The Soviet Union’s Vietnam
Congress and U.S. foreign policy on Afghanistan
Master thesis
W.K. de Jong
0410748
A.M. Kalinovsky
Universiteit van Amsterdam
0
Contents
Introduction
2-5
The end of détente
6-15
Ronald Reagan and U.S. foreign policy
16-24
The CIA and the early years of operation cyclone
25-28
Congress: champions of the Afghan cause
29-51
Conclusion
52-54
Bibliography
55-57
1
Introduction
In December 1979 the first Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan in order to restore the
communist’s grip on the country and instate a new puppet regime in Kabul. This meant the
end of détente and a renewal of hostilities between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Policymakers in Washington saw the invasion as an act of aggression, marking the beginning
of a new era of Soviet expansionism. This expansionism had to be curbed which meant a
heating of the Cold War especially in the Third World. Africa, Latin America and the Middle
East would be the main battleground where this war was to be fought. Throughout the world
the Soviet Union or the U.S. were supporting and aiding anti-capitalist or anti-communist
forces, respectively. The new American president Ronald Reagan was convinced that the ‘evil
empire’ would be defeated. By heavily increasing the budget for the U.S. arms program he
renewed the arms race, which shivered the world, afraid of an all-out nuclear war.
Afghanistan proved to be one of America’s largest and most successful covert
operations during the Cold War. What started off as a reluctant operation with the CIA
providing Soviet made small arms and light weapons to the Afghan resistance, became a
large-scale operation as the war progressed. Not only light weapons and machine guns were
provided but also the American made, highly advanced Stinger missile system which could
take out Soviet gunships and fighter jets that wrecked havoc among the Afghan populace.
These weapons in combination with Mujahidin perseverance proved to be an unmanageable
force for the Soviet army. The Soviet Union became bogged down in a guerrilla war and there
was no easy way out. Only the urban centres of Afghanistan were under Soviet control, but in
most of the rural parts the Mujahidin were in charge. Eventually, the Red Army left the
country in 1989 leaving the defence of the fragile communist regime to the Peoples
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) itself. Two years later the Mujahidin would defeat
the government forces but this didn’t end the violence. The Afghan resistance was fractured
and the different groups battled each other for control.
The U.S. played an important role in the eventual ‘defeat’ of the Soviet army. U.S. aid
gave the Mujahidin a fighting chance against the superior Soviet forces. Especially when the
Afghan resistance was provided with Stinger missiles. An important role in this decision has
been ascribed to Charles Wilson. Wilson was a Congressman of low esteem when the Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan but after seeing the dire circumstances the Afghan resistance and
people were in he became one of the champions of the Afghan cause. It was Wilson who
2
‘started a campaign to supply the guerrillas with an effective anti-aircraft weapon.’ 1 But in his
sympathy for the Afghan resistance he was not alone. Other Congressmen also made sure that
Afghanistan was given high priority in American foreign policy. Senator Paul Tsongas for
example introduced a resolution which said that it was ‘indefensible to provide the freedom
fighters with only enough aid to fight and die, but not enough to advance their cause of
freedom’. 2 Representative Donald Ritter and Senator Gordon Humphrey were also upping the
ante, the former founding the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan (CTFA) and the latter
chairing it. The CTFA was formed to promote material assistance for Afghanistan to advance
the chance for freedom for which was called in the resolution set up by Tsongas in
cooperation with Ritter.
Congress heavily influenced U.S. aid to the Mujahidin during the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Forces within Stated Department and the CIA were not always thrilled about the
Congressional initiatives. Officials within these powerful foreign policy institutions tried to
delay or block these initiatives. By many it was believed that the Mujahidin were fighting a
lost cause and that heavily aiding them was nothing but a loss of money. Therefore the
resistance was provided with a minimum of aid, just enough to keep them fighting and to
harass the Soviet army. But small arms and light weapons were no match for the superior
Soviet forces consisting of tanks and a highly effective air force. So, for the first five years of
the war the Mujahidin were fighting a lost cause. But when more and more people in
Congress got interest in their struggle U.S. aid rose to proportions never seen before.
This research thus looks into the forces within Congress that shaped U.S. foreign
policy considering Afghanistan. What role did U.S. Congress play in shaping foreign policy
concerning Afghanistan? Who were the main players? How did they change foreign policy?
And why were their initiatives hindered by the CIA or State Department? This research makes
a case study of how Congress could shape U.S. foreign policy. At the same time this research
tries to find an answer to why Congress decided in favour of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan.
This was not usual for Congress after a period of non-interventionism in the seventies,
especially after the debacle in Vietnam. These are interesting questions because there has
always been consensus among historians about the important role Congress played in this
matter. But not a lot has been written about the dynamics between Congress, CIA and State
Department in this period. It’s interesting to see what influence Congress had on U.S. foreign
1
2
Arming Afghan guerrillas: a huge effort led by U.S., New York Times, April 18, 1988.
Ibid.
3
policy and how forces within the CIA and State Department tried to hinder congressional
efforts.
Before I will go in depth in the role of Congress I shall have to examine the conflict in
Afghanistan and its implications on the Cold War. How did the Cold War develop? How did
the invasion of Afghanistan influence East West relations? What was the reaction of the
White House? To do this I will examine the literature that already exists on the topic. Works
by Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler will be key to this chapter. Both have written
extensive studies on the Cold War in which the Afghan conflict plays an important role.
Westad’s The global Cold War and Leffler’s For the soul of mankind both deal in depth with
the conflict and its implications on the Cold War. But also the work of Craig & Logevall,
America’s Cold War, will prove useful. Especially since this work primarily focuses on
American foreign policy. It will therefore give good insights in the reactions of the White
House on the renewed Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. For this chapter I will primarily
focus on American foreign policy in the seventies and Carter’s reaction to the invasion. This
will then lead to another important aspect of my research: the Reagan doctrine and U.S.
foreign policy.
Chapter two will be focussed on these topics. The Reagan Doctrine will be one of the
most important themes of my thesis since aid to the Mujahidin was basically the most explicit
example of this doctrine. The Reagan doctrine and how it came into being will be defined.
This chapter will also be primarily based on existing literature. Sean Wilentz’ The age of
Reagan is a recent study on Reagan’s presidency and therefore deals with Reagan’s foreign
policy among others. The works of Westad and Leffler will prove useful as well. To place the
new foreign policy of Reagan into perspective I will also examine the political school of
neoconservatism. To explain the ideas of this school I will use Justin Vaisse’s
Neoconservatism. Neoconservatives in the administration were important in shaping U.S.
foreign policy.
In the third chapter I will shortly focus on another important foreign policy institute:
the Central Intelligence Agency. The Director of the CIA had great influence on American
foreign policy and should therefore be discussed. It’s influence would also hinder later
congressional initiatives considering Afghan aid. William Casey was CIA Director from 1981
to 1987 and will therefore be of main importance but others within the Agency also were
influential in decision-making and execution of policies considering Afghanistan. Steve Coll’s
Ghost wars will be the core of this part of the my thesis since it deals completely with the CIA
4
and the Afghan case. Legacy of ashes by Tim Weiner is a history on the CIA and will give
apart from insight in the topic discussed also a more clear view on CIA dynamics.
Finally, in the forth chapter I will focus on U.S. Congress and its influence on U.S.
foreign policy as a whole and aid to the Mujahidin in particular. Who were the major players?
And more importantly how did they manage to allocate such huge amounts of money to the
Afghan cause? Forces both within the Pentagon and the White House were more inclined to
funding a small scale operation. So how could Congress influence these very powerful foreign
policymakers and make the Afghan operation one of America’s most expensive and
successful interventions in Cold War history? To answer these questions I will base my
research for a large part on sources. I have consulted online archives for the most part and
tried gather as many official papers from especially Congress, but also White House and CIA.
One of the most important archives I will use is the National Security Digital Archive. This
archive has 2,000 documents that together contain 14,000 pages of material. Of course not
everything is on Congress but I’ve found several documents which show correspondence
between congressmen and Pentagon and White House officials. Congressional hearings also
offer an interesting insight in the dealings and views of the main protagonists. Due to the
absence of a large and accessible congressional archive in the Netherlands I have also
searched the archives of two large American papers: the New York Times and the
Washington Post. With all these sources I will try to create a complete as possible view of the
dynamics between Capitol Hill and the White House.
5
The end of détente
East-West relations and American foreign policy in the seventies
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 it was perceived in Washington as
an act of renewed Soviet aggression and expansionism. To the Carter administration the
Soviet Union was willing to give up the détente that had carefully been built up in the
seventies. The invasion of Afghanistan was another example of the Kremlin’s hunger for ever
more power and control over the world which was an obstacle in obtaining a durable peace.
What decision-makers in the White House believed during the invasion, or at least told the
American public, was different from what many contemporary scholars believed though.
Already in the eighties academics believed that the Soviet Union wasn’t actively pursuing the
gain of extra territory or trying to gain access to the warm water ports and oil resources of the
Gulf region. In fact it seemed that the Soviet Union was rather sucked into the conflict.
According to Henry Bradsher, who already wrote on the conflict in 1982, the Soviet Union
was ideologically obliged to maintain communism in Afghanistan. The Kremlin could not
leave the Kabul regime to its fate without ‘betraying the Soviet regime’s own rationale.’ 3 The
Red Army didn’t simply rush in to crush anticommunist forces. Instead Soviet involvement
increased gradually as the situation for the Afghan communists grew more dire. The strategic
location of the country also played part in the decision. Just as with the ideologically driven
notion of protecting communist brothers and sisters, defensive considerations were of greater
importance than offensive ones; a possible U.S. stronghold on the Soviet Union’s southern
border was simply unacceptable to the Kremlin.
What happened in Afghanistan that made the Communist Party leaders to decide they
had to intervene? In April 1978 the People’s Democratic of Afghanistan (PDPA) rose to
power as it deposed of Mohammed Daoud. The new government was led by Nur Mohammad
Taraki and Hafizullah Amin. Both had radical ideas about how to pick up the pace
modernizing the country and initiated reforms that severely alienated the people, especially
the population of the rural parts of the country who were the majority and already fed up with
central government. Furthermore, heavy factional infighting within the PDPA made it
difficult for government to function at all. The two main factions, Khalq and Parcham, were
basically functioning as two separate parties. But Khalq, to which both Taraki and Amin
belonged, was dominant and most high positions in government were taken by this faction’s
3
Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham 1983) 6.
6
members. Taraki and especially Amin governed the country ruthlessly and the Soviet
leadership grew concerned about their ways. ‘Soviet leaders told the Khalq leaders that they
needed to rule with better judgment and more sophistication.’ 4 Infighting within Khalq
reached its apex when Amin disposed of Taraki. He now had all the power but ‘Soviet
officials could not control him and did not trust him.’ 5 And thus it was decided in the Kremlin
that Amin had to be replaced by a more moderate leader, Babrak Karmal. But to realize this
and to built a stabile government Karmal had probably to be supported by Soviet army units.
An intervention seemed inevitable.
The political situation within Afghanistan thus made that an intervention was
unavoidable if, in the eyes of the Kremlin, a communist Afghan state was to survive. The end
of communist rule in Afghanistan was unacceptable to the small clique of old-style Soviet
oligarchs that dominated Soviet foreign policy-making in the Kremlin. The power was
basically in the hands of the so-called troika which consisted of KGB Chairman Yuri
Andropov, Foreign Minister Adrei Gromyko and Defence Minister Dimitri Ustinov. They
were convinced that intervention was necessary and would serve the Communist cause even
though they were told otherwise by several voices both within and outside the Politburo. The
Soviet military, for example, was not convinced an easy victory and solution could be
achieved when the Soviets would intervene. 6 But these dissenting voices were quickly
silenced and their rapports were kept out of crucial Politburo meetings on the matter.
In the eyes of the leading foreign policy officials Hafizullah Amin had to be disposed of to
save Afghan communism. Not only were his policies rapidly alienating the Afghan people,
but rapports by the KGB about possible talks between Amin and U.S. officials also made the
Kremlin believe that he might cross over to the American camp which was unacceptable.
Although these talks were never confirmed by the U.S. and they might have been false, even
the possibility of such an event was enough reason for the Soviets to install a new and more
controllable leader in Kabul. 7 Again the Kremlin was mainly concerned about Afghanistan
from defensive considerations.
What contributed to the eventual decision to intervene in Afghanistan by the Soviet
Union was the already deteriorating condition of the fragile détente that had dominated EastWest relations in the seventies. The Small Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) was not ratified
4
Melvyn P. Leffler, For the soul of mankind: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York
2007) 306.
5
Leffler, For the soul of mankind, 330.
6
Artemy Kalinovsky, ‘Decision-making and the Soviet war in Afghanistan: from intervention to withdrawal’,
Journal of Cold War Studies, 11: 4 (2009) 46, 48-50.
7
Artemy Kalinovsky, A long goodbye: the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge 2011) 20.
7
by U.S. Congress which meant that talks about further East-West rapprochement came to a
standstill. Already under the Carter administration the U.S. was picking up the arms race
again, which was a further strain on a possible loosening of tensions between the two
superpowers. This meant that the Kremlin’s leaders were more inclined to consider a possible
intervention. Détente was thus already failing since the U.S. was not to ratify SALT II and
was planning on placing missiles in Europe. ‘To the Russians it looked as if the Americans
were trying to undermine the principle of strategic parity which for some years had provided a
fairly stable framework for the superpower confrontation.’ 8
The decision by the Kremlin to invade Afghanistan was thus a defensive strategy
instead of an offensive one that fitted within the Soviet Union’s Grand Strategy of communist
world domination. Events within Afghanistan and the deteriorating conditions of détente
made the Soviets believe that Afghan communism had to be saved and that intervention was
the only way to do so. The loss of prestige that would come with the loss of communist Kabul
was unacceptable. But the intervention would prove to have severe consequences.
As mentioned above the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union meant the end of
a fragile détente that was achieved in the seventies. This short era of détente was championed
by both Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev. Both leaders aimed for peaceful coexistence
between the two superpowers because they thought it would benefit their nations. After the
brutal crush of the ‘Prague Spring’ by Communist forces in August 1968 not only the enemies
of the Kremlin condemned Soviet aggression. Discontent also grew within the Warsaw Pact.
