Hydro-Political Hyperbole
David Katz
Research Articles
Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining
Incentives for Overemphasizing the
Risks of Water Wars
•
David Katz
Introduction
Reference to linkages between natural resource scarcity and the potential for violent conºict is now commonplace. Perhaps the most highlighted and most
studied such linkage is that between freshwater scarcity and conºict. Predictions
of looming water wars—such as former Egyptian Foreign Minister and later
United Nations Secretary-General Boutrous Boutrous Ghali’s statement that
“The next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics,” or former World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin’s declaration that “the wars of
the next century will be over water”1—have been cited extensively by a variety
of sources over the past three decades. More recently, UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon stressed reports that water scarcity has created “a high risk of violent
conºict.”2 Those who make claims regarding the possibility of future water wars
range from people who present such a scenario as a possibility that can be
avoided with cooperation and proper planning,3 to those who predict that
such wars are likely,4 to those who conªdently assert that such outcomes are
“certain”5 and only a matter of time.6
While the claim that increasing water scarcity will lead to increased outbreaks of wars—often dubbed the “water war hypothesis”—is widespread in
public discourse, a growing body of literature has challenged both the empirical
1. Cited by Barbara Crossette, “Severe Water Crisis Ahead for Poorest Nations in Next 2 Decades,”
New York Times, 10 August 1995.
2. Cited by Mark Clayton, “Is Water Becoming ‘The New Oil’?” The Christian Science Monitor,
29 May 2008.
3. Frey and Naff 1985; and Postel and Wolf 2001.
4. Cooley 1984; Naff and Matson 1984; Starr 1991; Bulloch and Darwish 1993; De Villiers 1999;
and Ward 2002.
5. Myers 1993, 47.
6. Waslekar 2005.
Global Environmental Politics 11:1, February 2011
© 2011 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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David Katz
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and theoretical foundations of such a hypothesis.7 Critics note, for instance, that
proponents of the water war hypothesis often rely on a very limited number of
case studies or statements from a handful of prominent ªgures,8 that relatively
little systematic empirical evidence exists of past wars over water, and that there
is scant evidence that violent conºict over water is becoming more frequent.9
Despite weak supporting evidence and numerous theoretical challenges to
the water wars hypothesis, proclamations that water wars are imminent remain
prevalent. Much of the academic literature on the topic has attempted to promulgate, refute, or test the water war hypothesis. Little has attempted to explain
why the predictions of water wars remain so popular despite questionable empirical support. This study addresses this gap. It outlines various incentives different types of key actors have to emphasize, and even exaggerate, the likelihood
of water wars. Moreover, it demonstrates that relationships between several of
these actors serve to mutually reinforce these incentives. This conºuence of incentives to stress such risks is likely to have contributed to the persistence of
such warnings in public discourse at levels and proªles far beyond what appears
justiªed by empirical evidence. While this article speciªcally addresses violent
conºict over water, its premises and conclusions are likely relevant to much of
the discourse in the ªeld of environmental security.
The article proceeds as follows: The next section speciªes what is meant by
water wars and violent conºict over water for the purposes of this discussion. It
then lays out the main arguments for and against the water war hypothesis, and
provides a review of some empirical studies. The subsequent section outlines
incentives to stress the risks of war over water for ªve different actor types—
political ofªcials, academics, the media, NGOs, and the private sector—and explores interactions among each groups’ incentives. The ªnal section offers concluding thoughts and suggestions for further research.
The Water War Hypothesis: Examining the Evidence
Deªning Water-based Conºict and the Water Wars Hypothesis
Perhaps because of its alliterative character, the expression “water wars” is often
used to describe any level of conºict between parties involving water.10 Singer
notes that most studies of war fail to distinguish between war, which is uncommon, and conºict, which is more common.11 Wolf and colleagues cite the lack
of a clear use of the term “conºict” as a contributing cause for confusion and
disagreement regarding the water wars hypothesis.12 This article focuses on the
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Lonergan 2001; Dolatyar 2002; and Wolf 2007.
Dinar 2002.
Yoffe et al. 2003.
For example Annin 2006.
Singer 1981.
Wolf et al. 2003.
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Hydro-Political Hyperbole
potential for use of armed force or armed conºict13 between politically organized groups over control over or access to freshwater resources, as this is a
deªnition commonly used by both proponents and detractors of the water war
hypothesis.
The typical version of the water war hypothesis posits that countries will
be willing to wage war in order to secure or preserve access to scarce water resources. A stronger version claims that countries experiencing acute water scarcity will be compelled by a “hydrological imperative” to obtain additional water
supplies from neighboring countries, resorting to violent means if necessary.14
Other versions stress that water scarcity alone is unlikely to serve as a casus belli
between nations, but rather, may aggravate existing international or domestic
conºicts—for instance, by increasing competition over scarce arable land or
causing displacement of rural populations and the creation of environmental
refugees.15 Kahl identiªes four hypotheses to explain how resource scarcity
could lead to violent conºict: simple scarcity, transboundary migration, deprivation, and state failure.16 Homer-Dixon noted that resource scarcities could
result from a decrease in supplies (e.g. drought), an increase in demand (e.g. increased consumption), or unequal distribution of a resource among a population.17
Support for the Water War Hypothesis
Support for the water war hypothesis rests on declarations of public ofªcials,
theoretical models, and empirical evidence. In addition to the quotes already
mentioned, other commonly cited ªgures warning of the risks of water wars
include former heads of state such as former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat,
the late King Hussein of Jordan, and former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon.18
Much of the empirical evidence presented in support of the water war hypothesis consists of anecdotal evidence and case studies. Among the most popular are Israel’s bombing of Syrian attempts to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River, the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s attempt to blow up Israel’s
National Water Carrier,19 and India’s decision to occupy the headwaters of the
13. For a detailed deªnition of the terms “armed force” and “armed conºict” as they are commonly
used in the environmental security literature see Uppsala Universitat: http://www.pcr.uu.se/
research/ucdp/deªnitions/ Accessed on 12 October 2010.
