June 14, 1969 Another analogy that may b

COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS AGAINST ABM
Chairman: Daniel D. MeCraeken* Consultant
7 Justamere Drive
Ossining, New York 10562
Executive Committee: Paul Armer, Stanford University T.
Prof, Joseph Weizenbaum^ M, I.
Gregory P» Williams* General Electric Co
June 14, 1969
, the undersigned members of the computing profession,
wish to record our professional judgment that there are grave
doubts as to the technical feasibility of the computer portion
of the Safeguard Antiballistic Missile system,* These doubts
range from a profound sk©pticisai that the computing system could
be made to work, to a conviction that it could not*
Although no project of precisely this nature has ever been
attempted before, the difficulty may b© understood in terms of a
elos© analogy. Suppose the task were t© design and implement the
computer portion of a national air traffic control system, and
that it were part of the design requirement that at some unspec­
ified instant the control of the air traffic of the entire nation
allel operation, testing under actual operating conditions, or
ice with large-scale computer systems
convinces us that such a pattern ©f development is highly un­
likely to lead to a successful computer system*
Another analogy that may b@ Instructive is the us© ©f eoas-
known in advance ©xaetly when th® system will be required t© act
;**
If such systems produce blunders, we must conclude that
the Safeguard computer probably could not b® made to work at all
since the conditions for it are much less favorable:
1* The computing task is much more complex than those
the examples cited«
2* The prteise nature of the compyting task cannot b©
defined„ It cannot be known what kinds of
count@naeasures would be used» for example
v@rs the attacker might employ. The offens* has more strategic
to be programmed and tested well in advance of
3* Realistic testing Is impossible sinee it would require
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere•
4*
Evolutionary development is out ©f the question*
or
The
GS *
It is important t© realise that the computer w©uld
virtually all of the docision-Making power, because the wa
f1"
a Jc>
withcmi any attack taking
@r because ©f aachine Malfunction or pr@grmM»ing orror*
Siaeo
COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS AGAINST ABM
June 14, 1969
Page 3
Our grave doubts as to the technical feasibility of the
Safeguard computer system, coupled with our recognition of the
possible consequences of system failure, lead us to the view
that the project is a dangerous mistake. Whatever other argu­
ments may be brought to bear, for or against Safeguard, our
conviction is that on technical grounds alone the project does
not deserve the support of the Congress.
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