nyilvánosság Klub. 1989, p.126. Also see appendix 2 in this volume.
Az 1956-os magyar forradalom. Reform–felkelés–szabadságharc–megtorlás [The Hungarian
Revolution of 1956. Reform-Uprising-Freedom-Fight-Retaliation] Budapest:Tankönyvkiadó, 1991;
ISTVÁN LÉVAI, Széna tér 1956 [Hay Square] Szeged: Dél-Magyarország Kft.1999;
LÁSZLÓ EÖRSI, A corvinisták, 1956. A VIII. kerület fegyveres csoportjai [The Fighters of Corvin
Cinema: the Armed Groups of the VIIIth district (of Budapest)] Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 200l.
Ibid., p. 129.
Ibid., pp. 131–132.
Ibid., pp. 370–371.
Ibid., p. 245.
MIKLÓS MOLNÁR, Egy vereség diadala. A forradalom története [The Triumph of a Defeat. A History of
the Revolution] Budapest:Educatio–Atlantic Research and Publications, 1991, pp. 217–222.
J(1 GYÖRKEI, MIKLÓS HORVÁTH, with a study by ALEXANDR M. KIROV and memoirs of JEVGENY I.
MALASHENKO, Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary. 1956, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999;
BÉLA K. KIRÁLY, BARBARA LOTZE, NÁNDOR DREISZIGER (Eds), The First War between Socialist
States. The Hungarian Revolution of l956 and Its Impact, Highland Lakes NJ. ARP. Distributed by
Columbia University Press.
HANNAH ARENDT, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Cleveland, Ohio: World, 1958, p. 480.
ALBERT CAMUS, “Kádár Had his Day of Fear,” in Resistance, Rebellion, and Death, translated by
JUSTIN O’BRIEN (New York, 1974), pp. 157–164. Quoted in BÉLA K. KIRÁLY, BARBARA LOTZE,
SÁNDOR F. DREISZIGER (Eds), The First War between Socialist States: The Hungarian Revolution of
l956 and Its Impact, pp. 79–80.
Ibid.
RAYMOND CLAUDE FERDINAND ARON, “The Meaning of Destiny,” In: TAMÁS ACZÉL (Ed.), Ten Years
After: The Hungarian Revolution in the Perspective of History, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1966), pp. 19 ff.
MELVIN J. LASKY (Ed.), The Hungarian Revolution. A White Book, New York: Praeger, 1957, p. 270.
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, The Ghost of Stalin, translated by MARTHA H. FLETCHER, JOHN R. KLEINSCHMIDT,
New York: George Braziller, 1968, p. 41.
Paragraph 291 of The United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary
(General Assembly Official Records 11th Session Supplement No. 18/A 3582) (New York, 1957). (UN
Special Committee Report below.)
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169
B. K. KIRÁLY: Ten truths of the hungarian revolution of 1956
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
UN Special Committee Report 571st Plenary Meeting 9 November 1956.
Ibid.
UN Special Committee Report Eleventh Session Supplement Bo.18 (A/33592) (New York: 1957), p. 4.
Ibid., appendix 13.
UN Special Committee Report, pp. 137-139.
A “Jelcin-dosszié” Szovjet dokumentumok 1956-ról [Yeltsin Files, Soviet Documents about 1956]
Budapest: Századvég Kiadó-56-os Intézet, 1993.
24. BÉLA K. KIRÁLY, LEE W. CONGDON (GV $ PDJ\DU IRUUDGDORP HV]PpL (OWLSUiVXN pV J\]HOPN
(1956–1999), pp. 518–519.
25. 1956 Kézikönyve. Megtorlás és emlékezés [1956 Handbook. Reprisal and Remembrance] Budapest:
Institute of 1956, pp. 301–312.
26. Paragraph 291 of the UN Special Committee Report Supplement No. 18 A/3592.
170
$$506 1(1) (2002)