Why do people support the Taliban in Kunduz?
By Grace O’Neill
Student No. 1202739
Terrorism and Counterterrorism: 7SSWM022
Word Count: 1500
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Why do people support the Taliban in Kunduz?
On the 28th September 2015, fears of a resurgent Taliban appeared to be confirmed when insurgents
raised their white flag in the provincial city of Kunduz after a swift overnight offensive. Although the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) reclaimed the city in a matter of weeks, the initial takeover
marked the greatest military success for the Taliban since 2001 and has been described as its ‘biggest
prize of the war’.1 Claims that the attack was an ‘inside-out’ offensive with insurgents pre-emptively
embedded among local residents, raises important questions about the level of support for the Taliban
among the Kunduz population.2 To explain this ‘support’, this essay considers the failure of the
Afghan central government to address local grievances and the ability of the Taliban to exploit these
failures. It argues that although the Taliban maintained a degree of ideological attraction and has
‘softened’ its approach, its main basis of support in Kunduz remained fuelled by a distrust and lack of
faith in the National Unity Government.
The battle of Kunduz is an appropriate case study to examine support for the Taliban for several
reasons. Firstly, the attack was launched almost exactly a year after the unity government was agreed
in September 2014, and followed in the wake of the withdrawal of ISAF forces in December 2014.
These events coincided with a notable resurgence in Taliban activity, with the launch of its spring
offensive culminating in the occupation of Kunduz. Secondly, Kunduz has been described as a
‘microcosm of Afghanistan’ due to its history of tension with the central government in Kabul and
array of local militias.3 It also reflects Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity having been described as the
‘Afghan Londonderry’ where ethnic tensions are ripe for exploitation.4 Thirdly, the battle was
significant because it had strategic and symbolic importance for the Taliban. As well as being a major
wheat producer and Afghanistan’s fifth largest city, Kunduz is considered a strategic ‘national
crossroads’ with major routes to Tajikistan in the north and Kabul in the south.5 Taliban leader Mullah
Akhtar Mohammad Mansour declared the occupation a ‘symbolic victory’, invoking the fact that
Kunduz was the first northern city controlled by the Taliban in the 1990s, and the last to fall in 2001.6
Finally, understanding Taliban support in Kunduz is pertinent given the morale boost it offered to
factions of the group opposed to the leadership’s current trajectory of peace negotiations.7
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1
Goldstein (2015).
Rubin (2015).
3
Ibid.
4
Farrell and Semple (2015) p.87.
5
Faiez (2015).
6
Wardenaer (2015).
7
Rafi (2015).
2
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In Kunduz, widespread government failures to address local grievances and deliver essential services
alienated the population, pushing some to support the Taliban. In December 2014, the new unity
government discussed the need for urgent improvements on seventeen issues in Kunduz including
security, education, housing, infrastructure, and representation in parliament.8 However, in the
subsequent months, meaningful improvements failed to materialise causing the population to become
disaffected with the new government. Chief Executive Officer of Afghanistan Abdullah Abdullah
admitted to the New York Times that, ‘Positive change had not taken place in Kunduz; the people were
not happy’.9 Martin has shown how the Taliban has benefitted from tapping into this disaffection in
the past and it appears that the situation in Kunduz provided similar opportunities for exploitation: a
dysfunctional local government, lack of faith in the ANSF to deliver security, and a corrupt and
inefficient judicial system.10
The dysfunctional nature of local government in Kunduz was arguably the main cause for the
irresolution of local grievances. Poor cooperation between local officials was partly due to petty infighting within the national government over-spilling to the local level. The Afghan government was
divided into two camps: those who supported President Ashraf Ghani and those who supported Dr.
