Title: Soviet Decision-Making and the War in Afghanistan
Author: Elias Kühn von Burgsdorff
Date: March 15, 2012
Institution name/journal where submitted: McGill University
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Introduction
The Cold War turned a new page on December 25, 1979, as Soviet divisions began pouring across the
Amu Darya River into Afghanistan. The decision-makers within the Kremlin convinced themselves in the
weeks leading up to the invasion that military intervention was the only viable prescription for securing
both the Soviet Union’s international credibility and its strategic interests in the region. Not surprisingly,
there existed a divide between the Western media’s understanding of the Soviet decision to invade
Afghanistan, and the actual decision-making process that had occurred within the Kremlin as events in
Afghanistan unfolded. While this divide largely stemmed from the secrecy of the Soviet decision-making
process concerning Afghanistan, it was reinforced by the failure of the Carter administration to appreciate
the actual complexity of the events in late 1979, which, eventually, translated directly into the media’s
limited insight. Hence, a comparison between the Western media’s perception of the events surrounding
the invasion of Afghanistan, and the Soviet archival evidence related to this pivotal episode in Cold War
history, illuminates a tragedy in which the final script was ordained as much by personalities, perceptions,
and ideology as by interests and strategies.
Section One: Afghanistan and the Cold War – Why Afghanistan Matters?
The Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan “plunged U.S.-Soviet relations to their lowest point since the
exuberant high of 1972”1. However, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had already
begun waning by as early as 1976, when President Ford “dropped the term ‘détente’ from his lexicon”2 :
namely, competition in the Third World and human rights issues increasingly placed tension on the
superpower honeymoon. Nonetheless, Afghanistan proved to be the culmination of a decade that had seen
a high in U.S.-Soviet cooperation, e.g. fostering the end of the Vietnam War, the signing of SALT I, and
the Helsinki Accords. Thus, in the context of the Cold War, Afghanistan was a clear “game-changer”3:
first, because the invasion (and the U.S. response) marked an end to the era of détente; and second,
because many believed it set the foundations for the ultimate demise of the Soviet Union in the late
1980s.
Primarily, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked the abrupt conclusion to the era of détente. The
bitter response by the United States was more severe than the Kremlin had anticipated. This result
stemmed almost exclusively from the issue that the Kremlin misunderstood détente as the logical
1
"Soviets Assail U.S. Response to Invasion." The Washington Post (1974-Current file): A1. ProQuest Historical
Newspapers: The Washington Post (1877-1995). Jan 06 1980. Web. 27 Mar. 2012.
2
Vladislav M. Zubok. A Failed Empire (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 253.
3
"Allies Seeking U.N. Action on Soviet Invasion." The Washington Post (1974-Current file): A1. ProQuest
Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post (1877-1995). Jan 01 1980. Web. 27 Mar. 2012.
1 outcome of a “new correlation of forces”4. After all, as Artemy M. Kalinovsky suggests in A Long
Goodbye, détente had “offered Soviet leaders the recognition of parity they craved”5. Yet, this
understanding of détente largely disregarded the unique combination of political and personal factors that
had existed upon the emergence of the system in the late 1960s. The consequent superpower
confrontation, which emerged in the early 1980s, had a feeling of déjà vu, i.e. a rampant arms race, covert
secret service battles, and psychological warfare which likened the situation to the last years of Stalin’s
rule.6
Secondly, the severe consequences of the Afghan invasion forced Soviet leaders to re-evaluate
interventions as an instrument of foreign policy. When revolution erupted in Poland in the summer of
1980, even a hardliner like KGB chairman Yuri Andropov conceded that: “the quota of interventions
abroad has been exhausted” 7. Vladislav M. Zubok in A Failed Empire goes so far as to argue that
Afghanistan “presents itself as one of the first signs of Soviet imperial overstretch”8. In line with this
thinking, the Sinatra Doctrine, which defined Gorbachev’s non-interventionist approach, found its roots in
the hangover the Soviet leaders felt following their initial overindulgence in Afghanistan.9 Thus, the
Soviet decision to intervene militarily in Afghanistan matters because it arguably defined the course of
the Cold War for the entire next decade: severely escalating U.S.-Soviet tensions in the early 1980s, and
in the longer run leading to the demise of the Soviet system.
