THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF
NATIONALIST ACTIVISM IN THE CHINESE ONLINE SPHERE
Margaret Steinhafel
Marquette University
International Politics of Asia
Dr. Barrett McCormick
May 6, 2015
Steinhafel, 2
With its increasing speed, volume, and global circulation of information and ideas, the
Internet has revolutionized almost every aspect of our daily lives in recent decades. As a result,
new technology has enabled state governments to optimize their nationalistic activism using the
Internet to promote the regime’s beliefs and persuade the public that it is performing effectively
and equitably – a technique otherwise referred to as ‘mass persuasion’ (Brady 2009). Academics
have consequently studied the political implications of the Internet revolution in general, and its
impact under various social, cultural, and political circumstances in particular (Zheng and Wu
2005). However, scholars are only just beginning to study online Chinese nationalist activism – a
government led political movement used to distract citizens from the state’s inability to meet
demands, generate public support for state interests, and gain domestic political advantages for
elites as a result of government propaganda – and its effect on domestic and international
politics.
This article evaluates the Chinese government’s use of online nationalist activism to
achieve these goals, namely to increase the CCP’s legitimacy, rally domestic support, and
mobilize citizens. Although Chinese leaders and elites have employed nationalist activism for
decades, the rapid development of the Internet, and its capabilities, has brought about dramatic
political changes and challenges, both domestically and internationally. My main argument is
threefold. First, the Internet has changed nationalist activism and communication between the
state and society. Second, the Internet boosts civic engagement and political participation. And
third, the interaction of state and societal strategies determine collective actions and can
influence domestic and international politics.
This article proceeds in the following way. The first section provides a brief analysis of
the evolution of Chinese nationalism, followed by a subsequent section on the growth and
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development of its online sphere. The third section attempts to identify how the Internet recruits
activists and spurs civic engagement and political participation with and in nationalist
campaigns. The fourth includes a historical analysis of Chinese online nationalist reactions to
Sino-Japanese tensions by examining interactions between the Chinese state and population, the
population’s use of the Internet to act collectively, and its subsequent influence on domestic and
international politics in varying ways.1
EVOLUTION OF CHINESE NATIONALISM
The Chinese communist movement in the late 1940’s represents the first nationalist
movement, and communist victory, for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) following the 1911
Chinese Revolution. Their defeat of the Nationalist Party (GMD) has been largely attributed to
its “ability to appeal to the sentiment of public nationalism” (Tang and Darr 2012). Over the
course of the next three decades, Chinese nationalism thrived along Marxist ideology under
communist rule.
It was not until the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, as well as the decline of
Marxist, Leninist and Maoist ideology during end of the Cold War that CCP nationalism was met
with any substantial challenge or protest. It was this period of rampant corruption among state
officials, periodic inflation, and widespread unemployment that forced the CCP to modernize its
propaganda work and promote nationalism through mass persuasion as a means of legitimizing
China. Prior to this messaging overhaul, the CCP used Marxism to validate itself, but after 1989
– with the Cold War winding down – this approach was no longer believable or viable. Thus,
new emphasis was placed on amended nationalist goals which focused on the party’s success in
Please note, this paper and analytic model is based on that used by Yongnian Sheng and Guoguang Wu in
their Comparative Politics Studies article, “Information Technology: Public Space, and Collective Action in
China”
1
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establishing China as a powerful state; and it also increased acknowledgement of the CCP's
economic goals and political declarations to substantiate the party as a necessary force for
ensuring stability and continued economic growth (Downs and Saunders 1998).
But the state also recognized its need to modernize its propaganda work in order for this
nationalist focus to be successful. The late ‘80s and early ‘90s marketed a period of political
consolidation, with the review of past policies, and study of Socialist and Western state
experiences (Brady 2009). The remainder of the decade included radical reform in party
propaganda work, with the most notable policy changes relating to the system of funding and the
“introduction of new technology and methodology into propaganda and thought work” (Brady
2009). The early to mid 2000s mark the period with which we are now most familiar. It is a new
era of confidence for the CCP and their potential to maintain its hold on power. This confidence
reflects a new basis for CCP legitimacy, one in which Party documents have been formally
incorporated, where the public sphere is tightly controlled but allows for a wide range of topics,
and that includes China’s promotion of a new “China model” to its remaining allies (Brady
2009).
