Policy Brief 3.13
Policy Brief
The New Barbary Wars
Assessing the Threat of Modern Day Piracy
Brandon C. Prins
Global Security Fellow, Baker Center for Public Policy
University of Tennessee
Ursula Daxecker
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of Amsterdam
Amanda Sanford
PhD candidate in Political Science
University of Tennessee
Fall 2013
Baker Center Board
Baker Center Board
Cynthia Baker
Cynthia Baker
Media Consultant
Media Consultant
Baker
Center Board
Washington, DC
Washington, DC
Cynthia Baker
The Honorable Howard H. Baker Jr.
The Honorable
Media
Consultant Howard H. Baker Jr.
Former Ambassador to Japan
Former
Ambassador
to Japan
Washington,
DC
Former United States Senator
Former United States Senator
The Honorable Howard H. Baker Jr.
The Honorable Phil Bredesen
The
Honorable
Phil
Former
Ambassador
to Bredesen
Japan
Former Governor of Tennessee
Governor
of Tennessee
Former United
States
Senator
Sam M. Browder
SamHonorable
M. Browder
The
Phil Bredesen
Retired, Harriman Oil
Retired,Governor
HarrimanofOil
Former
Tennessee
Sarah Keeton Campbell
Patrick
Butler
Sarah
Keeton
Campbell
Sam
M.
Browder
Attorney, Williams & Connolly, LLP
CEO, Assoc.
Public Oil
Television
Attorney,
Williams
&
Connolly,Stations
LLP
Retired,
Harriman
Washington, DC
Washington, DC
Sarah Keeton Campbell
Jimmy G. Cheek
Jimmy
Cheek & Connolly, LLP
Attorney,G.
Williams
Chancellor, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Chancellor, The
Washington,
DCUniversity of Tennessee, Knoxville
AB Culvahouse Jr.
AB Culvahouse
Jimmy
G. CheekJr.
Attorney, O’Melveny & Myers, LLP
Attorney, O’Melveny
& Myers,
LLP
Chancellor,
The University
of Tennessee,
Knoxville
Washington, DC
Washington, DC
AB Culvahouse Jr.
The Honorable Albert Gore Jr.
The Honorable
Albert
Gore
Jr.
Attorney,
O’Melveny
& Myers,
LLP
Former Vice President of the United States
Former Vice President
of the United States
Washington,
DC
Former United States Senator
Former United States Senator
The Honorable Albert Gore Jr.
Thomas Griscom
Thomas
Griscom
Former
Vice
President of the United States
Communications Consultant
Communications
Consultant
Former
United States
Senator
Former Editor, Chattanooga Times Free Press
Former Editor, Chattanooga Times Free Press
Thomas Griscom
James Haslam II
James Haslam Consultant
II
Communications
Chairman and Founder, Pilot Corporation
Chairman
and Founder,
Pilot Times
Corporation
Former
Editor,
Chattanooga
Free Press
The University of Tennessee Board of Trustees
The University of Tennessee Board of Trustees
James Haslam II
Joseph E. Johnson
Joseph E.and
Johnson
Chairman
Founder, Pilot Corporation
Former President, University of Tennessee
Former
President,
UniversityBoard
of Tennessee
The
University
of Tennessee
of Trustees
Fred Marcum
Fred Marcum
Joseph
E. Johnson
Senior Adviser to Senator Baker
Senior Adviser
to Senator
Baker
Former
President,
University
of Tennessee
The Honorable George Cranwell Montgomery
The Honorable
Fred
Marcum George Cranwell Montgomery
Former Ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman
FormerAdviser
Ambassador
to theBaker
Sultanate of Oman
Senior
to Senator
Regina Murray
Regina
Murray George Cranwell Montgomery
The
Honorable
Knoxville, Tennessee
Knoxville,
Tennesseeto the Sultanate of Oman
Former
Ambassador
Lee Riedinger
Lee Riedinger
Regina
Murray
Vice Cancellor, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Vice Cancellor,
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Knoxville,
Tennessee
John Seigenthaler
JohnRiedinger
Seigenthaler
Lee
Founder, First Amendment Center,
Founder,
First Amendment
Center,
Vice
Cancellor,
The University
of Tennessee, Knoxville
Vanderbilt University
Vanderbilt University
John Seigenthaler
Don C. Stansberry Jr.
