Failure of a pan-Mayan Party? Explaining Mayan Political Participation in Guatemala
By
Ryan Daugherty
Submitted to the graduate degree program in Political Science and the Graduate Faculty
of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts.
________________________________
Chairperson, Gary Reich
________________________________
Hannah Britton
________________________________
Brent Metz
Date Defended: August 25, 2015
The Thesis Committee for Ryan Daugherty
certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:
Failure of a pan-Mayan Party? Explaining Mayan Political Participation in Guatemala
________________________________
Chairperson Gary Reich
Date approved: August 25, 2015
ii
Abstract
Overthepast20years,indigenousgroupsacrossLatinAmericahavegained
significantgroundintheirrespectivecountries’nationalpolitics.Factorsrelatingto
institutionalreformsandeffectivepopulistappealshavecreatedseveralsuccessfulnational
indigenouspartiesinBoliviaandEcuadorinparticular.Guatemalaisacasethatmany
scholarsarepuzzledbybecauseitsharesmanysimilaritiesoftheEcuadorianandBolivian
politicalandethniclandscapes,buthasnotdevelopedanationalindigenousparty.
TheresearchpertainingtotheriseofLatinAmericanindigenouspartiescanbe
understoodintwoprominentgroups.Institutionalistspointtochangesinelectoralrulesas
adeterminingfactor.Inaddition,institutionalistsconcentrateonnationwidepolitics,not
localpolitics.Thesecondgroup,ethnopopulists,explainthattheriseofindigenousparties
isduetothesepartiesmakingindigenousandpopulistclaimswithoutalienatingthenonindigenouspopulation.However,neitheroftheseapproachesadequatelyaddressesthissocalled“failure”oftheMayainGuatemalatoformapan-Mayanparty.
ThisthesischallengesbothofthesenarrativesbyfocusingonMayanparticipationat
thelocallevel.Iarguethattraditionalinstitutionsatthecity/villagelevelinfluencethe
Mayanpopulationtoparticipatelocally.Additionally,divisionswithintheMayan
communitypreventalevelofunitynecessarytobuildapoliticalpartytorunatthenational
level.AlthoughIquestionthelimitationsofthesetwoapproaches,IfinditunlikelyapanMayanwillformintheforeseeablefutureduetotheMayaspreferencetoparticipatesolely
atthelocallevel
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TableofContents
ABSTRACT
III
WHYINDIGENOUSPARTIES?
2
INSTITUTIONALISTSVERSUSETHNOPOPULISTS
4
INSTITUTIONALISTAPPROACH
ETHNOPOPULISTAPPROACH
5
8
INDIGENOUSPOLITICSINGUATEMALA
10
INSTITUTIONALAPPROACHINGUATEMALA
ETHNOPOPULISTAPPROACHINGUATEMALA
11
13
RESEARCHDESIGN
14
HYPOTHESIS
15
DEPENDENTVARIABLES
16
INDEPENDENTVARIABLES
16
FINDINGS
18
OTHEREXPLANATIONSFORALACKOFAPAN-MAYAPARTY
21
CARGOSYSTEM
CIVICCOMMITTEES
INTER-MAYADIVISIONS
21
22
25
CONCLUSION
27
REFERENCES
29
APPENDIX
31
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TheriseandsuccessofindigenouspartiesinLatinAmericahasbeenasurprising
developmentthepastcoupleofdecades,leadingscholarstoexplaintheriseofsuccessful
indigenousmovementsincountrieslikeBolivia,Ecuador,andPeru.Withintheresearch
thereisadividebetweentwoapproachestounderstandingindigenousparties.Onegroup
ofscholarsemphasizesinstitutionalreformsandlearningeffectsfromothercountriesto
explainthesuccessofindigenousmovementsandpartiesintheregion.Theothergroup
emphasizeshowsuccessfulindigenouspartiesdevelopaprogrammaticplatformandmake
inclusiveappealsthatallowthemtoappealtothenon-indigenouspopulations.Combined,
thisresearchhasallowedforbetterunderstandingofthesuccessofindigenouspartiesand
candidatesinBolivia,Ecuador,andPeru.
However,acasethatisoftenoverlookedwhenevaluatingindigenouspolitical
participationinLatinAmericaisGuatemala.AquickglanceatGuatemalawouldappearto
makeitaverylikelycasetodevelopanindigenousparty.Ithasaverylargeindigenous
population,40to60percentofthepopulation.Ithasasemi-active,semi-strongindigenous
movementthatwasinstrumentalinendingGuatemala’s36-yearcivilwarandgainingthe
recognitionofindigenousrightsinlaw.However,sincetheendofthewarandsigningof
peaceaccordsin1996,theindigenousmovementhasnotcoalescedintoanactivepolitical
movement.TherehavebeensomeeffortstomoldtheMayanmovementintoapolitical
party,suchasWinaqledbyNobelPeacePrizewinner,RigobertaMenchu,whichisthefirst
nationalMayanpartyinGuatemala.Butithasonlyreceivedaround3percentofthevotein
themostrecentpresidentialelections.
Duetothisfact,manyresearcherstreatGuatemalaasanoutliercaseincomparison
tootherLatinAmericancountrieswithactiveindigenousmovementsandlabelitasa
‘failed’case.However,IarguethatthisisamisguidedviewofMayanpoliticalparticipation
inGuatemalabecauseMayanpoliticalparticipationismorediversethannationalparties.
1
InsteadafullerevaluationofMayapoliticalparticipationshouldfocusnotatthenational
levelbutathowMayangroupsparticipateatthelocallevel.Mayancommunitiestendto
focuslocallyanddonotnecessarilywantorneedtomovepastthislevelofgovernment.The
argumentthatMayansparticipatelocallyisthefocusofthisthesis.
Thispapermakesuseofthe2012LatinAmericanPublicOpinionProject(LAPOP)
surveyforGuatemalaandappliesamodelofindigenousvotingasproposedbyMadrid
(2012)toGuatemala.Afterlookingattheresultsofthesurvey,Ievaluatetheliteraturethat
assessesotherpotentialexplanationsofMayanpoliticalparticipation.Fromthisliterature,
itcanbeseenthatlabelingGuatemalaasafailureismisleading.
First,Iwillcovertheexistingliteratureontheadvantagesofindigenouspartiesin
LatinAmerica.Thereisaconsiderablesupportfortheargumentthathavinganindigenous
partyisbeneficialtotheindigenouspeopleandtopoliticalstabilityanddemocracy.Next,I
willreviewthekeyargumentsinthisliteraturebyinstitutionalistsandethnopopulists.
Then,IwillrunmodelspredictingvoteforanindigenouscandidateinGuatemala.Next,I
willlookattheliteraturethatexplainsthedifferentroutesofparticipationbythevarious
MayangroupsinGuatemala.Finally,Iwillconcludewiththoughtsforfuturepathsof
researchinregardstoMayanpoliticsinGuatemala.
WhyIndigenousParties?
Whataretheadvantagesofindigenousparties?Whycan’tmainstreamparties
addressindigenousconcerns?Thesequestionsareofconcernwhenevaluatingtheneedfor
indigenousparties.Previousresearchdemonstrateshowmainstreampartieshavefailedto
representindigenousgroups.Usuallymainstreampartieswillpaylipserviceandgain
recognizedrightsforindigenousgroupsinlawbutthiswillbetheextentofthehelp(Van
2
Cott2010a).Becauseofthisfact,indigenouspartiesshouldbeabletoadvanceindigenous
rightsandneedsmorethanmainstreamparties.