In combination with these dramatic economic, social and political changes, the party also
implemented mass communication methodology. Traditionally a Western method, this form of
communication introduced China to a new set of research methods (e.g. quantitative analysis and
public opinion polls), and potential formats and strategies for the privatization and modernization
of various propaganda sectors to deal with globalization (Brady 2009). It is during this time that
we can see Chinese media propagating commercialized, nationalistic messages provided or
monitored by the states. As a result, most Chinese media toolkits consist of content that make the
CCP look able and fair, and emphasize confidence. Efforts to achieve these goals include the
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following: “strengthening notions of both the ‘Other’ and the Chinese ‘Self;’ an ongoing effort to
present a negative picture of post-communist societies so as to bolster fears of the potential for
chaos in China if the CCP were to be overturned; image building activities that mold public
opinion in favor of both the CCP and the PLA; and targeted campaigns focusing on perceived
threats to CCP power” (Brady 2002).
For the time being, it would appear that these efforts are paying off. In their analysis of
“Chinese Nationalism and its Political Social Origins,” Tang and Darr (2012) sought to measure
the relative degree of Chinese nationalism as compared to other societies. Using factor analysis
with a feeling thermometer index, which ranges from 1 to 100 in both the 2008 China Survey
and in the 2003 ISSP National Identity Survey, the authors discover that China shows the highest
level of nationalism among 35 countries and regions.
Figure 1. Nationalism: an international comparison.
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Note: Nationalism is an imputed factor index of four survey questions (see Table 1). The scale
ranges from 0 to 100.
Source: Tang, Wenfang, and Benjamin Darr. “Chinese Nationalism and its Political and Social
Origins.” Journal of Contemporary China 21, no. 77 (2012): 811-826. Accessed April 26, 2015.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2012.684965. Original data obtained
from: National Identity Survey II, International Social Survey Programme, 2003, and 2008 China
Survey.
Yet, for as promising as these results are, or as much potential as these nationalist messages
have to increase the CCP’s legitimacy and number of activists, they have the matching potential
to cause international and/or domestic conflict. Downs and Saunders (1998) identify three
themes that have emerged in literature relating to benefits of nationalism, as well as their
congruent dangers. The first identifies nationalism as a welcomed distraction from the state’s
inability to meet societal demands. The second propagates nationalist myths to generate public
support for state interests. And the third emphasizes political elites and their use of nationalism
to gain domestic political advantages (Downs and Saunders 1998). However, nationalism can
also aggravate ethnic relations, inciting domestic and international conflicts. In these situations,
elites and government officials become trapped in their own rhetoric, forcing them to employ
risky strategies rather than jeopardize their rule. Furthermore, nationalist myths can be
misinterpreted by other states, giving rise to the security dilemma (Downs and Saunders 1998).
In this way, Chinese nationalism can sometimes act as a double-edged sword, threatening to cut
the man that bears it if not properly wielded. Managing these risks is especially difficult given
the unruly and ever evolving nature of the Internet.
THE RAMPANT GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S ONLINE SPHERE
“We know how much the Internet has changed America, and we are already an open
society. Imagine how much it could change China.
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Now, there's no question China has been trying to crack down on the Internet – good
luck. That's sort of like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall. But I would argue to you that
their effort to do that just proves how real these changes are and how much they threaten
the status quo. It's not an argument for slowing down the effort to bring China into the
world; it's an argument for accelerating that effort. In the knowledge economy, economic
innovation and political empowerment, whether anyone likes it or not, will inevitably go
hand in hand.”
-- Former U.S. President Bill Clinton speaking on China at Johns Hopkins University,
March 8, 2000
In the early years of the Internet, there was an expectation that the Chinese government
would be unable to censor the Internet, eventually forcing the state to decide between cutting
itself off from modern technology or giving up its authoritarian politics. Former U.S. President
Bill Clinton’s speech reflects popular opinion during the Internet revolution, with many
believing that the web was too large and widely dispersed to possibly be blocked or contained.
