Page source: http://intersectionproject.eu//article/russia-europe/transnistrian-deja-vu
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Author: Andrey Devyatkov
The Transnistrian deja vu
The President of Transnistria Yevgeny Shevchuk issued a decree “On the implementation of the outcome of the
national referendum held on September 17, 2006” on September 7. This document prescribes that “the legal
system of Transnistria is to be brought into line with federal legislation of the Russian Federation, which is the
key vector of domestic policy of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic”.
Passions are running high both in Transnistria and Moldova in the run-up to the presidential elections on both
banks. Still, the world has not yet recovered from the “Crimean effect”. Given these two factors, the reaction
to Shevchuk’s decree has been harsh: the initiative has been commented upon by many talking heads in
Chisinau and Bucharest and news of it has spread both in the Russian and international media spaces.
It is not the first time that an initiative of harmonization or the bringing Transnistrian legislation into
compliance with Russian legislation has been put forward by the head of Transnistria. In December 2013,
Yevgeny Shevchuk laid out before the Transnistrian parliament a draft constitutional law stating that “the
legal system of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic comprises federal legislation of the Russian Federation,
legislation of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic and generally recognized principles and norms of
international law as well as international treaties”. The Transnistrian Supreme Council even passed the bill at
its first reading but later turned to the State Duma of the Russian Federation for consultation. It was
recommended that the bill be given a further coat of paint and that a new draft should be submitted. The issue
has not been raised ever since.
In 2013, the Transnistrian authorities’ attention was most probably focused on drawing Russia’s attention to
the fate of Transnistria in the aftermath of Moldova’s signing of the Association Agreement with the European
Union. Reference to the EU-Moldova Association Agreement is also made in the explanatory memorandum of
the bill. Since the markets of the European Union, Moldova and Ukraine are vital for Transnistria (on average,
the region delivers one third of the total volume of exports to the EU alone), failure to join the Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) would have been fraught with huge losses to Transnistrian economy
difficult to recoup. However, Russia did not resort to serious political decisions such as the recognition of
Transnistria nor a sharp increase in provision of financial support back then. And in 2015, Moscow agreed to
Transnistria’s prospective joining of the free trade area with Moldova and the European Union.
The Transnistrian authorities have since put a different emphasis on their initiative. If one reads the decree till
the end, two items are worthy of special attention. First of all, Yevgeny Shevchuk instructs the government,
parliament and judiciary to set up a special commission within two weeks and submit a plan to harmonize
Transnistrian legislation with federal legislation of the Russian Federation for his approval no later than by
November 1, 2016. Secondly, the decree stipulates that the legal acts, which contradict the fundamental
principles of federal legislation in Russia, should be deemed inapplicable as they are in violation of the will of
the people of Transnistria.
A serious conflict between the executive and legislative branches of the government is currently observable in
Transnistria against the backdrop of the forthcoming presidential election. The Obnovleniye (Renewal) party
has held a majority in the Supreme Council of Transnistria since 2005. Observers link this party directly to the
largest economic operator in the region – the “Sheriff” group of companies. The conflict escalated into a
political one following attempts of the executive branch to weaken the monopoly status of “Sheriff”
economically and impose upon it higher customs duties to be paid to the treasury (after having revoked its
status as a “special importer” which it was granted in the days of Igor Smirnov), pay higher prices for gas etc.
The Transnistrian parliament was the first to launch an information attack. Practically anything could be used
to attack the president: a currency crisis, delays in the payment of salaries and pensions, a ban on the import
of excise goods via the Transnistrian section of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border introduced by Kyiv. Moreover,
the Supreme Council managed to significantly expand its powers due to certain legislative changes.
Besides, dubious measures were also employed against the executive branch. For example, a press-conference
was held in Moscow with the participation of a former investigator from Transnistria who spoke of the
siphoning off of funds via offshore operations of businesses belonging to the authorities. A plan for disrupting
the presidential election, allegedly drawn up by Shevchuk’s spin doctors, appeared online. As a result, these
actions have triggered political destabilization in Transnistria.