14. Stauffer 1982; Stork 1983; Cooley 1984; and Lebanese government ofªcial Fadi Comair, cited
in “Analysis: Shebaa farms key to Lebanese hydro-diplomacy,” IRIN humanitarian news
and analysis, 10 September 2009. Available online at http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx
?ReportId⫽86092, accessed 20 December 2009.
15. Gleick 1991; and Homer-Dixon 1994.
16. Kahl 2006.
17. Homer-Dixon 1994.
18. Sharon and Chanoff 1989; Starr 1991; and Amery 2002.
19. Naff and Matson 1984; Starr 1991; Gleick 1993; Lowi 1993; and Ward 2002.
David Katz
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Indus in Kashmir.20 Some observers have also attributed more recent conºicts to
water scarcity, such as those in Sri Lanka and the Darfur region of Sudan.21
Many early studies on water wars were guilty of what Singer noted as a tendency of many popular models to reduce war to single deterministic cause.22
Theories based on water scarcity as a single deterministic driver of conºict ignore other important variables such as historical relationships between parties,
riparian position, military balance (or asymmetry) of power, governance, and
decision-making structures. These factors have been identiªed as critical in both
the literature on the determinants of war in general,23 and transboundary water
conºict in particular.24 More recent empirical studies have attempted to address
shortcomings of early studies by conducting large-sample statistical analysis
that includes additional explanatory variables. Several have found per-capita
water availability to be statistically correlated with the outbreak of either civil or
international wars.25 Others have found that, holding other variables constant,
neighboring countries that share a river are more likely to engage in violent
conºict than those that do not.26 Still others have found correlations between
changes in rainfall or high levels of variability in rainfall and the likelihood of
violent conºict.27
Critiques of the Water War Hypothesis
A number critiques have been leveled against both the theory and the empirical
evidence behind the water wars hypothesis. One critique of the environmental
security literature, of which much of the published material on water wars is
guilty, is that warnings and threats of future violence are often considered as evidence.28 Statements from the 1980s that the next war in the Middle East will be
over water have already proven false. Research has shown, however, that even
the more general predictions of imminent water wars that are based on comments by ofªcials may be suspect. Leng, for instance, found no correlation between the frequency of threats of war and the onset of war.29 Examining conºict
and cooperation over water resources, Yoffe and colleagues noted over 400 incidents of water-related verbal exchanges by political ªgures between 1948 and
1999 that were conºictual in nature, but only 37 instances of violent conºict of
varying levels of intensity. Thirty of these were from the Middle East, none were
20. Mirza 2008.
21. Bajpaee 2006; Reddy 2006; and Ban Ki-moon, “A Climate Culprit in Darfur.” Washington Post,
16 June 2007.
22. Singer 1981, 2000.
23. Singer 1981; and Vasquez 2000.
24. Dinar 2009.
25. Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Gleditsch et al. 2006; and Hensel et al. 2006.
26. Toset et al. 2000; and Furlong et al. 2006.
27. Miguel et al. 2004; Levy et al. 2005; and Hendrix and Glaser 2007.
28. Gleditsch 1998, 381.
29. Leng 1980.
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Hydro-Political Hyperbole
more recent than 1970, none were all-out wars, and in none was water the central cause of conºict.30
Proponents of water war scenarios often premise their dire conclusions on
the fact that water is essential for life and non-substitutable.31 Yet water for basic
needs represents a small share of total water use, even in arid countries.32 Economists and others point out that over 80 percent of world freshwater withdrawals
are for the agricultural sector, a relatively low-value use and one in which large
gains in efªciency could be made by changes in irrigation techniques and choice
of crops. Thus, economic critiques of the water war hypothesis stress that the
value of water that would be gained from military conºict is unlikely to outweigh the economic costs of military preparation and battle, much less the loss
of life.33
Some authors have even questioned the empirical basis for the conclusion
that freshwater is increasingly scarce,34 an assumption on which the water war
hypothesis relies. Such a “cornucopian” view claims that people adapt to scarcity through improvements in technology, pricing, and efªciency—rendering
water less scarce, not more so.
Perhaps the strongest case against the likelihood of water wars is the
lack of empirical evidence of precedents. Wolf found only one documented case
of war explicitly over water, and this took place over 4500 years ago.35 Moreover,
he could document only seven cases of acute conºict over water. Yoffe and
colleagues also ªnd that armed conºict over water resources has been uncommon.36 They found that cooperation was much more common than conºict,
both globally and in all world regions except the Middle East/North Africa. This
pattern may explain why only a limited number of case studies of water conºict
are presented in the water wars literature.