To attempt to limit its reach would be, as Clinton phrased it, like “trying to nail Jell-O to the
wall.” As a result, scholars of this period also suggested that China’s acceptance of the Internet
would perhaps lead to democracy and/or a regime change in China. This change, it was
suggested, would be the result of increased access to information and ideas from around the
world, a platform to air grievances and interests, and a virtual ‘public sphere’ to associate with
others (Breslin and Shen 2010).
Today, scholars recognize a dramatically different reality. Not only has Chinese
authoritarian rule survived the Internet, but it has also been strengthened by it. With a great deal
of skill, China has rewritten the Internet’s rules to serve its own agenda: gaining firm control
over society and setting an example for other repressive regimes (A Giant Cage 2013). The CCP
has systematically financed and implemented large-scale software projects and development;
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including the ‘Great Firewall,’ which keeps out “undesirable foreign websites, and the ‘Golden
Shield,’ which monitors activities within China (A Giant Cage 2013).
The success of these projects is that much more staggering considering how China has
more Internet users than the United States has citizens. According to a 2010 White Paper
provided by Chinese officials, roughly 384 million users – 30 percent of the state’s population –
had Internet access by the end of 2009.2 This is compared to the 150,000 Chinese who had
access less than a decade earlier (Barme and Ye 1997). Figure 2 (Zheng and Wu 2005) offers a
visual representation of this growth between 1997 and 2004; years marked by a new era of
confidence for the CCP and the introduction of new technology and propaganda work to promote
nationalism (Brady 2009).
Figure 2. Growth of Internet Users in China, October 1997-January 2004
Source: Zheng, Yongnian, and Guoguang Wu. "Information Technology, Public Space, and
Collective Action In China." Comparative Political Studies 38, no. 5 (2005): 507-36. Accessed
April 26, 2015. http://cps.sagepub.com/content/38/5/507.short. Originally adapted from China
Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Survey Report on the Development of China’s
2
Reported to have risen to 560 million in 2013 (A Giant Cage 2013)
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Internet. Retrieved February 22, 2005, form http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/200301/25/content_707277.htm/.
So what was the Chinese government’s motivation for such quick and widespread
expansion? The PRC’s Information Office of the State Council claims that the government is
interested in 1) making the Internet ‘part of the state infrastructure,’ and 2) enabling Chinese
citizens to freely express their opinions. However, research suggests that this period of
technological modernization correlates with the party’s efforts to rejuvenate its propaganda work
– a much more likely motivation for quick and vast Internet expansion. In fact, Brady (2009)
identifies that one of China’s efforts includes the encouragement of Chinese media to go online,
recognizing that the Internet is a tool for government that should be embraced and used to
promote nationalism and encourage state activism. However, this online activism is not without
its restrictions (Zheng and Wu 2005).
STATE CONTROLS AND MANAGEMENT OF CHINA'S ONLINE SPHERE AND
NATIONALISTIC ACTIVISM THROUGH COMMERCIALIZED CAMPAIGNS
Validating the Chinese government’s efforts to promote nationalism online are the
following official statistics: more than 457 million bloggers and 72 million blogs existed in
China by the end of 2007, many of which addressed some political element (CNNIC 2007). By
the end of 2008, Chinese Internet users were acknowledged for spending more time online than
Internet users in any other country. They were also more likely to contribute to various forms of
online social networking sites – such as blogs, forums, chat rooms, photo or video-sharing
websites, etc. – than all other countries surveyed, except Korea and France (TNS Global
Interactive 2008). These statistics help to explain why the Internet has become the font-line
battleground in China's new "informational politics" (Yang 2008).