Section Two: The Media and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Afghanistan caught the Western media’s attention in the spring of 1978, when the Saur Revolution
toppled President Daoud’s “genuinely nonaligned”10 government and installed a pro-Soviet regime under
the leadership of Nur Mohammad Taraki. The crisis in Afghanistan worsened as Taraki failed to gain
substantial support among the Afghan people. Coupled by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the
region, the domestic situation within the Soviet Union’s southern neighbour steadily deteriorated.
Through the eyes of the media, Moscow’s decision in late 1979 to intervene militarily in Afghanistan was
predominantly the result of strategic thinking. Two arguments prevailed. First, “if Afghan Moslem
insurgents succeeded in overthrowing a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, it could spark restiveness among the
4
Zubok, 259.
Artemy M. Kalinovsky. A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2001), 4.
6
Zubok, 265.
7
Kalinovsky, 2.
8
Zubok, 228.
9
Kalinovsky, 231.
10
"A Communist Coup in Afghanistan." New York Times (1923-Current file): A28. ProQuest Historical
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008) with Index (1851-1993). May 05 1978. Web. 27 Mar. 2012.
5
2 Soviet Union’s 50 million Moslems.”11 And second, “to secure, eventually, access to the Indian Ocean
through Pakistan and Iran.”12 Tellingly, the Western media’s emphasis on strategic factors, and wholesale
disregard for issues concerning credibility and ideology, largely reflected Washington’s own
misconception of Soviet decision-making in the late 1970s.
Following the Saur Revolution in April 1978, the New York Times reported that Brezhnev (General
Secretary of the Soviet Union) had promised “all necessary help”13 to the Taraki Government to deal with
the rising Islamic insurgency. By October 1979, the CIA estimated that “more than 2000 Soviet personnel
[were] advising Afghanistan’s economic ministries,” and that “the Soviet Union [was] already committed
to $500 million in economic aid to Afghanistan”.14 However, the situation continued to deteriorate, as was
highlighted first by an uprising in Herat in the spring of 1979, and then by a coup d’état in mid-September
which saw the “elimination”15 of Taraki and the accession of Hafizullah Amin: “an extremist even among
extremists”16. The media interpreted the coup as highly troubling because there had been “indications that
the Soviet Union was not satisfied with Mr. Amin as Prime Minister”17. Nonetheless, the predominant
consensus within the West was that “Moscow would stop short of sending troops” into Afghanistan”18. As
a result, news of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in late December 1979 struck the world by
surprise, including Washington.
Interestingly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shifted the media’s attention away from the theme of
“Moslem insurgency”19 towards the hot topic of “U.S.-Soviet relations”20. “For the first time, Moscow
[had] asserted its power to intervene outside the Soviet bloc.”21 In particular, Soviet Union’s apparent
11
"Soviets Invasion of Afghanistan is Likely to Raise Pressures for Decisive U.S. Move." Wall Street Journal (1923
- Current file): 4. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Wall Street Journal (1889-1994). Dec 31 1979. Web. 27
Mar. 2012.
12
"Soviets Invasion of Afghanistan is Likely to Raise Pressures for Decisive U.S. Move." Wall Street Journal.
13
"No Light at End of the Tunnel for Russians in Afghanistan." New York Times (1923-Current file): E2.ProQuest
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008) with Index (1851-1993). Sep 23 1979. Web. 27 Mar.
2012.
14
"In Afghanistan, 2 Soviet Trends Now Emerging." New York Times (1923-Current file): A6. ProQuest Historical
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008) with Index (1851-1993). Oct 30 1979. Web. 27 Mar. 2012.
15
"New Afghan Leader, Taking Over, Pledges a Better Socialist Order." New York Times (1923-Current file):
1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008) with Index (1851-1993). Sep 18 1979. Web.
27 Mar. 2012.
16
"Bloody Kabul." New York Times (1923-Current file): 20. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times
(1851-2008) with Index (1851-1993). Sep 22 1979. Web. 27 Mar. 2012.
17
"New Afghan Leader, Taking Over, Pledges a Better Socialist Order." New York Times.
18
"Insurgency Poses Growing Threat to Afghanistans Pro-Soviet Rulers." New York Times (1923-Current file):
1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008) with Index (1851-1993). Jun 24 1979. Web.
27 Mar. 2012.
19
"Insurgency Poses Growing Threat to Afghanistans Pro-Soviet Rulers." New York Times.
20
"Soviets Assail U.S. Response to Invasion." The Washington Post.