Madrid(2005a)arguesindigenouspartiescouldleadtotheimproved
representationofindigenousgroupsandexpandparticipationthathasbeenlimitedby
historicalinjusticesandmarginalizationwithinLatinAmericansocieties.Inaddition,
indigenouspartiescouldreducesystemicvolatility,increasethesupportfordemocracy,and
reduceviolence.MarginalizationofLatinAmerica’sindigenouspeopleshasoccurredunder
bothauthoritariananddemocraticgovernmentsand,thereforehasdiscouragedindigenous
groupsfrombeingactivewithinthepoliticalarena.Mainstreampartieswillsometimes
adoptsomeoftheissuesimportanttotheindigenouscommunityandtrytogainthe
supportofindigenousvotersbysupportingindigenouspoliticians(VanCott2010a).
However,thissupportisoftensymbolicandnottrulyrepresentativeofindigenousneedsor
wants.Ontheotherhand,whenanindigenouspartyrunsforoffice,thereisahigherchance
indigenouspeoplewillparticipateinpoliticsandestablishastrongerconnectionbetween
electedofficialsandtheirconstituents.
Whenindigenouspartiesgainrepresentationinalegislature,Madrid(2005b,
2005c)arguesthattheyreducesystemicvolatilityandpartysystemfragmentation.Nations
withthehighestratesofelectoralvolatilityhavealargepercentageofthepopulationthatis
indigenousbecauseindigenousgroupsareunderrepresentedandmakeupalarge
percentageofthepopulation.Indigenouspopulations,moreoftenthannot,donottrust
mainstreampartiestorepresenttheirinterestsand,therefore,donotparticipatein
elections.Thus,theindigenouscommunityisunderrepresentedandnotincludedinthe
politicalprocess.Mainstreampartiesfailtoadequatelyrepresenttheviewsandneedsofthe
indigenouscommunityandcannotestablishafootholdintheindigenouscommunity.This
createsanopeningforindigenouspartiestoformandgainthetrustoftheindigenous
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community.Thus,indigenouspartiescanthengiveavoicetotheindigenouscommunity,
bringingthiscommunitybackintotheactivepoliticalarena,andideallyleadingtomore
stabilityofthepartysystem.
Inshort,Madrid(2005a)impliesthatindigenouspartiescouldleadtoanincreasein
supportfordemocracyandareductioninpoliticallyorientedviolence.Indigenousparties
createavoicefortheindigenouspopulation,andwouldpresumablyfostersupportfor
democracy.IndigenouspopulationsinnumerousLatinAmericanstatesdonotsupport
democracyatthesamelevelthenon-indigenouspopulationdoes;theytendtobewaryof
democraticinstitutions.Madrid(2005a)showsthisthroughbyusingdatafromvarious
surveysfromthelate1990sandearly2000ssuchasLatinobarometerandLAPOP. Madridalsodiscusseshowincreasedindigenousrepresentationcanleadtoa
decreaseintheuseofextrememeasurestoraisepoliticalawareness.Heexamines
indigenousprotestsinBoliviathatledtowidespreaddeathanddestructionpriortoMAS.
InBolivia,thenon-violentriseofindigenouspartiessuchasMASshowedthatthe
indigenouspopulationsnolongerfelttheneedtoprotestanduseviolencetobeheard.
Ideally,indigenouspopulationsbegintobelievetheyhaveanoutlettobeheardandwillnot
resorttoviolenceoncetheyhaveanindigenouspartythatrepresenttheirviews.
InstitutionalistsversusEthnopopulists
ResearchevaluatingtheriseandsuccessofindigenouspartiesinLatinAmericais
demarcatedbetweentwodifferingtheoreticalapproaches.Thefirsttheoreticalapproach
concentratesupontheroleofinstitutions.Thesescholarsevaluatetheeffectofinstitutional
changeinunderstandingtheriseofindigenouspartiesinLatinAmerica.Theirthesisisthat
institutionalchange,suchaschangeinpartyregistrationrules,changeindistrict
4
magnitude,andnewelectoralrules,havehadapositiveeffectonindigenousparty
formationandsuccess.
Thesecondtheoreticalapproachfocusesuponthestrategiesindigenouspartiesuse,
specificallyethnopopulism.Scholarsfromthistheoreticalapproacharguethatindigenous
partiesintheregionhavebeenmostsuccessfuliswhentheyrunasethnopopulistparties
andcanappealtotheindigenouspopulationandgroupswithinthenon-indigenous
population.Byevaluatingthesetwotheoreticalapproaches,itbringstolighthowneither
campcanfullyexplainindigenouspoliticalparticipationinGuatemalaandhowthereisa
needtoevaluateparticipationthereinadifferentlight.
InstitutionalistApproach
InstitutionalargumentsforunderstandingtheriseofindigenouspartiesinLatin
Americaareveryprominentwithintheliterature.Institutionalscholarsevaluatewhether
changesininstitutionshavecreatedtheenvironmentthathasencouragedindigenousparty
formation.Concentrationuponinstitutionalchangeisduetointhepastcoupleofdecades
numerousLatinAmericancountrieshaveimplementedinstitutionalreformstoencourage
theparticipationofunderrepresentedgroups(McNeish2008).Theinstitutionsthese
scholarsmostoftenciteareregistrationrules,electoralrules,districtmagnitude,and
reservedseats.
ThemostprominentoftheinstitutionalscholarsisDonnaLeeVanCott.Her
researchisconcentratedinSouthAmerica,whereindigenouspartieshavehadthemost
success.Muchofherresearchconcentratesuponinstitutionalreformanditseffectson
indigenouspartiesprimarilyinSouthAmerica.Herfindingshaveshowninstitutionsdo
matterbutthattheyalonecannotexplaintheriseofindigenouspartiesinSouthAmerica.
VanCott(2003)evaluatesinstitutionalchangeinsixSouthAmericancountries:
Argentina,Colombia,Peru,Venezuela,andmorein-depthcasestudiesofBoliviaand
5
Ecuador.Inthisstudy,VanCottdemonstrateshowchangesininstitutionalruleshavea
positiveeffectonindigenouspartysuccess.VanCottconcentratesuponregulationsplaced
onpoliticalpartiesthatreducethenumberofpartieselected.Shefindsthatwhenthese
regulationsareeliminatedandpartysystemsbecomedecentralized,itmakesiteasierfor
indigenouspartiestoformandhavesuccesssincetheydonotneedtoraisefundsfora
nationwidecampaign.Shealsoexamineshowreservedseatsleadtoindigenouspartiesto
gainpower.Inaddition,VanCottdiscussesotherrulechangesthatimpacttheriseof
indigenouspartiessuchasincreasingdistrictmagnitude.Wheredistrictmagnitudewas
increased,suchasinColombia,ithasledtoindigenouspartiesgainingpoliticalpower.Van
Cottconcludeswhiletheseinstitutionalchangeshaveinfluencedtheriseofindigenous
parties,theyalonecannotexplaintheirriseandsuccess.
VanCott(2010b)findsinstitutionalfactorscontinuetoplayastrongrolein
indigenouspartyformationandsuccessadecadeandahalfafterthesepartiesfirstemerged
onthepoliticalscene.SheusesdatafromBolivia,Colombia,Ecuador,Venezuela,Peru,and
Argentinatodemonstratehowinstitutionalfactorsarekeytowhetheranindigenousparty
willformandhavesuccess.TheinstitutionalfactorsVanCottidentifiesaskeytoindigenous
partyformationandsuccessareincreasedballotaccess,decentralization,andthe
reservationofseatsforindigenousrepresentatives.
Inadditiontotheserulechanges,VanCottidentifiesopennessofthepartysystem
ascrucialtoindigenouspartyformationandsuccess.Whilenotarule,thisexplanationfits
neatlyintotheinstitutionalargumentforunderstandingtheriseofindigenousparties.
