Report
Mali 2013
Peace Research | December 2013
Contents
Acronyms:
Error! Bookmark not defined.
Introduction:
3
Actors and Interests:
3
Recent Developments and an Increase in Violence:
4
Is Reconciliation A Possibility?
4
A Regional Approach to Reconciliation:
5
Regional Interests:
6
Preservation of Borders:
9
Conclusion:
10
Bibliography
11
Abbreviations
AFISMA - African led International Support Mission in Mali
AQIM – Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CCDS - Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staffs
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
HCUA - Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad
MAA - the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad
MINUSMA - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA - National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MUJAO - Movement of Unity and Jihad in West Africa
TRC – Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
UFR - l'Union des Forces de la Resistance
2 | Richardson Institute
Overview
This report will focus on the issues faced in the Malian peace settlement. It will examine the dynamics of the peace
process and factors that may be hindering stability in the region. A brief synoptic overview of Malian troubles will be
provided in order to establish some context to the current situation.
Introduction
In 2012, Mali’s troubles gained global recognition with the Tuareg rebellions once again resurfacing. The Tuareg
people, who compose 10% of the population, have been fighting for independence - for the nation of Azawad, northern
Mali - ever since the 1960s. This includes the notable rebellions of the 1990s and the years 2007-20091. A more
strategically centralized group, the MNLA (the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) emerged from the
Tuareg community2. The government and MNLA representatives adopted the Ouagadougou Accords on June 18 th,
2013 to initiate a ceasefire3, the deployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces in Kidal along with French and
MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) troops and the establishment of
a joint security commission4. However, since the agreement, new clashes have occurred between the Army and Tuareg
rebels, who are concerned about the government’s lack of commitment to the peace accords 5. Moreover, a recent
grenade attack in Kidal (a rebel stronghold) and a suicide bombing in Timbuktu, suggests the peace process is
breaking down6.
Actors and Interests
In June 2013, Richard Gowan, of New York University, stated that MINUSMA is ‘a potentially flawed peace operation’7.
This is due to the absence of a peace settlement between Mali’s conflicting parties.
There are various groups and factions currently involved in the conflict in Mali. These actors make the peace-building
process harder. Firstly, the Tuaregs, who have long felt marginalized by the Malian state 8 with branches developing into
the MNLA who fight for Azawad independence. The MNLA is thus ethically driven, fighting mostly for the rights of the
Tuareg community. Other actors include Islamic groups in Mali, who support the Movement of Unity and Jihad in West
Africa (MUJAO) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Their main mission is to impose Islamic law across Mali
and liberate Malians from the French colonial legacy. 9 Moreover, the influence of France as a former colonial power
has remained a key force within the Malian conflict.
M. Fonbaustier, ‘Mali: a Case Study of a Complex African Crisis’, Marc Fonbaustier Official Website,
http://marcfonbaustier.tumblr.com/post/25158046866/mali-a-case-study-of-a-complex-african-crisis [accessed 30th of November,
2013].
2 Ibid.
3 I. Bergamaschi, ‘MINUSMA: initial steps, achievements and challenges’, NOREF, September 2013,
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/89da563832be4b62d09bc99edc0cf080.pdf
[accessed December 3rd 2013].
4 Ibid.
5 ‘Malian army clashes with Tuareg rebels for second day in Kidal’, Reuters, September 2013,
http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2013/09/30/malian-army-clashes-with-tuareg-rebels-for-second-day-in-kidal [accessed 4th of
December 2013].
6 Ibid.
7 Bergamaschi, op. cit.
8 L. Deschamps-Laporte, ‘Understanding the Malian Crisis and its Actors’, Democracy in Africa, April 2013,
http://democracyinafrica.org/understanding-the-malian-crisis-its-actors [accessed 1st of December 2013].
9 ‘Mali Crisis: Key players’, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17582909 [accessed 29th of November 2013].