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Given the potential of these online tools considering the size and scope of China's
internet using population, the government has established a strict network of controls and
management of the media, balancing just enough information flow to appease citizens, but not so
much that users have an opportunity to effectively use it as a political tool against the CCP. To
achieve this delicate equilibrium, China employs what Rebecca MacKinnon (2011) refers to as
"networked authoritarianism." Under this online regime, the single ruling party remains in
control while a wide range of conversations about the country's problems nonetheless occur on
the Internet. The government then follows these online conversations, sometimes responding to
grievances with policy reforms; thereby making the average person feel as if they have a much
greater sense of freedom than they actually do. However, under networked authoritarianism,
there is no guarantee of individual rights and freedoms – "actors perceived to be threats to the
state are jailed; free and fair elections are not held; and the courts and the legal system are tools
of the ruling party" (MacKinnon 2011, 33).
Furthermore, a 2004-05 study of Chinese Internet censorship concluded, "China operates
the most extensive, technologically sophisticated, and broad reaching system of Internet filtering
in the world" (OpenNet Initiative 2005). Most commonly, the international community thinks of
China's advanced content filtering systems when they consider Chinese internet censorship: the
"Great Firewall of China," which blacklists website addresses and keywords into advanced
routers and systems to control Internet traffic across Chinese domestic networks; and the state's
"Golden Shield Project," a "broad project focused on surveillance, data mining and the upgrading
of Internet public security networks, of which Internet filtering is only a small part" (MacKinnon
2009). These initiatives require the employment of thousands of "Internet police," who are
located in various cities and empowered to determine which websites and posts are blocked to
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users of domestic Chinese internet services – it is predicted that tens of thousands of oversees
websites are already blocked (MacKinnon 2009).
Receiving less attention are the private citizens in every providence and city who are
"enlisted as volunteers or paid commentators to 'guide' online conversations in a pro-government
direction or to act as watchdogs, reporting anti-government conversations to authorities"
(MacKinnon 2009; Bandurski 2008). Similar to "astroturfing" in the United States – a technique
used by commercial advertising firms, public relations companies, and election campaigns to
simulate grassroots enthusiasm for a product or candidate – this public outreach is a clear
example of a CCP's commercialized online nationalist campaign strategy that is used to promote
the party’s nationalist agenda, distract from its faults, and highlight its efficiency and relevance.
Due to the state’s strict commitment to this agenda, the 2009 Committee to Protect Journalists
listed China as the world's worst jailer of journalists; often arresting those who speak out against
or challenge the CCP via both traditional and online media platforms (MacKinnon 2011).
ONLINE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
Yet, despite these advanced controls and restrictions, more than 66 percent of the Chinese
population frequently use the Internet to discus various topics, express opinions, and represent
interests through online posts (The Internet in China 2015). Given the Chinese Internet's ability
to reach vast audiences, it is easy to see why the state has placed so much value in its
development as a tool for promoting nationalistic agendas and activism. An important
component of this nationalist online activism is the increase in online civil engagement and the
rise of civil society as a result of online tools. These changes in civic behavior enforce the
balance that the CCP is working so carefully to construct: provide citizens with enough freedom
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to make them feel as if they have a voice, but silence those opinions that may jeopardize the
party's legitimacy and/or objectives.
Early discussions of the Internet debated it effects for engaging people in politics. Some,
like Rheinhold (2000), asserted that the Internet would promote political participate in politics,
while others, including Putnam (2000) and Sunstein (2001), argued that it would inhibit
engagement in public life. Interestingly, 2003 Chinese survey data addresses this debate in
regard to urban Internet use in 12 Chinese cities (see figures 3-5). Figure 3 reveals that an
overwhelming majority of people do not think the Internet has a negative impact on their public
engagement in public life; in fact, 47 percent of respondents indicated that access to the Internet
increased their contact with like-minded people.
Figure 3. The Internet and Interpersonal Interaction in China (2003)
Source: Zheng, Yongnian, and Guoguang Wu. "Information Technology, Public Space, and
Collective Action In China." Comparative Political Studies 38, no. 5 (2005): 507-36. Accessed
April 26, 2015. http://cps.sagepub.com/content/38/5/507.short. Originally adapted from
university of California Los Angels Center for Communication Policy and the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences (2003, pp. 27, 29, 20, 31).
