Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Chris Wilson
Land Management and Conflict Minimisation Sub-Project 1.1
The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat LMCM project is supported by AusAID and UNDP
Disclaimer
This paper was commissioned as an independent consultancy report by the Pacific Islands
Forum Secretariat. The views and opinions presented in this report are those of the
author(s). The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat bears no responsibility for the accuracy
of the facts represented in this report.
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Preface
The Land Management and Conflict Minimisation Project (LMCM) is an initiative of the
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) that was endorsed by the Forum Regional
Security Committee and the Forum Officials Committee in 2006. The project focuses on
the interlinkages between land management and conflict minimisation, and approaches
land issues in the Pacific from a holistic point of view, combining both economic
development and conflict prevention perspectives. The recognition of the centrality of
customary land tenure in the lives of the people of the Pacific is the key underlying
principle upon which the LMCM project is founded.
The first phase of the LMCM project has comprised a review of national, regional and
international literature. This review has resulted in ten sub-project reports. In 2008, these
reports were drawn together into a synthesis report Improving Access to Customary Land
and Maintaining Social Harmony in the Pacific, including 12 Guiding Principles and a
suggested Implementation Framework to provide guidance to Pacific Islands Forum
countries in land management whilst ensuring the minimising of land-related conflict.
The 2008 Pacific Islands Forum Annual Leaders meeting endorsed the importance of
addressing these issues, and endorsed the Principles and Framework where appropriate.
Whilst stressing the fact that land management is a national issue, Leaders instructed the
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat to
develop a regional initiative under the Pacific Plan to support members to progress land
management and conflict minimisation efforts.
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Summary Terms of Reference of Sub Project 1.1: Review of
Conflict in the Pacific and the Role of Land in Conflict and
Conflict Escalation
Objective of the consultancy
To undertake a detailed desk review and analysis on recent conflicts in the Pacific and the
role of land in the conflicts and conflict escalation including lessons learned.
Specific tasks
The consultant is expected to critically review published and unpublished literature from
the Pacific and other regions on recent conflicts in the Pacific and the role of land in the
conflicts. The review will include but not be limited to the following topics:
the role of land in recent conflict and conflict escalation;
the role of the different stakeholders, including the State, in contributing to
conflict and conflict escalation;
economic, social, environmental and political costs of land related conflict and
unresolved conflict (local and national); and
lessons learned on the role of land in recent conflict and conflict escalation.
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. 7
1. CRISIS IN THE PACIFIC 1987 – 2007 ...................................................................... 9
1.1 Secessionist insurgency, ethno-political violence and coups ....................................... 9
1.2 The social, economic and political costs..................................................................... 10
2. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................... 12
2.1 Land and conflict: the theoretical literature ................................................................ 13
2.2 Land and land issues in the Pacific ............................................................................. 14
3. CASE STUDIES: LAND IN CONFLICT AND CONFLICT ESCALATION ..... 18
3.1 Bougainville ................................................................................................................ 19
3.2 Solomon Islands .......................................................................................................... 23
3.3 Fiji
........................................................................................................................... 28
4. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................... 35
1. Conflict between landowners and Government and companies ................................... 36
2. Compensation for the alienation and use of land .......................................................... 37
3. Intra-generational and inter-generational conflict over land ........................................ 38
4. Land and employment................................................................................................... 40
5. Environmental degradation ........................................................................................... 41
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
6. Exploitation of land-related tensions ............................................................................ 41
7. Timely and effective response to rising tension ........................................................... 42
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 43
NOTES ............................................................................................................................. 47
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Executive Summary
In the past two decades, the South Pacific has experienced increasing political instability,
inter-communal violence and armed intervention. The democratic will of Fiji‟s people
has been overturned three times since 1987, most recently in December 2006. Unrest in
Papua New Guinea‟s eastern-most region of Bougainville stemmed from grievances
linked to exploitation of a large copper mine, including perception of inadequate benefits
and compensation to local communities. Protest attacks on the mine by local activists
resulted in brutal retaliation by the PNG security forces, and from 1988 to 1998 a small
guerrilla organisation waged secessionist war against the Papua New Guinean security
forces. From 1998 until 2003, the Solomon Islands capital Honiara and the island of
Guadalcanal were periodically paralysed by violence between indigenous Guadalcanalese
and migrants from the nearby island of Malaita. This inter-ethnic conflict was in large
part the result of differences over land ownership between the two groups, grievances
which were exacerbated by political intervention, ultimately leading to a spiral of attacks
and counter attacks.
These conflicts have exerted substantial social, economic and political costs on the states
and communities involved. Several thousand civilians and security personnel have died,
and tens of thousands have been displaced. Violence and instability has deterred tourism
and foreign investment and caused already fragile economies to contract. Each crisis
damages the State‟s „social capital‟ and sense of national cohesion and increases the
potential for subsequent instability.
The turmoil in various locations across the Pacific has been caused by a range of
intersecting and mutually reinforcing political, social and economic issues and disputes.
This report attempts to demonstrate how land-related issues have interacted with the
surrounding context to cause rising tension and violence. Particular focus is placed on
three cases:
In Bougainville, discontent over inadequate compensation, environmental
degradation, and a loss of land and way of life emerged following large-scale
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
resource extraction and compounded grievances from years of marginalisation of
the Bougainville people.
In Solomon Islands, tensions over the loss of customary land to migration and
resource projects were exacerbated by political competition.
In Fiji, tensions over the use of customary land were exploited in the context of
political coups, and a civilian-led putsch, from 1987 to 2006.
This study reveals a number of lessons for stakeholders in the region regarding the main
causes of land-related conflict. These include: landowners‟ reluctance to recognise the
permanent alienation of customary land; a perceived lack of adequate compensation paid
to landowners; a lack of jobs for traditional owners in resource projects on leased or sold
customary land; disputes between landowners over the distribution of revenue gained
from land; disputes between different generations of owners over the transfer of land; the
emergence of much greater environmental degradation than was formerly suggested; a
lack of information and decision-making power on the part of owners regarding the
management of their land; and the political exploitation of land-related grievances. Future
land-related conflict can potentially be avoided by means such as providing for a more
timely Government response to rising tension, and an institutional environment that
reduces the scope for disputes, as well as an early warning system for early intervention
to prevent disputes escalating into conflicts; appropriate mediation and resolution
mechanisms at different levels to prevent large-scale conflicts re-emerging; developing
more appropriate systems of compensation and leasing; and better informing people of
their land rights.
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
1. Crisis in the Pacific 1987 – 2007
1.1 Secessionist insurgency, ethno-political violence and coups
The following discussion focuses on three conflicts which have most greatly affected the
Pacific region and which best demonstrate the role of land in conflict – Bougainville,
Solomon Islands and Fiji.
In May 1987, Fiji‟s peaceful image was damaged when Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni
Rabuka led military personnel in a coup d‟état against the popularly elected Government
of Prime Minister Dr Timoci Bavadra. Subsequent opposition to the coup led to Rabuka
staging a second coup to end any further political accommodation. The installed
Government passed a new constitution into law in 1990, based on a foundation of
positive discrimination towards the indigenous Fijian community.
In late 1988, a dispute in the Papua New Guinean region of Bougainville between the
operators of the Panguna copper and gold mine, Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL), and
local landowners, led to attacks on mine staff and property. Following brutal reprisals by
the Papua New Guinean security forces, the dispute escalated into a regional ethnopolitical and secessionist conflict. Several years of guerrilla-style insurgency followed
before the Tarawa cease fire agreement in April 1998.
In July 1998, seemingly ethnically motivated attacks began on the island of Guadalcanal
in Solomon Islands. Militant Guadalcanalese, calling themselves the Guadalcanal
Revolutionary Army (GRA) – and later the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) – attacked
Malaitans living and working on the island. The militia drove Malaitan communities off
the Guadalcanal Plains. The capital, Honiara, fell into a form of siege situation. In June
1999, the Government was forced to declare a state of emergency on Guadalcanal. In
early 2000, Malaitans in Honiara formed the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), which began
attacking non-Malaitans in and around Honiara. On 5 June 2000, members of the MEF
kidnapped Prime Minister Ulufa‟alu and installed Manasseh Sogavare as prime minister.
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
In October 2000, members of the MEF and IFM signed the Townsville Peace Agreement
and in July 2003, at the request of the Solomon Islands‟ Prime Minister, Australia led an
armed regional assistance mission (RAMSI) into the country.
In Fiji, on 19 May 2000, armed civilians stormed the Fiji parliament and the democratic
will of the Fijian people was once more overturned. The group, led by George Speight,
held the Mahendra Chaudhry-led Government hostage for 56 days. Following the putsch,
thugs looted shops, attacked Indian places of worship and drove Indo-Fijians from their
homes in some areas. Following the resignation of the president, the Fiji military first
negotiated the release of the hostages, then forcibly quashed the rebel group. The ousted
Government was not reinstated and a new Government under Laisenia Qarase was
installed. In November, a mutiny within the military by soldiers seeking to install a more
ethno-nationalist Government, and involving some members of the Speight coup, was
suppressed after a bloody gun battle in the army barracks.
1.2 The social, economic and political costs
These conflicts have damaged the social fabric of each country. The long process of
nation-building has been set back as inter-communal distrust and tension have
undermined feelings of national unity. Each has left a legacy of political instability, as
demonstrated by recent riots in Honiara in April 2006 and Fiji‟s latest coup in December
of that year. As small economies, the Pacific Island Countries are also particularly
vulnerable to serious economic impact from such crises. Each affected country has lost
revenue from international investment and tourism and large proportions of domestic
budgets have gone towards combating rebellion and policing inter-communal warfare.
