Biljana Stošić, Radul Milutinović, Fakultet organizacionih nauka, 2017.
MENADŽMENT INOVACIJA - adaptirani materijal za nastavu
Studija slučaja: KODAK-POLAROID
Kodak
Industry
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Polaroid
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Digital imaging
Photography
Mobile devices
Industry
Predecessor
The Eastman Dry Plate Company
Founded
Founded
September 4, 1888; 128 years ago
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States;
1937; 79 years ago
Founder
George Eastman, Henry A. Strong
Founder
Edwin H. Land
Headquarters
Rochester, New York, United States
Headquarters Minnetonka, Minnesota, U.S.
Area served
Worldwide
Area served
Worldwide
Jeffrey J. Clarke (CEO)
James V. Continenza (Chairman)
Key people
Scott W. Hardy (CEO)
Key people
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Products
Digital imaging and photographic
materials, equipment and services
Number of
employees
6,500 (2015)
Website
www.kodak.com
www.kodakalaris.com
Products
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Photo
Consumer electronics
Licensing
Digital cameras
Instant cameras
Action cameras
Instant film
Parent
PLR IP Holdings, LLC
Website
polaroid.com
SARADNJA I SPOR DVA GIGANTA U INDUSTRIJI FOTOGRAFIJE
Dva giganta sa dugom tradicijom u industriji fotografije, Polaroid i Eastman Kodak, decenijama su imali saradnju koja
je donosila veliku korist i jednom i drugom. Tako je upravo Kodak 1934. bio prvi korisnik Land-ovih (Polaroid)
plastičnih polarizatora – optičkih filtera (engl. plastic polarizer sheet), invencije od koje je Harvard odustao, a do koje
je Land došao sa svojih devetnaest godina.
In 1943, when Land launched an experimental program to develop a photographic system that could deliver an
image in minutes without having to send the film to a laboratory for processing, it was his colleagues at Kodak
that provided the necessary photographic chemicals, despite having no idea what Land was up to. When the first
Polaroid one-step photography system was introduced in 1948, it was Kodak that manufactured the negatives, a
function it performed for every film Polaroid introduced thereafter, including its first colour film, Polacolor,
released in 1963. By the mid-60s, Polaroid had become Kodak's second largest corporate customer, trailing only
the tobacco companies for whom Kodak manufactured plastic cylinders for use in cigarette filters.
Iznenada 1968. godine, relacija se promenila kada je Land ponudio saradnju Kodaku u vezi sa poslednjim i
najznačajnijim inovativnim proizvodom – sistem instant fotografije.
Po prvi put, Kodak je prepoznao ovaj sistem kao potencijalnu pretnju
svojoj dominaciji u amaterskoj fotografiji, menjajući svoju percepciju
prema tehnologiji Polaroida. Kao posledica toga, Kodak je insistirao da
mu bude dozvoljena prodaja instant filma za Polaroid kamere u
prepoznatljivim žutim kutijama sa Kodak logom.
Ovako direktnu konkurenciju Polaroid nije mogao prihvatiti, i tada,
zapravo, dve kompanije kreću sopstvenim putem. Polaroid razvija i gradi
sopstvenu proizvodnju filma za svoj novi instant sistem, a Kodak
intenzivira tekuća istraživanja na razvoju sopstvenog instant sistema, kako bi ostao konkurentan.
U proleće 1972. na sastanku kompanije Land je prvi put prezentovao svoj novi sistem instant fotografije nazvan SX70. Svet je bio fasciniran onim što je Wall Street Journal nazvao “glamurozna, ali, i dalje misteriozna instant kamera u
boji”. Iste te godine u oktobru, kompanija je bila u potpunosti spremna da lansira novi proizvod na tržište. Kamera
SX-70 je dobila veliki medijski prostor.