21
"Deeper and Dirtier in Afghanistan." New York Times (1923-Current file): 18. ProQuest Historical Newspapers:
The New York Times (1851-2008) with Index (1851-1993). Jan 01 1980. Web. 27 Mar. 2012.
3 “willingness to send troops to a nation outside its well-recognized sphere of influence in Eastern
Europe”22 disturbed the Carter administration. Media sources reported that this fear was accentuated, first,
by the geographical proximity of Afghanistan to the “oil-rich Persian Gulf”23; and second, by the recent
events in Iran where the Western-backed Shah was removed by an Islamic revolution. “The last several
years have witnessed a shipwreck in America's reputation as a valid protector, with the Teheran hostage
crisis itself lethally damaging our prestige.”24 In the light of this perceived deterioration of U.S.
credibility, “Mr. Brzezinski (President Carter’s National Security Advisor) put forward the rationale for a
more assertive strategy”25.
The repercussions for this “naked act of aggression”26 – as the United States saw the Soviet invasion –
were severe, both domestically and internationally. “[Soviet] troops are bogged down with no victory in
sight. Their economy is under ever-increasing strain. Salt II is in limbo, and détente is derailed.”27
Moreover, this article in the Chicago Tribune continues: “It has speeded up the Chinese-American
rapprochement. It has made it more likely that new intermediate-range nuclear missiles will be installed in
Western Europe. And it has increased suspicion of Soviet motives and aims among many Islamic and
other nations.”28 There was a clear consensus amongst the Western media that “the worldwide response
[to the invasion of Afghanistan] was more severe than the Soviets expected”29.
The ‘strategic’ arguments that the media suggested prior to the Soviet invasion as to why the Soviet
Union may have interests in military intervention in the region largely resurfaced after the events
unfolded. “In strategic geopolitical terms, the Soviets secured a vital area on their southern frontier.”
Moreover, “there is one fewer unstable Islamic state that could produce a violently anti-Communist
regime and become an outpost of Western strength”30. Overall, the Western media’s response to the
Afghan intervention was highly negative. “The ugly Afghan adventure is hardly the crown of a successful
foreign policy,” wrote the New York Times on January 1, 1980.31 Yet, due to the secrecy of the decision 22
"Soviets Invasion of Afghanistan is Likely to Raise Pressures for Decisive U.S. Move." Wall Street Journal.
"How to Thwart Soviet Ambitions." Chicago Tribune (1963-Current file): B3. ProQuest Historical Newspapers:
Chicago Tribune (1849-1988). Apr 03 1979. Web. 27 Mar. 2012.
24
"A Hands-Off U.S. Policy on Afghanistan? no." New York Times (1923-Current file): E19. ProQuest Historical
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008) with Index (1851-1993). Jan 06 1980. Web. 27 Mar. 2012.
25
"U.S. is Indirectly Pressing Russians to Halt Afghanistan Intervention." New York Times (1923-Current file):
A1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008) with Index (1851-1993). Aug 03 1979.
Web. 27 Mar. 2012.
26
"Allies Seeking U.N. Action on Soviet Invasion." The Washington Post.
27
"Soviets Sure Afghan Invasion Worth the Price." Chicago Tribune (1963-Current file): 8. ProQuest Historical
Newspapers: Chicago Tribune (1849-1988). Dec 21 1980. Web. 27 Mar. 2012.
28
"Soviets Sure Afghan Invasion Worth the Price." Chicago Tribune.
29
"Soviets Sure Afghan Invasion Worth the Price." Chicago Tribune.
30
"Soviets Sure Afghan Invasion Worth the Price." Chicago Tribune.
31
"Deeper and Dirtier in Afghanistan." New York Times.
23
4 making within the Kremlin, journalists could, at best, only speculate what actually pushed the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan. Therefore, the media’s understanding of the situation was largely shaped by
statements made in Washington: causing the Western media to portray an incomplete reality which
largely ignored the issues of credibility and ideology. The primary documents analysed in the next section
provide more insight into the complexity of the “Afghan question” 32.
Section Three: Primary Documents and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
The New York Times suggested in the months leading up to the invasion that there existed “a very thin
line between crisis and quagmire”33. The primary documents concerning the Soviet intervention reveal the
accuracy of this statement. In a time span of just three weeks before the invasion materialized, the Soviet
decision-makers reversed their earlier conclusions and decided in favour of military intervention.
