Chapter 26
The United States in a Troubled World,
1920–1941
Ch. 26: United States in a
Troubled World, 1920–1941
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Seek stable world order
Independent internationalism
Not withdraw from world
Isolationist only in want to avoid war/
entanglements (esp. in Europe)
 Non-military methods
 Depression and foreign aggression
undermine efforts
 FDR and others argue German/ Japanese
expansion (for autarky) = threat
Fig. 26-CO, p. 710
I. Searching for Peace
and Order in the 1920s
 WWI devastate Europe
 League weak
 Peace societies form:
 including women’s groups
 Differ on how to prevent war
 Washington Conference (1921–22) try to:
 slow arms race
 stabilize Asia
 5-Power Treaty (on capital ships):
 between USA, England, Japan, France, Italy
p. 714
I. Searching for Peace
and Order in the 1920s (cont.)
 9-Power Treaty:
 affirm Open Door in China
 4-Power Treaty:
 USA, England, Japan, France respect each
other’s Pacific possessions
 Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) outlaw war:
 no enforcement power
 Washington Conference and Kellogg
Pact:
 reflect disillusionment with war
p. 715
II. Economic and Cultural
Expansion
 Assume expansion will stabilize world
 By 1920s, USA = dominant:
 creditor/investor
 manufacturer/exporter
 Products (e.g. movies) saturate globe
 USG help IT and T, RCA, AP, Pan
American
 Foreign reaction mixed
p. 716
III. War Debts and German
Reparations
 Allies owe USG $9.6 billion:
 want debt forgiven
 USG refuse
 German reparations to Allies = $33 billion:
 USA fear German default, then radicalism
 Triangle:
 US banks loan money to Germany
 Germans pay Allies
 Allies pay USG
 When banks buy stocks, system weaken
 Collapse with Depression
Fig. 26-1, p. 717
IV. Decline in Trade
 because of high US tariffs:
 others hike tariffs
 global trade declines
 Hull insist lower tariffs will:
 help economy
 prevent wars from economic competition
 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934):
 most-favored-nation principle
 Export-Import Bank help with loans
V. Recognition of
the Soviet Union (1933)
 1920s: USG reject recognition
 Late 1920s, businesses trade with USSR
 FDR hope recognition will:
 increase trade
 deter Japan
p. 719
VI. US Dominance
in Latin America
 Dominance (economic/military/political):
 grow after 1920 (Map 26.1)
 because of growing nationalist protests:
 seek less overt means of control
 FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy:
 withdraw troops (Haiti, Nicaragua)
 endorse non-interventionism, consultation
Map 26-1, p. 721
p. 720
VI. US Dominance
in Latin America (cont.)
 Support dictators (Trujillo, Batista):
 because protect US interests
 Mexico = biggest challenge:
 control of raw materials
 fearing Mexican-Axis trade, FDR
compromise
 Mexico control land/oil (1942)
 FDR reduce anti-Americanism:
 without loss of power/influence
p. 722
Totalitarianism
 A state that regulates nearly every aspect of
public and private behavior.
 Maintain political power by means
propaganda, state-controlled mass media,
personality cults, regulation of free speech,
and widespread use of terror tactics.
Dictators will look to War as a vehicle to
rebuild their country and spread their
ideologies.