S druge strane, lansiranje modela SX-70 na tržište je dodatno intenziviralo nezadovoljstvo u kompaniji Kodak. Tada
Kodak dolazi na ideju da pokuša sa kreiranjem sopstvenog sistema instant fotografije, koji neće kršiti patente koje
poseduje kompanija Polaroid. Do početka 1972. Kodak je pokušao da odgovori time što je razvio Lanyard kameru.
U martu, neposredno pre prezentacije modela SX-70, Lanyard kamera je predstavljena menadžmentu kompanije
Kodak. Svi su bili srećni onim što su videli, posebno veličinom i konfiguracijom kamere. Rad na Lanyard kameri i filmu
je nastavljen i intenzivira se u Ročester laboratoriji – završetak rada na finom podešavanju optičkih, mehaničkih i
fotometrijskih komponenti je bio planiran za maj iste godine.
Ali Land-ova prezentacija modela SX-70 je imala momentalni uticaj na Kodakovu istraživačku laboratoriju. U
izveštaju, u kojem je prikazano poređenje modela SX-70 sa Kodakovim prototipom, istraživači su naglasili da je
Kodakova kamera isuviše velika. Međutim, Kodak nije odustajao, tako da su odmah po lansiranju modela SX-70 na
tržište, inženjeri Kodaka kupili veliki broj Polaroidovih proizvoda i odneli u svoju laboratoriju na ispitivanje.
Iako se dizajn Kodakovog aparata relativno razlikovao od Polaroida, Polaroid je podigao tužbu protiv Kodaka nekoliko
meseci nakon lansiranja novog proizvoda, za povredu 12 patenata, optužujući kompaniju Kodak da je ilegalno
inkorporirala tehnologiju instant fotografije u svoj proizvod. Oni su tvrdili da je za vreme od deset godina kompanija
Eastman Kodak nanela štetu kompaniji Polaroid u vrednosti od 12 milijardi dolara.
Though Kodak was dismayed by the formidable challenge posed by the new system, it was even more
determined, under the leadership of its new president, Walter Fallon, to retreat from its current position well
down the wrong road toward its goal of competing with Polaroid.
First, it decided to scrap a project aimed at developing a color film that could be used in Polaroid's existing peelapart cameras. Up to this point, Kodak had already spent $94 million on this effort. As recently as its April 1972
shareholders meeting, then chief executive Gerald Zornow had proclaimed that Kodak "definitely" planned to sell
the peel-apart film.
But it was apparent to Fallon and his colleagues that, in light of the impressive integral SX-70 system, peel-apart
technology was not going to be the answer.
In a November 6 memo to Kodak management, a senior researcher noted that if Kodak continued with its peelapart film, "We would be introducing an essentially obsolete product, in a dying phase of . . . [the instant
photography] market with little or no possibility of recouping the additional capital required to achieve a
marketable . . . [peel-apart] product."
Kodak would instead "concentrate its efforts" on coming up with products to compete directly with SX-70.
On November 17, 1972, Kodak went public with its decision, announcing "that it had changed its mind and no
longer planned to market its own self-developing [peel-apart] film for use in Polaroid Corporation cameras."
Yet Kodak executives stubbornly denied any connection to Polaroid's introduction: "We don't respond to outside
effects like the SX-70," claimed Colby Chandler, Kodak's executive vice president of its U.S. and Canadian
photographic divisions. "We watch the competition for information, but we don't respond to it."
In addition to abandoning the peel-apart project, Kodak recognized that it had to change course radically for its
development program to have any chance of producing a product that would be competitive with the Polaroid
system, even if that product were not released until 1975. This was a formidable enterprise.
As observed many years later by industry commentators, Kodak, feeling "hemmed in by Polaroid’s vast portfolio
of patents," had indeed "panicked." In apparent desperation, a KPDC memo directed Kodak engineers to "not be
constrained by what an individual feels is a potential patent infringement." Although the memo did go on to
direct the researchers to "consult" the patent department in such instances, the excerpted passage would,
commencing in 1976 when Kodak finally introduced its competing instant camera and film system, later serve as
the signal call for Polaroid and its legal team for years to come—all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Finalna presuda, saopštena 1990, nije iznosila 12 milijardi dolara (vrednost za koju su mnogi smatrali da je
preterana), već 909 miliona dolara. Krivica im je izrečena po osnovu 7 od 12 patentnih prijava. Nakon suđenja 1985.