In view of this, the decree of September 7 resembles an attempt by the president to fight back. To begin with,
harmonization of Transnistrian and Russian legislation, although a convincing slogan, is extremely difficult to
implement in practice. Transnistria and Russia bear a number of significant differences when it comes to
administrative and territorial structures, fiscal and customs systems, land ownership matters etc. In any case,
the mere development of a plan to harmonize legislation would take far longer than one month. Yet through
the decree, the president has taken political initiative. And secondly, the decree will allow reference to Russian
political practice based on a purely presidential form of governance. For example, this concerns such cases in
which Transnistrian MPs attempt to enact laws without the president’s consent or else ones aimed at
significantly expanding their privileges.
What are Russia’s stakes in this game? At the top decision-making level Russia is clearly trying to maintain a
neutral position by showing no preference for one political camp or another, in contrast to the 2011 election.
On the one hand, President Shevchuk’s approval rating is currently at a low ebb, against the backdrop of
socio-economic difficulties. According to a poll conducted by VCIOM (the Russian Public Opinion Research
Center), as few as 14% of respondents were prepared to vote for him whereas 25% had a preference for Vadim
Krasnoselsky, the Supreme Council Speaker. On the other hand, the information attack launched by the
Supreme Council against the executive branch has clearly put the Kremlin on the back foot. Unable to increase
the financial assistance it provides to the region, Moscow is primarily interested in political stability in
Transnistria. Hence comes the verbal support for Yevgeny Shevchuk expressed by Dmitry Rogozin following
his visit to Tiraspol. In his interview for the “Kommersant” newspaper the latter said that the President of
Transnistria copes with his tasks quite well, like a manager faced with difficult circumstances.
It is also noteworthy that Moscow has no enmity (or obvious sympathy, for that matter) for the two leading
political forces. The current situation differs greatly from that of 2011 when Moscow directly contributed to
the failure of Igor Smirnov in the presidential election having conducted large-scale information campaigns
and employed other resources to that end.
Therefore, political groups among the Russian establishment establish relations both with Yevgeny Shevchuk
and the Supreme Council. For example, the Obnovleniye party has close ties with United Russia. The Russian
ruling party invites Transnistrian MPs to its congresses whereas Obnovleniye makes campaign contributions to
candidates in the upcoming election to the State Duma from United Russia by organizing meetings with
residents of Transnistria who will vote in the election.
Yevgeny Shevchuk also enjoys Moscow’s (indirect) support. His political ally, the former head of the
Transnistrian Customs Committee and former Minister of the Interior of Transnistria Gennady Kuzmichev
announced that he would run for president having taken on leadership in the “Russian Outpost” movement.
The establishment of the movement was announced during a Moscow press-conference. Prominent Russian
political scientists such as Sergey Markov, representatives of the Institute of CIS Countries and other
organizations supported the initiative of the formation of the “Russian Outpost” through their personal
presence.
The problem rather lies in the fact that an election race is also under way in Moldova. The leader of the “proRussian” Party of Socialists Igor Dodon stands a good chance of winning the presidential race. Dodon
promotes the idea of federalizing Moldova with a view to reintegration with Transnistria. Dodon reacted
emotionally to the initiative of Yevgeny Shevchuk claiming that “Transnistria has always been and always will
be part of the Republic of Moldova”. His emotions were stirred in light of the fact that the motive of
Transnistria’s desire to join Russia allows his opponents to argue that Dodon’s pro-Russian orientation is
detrimental to the country.
The leader of the Party of Socialists also enjoys substantial support from Moscow. The so-called Izborsk Club
openly sides with him. The club is represented by a number of famous figures such as Alexander Prokhanov,
Mikhail Delyagin, Nikolay Starikov and State Duma deputy Oleg Pakholkov. Members of the Izborsk Club have
already condemned Yevgeny Shevchuk’s decree.
Taking into account all of the abovementioned circumstances, Moscow is unlikely to treat the Transnistrian
initiative seriously. Hence, the words of Dmitry Peskov, the Press Secretary for the President of Russia who
stated that “one should understand what these actions are based upon” and that he cannot make any
comments given the lack of details, can be considered sincere indeed.
Category
Russia / Europe