As a result Albania severed its last ties with Moscow and Romania ridiculed the invasion and
discontent among the peoples of several East European states grew. But what proved most
importantly to Berzhnev and his aides was the fact that the West did not threaten serious
retaliation. This meant that Brezhnev felt that the Soviet Union was now considered strong
enough by its adversaries, and that a dialogue with the U.S. could be held on the basis of
equality. Brezhnev wanted stability and peace in Europe so there would be less chance of an
all-destructive war and more trade with the West. The Soviet economy was already dwindling
and the military burden on Soviet expenditures had to be curbed. Meanwhile, tensions with
China were increasing. Stability could only be achieved through dialogue and the recognition
of the territorial status quo, especially that of the DDR. Also because of Willy Brandt’s socalled Ostpolitik opportunities for rapprochement between East and West grew further. 9
8
9
Robert Braithwaite, Afghantsy: the Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89 (London 2011) 80-81.
Leffler, For the soul of mankind, 240-241.
8
But a possible rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States could
not be achieved without efforts from the other side of the Atlantic as well. And possibilities
came when Richard Nixon assumed the U.S. presidency in 1969. Nixon and Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger ‘pressed forward with the broader task of adapting U.S. foreign policy to a
more even distribution of global power.’ This meant not only that they wanted their allies to
carry more of America’s economic and military burdens, but ‘it also necessitated… a new
relationship of détente with the Soviet Union – increased cooperation with Moscow through
negotiations within a general environment of competition.’ This didn’t mean an end to the
rivalry between the two superpowers and Nixon still wanted a check on Soviet expansionism
and arms build-up. But he wanted to do this through different means, through diplomacy and
mutual concessions. 10 And so, in the same year as Nixon took office, negotiations with the
Kremlin on arms control went underway. These initial talks were concluded in May 1972
when Nixon and Brezhnev met in Moscow and signed the SALT treaty. The main element of
the treaty was the limitation of the amount of land-based and submarine-launched
intercontinental ballistic missiles. This was only a fraction of both countries’ nuclear arsenals
and the initial time span was only five years, but it was a first step towards further
appeasement. Domestic problems proved a strain the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy
however.
The late sixties and early seventies were marked by a renewed desire by liberals on
Capitol Hill to acquire more congressional influence on U.S. foreign policy. In the fifties and
early sixties Congress was barely interested in foreign policy, defence expenditures and
foreign aid. The Vietnam debacle changed sentiments in Congress. During the early seventies
Democratic liberals grew more sceptical about the domination of the executive branch over
foreign policy decisions. The Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente was based on the preservation
of the balance of power. This meant that the U.S. tried to contain Communism by aiding
friendly regimes. So-called ‘fringe states’ were ‘to become the principle agents of
containment.’ This meant the U.S. did not have to intervene directly so it would not
overextend its military force. ‘The U.S. and the Soviet Union would compete by proxy, rather
than directly.’ 11 U.S. foreign aid to anticommunist regimes grew. This led to heavy resistance
from within Congress. These ‘new internationalists’ were fervent opponents of U.S. aid to
every anticommunist force in dodgy Third World countries. For instance, they campaigned
10
Campbell Craig & Frederik Logeval, America’s Cold War: the politics of insecurity (Cambridge 2009) 260261.
11
Dina Badie, ‘Doctrinal cycles and the dual-crisis of 1979,’ International Studies Perspectives 12 (2011) 216.
9
against U.S. assistance of Augusto Pinochet who came to power after a military coup in Chile
in 1973 and reports came in of human rights abuses. More important was successful
Congressional resistance against covert assistance of anticommunist forces in Angola. A bill
introduced by Senator John Tunney and a later amendment to it by Senator Dick Clark
terminated all covert assistance to these forces. Congressional anti-interventionism was
widespread in the seventies. The Angolan case ‘represented the high point of a congressional
revolt against the anticommunist ethos of the Cold War and executive authority in foreign
policy.’ 12 U.S. interventionism would reach new highs under the Reagan doctrine.
Congressional criticism on foreign interventions would be a returning issue in most cases.
Apart from the clashes with Congress, trouble in other parts of the world like the
Middle East put further strain on U.S. foreign policy and the fragile détente that was achieved
by the Nixon administration. Washington was afraid of Soviet expansionism in the region and
Nixon wanted to keep the Jewish community satisfied knowing new elections were coming.
On top of all this Nixon was afraid of further Soviet interference in Africa and Latin America.
At the same time domestic opposition to détente grew. In the end it was domestic troubles that
brought an end to Nixon’s presidency as the Watergate affair grew bigger and bigger and the
president eventually resigned in 1974.
Kissinger’s foreign policy had grown discontent at the home front. Critique on détente
was growing as the seventies progressed. ‘Public opinion had changed significantly and the
“Vietnam syndrome” was fading rapidly.’ 13 While liberal Democrats attacked U.S.
interventionism and the militarization of foreign policy, the Republican right argued that the
U.S. was too soft on the Soviet Union. Within the Democratic Party new sentiment began to
stir as well. Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson, a neoconservative Democrat, attacked
Kissinger’s foreign policy fiercely. According to the ‘Scoop’ Jackson Democrats détente was
an impossibility for two reasons. First, the strategic dimension of détente was an unacceptable
paradox. Détente was based on a set of rules of reciprocity and acceptance of ‘quasi-nuclear
parity with Moscow.’ The U.S. left its safety in the hands of its archenemy the Soviet Union
and vice versa. This meant that détente acknowledged an element of vulnerability. But for
Jackson ‘the first priority of American policy was to maintain a greater nuclear power and
strength than the Soviet Union.’ 14 The U.S. had to keep the advantage over the Kremlin if it
12
Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (Cambridge 2006) xxi.
Daniel Cox & Diane Duffin, ‘Cold War, public opinion, and foreign policy spending decisions: dynamic
representation by Congress and the President,’ Congress & the Presidency, 35: 1 (spring 2008) 32.
14
Mario Del Pero, The eccentric realist: Henry Kissinger and the shaping of American foreign policy (Ithaca
2010) 121-122.
13
10
were to be safe. And this advantage was lost with Kissinger’s foreign policy. Second, the
neoconservatives believed in the moral superiority of the U.S., something that in their eyes
got lost with Kissinger’s realism. According to him the U.S. was not exceptional, nor the
highest form of civilization. They had to accept other powers in the world, i.e. the Soviet
Union, and peace could only be achieved through dialogue and a notion of equivalence. To
the neoconservatives this notion meant that the Soviet Union was morally equivalent as well.
This was opposite to everything they believed in. The values of the U.S. were universal,
therefore foreign policy had to reflect its beliefs and to embody its ‘democratic and
humanitarian heritage.’ Détente was ‘a policy indifferent to human rights.’ 15 The Scoop
Jackson Democrats shared this views with Ronald Reagan and and many neoconservatives
would later turn to the Republican camp. Neoconservatism would prove crucial to Reagan’s
foreign policy as we will see in the next chapter.
Kissinger’s foreign policy was thus under attack from all sides and support crumbled
fast. Pressure on Kissinger further grew under the presidency of Gerald Ford. ‘Détente had
become an albatross around the administration’s neck, so much so that pollsters advised Ford
to drop the term from his speeches and Kissinger acknowledged that it “is a word I would like
to forget.”’ 16 Congress was trying to get more influence in U.S. foreign policy and most
Republicans and neoconservatives was strongly opposed to détente. Therefore most initiatives
by the White House to improve East-West relations were shot down, like the SALT II treaty
later would. The Helsinki Accords were signed in 1975. Though these Accords had no
binding content, they meant that the West would acknowledge the current territorial status
quo in Europe and the USSR in exchange would do more to improve human rights in their
sphere of influence. Although this was a step closer to appeasement and would later serve
human rights activists in the Soviet bloc, at the time it was seen by the opponents of détente as
a sign of weakness to acknowledge the European division. Therefore it didn’t help Ford’s
presidential campaign. Cold War hawks both within Congress and the administration were
convinced that the CIA heavily underestimated the Soviet Union’s nuclear capabilities. In
their eyes the U.S. was falling behind and ‘détente, therefore, courted national catastrophe.’ 17
Ford was attacked on all sides for maintaining a too soft foreign policy. A problem his
successor would face as well. But Jimmy Carter successfully played the hardliner card in his
presidential campaign against Ford and would eventually win the 1976 presidential elections.
15
Ibid., 131
Craig & Logevall, America’s Cold War, 286.
17
Ibid., 287.
16
11
Jimmy Carter wanted to change U.S. foreign policy and make America strong and
sympathetic again. In order to do so he emphasized human rights, which became a central
theme to his foreign policy. The American ideals had to be held high and ‘Carter aimed to
restore faith in… the dream of human liberty.’ 18 This appealed to the American people, who
had lost faith in the White House during the Nixon-Ford era with its excesses and political
and economical turmoil. People around the world had to be liberated and experience personal
freedom, something that they couldn’t achieve under the yoke of Communism. With human
rights Carter therefore had a new card to play against the Soviet Union, a banner behind
which he could unite the free world. And this was needed since the Western alliance was
fragmented as stronger growing Western European nations and Japan were often unhappy
with the unilateral decision making of the U.S.. Economic troubles after the quadrupling of oil
prices by the OPEC after the Yom Kippur War in 1973 had further enhanced discontent
within the Western bloc. Carter felt he needed to mend West-West relations. But his human
rights stances were perceived by the Kremlin as ‘an anti-Soviet bludgeon.’ 19 According to the
Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko the new U.S. emphasis was ‘utterly unproductive’
and didn’t attribute to the already feeble détente.
At the same time talks with the Soviet Union about a possible SALT II treaty that had
commenced under President Ford continued. Carter wanted to improve relations with the
Kremlin and didn’t want to give up on détente, but his emphasis on human rights put new
strains on the negotiations. In a letter to Brezhnev Carter explained he hoped that ‘our
countries can cooperate more closely to promote the development, better diet and more
substantive life for the less advantaged part of mankind.’ 20 His emphasis on the freedom of
mankind was seen in the Kremlin as the U.S. trying to intervene in the internal matters of the
Soviet Union. But Carter told Brezhnev that the Helsinki Accords legitimized U.S. criticism
of Soviet prosecutions of dissidents. Kissinger and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance both
warned Carter that his stance on human rights might compromise the SALT negotiations and
might cause the Kremlin to toughen its policies towards dissidents. Even though the Kremlin
showed its discontent about Carter’s moralism on many occasions, the President thought that
‘criticisms of human rights practices would not impair U.S.-Soviet relations.’ 21 The SALT
talks were hampered though and relations between the White House and the Kremlin
18
Leffler, For the soul of mankind, 263.
Betty Glad, An outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, his advisers, and the making of American foreign
policy (Ithaca 2009) 73.
20
Leffler, For the soul of mankind, 267.
21
Glad, An outsider in the White House, 75.
19
12
worsened. Meanwhile, anti-Soviet sentiment in the U.S. grew and public opinion on SALT
became more negative. This further threatened congressional support for such an agreement.
The improvement of relations with China further troubled the SALT talks and the
possibility of lasting détente. The U.S. had wanted to play off the Soviet Union and China
against each other, but now these policies backfired. ‘The United States’ overtures to China
plunged Soviet-American relations into a deep freeze.’ 22 The negotiations continued, though,
and in June 1979 the SALT II treaty was signed which would limit the manufacture and
deployment of strategic missiles. But tensions between the two superpowers grew and Carter
felt he had to make a tough stance against the Soviet Union. He approved a new missile
system and threatened to deploy Pershing II missiles aimed at strategic sites in Western
Europe, if the Soviet Union would not remove its nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe. But
Carter’s foreign politics were considered weak by conservatives. Even one of his most trusted
foreign advisers, Brzezinski, felt the need to toughen up. ‘Public opinion in the world at
large…views this Administration as perhaps the most timid since World War II,’ he wrote in
appeal to the president. The Soviet Union was felt to have the momentum, while the U.S. was
just reacting to their actions. ‘The country craves, and our national security needs, both a
more assertive tone and [a] more assertive substance to our foreign policy.’ 23 Carter did not
want to endanger the SALT negotiations any further though. A few months later the Cold War
would reach a new low as Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan.
Carter reacted strongly to the renewed Soviet aggression calling the invasion ‘the most
serious threat to peace since World War II.’ He authorized the CIA to commence a covert
operation to supply the Afghan resistance, but at this point it was still a small scale operation
consisting mainly of delivering a limited amount of small arms and light weapons. He also
increased the defence budget and renewed the arms race by giving the final go ahead for the
new land based missile system. He also imposed economic sanctions on the Soviet Union of
which an embargo on grain sales was the thorough. Furthermore the summer Olympic Games
to be held in Moscow in 1980 were boycotted. In compliance with the new tougher American
stance the president announced the Carter doctrine in 1980: ‘the United States would regard
any attempt by an outside power to seize control over the Persian Gulf region as a direct act of
aggression against the United States.’ In doing so he hoped to appeal to the American people
as the elections were coming later that year. At the same time he wanted to make clear that the
oil rich region had become a priority since oil prices were soaring and a burden to the
22
23
Sean Wilentz, The age of Reagan: a history, 1974-2008 (New York 2008) 108.
Leffler, For the soul of mankind, 323-324.
13
economy. But Carter’s adversaries were not impressed and charged that Carter’s weak foreign
policy ‘had emboldened the Soviets to launch the invasion.’ According to his critics and also
much of the American public Carter’s foreign policy had been weak. In their eyes Carter had
lost Afghanistan. 24
Foreign policy troubles in Afghanistan were overshadowed by the Iran-crisis. Iran had
been one of the pillars of U.S. foreign policy to curtail Soviet influence in the region. The
U.S. wanted to protect its interests in the region where a power vacuum had emerged after the
British left. Regional powers in the region were armed and funded ‘to maintain an East-West
balance without direct American intervention.’ Iran and Saudi Arabia were the best candidates
to serve U.S. purposes. These allies would be the protectors of U.S. interests in the Gulf
region. 25 But in early 1979 the U.S. lost Iran as an important ally as the American backed
government of Shah Mohammad Pahlavi was overthrown and an Islamic republic was set up
under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As a result oil production in Iran stopped and OPEC
further raised oil prices, which meant growing discontent among the American people. Carter
was further embarrassed by the events in Iran as in November the American embassy in
Tehran was overrun by Islamist students and 66 Americans were taken hostage. Carter
considered this an act of terrorism and was not planning to give in to the demands made by
Islamists who wanted the extradition of the Shah so he could be tried and sentenced by the
Iranian state. This would surely mean the execution of the Shah. Carter refused and the crisis
dragged on. In April 1980 a rescue attempt by U.S. special forces went horribly wrong as one
of the helicopters crashed into a transport aircraft. Several U.S. soldiers died and the operation
was terminated. The incident further raised the prestige of Ayatollah Khomeini in his own
country and damaged Carter’s popularity in the U.S..