This series of crises in the Pacific has changed the international image of the region from
one of tourist idyll to one of instability and military intervention. Each crisis has had an
impact on the surrounding region and has in some cases played a role in causing
instability in neighbouring countries.
By 1996, the violence in Bougainville had claimed the lives of around 500 members of
the Papua New Guinea security forces, possibly 1,000 guerrillas and perhaps several
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
thousand Bougainvillean civilians. The crisis had displaced approximately 60,000 people
from their homes and brought the economic life of Bougainville to a halt. Between 8,000
and 10,000 jobs were lost in the mining sector and a similar number in the cocoa and
copra sectors (See Regan 2000 for an overview of the costs of the conflict). Papua New
Guinea also lost substantial revenue with the cessation of mining.
The violence led to
the destruction of much of Bougainville‟s important health, education and other
infrastructure.
The violence on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands has had a severe human cost for the
island nation. By May 2000, approximately 55 people had died. The fighting brought
reports of serious human rights abuses including rape. Attacks and intimidation forced
approximately 20,000 to flee the island as internally displaced people and caused
numerous others to leave their homes and move elsewhere in Guadalcanal. Women in
particular faced health risks as many were forced to deliver babies in camps, removed
from adequate health care. The conflict exacerbated an already difficult economic climate
in Solomon Islands. When Solomon Islands Plantations Ltd closed in mid 1999 because
of the violence in Guadalcanal, 1,800 people lost their jobs. A further 2,200 became
unemployed when Gold Ridge Mining Ltd and Solomon Taiyo Ltd closed in mid 2000
(Dinnen 2002:292). Guadalcanal‟s three main tourist resorts were also forced to close.
The series of coups in Fiji has damaged the Fiji economy, deterred foreign investment,
undermined the tourism industry and caused the exodus of numerous skilled workers. In
the years following the 1987 coup and the 2000 putsch, Fiji‟s GDP contracted by 6.4%
and 1.7% respectively (ADB 2007). The departure of tens of thousands of Indo- and
indigenous Fijians over the past two decades, taking with them business and other talents,
has also damaged the economic life of the nation. The decline in tourism, the largest
contributor to Fiji‟s economy, has had a detrimental effect on other industries. The
garment industry has been gravely damaged both by declining tourism and the departure
of Indo-Fijian workers over the past two decades. Since the 2006 coup, Fiji potentially
faces the damaging loss of international aid, including the subsidisation of the national
sugar industry by the European Union.
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
2. Introduction
This report is a desk review of literature on recent conflicts in the Pacific region and an
attempt to draw out the role of land in these conflicts. It is intended as a precursor study
for subsequent sub-projects in the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat‟s Land Management
and Conflict Minimisation Project, which will provide a greater depth of analysis and
will present new information based upon fieldwork and primary sources. This report is
intended as an overview for key stakeholders in the Pacific Island nations on the role of
land in regional conflicts.
The report focuses on three cases that have had the most impact on the region and which
best demonstrate the role of land in conflict in the Pacific: Bougainville, Solomon Islands
and Fiji. These case studies will highlight how land-related issues have contributed to
conflict in the context of resource extraction, migration and national politics. In the
report, the term „conflict‟ is used when discussing the use of force in the resolution of
social, political or economic disputes.
It is clear that all of the conflicts discussed in this report, as is the case with conflict
elsewhere in the Asia Pacific region and globally, have involved a range of mutually
reinforcing social, political and economic factors. Without denying the importance of
other factors, this report attempts to demonstrate how land issues have interacted with
other social, political and economic contexts to cause conflict in the South Pacific and
may continue to do so in the future.
The report will begin with a brief discussion of the theoretical literature on the
connections between land and conflict. The next section will discuss some of the landrelated issues that form the background to conflict in the Pacific, including customary
tenure and land shortages. The report will then introduce three case studies – those of
Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Fiji – which demonstrate how these issues have led to
conflict in the context of resource extraction, migration and national politics. The final
section considers lessons learned.
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
2.1 Land and conflict: the theoretical literature
Observers have long recognised that land and resources are often at the heart of
international and intra-State conflicts. Seemingly intractable violence in Israel and the
Palestinian Territories and in Ethiopia and Eritrea stemmed from disputed territory. Land
and resources have also featured prominently in internal conflicts in Southeast Asia. For
example, a conflict in the Indonesian province of North Maluku, during which several
thousand people died, began with a dispute over a small tract of rural land.1
Most detailed studies of these and other conflicts involving land suggest that they are
caused by the interaction of emotional ties towards territory and competition for the
economic benefit derived from it. Other theorists assert that a key to understanding the
incidence of internal conflict is ascertaining how relevant stakeholders view territory.2
For ethnic groups, territory is central to their identity, a major element of both their past
and future as a distinct group.3 Loss of control over a long-held tract of territory can
therefore be perceived as constituting a break with a group‟s ancestors, a loss of
economic well-being for future generations and a threat to the group‟s very identity.
Because of this highly emotive connection to land, conflict may sometimes erupt
regardless of the quality or economic viability of the land in question.
Studies suggest that there is a high correlation between a state‟s reliance on natural
resource extraction and civil war. Some conclude that the presence of mines, oil fields,
logging operations and other lucrative resource projects provide the necessary funding for
rebellion, as well as the motivation to begin conflict so as to undertake looting and other
exploitation of the resource – part of an argument now commonly known as the Greed
thesis.4 Other commentators suggest that conflict often occurs in the context of natural
resource exploitation because of the environmental degradation, land expropriation,
migration and unequal job allocation invariably associated with it.5
The economic
conflict linked to natural resources is almost always intertwined with other political and
social issues. Commentators have suggested that „environmental conflict‟ – competition
between stakeholders over natural resources – occurs most frequently in situations of
scarcity, uneven allocation of resources, and a lack of governmental transparency.6 The
13
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
potential for conflict is high when resource exploitation is carried out in areas where local
communities have strong local identities and have faced a history of political and
economic marginalisation by the State.7 Susan Olzak asserts that when migration or
other factors bring ethnic groups into closer proximity in an environment of declining
resources, all interaction and disagreements between such groups are increasingly viewed
in terms of ethnic difference and competition for resources becomes more volatile.8
Conflict over natural resources is invariably caused by a combination of grievances,
strong attachment to territory and a quest for greater economic and political benefit by
certain stakeholders. The exploitation of natural resources by major corporations, and the
environmental degradation and inequality that sometimes accompanies it, produces real
grievances among local populations. Yet these grievances also often disguise, or are used
by, more personal economic and political interests. As will be seen, many of the concepts
discussed above provide insights into conflict in the Pacific.
2.2 Land and land issues in the Pacific
For Pacific Islanders, land is both the basis of a group‟s cultural and existential integrity
and its primary means to a secure future. Indeed, land is often seen as the basis of claims
to citizenship.9 Ownership of land is what gives people a voice in local and national
politics. A community‟s land also holds a special significance as the place where parents
and ancestors are buried. As discussed in the previous section, such ties form a strong
emotional bond between people and their land.
In this widely quoted statement from 1974, three Bougainvillean students expressed their
close connection with the land:
“Land is our life. Land is our physical life – food and sustenance. Land is our
social life: it is marriage; it is status; it is security; it is politics; in fact, it is our
only world. When you take away our land, you cut away the very heart of our
existence. We have little or no experience of social survival detached from the
land. For us to be completely landless is a nightmare which no dollar in the pocket
or dollar in the bank will allay; we are a threatened people.”
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Given the great emotional and economic importance afforded to land by many
communities in the Pacific, perhaps it is not surprising that a number of land-related
issues have caused tension between various stakeholders. These have included disputes
over compensation for alienation of customary land, compensation for leasing of
customary land and perceptions of land ownership. Other tensions are those between
owners, between different generations of owners, and those caused by opposing systems
of descent. In addition, land shortages and a lack of high-quality land have caused
competition between communities.
Customary tenure: Some of the most contentious and complicated land-related disputes
in the region have arisen over the question of customary title. The vast majority of land in
the Pacific is held under group ownership or customary tenure. Customary tenure has the
benefit of both reflecting Pacific Islanders‟ attachment to the land and providing
economic security. Customary ownership provides a social safety net for owners because
they know they have a valuable resource to fall back on, allowing them to “take risks in
pursuing education, finding paid employment, investing and other activities”.10
Compensation for alienation of land: Tension has arisen at various times and locations
across the Pacific around the question of customary ownership, particularly in the context
of large-scale migration and resource extraction. The connection felt by Pacific Islanders
with their territory, and the central role this territory plays in their conception of who they
are, means that many never fully accept the permanent alienation of traditional land.11
This understanding of ownership has led traditional landowners to seek further
compensation from, or the return of land by, Government departments, mining
companies, agricultural plantations, tourist resorts and migrants. Demands for
compensation or land return have been made even when previous land sales have been
carried out through formal legal and customary channels and procedures. For example, in
Fiji, traditional owners have disputed, and in some cases reclaimed, tourist sites including
the Turtle Island Resort and Nadi Airport. Likewise in the Papua New Guinean province
of West New Britain, customary owners have demanded compensation for the oil palm
plantations established by the Government on their traditional land.12 As will be seen
later in this report, the violence in Guadalcanal in Solomon Islands stemmed in part from
15
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
the people of Guadalcanal not recognising the permanent alienation of their land.13 Even
when paid to local communities, compensation payments hold the risk of causing conflict
as non-recipients dispute the claim of recipients.14
Compensation for leasing of customary land: Tension has also arisen in the context of
the leasing of customary land. Landowners in Papua New Guinea have initiated
compensation disputes with mining companies after signing leases when they have come
to believe they were deprived of information at the time of signing the contract. 15 In
particular, disputes have arisen when landowners feel they had inadequate information
regarding the size or quality of the mineral deposit, the expected prices to be obtained for
the minerals and the environmental damage associated with the mining. The most
prominent claims for further compensation in Papua New Guinea include the Panguna
mine in Bougainville (discussed in greater detail below), the Ok Tedi mine and disruption
to the Mt Kare gold mine in 1991–1992.16 Frequent claims for further compensation have
in turn created a situation of insecurity for mining companies sometimes leading to only
short-term investment and a lack of capital injected into bridges, waste disposal and other
infrastructure.17 This in turn undoubtedly creates the conditions for further conflict.