Analysts have criticized environmental security arguments that are based
on case studies because such works tend to have no variation in the dependent
variable.37 Many large sample statistical studies have attempted to address such
shortcomings, however, in several cases these studies too have come under ªre.
For instance, a number of large-sample statistical studies ªnd correlations between water-related variables and conºict, however, few, if any, provide convincing support for causal relationships. Moreover, several studies found that water
availability had no impact on the likelihood of either domestic or international
conºict,38 including at least one study that attempted to replicate earlier studies
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
Yoffe et al. 2003.
For example Elhance 1999.
Gleick 1996.
Deudney 1999; Allan 2002; and Fisher and Huber-Lee 2005.
For example Lomborg 2001.
Wolf 1999.
Yoffe et al. 2003.
Levy 1995; and Gleditsch 1998.
Esty et al. 1999; Levy et al. 2005; and Stalley 2003.
David Katz
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that claimed to have found such correlations.39 Moreover, the results of several
studies that do ªnd correlations between water and conºict are either not robust
or are contrasted by other ªndings. For instance, Raleigh and Urdal ªnd that the
statistical signiªcance of water scarcity variables is highly dependent on one or
two observations, leading them to conclude that actual effects of water scarcity
“are weak, negligible or insigniªcant.”40 Jensen and Gleditsch ªnd that the results of Miguel and colleagues are less robust when using a recoding of the original dataset.41 Gleditsch and colleagues found that shared basins do predict an
increased propensity for conºict, but found no correlation between conºict and
drought, the number of river crossings, or the share of the basin upstream, leading them to state that “support for a scarcity theory of water conºict is somewhat ambiguous.”42
Evidence and Perception
In sum, despite some instances of violent conºict over water, there is little systematic evidence of war over water resources. Evidence for a deterministic relationship between water scarcity and the outbreak of armed conºict is particularly weak. Less ambitious claims that water shortages will contribute to
insecurity, which can, in turn, lead to violent conºict, have more empirical support. Even here, however, the importance of water as a causal variable is questionable. Several studies have found that variables such as regime type and institutional capacity are much more important indicators of conºict potential,43
and may have mitigating effects on any water-conºict link.
As a consequence of accumulated research, many scholars have concluded
that risks of water wars are low,44 and others have toned down or qualiªed their
statements about the likelihood of future water wars.45 Some governmental reports have limited their contentions to highlighting that water scarcity can
aggravate conºicts and increase insecurity,46 and many studies now emphasize
water as a tool for cooperation.47 Warnings and predictions of imminent water
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
Theisen 2008.
Raleigh and Urdal 2007, 674.
Jensen and Gleditsch 2009.
Gleditsch et al. 2006, 361.
Wolf et al. 2003; and Raleigh and Urdal 2009.
Beaumont 1994; and Dolatyar 2002.
Compare, for example, Homer-Dixon’s declaration that “the renewable resource most likely to
stimulate interstate resource war is river water” (Homer-Dixon 1994, 19), with his later statement that “wars over river water between upstream and downstream neighbors are likely only
in a narrow set of circumstances . . . [and] there are, in fact, very few river basins around the
world where all these conditions hold.” (Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Myth of Global Water
Wars,” Toronto Globe and Mail, 9 November 1995; and Homer-Dixon 1999, 208).
46. UNDP 2006; and UN 2009.
47. Wolf 1998; Haddadin 2002; Asmal 2001; Sadoff and Grey 2002; Yoffe et al. 2003; Conca et al.
2005; Brochman and Hensel 2009; UN 2006a; and Wolf 2007.
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Hydro-Political Hyperbole
wars continue to be commonplace, however. In a review of published academic
literature, Gupta and van der Zaag ªnd that articles on water conºict outnumber
those on cooperation by nearly three to one, and are ªve times more likely to be
cited.48
This article will now turn to offering possible explanations for the persistence and popularity of such declarations despite the bulk of expert opinion
downplaying the risks of water wars.
Incentives to Stress a Water War Scenario
Incentives Presented in Existing Literature
Observers have noted that various actors may have incentives to stress or even
exaggerate the risks of water wars. Lonergan notes, for instance, that in “many
cases, the comments are little more than media hype; in others, statements have
been made for political reasons.”49 Beyond mere acknowledgement of the possibility of such incentives, however, little research has attempted to understand
what these incentives are and how they may differ between actors. An understanding of the different motivations of various groups of actors to stress the
possibility of imminent water wars can help explain the continued seemingly
disproportionate popularity of such messages and help to evaluate such warnings more critically.
Mueller offers a general explanation for a focus on violence in public discourse by postulating that, following the end of the Cold War, policy-makers,
the press, and various analysts seek to ªll a “catastrophe quota.”50 According to
this theory, various actors seek out new areas of potential violence to justify
fears that had become commonplace during the Cold War period.
Simon, while not speciªcally addressing environmental conºict, suggests
four possible reasons for academic researchers to offer what he claimed were
overly gloomy scenarios resulting from resource scarcity.51 The ªrst reason is that
international funding organizations are eager to fund research dealing with crises, but not work that produces good news. The second is that bad news sells
more newspapers and books. The third is a psychological predisposition to focus on bad news or worst-case scenarios. The fourth is a belief that sounding
alarm bells can mobilize action to improve environmental issues.