Domestic discontent with Carter’s domestic and foreign policy came at a particularly
bad time, as 1980 was an electoral year. Carter’s republican opponent for the presidency was
Ronald Reagan. Reagan had ‘become one of the main critics of American “inaction”’ what in
his eyes U.S. foreign policy under Carter had become. The Iranian crisis was but one example
and a card Reagan readily played. The U.S. had to stand tall again against Soviet aggression
which laid at the basis of all threats to American security. ‘Let’s not delude ourselves, the
Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren’t engaged in this game of
dominoes, there wouldn’t be any hot spots in the world’, stated Reagan who considered the
24
25
Craig & Logevall, America’s Cold War, 303-304.
Badie, ‘Doctrinal cycles,’ 217-218.
14
Soviet Union an ‘evil empire’. 26 Reagan’s attacks on Carter’s domestic and foreign policy
proved effective and he won the presidential elections of 1980. His public denunciation of the
Soviet Union as the evil of the world and his undying belief in the inevitable victory of the
free world over communist totalitarianism brought the East-West relations to an all time low.
But with the rise to power of Gorbachev in the Kremlin relations would improve and the Cold
War would come to and quick and unexpected end.
The seventies thus proved crucial years in East-West relations as the détente
established in the late sixties slowly deteriorated. After the Vietnam debacle Nixon and
Kissinger believed that a durable peace could be reached through a dialogue with Moscow.
U.S. foreign policy came under attack quickly though from both the left and the right.
Liberals in Congress were critical about U.S. interventionism in the Third World and the
monopoly of the executive branch in foreign policy. Neoconservatives and republicans on the
other side of the spectrum accused Ford and Carter for being too soft on Communism and out
of touch with American ideals. These sentiments hampered U.S.-Soviet relations and détente
came under heavy pressure. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan meant the final blow to
Kissinger’s vision on U.S. foreign policy. Reagan’s ideas of a though America which
ideology would inevitably prevail over Communism proved more appealing to the American
public.
26
Westad, The global Cold War, 333-334.
15
Ronald Reagan & U.S. foreign policy.
In 1980 Ronald Reagan won the presidential elections. Before he became president he had
already confided his thoughts about the Soviet Union to his later to become national security
adviser Richard Alan: ‘My idea of American policy toward the Soviet Union is simple, and
some would say simplistic. It is this: We win and they lose. What do you think of that?’ 27
Ronald Reagan had an adamant belief in the ultimate victory of U.S. idealism over
Communism. In a radio commentary in May 1975 Reagan gave his view of Soviet ideology:
‘Communism is neither an economic or a political system- it is a form of insanity- a
temporary aberration which will one day disappear from the earth because it is contrary to
human nature.’ 28 This belief he displayed from the onset of his presidential campaign forms
‘the basis of claims about Reagan’s historical achievement.’ Often he and his foreign policy
are credited for having played an important role in ending the Cold War, but his importance
can easily be downplayed. According to Sean Wilentz, an renowned historian and teacher at
Princeton University, Reagan’s foreign policy was incoherent, consisting of different policies
for different parts of the world. Sometimes these policies proved successful, like in
Afghanistan. More often they proved disastrous, like the Iran-Contra affair. ‘In retrospect, the
chief efforts of the so-called Reagan Doctrine either were irrelevant to winning the Cold War
or helped set in motion forces that would challenge the United States after Soviet communism
collapsed.’ 29 How did Reagan develop his beliefs and what exactly entailed the Reagan
Doctrine?
Ronald Reagan began his political career as a member of Barry Goldwater’s campaign
team who ran for president in 1964. Having been a left wing Democrat in his early years
Reagan’s political color shifted to the right as he was an ardent opponent of government
regulation and progressive income tax. He believed in individual freedom and this idea was
impaired by left wing Great Society initiatives. He became more and more popular among
conservative Republicans and eventually ran for governor of California in 1966, a position he
occupied for two terms. Thereafter he ran for the Republican presidential nomination which
he lost in 1976. He proved successful though in 1980 and attacked Carter’s domestic policy
for taxing the American people to much, creating huge deficits and causing runaway inflation.
‘The Democrats, not the American people, were the cause of the problem.’ He promised deep
27
Wilentz, The age of Reagan, 151.
Kiron Skinner, ed., Reagan in his own hand: the writings of Ronald Reagan that reveal his revolutionary
vision for America (New York 2001) 12.
29
Wilenz, The age of Reagan, 151.
28
16
tax cuts and an end to the federal deficit. These promises appealed to the U.S. electorate. He
was also skeptical about arms negotiations and cuts in defense programs initiated in the
seventies. He believed that these had weakened the U.S. position opposing the Soviet Union.
According to Reagan the U.S. had to engage the Communist menace from a position of
strength. ‘We had to recapture our dreams, our pride in ourselves and our country, and regain
that unique sense of destiny and optimism that had always made America different from any
other country in the world.’ Reagan promised a new ‘morning in America.’ 30
Reagan’s attacks on Carter and his promises to revitalize American greatness proved
fruitful and in 1981 he took office. The new president’s first priorities lay with domestic
matters which became apparent as he lifted the grain embargo on the Soviet Union in order to
promote agricultural business interests. But Reagan’s promises that the U.S. had to be strong
again were not impaired, though, as he heavily increased the defense budget. Reagan regarded
the Mutual Assured Destruction philosophy as ‘the craziest thing [he] ever heard of.’ The
current nuclear balance of terror could never lead to a stable system between the two
superpowers in which peace could be ensured. The U.S. needed a stronger nuclear deterrent
capability. Only in the face of such determination would the Soviet Union’s leaders accept
true arms limitations proposals. The current treaties had been ‘agreements just for the sake of
having an agreement.’ 31 The President and Cold War hawks within the CIA and the
administration were convinced that the U.S. was lagging behind in the arms race and the
Soviet Union was now stronger than ever. . ‘The fiber of American military muscle was so
atrophied that our ability to respond effectively to a Soviet attack was very much in doubt,’ 32
Reagan observed as he assumed office in 1981. Therefore Reagan pumped large amounts of
money in the military increasing the defense budget from 171 billion to 229 billion dollar in
his first term, which meant an increase of 34 percent. Much of it was invested in the nuclear
capabilities of the U.S.: research on new (stealth) bombers was resumed, new war heads and
cruise missiles were developed and the Navy was expanded. 33 In doing so Reagan hit two
flies with one rock. The U.S. deterrent capabilities grew, ensuring enemies would think twice
before going on military adventures like the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan.
Furthermore, in drawing the Kremlin in a renewed arms race the already overstretched
resources of the Soviet Union would come under further pressure. The Soviet Union simply
30
Leffler, For the soul of mankind, 345.
John Gaddis, Strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of American national security policy during the
Cold War (Oxford 2005) 352.
32
Ronald Reagan, An American life (London 1990) 13.
33
James Patterson, Restless giant: the United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore (Oxford 2005) 200.
31
17
could not afford an extensive arms race. ‘They cannot vastly increase their military
productivity because they’ve already got their people on a starvation diet,’ Reagan
observed. 34
The increase of the U.S. nuclear deterrent capabilities was partly meant to dissuade the
Soviet Union from engaging in military adventures. Reagan wanted to intensify U.S. efforts to
halt or push back Soviet expansionism in the Third World. Jimmy Carter had been a strong
supporter of moralism and humanitarianism and believed that the U.S. should watch carefully
who to support. In his eyes not every anticommunist force should be backed by the U.S. just
because they were anticommunist. A lot of the Cold War hawks in Reagan’s administration
believed differently. They were convinced communist elements in especially Central America
should not gain strength. This was often to be achieved not through full-scale American
interventions but covert operations executed by the CIA in order to help right winged
governments who fought communism in their countries. Such was, for example, the case in El
Salvador. Here the CIA disrupted Sandinista arms flows in order to help the junta who were
ruling the country at the time. Humanitarian issues about the junta slaughtering peasants were
put aside. 35
At the same time Reagan and his advisers wanted to reverse Communist successes in
the Third World. Therefore they ‘were looking for revolutionary movements of the inverse
kind, those that for their own reasons were willing to let left-wing regimes bleed.’ In
communist countries around the world the U.S. was looking for revolutionary forces that were
willing to fight their governments. This meant the U.S. would play a minor role, just
supporting the anticommunist forces with money and supplies like weapons, medicine and
food. Reagan didn’t want to get drawn into another conflict like Vietnam. Therefore U.S.
newfound interventionism meant that others had to do the fighting for them. Already under
Carter a so-called counterforce strategy was developed which meant that any opposition to the
Soviet Union could be supported. In the late seventies the American elite had grown
concerned about the new wave of revolutionary change in the Third World. Even though
Carter was not in favor of blindly supporting every anticommunist force he told his national
security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to begin implementing this new strategy. 36 Reagan’s
policies were therefore not entirely new. He just increased and publicly supported aid to
34
Wilentz, The age of Reagan, 154.
Ibid., 156.
36
Westad, The global Cold War, 331-332.
35
18
anticommunist forces around the world. Reagan believed this was the time to take the
momentum and roll back Communism.
Covert help to the junta in El Salvador was but a minor operation. In the eyes of the
Pentagon the real problem in Central America was the left-wing Sandinista government of
Nicaragua which had come to power in 1979. They were supported by the Soviet Union and
Cuba and socialist successes in Nicaragua could spark more unrest in the region. The
Sandinista government was supporting rebels in other countries like El Salvador. Therefore
the U.S. government started a small scale cover operation equipping and training antiSandinista forces mainly from the former National Guard and who were still in support of the
old regime. This movement would grew into what would become known as the Contras, a
large counterrevolutionary army consisting of 15,000 men trained, armed, supplied and even
directed by the White House. What is striking about this support is that it was heavily opposed
by U.S. Congress, who would later be one of the driving forces behind the increase of support
to the Mujahidin in Afghanistan. Although the President called the Contras freedom fighter,
but according to Tip O’Neill, and many other Democrats in Congress, they were ‘a small
ragtag army of racketeers, bandits, and murderers who are led by some of the same people
who ran the national guard under Somoza.’ 37 Reagan and his aides had to surpass Congress if
they wanted to keep aiding the Contras and expand the war. This was not always
accomplished through legal means. 38 The war proved terrible for Nicaragua and El Salvador,
leaving tens of thousands of dead and even more impoverished. But also for the Reagan
administration the war had dire consequences.
The events in Nicaragua became part of what became known as the Iran-Contra affair
which had serious implications for Reagan and his foreign policy. The affair consisted of two
political crises which were linked by the fact that both of them consisted of illegal initiatives
by the government and were deliberately held back from Congress. The first was the aid to the
Nicaraguan Contras. In 1984 Reagan signed the Boland Amendments which ‘barred any
intelligence agency of the government from offering assistance of any kind to the Nicaraguan
contras, and specifically prohibited gaining indirect help from “any nation, group,
organization, movement, or individual.”’ 39 At the same time the president himself urged his
security staff to find ways of aiding the contras. A clandestine network called the Enterprise
consisting of all kinds of shadowy persons including known drug traffickers was set up for
37
Tip O’Neill, Man of the House: the life and political memoirs of speaker Tip O’Neill (New York 1987) 320.
Ibid., 345-347.
39
Wilentz, The age of Reagan, 212.
38
19
shipping weapons and supplies to Nicaragua. The Enterprise was run by Oliver North, a high
official from the NSC. Money was raised from third parties like Saudi Arabia, South Africa
and Israel, but also from wealthy American conservatives. All of this had to be kept secret for
Congress, especially since the mood at Capitol Hill was strongly non-interventionist when it
came to Nicaragua. ‘If the story gets out we’ll be hanging by our thumbs in front of the White
House until we found out who did it,’ Reagan recognized the political and constitutional
dubiousness of the matter. 40
Reagan and Congress had always had a difficult relationship. Especially on when it
came to foreign policy the President seemed annoyed by congressional interference. ‘My
battles with Congress over Central America went on for almost the entire eight years I was in
the White House,’ 41 Reagan complained. Democrats controlled the House during the entire
period of Reagan’s presidency and they were concerned about Reagan’s foreign policy. In
their eyes it was to militaristic. Reagan’s renewed arms race and firm stance versus the Soviet
Union turned the world away from the possibility of peace between the two superpowers. But
Reagan believed in peace through strength. ‘Peace is purchased by making yourself stronger
than your adversary- or by dismantling power and submitting to ones enemies.’ 42Congress
was undermining U.S. strength. Congress often delayed decision making in foreign policy
because it ‘often failed to speak in a single, cohesive… voice.’ The President should be able
to make decisions on his own since he knows all the facts and is the leader of the nation. 43
Congress kept giving Reagan and his foreign policy a hard time, though.
At the same time as North and others were looking for ways to support the Contras,
the U.S. was dealing with Iran delivering weapons to the country in return for American
hostages held by a terrorist group with ties to Iran. The plan was that Israel would deliver the
weapons to Iran and that the U.S. would replenish the Israeli arsenal. The hostages weren’t set
free though and an arms-for-hostages situation arose with the U.S. delivering more and more
arms. Not only did Iran pay for the weapons, mainly anti-tank missiles, with the release of the
U.S. hostages but also with cold hard cash. North made clever use of this undocumented flow
of cash and diverted it to the Enterprise, which used it for the Contra cause. The affair came to
light as a Lebanese magazine was informed by an Iranian source and published an article on
the matter. Immediately several investigations were initiated by Congress and by a committee
appointed by Reagan himself.
40
Ibid., 216.
Reagan, An American life, 482.
42
Skinner, Reagan in his own hand, 8.
43
Reagan, An American life, 483-484.
41
20
In order to justify the negotiations conducted with Iran on weapons in exchange for
hostages, administration officials emphasized on the fact that better relations with the
Khomeini regime were in the strategic interests of the U.S.. The reason for renewed
diplomacy with Iran was the Soviet threat in the region. The officials involved were afraid
that the Soviet Union would gain influence in the country balance in the region would be
further disturbed. At the same time, Iran might help the U.S. in countering the Soviets in
Afghanistan. Evidence, though not very substantial as much material is still classified, can be
found that negotiations with the Iranians were being conducted on the deliverance of a
percentage of the weapons bought from the U.S. to Mujahidin forces based in Iran. Though
U.S. foreign policy interests in the reason might be an argument to justify improved relations
with Afghanistan, the larger implications of the Iran-Contra affair were unconstitutional.
Evidence of a possible link between the affair and U.S. aid to the Mujahidin was muffled
away by congressional committees investigating the case. As the Democrats in Congress
sharply condemned the arms sales to Iran and U.S. involvement in Nicaragua, and more
broadly U.S. interventionism as a whole, ‘there was wide bipartisan consensus in favor of the
aid to the Mujahidin.’ 44 The congressional committees probably didn’t want to compromise
the Afghan operation. Public attention on a possible link with Iran and the Contras would
possibly jeopardize that undertaking. Therefore the possibility exists that the Afghanistan
references were concealed.