Kodak je bio „isteran“ sa tržišta instant fotografije. To je bila veoma loša vest za kupce koji su kupili Kodakovu instant
kameru.
The case did end favourably for Kodak though, especially after the high demands from Polaroid, who felt that
Kodak had intentionally copied their technology. After a 14-year legal battle, in 1991 Kodak was finally ordered to
pay Polaroid a total of $909 million, $925 million with interest, the largest settlement ever paid out until last year
when Apple was awarded $1.049 billion in damages from Samsung infringements.
As part of the settlement, Kodak needed to provide compensation for customers who had bought any of their
instant cameras between 1976 and 1986 and would no longer be able to purchase film to use in them. Owners of
Kodak instant cameras were invited to call a toll free number and register themselves in order to receive a
settlement packet. The packet was mailed out to those who registered, and provided customers with instructions
of how to receive a rebate check or certificate, which often involved removing the name plate off of the front of
the camera and mailing it in as proof of purchase.
RAZVOJ DIGITALNE FOTOGRAFIJE – KODAK
Zamislite svet u kome je fotografija spor proces koji je nemoguće savladati bez studiranja i pripravničkog staža. Svet
bez iPhon-a ili instagrama, svet gde vlada jedna kompanija. Takav svet je postojao 1973. godine, kada je Steven
Sasson, mladi inženjer (24 godine), počeo da radi za Eastman Kodak. Dve godine kasnije - 1975. izumeo je digitalnu
fotografiju i napravio prvu digitalnu kameru.
Sasson je kreirao proces koji nam danas omogućava da pravimo fotografije na telefonu, šaljemo fotografije širom
sveta u sekundi i delimo ih sa milionima ljudi. Isti proces je u potpunosti potresao industriju u kojoj je dominirao
njegov poslodavac - Kodak.
It started out innocently enough. Soon after arriving at Kodak, Mr. Sasson was given a seemingly unimportant
task — to see whether there was any practical use for a charged coupled device (C.C.D.), which had been
invented a few years earlier. “Hardly anybody knew I was working on this, because it wasn’t that big of a
project,” Mr. Sasson said “It wasn’t secret. It was just a project to keep me from getting into trouble doing
something else, I guess.”
He quickly ordered a couple of them and set out to evaluate the devices, which consisted of a sensor that took an
incoming two dimensional light pattern and converted it into an electrical signal. Mr. Sasson wanted to capture
an image with it, but the C.C.D. couldn’t hold it because the electrical pulses quickly dissipated.
To store the image, he decided to use what was at that time a relatively new process — digitalization — turning
the electronic pulses into numbers. But that solution led to another challenge — storing it on RAM memory, then
getting it onto digital magnetic tape.
The final result was a Rube Goldberg device with a lens scavenged from a used Super-8 movie camera; a portable
digital cassette recorder; 16 nickel cadmium batteries; an analog/digital converter; and several dozen circuits —
all wired together on half a dozen circuit boards.
It looks strange today, but remember, this was before personal computers – the first build it yourself Apple
computer kit went on sale that next year for $666.66.
Otkriće digitalne kamere je bio istorijski trenutak, ali Sasson je morao da kreira i playback sistem (sistem za
reprodukciju) koji će preneti digitalne informacije na kasetu i pretvoriti ih „u nešto što se može videti“ preko
televizora - digitalnu fotografiju.
“They were convinced that no one would ever want to look at their pictures on a television set.”
— Steven Sasson
“This was more than just a camera,” said Mr. Sasson. “It was a photographic system to demonstrate the idea of
an all-electronic camera that didn’t use film and didn’t use paper, and no consumables at all in the capturing and
display of still photographic images.”