Diverging perceptions of land ownership: Different understandings of the nature of
land ownership on the part of customary owners on one hand and the State and
multinational corporations on the other have also caused tension, sometimes years after
the sale or lease of land. Local communities often think differently from State authorities
about who has rights to the resources found within their land. Many do not comprehend
or agree with State declarations that mineral ore mined from within their land is State
property and will be extracted for the benefit of the nation as a whole.18 The lack of State
services has also exacerbated perceptions that landowners are not receiving adequate
compensation.
Intra-generational conflict over land: Disputes have also arisen over decision making
with regard to land and the distribution of the economic benefits from its commercial use.
Landowning communities in the Pacific involve various competing sub-groups and
hierarchies.19 Many land disputes in the Pacific arise from intra-clan disagreement over
16
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
the use and exploitation of land and the distribution of associated economic benefits. 20
This factionalism within groups has led to conflict as companies, governments and
migrants have reached agreements over the use of land with one section of the
community, only to face opposition from another at a later date. In addition, some
individuals invariably are, or perceive themselves to be, excluded from decision-making
power. Many owners do not have complete trust in the trustees of their land nor in the
land management system which oversees the use of their land.21
Intergenerational tension and different systems of descent: In some parts of the
Pacific, tension has risen over time as new generations of traditional owners have come
to believe that, while the previous generation derived some profit from signing away the
rights to their traditional land, they themselves have not been adequately compensated.
Often, such grievances are not directed at the older members of the kin group who sold
the land rights, but at the migrants or companies using the land. Younger generations of
landowners have asserted that their parents were ill-informed about the true value of their
land when they sold it to resource companies and have demanded greater compensation.22
In West New Britain Province, for example, younger generations of traditional
landowners have recently reclaimed land sold to migrants by the previous generation.23
Differences in systems of descent within and between Pacific nations have also
contributed to tensions. In some cases, different systems exist in neighbouring districts,
with one society based on patrilineal and the other on matrilineal descent. Sale or lease of
land to migrants or companies by male members of a kin group in a matrilineal society
has led to later generations questioning the legitimacy of the transaction.
Land shortages and quality: Growing population density and associated land shortages
as well as a lack of land of suitable quality for agriculture have further exacerbated
tension over land ownership. In the post-World War II era, rising populations have led to
increasing land shortages in many areas of the Pacific. In some areas, such as Solomon
Islands, population growth has led to a decrease in the size of agricultural plots and, as a
consequence, cultivation cycles have become much shorter. This in turn has led to
smaller crop yields and a much greater value placed on land as well as increased
reluctance to allow land to be used for public or other projects.24
17
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Many Pacific Island states face a shortage of quality agricultural land. For example, only
16% of Fiji is considered to be arable land.25 In certain areas of the Pacific, such as Papua
New Guinea, high rates of migration by communities from areas of poor land quality into
areas of arable land have caused tension between migrant and local communities.26
Koczberski and Curry illustrate how rapid population growth in West New Britain
Province of Papua New Guinea has created tension. Large-scale in-migration, in part by
workers seeking employment in the palm oil industry, has led to competition for jobs and
land. Rising tension has resulted in calls by locals for all migrants to be returned to their
home areas and in some cases violent attacks have taken place between locals and
migrants.
3. Case Studies: Land in conflict and conflict escalation
The nature of Pacific Islanders‟ deeply-felt connections to the land has interacted with the
particular post-colonial trajectory of many Pacific Island states to fuel tensions. As seen
in the previous section, disagreements over land ownership have emerged over the rights
to resources and heightened competition for arable land. When migration has been
accompanied by rising crime and competition for employment, such grievances can
quickly escalate into antagonism directed at a particular group, and then to violence. As is
also the case in many places around the world, local politicians in the Pacific have
frequently exploited tensions over land for their own political gain.27
In short, conflict in the Pacific has been a complex phenomenon. In some cases land has
been the primary source of tension between different stakeholders, in others land issues
have been utilised by individuals and groups for their own ends. The following section
provides case studies of three of the major conflicts in the region in recent decades. The
discussion draws out the role of various stakeholders to each conflict, including local
communities, landowners, militant groups, migrant communities, provincial and national
governments, security forces, and national and international corporations.
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
3.1 Bougainville
Bougainville is Papua New Guinea‟s eastern-most province, comprising two islands
closer to the Solomon Islands capital Honiara than to Port Moresby. Bougainville is
“geographically, culturally and linguistically part of the Solomon Islands chain”.28
Separatist violence began in the region in 1988 against a background of large-scale
mining. A large copper deposit was identified in the Panguna area of Bougainville in
1961 and mining began under Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL) in 1972. Secessionist
sentiment, based on the distinctiveness of Bougainvillean identity and years of political
and economic marginalisation, had been expressed in Bougainville long before the
Panguna mine became a central grievance. However, the mine introduced a range of
issues, many associated with land, that exacerbated this sentiment. The Bougainville case
carries a number of lessons for stakeholders involved in the extraction of resources in the
Pacific region.
The mine had a major ecological and social impact on Bougainville. The mine and
associated roads and dumps stretched across 13,047 hectares of Bougainville, about 1.5%
of the total region.29 Many local landowners opposed the establishment of the mine but
operations began nonetheless.30 Some villagers living in the immediate mining zone were
relocated to new homes on the mine‟s edge. Between 1969 and 1991, 200 households
were relocated. Although they were provided with new housing, the relocated families
were disturbed by the lights and constant noise associated with the 24-hour operation of
the mine.31 In addition, this new housing deteriorated over time, and little assistance with
maintenance was provided to the community.
BCL also paid compensation to local landowners for land used by the mine.32 However,
at least half of those who did receive compensation only received one-off payments and
many payments were small, particularly for those who had not lived immediately
adjacent to the mine site.33 While landowners were also paid a small amount
(approximately 0.2% in total) of the revenue generated by the mine, most came to see this
as inadequate. Later generations of landowners became aggrieved that they had received
little or no compensation while they suffered the same losses as the older generation.34
19
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Many one-off payments had long been spent and the housing and infrastructure provided
for relocation had deteriorated. This growing grievance within the subsequent generation
of landowners was an important proximate cause of the secessionist violence in the late
1980s.35
In addition, the revenue sharing agreements established by the Australian Government (as
the administrator of Papua New Guinea) made no arrangement for payment to
Bougainville as a producing region. Profits from the mine went almost exclusively to the
Papua New Guinea Government in Port Moresby and BCL itself. In establishing this
system of revenue allocation, the national Government was attempting to distribute the
profits of the mine as widely as possible and ensure equitable funding for all provinces.
However, following years of previous marginalisation of Bougainville, this system
angered many in the immediate region of the mine. In 1974 the independent Papua New
Guinean Government agreed to pay Bougainville a share of revenue from the mine. But
most of this 5.63% share was allocated to the provincial Government, with only a small
proportion reaching landowners. This agreement did little to allay local grievances in the
long term.36 Bougainvilleans‟ sense of grievance at Papua New Guinea receiving the
lion‟s share of revenue from the mine was exacerbated by their lack of any sense of
common identity with the Papua New Guinea nation.37 Many landowners further refused
to accept that they did not have ownership over copper deposits in their land and opposed
its wholesale extraction, which they felt would leave nothing for later generations.38
At the time when many landowners leased their land to BCL they appear to have believed
that, at the end of the mining period, they would once again be able to use it. However,
over time it became clear that their land was being rendered unusable by dramatic
environmental degradation. A perception developed among many in the area that even
land somewhat removed from the mine had suffered a decline in productivity due to the
chemicals used in the mining operation.39 Tailings from the mine also altered the flow of
the Jaba River, causing flooding and a decline in fish stocks,40 and waste from the mine
caused fish and shellfish to die in coastal areas near the outflow. Loss of land and
environmental destruction became increasingly salient issues as the mine site, waste
dumps and other associated infrastructure expanded.41
20
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
The mine and associated economic activity attracted large numbers of migrants from
other parts of Papua New Guinea into Bougainville. The employment opportunities in the
region unsurprisingly attracted large numbers of workers who exercised their right to
settle and work anywhere in the country. Some Bougainvilleans claimed that BCL
discriminated against them and gave the majority of jobs to non-Bougainvilleans.42
When migrant workers settled near the mine they were often joined by family and kin
members.43 Many also came to work in the cocoa plantations owned by Bougainvilleans.