Haas offers two reasons why “exaggerated beliefs about resource scarcity
and their possible threats to environmental security persist.” The ªrst is “the absence of any consensual mechanism for reconciling inter-discourse (or interparadigm) disputes.” This, Haas argues, allows for ideological disputes to con48.
49.
50.
51.
Gupta and van der Zaag 2009.
Lonergan 2001.
Mueller 1994.
Simon 1980, 1431.
David Katz
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tinue unresolved. “The second reason is the elective afªnity between environmental and security discourses on the one hand, and other dominant discourses
in social discussions . . . on the other hand. Consequently self-interested political actors can borrow from discourses that are similar in their ontology and
structure and that justify pre-existing political ambitions.”52 Trottier, addressing
the risks of water wars speciªcally, suggests that certain private-sector actors in
the water industry may stress the risks of water wars in order to promote waterrelated infrastructure.53
Mueller’s catastrophe quota does not distinguish among different types of
actors, nor does it explain why speciªcally water-related or environmental crises
would be the natural successor to Cold War worries. Straightforward explanations such as Simon’s claim that “blood sells” and Trottier’s economic argument
may have some merit, but ultimately are unsatisfying; they are not relevant for
several actors and they oversimplify a multifaceted picture by ignoring other
possible motives. Such explanations also may give a mistaken impression that
those offering such statements intentionally distort or mislead the public.
Haas’s explanations, too, fail to distinguish between differing incentives for different actors. In sum, even taken collectively, these explanations provide only a
partial picture of existing incentives. The following sections outline a range of
incentives facing multiple stakeholders.
Multiple Incentives for Multiple Actors
This study analyzes incentives of ªve different types of actors, each of whom has
played a role in the promotion of the water war hypothesis. These include political leaders and policy-makers, academic scholars, the media, NGOs, and the
private sector. Possible incentives to stress water war scenarios are offered for
each type of actor. These are summarized in Table 1 below. Several incentives
that are shared by more than one actor type are discussed ªrst, followed by a
discussion of those incentives unique to a single type. While it is not possible in
many cases to verify that these incentives have indeed played a role in the decision of a particular actor, several examples are given in which such a scenario
seems credible.
Shared Incentives
Call Attention to Genuinely Felt Risk: Given past instances of conºict as well as
declarations by policy-makers, many who stress the potential for war over water
no doubt do so out of a belief that such risks are genuine. Such genuine warnings appear to be the case, for instance, for statements in the 1950s and 1960s
52. Haas 2002, 2.
53. Trottier 2003.
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Hydro-Political Hyperbole
Table 1
Incentives to Stress or Exaggerate Risk of Violent Conºict
Actor
Politicians &
Policymakers
Academics
Media
NGOs
Private
sector
Call attention to a genuinely
felt risk
X
X
X
X
X
Raise the proªle of development or environmental needs
X
X
X
X
X
Incentive
Raise the proªle of the author
or organization
X
X
Expand pools of available
funding
X
X
Cite signiªcant statements by
primary deªners
X
Signal co-riparians that water is
high-level politics
X
Signal domestic population that
water is a priority issue
X
Signal to third party a desire for
intervention
X
Serve as negotiating tactic
X
X
Provide a gripping headline
X
Shorten analysis into soundbite or article-length piece
X
Give equal weight to opposing
views
X
Focus on aspect of most interest
to target audience
X
Serve as a null hypothesis in
research
X
X
by Israeli leaders that they would take military action against Arab forces should
they interfere with Israeli water development projects, a threat upon which they
later acted. Each actor, however, may have several other less straightforward incentives to stress the water war hypothesis.
David Katz
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Raise the Proªle of Water-related Development or Environmental Needs: Several observers have noted that the process of securitization of issues is a strategic practice done in a conscious way to achieve speciªc goals, which need not be security-related.54 Grifªths noted that “the rhetoric of security is used to attract
attention to new concerns.”55 A desire to bring attention to aspects of water
management that may otherwise be deemed as less deserving of attention or
funding is an incentive common to all actors examined in this study. Raising the
specter of war can draw attention to issues such as inequitable allocation, sanitation, pollution, or other environmental or development concerns that may
not otherwise be on many people’s political agendas. By tying their primary
cause to conºict over water, actors increase their visibility and offer those who
sympathize with their mission an additional reason to offer support or take action.
Of the actors discussed herein, NGOs, which often have public education
and awareness-raising as goals, face perhaps the strongest incentive to emphasize the risks of water wars in order to raise the proªle of water-related development or environmental goals they are championing. On the ªrst page of a report on improving access to water in poor communities, for instance, the NGO
CARE, an organization dedicated to “ªghting global poverty,”56 states in bold
letters that “conºicts over water are predicted to contribute to most wars in the
future.”57 The British-based NGO World Development Movement provocatively
named its water campaign “Stop Water Wars,” though the primary goals of the
campaign are advocacy in support of provision of basic water and sanitation services to the poor and opposition to privatization of the water industry.58
Other actors also may highlight the risks of water wars in order to bring attention to other environmental goals. Several books and articles have the phrase
“water war” in the title, although actual discussion of violent conºict over water
represents a relatively minor focus of the texts, with the bulk being dedicated to
various water management issues.59 The intent of such works appears to be an
effort to raise attention to some aspect of water management. Risk of violent
conºict is used as a motivational device to highlight the potential dangers of
failing to take action.