Indigenouspartieshadanopeninginthepartysystemduetothedeclineofleft-leaning
partiessincethe1980s.Whenthesepartiesdeclined,thiscreatedanopeningforindigenous
partiestogainafootholdandaddressindigenousdemandsinthepoliticalsystem.Thus,it
canbeconcludedanopenpartysystemfallsintotheinstitutionalargument.
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VanCottandRice(2010)findthatsocialcleavageandinstitutionalexplanationsfor
theriseofindigenouspartiesinLatinAmericacanexplainsomeoftheriseofindigenous
parties.However,bothconcludethatmoreexplanationfortheriseofindigenouspartiesis
needed.VanCottandRicebelievethatpoliticallearninganddiffusionmustalsobetaking
placeinordertoaccountfortheriseofsuccessfulindigenousparties.Inaddition,they
believethattheindigenousmovementsorganizationallyarematuring,whichallowsfor
explanationsoutsideofinstitutionalarguments.Thereisalsoincreasingde-alignmentand
partyfragmentationthroughouttheregionandtherecognitionofindigenousrightsinlaw.
Thus,VanCottandRicearguethatinstitutionalandsocialcleavageliteraturealonecannot
explaintheriseofindigenousparties.
Birnir(2004)evaluateshowchangingoneruleinaninstitutionalenvironmenthelps
indigenouspartiesgainpoliticalpower.Sheevaluatestheeffectcostshaveonparty
formation.Shedefines“formationcosts”inthesametermsasSimonHug(2001),whichare
theinstitutionalbarriersanewpartymustovercomeinordertoparticipateinanelection
orcontinueparticipating.Usingthisunderstandingofformationcosts,Birnirconcentrates
onpre-electionformationcostbyevaluatingtheeffectofspatialregistrationruleson
indigenouspartyformation.
BirnirusesevidencefromBolivia,Guatemala,Mexico,Peru,andamorein-depth
casestudyofEcuadortodemonstratehowpre-electionspatialregistrationrulesarea
hindrancetotheformationofindigenouspartiesinLatinAmerica.Pre-electionspatial
registrationrulesaresimplyarequirementonpoliticalpartiesthattheyhaveregistered
membersindifferentpartsofacountry.Theeffectofsuchrulescanbedetrimentalto
politicalpartiesconcentratedinoneareaofthecountry.Forexample,Birnirfindsin
Ecuadortherequirementforindigenousorganizationstohaveregistrationinboththe
highlandsandcoastalareas,in-spiteofthefacttherewereveryfewindigenousgroupsin
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thecoastalregions,ledtoindigenousorganizationsinEcuadorstrugglingtogainpolitical
power.Oncetheseruleswereeliminatedin1995,Ecuadorsawthesuccessofindigenous
parties.BirnirfindsasimilareffectinPeru,wheretherewerespatialregistrationrulesin
placebeforebeingeliminated.
Birnirisnotclaimingtheeliminationofregistrationrequirementsaloneledtothe
successofindigenousgroupsinEcuadorandPeru.Hermainconclusionistheeliminationof
theserulescreatesamorewelcominginstitutionalenvironmentforindigenousgroupsto
gainpoliticaloffice.Whilethereareotherfactorsinfluenceformationofindigenousparties,
Birnirconcludeseliminationoftheseruleswouldhelpintheformationofindigenous
parties.
Inall,theintuitionalistapproachhasledtogreaterunderstandingforwhy
indigenouspartieshavedevelopedandcontinuetohavesuccess.Thesescholarshave
identifiedthevariouschangesinelectoralrulesandpartyenvironmentpositively
influencedtheriseofindigenouspartiesinLatinAmerica.Theyhavealsoshedlighton
stepsindigenousorethnicpartiesneedtopursuetochangerulesthatmakegainingoffice
easierforthesegroups.
EthnopopulistApproach
Thesecondtheoreticalapproachforunderstandingtheriseofindigenouspartiesis
theethnopopulistargument.Theethnopopulistresearchthesisisthattheriseandsuccess
ofindigenouspartiesinLatinAmericaisduetohowindigenouspoliticalpartieshave
presentedthemselvesandhowtheyruncampaigns.Scholarsusingthislensfor
understandingindigenousparticipationarguewhatexplainsindigenoussuccessis
indigenouspoliticalpartiesrunasethnopopulistparties.Thesepartiesmakeindigenous
appealstotheindigenouspopulationalongwithinclusiveappealtonon-indigenousgroups.
8
Ethnopopulistpartiesalsomakepopulistappealbypromisingthemasspopulationof
changeandtakingpowerawayfromtheelites(Madrid2008;Madrid2012).
Madrid(2012)looksatBolivia,Ecuador,Peru,Guatemala,Colombia,Venezuela,and
Nicaragua.ThecoreofMadrid’sargumentisthatindigenouspartiesthathavehadthemost
successaretheonesthathavemadeappealstoboththeindigenousandnon-indigenous
populations.Inadditiontopartiesappealingtobothgroups,successfulindigenousparties
haveusedpopulistappealstocreateaslargeofanelectoralcoalitionaspossible.Populist
appealshavebeenaverypowerfulmethodforappealingtobothindigenousandnonindigenoussupportersbecauseoftheincreasingdistrustanddisillusionmentofcurrent
politicalpartiesandthoseparties’neo-liberalorientation.Thetwomostsuccessfulcases
MadridcitesareEvoMoraleswithMASinBoliviaandPachakutikinEcuador.Moralesand
hispartyMAShavebeenhighlysuccessfulbecausetheyhavecombinedindigenousand
non-indigenousrepresentationandofferedanalternativetotheneoliberaleconomic
outlookofotherpartiesinBolivia.PartiesinEcuador,ontheotherhand,havepursueda
differentrouteinrecentyears.PachakutikwasabletoachievesuccessinEcuadorsimilarto
MASinBoliviabyemployingthisinclusivetoneandplatform.However,Pachakutikinthe
mid-2000sbeganusingamoreexclusionarytone,appealingstrictlytoindigenous
populationsandalienatingnon-indigenousgroups.Theydidnotreachpreviouslevelsof
supportoractualrepresentationwhentheyhadthismoreinclusivestrategy.Madriddoes
notdiscounttheotherfactorsofinstitutionalreform,indigenousmovements,andchangein
partysystemrules,butfeelsthemostimportantaspectiswhetherpartieshavetriedto
movebeyondtheindigenouscommunityforsupportandwhetherthiscanexplain
indigenouspartysuccess.
Madridteststheethnopopulistthesisbydevelopingamodelofpredictingvotefor
anindigenouspartybyindividualcitizens.Thesemodelsuseshareofpresidentialvoteasa
9
meanstomeasuresuccessofanindigenousparty.Alongwithidentifyingthekeyindividual
levelfactors,Madriddescribesthenecessarymacro-levelfactorstoachievesuccess,which
areinstitutionalreform,thedeclineoftraditionalparties,theuseofethnicappeals,andthe
useofpopulistandinclusionaryappeals.
Insum,theethnopopulistapproachismoreofastrategyforindigenouspartiesto
takethananyreformoractionwithingovernment.Thisapproachdoesnotdiscountthe
effectsofinstitutionalreformorimplementationofnewrules.However,itdoesviewthe
strategyofindigenouspartiesasthecrucialaspecttothesuccessoftheseparties.