Migrants came to dominate the informal sector in the area and many also established
gardens on customary land. Local Bougainvilleans also appear to have seen many
migrants as the source of rising crime in the area. Further, when a migrant contested and
won a seat in the provincial election, many Bougainvilleans began to perceive migrants
as assuming dominance in the region. Many began to fear that dominance by migrants
would eventually lead to the permanent alienation of Bougainvillean customary land.44
The mine, along with increased private ownership of land, also undermined
Bougainville‟s social structure. Bougainville had been strongly egalitarian and functioned
through a system of reciprocal gift-giving and equality.45 Increasing inequality associated
with profits from and jobs at the mine disrupted this harmony. While many of those who
opposed the mine hoped for a greater share of mining revenue for Bougainville, some in
the secessionist struggle were not fighting for economic profit but for a return to an
egalitarian society based on subsistence agriculture and free from the social disruption
associated with the mine.46
As a means of articulating these grievances, landowners from the mining area formed the
Panguna Landowners Association (PLA) in 1979. Members established roadblocks
around the mine and looted the mine‟s supermarket. BCL renegotiated a new
compensation agreement, but this largely benefited the members of the PLA instead of
society more broadly.47 In August 1987 a new landowners‟ organisation was formed, the
New Panguna Landowners Association (New PLA). The founding members of this
organisation represented a younger generation of landowners who no longer had faith in
the ability of the older generation to obtain adequate redress for the social and
environmental impact of the mine and the seeming monopolisation of compensation
21
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
money by the members of the PLA.48 The New PLA included several men, such as
Francis Ona, who had worked at the mine. BCL refused to recognise or negotiate with the
New PLA and maintained its connections with the older generation of landowners.49
In 1988, the New PLA demanded that BCL improve environmental protection and health
care for local communities and carry out a new land survey. Not long after, the group also
demanded that BCL pay it 50% of all profits from the mine, along with K10 billion in
compensation for environmental damage.50 A consultancy report commissioned by the
company concluded that the mine could not be held responsible for the loss of fish stocks
or declining agricultural productivity. In response, the New PLA carried out attacks
against the mine and succeeded in cutting off its power source. Reprisals against local
communities by the Papua New Guinea police only served to unify a greater proportion
of the Bougainville population behind the New PLA.
Throughout 1989 the New PLA, now renamed the Bougainville Revolutionary Army
(BRA), fought a guerrilla campaign against Papua New Guinean security forces. While
the national Government attempted a negotiated ceasefire, the brutality of the Papua New
Guinean forces in Bougainville made these attempts irrelevant on the ground and the
conflict escalated.51 Increasing insecurity also forced BCL to halt operations at the mine
and the Papua New Guinea security forces withdrew from Bougainville in March 1990.
The BRA established the Bougainville Interim Government, but factionalism within
Bougainvillean society led to internal fighting and the eventual return of Papua New
Guinean security forces.
By 1996, the violence in Bougainville had claimed the lives of around 500 members of
the Papua New Guinea security forces, possibly 1,000 guerrillas and perhaps several
thousand Bougainvillean civilians. The Bougainvillean population faced devastating
trauma and destruction. The crisis displaced approximately 60,000 people from their
homes and the local health and education sectors collapsed as the Government cut the
region off from national services. The conflict brought the economic life of the region to
a halt, in particular from the loss of revenue associated with the cessation of mining. In
addition, Anthony Regan estimates that between 8,000 and 10,000 jobs were lost in the
22
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
mining sector and a similar number from agriculture. The violence led to the destruction
of much of Bougainville‟s crucial health, education and other infrastructure. The
economic cost to the Papua New Guinea State was also severe: it has been estimated that
the closure of the mine cost the country A$1,000 per minute. The conflict caused a steep
decline in exports of copra and other commodities and in foreign investment in other
development projects.
The Bougainville insurgency stemmed from a range of mutually reinforcing political and
economic grievances and interests, and identity factors.52 The prospect of greater revenue
clearly motivated some leaders and participants in the insurgency. Yet the conflict did not
stem from purely economic motives, as would be suggested by some of the theoretical
concepts discussed earlier in the report. In seeking the closure of the mine, many
Bougainvilleans were not seeking economic benefit. A number of land-related issues
caused grievances in the communities directly affected by the mine, including
environmental degradation and inadequate compensation for the loss of land and the
resources contained within. Grievances over the wealth extracted from local land, and a
number of issues associated with mine operations, such as migration into the area and
inequality in job allocation, exacerbated Bougainvilleans‟ long-standing sense of political
and economic marginalisation by the Papua New Guinea State.53
The national
Government and security forces, in seeking to prevent the cessation of production at the
mine, escalated the crisis through the excessive and indiscriminate use of force, which
widened support for the landowners among Bougainvillean society and eventually
threatened the State‟s territorial integrity.
3.2 Solomon Islands
The Solomon Islands archipelago stretches across 1,400 km of the Southwest Pacific and
is home to more than 80 languages. A range of factors caused rising tension and
instability in Solomon Islands in the late 1990s, including economic decline and political
corruption. The following section will examine how questions of the ownership and use
23
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
of land, brought to the fore in particular by long-term, large-scale migration, played a role
in the violence beginning in 1998.
Since the 1940s, Guadalcanal has been the destination for substantial numbers of
migrants from elsewhere in Solomon Islands. Most visibly, the new capital Honiara
became dominated by non-Guadalcanalese.54
When the capital was established on
Guadalcanal following World War II, many people from all over Solomon Islands were
drawn to the city in search of employment. A number of „squatter‟ settlements were
established on the outskirts of the city. Migrants also settled in rural Guadalcanal,
attracted by employment opportunities in palm oil estates, rice projects, logging
operations and coconut plantations. The Gold Ridge mine located east of Honiara has
also attracted migrants since it opened in 1997.55
Many of these migrants came from the island of Malaita where a relatively dense
population and land shortages encouraged young men to take up the opportunities offered
on Guadalcanal. Over recent decades, Malaitan migration has become more permanent,
with more migrants remaining in Guadalcanal rather than returning to Malaita, as land
and more permanent employment have become available on Guadalcanal, and „push‟
pressures of overpopulation and land shortages have increased on Malaita. Tension
between Guadalcanalese and Malaitans had begun to rise in the decade before the
conflict. As early as 1988, Guadalcanalese protested and called on the national
Government to repatriate all unemployed „illegal squatters‟.56 Many Guadalcanalese
believed the migrants were obtaining employment and economic opportunities at the
expense of locals who were being marginalised. Most commentators point to a clash in
the cultures of the two communities and say stereotypes contributed to tensions. For
example, Guadalcanalese accused Malaitans of aggressiveness and blamed them for a
large number of murders on Guadalcanal.
Land issues were important in this rising tension. The large area obtained for use by oil
palm plantations and attendant migrant populations meant that much of Guadalcanal‟s
best agricultural land had been alienated from its customary owners over preceding
decades.57 Much rural land on Guadalcanal had not been registered and many boundaries
24
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
were unclear.58 National financial arrangements have compounded tension: the vast
majority of profits from forestry, palm oil, mining and other projects have gone to the
national Government and private companies, and not to local communities nor even to
the provincial Government.59 As in the Bougainville case, the national Government
justifiably sought to benefit the nation as a whole from the profits of resources extracted
on Guadalcanal. A lack of revenue from, and employment in, local development projects
became a long-standing grievance among young men. Relationships between resource
companies and local villages also became strained. For example, the fact that the gold
mine had different lease arrangements with local communities to nearby oil palm
plantations also stirred resentment among those being paid less for the use of their land.60
While many of the first Malaitan settlers obtained permission from the customary owners
to settle on land in Guadalcanal, over the following years many more members of the
migrants‟ families and extended kin arrived in the area in numbers far beyond those
initially agreed with the customary owners.61 In response to rising concern over the rise
of squatter settlements around the capital, the Government established Temporary
Occupation Licenses, to be managed by the Lands Division. However, mismanagement
allowed the camps to expand and people to overstay their licenses, ultimately
exacerbating social tension. Despite the legality of earlier sales or leases of land to
migrants or companies, many customary owners came to resent the occupation and
economic use of their traditional land by others.62 Many Malaitans on the other hand, felt
they had legitimate rights to reside on the land, having lived there for generations and
having acquired it formally through both customary and legal channels. 63
Many younger-generation Guadalcanalese were angered at the sale of family-owned
lands to migrants by their parents and other members of the older generation. Many
younger Guadalcanalese repudiated the temporary and informal arrangements made
between the previous generation of their clan and migrant residents.64 It was many of
these younger landowners who formed the militias that were later to terrorise the
Malaitan settlers on Guadalcanal. In addition, despite Guadalcanal being a matrilineal
society, in some cases male members of the owning kin group sold family land to
25
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Malaitans without consulting other members of the hereditary line. This in some cases
left subsequent generations feeling aggrieved and questioning the legitimacy of the sale.65
The main turning point in this rising tension was the demand in mid-1998 by the Premier
of Guadalcanal Province, E. Alebua, that the national Government pay the province
compensation for the murders of 25 Guadalcanalese, allegedly by Malaitans, and return
all lands sold or leased to Malaitans to their traditional Guadalcanalese owners.66 Alebua
also demanded the national Government pay compensation for the loss of Guadalcanal
land used for the capital, Honiara. However, while he was Prime Minister, Alebua had
ignored similar claims, suggesting his demand for compensation in 1998 was at least
partly motivated by a quest for political and/or economic advantage. Indeed, as the
conflict progressed, demands for compensation became a prominent feature, opening up
widespread opportunities for the economic exploitation of the unrest.67 The repeated
payment of compensation also crippled the State financially and weakened its capacity to
respond to the conflict in other ways. When leaders of the Isatabu Freedom Movement
released a document entitled „Bona Fide Demands of the Indigenous People of
Guadalcanal‟, almost all claims contained within related to Guadalcanalese grievances
associated with the loss of, and lack of compensation for, their land.68 The focus on
Malaitans in these demands possibly motivated attacks by Guadalcanalese against
Malaitans.69
Some young Guadalcanalese men, motivated by the range of issues discussed above,
including members of the recently established Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA),
carried out attacks against Malaitans in rural areas. Migrant workers were expelled from
rice projects and plantations. As the violence increased, many groups also took advantage
of the rising instability to extort money and drive people from their property. In early
2000, Malaitans in Honiara formed the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), which began
attacking non-Malaitans in and around Honiara. On 5 June 2000, members of the MEF
kidnapped Prime Minister Ulufa‟alu and installed Manasseh Sogavare as prime minister.