Don C. Stansberry
Jr. Center,
Founder,
First Amendment
The University of Tennessee Board of Trustees
The University
of Tennessee Board of Trustees
Vanderbilt
University
The Honorable Don Sundquist
The Honorable
DonJr.
Sundquist
Don
C. Stansberry
Former Governor of Tennessee
Former
Governor
of Tennessee
The
University
of Tennessee
Board of Trustees
William H. Swain
William
H. Swain
The
Honorable
Don Sundquist
The University of Tennessee Development Council
The University
of Tennessee
Development Council
Former
Governor
of Tennessee
The Honorable Fred Thompson
The Honorable
Fred Thompson
William
H. Swain
Former United States Senator
Former
United of
States
SenatorDevelopment Council
The
University
Tennessee
Robert Waller
Robert
Waller Fred Thompson
The Honorable
Former President and CEO, Mayo Clinic
President
and Senator
CEO, Mayo Clinic
Former United
States
Robert Waller
Former President and CEO, Mayo Clinic
Baker Center Staff
Baker Center Staff
Matt Murray
Matt Murray
Director
Director
Baker Center Staff
Nissa
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Carl Pierce
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Woody
Director Emeritus & Senior Fellow
Director
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Office Manager
for Baker Studies
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Carl Pierce
Director Emeritus & Senior Fellow
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The contents of this report were developed under a
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ever, these contents do not necessarily represent
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The
Wars:
TheNew
NewBarbary
Barbary Wars:
Assessing
Threat of
of Modern
Modern Day
Piracy
Assesing
thethe
Threat
Day
Piracy
Brandon C. Prins
Ursula Daxecker
Amanda Sanford
Executive Summary
Changes in the international power
structure in the last two decades as well as
the rapid increase in international trade have
created an environment that is both
vulnerable to maritime piracy and lucrative
for those who might engage in such activity.
The volume of trade conducted on the high
seas (in excess of $1 trillion annually)
provides would-be pirates a tempting target,
especially where legitimate economic
opportunities in their home countries may be
unsatisfactory or even non-existent. Further,
the collapse of the global security umbrellas
characteristic of Cold War power dynamics
has meant that maritime security around
small, weak states virtually does not exist.
The Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public
Policy has prepared this Policy Brief to
survey the history of maritime piracy,
explain the drivers of its recent resurgence
as a global security threat, evaluate the
success of recent antipiracy measures, and
suggest some policy tools that may be more
effective at curtailing the lure of such
brigandry.
The Brief is divided into a short
introduction describing the recent trends in
and impact of maritime piracy and three
Baker Center for Public Policy
more substantive sections. The first section
provides a brief history of maritime piracy
as well as its evolution into a more recent
phenomenon. Innovations and
improvements in maritime technology and
the expansion of international sea trade
coupled with the absence of a capable police
presence by smaller states in heavily
trafficked trade routes are the underlying
global conditions that have led to the
resurgence in the incidents of maritime
piracy.
The second section differentiates
between the factors that motivated piracy in
ancient and early modern eras from those
that underscore the frequency of attacks in
the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Though
the root factors – poorly regulated seas or
profitable economic opportunities – are
common to both past and contemporary
incidents of maritime piracy, there are some
differences in the drivers of piracy in the
modern period, especially state fragility and
the absence of legitimate employment
opportunities in weak states. Also important
here is the diversion of resources from
maritime security to protections against
international terrorism.
The third section elaborates on the trends
in maritime piracy incidents over the last 20
years. Maritime attacks, though a global
phenomenon, occur largely in specific
regional clusters. These often coincide with
established and highly trafficked shipping
lanes close to territorial waters. Moreover,
not all states near such trade routes
experience episodes of maritime piracy with
equal frequency. Those who rank higher on
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political fragility indices, are prone to
corruption, or that experience high rates of
unemployment are much more likely to
serve as shelters for pirate groups.