Boththeinstitutionalistandethnopopulistapproachesareincompleteintheir
explanationsoftheformationandsuccessofindigenousparties.Theinstitutionalapproach
islackingbecauseofitsconcentrationonnationallevelpolitics.Itdoesnotgivemuch
attentiontolocallevelpolitics.Ontheotherhand,theethnopopulistapproachmakes
assumptionsaboutthehomogeneityofanindigenousgroupandassumesallanindigenous
partyneedstodoisimplementtheethnopopuliststrategyandsuccesswillcome.Inthe
nextsection,thesemissingaspectswillbeapparentinwhybothapproacheshavesimply
writtenGuatemalaoffasa“failedcase.”
IndigenousPoliticsinGuatemala
Intheprevioussection,thedebatebetweentheinstitutionalistsandethnopopulists
highlightsdivisionswithintheliteratureforunderstandingtheriseandsuccessof
indigenouspartiesinLatinAmerica.However,therearecaseswithinLatinAmericathatdo
notfiteitherexplanationforindigenouspartyformationandsuccess.Onesuchcaseis
Guatemala.ThiscaseisinterestingbecauseGuatemalahasmanysimilarcharacteristicsas
othercountriesintheregionbuthasnotseentheformationofasuccessfulindigenous
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party.Thefailureofasuccessfulindigenouspartyinthecountryhasledtoscholarstobe
bewilderedwhyasuccessfulpartyhasnotdevelopedinGuatemala.
ThereasonforthisbewildermentisduetothecharacteristicsofGuatemala.Ithasa
verylargeindigenouspopulationwithestimatesrangingfrom40percentofthepopulation
to60percent(Madrid2012).Thissizeofpopulationwouldseemtoleadtoahigh
probabilityofalargeindigenousparty.However,thishasnotcometopass.Thereisan
indigenouspartyinGuatemala,Winaq,butithasonlyreceivedaround3percentofthe
popularvoteintheprevioustwopresidentialelections(Madrid2012).Duetothisrealityit
hasledtoscholarstoinvestigatewhytherehasnotbeenamoresuccessfulindigenousparty
inGuatemala.
ResearchonindigenouspartiesinGuatemalaisalsodemarcatedbetween
institutionalandethnopopulistargumentsforthelackofasuccessfulindigenousparty.The
institutionaliststendtoemphasizetheunderinstitutionalizationofGuatemala’sparty
systemandstructuralfactors,suchashistoricalviolenceanddiscrimination,Ethnopopulist
scholars,ontheotherhand,citetheoneMayanpartyinGuatemala,Winaq,anditselectoral
strategy.
InstitutionalApproachinGuatemala
Muchoftheinstitutionalists’concentrationinGuatemalaisevaluatingindigenous
participationisatthenationallevel.Researchfocusesonthepartysystemorlackthereof.
Guatemalahasanunderinstitutionalizedpartysystemthathasbeencalledan“inchoate”
partysystemorevena“non-system”(Jones2011;Sanchez2008;Sanchez2009).
ScholarsofGuatemala’spartysystemdemonstratehowpoliticalpartiescomeand
goanditsdestabilizingeffectondemocracy.Becausepartiescomeandgo,theydonothave
rootsinsocietyandareoftenthevehiclesofelitesinGuatemala.However,becauseparties
comeandgo,itdoesshowpartyformationisnotacostlyendeavorandcouldbeapositive
11
factorininfluencingtheformationofindigenousparties.Therefore,thesescholars
demonstratethereisthepossibilityofanindigenouspartytodevelopwithrelativeeasebut
theydodiscussthatthemostsuccessfulpoliticalpartiesarevehiclesforthepoliticalelite.
ScholarsofGuatemala’spartysystemhighlightmanyissuesindigenous
organizationsfaceinformingandbeingasuccessfulpoliticalparty.Oneissueisthemost
successfulpartiestendtobewellfinanced.Thisisproblematicformanyindigenous
organizationssincetheyareadiscriminatedagainstgroup.Anotherissueisbuilding
alliancesinGuatemala’sCongress.Becausepartiescomeandgowithease,itisverydifficult
tobuildalliancesforeffectingpolicy.
Thisareaofinstitutionalresearchhighlightsthedifficultiesindigenous
organizationsfaceinGuatemalaintheireffortstodevelopaMayanpoliticalapparatus.
Whilepartyformationmightbeapossibilityforindigenousgroups,itishardtoruna
campaignnationwide.Inaddition,itwouldbetoughtobuildanylastingalliancessince
partycomeandgowithease.
Otherinstitutionalscholarshavemoredirectlyevaluatedindigenousparticipation
inGuatemala.Theyhighlighthowcandidatescanrunasindependentsandnothavetobe
attachedtoapoliticalparty(Hale2002;McNeish2008).Thesescholarsalsodiscussthefew
successfulcasesofindigenouspoliticalleadershavingsuccessattheballotbox.Onesuch
caseisRigobertoQuemeChayinQuetzaltenango.Hewaselectedmayorin1995and1999
(Rasch2011a;Copeland2011).However,outsideofQueme,therehavebeenveryfewcases
ofindigenouspoliticiansgainingelectedpoliticaloffice.
AnothertrendininstitutionalresearchinregardstoGuatemalanindigenousparties
istoevaluatesub-nationalmeansofparticipating.OnemeansthroughwhichtheMayan
populationinGuatemalaparticipatesisciviccommitteesatthelocallevel(Pallister2013).
Civiccommitteesareshort-termcommitteesorganizationscancreatetosupportapolitician
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forelectedoffice.Theadvantageofthesecommitteesistheycanbetemporary,lasting
throughtheelectoralcampaignanddissolvedafterthecampaign.Thisinstitutionalrule
mightbeinfluentialinMayansnotattemptingtomovepastthelocalpoliticallevelandbuild
anationwidepoliticalinfrastructurebecausetheyhaverepresentationatthelocallevel.In
additiontociviccommittees,thereishistoricandpresentviolenceanddiscrimination
againsttheMayanpopulationinGuatemala.ThisrealitydiscouragesMayansfromwanting
tomovepastthelocallevelofgovernment(Pallister2013).
EthnopopulistApproachinGuatemala
Theethnopopulistapproachdescribeseffortsinthe1970sbythoseintheMayan
movementtobuildamorecohesiveandunitedpoliticalmovement.However,thiswas
preventedduetotheMayanpopulationbeingtargetedduringGuatemala’scivilwar
(Warren2003).Afterthereturnofdemocracyinthe1980s,theMayanmovementwasa
crucialplayerinhelpingbrokertheagreementthatendedtheconflictin1996.Inspiteof
thissuccess,themovementwasnotabletotranslatethisunityintoaviablepolitical
movement.
Madrid(2012)commentsonthefactthatwiththeMayanmovementhavingsome
unity,itwouldseemGuatemalanMayanswouldhaveanopportunitytoformasuccessful
indigenousparty.InhisevaluationofWinaq,hecritiquesthefactitsleadershiphasnot
followedtheethnopopulistmodelforwinningpoliticaloffice.WinaqisledbyNobelPeace
Prizewinner,RigobertaMenchu.SheisknownthroughoutGuatemalaandespeciallyinthe
Mayancommunity.However,shehasnotrunWinaqlikeEvoMoralesinBolivia.Shedoes
makeethnicappealsalongwithbeinginclusiveofLadinosbutdoesnotmakepopulist
appeals.Shedoesnotmakepopulistappealsinfearofupsettingthebusinesscommunityin
Guatemala.Inaddition,sheisnotconnectedtotheMayangrassrootsmovement.Winaqis
headquarteredinGuatemalaCity,whichisfarremovedfromthecenteroftheMayan
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community,whichislocatedinthenorthernpartofthecountry.Seeminglyitappearsthat
theenthopopulistliteraturebelievesthatifMenchuweretopursueamoreethnopopulist
approach,Winaqwouldhavemoresuccess.