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Recent Developments and an Increase in Violence
The Rebels’ attempt to take over the northern part of Mali, in March 2012, resulted in an escalation of violence and
ultimately an intervention led by France. Although the French forces pushed the rebels back to the mountains on
Mali’s border with Algeria, violence still continues 10. For example, in November 2013, two French journalists were
kidnapped and killed in Kidal. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have claimed responsibility. They have argued the act
was in retaliation for French and African military action in Mali 11. Moreover, an ethnic Tuareg separatist group within
Mali has said it is ending a ceasefire agreed with the government in June 12. This news came a day after clashes
between Malian troops and Tuareg protesters, who prevented a visit by Prime Minister Oumar Tatam Ly to the town of
Kidal. As MNLA leader said, "What happened is a declaration of war” 13.
Is Reconciliation A Possibility?
The commitment to national reconciliation by the new government has been reflected in the successful presidential
election of Ibrahim Boubacak Keita and the establishment of democratic governance. The elections saw high
participation, a record level of 48 percent, with considerable support for the winning candidate14. Boubacak’s new
cabinet carries 34 positions and includes the office of National Reconciliation and Northern Development, which aims
to repair and rejuvenate Mali15. Similarly a Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation, which includes 33 members,
was set up in March. This is based on a widely used model of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC). It is
through TRC that commissioners’ release public reports that recognize human rights violations have been carried out,
in the attempt to build bridges between conflicting communities 16. In Mali, the army, rebels and Islamic militants have
all been accused on human rights abuses. Due to this the establishment of a TRC organization remains an important
step. However, a lack of regular meetings has led to the TRC’s effectiveness being questioned.
Cooperation with different factions has been encouraged within government. Ex-rebel leader Zahibi Ould Sidi
Mohamed has been appointment to head of the Foreign Ministry17. The government has also said it will hold
discussions with all groups living in the north of the country, before opening peace talks with Tuareg rebels. However,
some groups have been excluded from negotiations. For example, the Patrouilleurs de Gao, a group involved in nonviolent resistance to Tuareg rebels, are discontent due to a lack of recognition from the government. They have
asserted that they have not been included in any dialogue aimed at a settling long standing Tuareg grievances 18.
‘Conflict in Mali and Climate Change’, ICE, May 2013, http://www1.american.edu/ted/ICE/mali.html [accessed 3rd of December
2013].
11 ‘Mali Timeline’, BBC News, November 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881978 [accessed 5th of December
2013].
12 ‘Mali Info/News’, Twitter, [accessed 30th November]
13 ‘Tuareg separatist group in Mali 'ends ceasefire’, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25161049 [accessed 2nd
of November 2013].
14 ‘Mali crisis: France's Fabius calls for reconciliation’, BBC News, April 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22048162
[accessed 2nd of December 2013].
15A. Hirsch, ‘Mali's fight with militants is far from over’, BBC News, October 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa22048162 [accessed 4th of December 2013].
16 M. Tran, ‘Mali's new president faces tough test as he strives for reconciliation’, The Guardian, September 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/18/mali-president-ibrahim-boubacar-keita-tough-test [accessed 4th of December
2013].
17‘Mali's New PM Unveils 34-Member Cabinet’, Voice of America, September 2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/malis-newpm-unveils-34member-cabinet/1745724.html [accessed 1st of December 2013].
18 A. Diarra, ‘Malian separatist rebels end ceasefire after clashes’, Reuters, November 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/29/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE9AS0R520131129 [accessed 1st of December 2013].
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Despite these examples of governmental attempts to encourage reconciliation, tension between the central
government and Tuareg separatists remains. In September, government forces clashed with protesters who impeded
the Prime Ministers visit - throwing stones at his convoy, which was heading to the main northern rebel stronghold in
the city of Kadil. The MNLA has called for the lifting of the ceasefire with central government, which has been in place
for five months19. President Ibrahim Boubacak Keita insists the solution will be found through improved government
decentralization. Separation or federal independence for Azawad is not an option 20.
The local populations in the northern areas largely reject the notion of reconciliation. Many have asserted they would
not support a policy of forgiveness for the Islamic militants who, in a brutal interpretation of Islamic law, committed
acts such as amputations and executions. For many, there is an emphasis on justice, before reconciliation. However,
damaged courthouses, police states and other administrative buildings in the north have made this difficult to
impose21.
A Regional Approach to Reconciliation
Regional approaches to peacebuilding emphasize a country’s specific challenges. With most conflicts now occurring
within, rather than among states, peacekeeping in a regional form has become popular. A regional framework
appreciates local variation in conflicts22.