Policy-makers, too, may attempt to “securitize” water in order to bring attention to water management issues. For instance, former US Senator Paul Simon warns of water wars in a book on water policy.60 British diplomat John
54. Balzacq 2005.
55. Grifªths 1997, 19.
56. CARE, “About CARE,” available at http://www.care.org/about/index.asp, accessed 10 January
2010.
57. CARE 2006.
58. The web site http://www.wdm.org.uk/stopwaterwars/ was closed following the completion of
the campaign in 2008.
59. For example de Villiers 1999; Ward 2002; and Brahma Chellaney, “Averting Water Wars in Asia,”
New York Times, 26 June 2007.
60. Simon 1998.
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Ashton, the United Kingdom’s “Climate Ambassador,” reportedly said that
global warming should be recast as a security issue to help mobilize support for
cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions.61 While the previous comment addressed climate change in general rather than water shortages speciªcally, such a
rationale seems reasonable in explaining declarations concerning water wars
made by other ofªcials in government and at bodies such as UNDP and
UNESCO, which are formally charged with development and educational issues, not conºict resolution, and which make such declarations in reports that
primarily focus on other aspects of water or environmental management.62
Raise the Proªle of the Author or Organization: Similar to the desire to draw attention to a cause, framing water issues in a security context can be a means of
raising the proªle of an organization or author. Again, this incentive is probably
most dramatic for NGOs. Many observers have noted that NGOs and other
“non-elites” can face serious challenges in attracting attention. Some have resorted to “exceptionally strange or violent acts as a substitute for their lack of
status or resources” in order to attract the media’s eye.63 However, as some have
noted, while “the beneªt of outlandish behavior is media attention, the price is
that you get stuck in this role or caricaturization.”64 In order for their organization and message to be taken more seriously, many environmental organizations have moved away from such tactics.65 Increasing the severity of their message is one tactic to attract attention while toning down behavior.
In the case of academics, connecting water to security also offers researchers a way to raise the proªle of their work, given the salience of security issues in
high-level policy circles and with the general public. Doing so increases the potential to gain access to policy-makers and the media. There is some evidence
that water research stressing conºict potential may be more likely to be published.66 Furthermore, combining environmental and security issues expands
the number and types of journals in which academics can publish. Moreover, by
gaining exposure to audiences outside their particular ªeld of expertise, researchers also expand possibilities for further research collaboration.
Expand Pools of Available Funding: Several actors face ªnancial incentives to reference the possibilities for water wars. Conºict can affect terms and levels of investment. There is some evidence to support Trottier’s claim that certain private
industry actors may stress the risks of war in order to encourage policy-makers
to invest in water infrastructure.67 A representative of a desalination facility un61. Alister Doyle, “Climate Change Called Security Issue Like Cold War,” Reuters News Service, 22
August 2007.
62. For example UN 2006b; and UNDP 2006.
63. Anderson 2003, 37.
64. Anderson 2003.
65. Cottle 2003, 37.
66. Gupta and van der Zaag 2009.
67. Trottier 2003.
David Katz
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der construction in Israel commented, for instance, that “unfortunately water is
one of the reasons that create war. If you compare the cost of one F-16, it is
more or less the cost of this desalination plant. I believe at the end of the day it
will be much cheaper to solve conºict based on this type of plant than through
buying new F-16s.”68 The website of a developer of large bags that can be ªlled
with water and towed quotes World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin’s
statement that the next century’s wars will be over water and then claims that
“Waterbag technology will have a direct impact on the Peace Process in the Middle East.”69
Other types of actors also face ªnancial incentives to stress risks of water
wars. Many NGOs are engaged in a constant search for funding, as are many academics. Both NGOs and academics with a focus on environmental, development, or security stand to beneªt by expanding their focus to include some aspect of environmental security, as adding additional ªelds increases the pools of
funding available. This is especially true for those adding the security element to
their core focus, given the large pools of funding frequently available for security issues. In addition, many NGOs use press coverage as evidence of their effectiveness in awareness-raising vis-à-vis current and future sources of funding. As
already mentioned, stressing war can increase the likelihood of media exposure.
Cite Signiªcant Statements by ‘Primary Deªners’: The media and academic researchers may cite statements of policy-makers, regardless of their own personal
beliefs as to the veracity of the claims, simply because they view statements by
public ofªcials as legitimate subjects of study. Elites, including political elites,
are considered inherently worthy of media coverage.70 Davis states that journalists are drawn to government and institutional sources in positions of power.71
Also, the media rely on these policy-makers to provide expert knowledge. Thus,
Davis concludes that the media grant ofªcials “primary deªner” status.72
The prospect of imminent water wars was ªrst presented by authorities
with such “primary deªner” status. Once the notion was established, it has remained a popular theme in the press, despite subsequent empirical studies. Furthermore, if political leaders continue to make reference to the possibilities of
water wars, the media can be expected to continue to report such comments, regardless of the state of research supporting or refuting such claims.
Academic researchers, too, may choose to focus on statements of leading
ªgures. Furthermore, because of the multitude of possible methodological approaches, the topic of water-based conºict invites numerous research studies.
68. “Water Factory’ Aims to Filter Tensions,” BBC News, 7 September, 2004. Available online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3631964.stm, accessed 8 October 2007.