Overall,theresearchonindigenouspartiesinLatinAmericaisdividedbetween
institutionalargumentsandethnopopulistarguments.Thisdivideisalsopresentinthe
literatureonGuatemala.Understandingthestrengthsandweaknessesoftheresearchwill
allowforbetterunderstandingofindigenouspartiesinLatinAmericaandinGuatemala.
ResearchDesign
Intheprevioussection,itwasdemonstratedthedivideintheliteraturebetween
institutionalandethnopopulistapproachestounderstandingindigenouspartyformation
andsuccessinLatinAmericaandGuatemala.IntherestofthisthesisIwillshowhowboth
oftheseapproachesmissimportantaspectsofMayanparticipationinGuatemala.The
ethnopopulistapproachmissesmanykeyfactorsaboutMayangroupsinGuatemala.It
appearstomaketheassumptionthatifWinaqwouldonlydowhatEvoMoraleswasableto
doinBolivia;itwouldthenstarttohavemoreelectoralsuccess.Thisassumptionis
problematicbecauseifapureethnopopulistapproachwouldbeasuccessfulstrategythen
Winaqorsomeotherindigenouspartywouldhaveimplementedit.
Institutionalists,ontheotherhand,showthatinstitutionsmattersintheformation
andsuccessofindigenouspartiesinothercountriesinLatinAmericaandcouldbea
positiveimpactinGuatemala.However,whatismissedinthisapproachisinstitutionalists
arenotlookingattherightlevelofgovernment.WhatneedstobeevaluatedareMayan
institutionsatthelocal/villagelevelofgovernment.AsIwilldemonstrate,thereare
numeroustraditionalinstitutionsanddivideswithintheMayancommunitywhichleadsto
Mayansparticipatingatthelocallevelofgovernmentbutnotmovingpastittobuilda
14
nationwide,pan-Mayanparty.Lookingatthislevelofgovernmentwillallowforgreater
understandingofMayanparticipation.Participationatthelocallevelnullifiesthe
assumptionthatGuatemala’sindigenouspopulationisnotactivepolitically.
Theempiricalsectionofthispaperhastwoparts.First,Iwillrunanempiricalmodel
withdatafromthe2012LAPOPsurveyforGuatemala.ThismodelcloselyfollowsMadrid’s
(2012)ethnopopulistmodel.Thedifference,however,isthismodelwilltesttoseeif
supportforahypotheticalindigenouscandidateisalongthelinesofanethnopopulist
approach.Then,IwilldemonstratehowMayansparticipateatthelocal/villagelevelof
governmentthroughtraditionalandmoderninstitutions.Inaddition,Iwillshowhow
divisionswithinMayanethnicidentityalsoplayaroleinthestruggletobuildasuccessful
pan-Mayanparty.
Hypothesis
ThehypothesisIwillbetestingis:
H1:Voterswithanindigenousidentityaremorelikelytosupportanindigenousparty
orleaderinGuatemalathanthosewhoareMestizoorspeakSpanishastheirmother
language
Totestforthishypothesis,thispaperwillrunmultiplemodelstoseeiftherearesimilar
mechanismsinGuatemalacomparedtowhatMadridhashypothesizedshouldhappenfora
successfulindigenousparty.ThispaperwillrunsimilarmodelsforGuatemalabutwillhave
differentindependentvariablesduetosomequestionsaskedintheBoliviasurveythatwere
notaskedintheGuatemalanone.Themotivationfortestingthishypothesisistoseeifthere
isdemandforanindigenousleaderbytheindigenouspopulation.Failuretofalsifythis
hypothesiswillmeanthatthereisnotdemandforanindigenousleaderbytheindigenous
population.
15
DependentVariables
Thispaperusesthe2012LAPOPsurveydataintheanalysis.Fromthesurvey,Iuse
twoquestionsforthedependentvariablesforthetwomodels.Thefirstdependentvariable
isderivedfromthequestion,“Wouldyouvoteforanindigenouspersonforpresident?”This
questionisaskingwhatthispaperwantstoevaluate:voteforanindigenous
party/candidate.Intheoriginalquestionnaire,thequestioniscodedas“yes,”“no,”“no
response,”or“donotknow.”Ihaverecodeditasabinaryvariablewhereapersonwould
voteforanindigenouspersonforpresidentiscodedas1andapersonwhowouldnotvote
foranindigenouspersonforpresidentiscodedas0.Forthismodel,Irunanordinarylogit.
Inaddition,Irunasecondmodelwithadependentvariablederivedfromthe
questionaskingcitizensiftheythinkdarkskinnedleaders,referringtoindigenouspeople,
wouldmakegoodpoliticalleaders.Theoriginalquestionfromthesurveyis,“Ingeneral,
peoplewithdarkskinarenotgoodpoliticalleaders.Doyoustronglyagree,agree,disagree
orstronglydisagree,withthisstatement?”Itisonascaleofstronglydisagree,disagree,
agree,orstronglyagree.Becausethevariableisonascaleofstronglydisagreetostrongly
agree,Irunanorderedlogitmodel.
Thelogicforrunningmodelswiththesedependentvariablesistoevaluatewhether
theresultsholdupacrossthesurvey.AnissuebothmodelshaveisarelativelylowN.Thisis
duetorespondentsnotansweringthequestionsthatarethedependentvariables.By
runningboth,itcanbeseenifsimilarmechanismsholdupacrossthedifferentmodels.
IndependentVariables
Thekeyindependentvariablesareidentity,language,andsupportforindigenous
education.Identityiscodedaswhite,Ladino,indigenous,black,mulatto,orofanotherrace.
ThereasonforthisvariableistoevaluatewhetherthereisadifferencebetweentheLadino
andindigenouspopulationsoftheirsupportforanindigenouscandidate.Inthe2012
16
LAPOPdataforGuatemala,mostrespondentssaidtheywereeitherLadinoorindigenous,
indicativeofadividebetweentheladinoandindigenouscitizenswithinGuatemalansociety.
LanguageiscodedasSpanish,Mam,K’iche’,Kaqchiquel,Q’eqchi’,othernative,or
anotherforeignlanguage.Itisexpectedthatthosewhospeakanindigenouslanguageare
morelikelytosupportanindigenouspartyorleader,consistentwithwhathasbeen
observedinBolivia.
Indigenouseducation(orieducation)isavariableaskingrespondentsabout
opportunitiesforstudentsofindigenousordark-skinheritageandwhetherstudentsfrom
thesebackgroundsshouldhavespotsreservedforthematuniversities.Thisvariableis
codedonascalefrom1-7,with1beingstronglydisagreewiththatstatementand7being
stronglyagreewiththestatement.Theexpectationisthatthosewhowouldbemorelikely
tosupportanindigenouspartywouldbemorelikelytostronglyagreewiththisstatement.
Thisquestionismeaningfulbecauseitindicatesthatpeoplemoreacceptingofindigenous
participationinsocietyat-largewillbemorelikelytoacceptanindigenouspoliticalleader.
Theothervariablesincludedinthisanalysismeasuresocio-economicandpolitical
ideologyandparticipation,whichareexpectedtohaveaneffectonwhetherrespondents
supportanindigenouspartyorleader.Thevariableforideologyisonascalefrom1-10with
1beingleftand10beingright.Whilethereisnotanexpectationthatideologywillhavea
greatimpactonwhetherapersonwouldsupportanindigenousparty,iftheseindigenous
partiesdotakeaturntowardspopulism,itverywellcould.UsingtherationaleofMadrid’s
modelforBolivia,theprotestvariableisayesornotothequestion“Haveyoumarchedor
demonstratedinaprotestinthepast12months?”Iexpectifrespondentswhoprotestedto
bemorelikelytobeinfavorofanindigenouspartyorleader.Thetrustinpoliticalpartiesis
measuredonascalefrom1to7,witha1beingnotatalland7beingalotoftrust.Iexpect
respondentswhosaytheydonottrustpoliticalpartiestobemorelikelytosupportan
17
indigenousparty.Thetrademeetingsvariableisanothermeasureofthepolitical
participationoftherespondents.Thisvariableismeasuredonascalefrom1-4,with1being
arespondentattendsameetingonceaweekand4beingarespondentwhoneverattends.It
isnotexpectedtoseearelationshipbutsimplyanothermeasureofpoliticalparticipation
andideology.