Note: A = Has the use of Internet increased or decreased your contact with people who share or
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hobbies/recreational activities? B = Has the use of Internet increased or decreased your contact
with people who share your political interests? C = Has the use of Internet increased or decreased
your contact with people who share your profession? E = Has the use of Internet increased or
decreased your contact with people with your family and friends.
Furthermore, figures 4 and 5 measure the Internet's substantial political impact over that
seen in democratic countries. Nearly 80 percent of the people in China think that their internet
usage can help them better understand politics, as compared to only 43 percent in the United
States, 31 percent in Japan, and 48 percent in South Korea (see Figure 4). Also, nearly 61 percent
of Chinese respondents think that they can have more to say about the government's policies and
actions as a result of their internet participation; this is compared to 20 percent in the US, 24
percent in Japan, and 26 percent in South Korea (see Figure 5). These results indicate strong
civic engagement and faith by the Chinese people for the CCP party and PRC government -indicating the success of China's online nationalist activism in promoting legitimacy and trust.
Figure 4. Do You Think by Using the Internet People Like You Can Better Understand
Politics? (all respondents, 18 and above)
Source: Zheng, Yongnian, and Guoguang Wu. "Information Technology, Public Space, and
Collective Action In China." Comparative Political Studies 38, no. 5 (2005): 507-36. Accessed
Steinhafel, 14
April 26, 2015. http://cps.sagepub.com/content/38/5/507.short. Originally adapted from
university of California Los Angels Center for Communication Policy and the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences (2003, pp. 45).
Figure 5. Do You Think by Using the Internet People Like You Can Have More Say About
What The Government Does? (all respondents, 18 and above)
Source: Zheng, Yongnian, and Guoguang Wu. "Information Technology, Public Space, and
Collective Action In China." Comparative Political Studies 38, no. 5 (2005): 507-36. Accessed
April 26, 2015. http://cps.sagepub.com/content/38/5/507.short. Originally adapted from
university of California Los Angels Center for Communication Policy and the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences (2003, pp. 45).
METHODOLOGY
As Tang and Darr (2012) note, “the study of Chinese nationalism often does not fit neatly
into the study of nationalism more generally.” Unlike other states, China was never fully
colonized (like most developing countries); it inherited the legacy of an empire; and it is an
empire-turned-nation (unlike the modal case of nationalism as a reaction to the oppression of an
empire), suggesting that some of the main victims of contemporary nationalism are those whom
it is forced upon, such as Tibetans (Tang and Darr 2012). However, despite its historical
uniqueness, I believe there is much to be learned by considering China as an example of the
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broarder phenomenon of nationalism. After all, despite varied histories and attributes, all states
have an interest in promoting national identity, thereby justifying individual-level measures of
national pride across national borders (Tang and Darr 2012). There are also many types of
Chinese nationalism to be considered: ethnic nationalism, liberal nationalism, state nationalism,
pragmatic nationalism, elite nationalism, mass nationalism, etc. However, in this paper’s
historical analysis, I focus on public or mass nationalism.
I will evaluate the success of Chinese online nationalistic efforts through a brief historical
analysis of two Sino-Japanese diplomatic disputes: 1) Chinese opposition to Japanese pursuit of
a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC); and 2) territorial disputes over Diaoyu
Islands. Despite being well studied in academia, I choose to focus my attention on these two
cases due to their visible intensity and magnitude of popular mobilization in both domestic and
international politics. Furthermore, China’s long and varied history with Japan offers a unique
opportunity to test the surge of popular nationalism, which I’ve previously implied “is often
attributed to mixed memories and feelings about China’s glorious past as well as humiliations
suffered at the hand of foreign forces” (Hyun et al. 2014). I will conclude by reviewing and
analyzing qualitative results obtained by Hyun, Kim and Sun via an online Chinese survey.
Based on my analyses of these conditions, I will either prove or disprove the following
three hypotheses:
H1. The Internet has changed nationalist activism and communication between the state and
society.
H2. The Internet boosts civic engagement and political participation.
H3. The interaction of state and societal strategies determine collective actions and can
influence domestic and international politics.