In Mali, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is the principle regional actor. ECOWAS was
established in 1975 to promote economic development and prosperity in the region. It has since expanded to
encompass conflict management and peacekeeping intervention 23. The ECOWAS Standby Force provides support in
conflict prevention, humanitarian intervention, enforcement, peacebuilding and the control of organised crime 24.
However the ECOWAS are limited in their actions. They struggle with financial, military and political difficulties. They
must also face the forces’ inability to effectively safeguard civilians under their authority, the poor human rights record
of their troops, the lack of neutrality, and their complicity in the exploitation of natural sources of their host countries 25.
These weaknesses, however, allow the UN an opportunity to co-deploy a peacekeeping force with a regional
organisation, as was originally envisaged in the UN charter26. An example of co-deployment by the UN and ECOWAS
was seen in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire. In West Africa ECOWAS typically contributes a rapid response force
to stabilise a volatile conflict. Their authority is then handed over to a larger, better-resourced UN mission. This assigns
the ECOWAS a leadership role in matters concerning peace and security in the region 27. This model is seen in Mali
today.
‘Reconciliation Challenges Ahead for Mali President’, Voice of America, September 2013,
http://www.voanews.com/content/reconcialiation-challenges-on-horizon-for-new-mali-president/1753176.html, [accessed 2nd of
December 2013].
20‘Mali announces first post-war government’, ENCA, September 2013, http://ww.enca.com/africa/mali-announces-first-post-wargovernment [accessed 3rd of December 2013].
21I. Bergamaschi, ‘MINUSMA: initial steps, achievements and challenges’, NOREF, September 2013,
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/89da563832be4b62d09bc99edc0cf080.pdf
[accessed December 3rd 2013].
22 N. Tschirgi, ‘Making the Case for a Regional Approach to Peacebuilding’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development (Volume 1,
Issue 1, 2002).
23 Dr. J. M. Kabia, ‘Regional Approaches to Peacebuilding: The ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture’, BISA – African and
International Studies ESRC Seminar Series: African Agency in International Politics, April 2011.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
19
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On December 20th, 2012 the UN Security Council Resolution 2085 passed a mission that authorised the deployment
of the African led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) for one year 28. The focus of the operation was the
protection of the Mali government against Islamist rebels in the Northern Mali conflict. On April 25 th, 2013, the US
Security Council Resolution 2100 established MINUSMA 29. This resolution initiated MINUSMA’s replacement of
AFISMA in Mali. On July 1st, 2013 AFISMA transferred its authority in Mali to MINUSMA. This seems to mimic previous
relations between the UN and the ECOWAS.
However, the UN and Western powers have to be wary of placing African states in subordinate positions during
missions. For example, the former Burundian president and head of AFISMA, Pierre Buyoya, was passed on as head of
the mission in Mali. Instead Bert Koenders, a candidate from the Netherlands who carried French support, was
awarded the position30. It has been contended that the supporting role given to African states in these operations has
caused the withdrawal of some Nigerian troops from MINUSMA 31. The UN and Western states must thus be delicate in
their intervention. However France’s plans to withdraw the majority of their troops form the conflict, by the end of
201332, weakens any allegations of Western imperialism. These forces will be replaced by troops from several West
African countries.
Regional Interests:
ECOWAS member states
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo have a shared interest in the diplomatic resolution of Mali war. In the Mali conflict
they attempted to act as mediators. On June 18th, 2013, the transitional government and armed groups in the
northern regions of Mali signed a preliminary agreement for inclusive peace talks with the promise of a presidential
election33. After the coup in Mali ECOWAS leaders placed ‘the re-establishment of constitutional order34’ as their
principle aim. As stated by Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara 35, ECOWAS are committed to the use of military
force if it is required.
AFISMA
Set up by the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staffs (CCDS) with a purpose of deploying 11,200 and 1,440
police officers to work for the UN counter-insurgency operation in Mali36.
28‘MINUSMA
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali’, United Nations,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtml [accessed 1st of December 2013].
29 I. Bergamaschi, ‘MINUSMA: initial steps, achievements and challenges’, NOREF, September 2013,
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/89da563832be4b62d09bc99edc0cf080.pdf
[accessed December 3rd 2013].