Abdullah Abdullah. In Kunduz, this rivalry manifested in a lack of cooperation between the Pashtun
provincial governor appointed by Ghani, and his Tajik deputy and head of the police, both appointed
by Abdullah Abdullah.11 One point of serious disagreement between these men was the decision not
to arrest pro-government militias, which negatively impacted the local sense of security.12 It can be
argued that this polarisation within the local government impeded its ability to deliver much wanted
security, and ultimately helped shape conditions for the Taliban to exploit.13
In relation to the security problem in Kunduz, a lack of faith in the ANSF and particularly, the Afghan
Local Police (ALP) was another issue driving a wedge between the population and the government.
Farrell and Semple describe how the ALP looted districts they claimed to be clearing from the
Taliban, fitting the familiar narrative of corrupt commanders participating in illegal taxation, robbing
and rape of the local population.14 According to a Crisis Group report, harassment by members of the
ALP was directly responsible for an ex-schoolteacher joining the Taliban in Kunduz.15 If the police
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8
Matta (2015).
Rubin (2015).
10
Martin (2014).
11
Farrell and Semple (2015); Matta (2015); Osman (2015).
12
Osman (2015).
13
Matta (2015).
14
Farrell and Semple (2015), pp.86-87.
15
International Crisis Group report (2015), p.9.
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and their militiamen were ‘more often abusive than responsible’, it is unsurprising that people felt a
sense of abandonment from the government and considered an alternative authority.16
An essential service that the government failed to deliver to Kunduz was a corruption free and
efficient judicial system - an area that the Taliban was particularly skilled at exploiting. Through
informal networks, which ran not only in Kunduz but throughout most provinces, the Taliban had
established a ‘shadow judiciary’.17 In an interview for Reuters, one Taliban judge said, ‘Most people
refer their cases to us because we have a good system, there is no corruption. We just follow the rules
in accordance to the Koran.’18 In 2014, civilians throughout the province increasingly relied upon the
Taliban to deal with a high number of land disputes, some of which had been unresolved from 2001.
As a result of government ineptitude, the Taliban was able to occupy a framework of authority in
Kunduz and gain a degree of credibility as a parallel government.
As demonstrated, in areas where the government failed to address the grievances of Kunduz, potential
opportunities were created for the Taliban. However, for its part, we should consider how the Taliban
actively adapted to capitalise on the disaffected population. One method was to ‘soften’ its hard-line
approach and improve its image, something the group had been doing across the northern provinces
since 2007 according to Giustozzi.19 The Taliban in Kunduz took a ‘calculated and new approach’,
with insurgents becoming more flexible on the matter of female education and less stringent on
enforcing corporal punishment on cleanly shaven men or those caught listening to music.20 Quoted in
the New York Times, Taliban judge Obaidullah from a neighbouring province said, ‘Our mentality has
changed… We realized that having a strict stance will not lead to success, so we changed.’21 This
demonstrates that the Taliban was aware of the need to alter its image in Kunduz for a battle that was
not only military, but clearly had a political dimension. However, this ‘softer’ image is questioned by
Amnesty International reports of mass murder and gang rape conducted by the Taliban during the
occupation. 22
A second way the Taliban was active in gaining support in Kunduz was its astute ability to attract
support from ethnicities other than Pashtun given the high numbers of Tajiks and Uzbecks in the
province. The Taliban was even successful in attracting increasing numbers of Turkmens, one of the
smallest minority groups, who were unsatisfied with their limited representation in the national
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16
Rubin (2015).
Giustozzi and Baczko (2014).
18
Donati and Sultani (2014).
19
Giustozzi (2013), p.248.
20
Goldstein (2015).
21
Ibid.
22
Amnesty International report (2015).
17
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government.23 Even more striking is the fact that one of the Taliban commanders who participated in
the offensive was a Hazara, a ‘group that has traditionally known terrible persecution at the hands of
Pashtuns’.24 He was quoted saying, ‘We are all fighting side by side under one banner, which is Islam.
We are struggling for Islam not for any particular ethnic group.’25 This serves as a reminder that there
is a religious ideology that will always be an attraction of the Taliban, but also demonstrates that
success in the area relied on the ability to attract disaffected individuals from various ethnicities.