Our concluding section evaluates the
effectiveness of international policing
mechanisms and argues that though these
must necessarily be part of any successful
global antipiracy regime, they are
insufficient to deter would-be pirates from
pursuing such illicit activity. Rather, policies
that address the underlying conditions that
enable pirate groups – fragile and corrupt
governments and dissatisfactory economic
environments – are much more likely to
succeed at decreasing the frequency of such
attacks.
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The Howard H. Baker Center for Public Policy
Policy Brief | 2
On April 5, 2010, two attack skiffs
successfully boarded and hijacked a
German-owned commercial vessel in the
Indian Ocean. The MV Taipan, on its way
from Haifa, Israel, to Mombasa, Kenya,
intentionally avoided sailing near Somali
waters because of the increased frequency of
such attacks since 2005. When captured, the
Taipan was 500 nautical miles off the
Somali coast, and had sighted a seemingly
innocuous dhow. The two skiffs, equipped
with 10 Somali pirates, attacked the Taipan
with machine gun fire upon approach,
causing the ship’s master to order his crew
into a secure location, while he and another
officer remained on the bridge. The pirates
disabled the ship’s GPS and redirected its
route to Somalia. The sequestered crew were
able to radio international naval forces in the
area, bringing the Dutch warship HNLMS
Tromp to the Taipan’s rescue. The approach
of the Tromp led to the immediate retreat of
the dhow Hud Hud – serving as the pirate
mothership – but all attempts at negotiations
between the Dutch Marines and the pirates
aboard the Taipan were unsuccessful. The
Tromp resorted to freeing the Taipan and its
crew by force, opening fire against the
pirates and boarding the ship by rappelling
down from a military helicopter. Within
only a matter of hours from the initial
hijacking, the Dutch Marines successfully
apprehended the Somali pirates, rescued the
crew, and freed the ship with no casualties
or loss of merchant supplies.
The suspects involved in the pirate
attack on the Taipan were immediately
taken to Djibouti, flown to the Netherlands,
and extradited to Germany, where they
Baker Center for Public Policy
stood trial for their crimes in the first
legitimate piracy trial in Germany in 400
years. The trial itself lasted an
unprecedented 105 days given the apparent
simplicity of the ordeal, and was marred by
the inability of the German prosecutors to
assess the age of the accused, the specific
actions taken by each individual during the
hijacking, and the consideration of the
duress under which some of the suspects
may have acted. Nevertheless, the
meticulous and drawn-out proceedings
resulted in the conviction of all 10 Somali
pirates on charges of kidnapping and attacks
on maritime traffic. Prison sentences ranged
from two to seven years, and the trial itself
set a precedent for larger antipiracy countermeasures in the international community.
The importance of this incident – and the
subsequent criminal proceedings – cannot be
ignored in a brief on the resurgence of
maritime piracy and the success of
antipiracy policies, as incidents like the
attack on the Taipan are not rare.
Maritime piracy reappeared as a security
threat in the early 1990s, as Figure 1 shows.
The reemergence of piracy is commonly
attributed to two phenomena. First, the end
of the Cold War weakened the political
control of states previously supported by the
superpowers, which reduced states’ ability to
provide maritime security. Coinciding with
these developments was an increase in
international business and trade as a result of
globalization. In 2011, pirates launched 439
attacks against shipping vessels worldwide.
This represented an 83% increase in piracy
from 2006 and more than a 300% increase
from 1991. Incidents dropped in 2012, but
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still there were at least 297 attacks, 28
hijackings, and more than 550 hostages were
seized, most by Somali pirates.1
Figure 1: Global Piracy Incidents, 1991-2012
500
Number of Piracy Incidents
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Year
Source: International Maritime Bureau
The increases in the number of piracy
incidents come at a high cost for shipping
companies and states. More than 80% of
global trade is transported on ships, and
these vessels provide pirates with large
numbers of lucrative targets. Attempts to
quantify the cost of maritime piracy put
yearly losses to the international economy
between $7-12 billion.2 Understanding the
drivers of piracy thus has important
economic and security benefits for the
United States and other countries. Yet
despite threats posed by maritime piracy,
modern manifestations of piracy continue to
be largely ignored by scholars, the media,
and political elites. While certain incidents
have generated considerable attention, such
1
Data come from the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB).
2
Oceans Beyond Piracy Project,
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/.