In October 2000, members of the MEF and IFM signed the Townsville Peace Agreement
and in July 2003, at the request of Solomon Islands‟ Prime Minister, Australia led an
armed Regional Assistance Mission ( known as RAMSI) into the country, which brought
26
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
some stability to the nation. Since the RAMSI intervention, a number of customary
landowners have requested formal registration of land titles to eliminate the uncertainty
over ownership that caused tension in the 1990s.70
The violence on Guadalcanal had a severe human cost on the island nation. By May
2000, approximately 55 people had died. The fighting involved other serious human
rights abuses including rapes. By November 1999, attacks and intimidation had forced
35,309 people to flee their homes as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), many of whom
fled to Malaita.71 Some women were forced to deliver babies in IDP camps, removed
from adequate health care. IDPs faced not only the trauma of being driven from their
homes, but also loss of property, employment and livelihoods. The long-term cost of such
experiences can be severe. The Solomon Islands police force all but collapsed as a result
of the conflict.72
The overthrow of the Ulufa‟alu Government also established a
precedent for political change at the point of a gun, and increased doubts among some
Solomon Islanders over the legitimacy of the unitary State.73
The conflict exacerbated an already fragile Solomon Islands economy. When Solomon
Islands Plantations Ltd closed in mid 1999 because of the violence on Guadalcanal,
exports of palm oil and palm oil products fell from $SI 98 Million in 1998 to $SI 6.5
Million in 2000.74 In addition, 1800 people lost their jobs in the industry. A further 2,200
became unemployed when Gold Ridge Mining Ltd and Solomon Taiyo Ltd closed in mid
2000. The national economy contracted by 14% in 2000.75
As we have seen, tensions over the use and ownership of land featured heavily in causing
the violence on Guadalcanal. These land issues interacted with a range of other issues,
such as uneven economic development between islands and between urban and rural
areas. Tensions on Guadalcanal had multiple causes, including large-scale migration, the
alienation of customary land (by resource companies, the capital Honiara and agricultural
plantations), and conflict between generations of Guadalcanalese over the sale or lease of
kin land. Large-scale in-migration and competition for employment caused economic and
political issues to be viewed through the lens of ethnic tension.
27
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Yet it is important not to exclusively blame the conflict on migration and tensions over
land. Partly supporting the Greed thesis of Collier and others, it also seems likely that the
crisis in Solomon Islands was partly caused and aggravated by certain businessmen and
politicians who sought to use the tensions discussed above for personal gain. 76 The
reformist agenda of the Ulufa‟alu Government, particularly its plans to regulate the
forestry industry, threatened the interests of a broad range of the middle class.77 The
conflict and the eventual coup in 2000 halted this process. Many individuals also
benefited from the criminality and instability associated with the violence as well as from
the Government‟s ongoing payment of compensation to „victims‟ of the violence.
3.3 Fiji
The democratic will of Fiji‟s people has been overturned by four coups (and civilian led
putsches) since 1987. The causes of this political turmoil involve a complex range of
intertwined social, political and economic factors. The question of land has featured as
one among several contributing factors in this series of crises, as the rhetoric of coup
leaders has invariably centred on the need to protect indigenous Fijian control of land as
well as political authority against the increasing influence of Indo-Fijians. As Overton
puts it, “land is at the heart of any investigation into Fiji…it is a burning political
issue”.78 As the following section will attempt to show, the question of land and its
connection to national politics in Fiji is complex, and goes beyond simple ethnic tension
between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians.
All of Fiji‟s constitutions have been explicit in protecting indigenous Fijian ownership of
the vast majority of Fijian land. The constitutions have placed 83% of the land under
indigenous Fijian ownership. With the transfer of State owned land that was not claimed
or lay unused at the time of registration (Schedule A and B State lands) to indigenous
Fijian ownership in 2002, this figure is now closer to 90%. The remaining land is held
under freehold or State ownership.
While indigenous Fijian clans cannot sell their land to non-clan members, they can lease
it. Most notably, many indigenous Fijians lease their land to Indo-Fijian farmers for the
28
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
sugar cane plantations that provide a crucial element of the Fijian economy. Landowners
do not lease land to tenants directly but must do so through the Native Lands Trust Board
(NLTB), established in 1940.79 Rent is set at a certain percentage of the unimproved
value of the land and leasing periods set at 30 years. This leasing system has meant that
ordinary members of the owning clan receive a relatively small proportion of rental
payments. NLTB retains 20% of any payments (reduced from 25% in 1999) and the
various chiefs of the clan receive approximately 30%, leaving only 50% to be distributed
among the remaining members of the clan.80
The minimal return on leased lands received by most members of owning clans, and a
lack of information provided to local communities regarding the above system of
payments, has caused misperception between the two communities. The fact that chiefs
retain a large proportion of land revenue has precluded the dissemination of revenue to
ordinary members of the owning clan.81 This in turn has caused resentment among
indigenous Fijians, who blame their lack of compensation on an unfair leasing system
that unfairly favours the tenant. Many indigenous Fijians think that the leasing system
favours Indo-Fijian farmers who they believe grow rich by renting Fijian land while they
themselves receive little compensation.
In the past decade, land leases have been a major source of tension as the vast majority
have expired or are rapidly approaching the end of the lease period. Many indigenous
owners have not renewed the leases, and many more plan to follow suit in the future,
either to begin working the land themselves or to try to obtain higher rents privately.82
This has led to tension between owners and tenants. In one case, owners were arrested for
blockading a tramline used by the Fiji Sugar Corporation that ran through their land after
the lease had expired.83
This has created a great deal of insecurity in the Indo-Fijian community as many have
had to abandon their life‟s work and leave land that has been their family‟s home for
several generations. Conversely, while some Indo-Fijians may resent the indigenous
Fijian monopolisation of most of the country‟s land, much of this land is not suited to
29
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
agriculture. When Indo-Fijians have called for longer leasing periods, or Government
assistance in finding new land, this has increased tension between the two communities.84
Despite the overwhelming proportion of the country‟s land being held under indigenous
Fijian ownership, the question of land therefore has served as a convenient tool for
mobilising and unifying indigenous Fijian political support against governments accused
of undermining indigenous Fijian interests. Indigenous Fijian concerns with losing their
land to Indo-Fijians, and through it political power in the country, were central to the
coups in 1987 and 2000, or at least the rhetoric surrounding them. The small rental
payments received by ordinary Fijians for the use of their land, and the perceived success
of Indo-Fijian tenants in the cane industry, made land a powerful mobilising tool.
During the 1987 election campaign, the ruling Alliance Party warned the nation that the
Coalition sought to overturn the existing system in which “ownership of Fijian land rests
exclusively with Fijian mataqali (clans)”.85 In contrast, the Labour Coalition presented
its position as in the interests of ordinary Fijians and as a challenge to the interests of the
chiefly class. As Dr Timoci Bavadra stated publicly during campaigning: “By restricting
the Fijian people to their communal way of lifestyle in the face of a rapidly developing
cash economy, the average Fijian has become more and more backward. This is
particularly invidious when the leaders themselves have amassed huge personal
wealth.”86 The Coalition‟s election win not only exacerbated some indigenous Fijians‟
concerns with a high Indo-Fijian representation in the Government but also threatened the
vested interests of a class and individuals that had long benefited from the post-colonial
system.
Within weeks, the new Government was challenged by a number of different groups,
including a new organisation called the Taukei (indigenous or owner) Movement.
Leaders of the movement claimed that Indo-Fijians dominated the Bavadra Government.
A broad range of other interest groups also opposed the Government. The earlier
campaigning of the ruling Alliance party, which claimed that the Coalition would
undermine indigenous Fijians‟ right to land, was one issue that was instrumental in
fostering opposition to the Bavadra Government, culminating in the eventual coup.87
30
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Those opposing the Bavadra Government approached Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni
Rabuka, who agreed to lead a military coup against the Government. A spate of violent
attacks and protests culminated in the overthrow of the Government and the eventual
reinstatement of the recently defeated Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as Prime Minister.