Several officials including North were indicted, but the president himself came out
fairly unharmed. In a speech to the nation the President acknowledged faults were made on
his watch and that he regretted them. But he denied that he had had any knowledge about ‘any
diversion of funds to the Contras.’ 45 Although his popularity among the American people had
somewhat abated there was no direct evidence Reagan had known about the full extent of the
arms sales, let alone about the diversion of money to the Nicaraguan contras. A political
disaster was diverted as the president could have been impeached for the expenditure of funds
without informing and getting approval from Congress as it would be unconstitutional. ‘You
cannot spend funds that Congress doesn’t either authorize you to obtain or appropriate. That is
what the Constitution says, and we have to stick with it,’ stated Secretary of State George
Schulz. 46 Reagan’s popularity had soared somewhat but he found in the Soviet Union’s new
44
James Hershberg, ‘The war in Afghanistan and the Iran-Contra affair: missing links?’ Cold War History, 3: 3
(April 2003) 24-25.
45
Speech by President Ronald Reagan addressing the nation from the White House concerning the Iran-Contra
affair, March 4, 1987, http://www.presidentreagan.info/speeches/iran_contra.cfm.
46
Wilentz, The age of Reagan, 241.
21
leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, a way to improve public relations. Two years after Ronald
Reagan left the White House, the Soviet Union would crumble and the Cold War would be
over.
The Iran-Contra affair shows, just as case of Angola earlier, the deep
noninterventionist sentiment that prevailed in Congress, especially among Democrats, after
the Vietnam war. U.S. aid to the Afghan freedom fighters was the exception and could count
on broad bipartisan support from Congress. Even liberal Democrats were in favor of aid as
they felt that in Afghanistan the resistance truly fought a just war. In other cases, like in Latin
America, the U.S. often supported governments or resistance groups that oppressed their own
people and abused human rights on a large scale. The Mujahidin were considered freedom
fighters, though. They fought the Soviet oppressor who slaughtered millions of their people
and drove even more from their homes. In Afghanistan the Red Army directly fought against
a free people. The Afghans might had different beliefs than most Americans, but they fought
for an ideal that was considered universal by the United States: the right of self-determination.
And thus joined the liberal Democrats the ranks with the Republicans and the
neoconservatives. The latter would play an important role in shaping American foreign
policy.
Neoconservatism
The Reagan Doctrine and the Afghan example of its policies can be seen in the light of a
political ideology called neoconservatism. Neoconservatism consists of a range of ideas, is
highly incoherent and its definition has changed during the course of history. It came into
being in the sixties as major social upheavals split American society and also American
liberalism. Some liberal intellectuals began to reconsider their believes and turned away ‘from
what they viewed as the excesses of radicalism and the hubris of overly ambitious attempts at
reform.’ 47 Neoconservatism was thus born as reaction to the New Left. Though leftists
themselves, neoconservatives opposed Lyndon B. Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ policies which
consisted of very ambitious social policies. Irving Kristol, one of the founding fathers of
neoconservatism, was ‘strongly opposed to Wilsonian idealism.’ He was against the excesses
of the counterculture that arose as a reaction to the Vietnam war. He considered the babyboom generation as being ‘individualistic, hedonistic, and relativistic.’ Though the
neoconservatives were not against the welfare state they did point to its limits; ‘in their view
47
John Ehrmann, The rise of neoconservatism: intellectuals and foreign affairs 1945-1994 (New Haven 1995)
33-34.
22
[it] could never achieve the boundless egalitarian dreams of the New Left.’ 48 Johnson’s liberal
programs of the time were failing as they did not look at the causes of social disturbances.
According to Daniel Moynihan, an influential neoconservative in the sixties and seventies,
stability and social order was in the interest of the liberal movement and it had to ‘seek out
and make must more effective alliances with political conservatives.’ 49 This early form of
neoconservatism was thus mainly focused on domestic policy and the excesses of leftist
movements of the time.
During the seventies a second group of neoconservatives arose as a reaction to the
even further shift to the left of the Democratic Party. The party became even more ‘supportive
of minority preferences, massive social programs and [had] a penchant for a somewhat
isolationist foreign policy.’ The new neoconservatives saw themselves as ‘the guardians of the
“vital center”: in favor of social progress and civil liberties at home and anticommunism
abroad.’ Instead of isolationism they wanted a firm containment policy and promoted
democracy around the world. They were strong opponents of Kissinger’s détente. Instead they
envisaged a strong America that opposed the Soviet Union and dominated foreign affairs.
Only then would democracy and freedom be save. This new group of neoconservatives called
themselves ‘Scoop Jackson Democrats’ after Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson who in their
eyes ‘embodied the persistence of “vital center” liberalism: in foreign policy he favored
containment of the Soviet Union without concessions, while at home he advocated a
Keynesian welfare state based on the model of the New Deal.’ 50 Neoconservatives were
Democrats, but in the early eighties they lost faith in the Democratic Party as a whole and
Jimmy Caster in particular. There hopes shifted towards Reagan who took a firm stance
against the Soviet Union. Many neoconservative Democrats shifted camps and became
members of the Republican Party, others remained loyal to the Democratic Party even though
they had failed to reform the party. 51 Jackson himself for example ‘never embraced Reagan’s
domestic agenda’ and ‘remained to the end a partisan Democrat.’ But he and other
neoconservatives that remained in the Democratic Party did support Reagan’s foreign
policy. 52 The president needed their support as the Republican Party was a minority in both
chambers during the bulk of his presidency. The neoconservative votes were important for
Reagan if he wanted to implement his policies.
48
Justin Vaisse, Neoconservatism: the biography of a movement (London 2010) 5-7.
Ehrmann, The rise of neoconservatism, 37.
50
Vaisse, Neoconservatism, 8-10.
51
Ibid., 180.
52
Robert Kaufmann, Henry M. Jackson: a life in politics (Seattle 2000) 411.
49
23
Ronald Reagan and his doctrine could thus count on the support of a group of
Democrats in Congress. His foreign policy appealed to the neoconservatives as both
advocated ‘American exceptionalism, fierce anticommunism, a certain muscular idealism, and
an unapologetic defense of U.S. values and interests abroad.’ 53 But his foreign policy was not
very popular among liberal Democrats. The trouble with for example the support for the
Contras was the fact that these right-winged rebels used tactics against their own people
which questioned the morality of the operation. But aid to the Mujahidin, who fought Soviet
oppressors which murdered millions of innocent Afghans, could count on broad support in
Congress. Democrats who supported the Afghan operation and actively promoted the
Mujahidin cause, like Claiborne Pell, Daniel Moynahan and of course Charles Wilson, were
often neoconservatives or closely linked to Jackson. It not surprising that these men got a seat
in the Congressional Task Force in Afghanistan. These men played a large role in upping the
ante in South Asia. Neoconservatives within the executive branch like Fred Iklé and Richard
Pipes, men with high posts in the Pentagon and Defense Department who favored U.S.
support for the Mujahidin, supported congressional initiatives on Afghanistan.
Neoconservatism thus played an important role. The combined commitments of
neoconservatives in Congress and the executive branches played a large role in ensuring
increased interest and aid for the Afghan freedom fighters.
53
Colin Dueck, Hard line: the Republican Party and U.S. foreign policy since World War II (Princeton 2010)
227.
24
The CIA and the early years of Operation Cyclone
The inauguration of Ronald Reagan thus meant a new impetus for U.S. interventionism. But
where interventions in the Third World weren’t always effective and sometimes even
disastrous like in El Salvador and Nicaragua, others proved successful. One example is the
intervention in Grenada, a tiny island in the Caribbean with only 100,000 inhabitants. While
there was factional infighting between the revolutionaries of the country U.S. marines invaded
the island and quickly put an end to the socialist regime. It was but a modest victory for Cold
War hawks in Reagan’s administration. The Afghan case proved to be by far the most
successful of U.S. interventions in the Third World. The intervention started as a modest
enterprise but during the eighties grew out to be the biggest U.S. intervention after World War
II. Hundreds of millions of dollars a year were appropriated for training, supplies and
weapons, under which the highly sophisticated Stinger missile system, for the Mujahidin.
After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan president Carter was quick to order the
CIA to initiate a small covert operation which mainly consisted of the deliverance of small
amount of light weapons to the Afghan resistance. Under Reagan aid to the Mujahidin took
flight, but although conservative hawks within the Pentagon and the White House were
enthusiastic about letting the Soviets bleed there was reluctance to send large amounts of
weapons let alone sophisticated weapon systems to counter Soviet tanks and air superiority.
The CIA was keen on the fact that only Soviet made weaponry was delivered to the resistance
and only in small amounts. In delivering Soviet Kalashnikovs the resistance could pretend to
have stolen the weapons from the Soviet and Afghan army. In doing so the U.S. could keep
up the image that they weren’t involved. And there also was the case of Pakistan. Especially
in the early years the Pakistani government was afraid of a spillover of the conflict onto their
territory. If Pakistan would be to heavily involved in supporting the Mujahidin the Soviet
Union might have a justification to invade Pakistan as well. At the time it was still believed
that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was an act of aggression resulting from their drive to
expand Soviet territory and to get access to the Persian Gulf. Pakistan wouldn’t risk a possible
Soviet invasion. They also wanted more in return for helping the U.S. in their quest to give to
Soviet army a hard time in Afghanistan. Especially military aid in the form of technology,
tanks and especially aircraft, the F-16 fighter jet, was prerequisite for large scale Pakistani
help.
CIA covert operations in Afghanistan thus proved to be a humble enterprise in the
early years of the conflict. The CIA was willing to supply the Mujahidin just enough to fight
25
and die. To give the Soviets resistance so the conflict would drag on and as many Soviet
soldiers would be killed. But the impression at Langley was that in the end the islamist
freedom fighters would be crushed and defeated. The Soviet army simply was to powerful and
could not be defeated by lightly armed, untrained Afghan peasants. Howard Hart was chief of
the CIA station in Pakistan and was coordinating the operation on the spot. He was delighted
with his mission. ‘Go kill Soviet soldiers,’ he was told. He was proud of doing what he did
since he felt that ‘he was the first officer ever to be given the mandate to kill America’s true
enemy, the troops of the Red Army.’ 54 But he did not believe to Afghans could win.
The operation, codenamed Cyclone, consisted of the CIA providing funds for
weaponry and training for the Afghan resistance. Other countries like Saudi Arabia also
invested and weapons were bought from former Soviet allies and other communist
governments. Pakistan´s Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) had a large role in the
operation. They demanded a great deal of control and were in charge of day-to-day operations
and direct contact with the Mujahidin. They were the ones who delivered the weapons and
other aid provided by the CIA to the Afghan resistance. 55 Tim Weiner explains the operation
very simply:
From the start, the Saudis matched the CIA’s support for the rebels, dollar for dollar. The Chinese
kicked in millions of dollars’ worth of weapons, as did the Egyptians and the British. The CIA
coordinated the shipments. Hart handed them over to Pakistani intelligence. The Pakistanis skimmed of
a large share before delivering them to the exiled political leaders of the Afghan resistance in Peshawar,
east of the Khyber Pass, and the rebel leaders cached their own share before the weapons ever got to
Afghanistan.
56
A lot of the weapons thus disappeared. But this was not of great concern. As long as the
Afghans stung the Soviet bear the CIA was willing to keep sending weapons. And according
to the rebel leaders in Peshawar the weapons that weren’t delivered in Afghanistan were held
back in case the U.S. would not be there to help them anymore. A plausible argument that
proved to be true when the Soviets left Afghanistan and the different Mujahidin factions
began fighting each other and eventually the U.S. itself. At the time though this was of no
concern to U.S. officials who believed in the Mujahidin cause.
At first most weapon shipments for the Afghan resistance consisted of old-fashioned
Lee Enfield rifles. Though they weren’t Soviet weapons they also weren’t American made
and hard to trace back to the U.S. and bought cheaply from countries like Turkey, Greece and
54
George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s war: the extraordinary story of the largest covert operation in history (New
York 2003) 121.
55
Anatomy of a victory: CIA’s covert Afghan war, Washington Post, July 19, 1992, p. A1.
56
Tim Weiner, Legacy of ashes: the history of the CIA (New York 2007) 384.
26
India. But soon the U.S. found a willing supplier of Kalashnikovs, RPG’s, mortars and
machine guns in the Soviet Union’s former ally China. Funds for Afghanistan’s jihad against
the Soviet Union had already risen heavily from 30 million in 1981 to 200 million in 1984.57
The U.S. kept sending more and more weapons to Afghanistan but the call by the Afghans for
a solution for Soviet air superiority fell on deaf man’s ears. The Pentagon was not willing to
send advanced U.S. weaponry to counter Soviet gunships. Not until Wilson started his appeal
for even more U.S. aid.
Though William J. Casey was happy to kill Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, he was an
ardent opponent of Congress. Especially after the Iran-contra affair in which he was heavily
involved and had ordered to North to find funds for the Mujahidin in other countries and
evade Congressional interference. Casey became Director of Central Intelligence in January
1981 and was appointed by Reagan who had just won the presidential elections. At the time
not everyone was convinced Casey was the right man for the job though. According the
former president Ford and his own director of central intelligence Bush Casey wasn’t capable
of leading the CIA and an inappropriate choice. 58 And Casey was by all means inappropriate.
Everyone knew he was fond of the law and always tried to bend them as far as possible. He
believed that ‘the primary battlefield [was] not on the missile test range or at the arms control
negotiating table but in the countryside of the Third World.’ The CIA had grown weak in his
eyes and thus he engaged in all sorts enterprises in the Third World to counter the Soviet
strategy of ‘creeping imperialism’. 59 Although Congress was in favor of a stronger CIA, a
majority was against the interventions in Central America, the ones Casey was funding
through all sorts of illegal means. Congress had different ways of checking on Casey and his
CIA but the director was an easy liar and worked his way around them. He was eager to
confront the Soviets but his shadowy ways of doing this made people around him afraid that
the CIA would face the consequences of his bold endeavors. ‘That he would gamble the
CIA’s credibility and lose.’ 60 And they proved right as the Iran-contra affair unfolded. Casey
was in very bad health by that time and never testified before Congress.
Congress and the CIA were in constant and high distrust of each other. The CIA and
William Casey grew sick of constant congressional probing. Congress on the other hand
wanted more to say especially where it came to foreign policy. Several members of Congress
57
Steve Coll, Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to
September 10, 2001 (New York 2004) 58,65-66.
58
Weiner, Legacy of ashes, 376.
59
Coll, Ghost wars, 97.