The camera and the playback system were the beginning of the digital photography era. But the digital revolution
did not come easily at Kodak.
Sasson made a series of demonstrations to groups of executives from the marketing, technical and business
departments and then to their bosses and to their bosses. He brought the portable camera into conference rooms
and demonstrated the system by taking a photo of people in the room.
“It only took 50 milliseconds to capture the image, but it took 23 seconds to record it to the tape,” Mr. Sasson
said. “I’d pop the cassette tape out, hand it to my assistant and he put it in our playback unit. About 30 seconds
later, up popped the 100 pixel by 100 pixel black and white image.”
Though the quality was poor, Mr. Sasson told them that the resolution would improve rapidly as technology
advanced and that it could compete in the consumer market against 110 film and 135 film cameras. Trying to
compare it with already existing consumer electronics, he suggested they “think of it as an HP calculator with a
lens.” He even talked about sending images on a telephone line.
Their response was tepid, at best. “Print had been with us for over 100 years, no one was complaining about
prints, they were very inexpensive, and so why would anyone want to look at their picture on a television set?”
Glavne zamerke na ovu inovaciju su dali marketing i biznis eksperti. Kodak je imao virtuelni monopol na tržištu
fotografije u SAD, i pravili su profit na svakom koraku u okviru procesa stvaranja fotografije. Na primer, u to vreme
da biste fotografisali rođendan svog deteta verovatno biste koristili Kodak Instamatic, Kodak film i Kodak blic.
Fotografije ste mogli da razvijete u radnji na ćošku ili da poštom pošaljete film Kodaku i dobijete nazad slike
korišćenjem Kodak hemije i Kodak papira. Bio je to odličan poslovni model.
Kada su izvršioci kompanije Kodak pitali kada će digitalna fotografija postati konkurentna, Sasson je iskoristio Murov
zakon, koji predviđa napredovanje digitalne tehnologije i predvideo da će to biti za period od 15 do 20 godina.
Ispostavilo se da je Kodak ponudio svoju prvu digitalnu kameru 18 godina kasnije.
“When you’re talking to a bunch of corporate guys about 18 to 20 years in the future, when none of those guys
will still be in the company, they don’t get too excited about it,” he said. “But they allowed me to continue to work
on digital cameras, image compression and memory cards.”
Prva digitalna kamera je patentirana 1978. godine. Nazvali su je elektronski fotoaparat. Međutim, Sasson-u nije
dozvoljeno da o tome razgovara ili da pokazuje prototip bilo kome van kompanije Kodak.
Godine 1989. Sasson i njegov kolega Robert Hills, kreirali su prvu modernu digitalnu kameru - Ecam, koja izgleda kao
današnji profesionalni modeli – S.L.R single-lens reflex. Ova kamera je imala rezoluciju od 1,2 megapiksela i koristila
je kompresiju slike i memorijsku karticu.
Međutim, ova kamera nije komercijalizovana, već je samo naplaćivano korišćenje patenta.
“When we built that camera, the argument was over,” Mr. Sasson said. “It was just a matter of time, and yet
Kodak didn’t really embrace any of it. That camera never saw the light of day.”
Still, until it expired in the United States in 2007, the digital camera patent helped earn billions for Kodak, since it
— not Mr. Sasson — owned it, making most digital camera manufacturers pay Kodak for the use of the
technology. Though Kodak did eventually market both professional and consumer cameras, it did not fully
embrace digital photography until it was too late.
“Every digital camera that was sold took away from a film camera and we knew how much money we made on
film,” Mr. Sasson said. “That was the argument. Of course, the problem is pretty soon you won’t be able to sell
film — and that was my position.”