Thelastthreevariablesaresex,age,andincome.Thesevariablesareincludedas
controlsandIdonotexpectthemtoheavilyinfluencesupportforanindigenousparty.Sex
iscodedasfemale,wherefemalerespondentsarecodedas1andzeroifmale.Ageinthe
datasetsimplytakestheageoftherespondent.Therangeofagesinthedatasetis17to89.
Incomeisin10incomebracketsandrangesfromnomonthlyincometomonthlyincome
over10,000quetzales.
Findings
Iuseanordinarylogisticregressionforthefirstdependentvariablepredicting
whetheracitizenwouldvoteforanindigenouspersonforpresidentandanordered
logisticalregressioninthesecondmodelwiththedependentvariablebeingcodedas1-4,
askingwhetheranindigenouspersonwouldmakeagoodpoliticalleader.Fortheordinary
logitmodel,therearemostlynullresultsfortheindependentvariablesofthemodel.
However,encouragingly,thevariableforindigenousidentityisstaticallysignificantatthe
0.01levelandhasapositivecoefficient.Thisshowsthatthosewhoidentifyasindigenous
aremorelikelytosupportanindigenouscandidatethannot.Thevariableforlanguage
spokenshowsthatacoupleoftheindigenouslanguagevariablesapproachstatistical
significanceatthe0.10level.Theseresultsconfirmpartofthehypothesisthatan
indigenousidentitywillmakeapersonmorelikelytosupportanindigenouspolitical
candidate.Speakinganindigenouslanguageshouldhaveaneffectonwhetheraperson
18
wouldsupportanindigenouscandidatebutIcannotdiscernwithcertaintybecauseofalow
responserate.
[Table1Here]
Tobetterunderstandtheresultsofthismodel,Irantheoddsratioforthemodel.Theodds
ratiotellstheoddsofapersonsupportinganindigenouscandidateforpresidentifthe
respondentisindigenous.Inthismodel,thosewhoidentifyasindigenousare2.25times
morelikelytosaytheywouldsupportanindigenouscandidateforpresidentofGuatemala
thaniftheywerenotindigenous.ThosewhospokeK’iche’athomeasachildare5.45times
morelikelytosaytheywouldsupportanindigenouscandidateforpresident.However,this
variableapproachesstatisticalsignificanceatthe0.10level.Thisshowsspeakingan
indigenouslanguagecouldhaveapositiveeffectifasurveywithmoreindigenouslanguage
speakerscouldbeconducted.Finally,theonlyothervariablethatisstatisticallysignificant
isage.Thisisanegativecoefficientanditsoddsratiois.9828.Theseresultsmeansagehas
littletonoeffectonwhetherapersonwillsupportanindigenouscandidateforpresident.
[Table2Here]
Forthesecondmodel,itcanbeseenthatthestatisticallysignificantvariablesareforthose
whoidentifyasindigenousandthevariableforincome.Thenativelanguagevariableorthe
variableforsupportforindigenouseducationisnotstatisticallysignificant,norareother
variablessuchasideologyorparticipation.However,whenevaluatingthepredicted
probabilitiesforthekeyindependentvariables,itisseenthatthosewhoidentifyas
indigenousandspeakanindigenouslanguagearemorelikelytostronglydisagreewiththe
statementofwhethertheybelieveanindigenouspersonwouldmakeabadleader.
Participantswhoidentifyasindigenouswere10.7percentmorelikelytodisagreewiththe
statementthatindigenousleadersmakebadpoliticalleaders,holdingallothervariables
constant.Thereisasimilarfindingwhenlookingatdifferencesbetweenlanguages.The
19
changeintheprobabilityapersonwillstronglydisagreewiththestatementanindigenous
personwouldmakeabadpoliticalleaderincreasesby3.4percentmovingfromaSpanish
speakertoanindigenousspeaker,holdingallothervariablesconstant.Thisisseenacross
allindigenouslanguages.Indigenousspeakersaremorelikelytostronglydisagreewiththe
statementthanSpanishspeakers.Thisisnotsurprisinggiventhatit’sexpectedthat
indigenouspeoplewouldbemorelikelytosupportanindigenousleader.
Fromtheseresults,itcanbeconcludedthatthereissomesupportforthehypothesis
thatindigenouspeoplewillbemorelikelytosupportanindigenousleaderthanthosewho
areLadinoandthosewhospeakSpanish.Itdoesappearthatthereissomedemandoratthe
veryleastsomepotentialsupportforindigenouspartiesinGuatemala.However,some
limitationsofthedatashouldbenoted.ThereisanNof462forfirstmodelandanNof425
forthesecondmodel.Thisisanissuebecauseitisaverylowresponserateandmeanseven
morepeoplegavenoresponseorgavenoanswerthanansweredthequestion,anditlowers
thepredictivepowerofthemodel.Whileitdidgivetheresultsdiscussedabove,Iamnot
abletomakedefiniteconclusionsfrombothmodelsbecausethereissuchalowN.Common
remediessuchasreplacingmissingresponseswithaverageswouldbeproblematicgiven
thatover50%ofthevariablewouldthenbeaverages.
Fromthesemodels,itappearsthatGuatemaladoeshavesomesimilar
characteristicstootherLatinAmericancountriesinthatethnicityandspokenlanguagehas
animpactonvotingbehavior.Inbothmodels,identifyingasanindigenouspersonand
speakinganindigenouslanguagemakesapersonmorelikelytovoteforanindigenous
personandpartyinGuatemalaandlesslikelytosayanindigenouspersonwouldmakea
badpoliticalleader.Themainissueisthelowresponserateforthequestionofwhether
citizensthinkthatanindigenouspersonwouldmakeabadpoliticalleaderornot.Thus,I
amabletoconcludethatthereappearstobesomeevidencethattheMayapopulationwould
20
supportanindigenouspartyinGuatemalaandthatthefirsthypothesisisnotfalsifiedby
thisadmittedlylimiteddata.Thequestionsremain,however:whyhavepoliticalpartiesthat
attempttorepresenttheMaya,struggledtogainthesupportoftheMayapopulation?Is
thereadesireforasuccessfulpan-Mayaparty?
OtherExplanationsforalackofaPan-MayaParty
Theprevioussectionsattemptstoseeifthereisdemandforanindigenousleaderin
Guatemala.Thedependentvariablesforthetwomodelsaskedifacitizenwouldvoteforan
indigenouspersonforpresidentandwhethertheybelievethatadark-skinnedperson
wouldmakeabadpoliticalleader.However,therewasalowresponserateforthe
dependentvariablesandkeyindependentvariables.Inspiteofthisissue,Iamableto
determinethatthereappearstobesomeindigenoussupportforahypotheticalindigenous
candidateforpresidentorsupportahypotheticalindigenousleader.Evenwiththeresults
ofthelogisticmodels,thereisstillaneedtoevaluatemorein-depththediversityofpolitical
participationintheGuatemalanMayacommunity.Byevaluatingpoliticalparticipationat
thelocallevelofgovernment,itcanbeseenthatthereisadiversityofwaysfortheMaya
populationtoparticipate.Participationatthelocalleveldemonstratesthelabeloffailed
caseisnotanaccuratedescriptionofGuatemalanindigenousparticipation.Iwillnow
highlightthreefactorsimportanttounderstandinghowtheMayapopulationparticipates:
the“CargoSystem”,civiccommittees,anddivisionswithintheMayacommunity.