Growing opposition to the coup, and meetings between Bavadra and Mara, led to Rabuka
staging a second coup to end any further political accommodation. The Government
passed a new constitution into law, based on a foundation of positive discrimination
towards the indigenous Fijian community
Land was even more clearly a contributing factor in the 2000 civilian putsch led by
George Speight. Land became the rallying cry for indigenous Fijian opposition to the
Mahendra Chaudhry Government, which was elected to power in 1999.88 The
Government faced a difficult dilemma during its term – the impending expiration of
numerous 30-year leases for land used by Indo-Fijian farmers. Soon after its election, the
Chaudhry Government set out to resolve the problem of the expiring leases, attempting to
protect tenants who were likely to be forced from the land, while also trying not to
alienate indigenous Fijians. The Government agreed to transfer all State Schedule A and
Schedule B land to the NLTB.89 The Government argued for a renewal of the
Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act (ALTA), which provided 30-year leases to
tenants. This support for retaining the existing leasing arrangements was seen by some
indigenous Fijians as support for Indo-Fijian tenants at the expense of owners. The
Government also stated it would pay F$28,000 to those tenants forced to leave the land.90
To some Fijian owners however, this payment to Indo-Fijian tenants seemed an unfair
handout to those already enriched by their use of the nation‟s most-fertile arable land.91
The Government also established a Land Use Commission designed to identify unused
arable land. Once again, however, this measure was seen and portrayed as an attempt to
undermine indigenous Fijian control of the land and assist Indo-Fijians. Another land
issue causing tension around this time was the announcement by the Government that the
Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) would manage the massive Fiji
mahogany industry. The Great Council of Chiefs, the premier indigenous Fijian
traditional authority, requested that further movement in the exploitation of mahogany be
31
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
suspended until a commission could ascertain the benefits to landowners.92 The issue had
already emerged as a cause of tension when the Government had fired the manager of Fiji
Hardwoods, George Speight, over a conflict of interest.93
Land usage became a central element in rising opposition to the Chaudhry Government
within its first year in office. Soon after the election, the head of the NLTB issued a
„Deed of Sovereignty‟ calling for the return of all freehold and State land to indigenous
Fijian ownership.94 The speaker of the Taukei Movement, which regrouped in March,
stated that, for indigenous Fijians, “no amount of assurance would remove the fear that
their rights were under threat”.95
On 19 May 2000, armed men led by George Speight stormed the parliament and held the
Chaudhry-led Government hostage for 56 days. Groups of thugs looted shops, attacked
Indo-Fijian places of worship and drove Indo-Fijians from their homes in some rural
areas. Analysts assert that frequent public statements by the NLTB, nationalist politicians
and other leaders that Fijian ownership of land was under threat contributed to the public
sentiment that allowed the putsch.96 The supporters of George Speight who gathered
around the parliament buildings expressed their fear of indigenous Fijians losing their
land.
As the situation worsened in Suva, the military asked President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara
to resign so as to ensure security, negotiated the release of the hostages and then
eventually forcibly quashed the rebel group, taking George Speight and other leaders into
custody. A new interim Government was sworn in, comprising many of those who had
opposed the Chaudhry Government, including the leader of the Taukei Movement. The
new Government swore to protect indigenous Fijian interests, including land rights. In
November, a mutiny within the military by soldiers seeking to install a more ethnonationalist Government, involving some members of the Speight putsch, was suppressed
after a bloody gun battle in the army barracks.
The question of land in Fiji continued to play a destabilising role in national politics
when another military coup was launched in December 2006. One of the stated primary
causes behind the coup appears to have been military opposition to a set of bills being
32
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
pushed through parliament by the Laisenia Qarase Government. While the most
publicised and probably the most important of these bills related to the pardoning of those
involved in the 2000 putsch, one of the bills, the Land Tribunal Bill, related to the
Government‟s support for a payment of F$500,000 to customary landowners to buy back
freehold land that they felt had been taken in return for inadequate compensation.97 The
military claimed these bills were an attempt to buy the support of ethno-nationalists.
The social, economic and political costs for Fiji of this series of coups and putsches have
been extensive. The series of coups in Fiji has damaged the Fiji economy, deterring
foreign investment, undermined the tourism industry and caused the exodus of numerous
skilled workers. In the years following the 1987 coup and the 2000 putsch, Fiji‟s GDP
contracted by 6.4% and 1.7% respectively.98 The departure of tens of thousands of IndoFijians, as well as a number of indigenous Fijians, over the past two decades, taking with
them business and other talents, has also damaged the economic life of the nation. The
garment industry has been gravely damaged both by declining tourism and by the
departure of Indo-Fijian workers over the past two decades. Disruptions to sugar
production are particularly severe, since the industry accounts for 40% of the national
economy.99 While the most recent coup has not been accompanied by the same levels of
violence and looting as the 2000 putsch, the ramifications for Fiji in terms of lost aid and
tourism may be just as severe. Fiji potentially faces the damaging loss of international
aid, including the subsidisation of the national sugar industry by the European Union.
These crises have undermined a series of constitutions, the legitimacy of democracy in
Fiji and even cast doubt on the current boundaries of the nation State.100 This regular
political turmoil has left many Indo-Fijians unsure of their place and security in the
nation, having often been targeted for beatings and repressions. Indigenous Fijians have
also been victimised since the 2006 coup.101
The political crises in Fiji have therefore had a range of causes. The case belies a neat
correlation between inter-ethnic inequality and conflict suggested by some theories. The
turmoil in Fiji has arisen as much from inequality within indigenous Fijian society as
between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians.102 The 2000 putsch illustrates the problems
33
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
with legitimacy likely to be faced by any Government led by an Indo-Fijian – the
question of ethnicity and political control has proved a convenient tool for rallying
opposition to elected governments.103
The question of land ownership and use has clearly been an important issue causing
tension between indigenous Fijian landowners and Indo-Fijian farmers. Re-leasing and
rental arrangements require careful attention by national governments in the interests of
inter-ethnic harmony, political stability and economic development, and the potential
damage of manipulating local grievances to political ends should be recognised and
addressed. Sensitive as grievances over land are in themselves, they have only spilled
over as national concerns through the efforts of politicians and others seeking to unify the
constituencies for their own political gain. In each of the coups, poor and marginalised
indigenous Fijians responded to the ethno-nationalist claims of the coup leaders.
Indigenous Fijian control over land was always central to this rhetoric.
34
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
4. Lessons Learned and Recommendations
The three conflicts discussed above differ in detail but reflect a number of common
threads. Each suggests that those theoretical contentions which explain resource-based
conflict in terms of simple economic competition or the emotional ties to land present too
narrow a focus. All three conflicts considered here have been the result of the interaction
of a range of political, economic and social tensions. In all cases too, the actions and
motivations of certain actors, some motivated by land issues, others by more personal
economic interests, exacerbated this tension and worsened and lengthened the conflicts.
The case studies above have attempted to illustrate the varying importance and role of
land in each conflict. The question of land has been a contentious issue in all three,
although how this has interacted with other factors to cause conflict has varied between
and within each case study.
As suggested by the overview of the theoretical literature on resource-based conflict
presented at the start of the report, land has become a volatile issue when communities
have believed the loss of their land represents both a threat to their economic well-being
and their identity. In certain locations, such as around the Panguna mine in Bougainville
and on Guadalcanal, the alienation or destruction of land has been the primary source of
real grievance, particularly when accompanied by long-term uneven economic
development, perceptions of inadequate compensation, or large-scale migration. As
suggested by the theory of Susan Olzak discussed earlier in this report, in this way, ethnic
or clan differences became polarised around issues of socioeconomic justice, within
which land was a prominent feature.
This report has touched on some of the ways in which land has fed into rising tension and
conflict in the Pacific. In some areas, such as on the Guadalcanal Plains, the legal transfer
of rights to land has been challenged by later generations of landowners or different subgroups of the owning community. In several areas, such as Bougainville, unsuccessful
35
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
demands for further compensation by owning groups for the use of their land has led to
conflict. Similar dynamics can be seen in Fiji, where demands for increased rental
amounts by indigenous Fijian landowners have led to ethnic tension. The permanent
destruction of land and other natural resources was a source of grievance in Bougainville.
In all three cases, land issues have become volatile at times when used by powerful
individuals as a means of mobilising political support or seeking economic benefit. In
Fiji, where traditional ownership has been enshrined in law, politicians and those with an
interest in the status quo have raised the spectre of land alienation to mobilise opposition
to democratically elected governments. The agency of community leaders can be seen as
one cause of the escalation and prolongation of conflict in Bougainville and Solomon
Islands, as individuals made new claims of compensation and exploited the grievance and
attachment to land within communities, and the instability of conflict itself, for their own
agendas. These issues are discussed below, along with several ways in which
governments and other stakeholders can minimise their potential for causing conflict.
1. Conflict between landowners and Government and companies
The conflict surrounding the Panguna mine in Bougainville demonstrates the need for
national governments and resource companies to thoroughly take into account the
interests of local landowners when initiating such projects. 104 Agreements with
landowners in the Panguna area in Bougainville were made in a “virtual vacuum, with
little precedent to call on”.105 Future mining operations do not have to be carried out in
such a vacuum.
The Bougainville case also shows the dangers of strongly centralised financial
arrangements in resource extraction. When local communities face all the adverse
consequences of mining in terms of land loss, environmental degradation and the
destruction of a way of life, but do not accrue correspondingly greater benefits from
mining than citizens elsewhere in the country, the potential for conflict is high. The
success of economic (and political) decentralisation in ameliorating conflict in
36
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Bougainville, and in other places, such as in Aceh in Indonesia, provides valuable lessons
for devising appropriate institutions for diverse archipelagic nations.
Many owners do not have complete trust in the trustees of their land, nor in the land
management system which oversees the use of their land.106 In several cases around the
region, the leasing of land has unnecessarily caused tension due to overly complicated
and inequitable leasing systems. This appears to be the case in Fiji. While the NLTB has
done much to guarantee the rights of tenants and owners alike, many owners feel
excluded from decision making with regard to their land. The NLTB has the power to,
and frequently does, make decisions regarding land without the consultation of
landowners.