Curiously, by as late as October 1979, there still existed a consensus amongst the Soviet political elite that
military intervention was by no means a viable option in solving the ‘Afghan question’. What inspired
this fatal turnabout? It is evident that Hafizullah Amin’s coup d’état in mid-September 1979 set the
essential foundations for changing Moscow’s stance: marking not only a turn to the worse for the
domestic Afghan situation, but also compromising Brezhnev’s personal credibility on the issue.
Moreover, the primary documents suggest that by late 1979 the Soviet Union’s perception concluded that
the United States had become insincere concerning détente, which solidified the Soviet leader’s
conviction to intervene in Afghanistan.
The question of military intervention first arose during the bloody rebellion in Herat, Afghanistan, in
March 1979. As the situation proved ever-more critical, President Taraki travelled to Moscow to plead in
person with Soviet leaders for greater Soviet support. In the days preceding Taraki’s visit, the Kremlin
elites formulated their stance concerning Afghanistan. A consensus emerged against direct Soviet military
involvement, with Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev confronting Taraki on the issue on March 20.
“And now for the question of the possibility of deploying soviet military forces in Afghanistan. We
examined this question from every angle, weighed it carefully, and, I will tell you frankly: this should not
be done.”34 The archival evidence reveals that the Soviet leaders were absolutely aware of the domestic
and, more decisively, the international repercussions such a dramatic moved entailed. “All that we have
done in recent years with such effort in terms of détente in international tensions, arms reductions, and
32
“About further measures to provide for the national interests of the USSR in relation to events in Afghanistan,” 28
January 1980, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 164.
33
"Bloody Kabul." New York Times.
34
“Record of Conversation of Brezhnev and Taraki,” 20 March 1979, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 74.
5 much more – all that would be thrown back,” Gromyko (Minister of Foreign Affairs) argued at a
Presidium meeting on March 17, 1979. 35 The decision against intervention, however, did not seem final.
The Soviet Union continued to support the Marxist Afghan regime by “political and economic means”36.
The illusory project of leading Afghanistan along the path of socialist reform was not renounced. Yet, the
removal of Taraki and the accession of Amin as President of Afghanistan in mid-September represented,
as Yuri Andropov later remarked to Brezhnev: “an undesirable turn for us”37. In early October, in a
conversation with Honecker (the East German President), Brezhnev pronounced that the Soviet Union
was “not pleased by all of Amin’s methods”38. The Soviet leadership feared that Amin’s brutality
alienated the Marxist regime from large sectors of Afghan society, indirectly sponsoring the cause of the
Islamic insurgency. A report to the CC CPSU on October 29 stated that “the scale of repressions in the
Party, army, state apparatus and civic organizations has widened,” despite “repeated appeals of our
comrades warning him that such a step might have dire consequences for the country”.39 Tellingly, the
documents consistently express Moscow’s frustration with Amin’s rule in the light of the growing
instability in the region.
Amin’s accession to power and ensuing actions as Afghanistan’s President generated increasing concern
amongst the Soviet leadership that their credibility and authority was being undermined, if not
jeopardized. Gen. Lyakhovsky reported that after Amin’s coup, Brezhnev used to say: “how should the
world be able to believe what Brezhnev says, if his words do not count in Afghanistan?”40 The
assassination of Brezhnev’s Afghan protégé suddenly involved the General Secretary personally in the
affairs of Afghanistan. Moreover, Brezhnev and the other Soviet elites were privately convinced of
Amin’s “insincerity and duplicity”41. In the light of the past Soviet support for Taraki, Moscow suspected
Amin of planning on “doing a Sadat on us”: a wholesale defection from the Soviet camp and an
alignment with the United States, which would allow the Americans to place “their control and
intelligence centers close to our most sensitive borders”42. The ever-growing signs that Amin’s leadership
could seriously jeopardize Soviet credibility were a real concern.
35
“About the Exacerbation of the Situation in the DRA and Our Possible Moves,” 17 March 1979, CWIHP Bulletin,
e-Doessier No. 4, 71.
36
“Record of Conversation of Brezhnev and Taraki,” 20 March 1979, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 74.
37
“Personal memorandum, Andropov to Brezhnev,” early December 1979, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 159.
38
“Transcript of Brezhnev-Honecker summit in East Berlin,” 4 October, 1979, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4,
157.
39
“Transcript of Brezhnev-Honecker summit in East Berlin,” 4 October, 1979, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4,
157.