69. See the website of the company Waterbag, http://www.waterbag.com/,accessed 14 June 2008.
70. Cottle 2003; and Becker 1967.
71. Davis 2003.
72. Herman and Chomsky (1988) go even further, asserting that relations of economic dependency
ensure that political leaders are given preferential access to and coverage by the media.
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Even if such studies do not promote the water war hypothesis, they keep the issue alive in public affairs and academic circles.
Incentives to Political Leaders and Policy-makers
Political leaders and policy-makers have several other, unique, reasons to voice
water war risks. Indeed, given that research has shown that public threats are
more often met with deªance rather than compliance,73 other reasons may in
fact be primary ones.
Signal Co-riparians that Water is Considered High-level Politics: Actors may use
the language of securitization in order to elevate an issue from low to high politics.74 Issues of water management are often considered technical or bureaucratic matters far from the realm of high politics, which traditionally has focused on security and economic development. Warning of risks of war over
water can be a signal to a co-riparian country that their actions are being taken
seriously. This may be done, for instance, to convince a country to refrain from a
planned action or to induce it to engage in negotiations. While Fearon shows
that offering non-credible threats is a dominated strategy, he also notes that in
reality, such policies are often pursued.75 For example, saber-rattling by Syria
and Iraq towards militarily superior Turkey, including threats of war and mobilization of troops, were (unsuccessful) attempts to dissuade Turkey from developing dams upstream. Güner presents the use of threats of war over water as a
signaling tactic by Turkey and Syria in a game-theoretic model.76 Such use of
threats of war may be an important signaling device even if parties recognize the
likelihood of the threat being realized as minor.
Signal Domestic Population: Political leaders may wish to signal not only to rival governments but to domestic constituencies as well. Putnam and others
have noted that national political leaders are often engaged in two-level decision-making in which they must simultaneously attempt to balance domestic
and international demands.77 Fearon notes that signaling threats of war is often
done with both domestic and international audiences in mind, and that this
may be responsible for “half-hearted” signals that are less likely to be acted
upon.78 A public statement of willingness to ªght for water rights is likely to
send a signal to domestic constituencies that water rights are being taken seriously by the national government, or it may be issued with the intent of per-
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
Leng 1980.
Waever 1995.
Fearon 1997.
Güner 1998.
Putnam 1988.
Fearon 1997.
David Katz
•
25
suading a domestic audience to favor or oppose a particular political party or
policy.
In analyzing the “bellicose statements, even at the highest levels” of the Indian and Pakistani governments in the 1950s and 1960s, Alam suggests that
. . . though the statements made by key decisionmakers in public may suggest a move towards war, the statements are used to generate domestic support for a political position. As seen in the Indus basin the political rhetoric
did not match the governments’ actions which sought to resolve an international water dispute through cooperation . . . The experience from the Indus
basin, therefore, throws into question whether public statements made for a
domestic audience are truly indicative of a country’s intent to go to war over
shared waters.79
Many experts agree that accords over shared water resources between Israel
and its neighbors are possible and need not be an obstacle to larger peace agreements.80 Political ofªcials and other parties opposed to territorial concessions,
however, have often raised the risks of water wars among their reasons to maintain control of territory.81 Often this belligerent rhetoric is directed towards internal audiences. In so doing, policy-makers can develop a constituency block
to make concessions more difªcult.
Signal Third Party: Third parties often play a role both in mediating international disputes and in ªnancing water development projects. Hensel and colleagues found that water scarcity was positively correlated with third-party assistance.82 Warnings of war may be meant to inºuence these third parties. Iraqi
threats against Syria in the 1970s spurred intervention by the Soviet Union and
Saudi Arabia, who helped negotiate a settlement. At the time that Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon issued warnings that continued diversions of waters of the
Wazzani stream could spur military conºict with Lebanon, the diversions presented a very minor threat to the Israeli economy.83 While Sharon may have
been attempting to send a signal to Lebanese leadership, he may also have been
attempting to engage a third party to mediate between Israel and Lebanon, with
whom Israel has no direct diplomatic relations. Soon after the statements were
made, US ofªcials became involved in the matter. They reportedly requested
from the Israelis that messages should be transmitted through them and not
through threats of military reprisals84 and proceeded to negotiate an agreement
between the sides.
Threats of war are also likely to undermine possible credit options for na79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
Alam 2002, 349.
Asmal 2001; Allan 2002; and Haddadin 2002.
Sherman 2002.
Hensel et al. 2006.
Amery 2002.
“US Offers to Mediate Hasbani Problem,” Walla! Online News Service. Available online at
http://news.walla.co.il/?w⫽//281451, accessed 18 September 2002 (in Hebrew).
26
•
Hydro-Political Hyperbole
tions seeking to ªnance large-scale water projects. Thus, leaders may issue them
in order to deter institutions from offering project ªnance or to inºuence the
terms of projects being considered. Threats of violence were important in motivating World Bank efforts to help negotiate an agreement between India and Pakistan on the Indus River in the 1960s.85 Reputedly, the Bank not only refused to
fund projects while the river was being disputed, but also convinced India not
to take on projects unilaterally until an agreement was negotiated.86
Iraqi threats of military action against Turkey may have been intended not
only to send a signal to Turkey, but also to the World Bank, which was contemplating funding of Turkish dams.87 Risks of regional instability also may have
been a factor dissuading international agencies and governments from ªnancing dams in Ethiopia.88
Serve as Negotiating Tactic: Threats of war can be useful in extracting information that helps a state gauge the importance of an issue to a potential adversary
or negotiating partner.89 Policy linkage is common in water negotiations,90 and
threats of war may signiªcantly up the ante in terms of expected concessions on
non-water-related issues. Güner explained how threats of military acts between
Syria and Turkey, while ostensibly over shared water resources, were likely an attempt to inºuence issues such as territorial disputes and separatist movements.91 In 1993, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller sent a message to Syrian
President Hafez al-Assad stating that there would be no solution to water disputes between the nations unless Syria prevented the Kurdish separatists from
acting within its territory. Thus, despite the rhetoric, threats over water were an
outcome of conºict over other issues, and likely used as an attempt to extract
concessions on these other issues.