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32‘Mali crisis: France's Fabius calls for reconciliation’, BBC News, April 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22048162
[accessed 2nd of December 2013].
33 ‘Report from the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’, United Nations Security Council S/2013/582, October 2013,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_582.pdf [accessed
2nd December, 2013].
34 L. Coulibaly and D. Lewis, ‘Mali neighbors threaten force to reverse coup’, Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/us-mali-army-ecowas-idUSBRE82R01B20120328 [accessed 2nd December, 2013].
35 Ibid.
36 A. Mezyaev, “Operation Mali”: United Nations Complicit in Recolonization of Africa’, Centre for Research on Globalization,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/operation-mali-united-nations-complicit-in-recolonization-of-africa/5330465 [accessed 2nd
December, 2013].
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Algeria
Algeria is dealing simultaneously with the refugee influx caused by the civil war in Mali and, from this level of
migration, the expected food crisis in Sahel-Saharan Africa37. Co-operating and maintaining good relations with the
U.S. and France through the 'pacification' of Northern Mali is in the country’s best interests 38. This is being achieved in
the containment of internal demonstrations against intervention in Mali 39. Algeria are also participating in the TransSahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership established by the U.S. in 2005. 9
Burkina Faso
This country is also dealing with the refugee crisis40 and participating in the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Partnership established by the U.S. in 200541
Chad
In April 2013, Chad’s president, Idris Deby, announced his decision to pull out the Chadian troops supporting France in
Mali. Chad was not sufficiently equipped to fight a guerilla-style war in Mali42. Nevertheless, the President stated that
Chad would continue to contribute to the UN peacekeeping force currently operating in Mali.
In March 2013, a rebel coalition operating in Chad - the l'Union des Forces de la Resistance (UFR) – announced the
end to a two-year truce and the intention to take up arms43. Thus, to ensure the UN’s support in an internal conflict, it
is in Chad’s best interest to cooperate with the UN and contribute to the peacekeeping operation in Mali.
Most recently, on October 24 th, 2013, BBC News reported that the UN has called for more troops to be deployed to
Mali. This occurred after two peacekeepers from Chad had been killed and six wounded, in a suicide attack in
northern Mali44.
Mauritania
This country has pushed diplomatic resolutions to the conflict in Mali. On August 6 th, 2013, a meeting was facilitated
between the MNLA, the Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) and the Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (MAA).
This resulted in an agreement on the cessation of inter-group attacks and security collaboration in northern Mali 45.
The country is also preoccupied containing the widespread opposition from various political parties from the Islamic
community, who are critical of the France’s involvement in Mali46.
N. Bowie, ‘Washington’s Political Destabilization Agenda in Africa: Separatist War Looms in Post-coup Mali’, Global Research,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/washington-s-political-destabilization-agenda-in-africa-separatist-war-looms-in-post-coup-mali
[accessed 2nd December, 2013].
38 R. Annis, ‘France Launches War in Mali in Bid to Secure Resources, Stamp Out National Rights Struggles’, Socialist Project EBulletin No. 762, January 2013, http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/762.php [accessed 2 nd December, 2013].
39 A. Azikiwe, ‘French, NATO War in Mali Spreads to Algeria. Over 80 known dead in seizure of gas field’, Pan African News Wire,
January 2013 <http://panafricannews.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/french-nato-war-in-mali-spreads-to.html [accessed 2nd December,
2013].
40 Mezyaev, op. cit.
41 Annis, op. cit.
42 A. Duval-Smith, ‘Mali crisis: Chad's Idriss Deby announces troop pullout’, BBC News, April 2013
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22150625 [accessed 2nd December, 2013].
43 Ibid.
44 ‘UN troops from Chad killed in Mali's Tessalit town’, BBC News, October 2013 [accessed 2nd December, 2013].
45 ‘Report from the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’, United Nations Security Council S/2013/582, October 2013,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_582.pdf [accessed
2nd December, 2013].
46 A. Azikiwe, ‘French, NATO War in Mali Spreads to Algeria. Over 80 known dead in seizure of gas field’, Pan African News Wire,
January 2013 <http://panafricannews.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/french-nato-war-in-mali-spreads-to.html [accessed 2nd December,
2013].