Zanimljivost:
Today, the first digital camera Mr. Sasson made in 1975 is on display at the Smithsonian’s National Museum of
American History. President Obama awarded Mr. Sasson the National Medal of Technology and Innovation at a
2009 White House ceremony.
PHOTO SHARING - KODAK
Kodak je imao pravi pokušaj da stvori novu i korisnu funkciju digitalne kamere. Kompanija je 2005. godine lansirala
prvu Wi-Fi kameru na svetu - EasyShare-One. Kamera je imala specijalnu
karticu (odvojena od SD kartice) koja je služila za konektovanje na Wi-Fi
mrežu. Korisnicima je bilo omogućeno da pošalju fotografije prijateljima
direktno sa kamere.
Iako je kamera bila malo glomaznija i imala malo teži način korišćenja Wi-Fi
mreže, radila je kao što je obećano. Slanje fotografija je bio relativno lak
zadatak (izuzev unošenja adrese), i s obzirom da je malo ljudi u to vreme
obezbeđivalo Wi-Fi mrežu šifrom, pronalaženje otvorene mreže bilo je veoma lako, u urbanim sredinama.
Nonetheless, the camera failed to sell well, and Kodak killed the line. However, if the company had the foresight
to realize sharing was going to become the way people interacted with their photos, it might have thought twice.
The year the EasyShare-One came out was the same year a group of engineers founded Eye-Fi, which has gone
on to create a successful business around Wi-Fi-enabled SD cards for cameras — virtually the exact same concept
Kodak abandoned.
"Photo sharing is the killer app today," says Hayzlett. "There's nothing that beats it. The issue is they built a Wi-Fi
camera well before its time, and really the application needs to be on a phone."
Sharing via the Web is by far the biggest way people use their photos, though, and Kodak seemingly got into the
game reasonably early with its purchase of the Ofoto service in 2001 (Snapfish, now owned by HP, was founded
in 2000). It took Kodak four years to relaunch the service as Kodak EasyShare Gallery, though, a huge amount of
time that saw the emergence of Flickr, Picasa, Photobucket and others. Although EasyShare got good reviews for
a while, the buzz surrounding its competitors was too loud for it to make any noise.
And let's not forget cellphones, which not only helped murder Kodak's digital camera business (along with
everyone else's — right, Flip?), but also made photos social. While it would be expecting too much of Kodak to
have created novel apps like Instagram or PicPlz, it was a virtual non-presence in mobile apps (no, SmileMaker
doesn't count), which cemented the company's irrelevance in the way people experience photos today. There are
no Kodak moments in mobile.
PHOTO VIEWING - KODAK
Kodak bet big on digital photo frames and photo printers, though it didn't anticipate the market forces at work in
each field. When Kodak began pushing hard into frames — with differentiating features like Wi-Fi and batteries
(most frames only work when plugged in) — prices were in free-fall, and digital frames were rapidly becoming a
commodity market, with thin margins.
"That's a very tough business to make money in, if you can make it at all," says Hayzlett. "Everybody wants the
best quality for free, basically."
At the same time, Kodak frames were still hampered by the necessity to tie into the company's photo services,
and the setup was much more technically cumbersome than the average person was willing to endure (if you've
ever set up a Wi-Fi frame, you've probably wished Apple would enter the market so it would "just work").
Competing against value brands and other heavy hitters such as HP and Sony, Kodak frames only marginally
stood out, and the company couldn't make any substantial money on them.
The field of photo printing, which Kodak is expected to emphasize if it emerges from bankruptcy, experienced a
total transformation over the last decade. Everyone outside of professional photographers used to get prints of
all their pictures out of necessity, but today few print photos in any quantity. Ever fewer want the hassle of
owning a photo printer, instead choosing to get prints mailed to them from online services like Snapfish.
"They made a big bet on consumer imaging technology — point-and-shoots and photo printers and picture
frames — at a time when people increasingly using their phones," says Leuchter. "And they're not printing as
much. Home printers are nice, but nobody's printing. They're only printing the photos they care most about."
A significant number of consumers do print photos, however, and the cheap-printer-as-means-to-sell-ink model is
a proven model for companies to make money. If indeed Kodak survives, it makes financial sense for it to try and
continue to be a force in the business, though since prints have been demoted to an ancillary way people
experience photos, the company will never become the influencer it once was by focusing on it.