CargoSystem
OneofthewaysMayaparticipateatthelocallevelinGuatemalaisthroughthe
“CargoSystem.”The“CargoSystem”isaninstitutionputintoplaceduringSpanishruleand
isasystemofcommunityservice.Thiscommunityservicesystemexpectsthemenofa
villagetoperformthreeactsofcommunityservicewithoutreimbursement.(Rasch2011a;
21
Ekern2011)Theseactscanbeofacivilorreligiousnature.Historically,thissystemwould
helpintherankingofmembersofthecommunityandattemptstoincludeallmembersof
thecommunity.Inturn,politicalpositionssuchasthecouncilofeldersarebasedonone’s
participationintheCargoSystem.Thecouncilofeldersinvillagesaretheoneswhoactas
administratorsforcivilandreligiousaffairs.Thissystemofelderleadershipwasbannedin
1987inTotonicapánduetoaloggingscandalandledtomistrustintheeldersandhasbeen
indeclineinothertownsinK’iche’GuatemalalikeSantaMaria(Ekern2011;Rasch2011a).
Thisledtotheopeningupofthecargosystemtomakeitmoredemocraticbutthe
communityserviceaspectofthe“CargoSystem”isstillinusetoday(Ekern2011).Even
withitsdecline,theCargoSystemisstillinfluentialinhowleadersareselected,evenwith
theprocessbeingdemocratic.
InspiteofthecontinuingimportanceoftheCargoSystem,thereisadividewithin
theMayancommunityoverthecontinuationoftraditionsliketheCargoSystem.Thisdivide
isbetweenthosewhowantvillagepoliticstobeconcentratedonthecommunityasawhole
againstthosewhowanttobetreatedmoreasindividuals(Rasch2011a;Ekern2011).
Thosewhowantamorecommunitybasedpoliticstendtobeolderandwanttomaintain
traditionalvillageinstitutionswhereastheyoungergenerationsaremovingtowardsamore
westernstyleofpolitics,wheretheconcentrationisontheindividual.Thismoveawayfrom
theCargoSystemandtraditionalinstitutionsbyyoungergenerationsistheirattemptto
interactwiththeGuatemalanstateasindividualsandnotthroughindigenousinstitutionsor
identity.
CivicCommittees
AnothermeansthroughwhichtheMayaparticipatearethroughciviccommittees.
CiviccommitteesareawayoforganizationinGuatemalathatallowsgroupstoforma
committeetosupportacandidateforpublicofficewithouthavingtoformapoliticalparty.
22
Thesecommitteeshavebecomeapopulartoolforindigenousgroupsatthelocallevelto
supportcandidatesforofficewithouthavingtoputtheresourcesrequiredtoforma
politicalparty.TheuseofciviccommitteeshasbeenapopulartoolamongMayaactivists
(Pallister2013;McNeish2008;Hale2002).Drivingtheuseofciviccommitteesisthefact
manymainstreampoliticalpartiesignoreindigenousissues.Thus,atthelocallevel,Maya
groupsfindformingciviccommitteesisonewaytohavetheirvoicesheard.
MayagroupshavehadsomesuccesselectingMaya/indigenouscandidatesto
politicaloffice.Thegreatestsuccessoccurredin2003,whereciviccommitteeshelpedwin
27mayoralties(Pallister2013).Acasewhereciviccommitteeshavehadsignificantsuccess
isinQuetzaltenango.ThesuccessinQuetzaltenangoisprofoundbecauseQuetzaltenangois
thesecondlargestcityinGuatemalaandistheunofficialcapitalofK’iche’Maya.The
politicalorganizationanditsciviccommittee,Xel-ju,supportedRigerbertoQuemeChayfor
mayorofQuetzaltenangointhe1990sandearly2000s.Quemewaselectedmayorin1995
and1999andlostinthe2004election(Rasch2011b).
Xel-juwasfoundedasaMayanorganizationinthe1970s.Influencingthedecisionto
formasaMayapoliticalorganizationwasthemotivationtogainpoliticalofficeatthelocal
levelfortheMayacommunityinGuatemala,especiallyintheQuetzaltenangoarea.Ithas
beenprimarilyconcentratedinQuetzaltenangoandrepresentsmostlyK’iche’Maya.Since
it’sfoundinginthe1970s,Xel-ju,haswalkedafinelinetonotincurthewrathofthemilitary
duringGuatemala’scivilwarandtohelpinnegotiatingtherecognitionofindigenousrights
inQuetzaltenango.
BecauseXel-juisanindigenousorganization,theymakeeffortstorecruit
indigenouscandidatesforpoliticaloffice(Rasch2011b).However,Xel-justruggledtogain
politicalofficeandthiseventuallyledtoadecisionbytheorganizationtoalsoinclude
Ladinosintheorganization.BybecomingmoreinclusiveofLadinos,thishelpedleadto
23
successforXel-juinthe1990s.Inthe1995campaignformayorofQuetzaltenango,Xel-ju
ranMayaandLadinocandidatesandalsousedbothMayaandLadinoimageryandsymbols
(Rasch2011b).Usingthisapproach,Xel-juledbyQuemewasabletogainpowerin
Quetzaltenangoin1995and1999.
However,makingXel-juamoreinclusiveorganizationcauseddivisionsthatproved
tobeitsundoingbythemid2000s.EvenwhenQuemewonreelectionin1999,therewas
alreadyadivisionwithintheorganization(Rasch2001b;Rasch2011c).Thedivisioncame
fromthosewithintheorganizationwhowantedXel-jutobefocussolelyontheindigenous
populations,nottheinclusiverouteQuemeandothersweretakingtheorganization.In
addition,therewerecriticismssuchasQuemewasincludingallowingLadinosinthe
runningoftheorganizationandsubsequentcorruptionandscandalsshortlyafterQueme
allowedLadinosmoresaywithintheorganization.OthercriticismsofQueme’s
multiculturalapproachwastomakeXel-jumoredemocraticandopeneduppoliticsforthe
indigenouspopulationthatismoreruralandpoorer.ManywithinXel-jufoundthistobe
problematicbecausethispopulationdidnotnecessarilyidentifyasMayaandincluding
groupsotherthanMayarancontrarytowhatthefoundingmembersofXel-juwantedthe
organizationtobe.
ThedivisionswithinXel-juwereproblematicforQuemeduringhissecond
campaignformayor.Inspiteofthesedivisions,hewasabletoovercometheseissuesand
winasecondtermin1999.However,inthe2004election,Xel-juwasadistantfourthandit
hasnotachievedthelevelofsuccesscomparedtowhenQuemewasinoffice.Todate,Xel-ju
hasbeenthemostsuccessfulindigenousorganizationinGuatemalathathasmadeuseof
civiccommittees.
24
Inter-MayaDivisions
Alongwithdifferentmeansofparticipating,therearedivisionswithinthe
Maya/indigenouscommunity.Therearedivisionsalonglinguistlines,divisionsbetween
differentMayangroups,anddivisionsalongclasslines.Thesedivisionsareoftentimes
brushedasidewhenexplainingindigenouspoliticalactivitiesinGuatemala.Scholars
seeminglytreattheMayaasahomogenousgroup.Inreality,thedivisionswithintheMaya
communityaredeepenoughthatassumingtheMayaareone,unifiedgroupsleadsto
missingkeydivisionswhichcanhelpunderstandMayapoliticalparticipation(Vogt2015;
Ekern2011;Rasch2011b;Rasch2011c).