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The Howard H. Baker Center for Public Policy
as the rescue of Maersk Alabama captain
Richard Phillips by US Navy SEALs in
April 2009, maritime piracy continues to be
ignored and largely misunderstood.
Piracy continues to pose problems for
the international community, and it
remains to be seen whether deterrent
measures can successfully reduce such
criminality on the high seas.
The public policy response to piracy has
also been limited. The United States and
other countries have sent additional
warships to the waters off Somalia and
President Barack Obama publicly pledged to
“halt the rise of piracy,” but such limited
actions have had only marginal success.
While international efforts such as UN
Security Council Resolution 1851,
Combined Task Force 150 and 151, and the
European Union’s Operation Atalanta have
attempted to stem piracy off the coast of
Somalia, the actions appear to have had only
limited impact. Indeed, the Task Force
became fully operational in January 2009,
but piracy incidents increased from 406 in
2009 to 445 in 2010, and then stabilized in
2011 at 439. Naval cooperation between the
EU, the United States, and the United
Nations has improved, and these efforts
appear to have succeeded in reducing
Somali piracy for the first time in 2012. But
it remains to be seen whether deterrent
measures can abate piracy in the long-term.
Indeed, IMB statistics show that while
piracy has seemingly decreased in the Gulf
of Aden, it has increased in other areas, such
as in the Gulf of Guinea. And while
incidents decreased substantially in
Southeast Asia from 2003 to 2009, incidents
Policy Brief | 4
in Indonesian waters have increased more
than four-fold since 2009. Further, shipowners appear to regard the multilateral
naval actions as insufficient (PiraT,
November 2011). It seems that both the
drivers of piracy as well as effective tools to
combat piracy remain poorly understood.
For example, if piracy and terrorism are
linked, as they may be in certain places, and
the United States continues to serve as a
lightning rod for terrorist organizations, then
an increased US naval presence may
actually increase attacks rather than decrease
them. Or, if fish catches continue to decrease
as a result of foreign fishing fleets entering
the territorial waters of under-developed
states, then an international naval presence
designed to combat piracy will only be
addressing a symptom of the problem rather
than the fundamental economic driver of
pirate attacks.

A History of Piracy
Mentions of piracy frequently conjure
romanticized notions of swashbuckling,
rum-swigging, and skirt-chasing buccaneers
hoisting the Jolly Roger. While such images
stem from the portrayal of piracy in
literature and film, they are of limited use in
understanding both ancient and more recent
manifestations of maritime banditry. Piracy
has a long history in the oceans of the world,
and its origins date back to the Phoenicians
more than 4,000 years ago. However, as
maritime technology increasingly allowed
sailing vessels to travel farther away from
littoral zones, and without adequate policing
of the high seas, piracy not only flourished,
but was largely sanctioned by the critical
powers of the day (Nadelmann, 1990).
Baker Center for Public Policy
Piracy was a means by which individuals
accrued wealth, but also a tool used by
political leaders to increase state power.3
Further, as trade on the high seas increased
with European colonization, cargo ships
laden with spices, silks, ivory, and precious
metals became lucrative targets for the
corsairs of the day.
The Barbary pirates, for example, were
the scourge of American merchant ships
immediately following the Revolutionary
War.4 While the British were able to patrol
the Mediterranean and protect their trade
routes, most states simply paid tribute to the
Deys of the Barbary States (Howarth, 1991).
Ransoming crews (similar to today) as well
as tributes were common responses to the
North African corsairs. The U.S. in 1791,
for example, offered $49,000 to the Dey of
Algeria for ransoming held U.S. sailors and
created a tribute account to buy off the
North African leaders (Howarth, 1991).
Other countries, such as Holland, Austria,
and Norway also paid for protection.
Despite such efforts, Davis (2003) concludes
that upward of a million European sailors
were seized and sold into slavery during the
3
In return for a letter of marque, which offered
pirates some legitimacy through state sanction,
governments received a share of the spoils
(Conybeare and Sandler, 1993).