40
“Concerning the Situation in ‘A’,” early January 1980, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 130.
41
“Afghanistan,” late December 1979, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 75.
42
“Concerning the Situation in ‘A’,” early January 1980, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 130.
6 The Kremlin’s frustration with President Amin was reinforced by international developments that the
Soviet leadership perceived as marking a more hostile episode in U.S. foreign policy. The KGB was
clearly aware of the U.S. involvement in supporting the Afghan insurgency, christening it an “undeclared
war”43. In a private report sent on February 1, 1980, to Willy Brant (Chancellor of West Germany)
Moscow emphasised this fact: “Bands of mercenaries, financed with money from the CIA, have literally
terrorized the…country”44. Furthermore, NATO’s decision to deploy a new class of medium range
nuclear missiles in Europe (following U.S. pressure), and the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the SALT
II agreement, sent purely negative signals to Moscow. The Soviet political leaders perceived these signals
as representing an end of détente, or as a report to the CC CPSU in late-January 1980 put it: “an
intensification of anti-Sovietism as a justification for long-term foreign policy acts which are … directed
at changing the balance of power in their favour”45. Such a notion, misconceived or not, dangerously
lowered the threshold for Soviet intervention.
On December 12, the Politburo met and formally ratified the proposal to intervene militarily in
Afghanistan. The factors mentioned above, i.e. the Islamic insurgency, dissatisfaction with Amin’s
leadership, decay of détente, all contributed to the final decision to invade Afghanistan. Crucially
however, it becomes apparent when analyzing the primary documents that the Soviet concern regarding
credibility underscored each of the above-mentioned factors. This concern surrounding credibility is
plainly reflected in Alexei Kosygin’s powerful statement: “we must not surrender Afghanistan”46.
Ideology also contributed to this inflexibility, as is seen in the next section. Thus, the evidence found in
the primary documents does not just depict strategic factors surrounding the Soviet military intervention
in Afghanistan, but also illuminates the fact that factors linked to perception and reputation were
fundamental during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry.
Section Four: Comparison between the Media’s Story and that of the Primary Documents
The Western media’s understanding of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan revolved predominantly
around strategic thinking. The first argument the media emphasized concerned Islamic fundamentalism
and the Afghan insurgency, and the second outlined Afghanistan as a Soviet springboard pointing towards
the Middle East. In view of the primary documents, the insurgency was indeed a central theme within the
Kremlin. The insurgency posed a continual threat to the Soviet-leaning regime in Kabul; and the Islamic
43
“Bonn: To Soviet Ambassador,” 1 February 1980, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 126.
“Bonn: To Soviet Ambassador,” 1 February 1980, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 126.
45
“About further measures to provide for the national interests of the USSR in relation to events in Afghanistan,” 28
January 1980, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 163.
46
“About the Exacerbation of the Situation in the DRA and Our Possible Moves,” 17 March 1979, CWIHP Bulletin,
e-Doessier No. 4, 70. 44
7 revolution that materialized in Iran over the course of several months in late 1978 and early 1979 greatly
enhanced this threat. Furthermore, the KGB was well aware of the U.S. involvement in providing supplies
and training to these ‘insurgents’ in Afghanistan. However, the Soviet leaders did by no means regard
Afghanistan as a springboard of any sort. The Soviet Union conducted foreign policy in a much more
compartmentalized fashion than Washington had presumed. In strategic terms, the Soviet Union simply
sought to preserve a friendly neighbour on its southern flank: after all, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan
shared a 2000-kilometer border. Losing this region to Islamic fundamentalism, or worse, to the United
States, would threaten Soviet security and domestic stability.
The events of late December 1979, however, still struck Washington, and consequently the media, largely
by surprise. Strategic considerations alone could not rationally explain the military intervention,
especially when acknowledging that the Soviet decision-makers were aware of the bitter international
consequences such a move entailed. The primary documents reveal the complexity of the Afghan
situation, and how strategic considerations went hand in hand with issues of credibility and ideology. First
and foremost, credibility wrested on ‘power’, and as John L. Gaddis argued in Strategies of Containment:
“power was as much a function of perceptions as of hardware, position, or will”47. Thus, losing
Afghanistan would severely harm Soviet credibility, at a time when it had just recently achieved ‘parity’
with the United States. By the same token, ideology too was basically disregarded by the White House.