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HISTORICAL ANALYSES
According to Shambaugh (2013), modern Chinese nationalism, carries two distinct
aspects: the first is that “China is an aggrieved nation that has endured a ‘century of shame and
humiliation’ and various indignities at the hands of the West and Japan; and second, China has
been a great power historically and deserves to return to that status” (Shambaugh 2013). Chinese
reactions to these diplomatic cries have “revealed a public desire to redeem past indignities
inflicted by foreign powers and to restore national pride and international recognition
(Brittingham 2007; Gries, 2004). It is this sort of reactive behavior that that characterizes online
nationalist activism in China to be ever-changing in response to provocations; but also lacking
any coherent ideological tenor (Wu 2007; Breslin & Shen 2010).
Chinese Opposition to Permanent Japanese Seat on UN Security Council
During the first wave of anti-Japanese online activism in 2005, the “number of websites
dedicated to opposing the Japanese attempt at UNSC membership increased greatly” (Hyun et al
2014). Most notably, a call for online petitions against the proposed permanent Japanese Security
Council seat received tens of million signatures within only a few months and was followed by
offline protests in major Chinese cities (Liu 2010, Reilly 2010, Wu 2007). Their objections were
based on both Japan’s bid for permanent membership on the UN Security Council and its
justification and glorification of the Japanese empire’s colonial rule in Asia (Liu 2010).
Yet, what was particularly dynamic about these protests was the significant use of the
Internet and mobile devises to share protest information and mobilize nationalist activists (Liu
2010). Such online nationalist behavior sparked a wave of popular nationalism, which ultimately
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undermined pragmatic and liberal conflict resolution approaches to Japan (Reilly, 2010). SinoJapanese Disputes Over The Diaoyu Islands
A similar display on mass nationalism occurred seven years later regarding the soveirgnty
of the Diaoyu Islands. Debates regarding this group of islands in the East China Sea also sparked
anti-Japanese online activism in 2012. Having lost the islands to Japan during China’s defeat in
the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, this territorial dispute was an intermittent topic of discussion in
Chinese cyberspace (Hyun et al 2014). However, it resurfaced following the Japanese
government’s attempt to purchase the islands from a private Japanese owner. In response,
nationalist actors took to the streets and used online platforms to ask for anti-Japanese boycotts
and to incite protests that spread across China (Hyun et al 2014). The demonstrations, which
included such violent acts as the tearing of Japanese flags and destroying Japanese goods,
eventually required police intervention (Branigan 2012).
The islands, which are surrounded by rich energy resources and fisheries, are fraught
with sovereignty claims by both Chinese and Japanese activists. In this historical instance, the
announcement that Tokyo’s nationalist governor Shintaro Ishihara was interested in buying and
developing the uninhabited islands further threaten China’s claims and provoked national outcry.
Ian Storey, an expert on maritime issues at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore,
was quoted saying: “Ishihara is extremely rightwing and ultra-nationalist and if he controlled
these islands there is no telling what he might do with them. It seems almost like he wants to
provoke China on this. The Japanese government clearly does not” (Branigan 2012). In this
sense, it would appear as if this case represents two competing forms of nationalism: Chinese vs.
Japanese. Most impressively, Chinese activists used the Internet to mobilize themselves based on
Steinhafel, 18
nationalist feelings and voice their outrage over the situation. Subsequently, China surrounded
the island with vessels, in addition to the rise of civil society in the form of nationalist protests.
Additionally, diffusion of anti-Japanese sentiment exasperated negative public sentiments toward
Japan and directly affected domestic strategies and international affairs.
Hyun, Kim and Sun’s Findings Regarding Nationalism and Sino-Japanese Conflicts
Hyun et al. (2014) takes this research one step further, using online survey data collected
form 544 individuals to determine “the effects of news use from traditional and new media,
nationalistic attitudes, and motivations for Internet use on anti-Japanese political behaviors such
as boycotting and protest participation.” Although survey participants were younger and more
educated that the general Chinese population – most were between the ages of 18 and 30 years
old (65.8 percent) with a 4-year degree (62.5 percent) – and approximately a quarter of them
reported themselves as a communist party member (26.3 percent), I believe the study provides
valuable insights regarding new media technologies in China’s political and media contexts and
how Chinese nationalist online activism gains influence.