4
The Barbary pirates were sponsored, in most
instances, by sovereign states and thus the term
privateer is more accurate. Yet, how much control the
Sultans of North Africa had over these ships and
crews is not entirely clear. A treaty between Charles
V of Spain and the King of Tunis requires the North
African leader to offer no shelter to corsairs, pirates,
and robbers, which suggests that some pirate vessels
were operating independently of state control
(Montmorency, 1918).
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height of Barbary power in the 18th and 19th
centuries.
Piracy reached its heyday in the late 17th
and early 18th centuries when it flourished in
the seas adjacent to Europe and North
America as well as the Indian Ocean (Dear
and Kemp, 2005: 430). Yet its success
eventually produced a response by the
British, whose naval forces had been
substantially strengthened toward the end of
the 17th century (Nadelmann, 1990). In part,
the naval response to piracy by the British
(as well as the Dutch, Spanish, and French)
stemmed from the increasingly profitable
maritime trade in goods to and from
European colonies (DeNevers, 2007;
Rediker, 2004). Consequently, political
elites not only attempted to delegitimize
criminality on the high seas, but also sought
to crush it through the use of naval power
(Ritchie, 1986). These actions were largely
successful as buccaneers around the world
were slowly eradicated and their state
sponsors persuaded to close down safehavens (Lehr, 2007: vii; Nadelmann, 1990).5
Piracy all but disappeared from security
discussions until the number of pirate
attacks started to rise again in the late 1980s.
The reemergence of piracy was driven by
both the collapse of the superpower rivalry,
which frequently propped up weak states in
Africa, Asia, and South America, as well as
the tremendous increase in goods shipped
around the world on the high seas (Lehr,
2007: viii). What are similarities and
differences between earlier and more recent
forms of piracy? Research argues that
differences arise in the geographic reach and
the international assessment of piracy (OngWebb, 2007). Recent piracy events occur
primarily in the territorial waters of states,
whereas piracy during its height was carried
out on the high seas (Murphy, 2009). In
addition, earlier forms of piracy possessed at
least conditional legitimacy. Privateering
(the procurement of private vessels by
states) was given a degree of official
government sanction (Abbot and Renwick,
1999). In comparison, contemporary piracy
is seen as illegitimate and is considered
criminal activity under international law.6
Yet there are also reasons to believe that
substantial similarities between ancient and
contemporary forms of piracy exist,
especially with regard to explanations of
piracy. Murphy (2009: 21) and Ong-Webb
(2007) argue that many of the underlying
factors contributing to piracy remain the
same. For example, poorly regulated seas,
favorable geography, sanctuaries on land,
and economic prospects provide
opportunities and motives for pirates old and
new.
5
Interestingly, Nadelman (1990: 491) also maintains
that the advent of steam power brought a final end to
the incidence of piracy. Pirates could not keep up
with steam powered vessels and the resources needed
to build or buy such technologically advanced ships
were out of reach of the pirates of the day.
Unfortunately, technology now allows even the most
resource-limited groups to chase down and threaten
large merchant ships.
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The criminalization of piracy in international law
was completed with the ratification of UNCLOS
(United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea),
which entered into force in 1994 and currently has
161 member states. In addition, many states have
domestic legislation against piracy although
substantial variation exists (Murphy, 2007: 166).
Policy Brief | 6

The Drivers of Modern Day Piracy
Piracy, while implemented at sea, begins
and ends on land. Access to a state is
essential because pirates need sanctuaries on
land to plan attacks, protect themselves from
capture, and conduct ransom operations. In
addition, piracy groups need access to
markets to dispose of their loot. State
weakness, then, creates the enabling
environment in which piracy can flourish.
Weak states are states in which corruption,
crime, and other social problems are
rampant. The inability of governments to
monitor and police their territories opens up
the geographical space that enables pirates
to act. Space refers not only to territorial
waters and the inability of fragile states to
provide the naval forces necessary to capture
suspected criminals. But it also refers to the
space on land where pirates organize and
plan their raids. Sometimes the piracy exists
long enough to become accepted and
integrated into the local culture and
community (Murphy 2009, 43; Hansen
2009). Further, limited government control
over a country’s coastal zone allows pirates
access to ports and anchorages for
discharging their captured cargo. Such
illegal activities might be obvious in strong
states with working political institutions
(Liss 2007). However, in countries with
weak governments, local police forces and
bureaucratic officials may be more likely to
facilitate piracy rather than hinder it so as to
share in the proceeds from the sale of
plundered goods or ransom rewards (Hansen
2009; Murphy 2009).7 Moreover, the
7
The underfunding of law enforcement in coastal
waters was exacerbated by September 11, 2001.