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Niger
This country acts to contain the threat of spreading terrorism that is caused by widely roaming radical militants –
especially after an increase in kidnapping cases 47. It also cooperates with both France and the US. At the beginning of
2013 the US opened a drone airbase in Niger, with around 100 American troops being sent to help set up this base 48.
Due to a limited US military presence in Africa - the only other military base being located in Dijbouti49 - opening an
airbase in Niger signifies an increasing US presence in the countries bordering with Mali. This was confirmed by the
status-of-forces agreement with the US, signed by Niger in January 2013. This agreement legally safeguards the
presence of American troops and enables the US military to increase its involvement in Niger 50. According to President
Obama, troops were sent to support the French-led operation against Al-Qaeda51. Niger’s President Mahamadou
Issoufou justified this agreement by emphasizing the need to contain the terrorist threat coming from both Mali and its
fleeing refugees52.
Qatar
Qatar’s interests can be divided into 2 groups - the first focusing on religion, the second on geo-strategic concerns.
Qatar is involved in the promotion of Islamic fundamentalism in Africa 53. An unnamed source in French military
intelligence stated, ‘the MNLA, al Qaeda-linked Ansar Dine and MUJAO have all received cash from Doha’ 54. The mayor
of the north, Sadou Diallo, supported this, accusing Qatar of aiding Islamists in Gao and Timbuktu55.
In terms of Qatar’s geo-strategic interests, the increase in the Emirate’s influence in West Africa and the Sahel region who aim to replace Saudi Arabia as the centre of Sunni Islam – and the ensuing competition between Sunni and
Shiite, is at the forefront of the country’s agenda and concerns 56.
Senegal
This country is contributing troops to UN peacekeeping forces in Mali despite growing fears of terrorist reprisals by
Islamist militants57.
G. York, ‘Mali’s neighbours fear spread of terrorism from Islamists’, Global Mail, December 2012,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/malis-neighbours-fear-spread-of-terrorism-from-islamists/article6604820 [accessed
2nd December, 2013].
48 E. Schmitt and S. Sayare, New Drone Base in Niger Builds U.S. Presence in Africa, New York Times, February 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/world/africa/in-niger-us-troops-set-up-drone-base.html?_r=1& [accessed 2nd December,
2013].
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 A. Mezyaev, “Operation Mali”: United Nations Complicit in Recolonization of Africa’, Centre for Research on Globalization,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/operation-mali-united-nations-complicit-in-recolonization-of-africa/5330465 [accessed 2nd
December, 2013].
53 S. Allemandou, ‘Is Qatar fuelling the crisis in north Mali?’, France 24, http://www.france24.com/en/20130121-qatar-mali-franceansar-dine-mnla-al-qaeda-sunni-islam-doha [accessed 2nd December, 2013].
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 G. York, ‘Mali’s neighbours fear spread of terrorism from Islamists’, Global Mail, December 2012,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/malis-neighbours-fear-spread-of-terrorism-from-islamists/article6604820 [accessed
2nd December, 2013].
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Preservation of Borders
The status and government’s perception, of borders within Mali, can be linked to the general features of the Malian
post-colonial political culture. The lack of commitment to the preservation and control of borders can be explained by
two factors. The first of these refers to the character of the borders themselves and the second examines the
perception of both borders and territory in Malian society.
Mali has an extensive land border than runs for 7.2 thousand kilometers, with seven neighboring countries58. Modern
Mali inherited its borders from the former colony of French Sudan. This territory was constantly re-shaped by the
French West Africa’s colonial administration prior to 1960. This resulted in numerous changes in administrative
borders59.
It can be observed that today, Malian borders in different sectors carry different de-facto statuses. For example the
northern borders, which lie within three large, scarcely populated provinces, receive far less attention from the central
government.
Indeed, there are several factors behind the Government’s inability to effectively control the borders in the north:
Borders in Mali are extensive and most are not demarcated (especially when they have been delimited by abstract
lines rather than geography).
The Government has little capacity to effectively control the northern borders and frontier areas due to a small-sized
military and poor road infrastructure in northern areas 60.