To conclude, although the Taliban in Kunduz was active in gaining support by ‘softening’ its image
and embracing recruitment from non-Pashtuns, it was ultimately the multiple failures of the
government to provide security and vital services that alienated people in the first instance.
Understanding Taliban support in this way highlights the importance of establishing good governance
for successful counterinsurgency strategies. As Jones argued in 2008, the insurgency in Afghanistan is
more than an issue of grievances and greed; it is structural.26 Although Jones was referring to Karzai’s
government from 2001, this essay has shown that under the new unity government structural issues
have remained and are responsible for handing the initiative to the Taliban in Kunduz.
Bibliography
Amnesty International (2015), ‘Afghanistan: harrowing accounts emerge of the Taliban’s reign of
terror in Kunduz’, 1 November 2015. At
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/10/afghanistan-harrowing-accounts-emerge-ofthe-talibans-reign-of-terror-in-kunduz/.
Donati, Jessica, and Feroz Sultani (2014), 'In Afghan North, Taliban Gains Ground and Courts Local
Support' Reuters, 21 October 2014. At http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/21/usafghanistan-taliban-insight-idUSKCN0IA2OA20141021.
Faiez, Rahim (2015), 'Afghan Probe Finds Leadership Failure behind Fall of Kunduz', Associated
Press: The Big Story, 21 November 2015. At
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/f790b12a8c30488bad0e11cd97ab82a4/afghan-probe-findsleadership-failure-behind-fall-kunduz.
Farrell, Theo, and Michael Semple (2015), 'Making Peace with the Taliban', Survival: Global Politics
and Strategy Vol. 57, No. 6, pp. 79–110.
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23
Goldstein (2015).
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Jones (2008).
24
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Giustozzi, Antonio (2013), 'Military Adaptation by the Taliban, 2002-2011', in Theo Farrell, Frans
Osinga, and James Russell, eds., Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford: Stanford
University Press).
Giustozzi, Antonio, and Adam Baczko, (2014), 'The Politics of the Taliban’s Shadow Judiciary,
2003–2013', Central Asian Affairs Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 199–224.
Goldstein, Joseph (2015), 'A Taliban Prize, Won in a Few Hours After Years of Strategy', The New
York Times, 30 September 2015. At http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/a-talibanprize-won-in-a-few-hours-after-years-of-strategy.html.
International Crisis Group (2015), ‘The Future of the Afghan Local Police’, Asia Report, No. 268, 4
June 2015. At http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/ afghanistan/268-thefuture-of-theafghan-local-police.aspx.
Jones, Seth (2008), 'The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad', International
Security Vol. 32, No. 4, pp.7-40.
Martin, Mike (2014), An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1st edn. (C Hurst &
Co Publishers Ltd).
Matta, Bethany (2015), 'The Failed Pilot Test: Kunduz’ Local Governance Crisis', Afghanistan
Analysts Network, 5 June 2015. At https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-failed-pilot-testkunduz-local-governance-crisis/.
Osman, Borhan (2015), 'The Fall of Kunduz: What Does It Tell Us about the Strength of the PostOmar Taleban?', Afghanistan Analysts Network, 30 September 2015. At
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-fall-of-kunduz-what-does-it-tell-us-about-thestrength-of-the-post-omar-taleban/.
Rafi, Kambaiz (2015), 'The Afghan Insurgency and the Uncertainty of Peace Negotiations',
Perspectives on Terrorism Vol. 9, No. 5.
Rubin, Alissa (2015), 'For Afghans in Kunduz, Taliban Assault Is Just the Latest Affront', The New
York Times, 7 October 2015. At http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/world/asia/for-afghansin-kunduz-taliban-assault-is-just-the-latest-affront.html.
Wardenaer, Jens (2015), 'The Brief Conquest of Kunduz', IISS Voices, 9 October 2015. At
https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2015-dda3/october9d0c/conquest-of-kunduz-3d51.
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