Governments shifted funds to combat terrorism and
Baker Center for Public Policy
international focus on terrorism in recent
decades may have only exacerbated this
situation, as it has forced many states to
devote extensive resources into homeland
security initiatives and away from the
investigation, apprehension, and prosecution
of maritime brigands (Chalk, 2009).
State weakness creates the environment
from which piracy flows and can
flourish.
Weak institutional environments also
create more direct opportunities for piracy
by threatening the livelihoods of coastal
fishing communities. Weak states’ inability
to protect their territorial waters can lead to
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing
(IUU), which results in the redeployment of
fishers into illegal activities such as piracy.
After the collapse of government institutions
in Somalia in the early 1990s, for example,
commercial foreign fishing vessels began
working off the Somali shoreline, frequently
invading its territorial waters and exclusive
economic zone, and thus displacing local
fishers (Lehr and Lehmann, 2007).8 While
such infringement by third parties may
increase fish catch for these foreign actors,
the IUU fishing reduces the fish stock
available for local communities and also
terrorists on land (Murphy 2008, 31; Chalk 2009).
Hansen (2009) reports that interviewed pirates from
the Puntland region of Somalia indicated that local
police helped facilitate piracy by not arresting known
pirates in the area. Murphy (2009) insists that
corruption within police forces affects not only
Somalia, but all piracy prone areas. In Indonesia,
Frécon (2005) found police acting as both partners
and security guards for suspected pirates.
8
Menkhaus (2009) additionally targets illegal foreign
fishing as driving individuals to piracy in the greater
Gulf of Aden.
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threatens the long-term health of fisheries
through overexploitation.
Some research points out that piracy
requires skills enjoyed by only a small
subset of a country’s population (Murphy
2009; Daxecker and Prins 2012; Weir 2009).
Raiding a local business on land requires
only a weapon and will, but at sea, boat
handling and navigational skills are critical
to success. Frécon (2005), Burnett (2002),
and Murphy (2009) all maintain that
unemployed fishermen, sailors, and taxiboat captains provide a pool of available
talent to recruit into piracy. These are
individuals that can most easily transition to
maritime brigand.
In countries where the average worker
receives only a dollar a day in wages, the
payoff from even one successful hijacking
is worth sizable risks.
The absence of employment
opportunities in the legal economy also
drives individuals into piracy. This is not to
say that poverty or unemployment turns
otherwise honest people into pirates, but
structural changes in an economy can
produce, as Vagg (1995), writes “the
dislocation of segments of the working
population.” As individuals seek to provide
for themselves and their families, the
possibility of a large reward in a relatively
short amount of time can push some fence
sitters into piracy. In countries where per
capita income can be less than $1,000 or
$2,000 a year, a single day’s payoff of
several hundred U.S. dollars is obviously
quite valuable and worth sizeable risks
(Murphy 2008). Indeed, Eklöf (2005)
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concludes that individual attacks in
Southeast Asia on average result in between
$500 and $700 for each pirate.9 Crossnational evidence appears to support the
relationship between economic weakness
and piracy. Iyigun and Ratisukpinol (2010)
find GDP per capita to correlate with
variation in pirate attacks and Jablonski and
Oliver (2012) observe increases in the price
of labor-intensive goods to drive pirate
attacks higher. Daxecker and Prins (2012)
directly address changes in a country’s
fishing sector and find that decreases in
annual fish catches correlate with increasing
numbers of pirate incidents.

Describing Piracy
Piracy affects nearly every region of the
world. As seen in Figure 2, Southeast Asia
and Africa account for a sizable majority of
incidents. In fact, approximately 65% of all
piracy occurs off the coasts of sub-Saharan
Africa and Southeast Asia. Nigeria and
Somalia tend to dominate the African
incidents while Malaysia, Thailand, the
Philippines, and Indonesia account for most
of the incidents in S.E. Asia. Still, nearly
every littoral state in sub-Saharan Africa,
S.E. Asia, and the Far East has experienced
some piracy according to the IMB data.