2. Compensation for the alienation and use of land
The manner in which customary land is managed and utilised is a crucial issue in the
Pacific, not only as it relates to the potential for social conflict as discussed in this report,
but also to economic development. A review of the literature suggests there are several
issues with the potential to cause conflict over the management and use of customary
land: a fear of the alienation of customary land; a lack of information regarding the use of
land; a lack of input into decisions made regarding customary land; and an inequitable
distribution of economic benefits from the use of customary land.
As is clear from the review of the literature presented in this report, the alienation of
customary land has been the source of intense grievance in a number of areas across the
region. In some cases, the State has expropriated traditional land, and urban areas or
workers‟ settlements have spread out into customary land which was not included in
original agreements. Even after legitimate sales, customary owners have come to
subsequently challenge the permanent alienation of their land for a number of reasons.
These include perceptions that the clan as a whole has not been adequately compensated
and that the land was not appropriately valued at the time of sale.
37
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Tension has arisen in some cases due to the provision of inadequate information to
owners regarding the use of their land. In Bougainville for example, owners were
unaware of the revenue likely to be generated by their land and the extent of the
environmental degradation likely to be associated with the exploitation of it. Many
landowners also do not have access to adequate information regarding fair rent for the
property. In the case of mining, information must be provided regarding the likely size of
mineral deposits and expected prices to be gained for the ore, and concerning the likely
environment impact of the mine. Problems of mistrust between landowners and
companies can only be resolved by ensuring the former believe the latter are being honest
with them.107
3. Intra-generational and inter-generational conflict over land
Many land disputes in the Pacific arise from intra-clan disagreement over the use and
exploitation of land and the distribution of associated economic benefits. 108 The conflicts
addressed in this report, which are on the whole indicative of conflict in the region, have
arisen at least partly because local communities have perceived they have not been
adequately compensated for the use or loss of their land. In many cases, these grievances
have been legitimate, with only small, one-off, payments having been made to a handful
of individuals for the transfer of the land instead of benefit reaching the whole
community.
The case of Fiji demonstrates that problems of inadequate compensation sometimes result
from intra-community dynamics. The retention of a large proportion of land revenue by
chiefs has meant ordinary members of the owning clan receive little compensation.109 As
discussed above, the leasing of land has in some areas unnecessarily caused tension due
to overly complicated and inequitable leasing systems. Many indigenous Fijians for
example, blame their lack of compensation on an unfair leasing system that they consider
unfairly favours the tenant, for example, by calculating rental amounts on the unimproved
value of their land. Land has therefore been a convenient tool for the mobilising of
38
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
political support among the indigenous Fijian population. Further research is required
into how the unequal distribution of revenue within communities is linked with tension
between ethnic communities.
A major source of grievance has been resentment among younger members of the owning
clan who feel they have been deprived of their birthright while receiving little
compensation. Compensation has often been exhausted within one generation, while
housing and other infrastructure provided to landowners has deteriorated significantly. In
other cases, later demands for compensation stem more from personal interest and rent
seeking behaviour. This tension has led to disputes within clans, in turn causing greater
militancy, as seen in the case of Bougainville. Invariably, however, grievances have been
directed at resource and plantation companies and, most dangerously, migrant
communities.
The examples discussed in this report suggest that to avoid conflict, the alienation or
commercial use of land must only be carried out in consultation with as many
representatives of the clan as possible and with ongoing compensation provided to the
owning kin groups. Safeguards must be established to prevent a small elite of the
landowning unit making important decisions regarding the land without the consultation
of the wider clan.110 Likewise, steps should be taken to disallow a small number of
individuals from monopolising the financial benefits accrued from the use of clan land.
To prevent disputes over what constitutes customary land, in areas where ownership has
not been documented a formal recording process should be carried out with the
agreement of local communities. Further research is required into the establishment of
effective, transparent and equitable land management systems. Possible means of
reforming customary land tenures in the Pacific are discussed in Fingleton (2006) and on
the land tenure question in Lal, Lim-Applegate and Reddy (2001).
To avoid grievances increasing in subsequent generations, agreements with local
communities should involve ongoing compensation – provision must be made for new
injections of capital to later generations, and investments should be made in the name of
subsequent clan members. The provision of jobs, education scholarships and other
39
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
assistance to local landowners might also help to ameliorate this tension. Where feasible,
leasing arrangements should be subject to periodic review by both tenants and owners so
as to avoid rising tension.111 Further investigation is needed into the legitimacy of
subsequent demands for compensation and the most effective means of balancing the
rights of owners with the efficient operation of business.
4. Land and employment
In all cases examined here, in particular Bougainville and Solomon Islands, landowners
have been aggrieved that they have been given fewer employment opportunities than
migrants in resource projects located on their traditional land. This factor has aggravated
tension over the loss of land as well as leaving many young male members of the local
communities under-employed and more vulnerable to provocation. One possible solution
to this problem is to establish and monitor job quotas for local communities in
plantations, resource projects and other industries. Funding for employment-focussed
skills training for local communities in such areas may partially resolve the problem of
imbalances in employment between local and migrant workers.
When considering the rights of traditional landowners however, policy makers must be
aware of the need to balance this requirement with the need to also find a just and
peaceful space for migrants. While indigenous landowners in many cases have legitimate
grievances and claims, many migrants were born in the area and are often the latest of
several generations to live in the area. As one migrant in West New Britain Province
remarked when asked about concerns of locals attempting to evict migrants from the area,
“Where will we go?…This is our home. Our parents and relatives are buried here.”112 In
a study of West New Britain Province, Koczberski and Curry demonstrate that tensions
between local communities and migrants can facilitate the emergence of different and
opposed identities that can ultimately undermine the nation state.113
40
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
5. Environmental degradation
In the context of resource extraction, the degradation of the environment in traditional
areas has been a major source of discontent among local populations. In Bougainville, the
destruction of large swathes of traditional land, declining productivity, reductions in fish
and bird life and an increase in disease among the local community played a major role in
causing conflict. As stated above, regional governments have learned a great deal from
the Bougainville case. Landowners must be made aware of the likely environmental
impact of mining and other resource projects. As Duncan and Duncan argue, “there is a
need for a fully public and widely-framed environmental impact statement for any
proposed mining project”.114 Stronger regulation and enforcement of environmental
protection by resource companies is also required to prevent a reoccurrence of the
destruction caused in that region and the concomitant tension.
6. Exploitation of land-related tensions
In some areas of the Pacific, politicians and businesspeople have exploited tensions over
land for political gain. In Solomon Islands, this largely took the form of claims for
compensation. In Fiji, powerful groups with political and economic interests in the
maintenance of the existing land management system have exploited fears of land loss to
mobilise opposition to political opponents. Other groups with agendas separate to the
maintenance of land management systems have allied themselves with these interests so
as to pursue their own goals. Politicians‟ statements about migrants have also played a
role in stimulating rising tension and attacks against migrant communities.
The capacity of politicians and other community leaders to exploit and cause intercommunal tensions can be reduced by the widespread provision of information to the
public about their land rights and how leasing systems operate. In the case of Fiji, all
stakeholders, including indigenous Fijian landowners, should be reminded that customary
land is protected by the Fiji Constitution. Further questions remain concerning the
41
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
relative importance of genuine land related grievances versus other contentious issues –
such as cultural and identity issues, employment competition and corruption, and the
machinations of community leaders – in the onset and escalation of violence.
7. Timely and effective response to rising tension
National governments, with the assistance of international agencies, require the
establishment of systems to address the systemic causes of conflict discussed in this
report. In particular, before the initiation of large resource projects or large-scale
migration, governments need to ascertain the social and cultural situations in the relevant
areas and potential sources of tension. As discussed above landowners and local
communities must also be given greater say in the management of their lands and the use
of the profit derived from them. All members of society must be given a voice in this
management, rather than a small elite section of the kin or ethnic group.
An early response to escalating tensions is clearly crucial. This was shown in
Bougainville, where Bougainvilleans ceased to trust the Government in Port Moresby
after it failed to provide what they felt was adequate compensation for the impact of the
Panguna mine.115 Regional governments at risk of communal or political tension require
early warning systems for the identification of potential conflict. This system would
involve representatives from relevant stakeholders as well as impartial analysts employed
in monitoring social and political change in at-risk areas. Proper institutions must be
designed for the mediation and resolution of serious disputes at local, regional and
national levels to prevent the emergence of violent conflict. Criminal cases allegedly
involving different ethnic groups should be investigated thoroughly and, where possible,
demonstrated to be criminal and personal and not ethno-communal in nature.
42
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
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45
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
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46
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
Notes
1
Chris Wilson, “The Ethnic Origins of Religious Conflict in North Maluku Province, Indonesia, 1999 –
2000”, in Indonesia, Ithaca, vol 79, April 2005.
2
Monica Duffy Toft, “Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War”, in Security
Studies, 12, no 2, (Winter 2002/3), p84.
3
Ibid, p86.
4
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, Policy Research Working Paper no
2355, Washington DC, World Bank, 2001.
5
For a good overview of these arguments, see Jackson, Laurie Skuba & Pradubraj, Piyachatr,
“Introduction: Environmental Conflict in the Asia-Pacific”, Asia Pacific Viewpoint, vol 45, no 1,
April 2004, pp1-11.
6
Ibid, p5-6.
7
Anthony Regan, “The Bougainville Conflict: Political and Economic Agendas”, in Ballentine, Karen, &
Sherman, Jake, (eds), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2003, p160.
8
Susan Olzak, The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict, Stanford University Press, Stanford,
1992, p209.