Incentives to the Media and Popular Press
Provide Gripping Headlines: Simon’s claim that “bad news sells” more than
good news92 seems to have ample empirical support. Cottle provides numerous
examples in which the press focuses on exceptional or violent behavior,93 and
New York Times reporter Max Frankel stated that among the news media “conºict
is our favorite kind of news.”94
Disagreements over water allocations may be considered mundane, and
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
Ward 2002.
Mirza 2008.
Kibaroglu and Ünver 2000.
Ward 2002, 185–186.
Fearon 1994.
Fischhendler et al. 2004.
Güner 1998.
Simon 1980.
Cottle 2003.
Frankel, Max, “I Am Not a Camera,” New York Times, 16 October 1994.
David Katz
•
27
thus not newsworthy, while violence over such allocations is. The need for gripping headlines ensures that the media is predisposed to favor presenting the
possibility of water wars over more moderate, less dramatic positions. For example, an article in the San Francisco Chronicle was titled “Future of War Will Go
with the Flow” with the subtitle “Water Promises to be Flash Point;” this, despite the fact that experts quoted in the article actually stated that they felt water
was unlikely to lead to violence and that such prognostications were “media
hype.”95 Watkins and Berntell, development and water experts respectively,
wrote an article provocatively headlined “A Global Problem: How to Avoid War
Over Water.” However, while the article warned that water shortages can lead to
conºict, the authors themselves surmised that “cooperation tends to attract less
news than violent conºict. Perhaps that is why ‘water wars’ get such exaggerated
coverage.”96
Shorten Analysis into Sound-bite or Article-length Segment: Because the media are
increasingly structured around presenting brief sound-bites or catchy headlines,97 they frequently reduce complex issues into memorable catchphrases and
simplistic storylines, at the expense of nuanced explanation and accuracy. Furthermore, Bird and Dardenne contend that the media often present what they
feel the story should be, rather than what the facts actually depict.98 Aubin details how pressures to provide pithy coverage of complex security issues have resulted in inaccurate media coverage and how, once established, this misinformation has managed to persist in subsequent coverage.99 The connection
between water and conºict is complex and context-dependent, with several intervening and mitigating variables. An explanation of this complex relationship,
however, is not amenable to short press articles or brief news segments.
Give Equal Coverage to Opposing Views: The quest for “balanced coverage” itself
may contribute to the amount of media exposure granted to the risk of water
wars. When confronted with differing expert opinions regarding highly specialized or technical issues, the merits of which the press is not competent to evaluate, journalists often attempt to provide equal coverage, regardless of how the
weight of expert opinion is distributed.100 Dunwoody and Peters refer to such a
strategy of balance as “a surrogate for validity checks.”101 This provision of equal
coverage, ostensibly done in the spirit of fairness and balance, can result in disproportionate representation of minority viewpoints. One survey of scientists
95. Freid, Stephanie L. “Future of War Will Go with the Flow,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10 June
2007.
96. Watkins, Kevin and Anders Berntell, “A Global Problem: How to Avoid War Over Water,” International Herald Tribune, 23 August 2006.
97. Davis 2003.
98. Bird and Dardenne 1988, 337.
99. Aubin 1998.
100. Dearing 1995.
101. Dunwoody and Peters 1992, 210.
28
•
Hydro-Political Hyperbole
found that 76 percent felt that news reports fail to distinguish between ªndings
that are well-founded and those that are not.102 Press coverage of climate change
is a well-documented example, in which the minority viewpoint among climate
scientists that climate change is not occurring has been given disproportionately
prominent media coverage.103 While no extensive content analysis of media coverage of conºict over war was undertaken for this study, numerous examples exist of articles that either present the potential for conºict or cooperation over
water on equal footing or simply quote experts with a range of opinions.104
Focus on the Aspect of a Story of Greatest Interest to Target Audience: Not all bad
news is the same in terms of newsworthiness. Singer and Endreny found a “lack
of congruence between the size of the risk and the amount of media coverage it
receives.”105 Combs and Slovic found that relative to actual objective risks, “disease appeared to be greatly underreported while violent, often catastrophic
events . . . stood out as being overreported.”106 Moeller noted that “crises that
threaten or even kill many but are not intrinsically horriªc . . . do not make the
newsroom cut.”107
Water-related illnesses kill several times the combined number of casualties from all the wars in the world each year, but they generally afºict the poorer
classes in developing countries, not the media’s more afºuent target audiences.
Thus, they are less likely to get prominent news coverage. In attempts to capture
market share, major media outlets attempt to target their features to the presumed tastes of their intended audiences.108 Wars over water, even if in developing countries, may have spillover effects that impact or interest the typical consumer of Western media in ways that more chronic humanitarian issues do not.