While rarer, the Americas also experience
piracy. More than 70 incidents were
reported in the Americas in 2003, with
Colombia and Venezuela witnessing the
highest numbers of attacks. By 2011 and
2012, incidents had dropped considerably in
the Americas, but the waters off Colombia
9
Valencia and Johnson (2005) find the payoff to be
around $5,000 to $15,000 for each successful attack,
which is then split among group members.
Policy Brief | 8
and Venezuela remained prone to piracy.
The littoral states of Europe and North
America remain the safest with only a
handful of attacks occurring over the twenty
year time period.
Figure 2: Piracy Incidents by Region, 19922012
350
Africa
Number of Piracy Incidents
300
250
Americas
Far East
Indian Sub-Continent
200
SE Asia
government revenue sources and this only
facilitates extortion and protection rackets
(Murphy 2008, Human Rights Watch 2006).
In Somalia, the collapse of the Barre regime
in the early 1990s and its replacement with
warlordism and political chaos allowed
criminality to flourish. Somalia’s political
fragility also enabled widespread illegal
fishing in its territorial waters likely pushing
many former fishers into piracy and other
criminal activities. In fact, when the USS
Gonzalez apprehended Somali pirates in
2006 they claimed to be challenging foreign
fishing vessels in Somali waters (Lim 2006).
Data from the Food and Agricultural
Figure 3: The Five Most Piracy Prone
Countries, 2003-2012
150
180
100
Somalia
160
50
Number of Piracy Incidents
140
120
0
100
Year
Source: International Maritime Bureau
While nearly 60% of non-landlocked
countries have experienced piracy in their
territorial waters, a handful of states account
for the vast majority of incidents that occur
in any given year. Figure 3 shows the five
most piracy prone countries from 2003 to
2012. All five countries suffer from
significant piracy, but Indonesia and
Somalia consistently witness the most pirate
attacks in their territorial waters. In part this
is a function of geography, but it also results
from extensive illegal fishing and
government corruption. Indonesia’s military
is funded at least in part through nonBaker Center for Public Policy
Indonesia
80
60
Bangladesh
Nigeria
40
Malaysia
20
0
Year
Source: International Maritime Bureau
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations
shows a significant decline in the value of
fish production in Somalia starting in 2004.
The value drops by 50% from 2004 to 2005,
and while the value of fish caught in Somali
waters increases in 2006, by 2007 the value
was only 32% of its 2004 price. The
variance in the value of fish produced also
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increases over this time period. For fishers,
this is a perfect storm: the value fluctuates
widely, but also the general trend is for
fewer fish caught.
States with long coastlines, archipelagic
makeup, numerous islands, or that are
located proximate to strategic shipping lanes
offer opportunities for piracy (Ong-Webb,
2007: 46). The concentration of piracy
events along the Straits of Malacca and
around the waters of Indonesia seemingly
supports such arguments. Indeed, Indonesia
has more than 54,000 kilometers of coastline
and approximately 17,508 islands make up
the country. The Philippines has only a
slightly smaller coastline at 36,000
kilometers and more than 7,000 islands.
Figure 4: Locations of Piracy Incidents, 2012
(Yellow = Attempted Attack) (Red = Actual
Attack)
Source: International Maritime Bureau
Both of these countries present difficult
challenges in controlling piracy as nearly
endless coves, inlets, and swamps exist to
conceal activity and allow for evasion.
Emphasis on favorable geography also
suggests that piracy, while a global
phenomenon, tends to be regionally
concentrated, particularly in areas close to
major shipping lanes such as East Africa and
Southeast Asia. Figure 4 maps the 2012
incidents geographically. Again, one can
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easily see that the Gulfs of Guinea and
Aden, plus the Malacca Straits witness
substantial piracy. Given that trade in the
greater Gulf of Aden is valued at nearly $1
trillion a year, it is clear why would-be
pirates gravitate toward these waters. The
value of trade in Asia is even greater,
estimated at close to $10 trillion a year.