BANKROTSTVO
Eastman Kodak je 2012. godine proglasio bankrot.
Kompanija je objavila da bi prodaja 1100 patenata vezanih za proces digitalne fotografije donela prihod koji bi
mogao da podupre i čak spasi „namučenu“ kompaniju.
Prodaja je objavljena, ali umesto 2,6 milijarde dolara, koliko je Kodak procenio, prodajna cena je bila značajno manja,
oko 525 miliona dolara. Kupac je bio konzorcijum koji je uključivao najveće svetske tehnološke kompanije - Apple,
Google, Facebook i Samsung Electronics.
Zvaničnici Kodaka su saopštili da jedino prodaja patenata vodi izlasku iz bankrota i okretanju novog lista u
poslovanju.
The company filed for bankruptcy protection in 2012, exited legacy businesses and sold off its patents before reemerging as a sharply smaller company in 2013. Once one of the most powerful companies in the world, today
the company has a market capitalization of less than $1 billion.
“This monetization of patents is another major milestone toward successful emergence,” Antonio M. Perez,
Kodak’s chief executive, said in a news release. “Our progress has accelerated over the past several weeks as we
prepare to emerge as a strong, sustainable company.”
Among the benefits of the sale, Mr. Perez noted, was that it would allow Kodak to largely repay a debtor-inpossession loan it obtained nearly a year ago. It also satisfied a major provision for an $830 million financing
facility, approved in November, that required Kodak to sell its patent portfolio for no less than $500 million.
Kodak will retain a license to use the digital imaging portfolio patents in its future businesses, and for those
businesses that it is selling.
POLAROID BANKROT I SADAŠNJE POSLOVANJE
Polaroid won bankruptcy court approval to sell itself for $88 million to a joint venture led by two liquidation firms.
The partnership, led by Gordon Brothers Brands and Hilco Consumer Capital, will acquire substantially all of
Polaroid’s assets, the companies said. The joint venture includes the private equity fund Knight’s Bridge Capital
Partners.
The venture’s bid was approved over an $88 million bid by Patriarch Partners, another private equity firm.
Creditors argued after the court-supervised auction closed that the structure of the partnership’s bid was better
and Patriarch, which offered to adopt that structure, was not given an opportunity to bid again, said Taylor
Griffin, a Patriarch spokesman. The firms will appeal, he said.
The partnership plans to develop a global licensing and marketing strategy for wholesale, retail and online
businesses for Polaroid, according to the statement. Polaroid sought Chapter 11 protection in December.
The Polaroid film cameras may be dead, but you can still have instant photos with the company’s new PoGo
Instant Digital Camera, a compact snapshooter with a built-in printer that lets you capture and immediately print
2-by-3-inch images.
The $200 PoGo camera is a follow-up to Polaroid’s PoGo Instant Mobile Printer, which appeared on store shelves
in July. Like the printer, the combination device uses Zink printing technology, an inkless system that uses heatactivated dye crystals to produce an image in about 60 seconds. The photos have an adhesive backing, which
enables them to double as stickers.
The PoGo camera has a 3-inch LCD for reviewing images before you print. That is essential because the paper will
set you back $12.99 for a pack of 30, or about 43 cents for each photo.
The device looks a bit clunky but weighs only 10 ounces, which is pretty slight when you consider there is a printer
inside. Don’t expect great images or outstanding prints from a device in this price category, though you will get
the instant gratification that Polaroid made famous many decades ago.
PITANJA:
1. Prepoznati trend inovacija koji je ključno uticao na obe kompanije;
2. Analizirati inovacionu strategiju i poslovni model dve kompanije;
3. Prepoznati i označiti ključne događaje sa vremenskom odrednicom; identifikovati uspešne i neuspešne
projekte u obe kompanije;
4. Značaj intelektualne svojine;
5. Naučene lekcije.

Školj Castle and its architectural history Castello Školj e la sua storia