60
Ibid., 92.
27
for instance were in favor of an increase of U.S. aid to the Mujahidin. Their probing and
initiatives made that funding of the Afghan operation increased explosively in the second half
of the 1980’s.
28
Congress: the champions of the Afghan cause.
The Mujahidin would never have gotten as much aid as they did if it weren’t for a few men
both within the House and Senate. One of the most famous and well known names among
them is Charles Wilson. It is often thought that he singlehandedly altered the face of the war.
This view came into existence partly because of a book and a film that were made about him
in which his person and his role are heavily romanticized. Partly, these were true though.
Others within Congress also played a big part in the biggest and most successful intervention
since World War II. Who were they? And how did they influence U.S. foreign policy, in
particular U.S. aid to the Mujahidin? In order to find the answers to these question one must
look not only at the men but also at the committees they were in and what the role of these
committees is within U.S. decision making.
To understand who were the main players and how they could exert their influence
one should first know more about the committees they were in. A seat in a committee means
one can exercise more influence on a certain subject since the different committees are
specialized in different fields. They keep track of everything that is going on in their field and
identify issues which they think need extra attention. They inform Congress and state what in
their eyes is the best course of action. Mostly Congress listens to what the committees
recommend. In the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan three committees seem to have
had the most influence on events. First of all the House Appropriations Committee. Through
this committee did Charlie Wilson get the first increases in budget for the Afghan resistance.
Second there is both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. The CIA budget which
also entails the Afghan budget and CIA operations fall under their jurisdiction. And finally the
House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees are of importance since U.S. foreign policy is
their specialty. The different committees’ responsibilities have some overlap which could
cause tensions since they all had different interests. This was the case with the Afghan aid as
will be shown below.
The House Appropriations Committee determines how much money the government
can spend on any certain program. The budget process starts with the President submitting a
budget request with the Budget Committees of both chambers. They come up with a
blueprint, but the budget is finalized by the Appropriations Committees and thus they have a
large input in the final draft which then has to be approved by Congress. Therefore the
committee is one of the most powerful in the House. All the other committees that have
budgetary responsibilities must get their wishes through Appropriations. During the eighties
29
Jamie L. Whitten was chairman of the committee, from 1979 to 1993. He was one of the
longest serving chairman in the House Appropriations Committee. And one of the men
responsible for Congressional aid to the Mujahidin. The subcommittee considered with
appropriations for the operation in Afghanistan was the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs. Charlie Wilson had a seat in this committee and
could therefore exert his influence on the CIA’s budget for the operation.
The Intelligence Committees were set up to keep the security community in check.
Both committees were set up in the mid-seventies to improve oversight of the intelligence
community after the Vietnam debacle and the Watergate scandal. ‘The Senate put into place a
potentially effective standing committee, equipped with a large and experienced professional
staff, devoted to monitoring the secret agencies day by day and reviewing their programs and
budgets.’ 61 Already in the sixties an oversight committee was tried to set up but quarrels
between Foreign Affairs and the Armed Services Committee hindered the initiative.
Opposition also came from State Department and the intelligence services themselves as for
example J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI until 1972, was convinced the initiative was
intended to ‘disrupt intelligence operations.’ 62 But in the seventies more and more
unauthorized covert operations conducted by the CIA came to light. The accusations went
even further as ‘the New York Times revealed that the CIA had illegally conducted
intelligence operations against thousands of Americans, including four former members of
Congress.’ 63 In both the House as the Senate a resolution was passed which demanded an
investigation and in both chambers a Special or Select Committee in Intelligence was set up.
A Special or Select Committee is supposed to be temporary and cannot report legislation
unless it is made temporary. And this is what happened to the House Committee a few years
after it was formed. The Senate Committee hasn’t been granted permanence till this day
however.
Finally, the Foreign Affairs Committees had a large role in the increase in aid for the
Afghan resistance. What might not be surprising is that these committees are considered with
foreign affairs and relations. The Senate committee has a bit more influence though since they
have to ratify treaties and approves appointments for important governmental posts abroad
like ambassadors and UN officials. But in general the committees have to oversee and
approve funding for foreign programs. Therefore they are also considered with operations in
61
Loch K. Johnson, ‘Congressional supervision of America’s secret agencies: the experience and legacy of the
Church Committee,’ Public Administration Review, 64: 1 (2004) 10.
62
Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (Cambridge 2006) 132.
63
Ibid., 219.
30
Afghanistan and Pakistan, which expected American aid in the form of money, technology
and a wide range of weaponry including F-16 fighter bombers in return for their help in
supplying the Mujahidin. In this committee important advocates of Mujahidin aid were seated
like Sen. Paul Tsongas, Gordon Humphrey and Rep. Donald Ritter. Their efforts proved to be
important incentives for the increase in aid as they had the right knowledge and posts to do so.
The Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific affairs and its chairman Stephen Solarz proved
especially important in the later years of the war as they investigated the proximity peace talks
about which they were highly skeptical.
Increasing aid; more and better weapons
Wide congressional support for a foreign covert operation could be considered a rare thing at
the time. In Congress noninterventionist sentiment prevailed during the seventies and early
eighties. This wasn’t only the case on Capitol Hill but the entire nation was scarred by the
gruesome experience of Vietnam. As noted above U.S. interventions in Central America were
not very popular. Especially U.S. backed right winged forces were not very concerned with
human rights and the civilian population in those areas suffered. Thousands of innocents died
during the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador. And the government and secret services were
not afraid to work around the law of which the Iran-Contra affair is the most stunning
example. But in the case of Afghanistan there appears to be remarkable consensus both within
Congress and between the different governmental institutes. Even more so, it seems that aid to
the Afghan freedom fighters was even boosted by forces within Congress. Already in 1981
the dire situation of the Afghans was put under attention of the president by several
Representatives of the House. Among them was Donald Ritter, the later founder of the
Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan. In a letter to President Reagan the congressmen
pointed to the ‘grave political, economic, and potentially serious crisis developing in
Southwestern Asia.’ The poorly armed Afghan resistance was putting up a vigorous fight
against the well-armed Soviet army ‘which has adopted… a “scorched earth” policy.’
Although at that moment the congressmen were mainly concerned about the high influx of
Afghan refugees into Pakistan, it was also clear that they were shocked about Soviet army
tactics and impressed by the Mujahidin struggle as well. 64
The first time Congress shows real interest in the conflict appeared to be in 1982. The
Reagan administration decided to increase the budget for Afghanistan for the first time, but
64
Letter co-signed by 15 congressmen, endorsing a proposal to send a high-level U.S. delegation to Afghan
refugee camps in Pakistan, April 14, 1981, Digital National Security Archive, AF01165.
31
not after months of haggling as not everyone within the Pentagon and State Department was
convinced this was the right way to go. But an event within Congress helped make a decision
as the Senate encouraged Reagan and his aides to increase the aid to the Mujahidin. A
resolution was introduced in by Senator Paul Tsongas which was ‘to encourage and support
the people of Afghanistan in their struggle to be free from foreign domination.’ Tsongas was a
liberal Democrat and usually was against Reagan’s foreign policy. Therefore it is remarkable
to see an initiative like this coming from a man like Tsongas. Especially since he authored the
resolution in cooperation with Representative Donald Ritter, a Republican that in contrast to
Tsongas favored Reagan’s foreign policy. Apparently they were able to put aside their
differences to champion the Afghan cause. Again this showed the broad support in Congress
for the Afghan resistance. In the resolution the courage and bravery of the Mujahidin was
praised as they have ‘gained the admiration of the free men and women in the world.’ More
importantly the Senate stated that ‘it should be the policy of the United States… to provide
the people of Afghanistan, if they so request, with material assistance, as the United States
considers appropriate, to help them fight effectively for their freedom.’ 65 Not everyone was in
favor of such a resolution. Charles Mathias of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to
which the resolution was referred, for instance tried to block the bill because he thought it
‘might instill false expectations of American intervention.’ Although the bill wasn’t brought
to the floor in the end, its many cosponsors did indicate that there was broad support for the
aid program within Congress. It did however stimulate a breakthrough in the White House as
the President approved more and better weapons were to be shipped to Afghanistan. 66
In 1983 Tsongas reintroduced the 1982 resolution in the Senate. At the same time
Ritter introduced a similar bill in the House. Both resolutions were rejected though. This was
partly because the CIA made people believe that such initiatives would endanger the secrecy
of the operation. Although many knew about America’s involvement in the conflict as a
supplier of the Afghan resistance, they could still count on plausible deniability as all the
weapons were Soviet made. State Department also disagreed with the resolutions as they
found its language to strong. 67 Members of Congress were also afraid that funds appropriated
for Afghanistan would find their way into the hands of the Contras. And the intervention in
Central America was, in contrast to the one in Afghanistan, highly unpopular among
congressmen. Finally, there were doubts about where to find the money to expand the aid to
65
S. Con. Res. 74, 98th Congress, 1st session.
James Scott, Deciding to intervene: the Reagan Doctrine and American foreign policy (London 1996) 50.
67
Ibid., 51-52.
66
32
the Mujahidin. 68 Even though the budget for such initiatives was extensive and Charles
Wilson would later use the enormity of it to his advantage. Fred Iklé, Under Secretary of State
confirms that at the time there were some forces within the Reagan administration who were
reluctant to increase the Afghan effort. ‘There was a general shyness and hesitation, a
reluctance to make a more concerted effort, to provide more instruments and tactics to
freedom fighters in Afghanistan.’ 69
In that same year, though, Representative Charles Wilson began showing interest in
the Afghan case. According to an infamous scene in both the book and the film about the
congressman’s involvement in the intervention Wilson’s attention was drawn when he was
watching an item about the freedom fighter while sitting in a Jacuzzi snoring cocaine together
with a naked playbunny. False or not, Wilson was known for his jet set life full of alcohol and
beautiful women. All employees of his office where women, known as ‘Charlie’s Angels.’
When asked about the reason he surrounded himself with those women Wilson supposedly
answered: ‘You can teach them how to type, but you can’t teach them how to grow tits.’ 70 But
beneath this image of decadence the Texan playboy had a more serious side. He was a
proponent of women’s and black’s rights for example. He believed in the ideals America
stood for and was a fervent opponent of communism. Wilson was a known lobbyist for the
Israeli cause as well and after one of his visits he decided to visit Pakistan. There he met with
President Zia ul-Haq and visited the Afghan refugee camps in northern Pakistan close to the
Afghan border. He made several trips to Pakistan in 1983 and got more enthusiastic about
helping the Afghan resistance.
Thus he thought of a plan to get more funding for the Mujahidin. Wilson had a chair in
the House Appropriations Committee. This committee basically determines how much money
goes to certain branches of government and their operations. Therefore the Appropriations
Committee must also approve the budget of the CIA. Normally the Intelligence Committee
would dictate how much funding the CIA gets from the Defense Department budget. All
funding has to be approved by the Appropriations Committee though. Wilson saw his
opportunity and asked for a doubling of the budget of the Afghan operation. In exchange he
would vote favorably on other matters. The Intelligence Committees in both the House and
the Senate were not pleased with Wilson trying to circumvent their authority and blocked his
initiatives. But Wilson already lobbied at the CIA about possible increase in and an upgrade
68
Olav Njolstad, The last decade of the Cold War: from conflict escalation to conflict transformation (New York
2004) 260.
69
Arming Afghan Guerillas, NYT, April 18, 1988.
70
Crile, Charlie Wilson’s war, 22.
33
off the weaponry delivered in Afghanistan. Langley and the Pentagon were both in favor.
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McMahon wrote a letter to both Intelligence
Committees to ask them to vote in favor of Wilson’s budget increase which they subsequently
did grudgingly. And thus the budget was doubled from forty to eighty million dollars. 71
But this was only the beginning. In 1984 Wilson used the same trick to add an
additional fifty million dollars to the Afghan budget. The House Intelligence Committee was
still reluctant though on the dramatic increase of funds. According to them the weapons and
ammunitions delivered to the various resistance groups was in some occasions used for
fighting each other. 72 Wilson’s enthusiasm proved contagious though as more and more
congressmen appealed for an increase in U.S. support for the Mujahidin. Senator Bill Bradley,
a Democrat from New Jersey, for instance sent a letter to the Secretary for Legislative and
Intergovernmental Affairs in which he recommended not only to increase support for the
Afghan rebels but also that he was concerned about media coverage about the topic. It
appeared as if the news networks and major papers were not very interested in the conflict
while both Congress, State Department and the CIA believed that in Afghanistan the Cold
War was actually being fought and the Soviet Union was dealt damaged. It was important that
the world public knew about this and about the crimes against humanity the Red Army was
committing. Therefore Bradley urged the White House to work on press coverage. And the
White House seemed to agree. 73 In September of that same year the Tsongas resolution that
had already been introduced twice, was finally passed by both House and Senate. In the
resolution Congress calls on the White House to ‘effectively support’ the Afghan freedom
fighters. Pressure from Congress was tantamount and the Reagan administration increased
the budget for the Afghan operation to a total of $250 million dollars for fiscal year 1985.
This brought the total U.S. aid to the Mujahidin since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 to a total of $625 million dollar. The amount of weaponry, training and other supplies
was almost doubled. Part of the money was for a new Swiss-made antiaircraft cannon; the
Oerlikon, for which Charlie Wilson had lobbied heavily. But according to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee ‘signs of Western aid [were] scarce’ because Pakistani and the Afghan
rebels were skimming off weapons. 74 The few critics in Congress of the Afghan operation
71
Scott, Deciding to intervene, 52-53.
$50 million for covert arms; more aid voted for Afghan rebels, The Washington Post, July 28, 1984.
73
W. Tappley Bennett, Jr., assistant secretary for legislative and intergovernmental affairs, responds to Bill
Bradley’s recommendation to increase support for the Afghan rebels, January 30, 1984, Digital National
Security Archives, AF01532.
74
Officials say U.S. plans to double supply of arms to Afghan rebels, New York Times, November 28, 1984.
72
34
used this argument to put a halt on quick increase in funds allocated to the Mujahidin. Their
efforts proved fruitless.