Manyscholarsdonottakeintoaccountthedivisionswithintheindigenous/Mayan
communityinGuatemaladuetothesuccesstheMayanmovementhashadoverthepastfew
decades.TheMayanmovementdevelopedlaterduetoGuatemala’scivilwarandpursued
organizationalgoalsdifferentlybecauseofitsexperienceduringthewar.Duringthe1970s,
groupswithintheMayanMovementbeganpursuingpoliticalroutesforadvancing
indigenousgoals.However,theseactionsweremetwithviolenceandhaveinfluencedthe
movement’sactionstothepresent(Warren2003).ThishasledtotheMayanMovementto
concentratemoreupontherecognitionofindigenousrightsandpreservationofindigenous
culturethanbuildingapan-Mayanparty.Theserightswererecognizedinthepeaceaccords
thatendedthecivilwar(Yashar2005;Warren1998).However,thesereformswereputtoa
votethatincludedlanguagerecognizingindigenousrightsintheconstitutionandwere
defeatedinalow-turnoutvote.
WhiletheMayanMovementhasexperiencedsomesuccessingainingindigenous
rightsinGuatemala,themovementhasstagnatedinrecentyearsandstillisnotasignificant
playerinGuatemalannationalpolitics.Partofthisreasonisduethesignificantethnic,
linguistic,andculturaldivisionswithintheMayancommunity.Thereareover20different
25
Mayanlanguagegroups(Vogt2015).OneattempttounifytheMayanMovementintoa
cohesivepoliticalmovementregardlessofMayangroupsisRigobertaMenchu’sWinaq
party.However,asdiscussedearlier,shehasnotbeensuccessfulandtheMayancommunity
remainsveryfractured.
Whenevaluatingwheretheindigenouspopulationhashadthemostsuccess
politicallyinGuatemala,ithaspredominatelybeenwithinK’iche’speakingregions.
RibgobertaMenchuandleadersoftheXel-juorganizationareK’iche’andQuetzaltenangois
consideredtobethecapitalofK’iche’Mayas.OtherMayanlinguisticgroupsconcentrate
moreuponcultureandlinguisticeducationandpreservationthanonrunningforpolitical
office(Hale2002;BastosandCamus2006).
AlongwithdifferencesbetweendifferentMayanlinguisticgroups,thereare
differenceswithinlinguisticgroups.ManyoftheissuesthathashamperedtheXel-ju
organizationafter1999canbetracedtodifferenceswithintheK’iche’Mayacommunity.
WhenRigobertoQuemeChaybecamethemayorofQuetzaltenango,oneofthepolicieshe
implementedincludedbuildingroadstotheruralareasoutsideofthecitylimitsof
Quetzaltenangoandparticipatorydemocracyinstitutions(Rasch2011b;Rasch2011c).The
goalofthesepolicieswastoopenuppoliticsofQuetzaltenangototheseruralpopulationsto
politicsandtobuildanindigenouswaytoconductpolitics.
However,thereisquiteadifferencebetweentheindigenouspopulationsthatlivein
urbanQuetzaltenangoandthosewholiveinthesurroundingruralareas.Theindigenous
populationthatlivesintheruralareastendstoidentifyasindigenousratherthanMayan
andthesepopulationsalsotendtobepoorer(Rasch2011b;Rasch2011c).Thosewho
identifyasMayantendtobeurbanandmiddleclass.Thisdividecouldbeseeninthe
divisionswithinXel-ju.ManywithintheorganizationwereupsetwithQuemespending
resourcestoimplementthepoliciesofroadbuildinganddirectdemocracy.Thecriticisms
26
werebythosewhowantedtokeepXel-juasamoreindigenousorganizationratherthan
openitupandmakeitmoremulticultural.AsaresultofthisdividewithintheK’iche’
communityinQuetzaltenango,Xel-juwasabletogainofficeforitscandidatesonmunicipal
councilsandelectQuemeasmayorin1995and1999.Insubsequentelections,Xel-juonly
partiallypursuedthevotesoftheexcludedindigenousandLadinopopulationsandwasa
factorinXel-jubecomingalessrelevantpoliticalplayinQuetzaltenango.
Thus,simplyclassifyingGuatemalaasa‘failed’caseissimplisticandlikelyafalse
classification.AmoreaccurateviewofhowMayansareparticipatingpoliticallyistolookat
thediversityoftheirinstitutionsatthelocallevelanddivisionsinidentitythatisobserved
withintheMayancommunity.Partofthisconcentrationonthelocallevelforparticipating
isduetohistoricalviolenceanddiscrimination.However,nottakingintoaccountthe
differenceswithintheMayancommunity,leadstoassumptionsabouttheMayan
communitythatisproblematic.FutureresearchinthisareaofMayanpoliticswillneedto
takethesefactorsintoaccountinordertogetamoreholisticviewofMayanpolitics.
Conclusion
Overallthispaperevaluateswhyapan-Mayanpartyhasnotdevelopedonthelevel
seeninotherLatinAmericancountries.First,IranmodelamodelbaseduponwhatMadrid
(2012)hassaidisthepathforanindigenouspartytogainmasssupport.Inthesecondhalf
ofmyempiricalsection,IdemonstratedthatMayansdoparticipatepoliticallybut
concentrateonlocalandtraditionalinstitutions.Inaddition,divisionswithintheMayan
communityareafactorthatpreventsanymobilizationoutsideofthelocallevel.Iamableto
concludethatwhileapan-Mayanhasnotdeveloped,thisdoesnotmeanGuatemalaisa
“failedcase”butdemonstrateshowdiversetheMayanpoliticallycommunityis.
27
ThediversityofpoliticalinstitutionsseenintheMayancommunitypresents
numerousroutesforfutureresearchcouldtake.Oneroutewouldbetobegintakingsurvey
ofthedifferenttraditionalinstitutionsinplaceinMayanvillages.Thiswouldrequire
extensivefieldworkandinterviewswithleadersinthesevillages.However,tobeginto
betterunderstandthesetraditionalinstitutions,thereisaneedtoobservehowthey
actuallywork.
Anotherareaoffutureresearchcouldtakeisevaluatinggenderdifferenceswithin
theMayancommunity.VanCott(2010a)speaksabouttheneedtoevaluatetheintersection
ofethnicityandgender.WithintheMayancommunity,thereisstillaviewfemalescanonly
participateiftheyfinishtheirotherduties,suchaschildrearing(Ekern2011).
UnderstandinghowfemaleswithintheMayancommunityhaveorhavenotovercome
traditionalroleswouldgiveamoreholisticviewoftheentireMayancommunity
participates.
BuildingofftheneedtoevaluategroupswhoareexcludedintheMayancommunity,
istheneedtoevaluatethedemocraticnatureoftraditionalinstitutions(VanCott2010a).
ThisthesishasdemonstratedhowMayansinGuatemalaareparticipatingatthelocallevel
ratherthanattemptingtobuildanationwidepan-Mayanparty.Afairquestiontoaskis
whetherthesetraditioninstitutionsaredemocraticandinclusiveofallmembersofthe
Mayancommunity.
Overall,futureresearchonMayanpoliticalparticipationcouldtakemanydifferent
paths.Thereisaneedtoevaluatethesetraditionalandlocalinstitutions.Morethan
anythingthereisaneedtounderstandmorein-depthhowtheGuatemalanMayan
communityparticipatespolitically.
28
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Appendix
Figure1:Wouldyouvoteforanindigenouspersonforpresident?withOddsRatios
P>.10*P>.05**P>.01***
31
Table2:Wouldadarkskinnedpersonmakeabadpoliticalleader?
P>.10*P>.05**P>.01***
32