Historically in Mali, borders have been porous and unprotected in the north due to geographical features: cross-border
Saharan trade and migrations of nomadic tribes, as well as cross-border communication of split ethnic communities
(e.g. Tuaregs in Mali, Algeria, Niger61). The movement of refugees across Malian borders has further lowered the
status of these boundaries62.
Militant groups in the North of Mali transcend borders, using the territories of several governments that have little
capacity to prevent their movement. This also affects the value of borders 63.
Malian governments have previously authorized military operations by the armies of neighboring states (for example
Maurentania64, Algeria65 and Niger66), against the militant Islamist and Tuareg groups. The easy movement of foreign
troops through the Malian borders has undermined the significance of borders.
Library of Congress, ‘Mali: Country Profile’, Federal Research Division, January 2005.
P. J. Imperato and G. H. Imperato. Historical dictionary of Mali (Lanham, Scarecrow Press, 2008), XXII-XXVII.
60 C. Châtelot and N. Guibert, Une armée malienne tombée en ruines, Le Monde, February 2013,
http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/02/04/une-armee-malienne-tombee-en-ruines_1826625_3212.html [accessed
December the 4th 2013].
61 Imperato, op. cit, p. 234.
62 ‘Mali Situation Update N° 21, August-September 2013’, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/5269310d9.html/ [accessed December
5th 2013].
63 M. D. Maiga, ‘Lutte contre le Terrorisme au Mali’, SIPRI, 2011,
http://www.sipri.org/research/security/africa/uploaded/mali_study_2011/ [accessed December 4 th 2013].
64 ‘Mauritanian army destroys al Qaeda camp in Mali’, France24, June 25, 2011, http://www.france24.com/en/20110625-alqaeda-camp-destroyed-mali-mauritania-aqim-terrorism/Mali 1st Draft.docx [accessed December 3rd 2013].
65 ‘Algerian troops 'in Mali to combat Qaeda groups’, AFP, December2011,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jhSUtgQ43HUoFm2OWiYwGbJ3uh1g?docId=CNG.1dcdf009c74210a2ec0
79517c86453b7.451&hl=en/ [accessed December 3rd 2013].
66 ‘Mali and Niger forces retake northern Malian town’, France24, January 29, 2013, http://www.france24.com/en/20130129mali-niger-forces-retake-northern-town-ansongo-france [accessed December 3rd 2013].
58
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There are also factors related to the perception of borders by the Malian society and political elites:
Malian borders are artificial and do not match the divisions of the West-African population. The government of Mali
had no influence in the delineating of the borders of the country. This imposition of borders at independence created a
mismatch between the identities of the population and political elites, on one side, and the actual configuration of the
country, on the other.
There is a certain level of alienation felt by the majority of the population of Mali and the ruling elite towards northern
areas inhabited by the Tuaregs. This is a result of continuing conflict between the Tuaregs and the central government,
as well as the history of racial conflict between Tuareg and black population 67. Consequently the northern areas are
perceived as the 'other' non-native part of the country opposing the rest.
As there exists no formal border-crossing regime for individuals between Mali and neighboring countries, the majority
of the population does not regard the border as a line of division when engaging in large-scale seasonal labour
migrations68.
Conclusion
To conclude, the situation in Mali appears to have no imminent solutions. Barriers to peace reconciliation remain and
must be addressed before real progress can be made. For instance, the need for justice is, for many, the priority
before bridges can be mended. Furthermore, the Tuareg populations will continue to call a platform to voice their
grievances and the need for political recognition and respect from the government. Therefore, a level of respect,
honesty and integrity is needed from all the actors involved in Malian conflict, to create a space to build on. Due to
this, the peace process in Mali must not be dictated by regional powers with vested interests or the wider international
community that may appear as interventionists. The Malian road to peace should concern the key actors involved in
the conflict. Thus, a grassroots approach appears to be the best solution in the prevention of escalating violence.
A. Morgan, ‘The Causes of the Uprising in Northern Mali’, ThinkAfricaPress, February 2012,
http://thinkafricapress.com/mali/causes-uprising-northern-mali-tuareg/Mali 1st Draft.docx [accessed December 3rd 2013].
68 ‘The Mali Migration Crisis at a Glance’, IOM, March 2013,
http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/Mali_Migration_Crisis_2013.pdf [accessed 5 th of December 2013],
p.4.
67
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