The year 1985 proved to be a crucial year for American interest in the conflict as
support for the Mujahidin took flight. As noted above more and more members of Congress
got enthusiastic about giving aid and the amounts of money for the operation rose quickly. It
rose so fast though that officials within the CIA, State Department and also Congress began to
doubt the scope of the operation. The program had grown too much and too fast and they
were afraid it was ‘getting out of hand and may trigger an escalation of Soviet military
operations in Afghanistan.’ Apart from doubts about the scope of the program and the
skimming off of weapons, opponents were also concerned about alleged atrocities committed
by the insurgents. According to an independent human-rights group called the Helsinki Watch
Committee, Afghan resistance fighters had tortured up to 200 prisoners. Intelligence reports
also described ‘Russian prisoners living in indescribable horror.’ Discontent also came from
the CIA as some of their intelligence officers felt that there was too much interfering from
Congress in Langley’s operations. In their eyes Wilson’s continued lobbying for the Oerlikon,
and his success in doing this ‘was an example of what the CIA calls “micromanaging” of their
operations from Capitol Hill.’ On top of all this some in the CIA were afraid that increased
aid to the Mujahidin could mean that Pakistan would have extra ‘leverage to demand more
U.S. aid for his country’ in return for their help. They were especially afraid that Zia might
ask for assistance building nuclear weapons. 75 But this seems to be highly exaggerated as not
a lot of sources speak of such fears.
Wilson and other advocates of stronger support were convinced that the U.S. was not
doing enough though on the other hand. According to them the Afghan resistance wasn’t
getting enough weapons and ammunition and needed more sophisticated weapons as well in
order to defend themselves against Soviet gunships. Not only the amount of weapons reaching
Afghanistan was of thus of concern to them. In a hearing by the Congressional Task Force on
Afghanistan dr. Alex Alexiev, senior Soviet analyst for the Rand corporation who did
research to Afghanistan, was convinced that the quality of weaponry was more important than
the quantity. According to Alexiev the Afghan resistance couldn’t win the war with the
weaponry currently delivered to them. ‘Five years after the Soviet invasion, the resistance has
still not been provided with adequate quantities of effective weapons.’ He criticizes ‘Western
unwillingness to provide the Afghans with modern anti-air weapons under the pretext of
75
U.S. covert aid to Afghans on the rise; Rep. Wilson spurs drive for new funds, antiaircraft cannon for the
insurgents, The Washington Post, January 13, 1985.
35
plausible deniability.’ 76 This was music to the ears of Wilson who was advocating the
deliverance of sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry to the Mujahidin since he first went to
Pakistan.
In 1985 the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan was created by Representative
Donald Ritter and Senator Gordon Humphrey. Ritter had been interested in the Afghan cause
since he was elected in 1979, the year the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and was already
involved in formulating the resolution by Tsongas in 1982. Humphrey was elected in the
Senate in 1978 and got seats in both the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services
Committees. He therefore had been heavily involved in Afghan affairs since the beginning of
the war. It is thus not strange that the two men initiated the creation of the CTFA. Humphrey
became its chairman and Ritter co-chairman. Charles Wilson evidently also got a seat on the
task force. The CTFA was subcommittee with members of both chambers meant to monitor
and increase aid to the Afghan resistance. The task force also conducted hearings and
meetings of different parties involved, including members of the executive branch, interest
groups and Members of Congress. In creating a platform for all these different parties to
promote their convictions the task force could form thoughts on the best way to conduct
future policy regarding Afghanistan. Not only aid to the Mujahidin was an important topic.
The U.N. led proximity peace talks were also of great concern to the task force’s members.
After 1986 it even became the main topic on the CTFA’s agenda. The task force was
convinced that the U.S. should keep supporting the Mujahidin until the last Soviet soldier had
left Afghanistan. The Soviet Union on the other hand planned a phased departure from the
country within a time span of eighteen months, but only after the U.S. ceased aid. In the eyes
of Humphrey and Ritter this meant that the Red Army had enough time to the deliver the
resistance a decisive blow and was therefore unacceptable.
Though aid to the Mujahidin was supported by a great majority in Congress, the
CTFA was dominated by Republicans with Humphrey as their leader. The Senator was a pure
conservative and closely linked to Ronald Reagan. Humphrey was a religious man, against
abortion and above all ‘against Communism in all of its manifestations.’ 77 Although he and
Wilson didn’t share a lot of convictions, in Afghanistan the congressmen found a similar
cause. Wilson wasn’t the only Democrat in the task force. Among them were Senators Ernest
Holling and Daniel Moynahan, known neoconservatives and in favor of a strong U.S. foreign
76
Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan: hearing on Soviet strategy and its implications for the West, March
11, 1985, Digital National Security Archives, AF01623, 90-91, 94.
77
Crile, Charlie Wilson’s war, 325.
36
policy. The CFTA was thus dominated by proponents of Reagan’s foreign policy and
interventionism in the Third World. Although Moynihan would turn away from
neoconservatism because of events in Central America, because he became heavily
disappointed by repeated violations of international law by the U.S. government. 78 But liberal
Democrats were represented in the task force. One of the most influential was Representative
Charles Rangel, Representative from New York, who had been against increasing the defense
budget and interventions abroad. 79 Afghanistan could count on his support though. Senator
Claiborne Pell was an influential liberal concerning U.S. foreign policy and would become
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1987. He was a supporter of the
Afghan program but as a lot of other liberal Democrats he would later revoke his support for
aid to the Mujahidin after the Red Army left Afghanistan and it became more and more clear
that a bloody civil war between the different factions was taking shape. The Afghan aid
program was thus mainly championed by Republicans and neoconservatives at Capitol Hill.
Liberal Democrats also supported the case though as in Afghanistan the Soviets were
murdering the population. Their support would vaporize quickly though after 1989.
The CTFA’s first priorities was to ‘bring to the Afghan people a greater ability to
resist, be it food, be it medicine, or be it the arms to neutralize some of the high technology
capability that is being brought to bear against them.’ 80 One of the main topics in the first
session of hearings before the subcommittee was the problem the Mujahidin were having in
facing the MI-24 HIND attack helicopters. Throughout his campaign for more support Wilson
had been asking for a sophisticated weapon to counter these gunships and this point seems to
have been high up the agenda of the CTFA. This seemed logical as Wilson had a seat in the
subcommittee himself. Gordon Humphrey’s interest in the gunships also played clearly from
the first hearings although he was still wondering if the introduction of a sophisticated
antiaircraft weapon might stimulate a Soviet escalation of the conflict. But when asked about
this possibility, both witnesses for the stand, dr. Alexiev and dr. Thomas Gouttierre from the
Center for Afghanistan Studies, don’t believe that the Soviet Union is capable to do so.
Alexiev argues that ‘given the terrain of the country and the dedication and commitment of
the resistance, even half a million Soviet soldiers cannot guarantee Moscow the desired
military and political outcome in the short term.’ In his eyes the West hasn’t done enough to
help ‘despite considerable rhetoric decrying Soviet behavior.’ He argues that better weapons
78
Ehrman, The rise of neoconservatism, 169.
See Appendix D in Ehrman, Congress and the Cold War for votes cast by the House on budgetary
amendments considering the B-1 bomber and the MX missile system.
80
Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan: hearing on Soviet strategy and its implications for the west, 5.
79
37
should be send to the Mujahidin. He is supported in his arguments by Gouttierre who stresses
that ‘it means not only the specific kind of weapons but also the right training and also
providing them to the right people.’ 81
Sentiment within the CTFA thus seems to have been in favor of more aid for the
Mujahidin, especially concerning a sophisticated antiaircraft weapon. Pressure from Congress
on President Reagan grew stronger and stronger. In April 1985 he signed National Security
Directive Decision 166 ‘which stipulated that it was U.S. policy to help the Afghan resistance
drive out the Soviet forces “by all available means.”’ 82 This opened the road for Humphrey
and others who intended more help for the Mujahidin, to supply them with all the means they
seemed fit. Including the Stinger missile system that had been blocked for so many years.
Finally, the belief had grown that the Mujahidin could not only fight and die, but fight and
win. With the proper resources the Soviet Union could be hurt in such a fashion that
continued occupation of Afghanistan was not a viable option anymore. As a result of NSDD166 the administration asked for an extra $300 million raise of the budget for the Afghan
operation. This extra funding would be diverted from a secret unused Defense Department
account with money from fiscal year 1985 and therefore it would not have to be approved by
the entire Congress. 83 Only the Intelligence Committees had to give their go. The extra $300
million dollar would raise the total Afghan budget for fiscal year 1986 to a total of $470
million dollar. 84 The budget was thus almost doubled since the last year. This raised new
concerns about the mushrooming of the program and there was some heated debating in both
intelligence committees. ‘For the first time there’s a realization of that [mushrooming], and
there’s a lot of questions about just what are the policy implications and what are we getting
out of this,’ one of the committee members asked. In his eyes and that of several other House
committee member the program should first be evaluated before events spiraled out of
control. And probably they were right as the men they supported would later turn on the U.S.
Apart from concerns about the size of the program, ‘the high pressured approach raised some
lawmakers’ hackles and led to questions about the sudden discovery of so much unspent
money.’ 85 But even though these question marks the budget was finally approved. For fiscal
81
Ibid., 92-93, 121.
Alexander Alexiev, ‘The United States and the war in Afghanistan,’ Digital National Security Archive,
AF02098, January 1988, 12.
83
Secret votes give Afghans $300 million; lawmakers uneasy as outlays climb, The Washington Post, October
10, 1985.
84
Afghan rebels get more missiles; bigger shipments of stingers intended to pressure Soviets to leave, The
Washington Post, February 8, 1987.
85
Secret votes give Afghans $300 million, WP, October 10, 1985.
82
38
year 1987 funding would grow only further as the decision was finally made to send Stinger
missiles to the Afghan resistance.
In April 1986 the Reagan administration finally gave the green light to send Stingers
to Afghanistan. Pressure to send the missiles did not only come from Congress. Bill Casey
had also been pushing hard in favor of the Stingers and Secretary of State George Schultz
supported him in his efforts. 86 If the Stingers were to be deployed the cost of the war would
increase heavily and according to Schultz ‘U.S. policy should seek to persuade the new
Communist Party boss, Mikhail Gorbachev, to cut his losses and get out before Afghanistan
turned into Gorbachev’s war.’ 87 Although still not everyone in State Department agreed on
sending the Stinger missiles to Afghanistan Schultz was convinced that this was the time to
act and deal the Soviets a decisive blow. But even as the noses seemed the point n the same
direction in Washington the Pakistani had to give a thumbs up as well. The Pakistani
president Zia insisted he had to agree on anything involving U.S. aid so he had to be
convinced as well. What proved crucial for him was the fact that he could ask the U.S. for
increased military and economic aid for Pakistan in return. In doing so Pakistan would
become the third largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world. Not surprisingly, Charles Wilson
who had become a trusted adviser to Zia, was the one who convinced him of this. 88
The first shipments of Stinger missiles would reach the Afghan resistance in the fall of
1986 and the results seemed to be promising. A U.S. army report from March 1987 describes
the changes in Soviet military tactics since the introduction of the Stingers. Although the
Afghan fighter had at first some troubles in handling the weapons a Mujahidin leader is
convinced his men need only one missile per aircraft. As a result Soviet helicopters now
quickly discharge troops after which they immediately fly back to safer altitudes. Before the
Afghans got an effective antiaircraft weapon they Soviet gunships would ‘hover anywhere
they desired and fire into villages.’ 89 Transports and bombers also had to fly at extremely high
altitude as well which made them less effective. This means that Afghan villagers have to be
less afraid of bombings since these became less accurate. All in all, in the opinion of the army
‘the Stinger missile has changed the cause of the war because Soviet helicopter gunships and
bombers no longer are able to operate as they once did.’ 90
86
George Schultz, Turmoil and triumph: my years as Secretary of State (New York 1993) 1087.
Crile, Charlie Wilson’s war, 419.
88
Ibid., 420.
89
Guerilla use of Stinger missiles and their effect on Soviet tactics in Afghanistan, March 1988, Digital National
Security Archive, AF01934, 2.
90
Ibid., 3.
87
39
Congressional proponents of the operation were elated but also a little surprised about
the success. Wilson was ‘startled by the success of the Stingers.’ And according to Humphrey
it was ‘rare that one weapon can transform a situation so radically.’ 91 But Humprey was still
skeptical about the management of the operation. In his eyes Washington suffered from what
former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski called ‘managerial neglect’. For the
Afghan operation there was not one single person who was in charge of day-to-day
management. Instead, ‘the responsibility is dispersed throughout the government.’ The
operation could have been more effective if it was managed properly. Especially State
Department seemed to be ineffective in the eyes of Humphrey. Since the operation was
mainly managed by medium and lower level bureaucrats it didn’t get enough attention. A high
level official should have been in charge to give it extra priority. But instead the Reagan
administration’s and State Department’s lofty rhetoric didn’t correspond with their actions.
Especially concerning diplomatic pressures there seemed to have been concern. ‘On the one
hand we have these inspiring statements by the President and the Secretary of State on the
anniversary date of the invasion, but on a daily basis it is really business as usual, if not
business warmer and more friendly than usual.’ Richard Pipes, history professor at Harvard,
agrees with Humphrey: ‘[The U.S.] has lifted most of the sanctions which were imposed in
connection with Afghanistan.’ 92
It seems that the CTFA was still skeptical about the effort the executive branch put
into the Afghan cause. They were especially concerned about diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union. But at the same time, the introduction of the Stinger missile system and its
success meant that the Reagan administration wanted to send even more missiles. In doing so
they increased pressure on the Kremlin were the Soviet leaders grew ever more anxious to
find a solution for the conflict. They had to get out without a too big loss of face. More
weapons required another raise of the Afghan budget. The year 1987 meant an absolute peak
in funding for the covert operation totaling $600 million dollar in secret aid. Again there were
some dissenting voices about the scope of the program and some questions about monitoring
the missiles. Some were afraid the weapons could fall in the wrong hands like anti-American
terrorists. 93 But eventually the new budget was again approved by a large majority in the
House and unanimous in the Senate. Charlie Wilson and the other champions for extra aid for
91
Arming Afghan guerillas, NYT, April 18, 1988, 3.
Open hearing of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan to review the U.N. sponsored proximity peace
talks on Afghanistan, February 17, 1987, Digital National Security Archive, AF01918, 92-93.
93
Afghan rebels to get more missiles; bigger shipment of Stingers intended to pressure Soviets to leave, The
Washington Post, February 8, 1987.
92
40
the Mujahidin had thus been successful. But this didn’t mean the end for congressional
meddling in Afghan affairs. Gordon Humphrey and the CTFA were concerned the United
States would leave the Afghans to their faith as the Soviets intended to leave and dug their
teeth in the U.N. sponsored proximity peace talks.
The Geneva accords
Already in 1981 peace talks started under the flag of the United Nations between the PDPA
and Pakistan. The Soviet Union and the United States, being the main sponsors of those
countries, also participated in these talks. But one major party to the conflict was banned. The
Afghan resistance was not welcome even though they were the ones fighting the communists.