Academic Scholars
Serve as Null Hypothesis of Research into Water and Conºict: Studies that address
the water war hypothesis, even if they do so in a critical light or present war as a
worst-case scenario, still serve to keep the issue alive in the public consciousness
and in political and academic debates. Moreover, these studies (including this
one) implicitly give the water wars hypothesis some credibility by deeming it
worthy of study and/or useful as a working hypothesis in empirical studies. Because empirical studies in this ªeld are still few, and theories remain speculative,
102. The Pew Research Center 2009.
103. Boykoff and Boykoff 2004.
104. For example “Streams of Blood or Streams of Peace,” The Economist, 1 May 2008; and Stephanie L. Freid, “Future of War will Go with the Flow,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10 June 2007.
105. Singer and Endreny 1987.
106. Combs and Slovic 1979, 841.
107. Moeller 1999, 317.
108. Bae 2000.
David Katz
•
29
publications both supporting and refuting the risks of conºict invite further
work, keeping the subject in public debate.
Interaction among Incentives
Several of the incentives discussed above may be mutually reinforcing. For instance, statements by policy-makers are not only covered by the media and academics; policy-makers also react to these actors’ reports and use them as sources
of information.109 Similarly, NGOs and academics may covet media coverage in
order to publicize their ªndings or may seek to inºuence policy-makers directly
or via the media, and they, themselves, may be sought out by the media and
policy-makers as credible sources of information. Statements by policy-makers
directed at domestic populations may appear via the press and result in NGOs
taking action on the issue. This mutually reinforcing web of interactions between actors may well be serving to maintain or even elevate the issue of water
wars in public discourse.
Conclusion
It is not the aim of this article to claim, as others have, that the prospect of war
over water is without merit.110 Water has been and continues to be a source of
political conºict, at times even violent conºict, a prospect which may worsen as
populations grow, economies develop, and climatic conditions change. Moreover, there are many possible rebuttals to critiques of the water war hypothesis:
the dearth of historical precedent may not be indicative of future trends; conºict
and cooperation over water are not mutually exclusive outcomes;111 although
wars over water may make little economic sense, many economically irrational
wars occur nevertheless;112 and the absence of past conºict over water may be explained by variables such as power asymmetries113 which, should they change,
could allow water issues to come to a boil. Still, the frequency with which water
wars are mentioned and the credibility given to that prospect do seem to be
markedly overrepresented in public discourse.
The efªcacy of such rhetorical strategies remains unclear. Overstating risks
of water wars or oversimplifying causal links may be detrimental to intended
objectives. For instance, raising the specter of war to raise attention to, or mobilize action on, related environmental or development issues may ultimately result in redirecting resources away from development and towards conºict pre109.
110.
111.
112.
For example Simon 1998.
Beaumont 1994; and Dolatyar 2002.
Zeitoun 2007.
Fearon (1995) discusses reasons for the outbreak of wars that are poorly explained by a rational actor model. The Economist expressed the counter-argument more succinctly, stating “wars
are usually fought for much stupider reasons than water.” See “As Thick as Blood: Water Supply in the Middle East,” The Economist 337 (7946): 53–56, 1995.
113. Zeitoun and Warner 2006.
30
•
Hydro-Political Hyperbole
vention. Moreover, there is a risk that policy-makers and other decision-makers
may feel that as long as violent conºict is avoided, they have been successful. Alternatively, by focusing on water as a cause of violent conºict, attention may be
drawn away from more important or proximate causes of such conºict.
It is not the intent of this study to imply that actors acting on these various
incentives intend to mislead or manipulate public opinion. It is legitimate to
highlight worst-case scenarios and to promote measures to avoid them. Rather,
this study suggests that numerous and varied incentives facing several actors to
stress or even exaggerate the possibility of such conºict may help to explain the
signiªcant exposure and tractability that such threats and warnings have received to date.
This study was meant to be suggestive rather than conclusive. It did not attempt to estimate the actual inºuence of the various incentives laid out above in
motivating the behavior of the set of actors discussed. Nor did it suggest methods for identifying when such incentives are in fact responsible for actions by a
given party. Some of the incentives, such as raising the exposure of other environmental issues, use of signaling by politicians, and need for catchy headlines,
appear to have much empirical support, while others have less.
Because this analysis relies on plausible hypotheses backed up with anecdotal evidence, it is subject to many of the same critiques leveled against much
of the early environmental security literature. Veriªcation of the relative importance of the various incentives laid out in this study is left to future research. Future research may also evaluate possible incentives actors may face to underestimate such risks—for instance, in order to encourage investment or inºuence
negotiations. Such incentives no doubt exist, but were not addressed herein.
Such limitations noted, this study does provide analysts with a framework with
which to start evaluating various claims regarding the prospects of violent
conºict over water and other natural resources.
Analysts have long acknowledged “that one cannot dismiss the political
motives of those who wished to elevate—or prevent the elevation—of environmental concerns to the same status as military ones.”114 The intent of this study
was to provide a clearer picture of these motives, with the hope that this will assist analysts in evaluating the credibility of the many diverse pronouncements
on this subject. While the speciªc topic of this study was conºict over water,
much of the analysis is relevant to discussions of conºict over other natural resources and to broader discussions of environmental security.
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