The primary documents, however, suggest that Stalin’s worldview, the revolutionary-imperial paradigm,
continued to hold the post-Khrushchev cohort of political leaders in its grip. Rarely do the documents
provide explicit statements proclaiming exactly this, so one must read between the lines to understand
how ideology played a role. After all, however, Brezhnev, Andropov, Ustinov, Kosygin and Gromyko all
belonged to the generation that had made spectacular careers under Stalin, and had been taught to
combine theoretical vision with practical political talent.48 Therefore, the Soviet Union couldn’t simply
forsake the April revolution.
Accordingly, the dual issue of credibility and ideology constrained Soviet decision-making, forcing upon
the Kremlin the conclusion that: “only one thing is clear, we cannot surrender Afghanistan”49.
Simultaneously, the Soviet Union’s newly achieved ‘parity’ with its Cold War rival, the United States,
reinforced its willingness to take bolder actions. Détente had significant effects on the Kremlin’s
perception of international relations, as Brezhnev’s remark below to Politburo members in 1968 grasps so
well. “Look, comrades, how radically the correlation of forces in the world changed in recent years. Not
47
Lewis J. Gaddis. Stratagies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 200.
Zubok, 196.
49
“About the Exacerbation of the Situation in the DRA and Our Possible Moves,” 17 March 1979, CWIHP Bulletin,
e-Doessier No. 4, 70. 48
8 so long ago we in the Politburo had to think carefully, time and again, before taking any foreign policy
step – What would the U.S. do? This period is over. When we believe now that something must be done
in the interests of the Soviet Union, we do it without hesitation.”50 Although this remark was made a
decade before the actual invasion of Afghanistan, it very much reflects the Soviet Union’s classic vision
of détente as “peace through strength”51. This misperception underscored a newly acquired ‘cockiness’
that translated directly into the rash decision to invade Afghanistan in December 1979. Essentially, by
comparing the primary documents with media sources, however limited they may be, places Soviet
thinking into the context of western public opinion: depicting a fatal divide. Afghanistan cannot be
explained by exclusively analyzing strategic factors, as was done by the media. The less-tangible issues of
credibility and ideology were absolutely central to the decision-making process.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Soviet decision to intervene militarily in Afghanistan in December 1979 was the
product of numerous intertwined factors: both domestic and international, tangible and non-tangible. The
rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region and the CIA backed insurgency were critically destabilizing
the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. The accession of Amin in September further destabilized Afghanistan
domestically, while Amin’s “insincerity and duplicity”52 now raised the possibility of Afghanistan
reorienting itself towards the West. Moreover, the Soviet political leadership perceived U.S. foreign
policy actions in the late 1970s to be signifying an end of détente. All the above were coupled by the
ideological conviction that “we must not surrender Afghanistan”53: a conviction that was reinforced by
concerns over Soviet credibility. Finally, the Kremlin’s long-term fatal misperception of the term détente
to mean the logical outcome of a “new correlation of forces”54 ominously increased the Soviet Union’s
willingness to take a confrontational foreign policy stance. Therefore, the failure of Moscow and
Washington to correctly deduce one another’s respective interests and consequent actions was a theme
that plagued U.S.-Soviet relations throughout the Cold War. The Afghanistan intervention, ultimately,
stands as an avoidable tragedy: a tragedy in which the final script was ordained as much by personalities,
perceptions, and ideology as by interests and strategies.
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50
Zubok, 209.
Zubok, 211.
52
“Afghanistan,” late December 1979, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 75.
53
“About the Exacerbation of the Situation in the DRA and Our Possible Moves,” 17 March 1979, CWIHP Bulletin,
e-Doessier No. 4, 70.
54
Zubok, 259. 51
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“Personal memorandum, Andropov to Brezhnev,” early December 1979, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 159.
“Afghanistan,” late December 1979, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 75.
10 “Concerning the Situation in ‘A’,” early January 1980, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 130.
“About further measures to provide for the national interests of the USSR in relation to events in Afghanistan,” 28
January 1980, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 164.
“Bonn: To Soviet Ambassador,” 1 February 1980, CWIHP Bulletin, e-Doessier No. 4, 126.
Secondary Sources:
Gaddis, J. Lewis. Stratagies of Containment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Kalinovsky, M. Artemy. A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Cambridge: Harvard
University
Press, 2001.
Zubok, M. Vladislav. A Failed Empire. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.
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