In 1986 concerns in Congress grew about the development of these peace talks. Especially the
U.S. pledged cessation of the arms flow to the Mujahidin as soon as the Soviets would start to
withdraw was a thorn in the eye of Senator Humphrey. Several hearings on the subject were
held before the CTFA and it seems its members were not amused about the way the Reagan
administration and especially State Department handled the case. According to Humphrey
‘there [was] little doubt… that there [was] a potential for a sell-out of the Afghan people and
their case in the course of these talks.’ 94 The secrecy in which the negotiations were held also
contributed to this notion of a possible sell-out. Humphrey uses the words of Edward Luttwak
who compared the peace talks with a dark tunnel. Nobody knew what is being discussed
exactly and when the results would finally come to light there would probably be some
unpleasant surprises. Apparently nobody from State Department felt obliged to come to the
same hearing as Luttwak to shed some light on the situation. 95 Luttwak was a Senior Adviser
for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Coming from the neoconservative
school he had battled alongside the Scoop Jackson Democrats against the Nixon-Kissinger
strategy of détente in the seventies. 96 His call upon the Reagan administration for a tough
stance against the Soviet Union can be seen in the light of his neoconservative background.
What to Humphrey and his aides was especially alarming about the peace negotiations
was the fact that in return for an immediate cessation of all help to the Mujahidin the Soviet
Union offered a phased withdrawal which would take to twelve to eighteen months to be
completed. Such a withdrawal would mean that the Red Army still had time to deal the
94
Open hearing of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan to review the U.N. sponsored proximity peace
talks on Afghanistan, February 17, 1987, 4.
95
Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan hearing, April 30, 1986, National Digital Security Archive,
AF01701, 56-57.
96
Vaisse, Neoconservatism, 110.
41
Afghan resistance a decisive blow before they would leave. The CTFA had doubts about the
reliability of Soviet promises. What if they decided to stay after the U.S. had severed its ties
with the resistance? In the eyes of Congress the U.S. probably wouldn’t be able to set up a
program of this magnitude again. The CTFA’s suspicions were supported by Fred Iklé,
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.
You have to keep in mind two things, not only that the withdrawal period may be too long, but also,
judging from past agreements of this kind with communist governments, that the agreement will be
violated on their side and we will adhere to the agreement for much longer, so that they may maybe
stall in the withdrawal, fail to withdraw, attack the people of Afghanistan again, while the outside world
would scrupulously adhere to the agreement for far too long if it is violated. 97
Iklé was one of the few neoconservatives that became part of the Carter administration
from which he resigned in 1980. 98 A year later he returned, now working for Reagan, a
president whose ideas appealed more to him. Iklé’s background in neoconservatism meant
that he was a supporter of a tough American stance in world politics. The operation in
Afghanistan was therefore something he applauded. He had supported and actively lobbied
for the Stinger missile system. Therefore it is not surprising that he was worried about the
peace talks and was not very convinced of the Kremlin’s sincerity about the promised
withdrawal. Especially the proposed length of the withdrawal was a problem to Iklé. He was
convinced that the Red Army would probably be able to withdraw in two weeks. Any
prolonged period of withdrawal would only mean that the Soviet Union had enough time to
subjugate the Afghan people as the resistance ‘[would] be deprived of outside support.’ 99
But there was another issue about the peace talks that concerned the CTFA. Before the
negotiations started in 1982 the United Nations listed four essentials for a political solution:
‘The preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and nonaligned
character of Afghanistan; the right of the people of Afghanistan to determine their own form of
government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention,
subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever; the immediate withdrawal of the “foreign”
troops from Afghanistan; the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan
refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honor.’ 100
One of the cornerstones on which a possible agreement could last was the right of selfdetermination for the Afghan people. Although a highly important point especially for the
Mujahidin, the topic was quickly dropped from the agenda. The Kabul regime was quick to
97
Open hearing of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan to review the U.N. sponsored proximity peace
talks on Afghanistan, February 17, 1987, 11.
98
Vaisse, Neoconservatism, 121.
99
Open hearing of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan to review the U.N. sponsored proximity peace
talks on Afghanistan, February 17, 1987, 26.
100
Rosanne Klass, ‘Afghanistan: the accords,’ Foreign Affairs, 66: 5 (Summer 1988) 927.
42
come with a different agenda on which the termination of outside interference was given great
importance. Kabul and the Kremlin ‘wanted to retain communist control of Afghanistan.’ 101
For most of the Members of Congress, and especially the members of the CTFA this was
unacceptable. The negotiations were clouded in secrecy though and not many in Congress
knew exactly what was going on.
This was a thorn in the eye of the CTFA. In a hearing before the Subcommittee on
Asian and Pacific Affairs Humphrey expresses his concern about the nature of the peace talks
and ‘the terms of the agreements already worked out according to the press.’ He was
especially worried about the fact that the talks ‘exclude legitimate representatives of the
Afghan people’ while the illegitimate regime in Kabul, which is not a democracy, is not. He
was also dissatisfied about the way State Department handled the negotiations. He claimed
the State Department had been played by the Soviets. Instead of promoting the interests of the
Afghan people and taking in account the ‘minimum standards set by the President’, the U.S.
had acquiesced in the peace talks. With these minimum standards Humphrey referred to a
speech held by President Reagan before the U.N. General Assembly in which he stated that
‘direct negotiations between warring parties in the regional conflicts… were a “starting point”
of a peace process which could lead to internal reconciliation with democracy and human
rights for all.’ One of the warring parties was evidently not included in the Geneva peace talks
and therefore a settlement was not going to have an effect. The administration had left State
Department bureaucracy in control of the negotiations and the time had come for the White
House to step in. 102
Other members of Congress also complained about the fact State Department didn’t
listen to the wishes of the President. Senator Malcolm Wallop, another member of the CTFA,
for instance believed that the President isn’t to blame for bad foreign policy. ‘Nobody ever
cleans the mirrors at the State Department, because they don’t reflect very often what the
Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, does or says.’ 103 Representative
Robert Lagomarsino, cochairman of the CTFA, also believed that State Department should
take a tougher stance because an agreement couldn’t be reached without the approval of the
Afghan resistance. He was less critical though because he thought that have negotiations, even
under such circumstances, was better than no dialogue at all. He was also convinced that in
101
Klass, ‘Afghanistan,’ 928.
The situation in Afghanistan : hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, May 1, 1986, Hathitrust Digital Library,
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/pur1.32754074689377, 3-5.
103
Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan hearing, April 30, 1986, 51.
102
43
the absence of a Mujahidin representative the Pakistani government took in account the
concerns of the Afghan people. 104
Sentiments within the CTFA against State Department grew as Congress got more and
more concerned about the negotiations. These concern were fed by statements of many of the
witnesses heard during CTFA hearings. Remarkably, a lot of the witnesses were
neoconservatives. Jeane Kirkpatrick, former ambassador to the United Nations, was a fervent
anticommunist and switched to the Republican Party when she served under Reagan. She was
famous for her thoughts on U.S. foreign policy. According to Kirkpatrick a traditional
authoritarian regime was still better and less repressive than revolutionary communism, which
robbed an individual of every form of self-determination, even in the personal sphere. She
attacked State Department’s way of handling the negotiations as they held double standards.
First of all because they committed themselves to certain standards, the points mentioned by
the U.N. that were the minimum requirements to engage in peace talks, ‘and then participate
in negotiations which do not meet the minimum standards we have set forth.’ Senator
Humphrey would later use the same argument in the hearing before the House Subcommittee
on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Another double standard was the fact that at first the negotiators
said the U.S. wouldn’t offer any guarantees about a possible accord, but then suddenly it
stepped up as a willing guarantor of such an agreement. An agreement that in the eyes of
many could never be legitimate since the Afghan resistance was not represented in the peace
negotiations. Kirkpatrick thus wanted more clarity and steadfastness, especially by State
Department whose record was ‘not perfect by any means.’ 105
State Department’s reaction to the accusations made by the congressmen and their
witnesses was one of denial and necessity. Assistant Secretary Robert Peck argued that as the
proximity talks began in 1982 the Afghan resistance had still been fractured. A coherent
Mujahidin presence at the negotiation table was therefore not possible. But Representative
Stephen Solarz, chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, pointed out that
according to the CTFA the Afghan alliance is totally able to speak for the Afghan people.
When he suggested that the negotiations would probably be terminated if the U.S. would
insist on Mujahidin involvement in the peace talks and Peck agreed. Therefore ‘we supported
this process in part because it is the only game in town.’ In the eyes of State Department it
was better to have these talks in which the Afghan resistance can’t participate, then have no
104
The situation in Afghanistan : hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, May 1, 1986, 10.
105
Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan hearing, April 30, 1986, 57-58.
44
talks at all. Peck added that the President was fully informed about U.S. policy concerning the
proximity peace talks, including U.S. willingness to be a guarantor of a possible agreement.
‘That decision… was fully vetted within the administration, and it is an administration
position. Not a State Department position. Every administration position is the President’s
position.’ 106
Criticism from Congress on the way State Department handled the Geneva
negotiations was thus fierce. But no significant changes were made and U.S. position on the
terms of the peace talks barely changed. The Mujahidin were not allowed to participate in the
negotiations and the right of self-determination remained an issue that was not open to
discussion. The beginning of 1988 marked a change in policy towards the negotiations
though. Under heavy pressure from Congress, but also from a different branches of the
administration, State Department was forced to revise its position. The Soviet Union’s leader
Gorbachev announced on February 8 in a televised statement that the Red Army would begin
its troop withdrawal on May 15 if an agreement had been reached before March 15. 107 After
this announcement developments took flight. Pressure upon the administration to revoke
promises made about a possible stop on aid to the Mujahidin if the Soviets withdrew grew. A
Senate resolution was introduced sponsored by several congressional champions for the
Afghan cause like CTFA members Gordon Humphrey, Claiborne Pell, Steven Simms and
Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd. In the resolution the Senate:
‘Expresses its strong belief that the government of the United States should not cease, suspend,
diminish, or otherwise restrict assistance to the Afghan resistance or take actions which might limit the
ability of the resistance to receive assistance until it is absolutely clear that the Soviets have terminated
their military occupation, that they are not redeploying their forces to be inserted again, and that the
Mujahadeen is well enough equipped to maintain its integrity during the delicate period of a transition
government leading up to new elections.’ 108
The resolution was unanimously adopted and clearly displayed widespread concern in
Congress about a possible sell-out.
In a CTFA hearing following Gorbachev’s announcement Humphrey again
denunciated the way State Department managed the negotiations ‘without the approval,
indeed the knowledge of the president.’ A one-sided deal had been negotiated. ‘Neville
106
The situation in Afghanistan: hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, May 1, 1986, 56-57.
107
Artemy Kalinovsky, ‘Old politics, new diplomacy: the Geneva accords and the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan,’ Cold War History, 8: 3 (August 2008) 391.
108
Senate resolution on Afghanistan, March 2, 1988, Digital National Security Archive, AF02156, 2.
45
Chamberlain himself could not have been more generous in designing such an agreement.’ 109
The CTFA pounded heavily on State Department, who in their eyes had failed completely.
Even if the Soviet troops would withdraw in the proposed timeframe of ten months, Soviet
Union would probably still assist the Najibullah regime in Kabul. Such an agreement was
unacceptable and therefore Humphrey called upon Reagan to take charge. ‘For what is at
stake is not only the future of Afghanistan, but the future of the Reagan doctrine as well.’ 110
Both the Senate and the CTFA sent a strong message to the government. The negotiations
went down a wrong path and someone had to take action before State Department would
totally screw up.
Secretary of State George Schultz had noticed congressional criticism but claimed
they were wrong. The U.S. was under no circumstances willing to abandon the Afghan
freedom fighter. Negotiations with Eduard Shevardnadze who was in charge of the Politburo
effort on Afghanistan, proved difficult. But Schultz kept his foot down and told the Soviets
that the U.S. ‘would accept no restrictions on [their] right to supply and that [they] would
assert this publicly at the Geneva signing ceremony.’ Schultz ‘was focused on ensuring that
this point was not to be lost or eroded.’ 111 The Secretary of State thus disagreed with the
CTFA.
Nonetheless there seemed to be confusion on the preconditions for a possible stop on
U.S. aid to the Mujahidin as showed from a letter sent by Representative Lee Hamilton,
chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, to Schultz on March 18.
According to Hamilton, Reagan had told Senator Byrd that ‘cessation of U.S. assistance must
be matched by cessation of similar aid to the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.’ But Schultz had
told Hamilton that U.S. aid would stop as the Soviet withdrawal was fully completed. 112
Congressional concerns and criticism on the coordination of and the information on the
Afghan operation and the negotiations thus seemed valid. Schultz’ own intentions might have
been honest, but the problem could be lying with his deputies or in the lower ranks of state
department. Shevardnadze told him that the U.S. delegation had had a different position
earlier in the negotiation process. ‘Now [that] you see an agreement might be reached, and
109
Hearing on U.N.-sponsored proximity talks on Afghanistan, February 18, 1988, Digital National Security
Archive, AF02135, 1-2.
110
Ibid., 3.
111
Schultz, Turmoil and triumph, 1092.
112
Lee Hamilton queries George Schultz about apparent difference between White House and State Department
positions on conditions for cutting U.S. aid to Afghan rebels, March 18, 1988, Digital National Security Archive,
AF02170.
46
now [that] you are involved. You have changed the U.S. position.’ 113 Shevardnadze’s remark
seems to confirm criticism by several Members of Congress as well as people within the
administration that the White House and the top of State Department had been neglecting the
situation in Afghanistan.
Because of the deadline set by the Kremlin the accords were rushed to completion and
signature in a few weeks. Eventually the accords were signed on April 14, 1988. Although the
deadline of March 15 wasn’t reached, the Soviet Union would commence its troop
withdrawal on May 15. Still, the accords didn’t refer to non-uniformed personnel in
Afghanistan and to Soviet support for the Najibullah regime. According to both governments
‘the Soviet-installed regime [in Kabul] is the lawful government of Afghanistan, and any
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is a purely internal matter.’ Pakistan, on the other hand,
had to cease all support to the Afghan resistance including the use of its territory. All outside
assistance to the Mujahidin was prohibited. The U.S. was not planning on ceasing its aid
operation though. When the Pakistani President Zia was asked what his opinion was on
continued aid he answered that they would ‘just have to lie about it. We’ve been denying our
activities there for eight years.’ 114 Schultz wanted to make the U.S. position on the cessation
of aid clear. So in a separate statement added to the accords, he announced that the U.S.
would not cut off all aid to the freedom fighters. ‘If the U.S.S.R. undertakes… to provide
military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the United States retains the right… likewise
effectively to provide such assistance.’ The U.S. would only exercise restraint in supplying
the Afghan resistance if the Soviet Union would show similar restraint in its support to
Najibullah. 115
Congress had pressured State Department heavily to include such a notion of
symmetry to the Geneva accords. Congressional opposition to the contents of the accords
seems to have paid off. Even though several key topics for successful negotiations were never
included, like self-determination for the Afghan people and continued aid to the Mujahidin,
most members of Congress could be satisfied. The U.S. would continue supplying the
resistance and the Kabul regime was expected to fall quickly after the Red Army had left the
country. State Department thought that even though the Soviet Union kept supplying the
Afghan army, the survivability of the regime was low due to a lack of motivation, leadership,
113
Schultz, Turmoil and triumph, 1087.