 The following
elements are usually
seen as its integral
parts:
 patriotism,
 nationalism,
 militarism,
 totalitarianism,
 anti-communism,
VII. German Aggression under
Hitler
 During Depression, Germans turn to Hitler
(1933) and fascism (supremacy of state)
 Revive economy/military for expansion
 Reject Versailles Treaty
 Ally with Italy, Japan (1936)
 England/France respond with appeasement
 Hitler expand (Map 26.3):
 Rhineland, 1936; Austria, 1938
 Sudetenland, 1938; Czechoslovakia, 1939
 Hitler/ Mussolini help Franco win, 1936–39
Map 26-3, p. 729
VIII. Isolationist Views in USA
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Oppose war
Attract majority
Diverse movement
Nye Committee (1934–36) reflect:
 suspicions about WWI
 anger at war industries
 DuPont, GM, etc. trade with fascists
IX. Neutrality Acts
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Avoid repeat of WWI
1935 Act ban arms sales to belligerents
1936 Act ban loans to belligerents
1937 Act:
 ban travel on belligerent ships
 require cash-and-carry
X. Roosevelt’s Evolving Views
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To WWI, an interventionist
Post-WWI, share isolationism
Increasingly worry German/Italian/
Japanese aggression threaten USA
Begin rearmament
Cautious re: Hitler’s anti-Semitism
 St. Louis (1939)
XI. Outbreak of WWII
in Europe (1939)
 After Czechoslovakia fall (March):
 France/England warn will protect Poland
 FDR agree appeasement dead
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Hitler and Stalin divide East Europe
Hitler attacks Poland (September)
England/France declare war
USA repeal 1935 Act:
 allow cash-and-carry arms sales
 FDR want to help with methods short of war
p. 725
XII. Japan, China, and a
New Order in Asia
 US interests:
 possessions, missionaries
 trade, Open Door
 “friend” to China
 Like Japan, China resent westerners
 Anticommunist Jiang gain US support:
 threaten Japan
 Japan want control raw materials and
 Expel white imperialists
 Japan-US tensions on immigration/trade
p. 727
XIII. Manchurian Crisis;
FDR’s Quarantine Speech
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Conquest (1931) upset USA
No power to stop it; so non-recognition
Sino-Japanese tensions cause war (1937)
FDR:
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denounce aggressors
allow China to buy arms
help China (loans)
hesitate regarding sanctions on Japan
fear war when Hitler greater threat
XIV. Foreign Policy Debate,
1939–1941
 Public opinion ambiguous:
 oppose aggression
 aid Allies
 but stay out of war
 Vigorous debate with much participation
 New organizations (America First)
 Debate increase after German victories:
 esp. Fall of France (May/June, 1940)
 Many fear if England fall:
 Germany could threaten USA
XV. FDR and Aid to Allies
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Slowly move from neutrality to
Undeclared war against Germany
Fall 1940: swap 50 destroyers for bases
1st peacetime draft
Lend Lease (Spring 1941):
 loan Allies materials
 Navy patrol ½ of Atlantic
 Lend Lease to USSR (post-June, 1941)
XVI. Atlantic Charter (Aug. 1941);
Greer Incident (Sept.)
 FDR/Churchill agree on war aims
 Tell Churchill will “force an incident”
 After German attack on Greer:
 Navy escort ships to England
 “shoot on sight”
 Congress scrap cash-and-carry
completely:
 armed US ships carry munitions to England
p. 732
XVII. FDR and Japan, 1940–41
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Not want war with Japan
because Hitler greater threat
Oppose Japan’s expansion (Map 26.2)
Embargo aviation fuel and scrap metal
after Japan sign Tripartite Pact
(September 1940)
 Embargo oil when Japan take French
Indochina (July 1941)
 Reject Konoye-FDR summit:
 insist Japan withdraw from China
Map 26-2, p. 728
XVIII. US Demands on Japan;
Attack on Pearl Harbor (1941)
 FDR accept Hull’s policy:
 risk war to thwart further aggression
 Japan launch surprise attack (December
7)
 Kill 2403
 Wound 1178
 Sink/damage 8 battleships
 Destroy 160 aircraft
 Carriers escape damage
XIX. Explaining Pearl Harbor
 Mistakes and lack of info key
 No “back door” conspiracy
 Intercepts tell war imminent:
 no military plans
 no mention Pearl Harbor
 Assume Hawai’i safe because far from
Japan
 Expect attack in Southeast Asia
 Warning message to Pearl Harbor:
 mistakenly sent by slow method
p. 733
XX. Clash of Systems
 Incompatible objectives block diplomacy
 Germany/Japan want to divide world:
 closed spheres of influence (autarky)
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USA want liberal capitalist world/free trade
Also expand democracy
Axis embrace authoritarianism/militarism
Axis charge USA with double standard
USA claim its expansion/empire (Latin
America) benefit USA and whole world
XXI. Avoidable War?
 Debate if could have avoided war:
 greater flexibility with Japan (fall 1941)
 delay confrontation to focus on Europe
Summary: Discuss Links to the
World and Legacy
 New uses of radio:
 by FDR
 by Hitler
 Radio news, late 1930s?
 Increase link with events abroad
 How FDR deceive media, public, and Congress
in Greer incident?
 Legacy for later presidents to mislead:
 Vietnam, 1960s
 Iran-contra, 1980s
 maybe Iraq, 2003
p. 726
p. 726
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p. 730