9
Chris Ballard, “It‟s the land, stupid! The moral economy or resource ownership in Papua New Guinea”, in
Larmour, Peter, (ed), The Governance of Common Property in the Pacific Region, National Centre for
Development Studies, Canberra, 1997, p48, and Ron Crocombe, “Overview: The pattern of change in
Pacific Land Tenures”, in Ron Crocombe, (ed) Land Tenure in the Pacific, Oxford University Press,
London, 1971, p4.
10
Chris Lightfoot, “Does customary land ownership make economic sense?” in Fingleton, Jim, (ed),
Privatising Land in the Pacific: A defence of customary tenures, The Australia Institute, Discussion
Paper Number 80, June 2005, p24.
11
Ballard, It’s the land, stupid! p50.
12
Gina Koczberski and George Curry, “Divided Communities and Contested Landscapes: Mobility,
development and shifting identities in migrant destination sites in Papua New Guinea”, in Asia Pacific
Viewpoint, vol 45, no 3, December 2004, p358.
13
Clive Moore, “Happy Isles in Crisis: The historical causes for a failing state in Solomon Islands, 1998 –
2004”, Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 2004, p95.
14
Regan, “The Bougainville Conflict”, p155.
15
Ron Duncan & Rod Duncan, “Improving security of access to customary-owned land in Melanesia:
mining in Papua New Guinea”, in Larmour, Peter, (ed), The Governance of Common Property in the
Pacific Region, National Centre for Development Studies, Canberra, 1997, p74.
16
Ibid, p74-75.
17
Ibid, p75.
18
See for example: on the Solomon Islands, Clive Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis, p85; on Bougainville,
Dom Vernon, “The Panguna Mine”, in Regan, Anthony, & Griffin, Helga (eds), Bougainville before
the conflict, Pandanus Books, Canberra, 2005, p262.
19
Glenn Banks, “Mining and the Environment in Melanesia: Contemporary Debates Reviewed”, in The
Contemporary Pacific, vol 14, number 1, Spring 2002, p42.
20
Marjorie Sullivan, “Recognition of Customary Land in the Solomon Islands: Status, Issues and Options”,
Resource Management in Asia Pacific Working Paper 66, 2007, p18.
21
Ibid, p19.
47
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
22
See for example, Koczberski and Curry, Divided Communities and Contested Landscapes, p361.
Ibid, p361.
24
Moore, “Happy Isles in Crisis”, p69-70.
25
John Overton, Land and differentiation in rural Fiji, Research School of Pacific Studies, Canberra, 1989,
p32.
26
Koczberski and Curry, Divided Communities and Contested Landscapes, p358. Also, Mike Bourke,
personal communication.
27
See for example Koczberski and Curry, Divided Communities and Contested Landscapes, p363.
28
Regan, The Bougainville Conflict, p134.
29
Ibid, p137.
30
Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, “Cohesion and Disorder in Melanesia: The Bougainville Conflict & the
Melanesian Way”, in Alailima, Fay, Busch, Werner von (eds), New Politics in the South Pacific,
Institute of Pacific Studies, Rarotonga, 1994, p68.
31
Vernon, The Panguna Mine, p261.
32
John Connell, “Compensation and Conflict: the Bougainville Copper Mine, Papua New Guinea”, in
Connell, John & Howitt, Richard (eds), Mining and indigenous peoples in Australasia, Sydney
University Press, Sydney, 1991, p55.
33
Ibid, p62.
34
Ibid, p63.
35
Regan, The Bougainville Conflict, p138.
36
Ibid, p140.
37
Ibid.
38
John Connell, Compensation and Conflict, p56, and Oliver, Douglas, Black Islanders: A personal
perspective of Bougainville, 1937-1991, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1991, p126.
39
Connell, Compensation and Conflict, p67.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid, p61.
42
James Tanis, “Nagovisi Villages as a Window on Bougainville in 1988”, in Regan, Anthony, & Griffin,
Helga (eds), Bougainville before the conflict, Pandanus Books, Canberra, 2005, p467.
43
Ibid, p459.
44
Tanis, Nagovisi Villages as a Window on Bougainville in 1988, p466.
45
Regan, The Bougainville Conflict, p137.
46
Ibid, p157.
47
Ibid, p140.
48
Tanis, Nagovisi Villages as a Window on Bougainville in 1988, p463.
49
Ibid.
50
Connell, Compensation and Conflict, p56.
51
Regan, The Bougainville Conflict, p145.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid, p160.
54
John Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom: from uprising to intervention in the Solomon Islands,
Pandanus Books, Canberra, 2004, p48.
55
Sinclair Dinnen, “Winners and Losers: Politics and Disorder in the Solomon Islands 2000 – 2002”, in
Journal of Pacific History, vol 37, no 3, 2002, p286.
56
Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom, p47.
57
Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis, p74.
23
48
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
58
Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom, p57.
Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis, p96.
60
Ibid, p75.
61
Judith Bennett, “Roots of Conflict in Solomon Islands Though Much is Taken, Much Abides: Legacies
of Tradition and Colonialism”, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Discussion Paper
2002/5, p8.
62
Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis, p95.
63
Ibid, p103.
64
Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom, p57-58.
65
Bennett, Roots of Conflict in Solomon Islands, p8.
66
Ibid, p10.
67
Dinnen, Winners and Losers, p289.
68
Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis, p109.
69
Bennett, Roots of Conflict in Solomon Islands, p11.
70
Sullivan, Recognition of Customary Land in the Solomon Islands, p2.
71
Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom, p55.
72
Dinnen, Winners and Losers, p291.
73
Greg Fry, “Political Legitimacy and the Post-colonial State in the Pacific: Reflections on Some Common
Threads in the Fiji and Solomon Islands Coups”, in Pacifica Review, vol 12, number 3, October 2000,
p300.
74
Dinnen, Winners and Losers, p292.
75
Ibid.
76
See Greg Fry, Political Legitimacy and the Post-colonial State in the Pacific, p302, and John Fraenkel,
The Manipulation of Custom, p186.
77
Bennett, Roots of Conflict in Solomon Islands, p10.
78
Overton, Land and differentiation in rural Fiji, p32.
79
Ibid, p33.
80
Oskar Kurer, “Land and Politics in Fiji: of Failed Land Reforms and Coups”, in The Journal of Pacific
History, vol 36, no 3, 2001, p300.
81
Padma Lal, Hazel Lim-Applegate, and Mahendra Reddy, “The land tenure dilemma in Fiji – can Fijian
landowners and Indo-Fijian tenants have their cake and eat it too?”, in Pacific Economic Bulletin, vol
16, no 2, p112.
82
Brij Lal, Islands of Turmoil: elections and politics in Fiji, Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 2006, p194.
83
One News 4 April 2007.
84
Lal, Islands of Turmoil: elections and politics in Fiji, p28.
85
Ibid, p59.
86
Quoted in Brij Lal, “Heartbreak Islands: Reflections on Fiji in Transition”, in Asia Pacific Viewpoint, vol
44, no 3, December 2003, p337.
87
See Lal, Islands of Turmoil.
88
Brij Lal, „The Sun Set at Noon Today‟ in Lal, Brij, V & Pretes, M, (eds) Coup: Reflections on the
Political Crisis in Fiji, Pandanus Books, 2001, p12.
89
Lal, Islands of Turmoil, p183.
90
Ibid, 195. The Government also agreed to pay F$8,000 to owners seeking to begin working their land.
91
Michael Field et al, Speight of Violence: inside Fiji’s 2000 coup, Reed, Auckland, 2005, p66.
92
Sandra Tarte, “Melanesia in Review Issues and Events 2000: Fiji”, in The Contemporary Pacific, Fall
2001, p531.
59
49
Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region
93
Ibid, p531.
Lal, Islands of Turmoil: elections and politics in Fiji, 195.
95
Kurer, Land and Politics in Fiji, p310.
96
Ibid.
97
Vijay Naidu, “Coups in Fiji: Seesawing Democratic Multiracialism and Ethno-nationalist Extremism”, in
Devforum, Council for International Development, Wellington, 2007, p32.
98
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2007, Fiji Islands.
99
Mahendra Reddy & Padma Lal, “State land transfer in Fiji: issues and implications”, Pacific Economic
Bulletin, vol 17, no 1, May 2002, p146.
100
Fry, Political Legitimacy and the Post-colonial State, p298 – 299.
101
Ibid, p300.
102
Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, “Inequality and conflict in Fiji: From purgatory to hell?”, in Asia Pacific
Viewpoint, vol 44, no 3, December 2003.
103
Fry, Political Legitimacy and the Post-colonial State, p297.
104
Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis, p85.
105
Carruthers and Vernon quoted in John Connell, “Logic is a Capitalist Cover-Up: Compensation and
Crisis in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea”, in Stephen Henningham & Ron May (eds), Resources,
Development and Politics in the Pacific Islands, Crawford House Press, Bathurst, 1992, p38.
106
Ibid, p19.
107
Duncan & Duncan, Improving security of access to customary-owned land in Melanesia, p83.
108
Sullivan, Recognition of Customary Land in the Solomon Islands, p18.
109
Lal, Lim-Applegate and Reddy, The land tenure dilemma in Fiji, p112.
110
Jim Fingleton, “Pacific 2020 Background Paper: Land”, Consultancy report prepared for AusAid, 2005,
p12.
111
Fingleton, Pacific 2020 Background Paper: Land, p20.
112
Quoted in Koczberski and Curry, Divided Communities and Contested Landscapes, p367.
113
Ibid.
114
Duncan & Duncan, Improving security of access to customary-owned land in Melanesia, p85.
115
Tanis, Nagovisi Villages as a Window on Bougainville in 1988, p468.
94
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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region