Ibid., 1091.
115
Ibid., 1093.
114
47
and morale. 116 These assumptions were shared by many in Congress. Some critics of the
reversal thought it was ‘a reversal of U.S. policy’ and that ‘the key provisions are unworkable
and unenforceable.’ 117 ‘With… bipartisan unity, Congress and the Executive Branch jointly
fashioned an American policy that left no doubt where the United States stood in this struggle
between freedom and depression.’ 118 Representative Solarz was satisfied with the eventual
outcome although this statement didn’t reflect the struggles Congress had with some branches
of the administration.
Continued support?
Congressional support van the Afghan cause was thus widespread during the Soviet
occupation. As the Red Army started to withdraw congressional unity fell apart though. Not
everyone in Congress was sure about the amount of support the Mujahidin should get. During
the war the different parties of the Afghan alliance had never been a true unity. The only
common ground they had was the struggle against the Soviet oppressor. Representative
Chester Atkins, member of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, expressed his
concerns soon after the signing of the Geneva peace agreements. He thought it was very likely
that Afghanistan would go down the path of long and bloody civil war, as both the U.S. and
the Soviet Union would keep sending loads of weapons into the country. And if the regime
was brought down, Atkins was wondering ‘what is to prevent there from being a continuing
series of civil wars?’ State Department was not convinced a prolonged period of turmoil and
civil war was very likely to happen. According to Robert Peck the Afghans would quickly
‘resolve their differences and choose a leadership’ even if the Afghan resistance was
fragmented. Historical and cultural mechanisms in Afghan society would sort this thing out.
Something that according to Atkins would probably involve bloodshed. 119
He seemed to believe that there wasn’t a peaceful way to form a new Afghan government.
Already during the war in Afghanistan reports came in that the different factions of the
Afghan resistance were not only fighting the Communists but also each other. The different
factions were ‘divided ideologically and tribally and didn’t share a program for the future’ of
116
The Geneva Accords on Afghanistan : hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, May 19, 1988, Hathitrust Digital Library,
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/pur1.32754074681903, 7.
117
Klass, ‘Afghanistan’, 925.
118
The Geneva Accords on Afghanistan : hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, May 19, 1988, 2.
119
Ibid., 29-30.
48
Afghanistan. 120 The weapons delivered to the Afghan resistance were also divided unevenly.
Especially the more religious factions got more weapons then others. This was mainly
because Pakistan, who distributed the supplies, was favoring the Islamist factions. One of the
most influential of these factions was the one led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a later Taliban
commander and highly wanted terrorist on America’s black list. These factions tried to
dominate or eradicate more moderate factions. As the Soviet withdrawal was completed on
February 16 1989, Mujahidin factional infighting became more intense. Finally in November
1989 the U.S. government cut off arms supplies to Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party. His faction
was accused of attacked other factions to gain dominance over certain regions in Afghanistan.
Hekmatyar had always been strongly critical about the U.S. and its “immoral” society even as
his faction got by far the largest share in the amount of weapons. But he wasn’t very
impressed by the U.S. boycott of his faction. He hated the U.S. as much as he hated the Soviet
Union and wanted a total stop a total stop on all outside interference. ‘The two superpowers
must cease their interferences and intervention in Afghanistan. They should cease supplying
arms, and let the Afghans go their own way.’ 121 Troubles with Hekmatyar deepened as he
supported Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War.
Factional infighting within the Afghan resistance reduced the change of a military
solution of the conflict. Even as Gorbachev turned policy around in 1989 and proposed to the
U.S. to agree on a policy of ‘negative symmetry’. This meant that both superpowers would
cease all military aid to their respective clients. Although the U.S. had already proposed such
an agreement in 1988 the Bush administration, that went into office in January 1989, declined
the offer. Bush opposed the idea because the Soviet Union had just provided the Kabul regime
with a massive amount of weapons which had created an imbalance between the Communists
and the Mujahidin. The administration ‘was clinging to its hope of a military victory,’ but is
was ‘a no-win policy that [would] entail high costs in bloodshed and devastation as well as
the growing alienation of the United States from the majority of Afghans.’ Selig Harrison, an
expert on Afghan affairs testified before the Subcommittee on Asian and Foreign Affairs. He
didn’t believe in a military solution because the government-in-exile based in Peshawar didn’t
represent the majority of the Afghan people, just as the Kabul regime didn’t. 122
Both experts on Afghanistan as congressmen were divided. Zalmay Khalilzad, who
testified before the same committee, believed that a military solution was still possible. But to
120
The Afghan resistance, The Washington Post, December 17, 1986.
U.S. cuts off arms to Afghan faction, The Washington Post, November 19. 1989.
122
What next in Afghanistan; testimony prepared for the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, June 14,
1989, Digital National Security Archive, AF02291, 3-5.
121
49
do so the Afghan resistance needed more military assistance and the U.S. had to be patient. 123
It was just a matter of time for the Najibullah regime to be overthrown. Humphrey, still
disappointed about the U.S. ‘sell-out’ of the Mujahidin at Geneva, had the same views.
According to him the U.S. had the obligation to help the freedom fighter in their effort to oust
the Kabul regime and claim their right of self-determination. Next to the Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan, the implementation of this right was one of the United States’ main
objectives. The U.S. could not abandon the Afghan resistance to its faith before this objective
was achieved. And for now these objectives were shared by President Bush. 124
The chairman of the CFTA was thus still in favor of continued aid to the Mujahidin
even though the country sank away in a civil war, not just between the government and the
resistance, but also between different Mujahidin factions. But winds began to change in
Congress. Stephen Solarz appeared more convinced by Harrison’s testimony then by
Humphrey. Several congressmen including Solarz began urging the administration ‘to pursue
with the Soviet Union mutual suspension of arms shipments to Afghanistan.’ 125 He was in
favor of the proposals concerning negative symmetry. Some members of the CTFA also had a
change of heart. According to Pell ‘the United States no strategic interests in Afghanistan
after the Soviet withdrawal, only humanitarian concerns.’ 126 Support for the Afghan operation
from liberal Democrats, like Solarz and Pell, thus began to wane. While Republicans and
neoconservatives remained in favor.
As the war in Afghanistan dragged on the administration began to lose faith in the
resistance that became ever more divided and inefficient. A political settlement was
considered an improbability. Sentiment about mutual cessation of aid grew stronger. For the
U.S. one of the reasons to stop aiding the Mujahidin was to increase the change for a political
solution. As long as both superpowers continued to pour in massive amounts of weapons the
different parties would keep fighting each other. If they weren’t supplied they would probably
be forced to look for a peaceful solution of the conflict. 127 The Soviet Union, though willing
to work on such a settlement, was concerned that even if both superpowers stopped their aid
123
Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, June 14, 1989, Digital National Security Archive, AF02293, 5.
Humphrey testimony before House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 14, 1989, Digital National Security
Archive, AF02292, 4.
125
Recent developments in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan: hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and
Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, June 20, 1991, Hathitrust Digital
Library, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/pst.000021080357, 1.
126
Scott, Deciding to intervene, 75.
127
Recent developments in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan: hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and
Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, June 20, 1991, 32-33.
124
50
programs, other nations, like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, would still support the Mujahidin. 128
In that case the Kabul regime would probably succumb quickly. But the summer of 1991
brought change. In August several hardliners from the Communist Party tried to oust
Gorbachev and reverse his reforms that changed the Soviet Union’s economy and society.
Though they failed in their attempt, the coup showed that the Soviet Union was losing its grip
on events. A month later did they signed an agreement of negative symmetry with the U.S.
which would be put in effect at the beginning of 1992. 129 It became clear very quickly that the
Najibullah regime wouldn’t last long without Soviet support. The Mujahidin gained more
ground and Najibullah’s own generals defected. The situation grew hopeless and on March 18
he stated his intention to ‘transfer all executive power and authority to the transitional
government from the first day of the transition period.’ 130 The different Mujahidin factions
could now start to form a government but differences proved too big and the bloodshed would
not stop for several years.
128
Ibid., 11.
Charles Cogan, ‘Partners in time: the CIA and Afghanistan since 1979,’ World Policy Journal, 10: 2
(Summer 1993) 77.
130
Peter Tomsen, The wars of Afghanistan: messianic terrorism, tribal conflicts, and the failures of great powers
(New York 2011) 479.
129
51
Conclusion
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan meant the end of détente. The role of Congress in what
became the largest U.S. foreign intervention since the Second World War cannot be
underestimated. Several Members of Congress proved crucial in increasing the budget,
improving the weaponry that was sent and keeping the pressure on the administration and
especially Sate Department so that policies would be improved. Struggles with the
administration were not uncommon as both the CIA and State Department were not pleased
with congressional probing in their internal affairs. Congress proved successful in partly
shaping U.S. foreign policy concerning Afghanistan. Congress shouldn’t get all the credits
though. High officials in the executive branch, like CIA Director Bill Casey, also pleaded in
favor of increased aid for the Mujahidin.
Sentiment in the U.S. grew stronger against détente and Nixon-Kissinger foreign
policy. The U.S. had to act from a position of strength again. This was the credo of Ronald
Reagan, but also from neoconservative Democrats. The U.S. had been weak vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union. The president boosted military budgets and developed what came to be known
as the Reagan doctrine. He probably could not have implemented new U.S. foreign policy if it
weren’t for the help of the neoconservatives who supported most of his plans. They gave him
the edge as the Republican Party was the minority in both chambers of Congress for most of
his presidency. The Reagan doctrine ‘extended “unashamed American support,” on the basis
of “justice, necessity and democratic tradition,” for “all armed resistance to Communism.”’ 131
This meant that freedom fighters of all sorts could count on the support of the U.S. as long as
they were anticommunist. Afghanistan became the most successful example of the
implementation of this doctrine. Although U.S. interventions were not very popular on
Capitol Hill, the Afghanistan operation could count on broad bipartisan support in both the
House as the Senate. One of the most important reasons was that in Afghanistan the freedom
fighters were fighting the Red Army which was terrorizing the Afghan people. Killing,
maiming and starving the Afghans was part of the Soviet ‘scorched earth’ strategy to bring the
Afghan people to their knees. But the resistance put up a stiff fight. Already in 1979 under
President Carter the CIA initiated an operation to supply the Mujahidin with weapons. Back
then the operation was still very small delivering only a modest amount of small arms and
light weapons to the Afghan resistance.
131
Chester Pach, ‘The Reagan doctrine: principle, pragmatism and policy,’ Presidential Studies Quarterly, 36: 1
(March 2006) 77.
52
In the early years of the conflict there was little attention for the conflict but a few
congressmen wanted the U.S. to step up. Senator Paul Tsongas and Representative Donald
Ritter had prepared resolutions in which the administration was encouraged to support the
Afghan resistance with as much material assistance as the U.S. deemed necessary for the
freedom fighters to fight effectively. Though never passed, the resolution tipped the balance
in the discussion within the administration about whether or not the budget for the Afghan
operation should be increased. In 1983 similar resolutions were drafted but a majority in
Conflict didn’t want to expand the operation. Partly because they were afraid the money
would also be used for the operation in Nicaragua. State Department also voiced against the
resolutions.
Charles Wilson stirred things up in 1983 as he used his position in the House
Appropriations Committee to increase the budget without consent of the Intelligence
Committees. Wilson did this again in 1984 and his enthusiasm encouraged the rest of
Congress. The Tsongas-Ritter resolution was finally passed in both chambers and pressure on
the executive branch grew. As a result of this pressure the budget for fiscal year 1985 was
doubled. Dissenting voices were heard from CIA and State Department. The operation grew
too fast too big and could not be controlled. They also had fear that the conflict might spill
over into Pakistan, which was heavily involved in the operation delivering the supplies to the
Mujahidin. But Congress kept pressuring the executive branch for an ever greater increase in
supplies. According to them the Afghan resistance needed more sophisticated weapons
especially to defend themselves from Soviet gunships. In 1985 the Congressional Task Force
on Afghanistan was set up and under the zealous guidance its chairman Gordon Humphrey
pressure grew even further. Humphrey was highly critical about State Department and the
relation between them remained ice cold for the duration of the Afghan operation. Pressure
came from high officials within the administration as well. Finally in 1986 State Department
dropped its resistance and the decision was made that the highly advance Stinger missile
system was to be send to the Mujahidin.
The Stingers proved highly effective but it didn’t end the war. In Geneva peace talks
were being held in order to find a solution to the conflict. The CTFA was again highly critical
about State Department and the way it handled the negotiations. According to the CTFA the
peace talks would result in a sell-out of the Afghan resistance. First of all did the CTFA
disagree with the fact that the U.S. had to cease its support while there were still Soviet
soldiers in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union still aided the Kabul regime. A view that was
shared by both the House and the Senate. Humphrey thought that the inclusion of the Afghan
53
alliance in the talks and a possible agreement was a prerequisite for successful closure of the
peace negotiations. A resolution by the Senate in which they urged the Reagan administration
to keep supporting the Mujahidin proved important. Secretary of State George Schultz put his
foot down and told the Kremlin that the U.S. was not prepared to cease aid as long as the
Soviets aided Najibullah. He was prepared to diminish aid on the basis of symmetry.
The Geneva accords were signed and the Red Army would leave ten months later. The
Mujahidin had never been invited and didn’t acknowledge the agreements. The U.S. didn’t
stop delivering weapons to the resistance. But consensus about the program quickly
disappeared after the Soviet withdrawal. Mainly because the resistance proved too divided
and factional infighting grew worse. Some Mujahidin leaders also showed similar hatred for
the U.S. as they had for the Soviet Union. Though Humphrey still argued in favor of support,
other former proponents of the program, mainly liberals like Stephen Solarz, began to
showing doubts. The Bush administration also turned around and in 1991 an agreement with
the Soviet Union was reached about negative symmetry. Not much later the regime in Kabul
was overthrown. Unfortunately, the country was not free from war yet. Until today the
country has a known a constant stream of violence and bloodshed and a solution to conflict
has yet to be found.
54
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