Much, if not most, of the trade in both
regions passes through the Red Sea and the
Malacca Straits. Somalia, despite having
only five deep sea ports, is only five
kilometers from where the Red Sea empties
into the Gulf of Aden. Both Indonesia and
Malaysia directly border the Malacca Straits
and possess seven times more ports than
Somalia. The thousands of container ships
that travel these strategic waterways present
lucrative targets for modern-day corsairs.
Figure 5: The Arabian Sea
Source: www.deepseawaters.com
Piracy also flourishes where political
and economic conditions facilitate
corruption and criminality. Countries that
suffer from piracy experience much higher
levels of political fragility. The Center for
Systemic Peace measures political weakness
using an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 25,
with higher values signifying increasingly
fragile states. Countries experiencing piracy
Policy Brief | 10
$17,753. Some of the most piracy-prone
countries remain some of the poorest places
on earth. Somalia had a per capita GDP in
2009 of only $512. Nigeria was slightly
higher at $2,373, while Indonesia seems
comparatively wealthy at $4,381.
Figure 7: Per Capita GPS (Current US Dollars)
for Countries with and without Piracy
18000
Per Capita GDP (Current US Dollars)
have fragility scores that are on average
65% higher than countries not suffering
from piracy. The average fragility score for
countries without piracy is 7.6. For countries
with piracy, the average fragility score is
12.73. Indonesia scored a 15 in the late
1990s when piracy incidents in its waters
numbered more than 50 a year on average.
For the last 20 years, Somalia has been
coded as near a failed state as there is in the
international system. Its fragility score was
25 in 2010, and Somalia experienced 139
incidents that same year.
Figure 6: State Fragility Scores for Countries
with and without Piracy
25
20
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
State Fragility Score
0
15
Piracy-Prone Countries
Countries
without
2009
Piracy 2009
Somalia
2009
Nigeria 2009 Indonesia
2009
Source: World Development Indicators
10

5
0
Countries Piracy-Prone
without Piracy Countries
2010
2010
Indonesia
1997
Nigeria 2008 Somalia 2010
Source: Center for Systemic Peace
Similarly, opportunities (or lack thereof)
in the legal economy affect the prevalence
of piracy. Unemployed youth (especially
males) provide the foot-soldiers both for
insurgencies and pirate gangs. The per
capita gross domestic product (current U.S.
dollars) for countries experiencing piracy is
only $5,172. The value for countries without
piracy is more than three times higher at
Baker Center for Public Policy
Conclusion
Since the International Maritime Bureau
first started recording information on piracy
in 1991, the number of incidents has
increased dramatically. With fast boats and
light but powerful weapons, pirates are
difficult to stop. They also can impose
significant costs on shipping companies,
leading to higher prices for consumers
worldwide. The international community
has recently taken notice of this increasingly
pressing problem, but counter-piracy efforts
have thus far not succeeded in eliminating
piracy, despite some recent successes in the
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Gulf of Aden. This reflects the difficulties
inherent in addressing a violent criminal
enterprise that predominantly occurs in the
territorial waters of individual states. The
U.S. and other naval powers also confront
logistical headaches in policing the
seemingly endless coastlines of Africa,
Indonesia, and South America, from where
pirates can hide and launch their attacks.
While anti-piracy efforts, including an
increased naval presence in strategic
waterways and more effective prosecution
of alleged pirates, must be part of any plan
to combat the Barbary Pirates of the 21st
century, patrolling and enforcement at sea
will only go so far. Indeed, the countries
suffering from piracy generally remain poor
and politically fragile. It thus appears that
improving governance mechanisms and
economic opportunities carry the most
promise in reducing the incidence of piracy
and likely will be more effective than
focusing on improvements in military
capacity or the policing of coastlines.
Interested readers can find up to date
information on piracy at the Oceans Beyond
Piracy Project (oceansbeyondpiracy.org),
which is funded by the One Earth Future
Foundation. PiraT (maritimesecurity.eu)
also reports on piracy worldwide and
publishes a newsletter that documents both
attacks and research on the drivers of
modern day piracy. PiraT is funded by
German Ministry of Education and Research
as well as the Institute for Peace Research
and Security Policy at the University of
Hamburg.
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