To determine the respondents’ nationalistic attitudes, the authors developed an index “by
summing their indications of the extent to which they agree with each of the following two
statements: ‘China is better than most other countries,’ and ‘The world would be a better place if
people were more like the Chinese’” (Hyun et al. 2014). Their findings suggest that nationalism
was not related to participant motivations for gathering alternative information about the disputes
(See Figure 6). However, nationalism did have a positive relationship with anti-Japanese
behavior in the final analysis, including all the control variables, media use, and motivations
variables (See Figure 7) (Hyun et al. 2014). Furthermore, the data suggests that males and the
elderly tend to more frequently engage in anti-Japanese actions than other respondents.
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Figure 6. Predictors of the four motivations of Internet use specific to Sino-Japanese
disputes.
Source: Hyun, Ki Deuk, Jinhee Kim, and Shaojing Sun. “News use, nationalism, and Internet use
motivations as predictors of anti-Japanese political actions in China.” Asian Journal of Communication,
24 no. 6 (2014): 589-604. Accessed April 26, 2015.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01292986.2014.944922.
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients; Gender (male = 1); CCP membership (member
= 1). +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Most interesting, was the link between social media news use and nationalism, which the
authors go on to explain in two ways. First, social media news may replicate mainstream news
media coverage, and therefore reinforces nationalism promoted in state-controlled news media
(Hyun et al. 2014). Second, “social media may serve as an independent source of news and
information about nationalism… [and may therefore affirm] the observation that social media are
often used as a mobilizing medium for nationalistic causes” and may represent popular
nationalism sentiment (Hyun et al. 2014).
Analysis also revealed that a strong nationalist attitude was correlated with increased
Internet use for information-seeking, social interaction purposes and entertainment, suggesting
that nationalism is the main source driving people’s need for the Internet during disputes.
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Figure 7. Predictors of anti-Japanese political behaviors.
Source: Hyun, Ki Deuk, Jinhee Kim, and Shaojing Sun. “News use, nationalism, and Internet use
motivations as predictors of anti-Japanese political actions in China.” Asian Journal of Communication,
24 no. 6 (2014): 589-604. Accessed April 26, 2015.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01292986.2014.944922.
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients; Gender (male = 1); CCP membership (member
= 1). +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on these results, it is obvious that the Internet has dramatically altered the way in
which the Chinese state and its people communicate. For some it means posting and monitoring
online blogs and information in support of the CCP, for others, it involves the use of proxy
servers to gather uncensored information (not closely examined in this paper since only 0.6
percent of surveyed Internet users admitted to frequently using proxy servers, and no more than
6.3 percent sometimes or often use them (Guo et al 2005). It is also clear based on literary
Steinhafel, 21
analysis that Internet use boosts civic engagement and political participation, though Hyun et al.
suggest that the inverse may also be true – strong nationalist political sentiments may boost
Internet usage. Finally, this paper’s historical analyses of recent Sino-Japanese relations
highlight the ability of online nationalist activism to influence domestic and international affairs.
Despite being a relatively modern phenomenon, nationalism is one of the most powerful
forces of collective action. The ability of Chinese activists to mobilize citizens to promote
nationalist agendas can have incredible domestic and international effects, especially since the
Chinese population consists of more than 1.3 billion people. This topic of nationalistic activism
in the online sphere will continue to become more relevant as China continues to ‘loosen’ its
censorship grip and discussion and information shared among Chinese citizens continues to
grow.
For these reasons, further research and data regarding the topic is necessary. In
attempting to empirically evaluate the role of Chinese online activism, I repeatedly struggled to
find substantive data and information from which I could confidently extract valuable
information. However, with sufficient information and data, it would be interesting to further
research and understand online nationalist movements that act against the state – holding
government officials responsible for corruption. Additionally, examining China’s assumed
online nationalist successes, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, would also provide valuable
insights regarding the power and influence of the Internet to promote nationalist ideas and
influence public opinion.
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REFERENCES
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